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SMM), Based on Information Received As of 19:30, 20 February 2019 KYIV 21 February 2019 Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 20 February 2019 KYIV 21 February 2019 This report is for the media and the general public. Summary Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The SMM saw fresh damage caused by shelling in Donetsk city’s Petrovskyi district. The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area. The SMM saw weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable inspection and repair works to essential civilian infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas, as well as at a checkpoint near non-government-controlled Kovske, Donetsk region.* Ceasefire violations[1] In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 475 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (225 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including the majority of explosions, were recorded at westerly and north-westerly directions of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) and at south-easterly and south-westerly directions of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk). On 20 February, positioned about 2km north of Staropetrivske (non-government- controlled, 35km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw seven tanks (types undetermined) and heard and saw 55 outgoing explosions of tank rounds about 1- 1.5km west-north-west of its position. The Mission assessed the explosions as live-fire training inside the security zone, in violation of the decision of the Trilateral Contact Group of 3 March 2016 that prohibits the conduct of live-fire training (exercises) in the security zone (see the withdrawal of weapons section below). In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (about 135), compared with the previous reporting period (about 170 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including the majority of explosions, were recorded in areas north-west and north-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and inside and near the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see the disengagement areas section below). Damage caused by shelling in Donetsk city’s Petrovskyi district On 19 February, at 12/1 Bezlisna Street in the Trudivski area of Donetsk city’s Petrovskyi district (non-government-controlled, 15km south-west of Donetsk city centre), the SMM saw a 15cm hole in the roof of a house. The Mission saw that the wooden frame of an attic window on the building’s south-western side was partially ripped out of the wall. The Mission assessed the damage to the roof and the frame as fresh and caused by infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) cannon (73mm) round(s) fired from a south-westerly direction. About 10m south-west of the house, the SMM saw a fresh crater assessed as caused by a projectile (type of weapon undetermined) fired from a south-westerly direction. A woman (in her sixties) who introduced herself as the resident of the building told the Mission that the damage had been caused by shelling on the afternoon of 17 February. At 2 Bezlisna Street, the Mission saw that a section of a gas pipeline was covered with grey tape. A man who introduced himself as a member of the team of workers conducting repairs to the pipeline told the SMM that it had been damaged during shelling on the morning of 19 February. At 13/3 Bokiia Street, the SMM saw debris hanging from the ceiling of a storage shed and a hole in the shed’s south-west-facing wall. It also saw that some panels on the roof were different in colour and that there were repair materials on the ground. The Mission assessed the damage as fresh and caused by a projectile fired from a south- westerly direction, but it was unable to determine the calibre. A man (in his forties) who introduced himself as the owner of the property told the SMM that the damage had been caused by shelling on the afternoon of 17 February. He added that he had repaired the roof after it had been damaged. At 13/2 Bokiia Street, the Mission saw that large sections of six bricks forming the south-western corner of a chimney about 2m from the ground were chipped off. The SMM also saw that there was shrapnel damage on the south-west-facing wall of a shed adjacent to the chimney. It assessed the damage as fresh and caused by a projectile fired from a south-westerly direction, but it was unable to determine the calibre. A woman (in her thirties) who introduced herself as a neighbour told the SMM that the damage had been caused by shelling on the afternoon of 17 February. Disengagement areas[2] During the day on 20 February, positioned on the western edge of Kalynove- Borshchuvate (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 40 undetermined explosions and nine bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all at an assessed range of 3-4km north-north-east (all assessed as inside the disengagement area near Zolote). Positioned about 1.5km south-east of Molodizhne (non- government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk), the Mission heard five undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 2-3km north (assessed as inside the disengagement area near Zolote) and an undetermined explosion 1-2km west-north- west (assessed as outside the disengagement area). Positioned on the western edge of Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard two impact explosions at an assessed range of 3-5km south (assessed as outside the disengagement area). Positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government- controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3] Withdrawal of weapons The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum. Weapons in violation of withdrawal lines: Government-controlled areas 19 February An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted: a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) near Voitove (33km north- west of Luhansk). 20 February The SMM saw: a surface-to-air missile system (9K35) heading east near Krasnohorivka (24km north of Donetsk). Non-government-controlled areas 20 February The SMM saw: seven tanks (type undetermined) near Staropetrivske. Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites Government-controlled areas 18 February An SMM mini-UAV spotted: a surface-to-air missile system (9K35) in Nyrkove (77km west of Luhansk). Non-government-controlled areas 17 February Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of: 17 tanks (type undetermined), nine pieces of self-propelled and 18 pieces of towed artillery or mortars in a training area near Myrne (28km south- west of Luhansk) and 27 tanks (type undetermined) in a training area near Kruhlyk (31km south- west of Luhansk). 18 February Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of: 17 tanks (type undetermined) in a training area near Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk); six tanks (type undetermined) in a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk); and 21 tanks (type undetermined) in a training area near Ternove (15km south- east of Luhansk). Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed on 18 February the presence of eight pieces of self-propelled and 23 pieces of towed artillery in a training area near Buhaivka.[4] Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[5] At heavy weapons holding areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines in government- controlled areas of Donetsk region 20 February The SMM noted that: nine self-propelled mortars (2S9 Nona, 120mm) and four anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) were present and 113 towed howitzers (56 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm; 45 D-20, 152mm; and 12 2A65 MSTA-B, 152 mm), 18 mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm) and 12 anti-tank guns (D48, 85mm) remained missing. At heavy weapons holding areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines in government- controlled areas of Luhansk region 20 February The SMM noted that: nine self-propelled mortars (2S9 Nona, 120mm) were present and 40 self-propelled howitzers (22 2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm and 18 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) remained missing. Weapons permanent storage sites A permanent storage site beyond the respective withdrawal lines in a government- controlled area of Donetsk region 20 February The SMM noted that: 14 mortars (2B11) continued to be missing. Indications of military presence in the security zone[6] Government-controlled areas 19 February The SMM saw: four IFVs (BMP-1) and an armoured medical evacuation vehicle (MT-LB S) near Popasna (see SMM Daily Report of 19 February 2019); an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in Troitske (69km west of Luhansk); and a self-propelled anti-aircraft system (ZSU-23-4 Shilka, 23mm) in Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk). 20 February The SMM saw: an APC (BTR-70) near Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk) and an IFV (BMP-2) near Kamianka (20km north of Donetsk). UAVs seen flying in the security zone Positioned near Lebedynske (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw three UAVs flying from west to east at altitudes of 100-200m about 500m north of its position. Recent impact craters On 14 February, in Zholobok (non-government-controlled, 47km west of Luhansk), an SMM mid-range UAV spotted about 75 recent craters assessed as impacts of mortar (120mm) rounds in a field south of houses occupied by the armed formations (not visible in imagery from 16 January 2019).
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