Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI)

N IGERIA Annual Report: FY 2018

P ROGRAM DESCRIPTION FACT SHEET #7, FISCAL YEAR (FY) 2013 JANUARY 15, 2013 The United States Agency for International Development’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) launched the Regional Transition Initiative (NRTI) in September 2014 to diminish conditions that allow Boko Haram to exist and flourish in North East Nigeria. An intensified military offensive by Nigeria, along with support from Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and limited support from the United States, has enabled the Government of Nigeria to reclaim areas previously held by Boko Haram. Coupled with a peaceful change in presidency in 2015 and significant military advances, a sense of optimism loomed in North East Nigeria in the past two years. However, recent counterattacks by insurgents and the emergence of the Islamic State West Africa Province indicates that a long path to recovery still remains.

In the midst of a dynamic security situation, NRTI identifies and supports activities OTI MISSION STATEMENT that positively impact citizens’ conditions while minimizing the space that allows terrorists to exist, operate, and thrive in their current environment. The program In support of US foreign currently operates through small-scale, strategically-targeted assistance to local policy, OTI seizes emerging partners in Nigeria. windows of opportunity in the political landscape to promote stability, peace, and Creative Associates International (Creative) implements NRTI under a task order democracy by catalyzing local that continues through November 2018. This annual report covers NRTI’s activities initiatives through adaptive from October 1, 2017 to September 30, 2018. and agile programming.

F AST FACTS

NRTI Start Date: September 2014

Implementing Partner: Creative Associates

Activities to date: 448

Sectoral Focus: Governance Youth Engagement Media/Communications

USAID/OTI

http://www.usaid.gov - Keyword: OTI

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PROGRAM STRATEGY Following a Strategy Review Session in September 2017, NRTI revised its program strategy to align with its current goal of ‘denying terrorists space to operate’ in the North East. Mirroring the goals of the United States Government, NRTI, in conjunction with regional OTI programs, seeks to harmonize its efforts in preventing the Islamic State West Africa (ISWA) from becoming a more significant threat while continuing activities to prevent terrorist influence in the country. To achieve this goal, NRTI’s objectives have shifted to the following:

• Offer alternatives to extremist action for vulnerable individuals; and • Increase community resilience to extremist action.

NRTI will work creatively to design activities in support of these objectives grouped into programming streams known as clusters. The current program clusters include: (1) providing positive alternatives for vulnerable individuals; (2) supporting the creation of an effective DDR program; (3) disrupting community entry points for terrorist groups; (4) improving community cohesion and reconciliation; and (5) battling indifference.

Potential indicators of success include: (1) reduced ISWA influence in the North East; (2) increasing IDP returnees to their communities; (3) increasing secure access to markets and fields in post-conflict areas; (4) decreased Boko Haram attacks; and (5) reducing the ability of ISWA to mount significant large-scale attacks in the country.

COUNTRY STRATEGY Security Situation – The Northeast of Nigeria remains a theatre of war. The fight against insurgent groups gained strides in 2015 when President Muhammadu Buhari assumed office.the During these past two years, the Nigerian military launched operations Deep Punch I and Deep Punch II, and the more recent Operation Last Hold to eliminate insurgents dwelling in border communities in Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe, (the BAY States), and on the islands situated in the Lake Chad Region.

While hampered in their operational capacity and territorial control, Boko Haram and ISWA continue to carry out sporadic attacks in the north east. This year has witnessed a rise in the number of attacks on military positions, calling into question the government’s stated “defeat” of the insurgency. In March 2018, ISWA laid siege on the village of Rann in Borno state before attacking a military base located nearby. In Jilli, , over 200 military personnel are still unaccounted for after a raid on a military base on 14 July 2018. The whereabouts of the missing soldiers remains a mystery as the military keeps mute on the matter. It has been reported that ISWA’s offensive on over 11 military positions has claimed the lives of over 600 Nigerian soldiers this year, in comparison to an estimated 300 recorded in 20172.

Notwithstanding the rise in casualty figures this year, the Nigerian military remains resolute. In the wake of ISWA’s attack on the town of Gudumbali in the Guzamala Local Government Area in Borno State, the military responded with a forceful offensive, successfully reclaiming the town and relocating the Army Operational Headquarters to Gudumbali.

As the theatre of war moves further north and into the Lake Chad Region, the Federal Government of Nigeria, the German Government, Norwegian Government and the United Nations co-hosted a High Level Conference on the Lake Chad Region on 3-4 September 2018. A total of 17 United Nations member states, the European Commission, the UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), the UN Peacebuilding Fund, the African Development Bank, and the World Bank pledged funding for both humanitarian and peacebuilding/development activities in the Lake Chad Region3.

2 Road to Maiduguri, SBM Intel, Premium Times, Sept 2018 3 Announcements at High-Level Conference on the Lake Chad Region, Berlin, Germany 3-4 September 2018

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As Nigeria prepares forgeneral elections scheduled for the first quarter of 2019, sporadic and opportunistic terrorist attacks by insurgents are likely to increase. This will greatly challenge military forces deployed for security at political party primaries,state gubernatorial elections, and national level elections. In the run-up to general elections, the politicization of the northeast security situation will become increasingly heightened, as efforts will be made competing politicians to give the perception of restored peace and stability in the region. Such events were witnessed in Guzamala, where refugees in the Gamboru/Ngala internally displaced persons (IDPs) camps in Borno State, were asked to return by government officials or face a cut to their aid supply.

Borno – There were significant advances made against the insurgents this year such as the July 29 military clearance operation in Mairari village in the Monguno Local Government Area (the known operational headquarters of the Al-Barnarwi faction of ISWA) and a significant reduction in attacks in the state capital of Maiduguri. However, 2018 also witnessed a rise in the number of attacks on military bases in Borno, resulting in high military casualty figures and a blow to the confidence of soldiers. For example, out the twelve (12) attacks on military positions and bases between March-September, ten (10) of those attacks took place in Borno. The psychological impact of these attacks on soldiers cannot be quantified. However, the sporadic shooting on the Maiduguri International Airport on August 12 by soldiers protesting their redeployment from the state capital of Maiduguri to another local government within the state provides a glimpse into the frustrations soldiers have experienced this year.

Yobe – Careful analysis of the security situation in Yobe state confirms the growing presence of ISWA throughout the state. ISWA’s attacks in Yobe have been infrequent yet tactical. Like ISWA’s modus operandi in Borno State, the group has carried out attacks on military bases and facilities, notably the July 14 attack on a military base in Jilli village in the Local Government Area, resulting in the death of over 60 Nigerian troops with an additional 200 missing. A week later, on July 21, the insurgent group ambushed troops in Babangida in the Local Government Area, resulting in the death of over eight (8) soldiers. ISWA’s frequent and lethal attacks attest to purported established reach into some communities where tax systems have been erected, recruitment of locals is rife, and sympathy is on the rise.

Througout the state, especially along the Yobe - Diffa border, communities have witnessed a rise in kidnappings for ransom by ISWA. One notable kidnapping that occurred in the first quarter of this year was the abduction of 110 school girls from the Government Girls Technical Science College in a town called Dapchi, in Geidem LGA. Although 104 of the girls were released by ISWA a month later, it was understood that 5 out of those abducted died during the ordeal, and one, Leah Sharibu, remains with ISWA for refusing to denounce her Christian faith. More revealing about the Dapchi girls’ incident, was the revelation that a huge ransom was paid for the release of the Dapchi girls, contrary to a statement issued by the Nigerian Government that no ransom was paid for the release of the girls. This statement was revealed in in the U.N. 22nd Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, pursuant to Resolution 2368, released in August. Other kidnapping incidents continue to occur along the border, and into the Niger Republic. The Nigerian Airforce has responded with numerous aerial bombardments on the insurgent group along the Yobe – Diffa border.

Adamawa – Apart from the senseless twin suicide attacks that occurred on May 1 in a mosque and market in Mubi that claimed the lives of 60 people and injured many more, Adamawa has endured various conflicts between farmers and herders this year, resulting in the death of over 100 people. In September, it was reported that over 200 armed Fulani herdsmen attacked the villages of Gon, Nzumosu, Bolki, Nyanga and Bukuto, all located in Numan Local Government Area, killing 50 people including a pastor of the Lutheran Church of Christ. This followed a protest organized by the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), Adamawa Chapter in August, protesting the rise in the number of deaths caused by Fulani herdsmen across the country.

Operation Lafiya Dole also confirmed the emergence of a new Islamic sect known as Hakika this year, located in the Yola South Local Government Area of Ngurore. Although the group has not carried out any violent acts, their presence alone has caused a stir in the community due to their strange doctrines promoting all forms of

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debauchery. They remain highly monitored by security agencies in the country as their presence has also been sighted in Nasarawa State.

Economic Stagnation and Naira Fluctuation – After Nigeria’s economy recovered from a recession in 2017 after suffering contraction for five consecutive quarters, it has continued on a path of sustained economic growth since then. However, in September, the Governor of the Central Bank, Mr. Godwin Emefiele, announced that a possible relapse into recession is highly inevitable due to the slow implementation of the 2018 budget.

The official naira / dollar exchange rate remained constant at N 305 to $1 at the official rate and N 358 to $1 at the parallel market rate.

GRANTS SUMMARY To date, NRTI has cleared, completed, or closed 458 activities in the following sectors: Research, Youth Engagement, Civic Engagement, Governance, Violence Prevention and Mitigation, and Media/Communications.

NRTI DISBURSEMENT BY SECTOR

4%

16% 15% 7% 27%

31%

Research Youth Engagement Civic Engagement Governance Violence prevention and Mitigation Media/Communications

ACTIVITY HIGHLIGHTS

In this annual activity cycle, NRTI cleared 170 activities, completed 52 activities, and closed 222 activities.

Supporting the creation of an effective DDR program Within this annual activity cycle, NRTI carried out 22 activities under this cluster. The activities were designed with the assumption that the creation of a viable Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) program in Nigeria will provide those who want to leave BH and ISIS-WA with additional incentives to do so, thereby weakening the fighting strength of these groups.

Traditional and Religious Leaders’ Forum on Transitional Justice for Reintegration (NRT093): As part of efforts towards finding sustainable peace in the BAY States of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe, NRTI organized three traditional and religious leaders’ forums on transitional justice and community reintegration in the northeast; one in each state, and a readout session of the findings took place in the Federal Capital Territory of Abuja. Figure 1: A Participant Making an The forums aimed to identify the role of traditional and religious institutions Observation During the Session (NRT093) in transitional justice, understand what is available within traditional

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institutions in the northeast as transitional justice, and understand what communities perceive and demand as acceptable transitional justice in order to provide them assurance of the repentance of offenders. The forums were successfully held in the BAY States and a readout session of the findings took place in the Federal Capital Territory. The forums revealed the chasm that existed between the Government’s DDR efforts and the awareness of communities of these efforts owingto the fact that an effective DDR process ought to carry the community leaders along. The forum also revealed efforts already being undertaken by traditional leaders to carry out transitional justice mechanisms within their communities; notably the Shuwa-Duhu District of Madagali LGA. The findings in Shuwa-Duhu District also revealed the peculiarity of transitional justice mechanisms, highlighting how these mechanisms are tailored to the customs and traditions of communities. For example, traditional customs provide for a person who was forced to commit murder or destruction of property be forgiven only when properly investigated and the family is willing to accept “diyah”; a specific amount or some form of compensation paid to as ransom or for restitution. In the case of murder, a diyah of 100 camels, which is equivalent to 64,000,000.00 Naira is paid. Through the learnings gained under this activity and also under NRT065, NRT080 and ADM048, the need to create greater awareness and understanding on a reintegration process became increasingly clear. Hence, during this year NRTI carried out an activity aimed at building the understanding of community groups in Pulka and Gwoza on reintegration (ADM096). The activity carried out two town hall meetings in eight communities in Pulka and Gwoza, targeting a total of 320 persons, of which 133 were females. The activity also revealed that communities in Pulka and Gwoza, were willing to accept ex-combatants who have truly repented, seeing that many young people from communities in Pulka and Gwoza were forcefully conscripted into Boko Haram and ISWA Findings from ADM096 further stressed the importance of local transitional justice mechanisms that provide the communities the opportunity to define what repentance looks like to them.

Livelihood Support of 250 Widows of Security Force Officers Killed by Insurgents: Before an effective reintegration of ex-violent extremist can occur, host communities must be prepared to live in harmony with them. One of the various interventions carried out by NRTI to prepare communities for an anticipated reintegration of ex-combatants this year were livelihood support activities rendered towards vulnerable members of communities greatly affected by the onslaught of ISWA and Boko Haram. These groups mainly consist of youth, children and women. Many families have been broken, and the states of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe have seen a rise in the number of women-led households, especially with the demise of many security force officers. It was in light of this that NRTI provided livelihood support to 100 widows of security men and CJTF in Gwoza (ADM076), as well as, livelihood support for 250 widows of security force officers killed by insurgents in Borno State. (BOR099)

In Gwoza, 100 widows of security men and CJTF were trained on tailoring, knitting, snack making, marketing and business management skills; and provided startup kits that included grinding machines, sewing machines, garment knitting machines, wheat flour, vegetable oil, charcoal ovens, muffin pans for baking, hand floor mixer, cake baking pan, and local mats. While in Borno a similar activity was carried out on 250 selected widows drawn from 21st Armored Brigades -Giwa Barrack, 7th Division Maimalari Cantonments, as well as other battalion’s domicile within the 7th Division such as 202 Bama, 212 Baga, 243 Nganzai and 33rd Division. Communities within the metropolis where the fallen hero’s wives reside after leaving the barracks were also assessed to link targeted beneficiaries with suitable business opportunities. The activities went a long way in strengthening NRTI’s relationship with the commanding officers of the Nigeria Military for future DRR activities, as well as provide victims with support, so they do not feel neglected, especially when support is being rendered to ex-combatants in the future. Katplang Friday, one of the beneficiaries of the activity in Borno had this to say - “I am a hardworking woman, but my husband has always been a pillar of support to us, when he was gone, I felt like the world was ending, I have managed through this period to provide food on the table, with this support now, I know that the days of my hardship are over. I am now selling zobo, kunun zaki, chilled water and minerals”. According to Katplang, she is now more independent and optimistic about the future and assured NRTI that she will continue to utilize this support even after leaving the barracks.

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Supporting effort to establish a DDRR policy framework: This year, NRTI was able to conclude its engagements with The Kukah Centre, which was mandated under an NRTI grant to carry out a series of stakeholder advocacy engagements on a National Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (DDRR) framework. The Kukah Centre, led by yh formidable and highly influential Catholic Priest, Bishop Matthew Hassan Kukah, held several meetings with key stakeholders capable of pushing for the establishment of a National DDRR framework in Nigeria. These key stakeholders included: the Vice Figure 2: Participants at the 2-day President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, The Army General that oversees CSO validation Meeting for the the National de-radicalization program (Operation Safe Corridor); General DDRR National Framework Bamidela Shafa, the Minister of Education, The Governor of Borno State, the Developed by the Kukah Centre Office of the Senate President, the Governor of Kebbi State, and many others. (NRT078) Under this activity, NRTI was able to develop a Civil Society position on a National policy framework for DDRR in the country. The Centre submitted a policy framework, implementation strategy and policy brief, vetted by NRTI, and organized a validation workshop where civil society organizations throughout the country came together to review, provide input and validated the document as recommendations made by Nigerian civil society organizations on DDRR in the country. (NRT078)

Offering positive alternatives for vulnerable individuals Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) use financial and other inducements to recruit fighters, logisticians and informants; capitalizing on the high rate of unemployment, poverty and drug abuse among these populations. NRTI has observed that if these vulnerable individuals feel that joining an extremist group and committing an extremist act is the only or best option available to them, they then remain highly susceptible to the allurements and influence of VEOs. This year, NRTI carried out 42 activities under this cluster. These activities worked to provided targeted vulnerable individuals with better choices, so they will be dissuaded from joining terrorist groups or committing extremist acts.

Cluster Evaluation: An evaluation of the activities under this cluster assessed whether NRTI was able to improve livelihood opportunities for vulnerable individuals through the implementation of these activities and analyze whether these activities had an effect on reducing the appeal of VEOs. Activities in this cluster included capacity and skill building programs, youth events and clubs and sports tournaments. The evaluation report surveyed past beneficiaries of NRTI activities and found them to have been beneficial in reducing marginalization as follows:

Economic Marginalization: The evaluation found that beneficiaries experienced moderate improvements to their livelihoods. The beneficiaries used funds in a variety of ways, from investing in business opportunities to supporting their families and pursuing education. These modest improvements were met with very high degrees of enthusiasm for the program from both implementers and beneficiaries. However, program beneficiaries expressed pessimism about the economy and their ability to sustain these gains. Comparatively, we were able to learn that the Apprenticeship/ Training programs did better at increasing perceived access to jobs than ‘Cash for Work’ activities because the newly acquired skills paved a path to future independence compared to the simple ‘Cash for Work’ stipends.

Social Marginalization: The evaluation was able to ascertain that beneficiaries consistently reported more trust, social connectedness and feeling more respected by their communities. Beneficiaries indicated that trust and credibility between the youths and stakeholders strengthened following the program activities. Specifically, the addition of peace talks/CVE discussions to livelihood programming played an important part in building trust and cooperation with the communities.

• Political Marginalization: The evaluation demonstrated that beneficiaries felt far less politically marginalized than non-beneficiaries, reporting more trust in police, civilian JTF, NGOs and the Military. It was also revealed that skills training activities showed higher effectiveness in reducing political marginalization than ‘Cash for Work’ programs.

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Market Support Structures for Small Businesses in the North East: Many beneficiaries of livelihood support under this cluster used the stipends provided during training workshops or Cash for Work activities to start businesses and trades of their own. However, as 65% of new businesses in Nigeria die within the first 3 years, NRTI provided 89 of these past beneficiaries, drawn from the three BAY States of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe, with a weeklong workshop on market support structures aimed at providing technical support to the participants. This workshop also exposed participants to the principles of small business startup, management, and bookkeeping. For one of the participants, Figure 3: Participants at the Market Support Bakura Alhaji Bukar, when asked what are the changes in him that he Structures workshop for Small Businesses in thinks he could sustain beyond the workshop on Market Support, he the North East (NRT127) posits, “there is nothing I can say except that, I have learned a lot in these few days, if only this could be extended to most of my business colleagues, although, we are not in the same community but we all grew up learning the business of pepper selling; it is lucrative but we still do it in a local way. This training has opened my head, especially the documentation. I am literate and so, why not document my business. I can say that I am now financially literate; thanks to NERI and its staff.” (NRT127)

Provision of ICT Related Business Startup Materials to Youths in Kanamma: In the month of July, NRTI conducted a one-day training on CVE and micro business management skills for 40 youths in Kanamma, Yunusari and Geidam communities. NRTI, in collaboration with Yunusari LGA, distributed desktop and laptop computers, printers, photocopying machine, binding and lamination machines, laptop external speakers, and plastic tables with chairs to Kanamma youth to improve their livelihood options and dissuade them from joining ISIA. This intervention became imperative when it revealed during previous NRTI engagements in the community (YOB079) that ISWA seek to recruit technology savvy youth in the community who lost their ICT business in the insurgency, rendering them vulnerable to ISWA influence. One of the beneficiaries of this activities, Yakubu Bukar had this to say: “I have never been so blessed like this time in my life. I could remember when two people met me in my shop and asked if I can photocopy something for them, then I said my photocopying machine hasn’t been working for a while, they collected my name and my phone number. Tthey later called me and some other beneficiaries and trained us on business management. They gave us these items; my business has been going well since then, and things have started changing drastically”. (YOB092)

Community Clean up exercises for Peace: This year, NRTI conducted community clean up exercises in Borno State, and 5 others in Adamawa State. One of the purposes of these activities is to build resilience amongst youth by providing them with Cash for Work in the various communities. Knowing that many of these communities are going through a rehabilitation phase, community clean up exercises allows for a sense of restored dignity in the communities. For example, under ADM112, NRTI identified, screened and engaged 300 youths to work for cash in community clean-up exercises in and around the Mubi New Motor Park. The engaged youth also took part in scheduled peace talks and interactive sessions geared at understanding the influence of insurgents and stimulate community recommendations for solutions. This activity provided the youths engaged with positive alternatives and a better understanding of ISWA and their methods. During one of the interactive sessions, the Chairman National Union of Road and Transport Workers (NURTW) Sabon Tasha (New Motor Park Mubi) appreciated the NRTI for such a wonderful initiative, he said, “Who on earth will ever think off sanitizing the whole of this park, I remember the last time that something like this happened was during the military rule when people were employed specifically for the purpose of environmental sanitation. NGOs in Mubi are taking us back to our original place of sense and wellbeing, we will do our best to maintain this practice at least once a month after the completion of your activity”.

The dialogue and cash for work exercise created a medium for interaction and social cohesion among the beneficiaries. Other youths that were not part of the activity also joined during the cleaning exercise, some people working in the park also joined the. The beneficiaries adopted a practice of chanting songs and dancing to keep themselves motivated during the cleaning exercise. The dialogue sessions however were full of uncertainty as it was in ADM111, the youths were not ready to speak about issues of security and other vital issues, after interviewing one of the participants, he expressed that the number of beneficiaries in the hall was too large for such information to be disclosed, he said you can’t trust no one being that they were all gathered from different communities. On the long run he applauded the initiative employed by NERI in its effort to empower the youths.

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In his statement “there has never been a youth centered activity carried out by any organization including the government in Mubi like this one, I am overwhelmed by the large number of youths empowered, this will help reduce the tensions we are in”.

Improving community cohesion and reconciliation One of the costs of the Boko Haram conflict is the deterioration of community cohesion in North East Nigeria - the interpersonal relationships and the networks and associations that help to build mutual trust and common purpose. The activities sought to support the development of shared interests, mutual understanding, and a sense of belonging so vulnerable communities will be more united, resulting in a reduction in VEOs ability to exploit the divisions to gain influence.

Cluster Evaluation: An evaluation of activities under this cluster was conducted to ascertain whether the program has been successful in increasing levels of social trust, and cohesion and thus increasing community resilience to extremist action.

Community Engagement: The evaluation was able to report a slight increase in community engagements. This includes attending community events and discussing community issues with friends. A lot of enthusiasm was expressed by beneficiaries and community leaders about the activities under this cluster, from festivals to land demarcation. It was also reported that beneficiaries of activities under this cluster also became members of more community groups, a sign of improved sense of community.

Community Cohesion: The report revealed that beneficiary communities consistently reported higher levels of community connection, pointing to the success of cultural festivals and dance in creating a focal point of collective engagement for individuals of diverse religious and ethnic backgrounds. The report revealed that Nigerians express the most trust in religious leaders in their communities and the least in local political leaders. In Adamawa State, the trust for local political leaders continued to decline throughout the evaluation exercise. This is possibly due to the high number of farmer/herder clashes that seldom lead to any arrests.

Community Resilience: The report indicated that a higher sense of community increases community resilience, measured as a perceived wiliness to report upcoming attacks. While the beneficiary population did not show a significant decline in the ability to contact VEOs or in the willingness to cooperate with them, they stayed constant, while the control communities show significant increases in both measures. At the very least, it means that programming can stabilize the communities and prevent further spread of VEO support.

High Frequency (HF) as an alternative means of Communication to Local Government Areas in Yobe State: Prior to NRTI’s intervention in Yobe State this year, mobile telecommunication has been the only means of communication provided in many of the Local Government Areas. This has made communication extremely difficult for security personnel who have experienced challenges in sharing security situation reports from their LGA to , the State Headquarters, due to the poor signal strength. An inability to transmit information further erodes any sense of community that exists amongst security personnel in the LGAs and those situated in the State Figure 4: Installation of mast in Capital. With this consideration, NRTI provided and installed HF radios as an Geidam LGA for High Frequency alternate means of communications in Geidam, Yunusari and LGAs. Radio Communication The installed HF radios opened a reliable line of communication between the LGAs and the State capital. In addition, these alternative lines of communication have improved access to information and helped in coordination and cohesion. (YOB087, YOB088, &YOB089)

Countering Violent Extremism Workshop for Media Practitioners: Communities directly affected by the Boko Haram crisis require activities that promote community cohesion and resilience. However, to effectively tell stories of the atrocities faced by these communities, media practitioners that report on the atrocities of these communities also require strengthening to tell these stories effectively. The media community plays a significant role in shaping the opinions of their audience; it is therefore imperative that they not only provide truthful reports, but also balanced ones. Through a 3-day training for media practitioners, NRTI provided 38 media personnel (14 women and 24 men) with the necessary skills on the art of reporting news stories to counter the narratives of extremist groups

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and promote community cohesion. One of the beneficiaries from Jos had this to say, “I learnt about transforming the narratives of violent extremism to narratives of peace, and that to transform violent extremist narratives, I have to know what message was used to indoctrinate extremists. I plan on using in the future, hopeful and peaceful narratives in my work.”

Disrupting Entry Points in Vulnerable Communities NRTI believes the creation of effective roadblocks to the overtures of terrorist organizations at the community level will cause these groups to “move on,” seeking to establish themselves elsewhere, thereby slowing the spread of their territorial control. Considering this, NRTI carried out 45 activities under this program cycle.

Cluster Evaluation: The cluster evaluation report highlighted that the program had a positive and well targeted, if modest, effect on disrupting entry points in vulnerable communities. The program, despite its short implementation timeline of one year under this strategy, has achieved significant gains in laying the foundation for grassroot mechanisms for disrupting VEO systems, tactics and overtures. These “entry points” were either vulnerabilities that were already exploited by VEOs or that represented a significant window of opportunity for VEOs to enter targeted communities in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe State.

Key findings identified from the cluster evaluation are:

• NRTI was able to identify and program against specific community vulnerabilities and identify VEO entry points through community engagement, dialogue processes and on-going M&E assessments of activities. • There is evidence of a modest level of effectiveness in deterring VEO’s attempts to establish or expand control in critical communities, demonstrated by a lack of a consistent pattern of increased or concerted influence in vulnerable communities. • The program identified vulnerable communities along critical VEO transit/control corridors. Also, the program was able to pivot in response to changing context and new knowledge of how VEOs were operating. This was the case in Mubi, after the July attack on the military installation. • The majority of the activities in the reports and by implementers show an increased sensitization of VEO tactics and risks, which was previously not known to communities. Communities were even less aware or prepared to adequately respond to VEO overtures. • There is an increased willingness by community members to contact and in some cases collaborate with legitimate security apparatus in their communities, such as the military or police. • Given the precarious nature of these communities, the program was able to offer community needs that provided a lifeline for community members (i.e. food provision) but most importantly counter tactics for potential VEO influence. • There is increasing evidence of disruptions of VEO strategy and tactics through increased relatedness of community members. More evidence must be gathered to demonstrate how the activities have contributed to creating grassroot mitigation mechanisms of disruption and their level of effectiveness (i.e. EWS, Youth Ambassadors, Drug Campaigns, etc...) • There was insufficient evidence to demonstrate significant disruptions to VEO territorial expansion or control aside from isolated cases where VEOs actually left an area or chose to move elsewhere.

Renovation of Hospital Staff Quarters in Kanamma: To disrupt vulnerable entry points, it is important to understand what makes communities vulnerable to VEO influence in the first place. Through YOB048, NRTI helped rebuild the Kanamma General Hospital, which is the only healthcare facility in the Local government headquarters. However, since its reconstruction, the hospital was not in use because healthcare personnel had not resumed duty due to a lack of accommodation for the health workers within the hospital premises. In order to meet this need and facilitate the return of healthcare personnel to the hospital to enable them to serve the community, NRTI renovated the hospital staff quarters, which Figure 5: Renovated Kanamma General Hospital Staff Quarters consists of two blocks of twin two-bedroom flats, a block of three-bedroom flats and a chalet. Prior this this renovation, community members had to

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travel a far as Niger Republic to receive healthcare. This left Kanamma extremely vulnerable to VEO influence, who occasionally provide medical support to communities as a means of winning community sympathy. (YOB090)

Disturbing vulnerable entry points by providing communities with access to water: Dala Shuwari is a cluster of over 31 villages, hamlets and homesteads, situated after Bakasi IDP Camp in the outskirts of Maiduguri. This cluster of villages occupied by predominantly members of the Shuwa-Arab ethnic group, have repeatedly been infiltrated and used by Boko Haram as a viable route to plan and launch attacks on soft targets in Maiduguri, especially by chauffeuring young suicide bombers carrying PBEIDs. Though these communities are not actively aiding insurgents, they were also not reporting terrorist infiltration into their communities. During a learning activity carried out by NRTI (BOR091), it was revealed that the formal town-hall meeting organized was the first time the people of Dala Shuwari were under the same roof with top government officials to discuss security and related matters. It was during the town-hall meeting that representatives of the people of Dala Purka and Ashamari made the strong point that amongst many of deprivations they are facing, the lack of safe drinking water was of serious concern. The specific marginalization of the Dala Shuwari communities amplified the vulnerabilities of the villages of Ashamari and Dala Purka and why community members seldom reported sighting of terrorist in their village. It was in light of this that NRTI helped drill two solar powered boreholes in the villages of Dala Purka and Ashamari and installed 20,000 liters overhead tanks. The installed facilities serve an estimated 1,600 people judging by the population of the villages. NRTI also held three community dialogues to discuss emerging community security issues.

This activity provided NRTI with an opportunity to demonstrate government responsiveness to the needs of the community, and an opportunity to deny VEOs an opportunity to exploit the communities through their perceived neglect. Khaleel Ismail, Community Elder and participant at the meeting had this to say, “during the dialogue, we made several requests for support and assistance to our community to all stakeholders and the Government representatives present. Barely a few weeks later, we begun seeing actions taken. First it was the engagement of our poor and unemployed youth and now it is this fully functional borehole. This is commitment and delivery”.

Battling Indifference Since the beginning of the insurgency, there has been a tendency in the rest of Nigeria to see Boko Haram (and subsequently, ISIS-West Africa) as a “Northeast problem,” far away from key cities like Lagos or Port Harcourt. This continues to undermine a united Nigerian response and contribute to feelings of marginalization and resentment that have been a major driver of the insurgency. NRTI believes that if Nigerians feel like they can identify with issues facing the Northeast, then they will be more interested in being part of a national solution. This year, NRTI implemented 21 activities under this cluster.

PROGRAM EVALUATION & NEXT STEPS

PROGRAM EVALUATION This quarter represented NRTI’s close out quarter and was thus focused on completing and closing out a number of activities in addition to the completion of evaluation of clusters. The clusters evaluated include: 1). Offering Positive Alternatives for Vulnerable Individuals, 2). DDR, 3). Disrupting Entry Points in Vulnerable Communities, 4). Community Cohesion, and 5). Battling Indifference. The five clusters focused on addressing program objectives to offer Alternatives to Extremist Action for Vulnerable individuals and Increase Community Resilience to Extremist Action.

Programming during the quarter remained diverse and directed at responding to the two problem sets of Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa. NRTI’s activities remained diverse, covering such areas as: community level activities, national (strategic level) activities, and continuing to support Nigeria’s DDR process. Remaining targeted and needs-driven, NRTI continued to push the boundaries of data gathering and community initiatives in Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin.

During this reporting period, the team focused primarily on activity completion and grants closeouts. Over the life of the program 458 activities were cleared/implemented with an average time between activity identification and clearance of 65 days. In this past year, NRTI ramped up its implementation model by increasing planning and staff management efforts, thereby ensuring responsive implementation in insecure but demanding environments.

NRTI Annual Report – FY2018 (October 2017 – September 2018), 10

The influence mapping exercise contributed to shared learning with regional counterparts about the characteristics of VEOs operating in the region. The program continued its DDR engagements, especially focusing on preparing communities (through a range of activities) in serving as hosts to IDP returnees. NRTI also concluded work on the national level activities including the fellowship program and online social media campaigns using the #NotAnotherNigerian and #ThePowerofYou hashtags.

NEXT STEPS The program is in the midst of its closeout phase and on schedule for task order completion on November 21, 2018.

NRTI Annual Report – FY2018 (October 2017 – September 2018), 11

Annex A: Counterterrorism Partnership Fund

Throughout the life of NRTI, the program received funding from the U.S. Department of State’s Counterterrorism Partnership Fund (CTPF). From the funds received, 3 activities were carried out under the Youth Network pool, while an additional 28 dedicated activities in Yobe State; resulting in a total of 31 activities carried out using the CTPF.

YOUTH ACTIVTIES

This reporting period, NRTI cleared one activity using the Youth Network funds:

• Alternative to Violence Project in Mubi, Michika and Madagali LGAs (AVP): NRTI implemented an alternative to violence project (AVP) in the communities of Muchalla and Mundag communities in Mubi North LGA; Gyella and Shuda in Mubi South LGA; Bazza and Michika communities in Mchika LGA; and Shuwa and Gulak communities of Madagali LGA of Adamawa State. The engagement consisted of training 200 participants (154 males and 46 females; 50 from each LGA) using an AVP approach that seeks to stimulate behavioral change, mitigates against recruitment into VEOs, and supports the adoption of community specific CVE approaches by participating beneficiaries. Engagements with communities are aimed at increasing their understanding of the dynamics of insurgency in northern Adamawa and strengthening the capacity of local leaders to lead alternative community approaches as well as erecting an early warning system that seeks to detect VEO influence in the communities.

NRTI Annual Report – FY2018 (October 2017 – September 2018), 12