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CASE STUDY SERIES #59 DECEMBER 2019

Ride-Hailing in and Australia Gig Economies: The Case of Go-Jek, , and Author: Lachlan Colgrave Editor: Treviliana Eka Putri Designer and Layouter: Naufal Alatas Radityasakti

Ride-Hailing in Indonesia and Australia Gig Economies: 1 The Case of Go-Jek, Grab, and Uber Introduction

The economy of tomorrow, or so we are told, will not necessarily consist of ‘jobs’ and permanent positions but instead ‘gigs’. Herein arises the term gig economy, a “” generally facilitated by technology platforms where workers are treated as contractors rather than employees.1 Presently, with companies like Go-Jek and Grab in Indonesia and Uber in Australia, the implications of the gig economy are particularly significant concerning traditional fair work, especially in the industry, alongside its consequences to the worker.

With Go-Jek founder and former CEO, appointed as Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s new Minister of Education and Culture, Go-Jek has had a dramatic rise to prominence since its 2010 founding. A described super app under the slogan “Karya Anak Bangsa” – made by the children of the nation – Go-Jek faces major competition from the 2012 Malaysian-founded, now Singapore-based, Grab. In Australia, the American company Uber, formerly UberCab upon its 2009 establishment, o ers similar products to its South-East Asian counterparts and dominates the ride-hailing landscape in Australia.

With desk research methodology, this case study seeks to disseminate the companies mentioned above in their national contexts, their applications on fair work, and their impact on work society. This will involve a comparison between Indonesian and Australian settings. Finally, this study aims to present some solutions to the consequence of a gig economy that remains laxly regulated.

Ride-Hailing in Indonesia and Australia Gig Economies: The Case of Go-Jek, Grab, and Uber 2 Important Aspects Indonesians Want from Ride-Hailing Based on Each City

Greater

25% 24% 19% 13% Frequent Promotions Always Able to Safety Easy Navigation and Discount Find a Ride within the App

7% 4% 4% 4% Many Payment Wide Food Loyalty Helpful Options Options Rewards Customer Service

Ride-Hailing in Indonesia and Australia Gig Economies: 3 The Case of Go-Jek, Grab, and Uber Bandung

0% 3% 4% 9% 22% 26% 26% 20% 4% 5% 16% 9% 21% 22% 4% 8%

Surabaya 0% 5% 4% 5% 15% 16% 17% 23% 3%

5% 19% 32% 24% 21% 5% 6%

Yogyakarta Makassar

0% 0% 4%

6% 20% 16% 32% 0% 27% 3%

20% 11% 16% 4% 12% 29%

Wide Food Loyalty Always Able to Many Payment Delivery Options Rewards Find a Ride Options

Frequent Promotions Easy Navigation Helpful Safety and Discount within the App Customer Service

Ride-Hailing in Indonesia and Australia Gig Economies: The Case of Go-Jek, Grab, and Uber 4 South-East Asia’s Ride-Hailing Profile Starting as only 20 taxis 'ojeks' and a Jakarta-based call centre, Go-Jek has grown to be one of the biggest super apps in .2 Unlike Grab and Uber, which operated out of the existing taxi industry, prior to Go-Jek's existence, there was no major motorbike-taxi service. The Ministry of Transportation Indonesia has even admitted to being unable to provide su icient public transport in some cases, leading to Go-Jek's expansion being welcomed by citizens.3 Meanwhile, it was not until May 2014 that Grab launched GrabCar, using private cars instead of taxis through licensed partners, mirroring a scheme similar to Go-Jek. Following this, Grab launched GrabBike in as a trial service before it spread to Indonesia by 2015.4 Despite Go-Jek having a head start in Indonesia, Grab has quickly surpassed its rival in expanding to 50 cities while Go-Jek only operates in 34 as of 2018.5 It was not until 2015 that Go-Jek, inspired by the success of Uber and Grab, o icially launched its application. Since then, the company has been upscaling its to generate more turnover given demand within its network would slump outside rush hours.6 This upscaling includes a suite of 18 di erent products, including said transport services, , logistics, electronic-payments, namely the GoPay e-wallet and "lifestyle services" such as massage and makeup.7 Grab supplies more limited services in Indonesia, namely transportation, food delivery, and electronic payments through its Ovo application. Uber only provides transportation and food delivery, lacking an e-wallet application as with Go-Jek and Grab instead only accommodating credit and debit cards.

Ride-Hailing in Indonesia and Australia Gig Economies: 5 The Case of Go-Jek, Grab, and Uber Grab vs Go-Jek: The Battle in Southeast Asia

Anthony TanVSCEO Nadiem Makarim Harvard Bussines School Almamater Harvard Bussines School

Estimated $9 Billion $11 Billion *

125 Million Number of 108 Million (Southeast Asia) Downloads (Indonesia)

Toyota Main SoftBank Group Investors KKR

* Based on current funding round Figure 2. Asian Review [14]

Ride-hailing apps have always been pitted against each other in competition. At the advent of Uber’s introduction to South-East Asia, Kuala Lumpur founded Grab moved to make a marketing coup which chief executive and co-founder, Anthony Tan described that “no foreigner would have thought [of]”.8 Grab had devised special packaging allowing any customer in the capital to have durians, with an odour so overpoweringly pungent, delivered door-to-door for the bargain price of a single ringgit. This promotion is well into its fourth year, and in March of 2018, Uber announced that it would sell its entire South-East Asia operations to Grab in exchange for a 27.5% stake in the company.9

Ride-Hailing in Indonesia and Australia Gig Economies: The Case of Go-Jek, Grab, and Uber 6 Eliminating its major competitor did not come without further expense, Grab conceding Uber a seat on its board.10 This merger may have not been all-successful for Grab given it inadvertently created a vacuum, demurely helping Go-Jek’s push into new markets within the region: namely Thailand, Vietnam and Singapore as of 2018. Singapore’s competition watchdog ruled that the Uber buyout was “anti-competitive” thus, Grab and Uber were fined a combined US$9.5 million and Grab was simultaneously levied US$305,000 by the Philippine competition watchdog over the same merger.11 Grab did not appeal the fines but maintained it had not negligently breached competition nor overstretched its legal rights.12 Uber meanwhile, has cited it may intend to challenge the levy.

Grab vs Go-Jek: Market Entries

2012 Malaysia 2012 2013 Thailand 2018 (Get, Beta) 2013 Singapore 2018 (Beta)

2013 Philippines Rejected (discussions ongoing) 2014 Indonesia 2011 2014 Vietnam 2018 (Go-Viet) 2017 Myanmar - 2017 Cambodia -

Figure 3. Asian Review [14]

In Indonesia today, given the absence of Uber, Grab controls the market by 64% while Go-Jek holds a 35.5% stake.13 Go-Jek’s market strategy is to compete by undercutting Grab with cheaper fares from 10% to 30% below Grab’s prices.14 With Nadiem Makarim exalted to Jokowi’s ministry in October 2019, Andre Soelistyo (former President of Go-Jek Group) and Kevin Aluwi (Go-Jek’s co-founder) will share the responsibility of CEO, heading the company’s future development and regional war against Grab.15

Ride-Hailing in Indonesia and Australia Gig Economies: 7 The Case of Go-Jek, Grab, and Uber Ride-Hailing in Indonesia’s Gig Economy In the traditional economy, provide capital and employees the labour, but today technology is reshaping the way companies and workers interact. Gig economy enterprises own a marketplace with two sides: one are those who want a job done – their house cleaned, a lunchtime delivery or a ride to the airport – while on the other side are the people willing to do those tasks.16 This work form is termed “work-on-demand via app” and redefines traditional work boundaries by casualisation of the workforce, informalization of a traditional economy alongside the so-called “demutualisation of risk” in modern labour markets.17 This demutualisation refers to companies within the gig economy becoming “asset light” whereby major risks associated with business are shied directly onto the and their families.18 Such risks can include health, safety, welfare as well as continued security of income and .19 This creates a highly individualised sense of work responsibility, the negative side e ect of which being the gig economy’s considerable potential in breaching compliance with labour laws and regulations.20

Workforce casualisation describes the process in which employment moves from a preponderance of full-time work to casual and contract positions. In the Indonesian context, casual workers do not only face higher job insecurity but also earn, on average, less than half the wage received by regular workers.21 However, Go-Jek and Grab drivers are not 'casual workers' and instead present work relations which are di icult to define. The Indonesian government states a worker or labourer as anyone who works for a wage or other forms of remuneration.22 This must be the case for Go-Jek and Grab

Ride-Hailing in Indonesia and Australia Gig Economies: The Case of Go-Jek, Grab, and Uber 8 drivers, yet they do not fit under the legal umbrella of employees and are instead classified as independent contractors. This categorisation unties companies from the obligation to meet a minimum wage, pay and provide medical, retirement, and unemployment benefits, drivers were faced with consistent income instability.23 By definition ‘contracting’ results in an absence of a formal relationship between worker and company where the individual gets to determine their work hours and has the power to negotiate their contract and salary with the business-partner.24 Go-Jek and Grab cite their workers as ‘partners’, yet Rambe, a Yogyakarta operational Go-Jek driver notes, “I oen wonder too, even if I am a partner, why am I not involved in draing a work contract […] we are just presented the consent and signature forms [to sign]”.25 Herein lies the grey area. Go-Jek and Grab drivers have the freedom of independent contractors but do not get to negotiate their contract and are instead reined in by company regulations akin to formal employment. Sena, a Go-Jek driver from Magelang recounts such a regulation, "there is a limit, mas, to cancelling orders, it is a maximum of two times. Any more than that our account (the driver) will be suspended for 30 minutes. Such a punishment!".26 Furthermore, Go-Jek and Grab can terminate a driver’s contract anytime, oen citing a list of regulations, and once laid o , there are cases of owed money being withheld from drivers.27 As a social consequence ride hailing services have faced widespread protests with many drivers, not only owed money but also now without work asking, how will they support their families when they are being robbed rather than paid?

The gig economy creates a new work-hierarchy with Go-Jek and Grab at the top of a power-ladder whilst customers act as managers, rating drivers and quantifying their future work prospects. When 4.5 is the minimum satisfactory rating for Go-Jek drivers28 customers who give less than five stars because “perfection is only for God” proves challenging for drivers who are already chasing bonuses to bolster their low income.29 Four stars is essentially a fail. Workers are getting punished in other ways, such as the case of a Grab driver who was reported and suspended for three days when mistaken by a customer for an earlier delinquent driver.30 Drive-partners are entering a seemingly exploitative workspace where some are clocked-on for up to 12 hours a day31 chasing points for bonuses in a “carrot and stick” model which treats drivers as sweated labour.32 With suspension and termination as a disincentive, Indonesian ride-hailing services impose a minimum daily acceptance rate of 50% impelling drivers into a continuous hunt for new orders in gathering points to cash-in their bonus. Kardun, a 2016 Jakarta-based protestor for driver justice reflected, “first we received Rp4,000 [as

Ride-Hailing in Indonesia and Australia Gig Economies: 9 The Case of Go-Jek, Grab, and Uber a bonus]33, then 3,000 […] has tried to eliminate our rights to get a bonus”.34 In a way Kardun was right, as of 2017 this bonus was Rp1,000-2,000 or US$0.07-$0.14 per kilometre for both Grab and Go-Jek motorcycle-taxis.35 With bleak realities like this, it is understandable how many driver-partners feel dispensable and superfluous to raid-hailing companies, even undervalued by customers too.

Uber Profile and Work Processes within Australia

Uber was introduced in 2012 to Australian cities and the company moved to launch its lucrative UberX service through app in 2014. Australia is now one of Uber’s most successful markets with 4.7 million Australians using Uber on a regular basis surpassing that of the taxi industry.36

Pecentage of Australian who used each services in average three months

30%

25% 22.9% Uber 24.4% 20% 21.8% Taxi

15%

10%

6.6% 5%

0%

Jun 16 Aug 16 Oct 16 Dec 16 Feb 17 Apr 17 Jun 17 Aug 17 Oct 17 Dec 17 Feb 18 Apr 18 Jun 18 Aug 18 Oct 18 Dec 18 Feb 19 Apr 19 Jun 19

Figure 4. [36]

Ride-Hailing in Indonesia and Australia Gig Economies: The Case of Go-Jek, Grab, and Uber 10 Australian regulators have described Uber as a disruptive technology giant with a ruthless rise to dominance crushing competitors. Blair Davies, CEO of the Australian Taxi Industry Association laments, "some of [Uber's] technology is not about providing better service to community, its about making bigger profits.37 This surmounted in one of the biggest class-action lawsuits in Australian history being filed in 2019 by more than 6,000 taxi, limousine and other drivers.38 They contend Uber operated illegally in Australia given it began operations before receiving regulatory approval. Thus, Uber had a market advantage over other ride-hailing companies who abided by regulatory standards while Uber did not. This class action is still ongoing. Before Uber was legalised for Australian markets in 2017, the company created incentives for drivers to keep signing up to its driver-partner program, ensuring business was still operatable despite legal hurdles. Uber "model driver", Mark Aliprandi, was one of those enticed to Uber explaining, "[Uber] paid for everything. Your check, your driver history check, your vehicle check, it was all paid for. You walked out with a bonus aer 20 trips [of] $500 (US$340)".39 From these comments, it seems Uber drivers are treated quite nicely in Australia. Aliprandi noted he works 10 hours a day, five and a half days a week with a total experience of four years and 23,600 rides.40 From this work, Uber takes up to 25% of everything drivers earn so in a good week, aer paying petrol, tolls and GST, Aliprandi can earn up to $30 (US$20) an hour, but a recent study found

Ride-Hailing in Indonesia and Australia Gig Economies: 11 The Case of Go-Jek, Grab, and Uber Australian Uber drivers earn on average less than $15 (US$10) an hour, 20% below the minimum wage.41 Another Uber driver, Andrew, says “it’s a struggle […] it’s getting harder to make a dollar” having worked up to 70 hours a week yet only securing $700 (US$475) for this period (US$6.7 an hour).42 This reinforces the aforementioned study of Uber drivers earning around US$10 per hour and makes Mark Alliprandi’s claim of US$20 to be at least unique if not inaccurate.

Australian drivers were part of a global protest over Uber in 2019 dissenting their pay and work conditions. A Melbourne-based driver, Deb, said, "Uber started here with the myth of being a tech innovator" but now their brand is becoming the image of an exploiter.43 Drivers are losing faith in Uber, struggling to make ends meet with low pay and long hours, particularly for those in full-time positions. Nevertheless, for many drivers in Australia, they say they have no choice but to be satisfied with their Uber partnership because old jobs have "even worse working conditions [with] too few hours, unpaid work outside shis and terrible managers.44 This underpins ride-hailing as being the only option for some Australians, the Australian Bureau of Statistics recording that 8.1% of Australian workers are underemployed, this being up 2.5% from the 1970s where it has been increasingly growing for decades.45

Ride-Hailing in Indonesia and Australia Gig Economies: The Case of Go-Jek, Grab, and Uber 12 The Percentage of Underemployed People has been Steadily Increasing Since The 1980s

8

7

6

5

4

3

1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015

Figure 5. The Conversation & the Australian Bureau of Statistics [44]

Uber is an aggressive force and when New South Wales o icers were sent undercover to hire rides with Uber drivers to monitor their illegal activity, Uber used “”, a piece of code to identify the workings of o icers and other “illegitimate” ride requests, blocking them from the app.46 47 This involved tracking name, phone number, credit card and other methods of payment to identify fraudulent behaviour. Further to this, Uber used a piece of spyware code-named “Surfcam” developed in its Sydney o ice to cripple GoCatch, its domestic-market competitor, scraping data from rival drive-partners such as their contact details and in-turn, directly luring GoCatch drivers to work for Uber.48 This history of data espionage was called into order aer Google sued the company for data the over its subsidiary company, , and its autonomous car program in 2018, a case which Uber settled for US$245 million.49 Not being the only scandal, a suite of global sexual assault cases previously ensued in 2017 with Uber’s board of investors forcing the resignation of founder and former CEO, , replacing him with .50 However, the company is yet to meaningful change its business culture with Khosrowshahi’s attempts at rehabilitating Uber’s sullied reputation failing to prove results, brand sentiment remaining at the same lows of 2017, the peak of its scandals.51

Ride-Hailing in Indonesia and Australia Gig Economies: 13 The Case of Go-Jek, Grab, and Uber Online Ride-hailing in Indonesia and Australia: A Comparison

In Australia, Uber pushed into new markets and asked for legislative forgiveness rather than permission, unlike Go-Jek and Grab. As a result, Uber has swallowed up domestic competitors like GoCatch while Go-Jek still competes strongly against foreign companies like Grab in its domestic marketplace, even spreading internationally across South-East Asia. In contrast, Indonesian online motorcycle taxis like Go-Jek and Grab, despite some ministerial condemnation, are not included in an "illegal category" but define a grey area in which online ride-hailing operates in: an unregulated marketplace.52 In 2019 the Indonesian government made a move to impose a legal umbrella over online ride-hailing companies operating within the country. This included minimum fares being raised to around Rp1,850-Rp2,000 (US$0.13) and services of less than 4km being lied from Rp7,000 to Rp10,000 (US$0.50-US$0.70).53 Regulations include sanctions for misconduct, safety measures ensuring drivers wear protective clothing and are qualified, creation of designated shelters to pick up and drop o patrons alongside a panic button installed in the app for customers.54

Relationships between the millions of Go-Jek and Grab drive-partners in Indonesia are skewed in their company’s favour where Go-Jek and Grab can unilaterally change the terms of contract leaving no bargaining power for drivers. Similarly, the over 60,000 Uber drivers in Australia are le with little work protection and a contract they must agree unilaterally to. This reality is oen penned as “uberization of work” where work-on-demand via app has become an easy, flexible and ever

Ride-Hailing in Indonesia and Australia Gig Economies: The Case of Go-Jek, Grab, and Uber 14 more prevalent reality for many prospective workers, accompanied by complimentary work instability.55 Such job insecurity is due to drive-partners in both national contexts being deemed independent contractors rather than employees, annulling any entitlement to a minimum wage, health insurance or leave. Although Uber Australia does o er the option for drivers to purchase a "contingent insurance policy", this is at their own expense unlike regular 'employees' who would be insured by their employer.56 Similarly, Go-Jek o ers to cover drive-partners with an insurance scheme of Rp2,300 (US$0.16) per day which would cover most health-related costs.57 Meanwhile Grab o ers drive-partners an Rm1.50 (US$0.36) per day of insurance coverage.58 The same issue applies here where all expenses come out of drivers’ pockets rather than their employers. Notwithstanding, almost 50% of drivers in the Indonesian ride-hailing industry are 19 to 30 years of age, either working to supplement if not provide themselves a full-time income.59 This condition is exacerbated by the challenges young Indonesians face in obtaining work, Go-Jek and Grab becoming easy and accessible alternatives. With no opportunities for career advancement, abilities and income, ride-hailing is trapping and deskilling youth in Indonesia diminishing their prospects of finding other forms of work in the future.60 This contrasts to Australia where nearly half of all Uber drivers spend a maximum of 10 hours a week on the app, evidently not working as frequently full-time.61 However, this does not account for some Uber drivers who work up to 21 hours a day but unlike Go-Jek and Grab, driver-partners are not chasing bonuses in Australia and Uber now even forces drivers to log o its app for six hours aer every 12 hours of work.62 Lastly, distinct to Australia is the little to no presence of unions in the gig economy for Uber drivers.63 Firms are resistant to unionization, whereas in the Indonesian context, there has been massive and successful mobilisation of workers against Go-Jek and Grab seeking to have their demands addressed. This may be down to a collective culture uniting driver-partners in Indonesia whilst individuality maintains the status quo of business in Australia.

Ride-Hailing in Indonesia and Australia Gig Economies: 15 The Case of Go-Jek, Grab, and Uber Conclusion This case study presented Go-Jek, Grab and Uber in their national contexts and in-turn, their implications on transport within the gig-economy. Providing work for countless people, ride-hailing challenges traditional fair work standards where driver-partners are not claimant to traditional work entitlements resulting in low pay, protest and even class-action lawsuits. Despite government attempts to condemn and even outlaw ride-hailing companies, the gig economy proves di icult to govern unless companies are happy to accept and abide by legislated outcomes. Consequently, the hierarchy of work society has shied in the gig economy where customers are managers while corporate responsibility becomes distanced, worker's rights degraded and skewed in the company's favour. This has resulted in driver-partners being treated as independent contractors or sweated labour rather than valued employees which they're explicitly contracted as not to be. Whether working in the ride-hailing industry is worth the time, money and e ort is up to the individual, but for some driver-partners it is clear there is no choice if they hope to make ends meet. To ensure labour rights, government and business must re-orientate the industrial relations of the gig economy and minimise hardship imposed on work society.

To promote labour protection within the gig economy, jobs must be fully recognised as work. This is paramount in countering commodification of workers as extensions of online platforms and apps where degrading work conditions and wages become a form of deskilling. Combating dehumanisation of workers by the creation of an expendable class must be advocated and legislated against if the gig economy can be recognised to safeguard human livelihoods above profit. Thirdly, the gig economy should not be conceived as an independent silo to a regular economy and therefore impartial to its rules and regulations. Casualisation of work, demutualisation of risks and informalisation of the formal economy should not be overlooked but valued weightily given that the gig economy realistically is the future of work.

Finally, with the launch of new ride-hailing apps ojol in Indonesia64 and Ola and Didi in Australia65 the gig economy’s ubiquitous use for transport is clearly here to stay. It is not a matter of how we resist these technologies, but rather how we repurpose them with the above recommendations to ensure people are not overworked, future technology instead, doing the heavy liing for us.

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Hitekno [online] Available at: -bintang-cEaw [Accessed 12 November 2011]. https://www.hitekno.com/internet/2019/09/19/080 29Nastiti, A. (2017). Drivers’ stories reveal how exploitation 000/hasil-studi-grab-sudah-kalahkan-gojek-di-indo occurs in Gojek, Grab and Uber. The Conversation nesia [Accessed 7 November 2019]. [online] Available at: 14 Iwamoto, K., and Tani, S. (2019). Ride-hailers Grab and https://theconversation.com/drivers-stories-reveal- Go-Jek wage first full-on war in 2019. Asian Review how-exploitation-occurs-in-gojek-grab-and-uber-8 [online] Available at: 2689 [Accessed 12 November 2019]. https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Sharing-Econom 30Ibid., y/Ride-hailers-Grab-and-Go-Jek-wage-first-full-on- 31Pratiyudha, P.P. (2018). Mencari Definisi Para Driver Ojek war-in-2019 [Accessed 11 November 2019]. Online: Pekerja Biasa, Kontraktor Independen, atau 15Pratama, A.M. (2019). Ditinggal Nadiem, Gojek Akan Pekerja Independen? Medium [online] Available at: Umumkan CEO Baru. Kompas [online] Available at: https://medium.com/@pppyudha/mencari-definisi https://money.kompas.com/read/2019/10/21/1324 -para-driver-ojek-online-pekerja-biasa-kontraktor-i 09826/ditinggal-nadiem-gojek-akan-umumkan-ceo ndependen-atau-pekerja-764e366741e4 [Accessed -baru?page=all [Accessed 13 November 2019]. 12 November 2019]. 16Kessler, S. 2015. The Gig-Economy Won’t Last because It’s 32Nastiti, A.D. (2017). Worker Unrest and Contentious Labor Being Sued to Death. Fast Company, [online] Practice of Ride-Hailing Services in Indonesia. Available at: [online] Available at: https://www.fastcompany.com/3042248/the-gig-ec http://www.isrsf.org/files/download/442 [Accessed onomy-wont-last-because-its-being-sued-to-death 12 November 2019]. [Accessed 21 October 2019].

Ride-Hailing in Indonesia and Australia Gig Economies: 17 The Case of Go-Jek, Grab, and Uber 33Ibid., 51Siddiqui, F. (2019). Internal data shows Uber’s reputation 34 hasn’t changed much since #DeleteUber. The Ibid., Washington Post [online] Available at: 35Ibid., https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/201 36Masige, S. (2019). Uber is now more popular than taxis in 9/08/29/even-a er--ipo-long-shadow-deleteu Australia – and its growth is being driven by ber-still-looms/ [Accessed 19 November 2019]. tech-savvy . Business Insider [online] 52Franedya, R. (2018). Pengamat: Gojek Cs Belum Diregulasi Available at: tetapi Tak Illegal. CNBC Indonesia [online] Available https://www.businessinsider.com.au/uber-is-now- a t : more-popular-than-taxis-in-australia-and-its-growt https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/201807032 h-is-being-driven-by-tech-savvy-millennials-2019-8 04559-4-21771/pengamat-gojek-cs-belum-diregula [Accessed 15 November 2019]. si-tetapi-tak-ilegal [Accessed 20 November 2019]. 37The Uber Story 2019, television program, Four Corners, 53 Mu i, R.R. (2019). Regulation on app-based ‘ojek’ comes ABC TV, Sydney, 18 March [online] Available at: into eect. The Jakarta Post [online] Available at: https://www.abc.net.au/4corners/the-uber-story/1 https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2019/05/03 0912940 [Accessed 14 November 2019]. /regulation-app-based-ojek-comes-eect.html 38Xu, V.X. (2019). Australian Taxi Drivers Sue Uber Over Lost [Accessed 20 November 2019]. Wages in Class-Action Lawsuit. New York Times 54Ibid., [online] Available at: 55Towers-Clark, C. (2019). The Uberization of Work: Pros and https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/03/technology/ Cons of the Gig Economy. [online] Available australia-uber-drivers-class-action.html [Accessed a t : 15 November 2019]. https://www.forbes.com/sites/charlestowersclark/ 39The Uber Story 2019, television program, Four Corners, 2019/07/08/the-uberization-of-work-pros-and-cons ABC TV, Sydney, 18 March [online] Available at: -of-the-gig-economy/#392ed98b1cc7 [Accessed 19 https://www.abc.net.au/4corners/the-uber-story/1 November 2019]. 0912940 [Accessed 14 November 2019]. 56Uber Technologies Inc. (2019). [online] Available at: 40Ibid., https://www.uber.com/au/en/drive/insurance/ 41Stanford, Jim (2018). Subsidising Billionaires: Simulating [Accessed 19 November 2019]. the Net Incomes of UberX Drivers in Australia. Centre 57Kontan : KEUANGAN / ASURANSI (2019). Driver Gojek for Future Work at the Australian Institute [online] ternyata sudah dilindungi asuransi Allianz. Kontan Available at: [online] Available at: https://www.tai.org.au/sites/default/files/Subsidizi https://keuangan.kontan.co.id/news/driver-gojek-t ng_Billionaires_Final.pdf [Accessed 18 November ernyata-sudah-dilindungi-asuransi-allianz 2019]. [Accessed 19 November 2019]. 42Zier, D., and Malaish, D. (2019). Uber drivers stage global 58 Grab Inc. (2019). Grab Daily E-Hailing Insurance. [online] protest over pay and conditions. ABC News [online] Available at: Available at: https://www.grab.com/my/daily-insurance/ https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-05-08/uber-dri [Accessed 19 November 2019]. vers-stage-global-protest-over-pay-and-conditions 59Fatmawati, D., Isbah, M.F., and Kusumaningtyas A.P. /11092696 [Accessed 18 November 2019]. (2019). Pekerja Muda dan Ancaman Deskilling-Skill 43Ibid., Trap di Sektor Transportasi Berbasis Daring. Jurnal 44Holtum, P. "PJ"., and Marston G. (2019). Uber drivers’ Studi Pemuda 8(1), pp.29-45. experience highlights the dead-end job prospects 60Ibid., facing more Australian workers. The Conversation 61Groeneveld, L. (2019). Australian report on the Uber driver [online] Available at: partner experience: ‘Flexibility and fairness: what https://theconversation.com/uber-drivers-experien matters to workers in the ’. Uber ce-highlights-the-dead-end-job-prospects-facing- Technologies Inc. [online] Available at: more-australian-workers-116973 [Accessed 19 https://www.uber.com/en-AU/newsroom/alphabet November]. areportaustralia/ [Accessed 20 November 2019]. 45 Ibid., 62Thompson, G. (2018). Uber X drivers working for half the 46The Uber Story 2019, television program, Four Corners, minimum wage, new report shows. ABC News ABC TV, Sydney, 18 March [online] Available at: [online] available at: https://www.abc.net.au/4corners/the-uber-story/1 https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-03-06/uber-x-d 0912940 [Accessed 14 November 2019]. rivers-working-for-half-the-minimum-wage/951325 47Levine, D., and Menn, J. (2017). Exclusive: Uber faces 0 [Accessed 21 November 2019]. criminal probe over so ware used to evade 63Magesan, A. (2019). Uber drivers strike: organizing labour authorities. [online] Available at: in the gig economy. The Conversation [online] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-uber-tech-crim Available at: e-exclusive/exclusive-uber-faces-criminal-probe-ov https://theconversation.com/uber-drivers-strike-or er-so ware-used-to-evade-authorities-idUSKBN18 ganizing-labour-in-the-gig-economy-115911 02U1 [Accessed 15 November 2019]. [Accessed 22 November 2019]. 48Nicholls, S., Cronau, P., and Fallon, M. (2019). Uber used 64Sebayang, R. (2019). Ojol Baru Bermunculan, Bisakah secret spyware to try crush Australian start-up Runtuhkan Dominasi Grab-Gojek? CNBC Indonesia GoCatch. ABC News [online] Available at: [online] Available at: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-03-18/uber-us https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/tech/2019111020 ed-secret-spyware-to-try-and-crush-australian-star 2339-37-114123/ojol-baru-bermunculan-bisakah-r t-up/10901120 [Accessed 15 November 2019]. untuhkan-dominasi-grab-gojek [Accessed 21 49Marshall, A. (2018). Uber and Waymo Abruptly Settle For November 2019]. $245 Million. Wired [online] Available at: 65Barratt, T., Veen, A., Goods, C., Josserand, E., and Kaine, S. https://www.wired.com/story/uber-waymo-lawsuit (2018). As yet another ridesharing platform -settlement/ [Accessed 15 November 2019]. launches in Australia, how does this all end? The 50Wong, J.C. (2017). Uber CEO Travis Kalanick resigns Conversation [online] Available at: following months of chaos. [online] https://theconversation.com/as-yet-another-ridesh Available at: aring-platform-launches-in-australia-how-does-thi https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/ju s-all-end-98389 [Accessed 21 November 2019]. n/20/uber-ceo-travis-kalanick-resigns [Accessed 15 November 2019].

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