Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) N IGERIA Annual Report: FY 2018 P ROGRAM DESCRIPTION FACT SHEET #7, FISCAL YEAR (FY) 2013 JANUARY 15, 2013 The United States Agency for International Development’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) launched the Nigeria Regional Transition Initiative (NRTI) in September 2014 to diminish conditions that allow Boko Haram to exist and flourish in North East Nigeria. An intensified military offensive by Nigeria, along with support from Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and limited support from the United States, has enabled the Government of Nigeria to reclaim areas previously held by Boko Haram. Coupled with a peaceful change in presidency in 2015 and significant military advances, a sense of optimism loomed in North East Nigeria in the past two years. However, recent counterattacks by insurgents and the emergence of the Islamic State West Africa Province indicates that a long path to recovery still remains. In the midst of a dynamic security situation, NRTI identifies and supports activities OTI MISSION STATEMENT that positively impact citizens’ conditions while minimizing the space that allows terrorists to exist, operate, and thrive in their current environment. The program In support of US foreign currently operates through small-scale, strategically-targeted assistance to local policy, OTI seizes emerging partners in Nigeria. windows of opportunity in the political landscape to promote stability, peace, and Creative Associates International (Creative) implements NRTI under a task order democracy by catalyzing local that continues through November 2018. This annual report covers NRTI’s activities initiatives through adaptive from October 1, 2017 to September 30, 2018. and agile programming. F AST FACTS NRTI Start Date: September 2014 Implementing Partner: Creative Associates Activities to date: 448 Sectoral Focus: Governance Youth Engagement Media/Communications USAID/OTI http://www.usaid.gov - Keyword: OTI NRTI Annual Report – FY2018 (October 2017 – September 2018), 1 PROGRAM STRATEGY Following a Strategy Review Session in September 2017, NRTI revised its program strategy to align with its current goal of ‘denying terrorists space to operate’ in the North East. Mirroring the goals of the United States Government, NRTI, in conjunction with regional OTI programs, seeks to harmonize its efforts in preventing the Islamic State West Africa (ISWA) from becoming a more significant threat while continuing activities to prevent terrorist influence in the country. To achieve this goal, NRTI’s objectives have shifted to the following: • Offer alternatives to extremist action for vulnerable individuals; and • Increase community resilience to extremist action. NRTI will work creatively to design activities in support of these objectives grouped into programming streams known as clusters. The current program clusters include: (1) providing positive alternatives for vulnerable individuals; (2) supporting the creation of an effective DDR program; (3) disrupting community entry points for terrorist groups; (4) improving community cohesion and reconciliation; and (5) battling indifference. Potential indicators of success include: (1) reduced ISWA influence in the North East; (2) increasing IDP returnees to their communities; (3) increasing secure access to markets and fields in post-conflict areas; (4) decreased Boko Haram attacks; and (5) reducing the ability of ISWA to mount significant large-scale attacks in the country. COUNTRY STRATEGY Security Situation – The Northeast of Nigeria remains a theatre of war. The fight against insurgent groups gained strides in 2015 when President Muhammadu Buhari assumed office.the During these past two years, the Nigerian military launched operations Deep Punch I and Deep Punch II, and the more recent Operation Last Hold to eliminate insurgents dwelling in border communities in Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe, (the BAY States), and on the islands situated in the Lake Chad Region. While hampered in their operational capacity and territorial control, Boko Haram and ISWA continue to carry out sporadic attacks in the north east. This year has witnessed a rise in the number of attacks on military positions, calling into question the government’s stated “defeat” of the insurgency. In March 2018, ISWA laid siege on the village of Rann in Borno state before attacking a military base located nearby. In Jilli, Yobe State, over 200 military personnel are still unaccounted for after a raid on a military base on 14 July 2018. The whereabouts of the missing soldiers remains a mystery as the military keeps mute on the matter. It has been reported that ISWA’s offensive on over 11 military positions has claimed the lives of over 600 Nigerian soldiers this year, in comparison to an estimated 300 recorded in 20172. Notwithstanding the rise in casualty figures this year, the Nigerian military remains resolute. In the wake of ISWA’s attack on the town of Gudumbali in the Guzamala Local Government Area in Borno State, the military responded with a forceful offensive, successfully reclaiming the town and relocating the Army Operational Headquarters to Gudumbali. As the theatre of war moves further north and into the Lake Chad Region, the Federal Government of Nigeria, the German Government, Norwegian Government and the United Nations co-hosted a High Level Conference on the Lake Chad Region on 3-4 September 2018. A total of 17 United Nations member states, the European Commission, the UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), the UN Peacebuilding Fund, the African Development Bank, and the World Bank pledged funding for both humanitarian and peacebuilding/development activities in the Lake Chad Region3. 2 Road to Maiduguri, SBM Intel, Premium Times, Sept 2018 3 Announcements at High-Level Conference on the Lake Chad Region, Berlin, Germany 3-4 September 2018 NRTI Annual Report – FY2018 (October 2017 – September 2018), 2 As Nigeria prepares forgeneral elections scheduled for the first quarter of 2019, sporadic and opportunistic terrorist attacks by insurgents are likely to increase. This will greatly challenge military forces deployed for security at political party primaries,state gubernatorial elections, and national level elections. In the run-up to general elections, the politicization of the northeast security situation will become increasingly heightened, as efforts will be made competing politicians to give the perception of restored peace and stability in the region. Such events were witnessed in Guzamala, where refugees in the Gamboru/Ngala internally displaced persons (IDPs) camps in Borno State, were asked to return by government officials or face a cut to their aid supply. Borno – There were significant advances made against the insurgents this year such as the July 29 military clearance operation in Mairari village in the Monguno Local Government Area (the known operational headquarters of the Al-Barnarwi faction of ISWA) and a significant reduction in attacks in the state capital of Maiduguri. However, 2018 also witnessed a rise in the number of attacks on military bases in Borno, resulting in high military casualty figures and a blow to the confidence of soldiers. For example, out the twelve (12) attacks on military positions and bases between March-September, ten (10) of those attacks took place in Borno. The psychological impact of these attacks on soldiers cannot be quantified. However, the sporadic shooting on the Maiduguri International Airport on August 12 by soldiers protesting their redeployment from the state capital of Maiduguri to another local government within the state provides a glimpse into the frustrations soldiers have experienced this year. Yobe – Careful analysis of the security situation in Yobe state confirms the growing presence of ISWA throughout the state. ISWA’s attacks in Yobe have been infrequent yet tactical. Like ISWA’s modus operandi in Borno State, the group has carried out attacks on military bases and facilities, notably the July 14 attack on a military base in Jilli village in the Geidam Local Government Area, resulting in the death of over 60 Nigerian troops with an additional 200 missing. A week later, on July 21, the insurgent group ambushed troops in Babangida in the Tarmuwa Local Government Area, resulting in the death of over eight (8) soldiers. ISWA’s frequent and lethal attacks attest to purported established reach into some communities where tax systems have been erected, recruitment of locals is rife, and sympathy is on the rise. Througout the state, especially along the Yobe - Diffa border, communities have witnessed a rise in kidnappings for ransom by ISWA. One notable kidnapping that occurred in the first quarter of this year was the abduction of 110 school girls from the Government Girls Technical Science College in a town called Dapchi, in Geidem LGA. Although 104 of the girls were released by ISWA a month later, it was understood that 5 out of those abducted died during the ordeal, and one, Leah Sharibu, remains with ISWA for refusing to denounce her Christian faith. More revealing about the Dapchi girls’ incident, was the revelation that a huge ransom was paid for the release of the Dapchi girls, contrary to a statement issued by the Nigerian Government that no ransom was paid for the release of the girls. This statement was revealed in in the U.N. 22nd Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, pursuant to Resolution 2368, released in August. Other kidnapping incidents continue to occur along the border, and into the Niger Republic. The Nigerian Airforce has responded with numerous aerial bombardments on the insurgent group along the Yobe – Diffa border. Adamawa – Apart from the senseless twin suicide attacks that occurred on May 1 in a mosque and market in Mubi that claimed the lives of 60 people and injured many more, Adamawa has endured various conflicts between farmers and herders this year, resulting in the death of over 100 people. In September, it was reported that over 200 armed Fulani herdsmen attacked the villages of Gon, Nzumosu, Bolki, Nyanga and Bukuto, all located in Numan Local Government Area, killing 50 people including a pastor of the Lutheran Church of Christ.
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