DELIBERATIVE DIPLOMACY: THE NORDIC APPROACH TO GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND SOCIETAL REPRESENTATION AT THE UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS STUDIES SERIES
Series Editor
Patrick James University of Southern California
Editorial Board Mark Theodore Berger, Naval Postgraduate School Annette Freyberg-Inan, University of Amsterdam Ewan Harrison, Washington University, St. Louis Axel Huelsemeyer, Concordia University Steven Lamy, University of Southern California Stephen M. Seideman, McGill University
VOLUME 11
DELIBERATIVE DIPLOMACY: THE NORDIC APPROACH TO GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND SOCIETAL REPRESENTATION AT THE UNITED NATIONS
by Norbert G tz
DORDRECHT 2011
Cover Design / Illustration: studio Thorsten / The Royal Library Copenhagen
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CONTENTS
Preface vii
List of figures and tables ix
List of abbreviations xi
1. Introduction 1 The problem 1 Why do the General Assembly and Norden matter? 10 Theory and methodology 24 Prior research 32
2. Challenges and traditions 49 Delegation and representation at the United Nations 49 Democracy and dilemmas at the UN General Assembly 68 Nordic diplomacy at the League of Nations 83 Unisex state actors and the representation of women 114
3. Parliament and UN delegations 141 The Scandinavian model: Denmark 141 An anachronism and parliamentary stronghold: Norway 198 Routine, squeeze-out, routine: Sweden 248 Between Lilliputian and full-scale representation: Iceland 301 Metamorphosis or parliament lost: The Finnish Sonderweg 308
4. The participation of civil society 345 Scandinavian model revisited: Denmark 345 The return of the body-snatched: Norway 371 Corporatism and double universalism: Sweden 401 Short stories: Finland and Iceland 416
5. Conclusions: On the way to deliberative diplomacy 421
Archives 437
Bibliography 439
Author Index 477
v
PREFACE
This study is the product of historical and political interest in the peculiarities of Northern Europe and the United Nations, as well as a belief in democracy and the need to find timely global solutions to current problems. It was begun at the University of Greifswald, continued at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, and concluded at the University of Helsinki. The manuscript was finalised at S dert rn University. The Danish Institute for International Studies and the University of Oslo hosted me as a guest researcher. The book has benefited from all of these scholarly environments. Among the numerous individuals and colleagues to whom I am indebted, two stand out: Jens E. Olesen and Henrik Stenius whose support and friendship were crucial for writing this book. I would also like to express my gratitude to Tomas Ries, Pertti Joenniemi, and Helge Pharo for their generous hospitality. The chapters on Finland could not have been written were it not for the committed assistance of Tiina Saksman-Harb. A key passage from Icelandic was kindly translated by Hartmut Mittelstädt. The continual encouragement of my long-time mentors Bernd Henningsen and Heinrich August Winkler has meant much to me. Jens E. Olesen, Thorsten B. Olesen, Reinhard Wolf and an anonymous reviewer have commented insightfully on earlier versions of the manuscript. Henrik Stenius and my friends at the EINO-seminar at the Centre for Nordic Studies, University of Helsinki, have discussed several draft chapters and been a source of inspiration. Apart from my employers in Germany and Finland, funding for the research and writing of this study was mainly provided by the German Research Foundation (DFG). The Wenner-Gren Foundations and the Norwegian–German Willy Brandt Foundation also offered benefits and financial support. My host institutions all graciously waived overhead charges, thereby enabling me to conduct research that would otherwise not have been possible. I feel privileged to have been able to work at a point in time when academic institutions still felt they were able to afford the luxury of non-paying guest researchers. Friends and family had direct influence on this study; it was in a conversation with the late Alfred Maria Polczyk that the idea of writing about the Nordic countries in the United Nations first emerged. Alexandra Widl, Christa G tz, Hans Norbert G tz, and Volkmar G tz provided significant support under extraordinary circumstances. Other friends and family were always there for me. Finally, the research and writing of this book were made delightfully more complicated and enjoyable by the
vii PREFACE presence of Linus, Joella, and Philine. The greatest ‘thank you’ of all goes to Alexandra – for sharing her life with me, despite this book.
Stockholm and Helsinki, March 2010
Norbert G tz
viii LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES
Figure 1: Peoples representation in Scandinavian UN delegations Figure 2: Swedish delegation to the UN General Assembly, 20 October 1949 Table 1: Women in selected delegations to the General Assembly (by percentage)
ix
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
~ Probably, approximately AGMA Alva and Gunnar Myrdal’s Archive BOA Bertil Ohlin’s Archive BPCAH Brage Press Cutting Archive, Helsinki CAMDUN Campaign for a More Democratic United Nations CM Cabinet meetings D.C. District of Columbia EC European Community ECA Ernst Christiansen’s Archive ECOSOC Economic and Social Council (United Nations) EO Embassy Oslo ES Embassy Stockholm EU European Union EW Embassy Washington FA Foreign Affairs FM Foreign Ministry FMAH Foreign Ministry Archives, Helsinki FMAO Foreign Ministry Archives, Oslo FMAS Foreign Ministry Archives, Stockholm FS Filing system of GA General Assembly GGC Georg A. Gripenberg’s Collection HLA Halvard Lange’s Archive ICFTU International Confederation of Free Trade Unions ILO International Labour Organisation INFUSA International Network for a UN Second Assembly INGO(s) International non-governmental organisation(s) IO(s) International organisation(s) IPU Inter-parliamentary Union KHC Kerstin Hesselgren’s Collection KNA Konrad Nordahl’s Archive LPA Labour Party Archives LPG Liberal Party Group LMAC Labour Movement Archives, Copenhagen LMAO Labour Movement Archives, Oslo LMAS Labour Movement Archives, Stockholm M.P.(s) Member(s) of Parliament MS Manuscripts’ Section NAC National Archives, Copenhagen
xi LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
NAH National Archives, Helsinki NAO National Archives, Oslo NAS National Archives, Stockholm NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NGO(s) Non-governmental organisation(s) NLS National Library, Stockholm N.S. New Series PLO Palestine Liberation Organisation PM Permanent mission to the United Nations PMO Prime Minister’s Office REC Ralph Enckell’s Collection SCAH Swedish Central Archives, Helsinki SDPG Social Democratic Party Group SG Secretary General SPP Swedish People’s Party (of Finland) UK United Kingdom ULA Ulla Lindstr m’s Archive ULG University Library, Gothenburg UN(O) United Nations (Organisation) UNA United Nations Association UNCIO United Nations Conference on International Organization (1945) UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation UNIO United Nations Information Office UNITAR United Nations Institute for Training and Research UNPA United Nations Parliamentary Assembly (suggested) UNRRA United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration US(A) United States of America USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics WAWF World Association of World Federalists WFTU World Federation of Trade Unions WHC Women’s History Collections WTUC World Trade Union Conference
xii
Die UNO zeigt der Welt ffentlichkeit doch mehr als die Diplomatie der einzelnen Staaten. Ein Organ der Menschheit – und sei es noch so miserabel – zeigt sich der Menschheit1
–––––––––––––– 1 Karl Jaspers. Die Atombombe und die Zukunft des Menschen: Politisches Bewußtsein in unserer Zeit. Munich: Piper, 1958. 218. In the American edition of the book, this sentence was translated as: “The UN shows us more than the diplomacy of its members. An organ of mankind, however wretched, appears to mankind” (Karl Jaspers. The Atom Bomb and the Future of Man. Chicago: University Press, 1984. 157).
1. INTRODUCTION
THE PROBLEM “Everyone’s a delegate”, declared the television and billboard ads promoting the 2005 United Nations World Summit.1 The publicity campaign surrounding the descent of UN representatives from all over the world on New York City tried to make the disruptions occasioned by the event more palatable to residents and visitors alike. The idea was to convince everyone of the Summit’s relevance and create a feeling of personal involvement with the UN agenda. Signs on busses and subways announced, “We apologize for causing traffic gridlock, but hopefully we’ll break through a little political gridlock.” Posters at airports and in railway stations, speaking more to the spirit of the campaign, showed an average white male or black female behind nameplates reading ‘Pete Jones’ or ‘Michele Johnson’ surrounded by suit-clad officials behind similar nameplates inscribed ‘Liechtenstein’ or ‘Iceland’.2 The micro states and small states identified on these last advertisements seemed to speak with greater reserve of the intention of the campaign: upgrading ‘Everyone’ to delegate status at the United Nations was not necessarily meant to represent empowerment. The campaign’s internet home page toned down the rhetoric considerably. Instead of suggesting that the public be given direct influence, the appeal here was lower key: “We need you: to be aware and to support our efforts. […] Many ordinary people come to the UN to get involved in issues.” The intention was clearly to channel people into NGOs and youth organisations, while disseminating information supportive of the UN’s activities.3 It is no secret that the 2005 summit was a highly profiled yet largely unsuccessful attempt by Secretary-General Kofi Annan to leave his mark on the world body by forcing through a comprehensive reform agenda before his retirement. However, only a small number of Annan’s suggestions were actually adopted.4 What he did manage to have passed –––––––––––––– 1 Available at
1 CHAPTER 1 was his proposal to open the United Nations not only to “States” (with a capital S), but also to civil society. Annan succeeded in this by calling on the General Assembly to act on the recommendations of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations – Civil Society Relations (the Cardoso Report) and on his own reserved comments to the report.5 The Cardoso Report, which bore the title We the Peoples, referred to the opening phrase of the Charter of the United Nations, the main symbolic point of reference for all attempts to make the world organisation more democratic (although it may be noted that the peoples is not the same as saying the people).6 The report applied the term ‘civil society’ in an unusually broad manner which subsumed parliaments as well. Its proposal that member states more regularly include parliamentarians in their UN delegations was among the suggestions endorsed by Annan (although in very general terms). Other sections of the report also encouraged governments to include representatives of civil society in delegations to United Nations forums.7 In addition, it contained a large number of suggestions meant to intensify UN relations with organisations in civil society as well as parliaments in order to enhance democratic global governance. The only mention of civil society and parliaments in the ‘outcome’ document of the summit were two short references that may have been mandatory in light of contemporary discourse on global governance. In the section “Strengthening the United Nations”, the document referred to “Participation of local authorities, the private sector and civil society, including non-governmental organizations” and to “Cooperation between the United Nations and parliaments”. As is evident from the titles of these sub-sections, the notion of interaction with civil society was somewhat more inclusive than with parliaments. Whereas parliaments were merely called on to help with the implementation of United Nations policies, the
–––––––––––––– 5 Kofi Annan. In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All. A/59/2005. New York: United Nations, 2005. 39, 41. 6 Cf. James Bohman. Democracy across Borders: From Dêmos to Dêmoi. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2007. 7 We the Peoples: Civil Society, the United Nations and Global Governance: Report of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations–Civil Society Relations. A/58/817. New York: United Nations, 2004. 48, 70; with regard to Annan’s endorsement: Kofi Annan. Report of the Secretary-General in Response to the Report of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations–Civil Society Relations. A/59/354. New York: United Nations, 2004. 5; cf. in general: Helmut Volger. “Mehr Partizipation nicht erw nscht. Der Bericht des Cardoso- Panels ber die Reform der Beziehungen zwischen den Vereinten Nationen und der Zivilgesellschaft.” Vereinte Nationen 53 (2005) 1: 12–18. In the context of the present study it is worth noting that Birgitta Dahl of Sweden figured as one of the co-authors of the Cardoso Report (named after the Brazilian politician Fernando Henrique Cardoso).
2 INTRODUCTION document welcomed the contributions of civil society for the promotion and enactment of overarching programmes.8 Nonetheless, the position assigned to civil society and its representatives in the world summit outcome document does not go much further than that assigned to parliaments or parliamentarians. In both instances the paper fails to even approach what one might expect from discourse on global governance, cosmopolitan democracy, and non-state actors in international affairs.9 The current discourse on the reconfiguration of democracy at the global level is fed by the observation of empirical phenomena and normative claims. For example, students of diplomacy have noted that governments find it useful to send representatives of civil society to international conferences as advisers and are doing so more frequently.10 At the same time, the call for a more representative United Nations with improved conditions for the inclusion of civil society and parliamentarians is apparent.11 There is a widespread notion of global civil society as a transforming force “something like a world proletariat in civvies”.12 The establishment or enhancement of a parliamentary dimension is en vogue in international relations – as an artefact of an intergovernmental world’s contested conceptualisation of parliamentarians belonging to ‘civil society’, as a coherent balancing force against the growing influence of unelected interest group-driven ad hoc democratisation in global politics, and for intrinsic reasons.13 Observers of what is perhaps the central question in contemporary world politics, the much-discussed ‘democratic deficit’ in
–––––––––––––– 8 2005 World Summit Outcome. A/RES/60/1. New York: United Nations, 2005. 37–38; cf. on the conceptual history of the term ‘non-governmental organisations’: Norbert G tz. “Reframing NGOs: The Identity of an International Relations Non-Starter.” European Journal of International Relations 14 (2008a) 2: 231–258. 9 The discourse took off with a number of publications in the mid-1990s, see: Commission on Global Governance. Our Global Neighbourhood. Oxford: University Press, 1995; Daniele Archibugi and David Held (eds). Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New World Order. Cambridge: Polity, 1995; Peter Willetts (ed.). ‘The Conscience of the World’: The Influence of Non-Governmental Organisations in the UN System. London: Hurst, 1996; see also: Daniele Archibugi (ed.). Debating Cosmopolitics. London: Verso, 2003. 10 Richard Langhorne. “Current Developments in Diplomacy: Who Are the Diplomats Now?” Diplomacy and Statecraft 8 (1997) 2: 1–15, at 12. 11 To give just one representative example: Lloyd Axworthy. “United Nations.” The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World. Joel Krieger (ed.). 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. 868–870, at 870. 12 John Keane. Global Civil Society? Cambridge: University Press, 2003. 65. 13 With regard to the balancing of interest groups: Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss. “Toward Global Parliament.” Foreign Affairs 80 (2001) 1: 212–220.
3 CHAPTER 1 international relations,14 view parliamentarians as directly embodying the legitimising power of the people. Whereas notions of the necessity of democratising foreign policy and introducing ‘parliamentary diplomacy’ (as exercised by parliamentarians) date back to the time of the First World War and the peace movement of the late nineteenth century, the widespread perception that globalisation has accelerated since the end of the Cold War appears to incite urgency. At the same time, organs known as models for the exercise of ‘parliamentary diplomacy’ (in the sense of diplomats’ adoption of parliamentary methods), particularly the Assembly of the League of Nations and the UN General Assembly, have always retained the connotation of a ‘parliament of man’, despite their undisputed intergovernmental character.15 In this sense it is almost taken for granted that improved democratic global governance must assign a leading role to the United Nations.16 Ideas of a world forum representative of the people are as old as the United Nations itself and the world organisations established in the twentieth century. They can be traced at least as far back as the seventeenth-century Czech pedagogue Jan Amos Komensk (Johann Amos Comenius) whose ideas on universal reform included the establishment of a universal assembly (concilium oecumenicum) of philosophers, theologians and politicians convening periodically at alternating sites on the four continents known at the time.17 Victorian poet Alfred Tennyson was among many authors who expressed similar ideas in the nineteenth century. Tennyson’s literary vision was embodied in the inspiring and much-quoted phrase “the Parliament of man, the Federation of the world”.18 US President Harry S. Truman, instant heir of the United Nations Organisation after the death of his predecessor, Franklin D. Roosevelt, in 1945, is said to have
–––––––––––––– 14 Cf. Andrew Moravcsik. “Is there a ‘Democratic Deficit’ in World Politics? A Framework for Analysis.” Government and Opposition 39 (2004): 336–363, at 336. 15 Cf. Norbert G tz. “On the Origins of ‘Parliamentary Diplomacy’: Scandinavian ‘Bloc Politics’ and Delegation Policy in the League of Nations.” Cooperation and Conflict 40 (2005a) 3: 263–279. 16 Cf. Daniele Archibugi. “From the United Nations to Cosmopolitan Democracy.” Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New World Order. Daniele Archibugi and David Held (eds). Cambridge: Polity, 1995. 121–162, at 122. 17 Johann Amos Comenius. De rerum humanarum emendatione consultatio catholica, vol. 2: Pampaediam, Panglottiam, Panorthosiam, Pannuthesiam necnon Lexicon reale pansophicum continens. Prague: Czechoslovakian Academy of Science, 1966. A history of subsequent ideas of a world parliament is provided by Claudia Kissling. “Repräsentativ- parlamentarische Entw rfe globaler Demokratiegestaltung im Laufe der Zeit: Eine rechtspolitische Ideengeschichte.” Forum historiae iuris 9 (2005). Available at
4 INTRODUCTION kept a clipping of these lines in his wallet for years.19 Albert Einstein endorsed the idea of the UN General Assembly being “composed of men and women who are responsible not to national governments but only to the people who elect them”.20 There have been Scandinavian contributions to this discourse, too.21 After 1982, the International Network for a UN Second Assembly (INFUSA), whose activities continued in the following under the name Campaign for a More Democratic United Nations (CAMDUN), pushed the issue of a consultative parliamentary body operating under authority of the General Assembly.22 However, observers noted that CAMDUN had yet to gain acceptance by the time the campaign lost its momentum in the mid- 1990s.23 Similar proposals for a global parliament were advocated by the world federalist movement and a number of allied authors.24 In recent times, the Committee for a Democratic UN (Komitee f r eine demokratische UNO), based in Germany, has been the most active proponent of augmenting the United Nations with a parliamentary body. In April 2007 the Committee was the main force behind the ongoing international Campaign for the Establishment of a Parliamentary Assembly at the United Nations (UNPA).25 Promoting the idea that “Everyone’s a delegate” has been a more academic project. Two Swiss economists have recently suggested representative citizens (trustees) be appointed by means of ‘random selection’.26 Despite such attempts and a modest breakthrough for non- governmental organisations at the United Nations in the mid-1990s as well as the increasingly close cooperation of the United Nations with the Inter- parliamentary Union (IPU) since that time, the atmosphere of departure that
–––––––––––––– 19 Paul M. Kennedy. The Parliament of Man: The Past, Present, and Future of the United Nations. New York: Random House, 2006. ix. 20 Albert Einstein. Einstein On Peace. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1960. 416. 21 E.g. Torbj rn Tännsj . Global Democracy: The Case for a World Government. Edinburgh: University Press, 2008. 95–99. 22 Cf. Frank Barnaby (ed.). Building a More Democratic United Nations: Proceedings of CAMDUN 1. London: Cass, 1991. 23 A.J.R. Groom and Paul Taylor. “The United Kingdom and the United Nations.” The United Nations System: The Policies of Member States. Chadwick F. Alger, Gene M. Lyons and John E. Trent (eds). Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1995. 367–409, at 406. 24 Cf. Saul H. Mendlovitz and Barbara Walker (eds). A Reader on Second Assembly and Parliamentary Proposals. Wayne: Center for UN Reform Education, 2003. 25 The campaign website is at
5 CHAPTER 1 characterised the tenure of UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali has given way to stagnation.27 The alignment of the United Nations with the Inter-parliamentary Union might be interpreted as a fig leaf that is a noncommittal substitute for the development of a genuine parliamentary dimension within the United Nations system. The following conjecture by Finnish politician Kimmo Kiljunen addresses a topic that must be confronted, in one way or another, by all international organisations: What has gotten into the leaders of international organisations? Why are they vying with each other in their eagerness to attach parliamentary bodies to their organisations? Are they hoping parliamentarians will give them a shield against demonstrators hurling rotten tomatoes and administering cream pies?28 To place this utterance in a global perspective, would parliamentarians, or ‘the people’, be an appropriate shield for international organisations against terrorists and suicide bombers? In the outcome paper for the 2005 world summit, parliaments and civil society associations were not treated better than ‘Everyone’ in the accompanying public relations campaign; in other words, they were viewed as tools of the United Nations. However, unlike ‘Everyone’ as depicted in the campaign, they were not even pictured at the conference table. With regard to its organisation and procedure, the 2005 summit has been characterised as a low point in relations between the United Nations and civil society.29 Similarly, the suggested collaboration between the United Nations and parliaments has been described as reasonable but missing the point of the quest for democratisation of the United Nations.30 Nothing of significance relative to the status of non-governmental organisations or
–––––––––––––– 27 Cf. Boutros Boutros-Ghali. An Agenda for Democratization. New York: United Nations, 1996; with regard to NGOs: G tz 2008a; with regard to the IPU: Claudia Kissling. Die Interparlamentarische Union im Wandel: Rechtspolitische Ansätze einer repräsentativ- parlamentarischen Gestaltung der Weltpolitik. Frankfurt/Main: Lang, 2006. 28 Kimmo Kiljunen. “Global Governance and Parliamentary Influence.” Helsinki: Helsinki Process, 2004. Available at http://www.helsinkiprocess.fi/netcomm/ImgLib/24/89/hp_track1_kiljunen.pdf. Accessed 25 March 2010. 29 Jens Martens. “Zukunftsperspektiven der Mitwirkung von Nichtregierungsorganisationen in den Vereinten Nationen nach dem Weltgipfel 2005.” ‘Wir, die V lker (…)’ – Strukturwandel in der Weltorganisation: Konferenzband aus Anlass des 60-jährigen Bestehens der Vereinten Nationen vom 27.–28. Oktober 2005 in Dresden. Sabine von Schorlemer (ed.). Frankfurt/Main: Lang, 2006. 53–67, at 60. 30 Christian Much. “Revitalisierung der UN-Generalversammlung: Die unendliche Geschichte.” Die Reform der Vereinten Nationen: Bilanz und Perspektiven. Johannes Varwick and Andreas Zimmermann (eds). Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2006. 85–99.
6 INTRODUCTION parliamentarians has happened since then. The observation by Harold Nicolson in his classical study on diplomacy published seventy years ago remains valid today: “Democratic diplomacy has not as yet discovered its own formula.”31 The concept of democracy was not always viewed with the positive connotations it bears today. In classical Greek political philosophy, democratic government was mainly associated with irresponsibility and incompetence. Despite a minority of more optimistic voices, democratic government was believed to fall short of the essential utilitarian goals of the political community. In an odd way this school of thought, which denies the feasibility of rule by the common people,32 continues in the field of international relations today. As demonstrated by the so-called incompatibility hypothesis, democracy is not generally regarded as an asset to international affairs. Alexis de Tocqueville, the most prominent observer of democracy in the first half of the nineteenth century, was convinced that democracies were inferior to other governments in their conduct of foreign policy.33 A logical extention of this thought was the realist approach, the dominant international relations theory of the Cold War era. It assumed that democratic principles did not apply to the handling of international affairs.34 Although there has recently been a strong tendency to consider democracy a product suited for export, it is questionable whether decision making in this regard has been based on good democratic practice and whether the results achieved have been favourable or counterproductive. In effect, the question of how compatible democracy and foreign policy are remains. The answer to such a question cannot be adjudicated here, although the empirical evidence presented may be interpreted in terms of the incompatibility hypothesis. It may here suffice to point to the historical dynamics of democracy as a force altering the conditions for legitimate
–––––––––––––– 31 Harold Nicolson. Diplomacy. London: Thornton Butterworth, 1939. 101. 32 Cf. Jennifer Tolbert Roberts. Athens on Trial: The Antidemocratic Tradition in Western Thought. Princeton: University Press, 1994; A. H. M. Jones. “The Athenian Democracy and Its Critics.” Athenian Democracy. Oxford: Blackwell, 1957[1953]. 41–72; Christian Maier et al. “Demokratie.” Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon zur politisch- sozialen Sprache in Deutschland, vol. 1: A–D. Otto Brunner, Werner Conze and Reinhart Koselleck (eds). Stuttgart: Klett, 1972. 821–899. 33 Alexis de Tocqueville. Democracy in America. Garden City: Anchor, 1969. 228. 34 Cf. Philip Everts. “Democracy and Foreign Policy: The Incompatibility Thesis Revisited.” The Role of the Nation-State in the 21st Century: Human Rights, International Organisations, and Foreign Policy: Essays in Honour of Peter Baehr. Monique Castermans-Holleman, Fried van Hoof and Jacqueline Smith (eds). The Hague: Kluwer, 1998. 411–425, at 411.
7 CHAPTER 1 action. As suggested by Volker Rittberger in an article calling for a more inclusive United Nations, the lack of response to the Cardoso report does not alter the need for the world organisation to confront societal transnational politics in order to adequately deal with the challenges of the future.35 Democracy has been a challenge for the past 250 years as it has spread from groups of privileged white males in Western societies to all adults in countries around the world. Nonetheless, it may be premature to imagine global democracy by analogy to nation-state voter democracy. Such a concept would presuppose the establishment of a supranational global authority – a world state.36 Yet, in addition to being far in advance of what would seem feasible in view of the current state of the world, a close analogy might not even be desirable. Immanuel Kant, one of the most distinguished proponents of the idea of a world state, did not actually propose that sovereignty be transferred from world confederates to a world republic; he advocated the idea of a “negative surrogate” for such a republic, namely, a confederation or league. This was partly due to his belief that a world state would not be endorsed by the peoples of the Earth – likely a paraphrase of his own concern for the potentially totalising effect of such a superstructure. Moreover, Kant’s confidence in reason and civil society and what is today called ‘democratic peace’ led him to favour the less demanding model of a league, despite his awareness that this enhanced the risk for hostilities.37 J rgen Habermas has broken down the Kantian project into two antagonistic paradigms. By distinguishing between genuine Eurofederalist and cosmopolitan views that regard a federated Europe as the starting point for more ambitious goals, Habermas seeks to harmonise these views by framing the former within the latter’s project. This results in the manageable proportion of “a transnational network of regimes that can pursue something akin to a global domestic politics, even without a world
–––––––––––––– 35 Volker Rittberger. “Der Wandel im internationalen System und die Tendenz zu inklusiveren Vereinten Nationen.” ‘Wir, die V lker (…)’ – Strukturwandel in der Weltorganisation: Konferenzband aus Anlass des 60-jährigen Bestehens der Vereinten Nationen vom 27.–28. Oktober 2005 in Dresden. Sabine von Schorlemer (ed.). Frankfurt/Main: Lang, 2006. 133–146, at 145. 36 Cf. on this idea: Barbara Walker (ed.). Uniting the Peoples and Nations: Readings in World Federalism. New York: World Federalist Movement, 1993. 37 Immanuel Kant. Zum ewigen Frieden: Ein philosophischer Entwurf. K nigsberg: Nicolovius, 1795. 35–38; cf. on Kant’s concerns: J rgen Habermas. “Does the Constitutionalization of International Law Still Have a Chance?” The Divided West. Cambridge: Polity, 2006[2004]. 115–193, at 125–126.
8 INTRODUCTION government”.38 This ambiguity is the intellectual outcome of Habermas’ universalist disposition, on the one hand, and his preoccupation with the public sphere, on the other hand, which require “‘thick’ communicative embeddedness” and give rise to the “troubling question of whether democratic opinion- and will-formation could ever achieve a binding force that extends beyond the level of the nation-state”.39 In this context, even Europe presents a difficult objective – a global public sphere is almost beyond comprehension. Thus, in addition to pragmatic concerns, there are substantial theoretical reasons for framing the issue of global democracy – not in analogy to nation-state majority democracy, but as a question of establishing an “international negotiation democracy”.40 For this reason, a deliberative understanding of democracy is particularly fitting for global governance, which characteristically lacks competitive elections and a transnational public sphere.41 A discussion of the incompatibility hypothesis or the notion of enhancing democracy by way of foreign policy would require a study of rhetoric, aid, pressure, and war, as well as a comparative analysis of why in some instances ‘democracy’ matters to ‘democracies’ and not in others or why ‘democracies’ might even outrightly oppose some democratically- elected regimes. It might also be linked to the idea of a democratically derived foreign or international policy mentioned above. The normative frame of reference in this study is one that presents democracy as an intrinsic value that cannot be compromised in principle. At the same time, the theoretical framework is primarily constructivist, questioning any claim of ahistorical truths. Although this approach may at first glance seem contradictory, as soon as democracy is accepted as a voluntarily chosen principle (rather than as a ‘truth’), the two-fold outlook employed here will be seen as compatible. Hence, the issue is not whether democracy and foreign policy are compatible, but how attempts to align democracy and –––––––––––––– 38 J rgen Habermas. “Euroskepticism, Market Europe, or a Europe of (World) Citizens?” Time of Transitions. Cambridge: Polity, 2006. 73–88, at 85; cf. J rgen Habermas. “The Postnational Constellation and the Future of Democracy.” The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays. Oxford: Polity, 2001. 58–112, at 89–90. 39 Habermas 2001: 109 (first quote); J rgen Habermas. “The European Nation-State: On the Past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship.” The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998a. 105–127, at 127 (second quote); among the Nordic peoples, the question posed by Habermas has troubled particularly Norwegian observers, e.g. Øyvind Østerud. “Rokkan mot Habermas.” Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift (2003) 2: 152–160. 40 Cf. Klaus Dieter Wolf. Die UNO: Geschichte, Aufgaben, Perspektiven. M nchen: Beck, 2005. 117. 41 Patrizia Nanz, and Jens Steffek. “Global Governance, Participation and the Public Sphere.” Government and Opposition 39 (2004): 314–335, at 318.
9 CHAPTER 1 foreign policy might appear, and how democracy might function in foreign affairs and international relations. No ideal solution to this question can be expected. Instead, one must reckon with a set of historically contingent answers that depend on time and place. In what follows, some such attempts to associate democracy and foreign policy will be reconstructed and analysed in detail. The present study employs a historical perspective on the various practises applied by the five Nordic countries of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden (collectively known as Norden) in composing their delegations to the General Assembly of the United Nations. The empirical focus will be on the years 1945 to 1975, or what the French call Les Trente Glorieuses.
WHY DO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND NORDEN MATTER? Why study delegations sent by the five Nordic countries to the General Assembly to understand the democratic conduct of international affairs and global governance? Although the General Assembly and the Nordic states are separate issues, an empirical link exists between them. Renowned International Relations42 scholar Robert Keohane once wrote an article entitled “Who Cares About the General Assembly?” and produced complex data meant to help provide an answer. In the end, however, he refraind from making a serious attempt to interpret it. Nonetheless, Keohane did establish that Canada, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden were among those who cared most about the General Assembly, and maintained this corresponded to the common sense observation that these countries exerted a certain leadership role at the United Nations. Hence, both statistical and hermeneutic evidence for a particular link of the General Assembly and Nordic politics exists.43 In another article, Keohane observed that the moral authority of the Scandinavian states enabled them to be among those commanding a measure of influence in the General Assembly.44
–––––––––––––– 42 Here the convention is followed to use capital letters for the scholarly discipline of International Relations. 43 Robert O. Keohane, “Who Cares About the General Assembly?” International Organization 23 (1969a) 1: 141–149, at 146, 149; cf. Ole Elgstr m. Aktiv utrikespolitik: En jämf relse mellan svensk och dansk parlamentarisk utrikesdebatt 1962–1978. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1982. 90, 98; it is worth noting that Canadians at the United Nations used to call themselves “displaced Scandinavians” (Andrew Boyd. United Nations: Piety, Myth, and Truth. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1964[1962]. 81). 44 Robert O. Keohane. “The Study of Political Influence in the General Assembly.” International Organization 21 (1967): 221–237, at 222.
10 INTRODUCTION
Similarly, Nordic self-understanding points to a special link between the Nordic countries and the General Assembly which, due to their infrequent membership in the Security Council, remains their main forum at the United Nations. Such a self-conception was also expressed by another quantifying political scientist, who noted “a strong identification with the United Nations in the Nordic countries is a fact which need not be proved.”45 From the perspective of one of the countries involved, it might even seem that “a type of a personal union” between Sweden, the other Scandinavian countries and the United Nations existed.46 This theory calls to mind the Secretary-General of the United Nations from 1953 to 1961, Dag Hammarskj ld, and could similarly be applied to his predecessor, Trygve Lie of Norway (1946 to 1953). In Denmark and Finland, Hammarskj ld was ‘adopted’ as ‘Scandinavian’ and, thus, as one of their ‘own’.47 However, as indicated by current Swedish and Norwegian rhetoric that portrays each country as the “best friend” of the United Nations, the spiritual union between the Nordic countries and the world organisation – not the personal factor – is and has been decisive.48 Their own self- understanding classifies the people from the Nordic countries as “genuine multilateralists” and, thus, as decisively interested in the General Assembly and the United Nations.49 –––––––––––––– 45 Kurt Jacobsen. The Nordic Countries in the United Nations: A Quantitative Analysis of Roll-call Votes Cast in the General Assembly. Oslo: Institute of Political Science, 1967a. 17–18. 46 Gunnar Romdahl. “Swedish Foreign Policy 1945–1961 [1961?].” NAS, BOA, F, vol. 35. See appendix on abbreviations for the basic meaning of the archival codes. 47 Cf. “Saaromsr stningen och FN-dagen.” Hufvudstadsbladet (23 October 1955); Hermond Lannung. “‘Stor-Skandinavien’ i FN. ” Fremtiden 14 (1959) 1: 13–16. On Hammarskj ld see also Brian Urquhart. Hammarskjold. New York: Knopf, 1972. 48 Swedish Under-Secretary of State Hans Dahlgren at the hearing “Seminarium inf r FN:s 60:e generalf rsamling: Ett nytt FN och en bättre värld står på dagordningen”. Stockholm, Riksdagens andrakammarsal, 6 September 2005; Swedish Prime Minister G ran Persson: “Statsministerns information till riksdagen den 21 september 2005 om FN:s h gnivåm te den 14–16 september.” Available at
11 CHAPTER 1
Nevertheless, the fact that Scandinavians care about the General Assembly and the United Nations and that they exert a certain influence therein fails to answer the question of whether the General Assembly matters or not. Rather, according to the Charter of the United Nations, the status of the General Assembly is secondary to that of the Security Council.50 Moreover, since 1991 the ongoing discussion over what has become (in official United Nations terminology) the agenda point of ‘revitalization’ of the General Assembly makes evident that not all has been well with that organ for a long time.51 The term ‘revitalisation’ can be seen as a euphemism because it implies the restoration of a previous vigour. However, apart from the special configuration that prevailed in the early 1950s at the time of the Korean War, it would be difficult to find historical examples to justify attributing to the General Assembly dynamic qualities that the ‘revitalisation discourse’ purports to celebrate, namely, ‘strength’, ‘effectiveness’, and ‘action-orientation’.52 It is worth recalling what Edward Stettinius, US Secretary of State at the time of the drafting conference of the United Nations Charter, reported to President Truman. Stettinius made it clear that the United Nations Organisation was not a super-state, nor was the General Assembly a legislative body in the usual sense of the term. Instead, he described the General Assembly as a deliberative body having the authority to discuss any subject within the scope of the Charter.53 Hence, if the General Assembly carries any weight, it is not based on ‘hard power’. Rather, it functions as “a talking shop, with all the potentialities –––––––––––––– number of membership of countries in international governmental organisations. Among the 26 countries in the survey, Denmark ranked first with 164 memberships, Norway third with 154 memberships, Sweden fourth with 153 memberships, Finland sixth with 139 memberships, and Iceland fifteeth with 105 memberships. France ranked second, the United Kingdom fifth, the Federal Republic of Germany seventh, and the USA eleventh (Harold K.Jacobson, William M. Reisinger and Todd Mathers. “National Entanglements in International Governmental Organizations.” American Political Science Review 80 (1986): 141–159, at 149). 50 E.g. Bengt Broms. The United Nations. Helsinki: Suomalainen Tiedeakatemia, 1990. 155; Gunnar Häggl f. Fredens vägar 1945–1950. Stockholm: Norstedt, 1973. 121. 51 Cf. Much 2006; the first resolution of the General Assembly applying the ‘revitalisation discourse’, which had earlier been reserved for the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), was: “46/77. Revitalization of the Work of the General Assembly.” Resolutions and Decisions Adopted by the General Assembly During Its Session 46 (1991): 30. 52 Norbert G tz. “Sechzig Jahre und kein bisschen weise: Die Vereinten Nationen in der postnationalen Konstellation.” Neue Politische Literatur 52 (2007) 1: 37–55, at 45; cf. on the attributes of ‘revitalisation’: Revitalization of the Work of the General Assembly: Note by the President of the General Assembly. A/57/861. New York: United Nations, 2003. 1. 53 Edward R. Stettinius. Charter of the United Nations: Report to the President on the Results of the San Francisco Conference. Washington: Government, 1945. 55 (emphasis in the original).
12 INTRODUCTION and disabilities that that implies”.54 Because this description corresponds with the overall image of the United Nations, it preempts a separate discussion on whether the world organisation as a whole matters in the first place. What, then, is the significance of the General Assembly as forum for discussion? First, as suggested earlier, it is relevant in discourses and in current United Nations non-decision making in terms of situating global governance in civil society, parliamentary models, and democratic ideals. It was the General Assembly that adopted the lackluster 2005 World Summit Outcome. More importantly, with the institutionalised principle of ‘one state – one vote’ the General Assembly is frequently conceived of as “the most democratic of all the instruments of the United Nations”, or even as “the people’s organ” (perhaps more accurately ‘the peoples’ organ’).55 It is frequently envisioned as at least as close to the ‘parliament of man’ as one can find in the world of today.56 Most post-Second World War notions of a ‘parliament of man’ with greater scope than merely representing governments refer explicitly to the General Assembly, proposing either its redesign or augmentation.57 Likewise, the General Assembly is the most prominent forum cited in discussions about the strengthening of bonds between the United Nations system and civil society.58 Whereas the United Nations Economic and Social Council remains for the time being the primary point of contact with civil society, the United Nations as a whole functions as the “coordinator of public and private efforts in weaving a worldwide web of interdependence”.59 Second, the General Assembly is frequently regarded as the principal organ of the United Nations. In addition to the view that the General Assembly comes closest of any organisation to the idea of a ‘world
–––––––––––––– 54 Herbert G. Nicholas. The United Nations as a Political Institution. 3rd ed. Oxford: University Press, 1967[1959]. 101. 55 Herbert Evatt. “The General Assembly.” Peace on Earth. New York: Hermitage, 1949. 27–45, at 27. 56 Heikki Patomäki, and Teivo Tivainen. Global Democracy Initiatives: The Art of Possible. Helsinki: Network Institute for Global Democratization, 2002. 36. 57 Cf. David Held. Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance. Cambridge: Polity, 1995. 273. 58 E.g. Bertram Pickard. The Greater United Nations: An Essay Concerning the Place and Significance of International Non-governmental Organizations. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1956. 74; Dianne Otto. “Nongovernmental Organizations in the United Nations System: The Emerging Role of International Civil Society.” Human Rights Quarterly 18 (1996) 1: 107–141, at 120. 59 Pei-heng Chiang. Non-Governmental Organizations at the United Nations: Identity, Role, and Function. New York: Praeger, 1981. 276.
13 CHAPTER 1 parliament’,60 we encounter a more elaborate version of an argument equating a “quasi-governmental organization” like the United Nations with what John Stuart Mill once remarked about representative government: if the character of a representative government is fixed by the constitution of the popular House, it is the General Assembly that resembles the ‘popular House’.61 This “quasi-parliament” of the world is crucial in helping create “some level of common discourse” with global outreach.62 Among the more detailed elements that underline the significance of the General Assembly within the United Nations system are the universality of its membership, the wide scope of its agenda, the supervisory role it carries vis-à-vis other organs, its budgetary powers, and the continuing attendance of high-ranking statesmen.63 This argument is derived solely from characteristics of the General Assembly and does not refer to the far- reaching blockade that largely paralysed the Security Council during the Cold War; it remains valid despite the increase in the Security Council’s capacity to take action in the decades since 1989. Third, with regard to the category of ‘meaning’, the most original study to date on the world organisation, Conor Cruise O’Brien’s The United Nations: Sacred Drama, argues that the General Assembly “is the main focus of such power as does reside in the United Nations – moral, imaginative, religious power”. In O’Brien’s view the General Assembly resembles a theatre, rather than a legislature, because its main thrust concerns the symbolic, whereas the parliamentary metaphor gives a –––––––––––––– 60 Johan Kaufmann. United Nations Decision Making. Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1980. 25. 61 Catherine Senf Manno. “Problems and Trends in the Composition of Nonplenary UN Organs.” International Organization 19 (1965): 37–55; cf. John Stuart Mill. Considerations on Representative Government. London: Parker, Son, and Bourn, 1861. 241. From a structural point of view, this analogy is somewhat problematic. As remarked by Egon Glesinger in connection with an unrealised book project in collaboration with Gunnar Myrdal: “The [ ] GA of the UN is not very different from a superparliament and resembles in many ways the upper house composed of provincial reps, senators sent there by the States of the Union etc. The point to stress is that despite these resemblances, the UN general assemblies are attended by delegates appointed by governments. Moreover many such delegations comprise several parliamentarians (incl US senators) representing both the ruling parties + the opposition.” (Comment by Glesinger on a Manuscript by Myrdal of September 1971, LMAS, AGMA, vol. 89b). 62 First quote: Robert O. Keohane. “Institutionalization in the United Nations General Assembly.” International Organization 23 (1969b) 4: 859–896, at 870; second quote: Mildred J. Peterson. The General Assembly in World Politics. Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1986. 217. 63 Kaufmann 1980: 25; cf. Peterson 1986: 1–2; Christian Tomuschat. “Generalversammlung.” Handbuch Vereinte Nationen. R diger Wolfrum (ed.). 2nd rev. ed. Munich: Beck, 1991. 225–234, at 225.
14 INTRODUCTION misleading impression of solidity and power that sustains a ‘platonic’ as-if United Nations: “The Assembly is not a legislative body except in the sense that poets are the unacknowledged legislators of mankind.” As an “essentially dramatic organization” with only diffuse symbolic power, the United Nations receives O’Brien’s praise for having restored to international life an element of play in Huizinga’s sense. Despite the powerlessness of such a configuration, O’Brien argued that the role of imagination in politics, and the dynamics of rhetoric (especially when it involves arguments of international law), should not be underestimated: “The ‘power of the United Nations’, and in particular of the General Assembly, is the power to evoke such rhetoric and squeeze it towards action.” On a more existential level, O’Brien suggests that the United Nations stage, with its theatrical ‘parliamentary diplomacy’, functions as a substitute arena for fighting out ‘real world’ conflicts in a ritualised, sublime (and at the same time absurd) form. In his view, the United Nations provides a time-consuming face-saving apparatus and represents an easy scapegoat in the Cold War era, enhancing the chances for survival in case the primary security mechanism of a balance of atomic terror ceases to function as an adequate deterrent from escalating conflicts. Thus, according to O’Brien, “Like the liturgy according to Guardini, the typical United Nations spectacle is ‘zwecklos aber doch sinnvoll’ – pointless but full of meaning.”64 From a similar perspective, Max Jakobson, a former Finnish candidate for UN Secretary-General, compared voting in the United Nations to the scenario in Hermann Hesse’s Das Glasperlenspiel (The Glass Bead Game) in which the players avail themselves of meaningful signs for signalling values and coming into contact with each other.65 In this environment the formal ‘policy outcomes’ are negligible, at least in comparison with the significance of the quasi-parliamentary entanglement itself.66 In summary, the General Assembly can be regarded as relevant in the discourse on democratising international relations and global –––––––––––––– 64 Conor Cruise O’Brien and Feliks Topolski. The United Nations: Sacred Drama. London: Hutchinson, 1968. 19, 23, 49, 52 (quotes), 50, 66, 222, 227, 245, 274, 277, 282, 287, 292; cf. Conor Cruise O’Brien. Memoir: My Life and Themes. London: Profile, 1998. 180; Johan Huizinga. Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play-Element in Culture. Boston: Beacon, 1955[1938]; Romano Guardini. Vom Geist der Liturgie. Ecclesia orans 1. Freiburg: Herder, 1918. 65 Max Jakobson. År av fruktan och hopp. Stockholm: Atlantis, 2002[2001]. 432. 66 Keith S. Petersen. “The Uses of the United Nations.” The United Nations System and Its Functions. Robert W. Gregg and Michael Barkun (eds). Princeton: Van Nostand, 1968. 127–135, at 131.
15 CHAPTER 1 governance, relevant within the United Nations system, and as a symbol for the aspirations of humankind, with potentially existential repercussions in international affairs. This evidence should demonstrate that the study of the General Assembly is not only rewarding for the comprehension of democratic tendencies in international affairs, but that it also merits attention in its own right. Moreover, as a semiotic system, the United Nations is relevant both as a producer of material output and as means of seeing how different actors relate to one another and present themselves to the world public and their home audience in a global arena.67 Those readers who support the ‘constructivist turn’ in historiography and social science or who accept O’Brien’s view that the predominance of the fantastic, which has tended to repel the serious scholar from studying the United Nations, “ought on the contrary to attract his concentrated attention”, may find additional reason to regard the General Assembly as a significant subject to survey.68 Why, then, focus on Nordic practises that seek to conciliate democracy and foreign policy at the General Assembly? A long quotation from an earlier work by O’Brien may provide a good starting point for an answer. Writing on the disastrous United Nations mission to the Congo in the early 1960s, the author, a former Irish diplomat and UN Secretary- General Dag Hammarskj ld’s personal representative to Katanga, describes how one of the Nordic countries was viewed at the end of the 1950s by foreign service officers of another small, neutral country, namely, his own: For some of us, particularly the younger members of the Department, the ideal of what constituted good international behaviour was exemplified at this time by Sweden. Sweden’s action in the international field was, as we saw it, independent, disinterested and honourable. The Swedes in international affairs did not spend much time in proclaiming lofty moral principles but they usually acted as men would do who were in fact animated by such principles. Their voting record was more eloquent than their speeches. It seemed to contain few or no votes against conscience […]. Sweden paid its share, and more than its share, for all the humanitarian and peace-making aspects of the UN work and sent out its men, soldiers or civil servants, on various more or less unpleasant or dangerous tasks as the work of the organization required. Sweden’s willingness to sacrifice was already symbolized by the death of Bernadotte. But above all, the example of Dag –––––––––––––– 67 Cf. G tz 2007: 55; Norbert G tz. “Kontrasten till allt detta afrikanska bubbeligum: Die Semiotik des Nordens in den Vereinten Nationen.” Lecture at the “18. Arbeitstagung der deutschsprachigen Skandinavistik”, Berlin, 21 September 2007. 68 O’Brien/Topolski 1968: 299; cf. J rgen Martschukat, and Steffen Patzold (eds). Geschichtswissenschaft und ‘performative turn’: Ritual, Inszenierung und Performanz vom Mittelalter bis zur Neuzeit. K ln: B hlau, 2003.
16 INTRODUCTION
Hammarskjold showed that, even in an organization, most of whose members seemed to be guided by standards very different from those of Sweden, a few countries and people could achieve remarkable results. Hammarskjold more than anyone had given the United Nations a focus of moral authority which could attract an international loyalty, and use it in the cause of peace and justice. […] these were the common assumptions. We hoped that Ireland would become one of the very small (and mainly Scandinavian) group of delegations at the United Nations whose chief concern it was to safeguard that moral authority.69 Many elements of Nordic self-description at the United Nations and the characterisations of Nordic countries or representatives by others are condensed in this remarkable piece of prose. It should be noted that the qualities mainly associated with Sweden in this context were largely common Nordic properties (as O’Brien hinted in his reference to ‘Scandinavian’ delegations). Whereas Iceland, in all fields apart from the special interest issue of the law of the seas, due to its small size and limited resources, largely acted (and was perceived) as an appendix to the other Nordic countries, Denmark and Finland conformed to the description given above, although they usually preferred to take a lower profile than Sweden. Thus, while Finnish diplomat Ralph Enckell defined the foreign policy of Finland as “a sincere endeavour to observe very strictly a code of international good behaviour”, he framed the difference between the Finnish and Swedish policies of neutrality with the following aphorism: “Finland tries to manage her relations in East and West equally well, Sweden equally badly.”70 Norway, a NATO member, had almost as high a profile as neutral Sweden in postwar United Nations politics, and bypassed its eastern neighbour in this orientation after the end of the Cold War. In recent recommendations regarding Norwegian public diplomacy exploring the option of “a meta-story about Norway as an ‘Über-Scandinavian’” and a campaign along the lines that “Some countries are more Scandinavian than others” has been suggested.71 Norway has also exceeded Sweden as the largest Scandinavian contributor to budgets of the United Nations system. –––––––––––––– 69 Conor Cruise O’Brien. To Katanga and Back: A UN Case History. London: Hutchinson, 1962. 14–15. 70 First quote: “Finland on the map of the world.” Speech in Portland, Oregon, International Trade Fair, 4 May 1959, FMAH, REC, vol. 18; second quote: Jakobson 2002[2001]: 463. 71 Mark Leonard and Andrew Small. Norway’s Public Diplomacy: A Strategy: Executive Summary. Oslo: Foreign Ministry, 2003. Available at
17 CHAPTER 1
The fact that Norway ranked seventh and Sweden ninth among the world’s largest contributors from 2002 to 2004 is remarkable for countries of their size. In total, the contribution of both states corresponded to that of the United Kingdom and was about forty percent more that of Germany.72 Also in a long-term perspective, the Nordic countries have excelled with extraordinarily high per capita contributions to the United Nations system and have ranked high in absolute figures as well.73 Despite the current, more clear-cut Norwegian efforts, the myth of Sweden as an exceptional country lives on, as exemplified by contemporary appreciations by such figures as North Korean ruler Kim Jong Il, Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, and overthrown Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein.74 It is notable that at the twenty-fifth anniversary session of the General Assembly, an Iraqi delegate protested against “the terrorism directed against permanent missions in New York” and demanded that United Nations Headquarters be “transferred to a country […] which had the highest tradition of moral values, namely, Sweden.”75 In the interest of fairness one should add that even US delegates to the General Assembly found the Swedish attitude at the United Nations exemplary, despite their awareness of troubles in bilateral relations.76 With regard to Sweden’s
–––––––––––––– 72 “Secretary-General’s Note: Top Ten Providers of Assessed Contributions to United Nations Budgets and of Voluntary Contributions to United Nations Funds, Programmes and Agencies, including the Standing Peacebuilding Fund.” New York: United Nations, 2006. Available at
18 INTRODUCTION overall image The Future Dictionary of America, a liberal 2004 election- campaign instrument, included the word abbapeasement, which was defined as “a Swedish diplomatic process whereby conflicting parties participate in a ‘dance-off’ to resolve their differences”.77 In addition to Sweden’s status as a symbol for the most advanced social welfare policy, the fact that Sweden’s population and economy was about twice as large as that of either Denmark, Finland, or Norway probably contributed to a perception of the country as a “secondary rank power”, whereas her regional neighbours were understood as belonging to a more modest category of states.78 Nevertheless, there have been petty Nordic jealousies, directed against Sweden in particular. This is simply an integral dimension of these countries’ cooperation at the United Nations and elsewhere.79 However, centrifugal tendencies in their inter-state collaboration did not usually outclass centripetal force, namely, the insight of the substantial benefit for each individual member of the Nordic group to maintain a common platform. As noted in the memoirs of a former head of the UN information services, the “superb performance” of the Nordic countries at the United Nations over the years has owed much to the fact that their delegates were “accustomed to functioning unobtrusively as members of the same team” when important issues were at stake.80 The conditions of the Cold War were favourable for maintaining the unified profile that characterised the Nordic countries.81 Focusing on –––––––––––––– Rank of Ambassador and the Future of United States Participation in the United Nations. Washington: Government, 1976. 68 (Clarence M. Mitchell). 77 Dave Eggers, Jonathan Safran Foer and Nicole Krauss. The Future Dictionary of America. San Francisco: McSweeney, 2004 (here quoted from: Lundberg 2005: 12). 78 Cf. Amry Vandenbosch and Willard N. Hogan. The United Nations: Background, Organization, Functions, Activities. New York [et al.]: McGraw-Hill, 1952. 21 (quote); Hans Mouritzen. “The Nordic Model as a Foreign Policy Instrument: Its Rise and Fall.” Journal of Peace Research 32 (1995) 1: 9–21. 79 Cf. Norbert G tz and Heidi Haggrén (eds). Regional Cooperation and International Organizations: The Nordic Model in Transnational Alignment. London: Routledge, 2009. 80 Hernane Tavares de Sá. The Play Within the Play: The Inside Story of the U.N. New York: Knopf, 1966. 108–109. 81 Cf. Norbert G tz. “Gibt es den Norden als Einheit? Über die Differenz von mentalen Landkarten und politischem Willen.” Die Ordnung des Raums: Mentale Landkarten in der Ostseeregion. Norbert G tz, J rg Hackmann and Jan Hecker-Stampehl (eds). Berlin: Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2006. 110–149, at 113–114 (or an earlier English version of this article: Norbert G tz. “Norden: Structures That Do Not Make a Region.” European Review of History 10 (2003a): 323–341: 324); Ole Wæver. “Nordic Nostalgia: Northern Europe after the Cold War.” International Affairs 68 (1992) 1: 77–102; Uffe Østergård. “The Geopolitics of Nordic Identity: From Composite States to Nation States.” The Cultural Construction of Norden. Øystein S rensen and Bo Stråth (eds). Oslo [et al.]: Scandinavian (continued)
19 CHAPTER 1 mutual collaboration in external relations enabled the Northerners to represent their region as one characterised by a considerably lower degree of tension than felt in continental Europe. Thus, at the United Nations the Nordic countries acted in collaboration, and they are frequently mentioned in international scholarly literature and memoirs as a particularly coherent body in discussions on the phenomenon of groups or ‘blocs’ at the world organisation. Their cooperative spirit was also reflected in the statistical surveys so fashionable in the 1960s.82 Whereas Danish membership in the European Communities only disturbed Nordic collaboration at the United Nations, the accession of Finland and Sweden to the European Union in 1995 and the development of the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy ended that.83 The positive image of the Nordic governments at the United Nations benefited from the fact that they consciously used the world organisation as a global stage for demonstrating both their mutual solidarity and their peculiarities.84 Among the latter was the inclusion of parliamentary or party representatives in delegations, and the frequent inclusion of individuals from civil society. Evidence points to such practises being viewed in these countries as a particularly democratic ‘Nordic model’. Three examples of this view may be given at the outset: (1) At the meeting of the Inter-parliamentary Union in Vienna in 1954, the Danish politician Alsing Andersen asked permission to pursue one of his
–––––––––––––– University Press, 1997. 25–71, at 25, 69; Mikael af Malmborg. “Geopolitik och kulturell konstruktion i Norden.” Europa i Norden: Europeisering av nordisk samarbeid. Johan P. Olsen and Bj rn Otto Sverdrup (eds). Oslo: Tano Aschehoug, 1998. 92–121. Remarkable are the regional entries of the following work: Spencer C. Tucker (ed.). The Encyclopedia of the Cold War: A Political, Social, and Military History. Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio, 2008. The following regions have their own entries: Africa – Americas – East Asia – Europe, Eastern – Europe, Western – Middle East – Scandinavia – Southeast Asia. By any standard, the company in which Scandinavia is presented can be regarded as amazing. 82 Case studies focusing on the Nordic group will be referred to in the section on prior research. For general studies identifying this group, see e.g. Hayward R. Alker and Bruce M. Russett. World Politics in the General Assembly. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965; Arend Lijphart. “The Analysis of Bloc Voting in the General Assembly: A Critique and a Proposal.” American Political Science Review 57 (1963): 902–917; Thomas Hovet. Bloc Politics in the United Nations. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960. 83 Cf. Katie Verlin Laatikainen. “Norden’s Eclipse: The Impact of the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy on the Nordic Group in the United Nations.” Cooperation and Conflict 38 (2003): 409–441; Lars Eriksson. “Norden enigare än EU i FN: Hur EG/EU och Norden r stade i FN’s generalf rsamling 1990–93.” Världshorisont 48 (1994) 2: 22–23. 84 Cf. Ralph Enckell’s speech “Norden i FN”, 22 October 1966 in Turku, FMAH, REC, vol. 18; with regard to Finland: Ahti Karjalainen. “Suomi YK:ssa.” Ulkopoliittisia lausuntoja ja asiakirjoja (1967): 64–67.
20 INTRODUCTION pet projects, “the question of the composition of the delegations to the U.N.” As no protest was voiced, Andersen declared it regrettable that in most cases such delegations consisted almost exclusively of officials. In view of the political character of the issues discussed at the United Nations, he stated that it seemed a serious mistake to include so few members of parliament among the delegates. He concluded by referring to the Scandinavian example, and, observing that many countries had not yet included any legislators in their delegations, stressed the significance of parliamentarians “for the establishment of the right kind of contact between the various peoples and for the right understanding of the U.N.’s work”.85 (2) In a document on UN reform, the Nordic Council requested in 1995 that “the United Nations should develop a parliamentary dimension, to express the views of the peoples of the world through the elected representative bodies of the Member States” and that it “should encourage effective participation in its work by non-governmental organisations as agents of the civil society, and should create modalities for a continuous international dialogue with trade and industry as well as trade unions, keeping in mind the parliamentary dimension as an instrument to support and to widen such contacts”.86 (3) At the ‘millennium session’ in 2000, a Norwegian diplomat officially recommended the Nordic model of including parliamentarians in delegations participating in the General Assembly.87 Yet, there is a huge difference between how parliamentary representatives were included in Nordic delegations in the early years of the United Nations and the situation now prevailing. Nordic countries were not unique in regard to parliamentary or societal representation, as we shall see when we systematically contextualise Nordic practises. However, a number of factors make the Nordic countries stand out in international comparisons. First, they are among the few states to regularly send a broad range of parliamentary representatives in their national delegations to the General Assembly, including politicians from the opposition. Second, the Nordic countries have a unique record of virtually always having done so since the preparatory work that resulted in the Covenant of the League of Nations. Third, Nordic representatives have at various times been actively engaged in the parliamentarisation of world assemblies. Finally, the Danish–Nordic
–––––––––––––– 85 Alsing Andersen. “A Danish Socialist View on a Revision of the U.N. Charter.” Socialist International Information 4 (1954): 719–722, at 722. 86 “Final Document [12 January 1995].” The Nordic Countries and the Future of the United Nations: Final Report from the Conference of the Nordic Council Held in Helsinki from 10– 12 January 1995. Stockholm: Nordic Council, 1995. 9–11. 87 General Assembly, Official Records 55 (2000) no. 55: 3–4 (Arne B. H nningstad).
21 CHAPTER 1 tradition of including representatives of civil society in their delegations is quite extraordinary. Thus, a Nordic case study on what could be conceived of as the ‘undercover’ parliamentary and corporatist tradition of the United Nations (and of the League of Nations) seems justified. It should be observed at this point that many critics are opposed to the inclusion of parliamentarians and representatives of civil society in governmental delegations. They point to the violation of the separation of powers principle, an element that legislators’ service in missions of the executive necessarily entails.88 Rather than adhering to genuine participatory principles, in Scandinavia and elsewhere, domestic consensus on foreign policy as well as a “united front” towards the outside world have been decisive in establishing this tradition.89 The issue at stake has been representation in the original medieval sense of the concept, the ‘virtual representation’ of society in a corporate body, whereby the consensus among the members of corporations legitimises their leaders.90 Hence, while the model of a democratic Nordic delegation clearly exists, there is also a universal instrumentalist advantage of multipartite representation in international delegations: the creation of national unity transcends everyday political divisions, thereby constituting moral capital for those confronted with the constraints of unpopular decision making and external negotiation partners. Whether including societal representatives conflicts with democratic participation and monitoring is an empirical question that will be addressed later. An increasingly relevant ‘democratic deficit’ is observed in international relations today, and the call for strengthening the voice of ordinary people as well as their elected representatives and those actively engaging in civil society, is getting louder. In this situation, a new vision and the re-examination of prior experience is in order. The Nordic countries have had experience with representatives of parliament and civil society participating in international relations. The brief answer to the question of why a study on Norden matters for the ongoing discussion of democratic
–––––––––––––– 88 A recent example is provided by an official statement (remiss) of the administrative court of appeal in Stockholm, see the court’s letter to the Swedish parliamentary Committee on the Constitution of 10 March 2006 (summarized in “Riksdagen i en ny tid: Konstitutionsutskottets betänkande.” Riksdagens protokoll (2005/06) KU21). 89 Quote: Erik Colban. Stortinget og utenrikspolitikken. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1961. 160. 90 Cf. Adalbert Podlech. “Repräsentation.” Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, vol. 5: Pro–Soz. Otto Brunner, Werner Conze and Reinhart Koselleck (eds). Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1984. 509–547, at 511–512.
22 INTRODUCTION foreign affairs and democratic diplomacy is presented in Figure 1.91 According to the general rules of international organisations, only the Nordic governments are formally represented by delegations to the General Assembly and, therefore, exercise ultimate control over the appointment of delegates. However, de facto participatory channels for major parliamentary parties and select civil society organisations were also at
Figure 1. Peoples representation in Scandinavian UN delegations
–––––––––––––– 91 Note that this chart is not literally applicable to Finland in the Cold War period, because there the President was directly responsible for international affairs and foreign policy.
23 CHAPTER 1 work. Such a model of societal inclusion is neither a preliminary stage on the way to a world parliament, nor a direct link between civil society and the General Assembly or the United Nations. It is still the ‘peoples’ rather than the ‘people’ who are represented by delegations. But it is a signal that parliaments and civil society should have a voice in international affairs. For Nordic countries, membership in the United Nations has not been a routine matter that could be relegated to proxies of government only. Among the various signs of decline of the United Nations in the perception in Nordic countries since the end of the Cold War, the deteriorating role of parliamentary representatives on delegations may be most ominous.
THEORY AND METHODOLOGY Research on international history and international relations traditionally focuses on either of two subjects: nation states or their common organisations. However, these topics are in no way ‘neutral’ material for empirical study. Researchers studying nation states usually have a pronounced attachment to so-called realist or neorealist approaches, the dominant schools of thought in International Relations from the Cold War up to today.92 ‘Realism’ according to this theoretical understanding means a political power orientation with a special interest in military capacities and economic potential. Authors adhering to this view generally consider democratic principles unsuitable for the conduct of foreign affairs. They also see small states and international organisations as irrelevant and try to dissuade others from wasting valuable research effort on such entities. Furthermore, the ‘realist’ approach favours structure and space over time. It has a pronounced ahistorical tendency. Nonetheless, ‘diplomatic history’ in the succession of Leopold von Ranke has been the dominant approach in Germany and elsewhere, applying a similar national and power-political perspective.93
–––––––––––––– 92 Hans J. Morgenthau. Politics Among Nations: The Stuggle for Power and Peace. New York: Knopf, 1948; Kenneth N. Waltz. Theory of International Politics. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979; John J. Mearsheimer. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: Norton, 2001. 93 Cf. Stephen Hobden. “Historical Sociology: Back to the Future of International Relations?” Historical Sociology of International Relations. Stephen Hobden and John M. Hobson (eds). Cambridge: University Press, 2002. 42–59, at 46; see also the overviews in: Wilfried Loth and J rgen Osterhammel (eds). Internationale Geschichte: Themen – Ergebnisse – Aussichten. M nchen: Oldenbourg, 2000. On the ahistorical tendency of the ‘realist’ school cf. Robert B. J. Walker. “History and Structure in the Theory of International Relations.” Millennium 18 (1989) 2: 163–183.
24 INTRODUCTION
The perceived incompatibility of foreign policy and democracy with their focus on the military and economic power and their disregard for modest sized nations and international organisations, makes the ‘realist’ approach somewhat impractical for the study of small state democratic practises in multilateral diplomacy. ‘Realism’s’ refusal to acknowledge many aspects of reality, in combination with the hegemonic claim inscribed upon the overall theory, has provoked one critic to exclaim: “There is one important thing to remember about the realist school – namely, that it has nothing to do with the real!” Rather, the argument goes, ‘realists’ are trained in a selective epistemology and in the belief that the relevant ontological questions have already been resolved.94 Despite its self-imposed narrow-mindedness, the realist school has a number of traits deserving our attention. Some ‘realists’ who stem from small countries frequently show interest in their personal surroundings or pursue their employer’s interests. Such a perspective has allowed them to refine the ‘realist’ theory for non-standard applications. For example, during the Cold War, some scholars developed the theorem of a ‘Nordic balance’, a unique geopolitical constellation that ostensibly removed Norden from the power games played by the super powers.95 Nordic exceptionalism and cohesion in the Cold War is a relevant background variable for the present study. A modified small state ‘realist’ perspective contributes a great deal to an explanation of security policy choices in the postwar years as well as to many features of Scandinavian foreign policy in general. Moreover, not all ‘realists’ subscribe to the incompatibility hypothesis. For example, four decades ago Kenneth N. Waltz maintained that the foreign policy capabilities of democratic states were “unduly disparaged”. One of the instruments he described for enhancing these capabilities was bipartisanship in US foreign policy, practised in connection with the founding of the United Nations and continues to this day in the composition of US delegations to the General Assembly. For Waltz, the decisive aspect was instrumental: avoidance of momentous divisions in foreign affairs and assurance of continuity and consistency in foreign policy “that will survive the transfer of government from one party to another”.96 In this particular form, the ‘realist’ perspective on bridging
–––––––––––––– 94 Costas M. Constantinou. On the Way to Diplomacy. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996. 23. 95 Arne Olav Brundtland. “The Nordic Balance.” Cooperation and Conflict 2 (1966) 1: 30– 63; cf. Håkan Wiberg. “The Nordic Countries: A Special Kind of System?” Current Research on Peace and Violence (1986) 1–2: 2–12. 96 Kenneth N. Waltz. Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics: The American and British Experience. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967. v, 78 (quotes), 77.
25 CHAPTER 1 the divide between government and opposition played an essential role in the Nordic delegations. In contrast to the realist school, the idealist, liberal institutionalist, or pluralist strands of thought, with their interest in international law and their functionalist perspective have a pronounced affinity to the study of international organisations.97 Such approaches often have the advantage of showing interest in the plurality of collective actors that lie below or transgress the level of the nation state. This twofold departure from the paradigm of the nation state makes the above-mentioned strands attractive for the study of societal representation in delegations to the United Nations. Unfortunately, historians have shown little interest in liberal approaches and have only rarely worked on topics related to cooperation between countries, leaving the floor mostly to political scientists and international lawyers. Moreover, the preoccupation with archival data rather than research questions and the ‘realist’ perspective on ‘high politics’ as a remote sphere dominated by ‘statesmen’, have frequently resulted in historiographic insights of little consequence. Today, a certain synthesis of liberal and realist points of view, influenced by rational choice theories, can be observed on a state-centric basis.98 For example, in Robert D. Putnam’s widely-cited article “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games”, national governments are seen as linking the levels of domestic and international politics.99 Initially, such a model seems to resemble the empirical structure of the present study, namely, societal representation in national delegations to the United Nations. Although the challenges faced by governments in balancing domestic and international demands and supports are crucial, the embeddedness of societal actors in international governmental delegations implies a hybridisation of levels for which ‘rationalist’ theories are not prepared. It is not enough to seek an understanding “of the complex milieu in which institutions operate by
–––––––––––––– 97 E.g. David Mitrany. A Working Peace System: An Argument for the Functional Development of International Organization. London: Institute of Interantional Affairs, 1943; Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye. Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition. Boston: Little, Brown, 1977; Stephen D. Krasner. International Regimes. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983; James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (eds). Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics. Cambridge: University Press, 1992. 98 Ole Wæver. “The Rise and Fall of the Inter-paradigm Debate.” International Theory: Positivism and Beyond. Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski (eds). Cambridge: University Press, 1996. 149–185. 99 Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games.” International Organization 42 (1988) 3: 427–460.
26 INTRODUCTION systematically examining the relationship between governments, domestic coalitions, IOs [international organisations] and transnational actors”.100 Attention also needs be directed to the complexity of institutions themselves and how they are permeated by what is conventionally called the ‘environment’. Given the overall focus theorists put on military and economic power structures in the first instance and secondarily on international organisations and societal agents, it is not surprising that phenomena related to diplomatic practice only receive marginal attention in their works. A recent handbook characterises diplomacy as “a fragmented field of study, with a weak theoretical base”.101 Moreover, as demonstrated by the limited body of scholarly literature on the agency of particular nation states in international organisations, the two major research topics have rarely been systematically integrated – an artefact of theoretical idiosyncrasies, not an indication of a lack of relevance. In addition, as the levels of sovereign nation states and multilateral institutions have rarely been transcended, their conceptualisation has largely remained one- dimensional.102 Only limited inquiry has been made into the deeper questions of how policies are initiated and set at the sub-state level with the interaction of vested interests and a plurality of domestic actors, and what strategies and structures were used to arrive at an intermediary aggregation of national interests below the level of the overall multilateral network. Questions such as these concerning sub-currents and networking efforts beyond the sphere of the nation state are the key issues in contemporary historiographic attempts to replace traditional ‘diplomatic history’ and its focus on ‘high politics’ with an ‘international’ or ‘transnational history’ that integrates elements from social and cultural history.103 The background of such questions on domestic and transnational factors of foreign policy formulation is illuminated by the constructivist –––––––––––––– 100 Quote: Beth A. Simmons and Lisa L. Martin. “International Organizations and Institutions.” Handbook of International Relations. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (eds). London: Sage, 2002. 192–211, at 205. 101 Christer J nsson. “Diplomacy, Bargaining and Negotiation.” Handbook of International Relations. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (eds). London: Sage, 2002. 212–234, at 217. 102 The limited impact of the literature on transnationalism of the 1970s can be gathered from the title of an edited volume published in the mid-1990s: Thomas Risse-Kappen (ed.). Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995. 103 Wilfried Loth. “Einleitung.” Internationale Geschichte: Themen – Ergebnisse – Aussichten. Wilfried Loth and J rgen Osterhammel (eds). M nchen: Oldenbourg, 2000. vii– xiv, at xi; J rgen Osterhammel. “Transnationale Gesellschaftsgeschichte: Erweiterung oder Alternative.” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 27 (2001): 464–479, at 474–475.
27 CHAPTER 1 approach, which challenges traditional diplomatic history and International Relations. This strand of theory seeks the socio-cultural background of foreign policy actors in values and identities, in political culture and political perception and self-description, in an inherent dynamism of social systems, transnational discourses, and structures of cooperation, in the framing of norms and rules, and in agents and structures as subjects of mutual processes of constitution and transformation. Finally, the constructivist approach addresses semiotic and hybrid phenomena that resist the simplistic models of traditional theories.104 The breadth of the above-mentioned agenda has led political scientists to reproach with constructivism’s ideographical preoccupations and “historiographisation of International Relations”.105 The constructivist perspective entails a notable ‘historical turn’ or, rather, a ‘historical return’ in the study of international relations. However, at the same time, historiography itself is a moving target.106 Presently, ‘diplomatic history’ is modernised and ‘international history’ advocated, both sub-disciplines integrating insights of the systematising social sciences and showing a high degree of affinity for the conceptual interest of constructivism.107 It is also worth observing that issues per- taining to global transformation and global governance have been identified as those most likely to provide common ground for constructivists and historical sociologists.108 It remains to be seen whether
–––––––––––––– 104 Friedrich Kratochwil. Norms, Rules, and Decisions. Cambridge: University Press, 1989; Onuf Nicholas G. World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989; Alexander Wendt. Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge Studies in International Relations 67. Cambridge: University Press, 1999. 105 Reinhard Wolf. “Zum praktischen Mehrwert aktueller Theoriebeiträge: Die Zukunft der innerwestlichen Beziehungen im Lichte konkurrierender Ansätze.” Zeitschrift f r Internationale Beziehungen 10 (2003): 111–141, at 129. 106 Hobden 2002: 56; cf. Geoffrey Roberts. “History, Theory and the Narrative Turn in IR.” Review of International Studies 32 (2006) 4: 703–714; Nick Vaughan-Williams. “International Relations and the ‘Problem of History’.” Millennium 34 (2005): 115–136; Mette Skak. “Den historiske drejning.” Politica 37 (2005) 1: 5–20; Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman. “Diplomatic History and International Relations Theory: Respecting Difference and Crossing Boundaries.” International Security 22 (1997): 5–21; see also the contributions debating the Elman/Elman article in the same issue. 107 Ursula Lehmkuhl. “Diplomatiegeschichte als internationale Kulturgeschichte: Theoretische Ansätze und empirische Forschung zwischen historischer Kulturwissenschaft und soziologischem Institutionalismus.” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 27 (2001): 394–423, at 404, 420. 108 Michael Barnett. “Historical Sociology and Constructivism: An Estranged Past, a Federated Future?” Historical Sociology of International Relations. Stephen Hobden and John M. Hobson (eds). Cambridge: University Press, 2002. 99–119, at 104.
28 INTRODUCTION
‘international history’, with its course between a social history of foreign policy and a cultural history of international relations, will enter a relationship with the study of ‘international relations’ that blurs the disciplinary dividing lines that were fortified at a time when history and political science followed two different positivistic paths.109 The cross-disciplinary synthesising tendency of constructivist and cultural studies provides distinct advantages. Many Nordic scholars have had a strong impact on the evolution of constructivism in the study of international relations.110 The present study seeks to extend constructivist research to a “‘sociational’ research agenda” (i.e. an agenda related to the process of Vergesellschaftung),111 just as both realist and liberal approaches have added particular insights to the study of societal representation in Nordic delegations to the General Assembly. From a global point of view, the similarities in these delegation orders are striking, and interest in Nordic regional cooperation – during the Cold War era, in particular – seems self- evident. At the same time, directing the focus to the Nordic countries themselves lends shape to internal distinctions. Given the generally acknowledged cultural and geopolitical affinities and the established image of a ‘Nordic model’ regarding both the issue of welfare and the region’s tradition of peace, the existence of similarities among these countries may appear trivial. Norden is rightly known as a rather homogenous and, in some respects, special region.112 Given this background, the Nordic countries are particularly suitable as a subject for comparative research when problems of collective identity and typology are discussed because they offer the possibility of studying the variation of certain phenomena under relatively similar cultural conditions. This makes these countries an especially useful sample for comparative inquiry in all studies not bound by the claim that their given research units are ‘independent’ and not influenced by each other.113 However, if the comparative approach is to be productive, the preconception of the Nordic
–––––––––––––– 109 For the characterisation of ‘international history’: Lehmkuhl 2001: 423. 110 Emanuel Adler. “Constructivism in International Relations.” Handbook of International Relations. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (eds). London: Sage, 2002. 95–118, at 100. 111 Lars-Erik Cederman, and Christopher Daase. “Endogenizing Corporate Identities: The Next Step in Constructivist IR Theory.” European Journal of International Relations 9 (2003): 5–35. 112 Cf. G tz 2006 (G tz 2003a); in regard to peace: Clive Archer and Pertti Joenniemi (eds). The Nordic Peace. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003. 113 Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune. The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry. New York: Wiley, 1970.
29 CHAPTER 1 region as a natural enclosure for common idiosyncrasies must be challenged. The constructivist theoretical approach advanced here denies the validity of essentialist explanations. Moreover, cultural affinities between the Nordic countries cannot simply be assumed. The same is true of geopolitics, as revealed by the greatly varying security policy challenges and the structures put in place. The five Nordic countries entered the world organisation after having travelled five different paths originating in five distinct starting points in the broad range of possibilities from allied proper (Norway) to what the UN Charter frankly frames as the ‘enemy state’ (Finland). The Nordic philosophies and practises of parliamentary and civil society inclusion have never been authoritatively spelled out, and no reliable documents for comparison exist for studies examining parliamentary and civil society inclusion. Instead, the issue under discussion here concerns practises that have been developed and continuously readjusted in an ad hoc manner, according to the preconditions and needs of the respective day and frequently in defiance of one’s previous orders. It is only through the detailed study of widely ramified practises that solid knowledge on democratic diplomacy in the Nordic countries can be obtained.114 Hence, the focus is directed to matters of identity rather than to those of typology. The historical account shows that practises have changed profoundly, severely affecting actors’ individual and collective identities and, to some degree, ‘national identities’ as well. From a diachronic –––––––––––––– 114 The present study draws from a broad range of sources, both published and unpublished. The individual chapters are generally based on research in the United Nations/General Assembly section of the archive of the respective foreign ministries under discussion, complemented by cross references from the archives of other Nordic countries and a few personal or party archives. The delegation lists published annually by the United Nations in connection with the records of the General Assembly, as well as the corresponding lists published in the annual Danish, Finnish, Norwegian, and Swedish reports from the General Assembly, have been the most important published sources. These documents are so central for the analyses undertaken here that they should be understood as constituting the basic source of information in discussions on the size and composition of delegations, without specific reference being made. Eleven parliamentary participants of the sixty-first session of the General Assembly have been kind enough to share their experiences and thoughts on the role of parliamentarians in delegations to the United Nations in interviews conducted in January 2007. While references to these interviews may be infrequent, a great deal is owed to the following members of the Danish Folketing: Frank Aaen, and Pia Gjellerup; Members of Norwegian Storting Solveig Horne, Hallgeir Langeland, Anna Ljunggren, and Olemic Thommessen; and Members of Swedish Riksdag Ewa Bj rling, Sonia Karlsson, Hans Linde, Fredrik Olovsson, and Johan Pehrson. They kindly helped me to frame this book with an awareness of the status and perceptions of present-day practitioners.
30 INTRODUCTION perspective in the context under discussion here, the concept of typology makes only limited sense. There is no atemporal substance inherent in a ‘Nordic’ or ‘Scandinavian model’ apart from the condensed and streamlined form presented in Figure 1 and apart from the association of this model with the notion of a particularly consensual type of ‘Nordic democracy’. Moreover, although there always seems to be a demand for ‘Nordic models’ and the inclusion of parliamentarians in government delegations has sometimes been suggested as such a model, the topical concern is of a more general nature. On the one hand, the quest for democratisation and participation has an expansive and inherent dynamic that cannot be restricted to certain sectors or that cannot be satisfied with intricate chains of authorisation. On the other hand, the ongoing process of globalisation diminishes the significance of traditional arenas for democratic practises. Given these contradictory tendencies, the discourse on global democracy referred to has emerged and needs to draw from a much richer reservoir of experiences than in the literature has hitherto been represented. In view of the overall structures for participation in inter- governmental organisations, nation states are the given basic units of inquiry. However, the analysis has not remained untouched by influences of transnational history and histoire croisée or the comparative five-country overall framework and the de facto existence of an underlying texture that resembles an embryonic Nordic ‘public sphere’ on top of considerable sectoral routines of collaboration and concertation.115 Hence, throughout the national case studies, cross-influences will be evident among the Nordic countries. At the same time, these countries only represent a particularly coherent and interconnected group of societies, linked by their pan- Nordic ideology.116 They are embedded in the larger frames of European and world society and are in constant interaction with their surroundings. Under the assumption there is only one world made up of nation state units, it would be absurd to suggest the existence of an isolated ‘Nordic model’. In the context of the United Nations, designed to bring –––––––––––––– 115 Cf. Osterhammel 2001; Michael Werner and Bénédicte Zimmermann. “Vergleich, Transfer, Verflechtung: Der Ansatz der Histoire croisée und die Herausforderung des Transnationalen.” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 28 (2002): 607–636; Karl Kaiser. “Transnationale Politik: Zu einer Theorie der multinationalen Politik.” Die anachronistische Souveränität: Zum Verhältnis von Innen- und Außenpolitik. Ernst-Otto Czempiel (ed.). Opladen: Westdeutscher, 1969. 80–109; Henrik Stenius, and Heidi Haggrén. “Det nordiska samarbetets vardagspraktiker: Vad vet vi om dessa f rutom att de har varit/är viktiga?” Finland i Norden: Finland 50 år i Nordiska rådet. Larserik Häggman (ed.). Vaasa: Fram, 2005. 79–90. 116 Cf. G tz 2006 (G tz 2003a) with further references.
31 CHAPTER 1 together the individual members of ‘world society’, it would be foolish to claim that the individual research units are independent and not influenced by one another.
PRIOR RESEARCH In a review essay of recent (mainly German) literature on the United Nations, I called for research with historiographic depth, applying a semiotic perspective, and attempting to rework the (neo-)corporatist agenda in the context of international relations.117 Had there been cause in the essay for taking up the issue of studies on individual countries, a call for research on the participation of the Nordic countries in the United Nations would probably have been added. Substantial deficits can be observed for each of the above-mentioned fields, despite an overwhelming body of literature on the United Nations – and despite the fact that paper output sometimes appears to be the raison d’être of the world organisation.118 Generally speaking, international and particularly US scholarship on the United Nations peaked in the 1960s and has since been dominated by the disciplines of political science and international law. Only in the past few years can some renewed interest be observed, this time on the part of historians. Whereas these observations also apply to Nordic scholarship, German colleagues have been somewhat out of touch with general developments. In the 1960s, when Germany was not yet a member of the United Nations, a review essay had good reason to deplore the void in literature on the world organisation in German language.119 Subsequently, the situation has improved, and Germans have been among the most productive scholars publishing on the United Nations for the past decades, even for an international, English-speaking audience.120 However, there is
–––––––––––––– 117 G tz 2007: 54–55. 118 Cf. Klaus H fner (ed.). The United Nations System: International Bibliography = Das System der Vereinten Nationen: Internationale Bibliographie. Munich: Dokumentation, 1976–1994; Ågot Brekke. Nordisk litteratur om De forente nasjoner: Et utvalg av b ker og tidsskriftartikler skrevet i årene 1959–1964. Oslo: Norsk Samband for De Forente Nasjoner, 1965; Ågot Brekke. Nordisk litteratur om De forente nasjoner: Et utvalg b ker og tidsskriftartikler skrevet i arene 1953–1958. Oslo: Norsk samband for De forente nasjoner, 1959. 119 Volker Rittberger. “Die Vereinten Nationen.” Politische Vierteljahresschrift 11 (1968): 310–314. 120 Apart from The United Nations System: Iinternational Bibliography (H fner 1976–1994) the most remarkable publications were: Wolfgang Spr te and Harry W nsche. Die Vereinten Nationen und ihre Spezialorganisationen, vol. 1–19. Berlin: Staatsverlag, 1974– 1988; Franz Knipping, Hans von Mangoldt and Volker Rittberger (eds). Das System der Vereinten Nationen und seine Vorläufer: vol. 1–2. Bern/M nchen: Stämpfli/Beck, 1995; (continued)
32 INTRODUCTION as yet an almost complete absence of historiographic literature of any quality. As assessed in a current review article: “Thus far, historiography, in particular from Germany, deals deplorably badly [beklagenswert schlecht] with UN research.”121 Awareness of the above-noted deficits in scholarship is not widespread. Research on the United Nations has always been dominated by political scientists and international lawyers with internationalist outlooks, idealist inclinations, and a positivist research agenda. A recent overview of United Nations research in Germany acknowledges lacunae in regard to individual countries’ UN policies. Otherwise, it only points to problems with regard to organisational-institutional fragmentation, subordination compared to European Union (EU) research, desiderata in regard to special agencies, and lack of public opinion surveys and self-reflection.122 However, there is a need for historiographic approaches that transcend the myths spun around the United Nations, as well as constructivist-reflectivist perspectives that do not simply accept the world organisation as described by those paying lip-service and an awareness that the discourse on global governance would benefit from research dealing with corporatism. Paradoxically, the following review of literature will be organised around the three lacunae of historiographic, constructivist or semiotic, and corporatist perspectives in order to undertake a selection within the vast literature on the United Nations. How have scholars worked in these particular fields? After a general overview covering German, US and other international literature, the focus will be on works dealing specifically with the Nordic countries for each of the three dimensions. In Germany, historians have recently discovered the League of Nations as a topic, but there has been practically no research on the United Nations.123 Whereas postwar history has emerged as a vibrant field of study since the 1990s, with dissertations on the former German Democratic Republic and some research on the Federal Republic and the European
–––––––––––––– R diger Wolfrum (ed.). United Nations: Law, Policies and Practice, vol. 1–2. New, rev. ed. Munich: Beck, 1995[1977]; Bruno Simma. Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary. Oxford: University Press, 2002[1991]. 121 Jost D lffer. “Historische UN-Forschung in Deutschland: Themen, Methoden und M glichkeiten.” UN Studies: Umrisse eines Lehr- und Forschungsfeldes. Manuel Fr hlich (ed.). Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2008. 101–115, at 104. 122 G nther Unser. “Einige Arbeitshypothesen zur Entwicklung und zum Stand der UNO- Forschung in Deutschland.” UNO-Forschung in Deutschland. Klaus H fner et al. (eds). Blaue Reihe 95. Berlin: DGVN, 2006. 9–20. 123 D lffer 2008: 103; G tz 2007: 37; for a review of earlier literature: Alfred Pfeil. Der V lkerbund: Literaturbericht und kritische Darstellung seiner Geschichte. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1976.
33 CHAPTER 1
Communities being published as well, the world organisation remains a blank spot. Among the rare exceptions to the rule are a dissertation on Germany’s relations to the United Nations from 1949 to 1963 and a dissertation on Canada’s wartime United Nations policy, as well as this author’s work on the Nordic countries and the United Nations.124 A broad review of literature, including studies with a historical perspective written by non-historians and non-German authors, is provided by Jost D lffer in his review “Historische UN-Forschung in Deutschland: Themen, Methoden und M glichkeiten” (Historical UN Research in Germany: Topics, Methods, and Possibilities). The article provides an authoritative and up-to-date picture, making it unnecessary to repeat here, other than summarising D lffer’s findings and main arguments. First, his title emphasises the word M glichkeiten (possibilities), rather than what has been accomplished. Second, D lffer explicitly endorses the historiographic, constructivis, and corporatist research agenda described above.125 D lffer delivers a broad overview of international literature on United Nations history. The standard work on the League of Nations is Francis Paul Walters’ two-volume A History of the League of Nations.126 The only broad historiographic overview on the United Nations by a historian is Paul M. Kennedy’s recently published The Parliament of Man: The Past, Present, and Future of the United Nations. (The subtitle of the British edition is The United Nations and the Quest for World Government, an idea regarded too controversial for a US audience.) One of the shortcomings of Kennedy’s book is its hegemonic US bias. The same may be said of political scientist Stephen C. Schlesinger’s Act of Creation: The –––––––––––––– 124 Klaus K ster. Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Vereinte Nationen 1949 bis 1963. Frankfurt/Main: Lang, 2000; Boris Stipernitz. Kanada und die Gr ndung der Vereinten Nationen 1939–1945. Cologne: University, 2001; Norbert G tz. “Prestige and Lack of Alternative: Denmark and the United Nations in the Making.” Scandinavian Journal of History 29 (2004): 73–96; G tz 2005a; Norbert G tz. “Political Culture and Nordic Democracy in Geneva and New York.” Democracy and Culture in the Transatlantic World: Third Interdisciplinary Conference, October 2004, The Maastricht Center for Transatlantic Studies. Charlotte Wallin and Daniel Silander (eds). Växj : University Press, 2005b; Norbert G tz. “Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark? Danish Participation in the United Nations and in the Security Council.” Militært tidsskrift 134 (2005c): 311–333; G tz 2008a; Norbert G tz. “‘In a Class by Itself’: Cold War Politics and Finland’s Position vis-à-vis the United Nations, 1945–1956.” Journal of Cold War Studies 10 (2008b) 2: 73–98; Norbert G tz. “Western Europeans and Others: The Making of Europe at the United Nations.” Alternatives 33 (2008c) 3: 359–381; Norbert G tz. “The Absent-Minded Founder: Norway and the Establishment of the United Nations.” Diplomacy & Statecraft 20 (2009c) 4: 619– 637. 125 D lffer 2008: 110. 126 Francis Paul Walters. A History of the League of Nations, vol. 1–2. London: Oxford University Press, 1952.
34 INTRODUCTION
Founding of the United Nations: A Story of Superpowers, Secret Agents, Wartime Allies and Enemies, and Their Quest for a Peaceful World.127 The most detailed historiographic account so far has also been written by a political scientist, Evan Luard’s two-volume A History of the United Nations, which covers the first twenty years of the world organisation.128 A large research programme currently underway is the United Nations Intellectual History Project located at the City University of New York. However, despite the availability of most volumes from this project, they have not been included due to their focus on policy-related issues. Literature on the United Nations with a constructivist or semiotic point of departure is rare. Traditionally, this type of approach is a domain for private scholars. It might be regarded as a genre established by a trio of popular works: Andrew Boyd’s journalistic account, United Nations: Piety, Myth, and Truth, the memoirs of former UN official Hernane Tavares de Sá The Play Within the Play: The Inside Story of the U.N., and Conor Cruise O’Brien’s idiosyncratic monograph, The United Nations: Sacred Drama.129 O’Brien was the Chancellor of the University of Ghana from 1962 to 1965, and was Albert Schweitzer Professor of Humanities at New York University at the time the large format book was published. It has illustrations by Feliks Topolski that are given the same weight as the text; it includes a centrefold, few footnotes, no chapter titles or index, and has one prose essay. Accordingly, the reviews noted: “The coffee table has long lacked a UN volume to place on top of its Great Gardens of Europe and From Lascaux to Guggenheim,” or “O’Brien’s books […] do not belong to modern, especially quantified, social science and have nothing directly to do with the development of the scientific study of politics”.130 All three books are considered insider accounts and thus have not received the scholarly attention they deserve.131 However, in connection with the rise of constructivism, reflectivism, and post-positivism in social and historiographic science, particularly in the study of international
–––––––––––––– 127 Kennedy 2006; Stephen C. Schlesinger. Act of Creation: The Founding of the United Nations: A Story of Superpowers, Secret Agents, Wartime Allies and Enemies, and Their Quest for a Peaceful World. Boulder: Westview, 2003. 128 Evan Luard. A History of the United Nations, vol. 1: The Years of Western Domination, 1945–1955, vol. 2: The Age of Decolonization, 1955–1965. London: Macmillan, 1982– 1988. 129 Boyd 1964[1962]; Sá 1966; O’Brien/Topolski 1968. 130 Reviews by Herbert G. Nicholas in International Affairs 44 (1968): 754–755, and Leon Gordenker in International Organisation 23 (1969): 897–913. Emphasis imported from the original quote. 131 However, O’Brien’s book has been translated into German, thereby receiving pocket- book format.
35 CHAPTER 1 relations, one can profit from their insights. A condensed summary of the starting point for the constructivist approach is provided by Karl Jaspers in the quote used as a motto for this book: “The UN shows us more than the diplomacy of its members. An organ of mankind, however wretched, appears to mankind.” It is worth noting that what was Americanised as us by the translator appeared as the global public in the German original.132 Recently, authors of different backgrounds have prominently referred to O’Brien, such as studies dealing with United Nations propaganda or anthropological approaches to peace operations.133 In Germany, a scholar examining the United Nations world conferences of the 1990s has elaborated on a “symbolicist political science view”, drawing from O’Brien and Ernst Cassirer, among others.134 Not all writers applying constructivist approaches to topics related to the United Nations refer to the same authors; post-positivism in studies on international relations has a wide range of sources to draw from.135 Particularly noteworthy is the recent introduction of Reinhart Koselleck’s conceptual history (Begriffsgeschichte) for the study of international relations by Risto Wallin, in a work comparing the political language of the League of Nations and the United Nations.136 Also this author has applied conceptual history to international relations, in a study on the rise and meaning of the term ‘non-governmental organisations’ in the context of the United Nations and elsewhere.137 While issues related to diplomacy play a marginal role in international relations research, it should be noted that studies on diplomacy – with the issue of representation at the centre of the subject matter – have for some time shown a particular affinity to a constructivist research agenda.138 A recent study in this tradition is political
–––––––––––––– 132 Jaspers 1984: 157; cf. Jaspers 1958: 218. 133 Mark DaCosta Alleyne. “The Global Promotion of Gender Equality: A Propaganda Approach.” Human Rights Review 5 (2004) 3: 103–116; Robert A. Rubinstein. “Intervention and Culture: An Anthropological Approach to Peace Operations.” Security Dialogue 36 (2005) 4: 527–544. 134 Reinhard Wesel. Symbolische Politik der Vereinten Nationen: Die ‘Weltkonferenzen’ als Rituale. Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 2004. 135 E.g. François Debrix. Re-envisioning Peacekeeping: The United Nations and the Mobilization of Ideology. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999; William Over. Human Rights in the International Public Sphere: Civic Discourse for the 21st Century. Stamford, Conn.: Ablex, 1999. 136 Risto Wallin. Yhdistyneet kansakunnat organisaationa: Tutkimus käsitteellisestä muutoksesta maailmanjärjest n organisoinnin periaatteissa. Jyväskylä: University, 2005. 137 G tz 2008a. 138 James Der Derian. On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement. Oxford: Blackwell, 1987; Constantinou 1996; Paul Sharp. “Who Needs Diplomats? The Problem of Diplomatic Representation.” International Journal 52 (1997) 4: 609–634; Paul Sharp. “For (continued)
36 INTRODUCTION scientist César Villanueva’s dissertation on Mexican and Swedish cultural diplomacy.139 What has been addressed as a corporatist research agenda is actually shorthand for approaches to breaking up the ‘black box’ of ‘nation state’ in international relations, directing attention to the forces that constitute a ‘unitary state actor’. These pose democratic challenges to solely governmental approaches of conducting international affairs. They are civil society associations on the one hand, and parliaments on the other.140 There is reason to be critical of attempts to subsume parliamentarians under the heading ‘civil society’ and then largely disregard genuine civil society, as was done by the Cardoso report. However, as parliamentarians have no independent base in the United Nations – specifically, no base in a proportional system of representation or one which would otherwise imply a systematic representation of constituencies – their presence conforms to a corporatist model for the representation of sectoral interests rather than to a systematised voter- related delegation of power.141 Like the presence of other non-state actors in international relations, they can be subsumed under the concept of “polylateral diplomacy”.142 –––––––––––––– Diplomacy: Representation and the Study of International Relations.” International Studies Review 1 (1999) 1: 33–57. 139 César Villanueva. Representing Cultural Diplomacy: Soft Power, Cosmopolitan Constructivism, and Nation Branding in Mexico and Sweden. Växj : University Press, 2007. 140 Evidently, transnational companies pose another challenge. These actors do not fit the category of democratic challenges and are therefore not considered here. However, the dimension of democratic challenge is covered by employers’ and business associations, which are part of civil society and form an indispensible element of (classical) corporatism. 141 Cf. Wolf 2005: 116–118. Note here that the classical definition of corporatism by Philippe Schmitter has the advantage that it is so far removed from empirical applicability that everyone can refer to it as an ideal type without having to bother whether his or her case fits the definition. It does not seem less applicable to parliamentarians in the context under discussion here than to representatives of interest organisations. According to Schmitter, corporatism is a “system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports” (Philippe Schmitter. “Still the Century of Corporatism?” Review of Politics 36 (1974): 85–131, at 93–94). In regard to the compatibility of the concepts of ‘civil society’ and ‘corporatism’ cf. Norbert G tz. “Century of Corporatism or Century of Civil Society? The Northern European Experience.” Civil Society in the Baltic Sea Region. Norbert G tz and J rg Hackmann (eds). Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003b. 37–48. 142 Geoffrey Wiseman. “‘Polylateralism’ and New Modes of Global Dialogue.” Diplomacy, vol. 3: Problems and Issues in Contemporary Diplomacy. Christer J nsson and Richard (continued)
37 CHAPTER 1
Apart from their normative implication, democratic challenges also have a practical side that affects the conditions for effective policy making and implementation. For example, the concept of ‘catalytic diplomacy’ has been suggested as a powerful symbiosis of state and non-state diplomacy “reflecting the desire of actors of all kinds to establish and preserve their autonomy whilst drawing on the resources of others to compensate for resource deficits”.143 A valuable book on both major dimensions concerning corporatist issues is the recent conference volume “Wir, die V lker (…)” – Strukturwandel in der Weltorganisation (“We the Peoples (…)” – Structural Change in the World Organisation) edited by Sabine von Schorlemer. The introduction states that despite the overtures of civil society and business, the United Nations is still in the preliminary stages of encouraging greater parliamentary participation; scholarly discourse on the question of the parliamentary dimension of the United Nations needs to be cultivated.144 Standing as an anomaly in an ‘intergovernmental world’, the participation of parliamentarians in national delegations to the United Nations has only been analysed in a few studies conducted under the auspices of international organisations. For example, a project initiated by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) took up the matter as early as 1951. In the 1970s, further research was undertaken by the Inter-parliamentary Union and the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR).145 Other relevant studies also stem from this period. Political scientist Peter R. Baehr published two contributions that may have changed the Dutch delegation
–––––––––––––– Langhorne (eds). London: Sage, 2004. 36–57; cf. Christer J nsson and Martin Hall. Essence of Diplomacy. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. 152, 157. 143 Brian Hocking. “Catalytic Diplomacy: Beyond ‘Newness’ and ‘Decline’.” Innovation in Diplomatic Practice. Jan Melissen (ed.). Macmillan, 1999. 21–42, at 37; the concept of ‘catalytic diplomacy’ draws from the concept of the ‘catalytic state’, cf. Michael Lind. “The Catalytic State.” The National Interest 27 (1992) Spring: 3–12. 144 Sabine von Schorlemer. “Vorwort.” ‘Wir, die V lker (…)’ – Strukturwandel in der Weltorganisation: Konferenzband aus Anlass des 60-jährigen Bestehens der Vereinten Nationen vom 27.–28. Oktober 2005 in Dresden. Frankfurt/Main: Lang, 2006. vii–xxii, at xix–xx. 145 National Administration and International Organization: A Comparative Survey of Fourteen Countries. Brussels: International Institute of Administrative Sciences and Unesco, 1951. Among the national reports on which this study was based were reports from Denmark and Norway. The studies of the 1970s were: Provisions for the Information of Members of Parliament Concerning the Activities of the United Nations and Specialized Agencies. Geneva: Inter-parliamentary Union, 1977; John Goormaghtigh. Parliaments and the United Nations: Dissemination of Information to Parliamentarians. New York: UNITAR, 1979.
38 INTRODUCTION practice at the beginning of the 1970s.146 Unfortunately, Baehr’s “Proposal for a Study on Parliamentarians in Governmental Delegations to International Organizations” never materialised.147 Robert E. Riggs has conducted some research for the United States in collaboration with a Norwegian colleague.148 In addition, a number of studies on ‘conference diplomacy’ or ‘parliamentary diplomacy’ take up the issue of participation of legislators in such surroundings.149 However, the term ‘parliamentary diplomacy’ is mainly rooted in international relations and international law with regard to parliamentary procedures in multilateral organs or conferences, and only rarely used to refer to parliamentary actors.150 The definition of parliamentary diplomacy as “conference diplomacy as practised by delegates of national parliaments in an international parliamentary or quasi-parliamentary assembly” has never been widely accepted.151 Studies on parliaments in a globalising world are rare.152 The relation of civil society (in the context of the United Nations traditionally addressed by the limiting and deprecating term ‘non- governmental organisations) to the world organisation at large is a topic scholars have addressed regularly after the heightened interest in
–––––––––––––– 146 Peter R. Baehr. The Role of a National Delegation in the General Assembly. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1970; Peter R. Baehr. “Kamerleden in Regeringsdelegaties: Een Oud Probleem Opnieuw Bezien” [“Members of Parliament in Governmental Delegations: An Old Problem Reconsidered”]. Acta Politica 5 (1969): 3–19. 147 The proposal was published in Baehr 1970: 79–83. 148 Robert E. Riggs. “One Small Step for Functionalism: UN Participation and Congressional Attitude Change.” International Organization 31 (1977): 515–539; Robert E. Riggs and I. Jostein Mykletun. Beyond Functionalism: Attitudes toward International Organization in Norway and the United States. Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1979. 149 E.g. Edvard Hambro. “Some Notes on Parliamentary Diplomacy.” Transnational Law in a Changing Society: Essays in Honor of Philip C. Jessup. Wolfgang Friedmann, Louis Henkin and Oliver Lissitzyn (eds). New York: Columbia University Press, 1972. 280–297; Johan Kaufmann. Conference Diplomacy: An Introductory Analysis. 3rd rev. ed. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996[1968]. 150 Cf. G tz 2005a. 151 Volker Rittberger. “Global Conference Diplomacy and International Policy-Making: The Case of UN-Sponsored World Conferences.” European Journal of Political Research 11 (1983): 167–182, at 171. 152 Marianne Beisheim and Achim Brunnengräber. “Das Parlament im Globalisierungsprozess: Ein Desiderat in der Parlamentarismus- und Global Governance- Forschung.” Zeitschrift f r Internationale Beziehungen 15 (2008): 73–100; cf., however, Stefan Marschall. Transnationale Repräsentation in parlamentarischen Versammlungen: Demokratie und Parlamentarismus jenseits des Nationalstaates. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2005.
39 CHAPTER 1
‘transnational relations’ arose in the early 1970s.153 This literature has flourished since the 1990s, and currently occupies a strategic position in discourse on global governance.154 The best book on this topic remains the semiotically astute Non-Governmental Organizations at the United Nations: Identity, Role, and Function, published in 1981 by Hannah Arendt’s student Pei-heng Chiang.155 Apart from this outstanding but somewhat outdated book, the most original contributions have been made in a number of articles by Peter Willetts and Anthony Judge.156 There are almost no accounts that touch upon the issue of civil society representatives in national delegations to the General Assembly. A notable exception is Dorothy B. Robins’ highly recommendable account, Experiment in Democracy: The Story of U.S. Citizen Organizations in Forging the Charter of the United Nations.157 It is agreed that direct representation in and interaction with the United Nations is more important for civil society organisations than indirect communication through national delegations. However, today this path, although direct, is narrow, and has been even narrower in the past. For example, ‘non-governmental organisations’ are still attached to the feeble Economic and Social Council and not to the General Assembly. The failure of scholars to recognise civil society representatives in national delegations –––––––––––––– 153 Cf. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye (eds). Transnational Relations and World Politics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972. 154 E.g. John E. Trent. Modernizing the United Nations System: Civil Society’s Role in Moving from International Relations to Global Governance. Opladen: Budrich, 2007; Kerstin Martens. NGOs and the United Nations: Institutionalization, Professionalization and Adaptation. New York: Palgrave, 2005; Willetts 1996; Thomas Weiss and Leon Gordenker (eds). NGOs, the UN, and Global Governance. Boulder: Rienner, 1996. For a critique of Martens see: G tz 2007: 48–51. 155 Chiang 1981. 156 See, in addition to Willetts 1996 in particular: Peter Willetts. “What is a Non- Governmental Organization?” Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems, vol.: Encyclopedia of Institutional and Infrastructural Resources. UNESCO (ed.). Oxford: Eolss Publishers, 2002. Available at
40 INTRODUCTION to the General Assembly is both a result of such representatives being rare and an artefact of idiosyncrasies in the discipline studying international relations. First, the dogma of international relations as a playground for unitary state actors is an effective barrier against the notion that civil society is relevant. Second, those International Relations scholars who do take civil society into account often restrict their interest to international ‘non-governmental organisations’. They apply, therefore, different selection criteria in identifying relevant research units in the non- governmental sphere favouring structure over function. By the same logic, international relations would not be about nation states functioning in international arenas, but would have to be restricted to international organisations (i.e. truly international structures). The discovery of national associations as actors on the international floor has not yet happened. Surprisingly little literature adequately treats the unique tripartite representational design of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) that gives nation states and national labour and employers’ federations representation independent of one another.158 This arrangement has sometimes been perceived as a kind of “world social parliament”.159 Comparatively little has been written on national policies in regard to the United Nations in general.160 The most comprehensive survey on nation states in the United Nations was published in a series entitled “National Studies on International Organization” in the 1950s. Two studies
–––––––––––––– 158 See, however: Pauli Kettunen. “The Nordic Model and the International Labour Organisation.” Regional Cooperation and International Organizations: The Nordic Model in Transnational Alignment. Norbert G tz and Heidi Haggrén (eds). London: Routledge, 2009. 67–87; Victor-Yves Ghebali. The International Labour Organisation: A Case Study on the Evolution of U.N. Specialised Agencies. Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1989; Nicolas Valticos. “Diplomacy in an Institutional Framework: Some Aspects of ILO Practice and Experience.” La comunità internazionale (1974): 446–464; Torsten Landelius. Workers, Employers and Governments: A Comparative Study of Delegations and Groups at the International Labour Conference 1919–1964. Stockholm: Norstedt, 1965; Georges Scelle. L’Organisation Internationale du Travail et le BIT. Paris: Rivière, 1930. 159 Nils Thedin. “Ett socialt världsparlament.” Riktlinjer f r en världsfederation: Ett inlägg i diskussionen om världens framtid. Stockholm: Natur och kultur, 1945. 203–229. 160 More recent studies include: Gary B. Ostrower. The United Nations and the United States. New York: Twayne, 1998; Chadwick F. Alger, Gene M. Lyons and John E. Trent (eds). The United Nations System: The Policies of Member States. Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1995; Keith Krause and W. Andy Knight (eds). State, Society and the UN System: Changing Perspectives on Multilateralism. Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1995; Seymour Maxwell Finger. Your Man at the UN: People, Politics, and Bureaucracy in Making Foreign Policy. New York: University Press, 1980.
41 CHAPTER 1 dealt with Denmark and Sweden.161 In what follows, a short survey of the research situation for each of the Nordic countries will be given, followed by an overview of research on the Nordic group in the United Nations. Literature on development aid and peacekeeping missions is not taken into account.162 Other types of literature not taken into account here are memoirs or works on general matters related to the United Nations by numerous Nordic international lawyers. For Denmark, Paul Villaume has recently pointed to the discrepancy between Danish self-perception and political rhetoric regarding United Nations membership on the one hand and the “surprising lack of published, thorough historical research of Danish U.N. policies in the Cold War era” on the other.163 Yet, while this self-perception has parallels in the other Nordic countries, the Danish research situation is far better than that of her neighbours thanks to Kristine Midtgaard’s studies on Denmark’s first twenty years in the United Nations, with a particular focus on security policy.164 Bo Lidegaard and the present author have written about
–––––––––––––– 161 Max S rensen and Niels J. Haagerup. Denmark and the United Nations. New York: Manhatten, 1956; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (ed.). Sweden and the United Nations. New York: Manhattan, 1956. 162 Cf. Jarle Simensen. “Writing the History of Development Aid: A Norwegian example: Some reflections on methods and results.” Scandinavian Journal of History 32 (2007) 2: 167–182; see however: Sunniva Engh and Helge Pharo. “Nordic Cooperation in Providing Development Aid.” Regional Cooperation and International Organisations: The Nordic Model in Transnational Alignment. Norbert G tz and Heidi Haggrén (eds). London: Routledge, 2009. 112–130. 163 Poul Villaume. “Post-Cold War Historiography in Denmark.” The Cold War – and the Nordic Countries: Historiography at the Crossroads. Thorsten B. Olesen (ed.). Odense: University Press of Southern Denmark, 2004. 17–41, at 24. 164 Kristine Midtgaard. “Oprettelsen af en permanent dansk FN-styrke 1958–64: Udvikling og hensyn, internationalisme og realpolitik i dansk sikkerhedspolitik i 1950erne og 1960erne.” Omverdenen trænger sig på: Politik og ideer id et 20. århundredes historie. Festskrift til Thorsten Borring Olesen. Kristine Midtgaard and Lise H. Rasmussen (eds). Odense: Syddansk Universitetsforlag, 2006. 139–158; Kristine K. N. Midtgaard. Småstat, magt og sikkerhed: Danmark og FN 1949–65. Odense: Syddansk Universitetsforlag, 2005; Kristine K. N. Midtgaard. “Dansk FN-politik 1949–65: Småstaten Danmarks offensive magtstrategi.” Den jyske historiker (2002) 97: 16–43; Kristine K. N. Midtgaard. Jutlandia- ekspeditionen: Tilblivelse og virke 1950–53. Copenhagen: Dansk udenrigspolitisk institut, 2001; Kristine K. N. Midtgaard. Danmark og FN 1949–63: FN-politikkens status og rolle i dansk sikkerhedspolitik. Århus: Historisk Institut, 1998; Kristine Kjærsgaard Nielsen (= Midtgaard). “Danmark og vetosp rgsmålet i FN 1945–49.” Historie (1997) 1: 1–31; Kristine Kjærsgaard Nielsen (= Midtgaard). Danmark og FN 1945–49: En unders gelse af FN-politikkens og FN-medlemskabets status og rolle i dansk sikkerhedspolitik 1945–49. Aarhus: Historisk Institut, 1996.
42 INTRODUCTION
Denmark’s earliest history in the United Nations.165 A general account by the Danish Institute of International Affairs and a special issue on Denmark in the United Nations by the journal Militært Tidsskrift have been published on the occasion of Denmark’s recent membership in the Security Council,166 although no overall studies of Denmark and the United Nations exist after 1965. A major scholarly work touching on the issue of parliamentary and civil society participation in Danish UN delegations is Erling Bj l’s monograph Hvem bestemmer? Studier i den udenrigspolitiske beslutnings- proces (Who rules? Studies in foreign policy decision making).167 There are also some articles on the Danish Folketing’s role in general foreign policy decision making.168 Virtually no scholarly literature has appeared on Finland’s role at the United Nations apart from a few texts written by diplomats. Klaus T rnudd’s book Suomi ja Yhdistyneet Kansakunnat (Finland and the United Nations) is a popular portrait of the United Nations that only includes a few pages dealing with Finland. He has also written a short article on Finland and the United Nations in the 1960s, continuing a book chapter by another semi-diplomat. T rnudd has further authored a booklet on Finnish UN policies for the foreign ministry.169 Unto Vesa has written on the impact of EU membership on the latter policy.170 None of these studies have a constructivist approach, although a historiographic study that also addresses the composition of delegations is Timo Soikkanen’s history of the Finnish
–––––––––––––– 165 Bo Lidegaard. I kongens navn: Henrik Kauffmann i dansk diplomati 1919–1958. Copenhagen: Samleren, 1996; G tz 2004; G tz 2005c. 166 FN, verden og Danmark. Copenhagen: Dansk udenrigspolitisk institut, 1999; Topical issue “Danmark i FN.” Militært Tidsskrift 134 (2005) 3. 167 Erling Bj l. Hvem bestemmer? Studier i den udenrigspolitiske beslutningsproces. Copenhagen: Jurist- og Økonomforbundet, 1983. 168 Françoise Mendel. “The Role of Parliament in Foreign Affairs in Denmark.” Parliamentary Control over Foreign Policy. Antonio Cassese (ed). Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1980. 53–64; Viggo Sj qvist. “Udenrigspolitik og parlamentarisme i Danmark.” Nær og Fjern: Samspillet mellem indre og ydre politik. Copenhagen: Politiske Studier, 1980. 57–74. 169 Klaus T rnudd. Suomi ja Yhdistyneet Kansakunnat. Helsinki: Tammi, 1967; Klaus T rnudd. “Finland in the United Nations during the 1960’s.” Essays on Finnish Foreign Policy. Helsinki: Finnish Political Science Association, 1969. 50–59; Jaakko Ilvessalo. “Finland and the Great Problems of the United Nations.” Finnish Foreign Policy. Helsinki: Finnish Political Science Association, 1963. 113–127; Klaus T rnudd. Suomen YK- politiikka. Helsinki: Ulkoasiainministeri , 1991. 170 Unto Vesa. “Finland in the UN as an EU state.” Northern Dimensions 4 (2001): 59–71; cf. Laatikainen 2003.
43 CHAPTER 1 foreign ministry.171 Moreover, some literature on parliament and foreign policy making in Finland can be found.172 The present author has written on Finland’s accession to the United Nations.173 The only relevant study on Iceland is Pétur J. Thorsteinsson’s three-volume Utanríkis j nusta Íslands og utanríkismál: S gulegt yfirlit (Iceland’s Foreign Service and Foreign Affairs: A Historical Overview), which devotes a few pages to the United Nations and to the issue of delegations.174 Norway’s accession to the United Nations has been covered by historical research, both with regard to the government-in-exile’s alliance policy during the Second World War and the move towards NATO membership in 1949.175 There is an unpublished 1959 manuscript by Olav Riste on Norway and the founding of the United Nations and a recent study of Norway’s early attitude towards the Security Council and the veto principle.176 Hallvard Kvale Svenbalrud’s dissertation project on Nowegian peace policy and the United Nations in the period 1970 to 2005 and Guri Hjeltnes’ forthcoming biography on Trygve Lie will eventually result in even broader historical knowledge. Sunniva Engh’s post-doc project about the Norwegian vision at the United Nations between 1945 and 1975 has unfortunately been shelved. Again, although there are hardly any constructivist accounts of Norwegian United Nations policy, general studies do exist.177 A number of publications by political scientist Jostein Mykletun focus on parliamentary members on Norwegian delegations to the General Assembly, most explicitly in an unpublished study entitled “A Study of Possible Political Effects of Delegating Members of Parliament to the United Nations: A Norwegian Exploration”.178 Mykletun elaborated on his findings in journal
–––––––––––––– 171 Timo Soikkanen. Presidentin ministeri : Ulkoasiainhallinto ja ulkopolitiikan hoito Kekkosen kaudella, vol. 1: Kansainvälistymisen ja muutosvaatimusten paineessa 1956– 1969. Helsinki: Ulkoasiainministeri , 2003. 172 E.g. Osmo Apunen. “Parlamentaariseen ulkopolitiikkaan.” Politiikka 16 (1974): 104– 114. 173 G tz 2008b. 174 Pétur J. Thorsteinsson. Utanríkis j nusta Íslands og utanríkismál: S gulegt yfirlit, vol. 1–3. Reykjavík: Hi íslenska b kmenntafélag, 1992. 175 The most recent study on the former is G tz 2009c. 176 Olav Riste. Norway and the Founding of the United Nations. Manuscript. Oslo: Universitetet, 1959; Øystein Horntvedt. Norge og opprettelsen av FNs sikkerhetsråd: Norske oppfatninger om de allierte stormaktenes vetorett og faste plass i Sikkerhetsrådet, 1941–1945. Oslo: Institutt for offentlig rett, 2002. 177 E.g. Halvard Leira (ed.). Norske selvbilder og norsk utenrikspolitikk. Oslo: NUPI, 2007. 178 Kurt Jacobsen and Jostein Mykletun. FN – Norden – Norge. Oslo: PRIO, 1973. Part III.
44 INTRODUCTION articles and in a monograph comparing Norway to the United States.179 Norway also has a rich tradition in scholarly literature on the role of parliament in foreign affairs.180 A dissertation on Swedish UN policy written by historian Bo Huldt in the 1970s dealt with how Sweden related to the issue of decolonisation and how it participated in the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly. Apart from an overview by Huldt on research of interest to his country,181 not much has been written about Sweden in the United Nations. The only other relevant publications are three papers on special topics produced by a research programme on Sweden in the Cold War in the late 1990s.182 A recent survey on the discipline of history in Sweden has diagnosed a rapid decline of interest in international history since the 1970s and an increasing preoccupation with narrow national matters – not a hopeful prospect for the field of historical UN research.183 Apart from the members of the Swedish –––––––––––––– 179 Jostein Mykletun. “FN – Norge – FN: Holdningsdannelse og utenrikspolitiske implikasjoner.” Internasjonal Politikk (1975b): 629–648; Jostein Mykletun. “Norwegian Policy Elites’ Attitudes Toward the UN: A Functionalist Perspective.” Cooperation and Conflict 11 (1976) 2: 241–258; Riggs/Mykletun 1979. I have been unable to consult the author’s also unpublished dissertation Jostein Mykletun. “Only Through a Function: A Case Study of Norwegian Policy Elites’ Attitudes Toward the United Nations.” Thesis (Ph.D.). University of Minnesota 1975a. 180 Anders Sjaastad. “Stortinget som utenrikspolitisk organ.” Norsk utenrikspolitisk praksis: Akt rer og prosesser. Birgitte Kjos Fonn, Iver B. Neumann and Ole Jacob Sending (eds). Oslo: Cappelen, 2006. 19–47; Olav Riste. “Ideal, interesser og parlamentarisk kontroll: Utforminga av norsk utanrikspolitikk 1905–1945.” Historiker og veileder: Festskrift til Jakob Sverdrup. Trond Bergh and Helge Ø. Pharo (eds). Oslo: Tiden, 1989. 63–80; Finn Moe. “Stortinget og den utenrikspolitiske avgj relsesprosessen.” Internasjonal Politikk (1969) 6: 670–677; Ottar Hellevik. “Stortingets rolle i den utenrikspolitiske avgj relsesprosessen.” Internasjonal Politikk (1969) 6: 691–713; Ottar Hellevik. “Stortingets utenrikspolitiske sp rrevirksomhet.” Tidsskrift for samfunnsforskning (1965): 91–112; Reidar Omang. “Stortinget og de utenrikske saker etter Unionsoppl sningen 1905.” Det Norske Storting gjennom 150 år, vol. 4: Spesialartikler. Carl J. Hambro et al. (eds). Oslo: Gyldendal, 1964. 67–164; Colban 1961. 181 Bo Huldt. Sweden, the United Nations, and Decolonization: A Study of Swedish Participation in the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly 1946–69. Stockholm: Scandinavian University Books, 1974; Bo Huldt. Sverige och F renta nationerna: Historia och framtidsperspektiv. Stockholm: Liber, 1976. 182 Sofia Ekfeldt Nyman. ‘I fredens tjänst’: Motiven bakom Sveriges deltagande i FN:s fredsbevarande styrkor i Kongo 1960–1964. G teborg: Forskningsprogrammet Sverige under kalla kriget, 1999; Joakim Niklasson. En olycka kommer sällan ensam: En studie av svensk krishantering under Suez- och Ungernkriserna 1956. G teborg: Forsknings- programmet Sverige under kalla kriget, 1999; Annika Norlin. Undénplanen: Ett lyckat misslyckande. G teborg: Forskningsprogrammet Sverige under kalla kriget, 1998. 183 Stefan Ekl f Amirell. “Den internationella historiens uppgång och fall: Trender inom svensk internationell historieforskning 1950–2005.” Historisk tidskrift 126 (2006) 2: 257– 278.
45 CHAPTER 1
Institute of International Affairs who wrote the aforementioned study on Sweden within the international programme “National Studies on International Organization”, political scientists Ulrika M rth and Bengt Sundelius have contributed to knowledge of Sweden and the United Nations.184 The few studies of Sweden from a constructivist point of view do not deal specifically with the United Nations, and only the dissertation by Villanueva offers a semiotic set of tools.185 With regard to parliamentary participation in delegations to the General Assembly, the only published account is Ulf Bjereld’s book on the so-called Hjalmarson affair, a study of the break down of such type of participation; its focus is on the political game, with no particular interest directed towards the Swedish delegation practice.186 A useful unpublished paper by a university student written in the mid-1960s includes a report of interviews with parliamentary delegates.187 There is also an authoritative work by Kjell Goldmann, Sten Berglund, and Gunnar Sj stedt on the issue of democracy and foreign policy in Sweden and related book chapters by Lars-G ran Stenelo and Magnus Jerneck.188 An outstanding publication related to Sweden and the United Nations is political scientist Staffan I. Lindberg’s report for the Swedish Riksdag on government, parliament, administration, and voluntary organisations at the United Nations world conferences of the 1990s. Lindberg showed that the dynamic of the political process in connection –––––––––––––– 184 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 1956; Ulrika M rth. Sverige i FNs säkerhetsråd: En neutral småstat på estraden. Sundbyberg: FOA, 1991; Ulrika M rth and Bengt Sundelius. “Sweden and the United Nations.” State, Society and the UN System: Changing Perspectives on Multilateralism. Keith Krause and W. Andy Knight (eds). Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1995. 101–131. 185 Lundberg 2005; Sten Ottosson. Svensk självbild under kalla kriget: En studie av stats- och utrikesministrarnas bild av Sverige 1950–1989. Stockholm: Utrikespolitiska Institutet, 2003; Ulf Bjereld. Kritiker eller medlare? En studie av Sveriges utrikespolitiska roller 1945–1990. Stockholm: Nerenius & Santérus, 1992; Ann-Sofie Nilsson. Den moraliska stormakten: En studie av socialdemokratins internationella aktivism. Stockholm: Timbro, 1991; Villanueva 2007. 186 Ulf Bjereld. Hjalmarsonaffären: Ett politiskt drama i tre akter. Stockholm: Nerenius & Santérus, 1997. 187 Arne Karlsson. “Parlamentarikerna i den svenska FN-delegationen.” Manuscript. Stockholm: Department of Political Science, 1965. I owe this reference to Krister Wahlbäck. 188 Kjell Goldmann, Sten Berglund and Gunnar Sj stedt. Democracy and Foreign Policy: The Case of Sweden. Aldershot: Gower, 1986; Lars-G ran Stenelo. “Den internationaliserade demokratin.” Makt och internationalisering. G te Hansson and Lars- G ran Stenelo (eds). Stockholm: Carslsson, 1990. 273–363; Magnus Jerneck. “Internationalisering och svensk partidiplomati.” Makt och internationalisering. G te Hansson and Lars-G ran Stenelo (eds). Stockholm: Carlsson, 1990. 149–223.
46 INTRODUCTION with these world conferences involves both empowering and disempowering tendencies for parliament, the latter partly to the benefit of civil society associations. The most important power base for parliament in this connection was the fact that political consensus at home was an important resource for the government in negotiations in both the United Nations and even more so in the European Union caucus. Lindberg found that civil society channels were an important factor in strengthening the Swedish government’s international position by means of improved expertise, information, and alternative negotiation venues. He noted that Swedish voluntary associations generally strove for representation on official delegations, despite the fact that this curtailed their own freedom of movement. One factor sustaining the ‘governmentality’ of the voluntary sector was the fact that representatives from such a background enjoyed greater manoeuvrability than their formal status as official representatives of government suggested. These “semi-official” delegates were given the task of disseminating sensitive information to the public. Lindberg described this as a win-win game for civil society and the government, and spoke of a tendency toward the corporatisation of Swedish foreign policy. He also noted a partial overlapping of civil society and parliamentary representation.189 The only studies of the overall history of Nordic UN policies or Nordic collaboration are the thesis by Lotte R. Bennedsgaard Olesen covering the period 1956 to 1965, and an article on the years 1949 to 1965 by Kristine Midtgaard.190 However, group formation in the General Assembly has attracted some attention from political scientists, who often apply quantitative methods in their work on this topic. For some time, Norden could be regarded as the smallest and, apart from the Eastern bloc, most coherent caucus at the United Nations.191 Katie Laatikainen’s recent –––––––––––––– 189 Staffan I. Lindberg. En uppf ljning och utvärdering av FN:s världskonferenser under 1990-talet: Regering, riksdag, myndigheter och frivilligorganisationer på nya internationella arenor – vem har makten ver svensk utrikespolitik i FN-frågor? Utredningar från Riksdagen 1998/99: URD4. Stockholm: Sveriges Riksdag, 1999. 20 (quote), 9–10, 24, 41, 43. 190 Lotte R. Bennedsgaard Olesen. Norden i FN, 1956–65: En unders gelse af nordisk politisk samarbejde i FN. Aarhus: Jean Monnet Center, 2003; Kristine Midtgaard. “Nordic Cooperation in the United Nations during the First Cold War: Between Internationalism and Realpolitik.” Regional Cooperation and International Organizations: The Nordic Model in Transnational Alignment. Norbert G tz and Heidi Haggrén (eds). London: Routledge, 2009. 47–64. 191 Lena Wiklund. “Nordisk samling i FN.” Norden i sicksack: Tre spårbyten inom nordiskt samarbete. Bengt Sundelius and Claes Wiklund (eds). Stockholm: Santérus, 2000. 253–274; Lena Wiklund. “Norden i FN.” Internasjonal politikk 54 (1996) 1: 75–83; Jan-Erik Lidstr m, and Claes Wiklund. “Norden i F renta Nationernas generalf rsamling.” Norden (continued)
47 CHAPTER 1 research shows that EU membership and the development of a common foreign and security policy have largely disintegrated the Nordic group.192 Some older accounts by diplomats and an article by this author add to that picture.193 Doris H. Linder has studied the contribution of Scandinavian women at the UnitedNations.194
–––––––––––––– på världsarenan. Åke Landqvist (ed.). Stockholm: tema, 1968. 86–124; Jacobsen 1967a; Kurt Jacobsen. “Voting Behaviour of the Nordic Countries in the General Assembly.” Cooperation and Conflict 2 (1967b): 139–157; Jaakko Kalela. “The Nordic Group in the General Assembly.” Cooperation and Conflict 2 (1967): 158–170; Jan-Erik Lidstr m and Claes Wiklund. “The Nordic Countries in the General Assembly and Its Two Political Committees.” Cooperation and Conflict 2 (1967): 171–187; Tormod P. Svennevik. “The Scandinavian Bloc in the United Nations.” Social Research (1955): 39–56. 192 Laatikainen 2003: 409–441. 193 Gunnar G. Schram. “The Role of the Nordic States in the U.N.” Small States in International Relations. August Schou and Arne Olav Brundtland (eds). Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1971. 123–127; Ralph Enckell. “Nordic Cooperation at the UN.” Nordic Cooperation: Conference Organised by the Nordic Council for International Organisations in Europe, Hässelby, 2–4 June 1965. Stockholm: Nordic Council, 1965. 40– 47; G tz 2005b. 194 Doris H. Linder. “Equality for Women: The Contribution of Scandinavian Women at the United Nations, 1946–66.” Scandinavian Studies 73 (2001) 2: 165–208.
48 2. CHALLENGES AND TRADITIONS
DELEGATION AND REPRESENTATION AT THE UNITED NATIONS “Tom, Dick, and Harry do not act in the United Nations. The actor is always the official representative of Ruritania, Mixolydia, or Utopia”, maintains Edvard Hambro, former Norwegian permanent representative to the United Nations and President of the twenty-fifth General Assembly.1 With this proposition Hambro, also known as co-author of a widely distributed commentary on the Charter of the United Nations, wants to direct attention to the principal–agent problem of governmental delegation in international relations and to the tidy solution provided for it by international law: the counterintuitive claim that international relations are conducted by states, not by individuals. While Hambro’s observation is in close accord with the common assumption of most studies in international history and relations, a critical look at the passage is apt to reveal a subtext that calls the statement into question. What are, in fact, the implications of being a representative and what does it mean to exercise delegated power? Does a crude logic of either/or apply in the above case? What about turning the statement upside down by taking the mythical countries Hambro names at their face value as imagined communities, that is, as an indication of the artificiality of the underlying concept of unitary state actors? Representation and its corollary, delegation, are largely neglected topics in the field of international relations. This may surprise someone unaware of the lack of theorising on diplomacy. The fact that diplomatic representations have been relevant institutions from their debut in the Renaissance, and delegations key instruments in twentieth century conference diplomacy may lead one to think otherwise.2 However, while diplomatic institutions that have been denominated representation and delegation will be empirically examined in the context of the United Nations in what follows, they are not to be confused with representation and delegation in the functional sense, as principles of responsive substitution or deputising. Therefore, official United Nations categories of delegates such as ‘representatives’, ‘alternate representatives’, and ‘advisers’ are marked by single inverted commas in order to distinguish the more specific from the general usage of these terms. The same applies to some unofficial labels used by individual nations, such as ‘parliamentary –––––––––––––– 1 Hambro 1972: 289. 2 Cf. J nsson 2002: 212–213, 216.
49 CHAPTER 2 advisers’ or ‘observers’. Thus, representatives are strictly distinguished from ‘representatives’; the former refers to a specific unit that is represented and might coincide with any of the technical categories mentioned above. Likewise alternating representatives are often something different from ‘alternate representatives’. In social theory the problem of delegation has been at the core of the principal–agent model – one of the major derivatives of rational choice theory – while the problem of representation has been of central concern to postmodern or constructivist philosophy and theory. Although these diverse strands of meta-theory, positivism and constructivism, have had substantive impact on the discipline of International Relations, it has hardly addressed issues of representation and delegation.3 Alexander Wendt’s explicit “‘sociology of error’ approach to representations” is a prominent example of what International Relations theory calls constructivism is generally a rather ‘light’ and putatively ‘realist’ version of meta-theoretical constructivism, and is lacking substantial reflection on the issue of reality and representation.4 Awareness of the mechanisms of representation and delegation will facilitate the understanding of the empirical chapters on Nordic delegations to the UN General Assembly. It also helps to overcome the preoccupation with nation states (represented by their governments, which, furthermore but widely ignored, are in their turn often represented by authorised agents). As this stipulation reveals, International Relations theories do operate with a presumption about representation, although it remains largely on an implicit level. Their favored model, the unitary state actor, is specific, namely, a model of agents representing principals (i.e. states) in a manner of identity. As we shall see, there is good reason to believe that representation does not function this way. Insight in the resulting problematisation of representation has far-reaching implications: it suggests a deconstructionist approach towards the state that makes a notion of state coherence or (according to Wendt) personhood obsolete. The question being debated by International Relations scholars as to whether the state is a person should, therefore, be reversed:5 Under what conditions is a person given the
–––––––––––––– 3 There are a few exceptions: Constantinou 1996; Sharp 1999; Alejandro Colás. “The Power of Representation: Democratic Politics and Global Governance.” Review of International Studies 29 (2003) S1: 97–118. 4 Wendt 1999: 335; cf. the critique of Maja Zehfuss. Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality. Cambridge: University Press, 2002. 5 The person-hood of states has been the topic of a discussion forum in the Review of International Studies 30 (2004) 2; see also 31 (2005) 2.
50 CHALLENGES AND TRADITIONS authority to act as a state? Other than in a dictatorship, a person might become a state only in narrowly defined contexts. But why should we not assume an identity of states and their agents in the first place? As the literature on representative government most typically concludes, “not the notion of identity but of similarity, should lie at the roots of the theory of representation”.6 Systems theory and common sense would likewise suggest that something gets lost if we reduce individuals or institutions to executives of the will of superior entities and neglect their intrinsic value. In a more systematic way, principal–agent models focus on differences, presupposing varying degrees of similarity rather than identity in their relationship. This is made clear by the leitmotiv of the theory, namely, ‘agency loss’. As rational choice was originally a microtheory, it has been identified as having difficulty “treating states as aggregate actors with well-defined preferences”.7 However, differences between masters and their servants matter. Their starting point, a ‘crisis of representation’, is grounded on the conviction that reference, apart from autopoiesis or recursiveness, is problematic. Thus, the question remains whether there is an element of willfullness in entities that act for the state.
A functional approach to delegation and representation On a conceptual level, representation and delegation are principles of responsive substitution that are closely related. In the Federalist Papers, James Madison characterises a republic both as “a government in which the scheme of representation takes place” and as a system with “delegation of the government […] to a small number of citizens elected by the rest”.8 A well-known passage in the French Constitution of 1791, written in all likelihood by the Abbé Sieyès, uses both concepts in the same breath: “The nation, from which alone all powers emanate, may exercise such powers only by delegation. The French Constitution is representative.”9
–––––––––––––– 6 Marek Sobolewski. “The Voters Political Opinion and Elections: Some Problems of Political Representation.” Die moderne Demokratie und ihr Recht – Modern Constitutionalism and Democracy: Festschrift f r Gerhard Leibholz zum 65. Geburtstag, vol. 2: Staats- und Verfassungsrecht. Karl Dietrich Bracher et al. (eds). T bingen: Mohr, 1966. 345–365, at 365. 7 Duncan Snidal. “Rational Choice and International Relations.” Handbook of International Relations. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (eds). London: Sage, 2002. 73–94, at 84. 8 James Madison. “No. 10.” The Federalist Papers. Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay (eds). New York [et al.]: Mentor, 1961[1788]. 77–84, at 81–82. 9 Murray Forsyth. Reason and Revolution: The Political Thought of the Abbé Sieyes. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1987. 141.
51 CHAPTER 2
Although the terms representation and delegation are at times used interchangeably, they might also be used as concept and sub-concept or even as conflicting principles. In politics, the term representation is sometimes reserved for agents with a free mandate and contrasted with the imperative mandate of delegation. This view can be traced back to Edmund Burke, who distinguished a parliament with independently acting representatives of the entire community with “a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile interests”.10 This mutually exclusive conception has been particularly vivid in the German tradition with its existential view of representation. As Eric Voegelin has observed, “a delegate to the United Nations […] is an agent of his government acting under instructions, while the government that has delegated him is the representative of the respective political society”.11 Despite the fact that that “representation means different things to different people, and different things in different contexts”, an overall pattern of the usage of the word is identifiable.12 Delegation is in general a narrower word. Whereas dictionaries define ‘delegation’ by reference to ‘representation’, the reverse is not true.13 The word ‘representation’ is derived from the Latin repraesentare, ‘to present again’, ‘to make present’, or ‘to stand for’, as in the term ‘symbol’, something which stands for something else. The etymological meaning of ‘delegation’, ‘the act of empowering to act for another’ comes from the Latin delegare. Delegation has a specific meaning largely pertaining to the administrative-juridical realm, while representation is a concept that is used more broadly. Juxtaposing the two concepts discloses that delegation belongs to a sub-class of representation. The most significant difference in the terms, also suggested by the formulations of Madison and Sieyès, is that while both indicate that one entity stands for another, delegation involves an element of of authorisation, whereby an official gives a mandate to an
–––––––––––––– 10 Edmund Burke. “Speech to the Electors of Bristol, on His Being Declared by the Sheriffs Duly Elected One of the Representatives in Parliament for that City, on Thursday, the 3d of November, 1774.” The Works of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke, vol. 2. London: Nimmo, 1899. 89–98, at 96. 11 Eric Voegelin. The New Science of Politics: An Introduction. Chicago: University Press, 1952. 37; the most influential representatives of this tradition have been: Carl Schmitt. Verfassungslehre. Munich: Duncker & Humblot, 1928; Gerhard Leibholz. Das Wesen der Repräsentation unter besonderer Ber cksichtigung des Repräsentativsystems: Ein Beitrag zur allgemeinen Staats- und Verfassungslehre. Berlin [et al.]: de Gruyter, 1929. 12 Quote: David K. Ryden. Representation in Crisis: The Constitution, Interest Groups, and Political Parties. Albany: State University of New York, 1996. 13. 13 E.g. The Oxford English Dictionary, vol. 4, 13. Oxford: Claredon, 1989; Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary. Springfield: Merriam-Webster, 1996.
52 CHALLENGES AND TRADITIONS agent. The inherent problem with delegation, therefore, is the fidelity of the delegate to the assignment entrusted. Representation involves a higher degree of freedom than delegation. It does not necessarily presuppose a specific perspective, nor does it require that the referent and the substitute be actors or that their relationship be one of dependency. Only in point of logic does the represented have a prior status to which the representative should be responsive.14 The idea of ‘standing for’ or ‘making present’ may be evoked by either of them, but might also emanate from the imagination of a third party. The key question involved in representation therefore is not reliability, but validity. Following Max Weber’s formulation, such validity may be brought about by appropriation, responsibility, resemblance, or ascription, and that it depends on recognition.15 Alfred de Grazia has noted that in the social sphere representation serves the enhancement of community, compromise, and collective action, and is thereby “primarily a frame of mind, reflecting a process of social communication that often changes in important respects without disturbing the outward appearance of political institutions”.16 This is an observation that unfolds the concept of representation to the fullness of its plurality and dynamism. In the realm of politics, representational validity might also be called legitimacy, while reliability with regard to delegation is primarily linked to questions of legality and conformity to rules. Since John Locke’s claim that there are instances of inalienable rights and functions that may not be transferred to others, the problem of legitimacy has often been discussed in connection with delegation;17 although, from a systematic point of view, legitimacy mainly involves the loss of authenticity and responsibility within a chain of representational units, and is not directly linked to delegation. The view of delegation as a sub-class of representation advanced here is in agreement with the findings of Hanna Pitkin, author of
–––––––––––––– 14 Hanna Fenichel Pitkin. The Concept of Representation. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967. 140. 15 Cf. Max Weber. Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Grundriß der verstehenden Soziologie. 5th rev. ed. T bingen: Mohr, 1980. 171–176 (Max Weber. Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, vol. 1–2. Berkeley et al.: University of California Press, 1978[1922]. 292–293); Giovanni Sartori. “Representation II: Representational Systems.” International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 13: PSYC–SAMP. David L. Sills (ed.). New York: Macmillan, 1968. 465–474, at 465. 16 Alfred de Grazia. Public and Republic: Political Representation in America. New York: Knopf, 1951. 3 (quote), 5, 252. 17 Cf. John Locke. “The Second Treatise of Government: An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent, and End of Civil Government.” Two Treatises of Government. Cambridge: University Press, 1993. 265–428, at 362.
53 CHAPTER 2 a distinguished study of representation as a concept. Pitkin is mainly concerned with questions of representative government, legislature and what she calls ‘substantive representation’. For her, delegation is absorbed into ‘formal representation’, while other related ideas, such as substitution or trusteeship overlap with the concept.18
Delegation and representation in the field of diplomacy Representation has been described, by the authoritative Dictionary of Diplomacy, as not less than “a synonym for diplomacy”.19 Given the practical workings of state sovereignty and government authority in international relations, one can add that diplomacy involves a strong element of delegation. This pertains to both the conditional delegation of powers from the government to a diplomatic agent, and the more unfettered delegation of powers by a society to a cabinet member acting in the role of a diplomat. Credentials are of prime importance to the classic diplomatic agent because they provide cabinet level status, namely, the rank of a recognised agent of the state. Conor Cruise O’Brien, former United Nations representative to the Congo, has remarked that there is no objective request that members of government “represent ‘the people of Tsetseland’”; rather, it is sufficient that they “represent the conditions of survival in Tsetseland at a given moment in time”.20 It has been said that diplomatic representation stabilises problematic identities in an encounter with another. Such representation also contributes to the constitution of a national government because it expresses this government’s acknowledgement as a sovereign. This principle is also at work in the United Nations, but it takes on a different quality there.21 The world organisation holds the ultimate legitimising capacity, as succinctly stated by the formula “‘accredito’ ergo sum”.22 The constitutive aspect of representation implies involvement in United Nations affairs, even as an observer if need be, if one’s government is contested. The question of who was to speak for China is the most commonly
–––––––––––––– 18 Pitkin 1967: 121–141. 19 Geoffrey R. Berridge and Alan James. A Dictionary of Diplomacy. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001. 204. 20 O’Brien/Topolski 1968: 249. 21 Cf. Sharp 1999: 48, 50, 54. 22 Orna Ben-Naftali and Antigoni Axenidou. “‘Accredito’ Ergo Sum: Reflections on the Question of Representation in the Wake of the Cambodian Representation Problem in the Fifty-second Session of the General Assembly.” Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 27 (1998): 151–203.
54 CHALLENGES AND TRADITIONS discussed item when the matter of representation has been taken up in the United Nations. Two types of diplomatic contexts have to be distinguished with regard to the United Nations: temporary bodies for particular conferences, like the General Assembly, and permanent missions. Permanent diplomatic representatives and delegates to international conferences perform similar functions. Both permanent and temporary diplomatic agents act on behalf of delegation, commission, or mission.23 There is the expectation that agents loyally exercise the function of representing their respective governments. Both temporary delegates and permanent representatives belong to the principal–agent sub-model of the larger concept of representation. In areas that do not fall under the general rules of international state agency (such as in the internal operations of missions and delegations) there are other types of representation. The wider concept of representation allows for assignments to be made by the represented, the representative, or any third party. Thus, it is not confined to the authority of any single actor and may not be bound to any objective criteria. The representative is, in this context, an individual member of the permanent mission or temporary delegation; the represented and the third party might be society in general or any group (or person) within it. If the third party is identical with the government or the public-at-large, it merits special attention because it may then be in a position to influence the behaviour of an agent. On the other hand, in a world where people are social animals and in which group-think constitutes a relevant category, it will be tempting to nominate individuals as representatives of particular groups. Permanent missions operate according to professional bureaucratic standards and almost exclusively employ career diplomats, the main exceptions being the head of mission, who is sometimes a political appointee. Temporary delegates are designated as representatives in the wider sense, often based on their educational background and expertise. While bureaucracy constitutes an instrument for collective action, it is “gravely handicapped in expressing the community folkways or the combination of practical, tangible values that meet on the bargaining level of representation”.24 Non-instrumental forms of representation in international relations have been regarded by many countries as desirable when it comes to the appointment of agents to international conferences,
–––––––––––––– 23 Cf. Pitkin 1967: 133–134. 24 Grazia 1951: 11.
55 CHAPTER 2 thereby introducing multilevel representation and an element of ‘lay diplomacy’ in their delegations. An obvious reason for this is that conference matters might require specialised competence not otherwise available in the foreign service. As diplomatic conferences often involve an element of decision making, they tend also to be politically charged to a greater extent than regular diplomatic intercourse and therefore lend themselves to representation by politicians. The temporary character of the task also allows for a representation by non-professionals. Temporary delegations, because of their complexity, provide an instructive case for the analysis of representation, as opposed to permanent missions. Representation as a frame of mind has the potential to produce notions of secondary representation. The question of how relevant imagined representation becomes at a practical level may be best answered by considering the wider legal framework in the United Nations. Because of its often freewheeling character, representation might be expected to result in conflicts with regard to the self-perception of a representative and the perception by others. Interference with the principle of delegation may become a major problem. The issue of delegation and representation can be viewed as a two-level game with structural similarity to the engagement between diplomacy and domestic politics described in an influential article by Robert D. Putnam.25 Yet the essence of representation may contain notions of identity that are quite dissimilar from the homo oeconomicus presupposed by rational choice. The constructivist issues of meaning, identity, and legitimacy offer a key for understanding representation: ‘standing for’ or ‘making present’ might be more relevant than the ‘acting for’ of conventional delegation because the former provide a structure from which single acts may be undertaken. Due to its narrow concept of human nature, rational choice cannot provide more than a useful micro-perspective on human agency within a larger constructivist framework.26
The evolution of the legal framework The mechanisms and conditions under which delegates to the United Nations are equipped with state authority date back to practises at the League of Nations. In a report, adopted by the first League Assembly, it was clarified that
–––––––––––––– 25 Putnam 1988. 26 Cf. Kratochwil 1989: 261.
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Representatives on the Council and the Assembly are responsible to their own Governments and to those Governments alone. The Assembly has no right to interfere with the choice which a Member of the League may make of persons to represent it, nor to prevent a Representative from saying what he pleases; but it is essential that it should be thoroughly understood that, when a Representative votes, the vote is that of the Member which he represents, whether the vote be cast in the Council or the Assembly.27 Representation to the United Nations is subject to the same principles. However, there are variations in the structure and working methods of different countries’ representation. National characteristics are influenced by international law, functional necessities and traditions of standing conference diplomacy. Agents at the United Nations continue the methods of traditional diplomacy in a complex, multilateral and, to a degree, ad hoc environment.28 The Charter of the United Nations mentions missions indirectly, and then only in the case of states who are members of the Security Council and who are requested by Article 28 (1) to “be represented at all times at the seat of the Organization”. The General Assembly, in an early resolution acknowledged that missions serve to assist “in the realization of the purposes and principles of the United Nations and, in particular, to keep the necessary liaison between the Member States and the Secretariat in periods between sessions of the different organs of the United Nations”. Because of the similarity in function and structure of missions engaged in bilateral diplomacy, the General Assembly has established rules governing the communication of permanent missions with the Secretariat of the United Nations analogous to the rules of conventional diplomacy.29 This was to ensure that someone who claimed to represent a particular government was actually entitled to do so.30
–––––––––––––– 27 “Report on the Relations between, and Respective Competence of, the Council and the Assembly: Amended and Adopted by the Assembly on December 7th, 1920.” The Records of the First Assembly: Plenary Meetings. Geneva: League of Nations, 1920. 318–320. 28 Kaufmann 1980: 104; Richard F. Pedersen “National Representation in the United Nations.” International Organization 15 (1961): 256–266, at 256; Abdullah El-Erian. “International Organizations and International Relations.” A Handbook on International Organizations. René-Jean Dupuy (ed.). Dordrecht et al.: Nijhoff, 1988. 625–642, at 626– 627. 29 See Resolution 257 (III) of 3 December 1948, e.g. in Frederik Mari van Asbeck and J. H. W. Verzijl (eds). United Nations Textbook. 3rd ed. Leiden: University Press, 1958[1950]. 90–91; cf. Edvard Hambro. “Permanent Representatives to International Organizations.” Yearbook of World Affairs 30 (1976): 30–41, at 32. 30 E. R. Appathurai. “Permanent Missions to the United Nations.” International Journal (Canadian Institute of International Affairs) 25 (1970): 287–301, at 288.
57 CHAPTER 2
The issue of temporary delegations, the principal form of representation at the United Nations, is also only briefly touched upon in the organisation’s Charter. Article 9 (2) provides that each member “shall have not more than five representatives in the General Assembly”. According to Article 18 (1), these representatives, who are natural persons, share one vote that belongs to the member state.31 As Hans Kelsen has remarked, the arrangement of having several individuals share one vote requires the organisation of the delegation “as an acting body”.32 The composition of delegations to the United Nations has been a subject of discussion at the San Francisco Conference on International Organisation in 1945, at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in 1944, and in connection with preparations for the post-Second World War order. The US Department of State’s Staff Charter of 1943 provided that delegations to the assembly of the new organisation ought to include “representation from the national legislative body”.33 This stipulation reflects the practice of some League of Nations members whose delegations represented a variety of political viewpoints. Although Woodrow Wilson has not been remembered for pursuing a sufficiently nonpartisan strategy, the idea that delegations should permit “a variety of representation” can be traced to him and has retained its appeal in the United States.34 Nevertheless, the Staff Charter’s provision cited above was deleted in subsequent drafts for fear it might encourage special interest groups to struggle for representation. According to Ruth B. Russell, it was thought that it would be possible to realise the idea of multipartite representation on an informal basis.35 The major powers failed to agree on the issue of representation in the autumn of 1944, and thus the Dumbarton Oaks proposal was confined to the statement that “all members of the Organization should be members of the General Assembly and should have a number of representatives to be specified in the Charter”.36 At the San Francisco Conference it was maintained that each country ought to have several delegates in order “to
–––––––––––––– 31 Cf. Siegfried Magiera. “Article 9.” The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, vol. 1. Bruno Simma (ed.). Oxford: University Press, 2002[1991]. 247–256, at 250. 32 Hans Kelsen. The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of Its Fundamental Problems: With Supplement. 4th ed. New York: Praeger, 1964[1950]. 155. 33 “The Charter of the United Nations (Draft 1943).” Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation 1939–1945. Washington: Department of State, 1949. 526–534, at 527 (Art. 3 (4)). 34 Quote: Woodrow Wilson. “An Address to the Third Plenary Session of the Peace Conference, February 14, 1919.” The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 55: February 8– March 16, 1919. Arthur S. Link (ed.). Princeton: University Press, 1986. 164–178, at 174. 35 Ruth B. Russell, A History of The United Nations Charter: The Role of the United States 1940–1945. Washington: Brookings, 1958. 358, 366. 36 Documented in Russell 1958: 1020, cf. 425.
58 CHALLENGES AND TRADITIONS obtain the advantages of consultation and division of work, and also to have in their representation in the Assembly various shades of political opinion”. The conclusion reached was “that in fixing the maximum number of representatives at five a proper distribution of work could be achieved”.37 However, given the League’s experience and the expected workload of the committees, it was formally recognised that members’ delegations could be extended to include additional representatives.38 While the Charter kept silent on this issue in order to avoid the nomination of principal representatives who would leave actual participation to representatives of lower caliber, it was understood at San Francisco “that each state was free to settle for itself the question of alternate delegates”.39 The Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly, suggested by the Executive Committee of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations in late 1945, do not leave this question entirely up to the member states. What has now become Rule 25 adds to the provision of the Charter, stipulating that “The delegation of a Member shall consist of not more than five representatives and five alternate representatives, and as many advisers, technical advisers, experts and persons of similar status as may be required by the delegation.”40 This provision belongs to the small group of “Rules based on the Charter with additions of constitutional importance”.41 The difference between ‘representatives’ and ‘alternate representatives’ has a terminological and symbolic character. A representative’s credentials must be issued by a head of state or government, or by the minister of foreign affairs.42 However, both enjoy the same rights according to the framework of the United Nations. Contrary to what one might expect, ‘alternate representatives’ do not alternate with or are deputies to act for any specific ‘representative’, but may function independently and parallel to the regular ‘representatives’, if empowered by the chairman of a delegation as a ‘representative’.43 Thus, ‘representatives’ –––––––––––––– 37 Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, 1945, vol. 1–22 [= UNCIO]. London: United Nations Information Organization, 1945–1955, here at 1945 VIII: 295–296, 451. In the following this documentation is referred to as UNCIO. 38 Magiera 2002: 250; Broms 1990: 154; Leland M. Goodrich and Edvard Hambro. Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents. 2nd rev. ed. Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1949[1946]. 149. 39 UNCIO VIII 1945: 531. 40 Report by the Executive Committee to the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations. N.p.: Preparatory Commission of the United Nations, 1945. 19. 41 Jan Kolasa. Rules of Procedure of the United Nations General Assembly: A Legal Analysis. Wroclaw: Towarzystwa Naukowego, 1967. 80. 42 Rule 27. 43 Pedersen 1961: 257.
59 CHAPTER 2 and ‘alternates’ are described as “full delegates”. However, the various types of ‘advisers’ are subject to limitations. They are not eligible for appointment as chairmen, vice-chairmen, or rapporteurs of committees, nor can they occupy regular seats in the General Assembly. The latter regulation is not enforced in practice, and the qualification of a delegate casting a country’s vote in the General Assembly has apparently never been questioned with regard to formal status.44 The different types of delegates at the General Assembly have little legal importance but do provide “a useful indication of the hierarchy of the delegation, enabling other delegations to know with whom they should negotiate”.45 Paradoxically, the formal difference in status has its most noticeable consequences in gatherings of an informal nature. In organs of the United Nations, the member state is regarded as the relevant unit, and is therefore free to delegate power to whomever it chooses. Nevertheless, there is a relevant distinction between alternate representatives and advisers with regard to the possibility of becoming a temporary official of United Nations organs and, thus, hold an additional representative function. Within all categories mentioned above, ‘representatives’, ‘alternate representatives’ and ‘advisers’, a number of persons may occupy the same position, as member states may “replace at any time the individual, appointed representative, by another individual.”46 Although generally of relevance only for ‘representatives’ and ‘alternates’, this type of substitution may also be practised at the adviser level. It is common practice to accord a foreign minister or other government members the status of ex officio representatives and chairpersons of the delegation during their presence in New York. Apart from this, most members of the United Nations have been hesitant to use this technique of increasing the number of their principal delegates over the period of the session. The Nordic countries are the exception with their extensive practice of substitution of single representatives and alternates.
The composition of temporary delegations The UN General Assembly is a diplomatic conference held annually from mid-September to mid-December. The delegations of member states are
–––––––––––––– 44 Rules 102, 103; as to the practice see André Lewin. “Article 9.” La Charte des Nations Unies. Jean-Pierre Cot and Alain Pellet (eds). Paris: Economica, 1985. 241–247, at 244; as regards the label “full delegates” see Goormaghtigh 1979: 71. 45 Henry G. Schermers and Niels M. Blokker. International Institutional Law: Unity within Diversity. 3rd rev. ed. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1997[1972]. 165. 46 Kelsen 1964: 155.
60 CHALLENGES AND TRADITIONS designated anew every year. Empowered to vote on behalf of their governments, these delegations sometimes exhibit a complex representational pattern. In the General Assembly the main body of delegates usually consists of the staff of permanent missions and officials from the foreign ministries of the member states. Other delegates might be chosen from the diplomatic service and sometimes also from other government agencies. Foreign ministers tend to be present at the General Assembly for shorter periods. While many governments send homogeneous delegations, the United States and some Western European countries enlarge the public outreach of their delegations by making members of parliament, politicians, trade union and industry leaders, heads of women’s organisations, scientists, or prominent figures in the arts represent their country.47 The inclusion of parliamentarians and representatives of civil society in government delegations has been welcomed on the grounds of enhancing the understanding of United Nations issues among legislatures and the wider public. Sometimes, however, this backfires and previously held prejudices against the United Nations are exaggerated. There are also potential conflicts when the continuity of a delegation is endangered by the educational goal achieved by a rotation system.48 Similarly, the element of charisma, a betimes significant aspect of lay diplomacy, is often considered as beneficial in delegations. However, it also has the potential to cause trouble. Political representatives in particular are said to crave “the juicy, controversial political items that promise headlines and excitement”, potentially causing a tug-of-war over assignment to more prestigious committees.49 There might also be schedule conflicts and other commitments due to ongoing regular business. On the other hand, it has been acknowledged that non-professionals who are prominent figures may have an advantage in attracting media attention and forming public opinion, establishing contacts with other delegations, and exercising a personal impact on foreign delegates. Moreover, due to their representational capacity, they might be able to speak with greater moral authority on certain issues. Charles Mayo of the Mayo Clinic is said to have been a particularly effective representative refuting charges by the Soviet Union that the United States employed germ warfare in Korea.50
–––––––––––––– 47 Kaufmann 1996[1968]: 105–106; cf. Kaufmann 1980: 104, 109; Magiera 2002: 251; Pedersen 1961: 257. 48 Cf. Finger 1980: 26, 309f; Kaufmann 1980: 106; Goormaghtigh 1979: 72; Baehr 1970: 80. 49 Finger 1980: 27. 50 Finger 1980: 21, 26–27; cf. Baehr 1970: 80.
61 CHAPTER 2
Another advantage of parliamentary and civil society representatives is that they open additional channels for communication with foreign countries. In contrast to regular diplomats, such representatives can also establish contacts with liberation movements, dissidents, or protest groups in a noncommital fashion: as their actions can be disavowed, they have considerable freedom of movement and can “be used to test new ideas and to sound out attitudes”.51 If necessary, they can be made to appear as representatives of a fraction of society or simply as individuals. Representation, not understood as a passively standing in for, but as dynamic acting in place of might allow the representative to explore new potentials. Layperson delegates are generally expected to perform the same functions as professionals: they are equally subject to instructions by their government, and are supposed to adhere to the lines of a consistent policy within the delegation.52 In addition to the members of the permanent mission, foreign service officers based at home and members of the diplomatic corps abroad regularly fill out national delegations, often in substantial numbers. As with other types of delegates, the argument for their presence is twofold. Firstly, the delegation might benefit from their expertise, experience and possibly stature. Secondly, the opportunity of a learning experience in a multilateral conference environment is provided.53
Agency loss and reverse representation As we have seen, representation is an ambiguous concept and no single authority controls its meaning. Because a representative’s sphere of action may be a grey area, clashes with straightforward delegation can occur. Empirical examples may here be instructive. With regard to the composition of the United States’ delegation to the General Assembly factors such as “regional balance; payment of a political debt; ethnic balance; religious considerations; and the need to have at least one woman” have been cited.54 The proposed make-up of the delegation, according to one source, was supposed to include “one Jew, one Catholic, one Protestant, one industrial and one labour union leader, 2 representatives of the Congress (one for each party) […] and one
–––––––––––––– 51 Goormaghtigh 1979: 70 (quote); Chadwick F. Alger. “United Nations Participation as a Learning Experience.” Social Processes in International Relations: A Reader. Louis Kriesberg (ed.). New York: Wiley, 1968[1963]. 505–521, at 517. 52 Baehr 1971: 22; Schermers/Blokker 1997: 173. 53 Cf. Finger 1980: 310. 54 Quote: Finger 1980: 26.
62 CHALLENGES AND TRADITIONS prominent ‘personality’”.55 Delegates who fulfil multiple criteria have been called “twofers”.56 Such a ‘personality’ on the United States delegation to the fifteenth session of the General Assembly, the opera singer and sociologist Zelma Watson George, recounted an incident in which a journalist addressed her as the only Negro delegate from the United States: I said I’m a member of the United States delegation to the United Nations I am a woman I am black … well I’m a Negro, we weren’t black then, and I’m over weight … I’m what you’d call, fat. […] Now I said … he didn’t call me the woman delegate, and he didn’t call me the fat delegate so why label me at all?57 George, a supposedly neutral, all-American delegate and adviser to the Eisenhower administration participated in one of the most remarkable instances of ‘agency loss’ in the history of the United Nations. When the General Assembly adopted a Resolution on Colonialism with 89 votes on 14 December 1960, the United States was among the nine nations that abstained. Agda R ssel, the permanent representative of Sweden, reported to her government: We observed at close quarters […] how the coloured member of the American delegation, Mrs. Zelma Watson George, when the result of the vote was announced, stood up from her seat and vigorously participated in the applause with the delegates of the states that had voted in favour. In her face, one could read bitterness and shame over the decision of her own delegation. She even explained in some later comments that she had taken great pains to convince the authorities in Washington to vote for the proposal, and she asserted that her efforts matched the personal view of all the American UN delegates.58 A member of the US-delegation remembers that George “was not reprimanded and continued to serve on the delegation on good terms with its other members, even though some questioned the appropriateness of her gesture”.59
–––––––––––––– 55 Permanent mission of Norway to foreign ministry, 25 July 1958, NAO, FM 1950–59, 26.5/63, italics: English in the original. 56 Conor Cruise O’Brien. Memoir: My Life and Themes. London: Profile, 1998. 190. 57 Jim Standifer. “Interview with Zelma Watson George.” African American Music Collection: The Interviews. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, School of Music, n.d. Available at
63 CHAPTER 2
Characteristic of diplomacy at the United Nations is that national representatives do not only work “for their own government but for the Organisation as well” and that “they are really not representatives ‘to’ but rather ‘in’ the United Nations”.60 The United Nations stands apart with its universal character and its tradition of being identified with a vision of one world. It is to some degree accepted that those active in the United Nations environment are being “UN-ised”. In this regard, the assertion of the Japanese representative Nasyoshi Kakitsubo would be unthinkable in the context of bilateral diplomacy: “There is only one real class struggle nowadays – the struggle between the missions and their governments.”61 Similarly, the permanent representative of the United States to the UN and former Supreme Court judge, Arthur Goldberg, claimed that his secondary role was to represent the United Nations to the American people.62 There were, inevitably, complaints that “The US Mission in New York and, rather more unusually, the Bureau in Washington [i.e. the State Department] had become clients of the institution to which they were accredited.”63 In Sweden such ‘reverse representation’ has been given a particularly emphatic quality by means of iconisation. A picture of the Swedish delegation taken at the fourth session of the General Assembly, on closer inspection turns out to be a ‘photographic negative’. The sign in front of five of the principal Swedish delegates, including foreign minister Östen Undén, should read “Sweden” to be intelligible to an international audience. Instead, it reads “F renta Nationerna”, that is, “United Nations” in Swedish. It is striking that the national delegation of Sweden chose to assume the role of representing the international organisation to their home public, and perhaps it is no coincidence that the persons shown on the photograph all belong to the more independent category of politicians and not to the foreign service.
–––––––––––––– 60 Hambro 1976: 35; cf. Kelsen 1964: 155. 61 Finger 1980: 36–37, 39 (quotes); cf. Baehr 1970: 15. 62 Arthur J. Goldberg. The Defenses of Freedom: The Public Papers of Arthur J. Goldberg. New York: Harper and Row, 1966. 7. 63 Daniel Patrick Moynihan. A Dangerous Place. London: Secker & Warburg, 1979[1978]. 106; cf. O’Brien/Topolski 1968: 74.
64 CHALLENGES AND TRADITIONS
Figure 2. Swedish delegation to the UN General Assembly, 20 October 1949 (UN Photo)64
There has been a tendency in Sweden and the Scandinavian countries, since the days of the League of Nations of identifying with the universal world organisation. This tradition has been carried on in the United Nations by the two first Secretaries-General, the Norwegian Trygve Lie and the Swede Dag Hammarskj ld. While these personalities, as employees of the Secretariat of the United Nations, were civil servants who represented their organisation, they continued to be identified with their national and Scandinavian background, and before assuming their high UN positions, each acted as chairman of his country’s delegation. Their heritage enhanced their candidacy for Secretary-General and was part of their social capital in the exercise of that office. Scandinavians at the United Nations have been especially known for their efforts to increase the effectivness of the world organisation. This need not originate from altruistic mentality or confusion over the principal– –––––––––––––– 64 From left to right: Georg Andrén, Östen Undén, Erik von Heland, Ulla Lindstr m and John Bergvall.
65 CHAPTER 2 agent relationship. Identification with the United Nations can also be a strategy to acquire and exert power. Nevertheless, despite the Realpolitik conducted under its auspices, the United Nations continues to be seen as a sacred institution with pristine legitimacy. Those who speak on behalf of it and interpret the ‘oracle’ will frame the United Nations according to their own ideas and may, if they appear sufficiently credible, gain moral authority on international issues.65 A study comparing attitudes among civil servants and politicians from Norway and the United States has shown that while there is a significant relationship between experience with international organisations and appreciation of the United Nations, the correlation is low. Asked if they were in favor of a transfer of sovereignty from nation states to international organisations, those with more experience tended to be even more sceptical toward such a transfer.66
Making delegation and representation work The mechanisms of representation and delegation require leadership, the division of labor, and communication. Daily or at the least weekly meetings are essential to “ensure that the delegation functions as a team”.67 The relevance of these meetings can be illustrated by their unofficial Swedish designation, namely, ‘morning prayer’ (morgonb n). One might argue that the shaping of opinions on specific issues is unlikely to take place during such official meetings.68 But while informal interaction plays a significant role in delegations, it is the final internal stage that leads to a unitary state action. The fundamental instrument for exercising leadership in delegations to the United Nations is instructions: both agenda-oriented orders distributed before the General Assembly and the supplementary orders during the session. While instructions allow some measure of discretion, they differ according to national traditions, the personalities of the foreign minister and the permanent representative or chief delegate, and the atmosphere at the ministry.69 It has been suggested that delegates generally have more discretion than is usually assumed.70 The type of –––––––––––––– 65 Cf. O’Brien/Topolski 1968. 66 Riggs/Mykletun 1979: 155, 159; cf. Appathurai 1970: 300f. 67 Robert E. Riggs. Politics in the United Nations: A Study of United States Influence in the General Assembly. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1958. 18. 68 Baehr 1970: 19. 69 Hambro 1972: 286. 70 Peterson 1986; Harold K. Jacobson. “Deriving Data from Delegates to International Assemblies.” International Organization 21 (1967) 3: 592–613, at 593.
66 CHALLENGES AND TRADITIONS contact between a government and its delegation is crucial and may consist of guidance, communication of relevant developments, and the provision of flexible responses.71 Even such comparatively similar countries as the Scandinavian states show considerable differences in this regard. Danish instructions, for example, have regularly been more comprehensive than those of her Nordic neighbours. Despite their great range and the little actually known about such instructions some have speculated about their nature. Richard F. Pedersen has hypothesised “that the larger the country, the greater the resources, or the more thoroughly organized it is, the greater the degree of control the foreign office will exercise”.72 Norway has been identified as an example that may be typical of small Western European nations with general instructions that leave considerable leeway to the delegation.73 The former Soviet-led bloc on the other hand, appears to have been characterised by rigid instructions that reflected its centrist style of governance. The opposite seems true of many Third World countries, with their small foreign affairs apparatus and the practice of framing a considerable amount of their policy on the spot, primarily in the context of group negotiations in the General Assembly. Western countries, perhaps because of their need to formulate a policy that satisfies various government agencies as well as concerned segments of the public, also tend to rely on detailed instructions, often based on prior consultation with the members of the delegation.74 In countries with parliamentary systems, specific instructions have been considered a necessity in order to enable the government to be accountable to the national assembly. It has been suggested that delegations given loose instructions “can accomplish more in the tactical field” and thus have an advantage over those with less flexible orders.75 On the other hand, “‘free- wheeling’ autonomy” has been criticised for leading to irresponsible decision making and paper tigers, instead of serious commitment.76 The Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly mention a “Chairman of the delegation” but make no provision with regard to qualifications, duties, or deputation of that office. Ultimately, it is “always the head of the delegation who is empowered to represent the member state” and other delegates act on the strength of power delegated by that
–––––––––––––– 71 Cf. Baehr 1970: 73. 72 Richard F. Pedersen, here quoted according to Baehr 1970: 12. 73 Riggs 1958: 20. 74 Peterson 1986: 212–213, 287. 75 Baehr 1970: 13–14, 72 (quote). 76 See Appathurai 1970: 298.
67 CHAPTER 2 person. Unless already a cabinet-level officer, the chairperson is an agent whose power is received from the member state’s government, including detailed instructions that limit the scope of action.77 Although a foreign minister or another high-ranking politician is frequently chosen as chairperson of a delegation, such representatives usually only stay for a brief period and “after that time the permanent representative is chairman, nearly always de jure and, hardly without exception, de facto”.78 Heads of state and leaders of government, when visiting sessions of the United Nations, are not customarily listed as delegates but act in their own capacity. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, perhaps the most controversial US ambassador to the United Nations, once remarked that neither the League of Nations nor the United Nations had evolved past representative impulses, but that “the principle of representation made headway nonetheless”.79 The issue of representation and the related matter of delegation are under-addressed, in the scholarly literature, yet they are central to the meta-theories of rational choice and constructivism that the discipline of International Relations draws on. Representation may be encompassed in what has recently been asked for as a “cross-paradigmatic exchange of characteristic questions and answers” between different schools of thought.80 At the same time, delegation and representation are key issues that suggest to break free from the self-imposed prison of studies on international history and international relations and to seriously start “to think ‘outside the (statist) box’”.81
DEMOCRACY AND DILEMMAS AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY The inherent quality of democracy lies in its readiness to meet a constant stream of voices, challenges and pitfalls. It is the same aspect that makes it risky. In the foreign policy area, democratic principles have been considered especially precarious. John Locke, champion of the separation of powers principle, went as far as excluding foreign affairs from control by law.82 Not believing in such divisibility, Alexis de Tocqueville, the master-
–––––––––––––– 77 Schermers/Blokker 1997: 165 (quote), 166; cf. Kelsen 1964: 156; Kaufmann 1980: 110– 111. 78 Kaufmann 1980: 37 (quote), 257, cf. 104–105. 79 Moynihan 1979[1978]: 83. 80 James Fearon and Alexander Wendt. “Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Sceptical View.” Handbook of International Relations. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (eds). London: Sage, 2002. 52–72, at 53; cf. Adler 2002: 95–118, at 103, 108–109. 81 Barnett 2002: 99–119, at 116. 82 Locke 1993: 366.
68 CHALLENGES AND TRADITIONS observer of modern democracy, suggested the inferior performance of democratic regimes in international relations.83 Drawing upon these traditions, the dominant International Relations theory of the Cold War period claimed the non-applicability of democratic principles with regard to diplomatic affairs. In summary, “the adherents of this view emphasise the vital interests involved, the complexity of and the remoteness of the issues of foreign policy, both of which lead to a lack of knowledge and involvement, as well as the emotionality and volatility of popular attitudes.”84 The assertion remains that enlightenment and democracy represent universal values that call for consistent application. Likewise, there exists a different yet equally pragmatic set of factors that require a more reconcilable approach to foreign policy and democracy. To- and fro-ing is often believed to produce added value in domestic politics, or at least, to not be particularly harmful. There is general agreement that stability and continuity are preconditions for the success of a country’s foreign policy. For this reason, democratic consensus on issues related to international affairs is desirable. Even neo-realist thinkers praise consensus and bipartisanship in the formulation of foreign policy, despite their otherwise pessimistic attitude and belief in international anarchy.85 For Tocqueville, foreign affairs were not off limits in a democracy. Foreign policy requires broad political support if it is to have stability and influence. The challenge is to design representative institutions in a way that can deal with foreign policy issues in a democratic yet constructive manner. Restated in more theoretical terms, how can a pluralist society function as the unitary state actor required in international relations? Over the past decade, the accelerating process of globalisation has caused parliamentarians to devote increasing attention to transnational issues. At the same time, they have also become sought-after partners in global governance due to their linkage to broad constituencies and their ability to provide bottom-up democratic legitimisation. A Swedish parliamentary committee that recently observed this tendency noted that “every self-respecting international organisation (even pure governmental organisations such as the World Bank or WTO) is now, in various ways,
–––––––––––––– 83 Tocqueville 1969: 228. 84 Philip Everts. “Democracy and Foreign Policy: The Incompatibility Thesis Revisited.” The Role of the Nation-State in the 21st Century: Human Rights, International Organisations, and Foreign Policy: Essays in Honour of Peter Baehr. Monique Castermans-Holleman, Fried van Hoof and Jacqueline Smith (eds). The Hague: Kluwer, 1998. 411–425, at 411. 85 Waltz 1967: 77–78, 94–95.
69 CHAPTER 2 trying to relate to parliaments and parliamentarians.”86 In the United Nations, the role of parliamentarians has recently become an issue with regard to efforts to institutionally strengthen the organisation. A panel of prominent individuals who were summoned at the initiative of Secretary- General Kofi Annan presented the Cardoso Report in June 2004. It dealt with the relationship of the United Nations with civil society and suggested that addressing the ‘democratic deficit’ in global governance would require linking parliamentarians more closely with international intergovernmental processes. The main concern of the panel was the establishment of “experimental global public policy committees” as an international equivalent to parliamentary committees on the national level. However, it also proposed that “member States should more regularly include members of parliament in their delegations to major United Nations meetings, while taking care to avoid compromising their independence.”87 Similarly, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, in a resolution adopted on 28 April 2004, called on the governments of its member and observer states to “include parliamentarians in their national delegation and endow them with the possibility of participating actively in the work of the General Assembly”.88 The accompanying report pointed out that the tendency of United Nations officials to classify parliaments as non- governmental organisations or civil society was “an inappropriate approach given the significance of parliamentary oversight and the fact parliamentarians are part of the legislative process”. Instead, parliamentarians “should be included as parliamentarians and not as ‘experts/advisors’” to national delegations.89 This is, however, not a category acknowledged by the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly. A subsequent resolution adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly on 23 January 2006, urged the inclusion of parliamentarians in national delegations to the United Nations as a first step in bringing about a thorough parliamentarisation of the General Assembly.90
–––––––––––––– 86 “Johannesburg – FN:s världstoppm te om hållbar utveckling: Sammansatta utrikes-, milj - och jordbruksutskottets betänkande.” Riksdagens protokoll (2002/03) UMJU1. 87 We the Peoples 2004: 48 (quotes), 46–47. 88 “Resolution 1373: Strengthening of the United Nations.” Strasbourg: Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 2004. Accessed 25 March 2010. Available at
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The European Parliament had earlier called for the establishment of an independent “United Nations Parliamentary Assembly (UNPA) within the UN system, which would increase the democratic profile and internal democratic process of the organisation and allow world civil society to be directly associated in the decision making process”.91 At the same time, the Inter-parliamentary Union (IPU), an independent worldwide organisation of members of parliament that has worked for more than a decade to establish a parliamentary dimension at the United Nations, has argued that such structures, if implemented, would run “contrary to the principle of separation of powers between the legislative and the executive branch of government”.92 However, the Inter-parliamentary Union only objects to the institutional diversification of the United Nations, not to the inclusion of parliamentarians in government delegations, which it praises as a “growing trend among delegations to the General Assembly to have parliamentary participation [that] was to be welcomed, as it strengthened the link between the executive and the legislative branches of government”.93 The practice of a number of governments in sending legislators to the United Nations can be criticised and advocated on democratic principles. Parliamentarians representing nation states in international relations obscure the boundaries between executive and legislative power. If they do not belong to the ruling party, they also blur the dividing line between the forces of government and the opposition. They have, therefore, been accused of co-optation and of endangering the fundamental principles of democratic checks and balances. On the other hand, letting parliamentarians participate in government delegations is advocated as a ––––––––––––––
71 CHAPTER 2 means of achieving democratic opinion formation, building consensus, and facilitating democratic control of foreign policy on the spot. Their charisma and legitimacy is also said to give vigour to their countries’ views and to bridge the local and the global.94
The loyalty dilemma It is a violation of constitutional norms associated with good democratic practice to make parliamentarians act as agents of the executive.95 As soon as elected legislators wear the hat of their government in international arenas, they are obliged to adhere to instructions and generally must have all their statements cleared by the executive branch. For legislators this implies what has been called ‘the loyalty dilemma’ – the converse of blurring the separation of powers. The disregard of the separation of powers can cause problems for both the government and the legislature. A study conducted for UNESCO notes, “instances are not lacking in which parliamentary representatives have got out of hand and acted contrary to their official instructions”. Moreover, sometimes “legislators have apparently hesitated to co-operate for fear of prejudicing their future parliamentary position”.96 The practice of including parliamentarians in national delegations, especially members of the opposition, is frequently criticised for leading to conflicting loyalties and restricting the political independence of those involved. In this spirit, a danger has been identified in that legislators might become ‘hostages’ of government and such examples do exist.97 A study by the Inter-parliamentary Union claims that parliamentary delegates sent to the UN General Assembly “are given no instructions, and when they are, they receive them […] in the form of explanations or advice”.98 This statement, however, is not supported by any other information. Rather, all available evidence points to the contrary. The universal practice seems to be that governments dispense instructions that –––––––––––––– 94 Cf. Baehr 1970: 79–83; Colban 1961: 159–161; Karl Kaiser. “Transnational Relations as a Threat to the Democratic Process.” International Organization 25 (1971) 3: 706–720. A recent example for an exchange of these arguments is provided by a controversy between the administrative court of appeal in Stockholm and the Swedish parliament, see: “Riksdagen i en ny tid: Konstitutionsutskottets betänkande.” Riksdagens protokoll (2005/06) KU21. 95 Here, the problem is discussed for parliamentarians, but similar problems arise in case of the inclusion of civil society representatives. The difference is the broad political mandate of parliamentarians, which gives them more legitimacy. 96 National Administration and International Organization 1951: 47. 97 Baehr 1970: 83 (quote), 81–82, 31 note 18; Goormaghtigh 1979: 69; Colban 1961: 160. 98 Provisions for the Information of Members of Parliament 1977: 31.
72 CHALLENGES AND TRADITIONS are obligatory for all members of a delegation, including parliamentarians. In fact, legislators who would not be bound by the rules have been assigned civil servant watchdogs to ensure their compliance.99 The Inter- parliamentary Union’s assertion seems to be the product of wishful thinking – the projection of an ideal of parliamentary independence and separation of powers that fails to take note of actual practice. Given the restrictions on a representative’s freedom of action the claim has been made that “it should theoretically remain possible that a member of parliament helps to shape a decision, which his faction in parliament and perhaps he himself may oppose.”100 The whole issue may also be turned on its head. As the author and onetime UN delegate William F. Buckley put it, “the iron control of the White House over the deeds and words of the delegates” saved him from “the embarrassment of personal association” with positions with which he disagreed.101 It seems questionable, on the other hand, whether it is appropriate for an elected legislator to be reduced to the role of a mere agent of government, except for issues of minor significance.102 Legislators differ from appointed diplomats in having the mandate of the electorate to contest their government’s position or decline to execute polices with which they disagree.103 In the latter case, a civil servant adviser simply casts a vote on behalf of the senior delegate, who is expected to be discreet about his dissent – at least at the world forum.104 As to the modification of instructions, a report of a Royal Dutch Commission from 1951 describes it as the essence of inclusiveness for legislators, although in a roundabout way: “Members of parliament can harmonise the instructions of the government and the political sensitivity of a country.”105 Such ‘harmonisation’ will usually be a matter of individual initiative, but a system may also be in place for instances of fundamental disagreement that
–––––––––––––– 99 Bj rn Alholm. Toisinajattelija suurlähettiläänä. Helsinki: Tammi, 2001. 112; Henning Kjeldgaard. “FN-missionen indefra: Fra antikolonialisme til ny konomisk verdensorden.” Rubicon (2007) 3: 33–50, at 36. 100 Dutch Foreign Minister Dirk U. Stikker interviewed at the 23rd session of the General Assembly according to Baehr 1970: 81. 101 William F. Buckley. United Nations Journal: A Delegate’s Odyssey. New York: Putnam, 1974. 96–97. 102 Cf. Colban 1961: 160–161. 103 Both options are used simultaneously, see e.g. Benjamin A. Gilman and Andy Ireland. Congressional Delegates at the 1981 U.N. General Assembly: Report. Washington: Government, 1982. 5. 104 Goormaghtigh 1979: 69. 105 Eindrapport van de Commissie Nopens de Samenwerking tussen Regering en Staten- Generaal inzake het Buitenlands Beleid (9 Juli 1951). The Hague: ‘s Gravenhage, 1951. 34.
73 CHAPTER 2 would allow members of parliament contact their party in order to stimulate a discussion at home on a possible change of instructions.106 It is sometimes the practice that government instructions must be debated and adopted by parliamentary organs before being issued. In Denmark, and Sweden instructions for national delegations to the United Nations are scrutinised by the foreign affairs committees of parliament. The opposition is thereby given the chance to participate in policy making and in the stipulations of those executive guidelines that will be binding on delegates. Under such circumstances, legislators in government delegations in a sense do become their own agents in the chain of delegation of powers. They can also be seen as substituting the normal interaction between the two powers under the condition of multilateral negotiations, which are hard to predict and require a considerable amount of flexibility.107 From a practical point of view, parliamentary ratification of decisions supported in the world organisation is made more likely by prior involvement of legislators. This is especially advantageous for countries with presidential systems or minority governments, in which the consent of the legislature to the policies pursued by the executive cannot be taken for granted.
People’s representatives in the General Assembly The opening phrase of the United Nations Charter, “We the peoples of the United Nations”, inspired by the constitution of the United States, was “something more than a cynically adopted euphemism”.108 Its adoption occurred under public pressure to eliminate war. Although it constituted a departure from the practice of referring only to states as parties to such international instruments, sovereign governments have remained the authoritative units in the United Nations.109 Still, the idea of a ‘parliament of man’ remains discernable, transcending the narrow view of nation states as the only players in the international arena. With the failure of the United States to join the League of Nations still a traumatic memory, the Roosevelt administration prepared for the international world order after the Second World War by carefully avoiding anything that resembled one-sidedness. Nonpartisanship and bipartisanship were the watchwords of the day. They gave expression to tendencies in the
–––––––––––––– 106 Goormaghtigh 1979: 69. 107 Colban 1961: 160. 108 Inis L. Claude. Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization. 4th ed. New York: Random House, 1971[1956]. 64. 109 Goodrich/Hambro 1949[1946]: 89; cf. Baehr 1970: 80.
74 CHALLENGES AND TRADITIONS later part of the Roosevelt era that considerably strengthened the element of consensus in the political culture of the United States.110 In line with Wilson’s approach, the initial plans for the United Nations considered representation from national legislatures as part of the new world organisation’s structure. This was reminiscent of some of the League of Nations members’ practice to mount delegations representing a variety of political backgrounds. The records of the San Francisco Conference reveal that a vision of multipartite national representation at the United Nations had an impact on the drafting of the Charter. Nevertheless, no UN document prescribes this type of political representation for individual countries. According to a general rule of international relations, the designation of individuals who are to represent a certain nation is only indirectly determined by international law and is instead delegated “to these states, that is to say, to their national legal order”.111 Thus, the appointment of parliamentary or political delegates will be the consequence of a nation’s political tradition and culture. The composition of delegations to the San Francisco Conference and to the UN General Assembly shows that numerous countries have opened their delegations to parliamentarians and politicians – sometimes even from opposition parties – and to representatives of civil society. In contrast to diplomats who serve at the pleasure of the executive branch alone, the kind of delegates mentioned above not only represent their government to the outside world, they also represent relevant domestic groups and institutions, and may even do so in their informal contacts with foreign delegates. While formally always confirmed by the government or the minister of foreign affairs, parliamentary delegates may in fact be appointed by the legislature, one of its committees, or by party officers.112 Official lists provide an incomplete picture of a delegation as party groups occasionally ask non-legislators to represent them in the General Assembly, or the government may appoint non-legislators from other parties. Members of parliament may even participate in delegations in other than their legislative capacity – as members of the government or as representatives of voluntary associations. Western countries with a long tradition of parliamentary representation at the UN General Assembly include the United States, Canada, Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian countries. As not all of these countries allow members of –––––––––––––– 110 Cf. John Foster Dulles. War or Peace. New York: Macmillan, 1950. 111 Kelsen 1964[1950]: 150. 112 Goormaghtigh 1979: 70; Provisions for the Information of Members of Parliament 1977: 31.
75 CHAPTER 2 opposition parties to attend General Assembly meetings, there is a significant distinction between ruling party and overall parliamentary representation.113 Discontinuity in routines and in the status assigned to parliamentary representatives, as well as a potential for conflict, such as tension between diplomats and politicians, is frequently reported. Moreover, parliamentary or political representation may be based on a government decision that neglects the wishes of constituents. A study made thirty years ago showed a low correlation between parliamentary representation in delegations to the General Assembly and type of political regime or geographical location.114 Inquiries undertaken at around that time indicated “there was no set pattern to parliamentary representation”.115 Despite increased membership in the United Nations, the number of countries that send parliamentary representatives to New York has decreased in the past fourty years. At the Sixty-fourth session of the General Assembly in autumn 2009, twenty-seven countries included parliamentarians. The countries with three or more parliamentary delegates at the autumn 2009 session were Denmark, France, India, Italy, Kenya, Malaysia, Norway, and South Africa. Countries with one or two legislators included among others Australia, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Russia, Tanzania, and the United States.116 Despite the weak institutionalisation of parliamentarians’ contact with each other, their inclusion in national delegations opens an additional channel for semi- official communication with other parliamentarians or non-governmental groups.117
–––––––––––––– 113 Kaufmann 1980: 107; Goormaghtigh 1979: 70. 114 Goormaghtigh 1979: 64. 115 “Report of the Parliamentary Advisers to the Australian Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly: Thirty-third Session, 1978.” NAC, FM 1973–88, 119.H.2.a.1979. 116 List of Delegations to the Sixty-fourth Session of the General Assembly. ST/SG/SER.C/L.618. New York: United Nations, 2009. Legislators from the United States are not identifiable from this list. Cabinet members who are also members of parliament have not been considered. For the 1960s cf. Baehr 1970: 86; for the 1970s cf. Goormaghtigh 1979: 61–4. 117 Cf. Goormaghtigh 1979: 70; on attempts of institutionalization: “Report of the Parliamentary Advisers to the Australian Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly: Thirty-third Session, 1978.” NAC, FM 1973–88, 119.H.2.a.1979; Circular by IPU Secretary General Pio-Carlo Terenzie, June 1979, ibid.
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Western routines of parliamentarians At the General Assembly
The United States The US parliamentary delegation to the General Assembly is frequently cited as a model due to that country’s leadership in international relations, but also because it constitutes a set formula and routinely applied practice. For each regular session of the General Assembly two members of Congress, one Democrat and one Republican, are chosen from the foreign affairs committees of either house to serve in the delegation as representatives.118 This bipartisan approach has its roots in the US delegation to the San Francisco Conference and to the first two sessions of the General Assembly. In 1948, an influential republican Senator, Arthur H. Vandenberg, withdrew from the delegation, in spite of his belief that congressional representation in the initial period had been beneficial. As the newly-elected chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Vandenberg believed his position as a free agent would be compromised were he compelled to vote according to government instructions.119 Congressional delegates from both parties were reintroduced in the US delegation in 1950, and have been part of it ever since. Reports by legislators in the US delegations reflect a sense of uneasiness over the practice of members of Congress serving as agents carrying the President’s brief; they fear congressional delegates might be forced to vote contrary to their personal convictions or those of their constituents. Letting a diplomat cast and possibly explain a given vote instead of the legislator assigned to the task is a way out of the dilemma, but this might send undesired signals to the outside world. Such a problem has generally been outweighed by the learning experience of being present at the United Nations and additional weight given to the US position by demonstrating the bipartisan consensus of the legislature with the executive.120 As permanent representative Richard C. Holbrooke put it in a Senate hearing on the promotion of United States interests in the United Nations, bipartisan congresspersons serving the executive have a unique
–––––––––––––– 118 Senators are appointed in even-numbered years, House members are selected in odd years. 119 Arthur H. Vandenberg. The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952. 330–331; cf. Dulles 1950: 128. 120 See e.g. Albert Gore, and Gordon Allott. The Seventeenth General Assembly of the United Nations: Report. 88th Congress 1st Session. Washington: Government, 1963. 17–8; Joel Pritchard, and Stephen J. Solarz. 38th Session of the U.N. General Assembly, September 19–December 20, 1983: Report of Congressional Delegates. Washington: Government, 1985. 16.
77 CHAPTER 2 qualification “to make a physical demonstration of the fact that both branches [of government] and both parties” act in unison.121 The advantage of granting congressional representatives insight into the policy making process with regard to financial matters is another relevant factor.122 There are significant differences in how seriously congressional delegates have taken their assignments.123 However, it is remarkable that a country has maintained representation of lawmakers in delegations to the United Nations, although the United States rejects the idea of parliamentary government because of the weight given to independent checks and balances. The formative experiences in connection with the founding of the League and the United Nations has contributed to a culture of US bipartisanship at the world organisation. Yet, the US model has not remained unchallenged. The former head of the UN information services, Hernane Tavares de Sá, recalls in his memoirs the “famous story” of a US senator who was a member of his country’s delegation to the General Assembly. The senator, standing in the receiving line at a reception, illustrates perfectly the convergence of the popular figures of ‘the ignorant American’ and the ‘incompetent parliamentarian’: He had been shaking hands with what seemed to be an unending procession of ambassadors from countries from all over the world and trying to say a few appropriate words as he greeted them. The next man in line looked unmistakably European, but was presented to the senator as ‘the representative of UNESCO.’ The senator pumped his hand warmly and said: “We all know in America of your brave little country’s fine record during the war.”124 Amusing as the story is, it must be apocryphal. It is situated at the third session of the General Assembly in Paris (also the seat of UNESCO) – one of the rare occasions when the delegation of the United States did not actually include a legislator.
–––––––––––––– 121 The United Nations: Progress in Promoting U.S. Interests. S. Hrg. 106–296. Washington: Government, 2000. 10. Even John R. Bolton frequently talked of bipartisanship in the hearings on his nomination and also brought to mind the US tradition of sending congressional delegates to the United Nations, see The Nomination of John R. Bolton to be U.S. Representative to the United Nations with Rank of Ambassador. Senate, Exec. Rept. 109-01. Washington: Government, 2005. In particular 239. 122 U.S. Participation in the United Nations: Hearings and Markup before the Committee on Foreign Affairs. Washington: Government, 1982. 165. 123 Riggs/Mykletun 1979: 111, 147. 124 Tavares de Sá 1966: 10–11.
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Canada Canada was another country to send legislators from both government and opposition parties to the United Nations upon the organisation’s founding. While these representatives were formally equal in both parts of the first General Assembly, opposition members were assigned the inferior status of “parliamentary advisers” at the succeeding session.125 The reason given for this change was the opposition’s dissatisfaction with having to share “responsibility with Government M.P.s for carrying out Government policy”.126 No opposition politicians were sent to New York for the third and fourth sessions of the General Assembly, but parliamentary advisers from the opposition were reintroduced in 1950 simultaneously with the return to bipartisanship in the US delegation. Subsequently, a new category of “parliamentary observers” was instituted; the term label signals that participation in the delegation’s decision making was not included nor did the designation have any legal status within the United Nations system.127 Although the titles given to different Canadian parliamentarians in delegations attending the General Assembly have changed several times over the years, the principle followed has either been to assign high status and responsibility to members of government parties and low status and corresponding responsibility to members of the opposition, or to grant both groups of legislators a loose affiliation to the delegation as observers. More recently, parliamentarians, although they continue to be sent regularly to the General Assembly, have not been included in official delegation lists and have only visited the United Nations for a short period. Thus, a semi- official publication noted in 2003 that “the time that Members of Parliament now spend at the UN is too short for them to develop much understanding of UN issues.”128 Nevertheless, the Canadian approach is a compromise that tries to make use of physical presence and learning experience with as little constraint as possible for parliamentarians or the opposition on the part of the government. The ‘Canadian model’ of parliamentary observers was discussed in most of the Nordic countries in the 1960s, when their traditional modes of parliamentary representation on UN delegations were challenged. The same model was also relevant when Finland introduced regular short-term observer visits of parliamentarians to –––––––––––––– 125 See letter of the Swedish legation, Ottawa to the foreign ministry of Sweden, 4 September 1947, NAS, FM, FS 1920, vol. 1788. 126 Memorandum of the Canadian Delegation to the United Nations, 13 October 1959, NLS, MS, L 108: Östen Undén, vol. 20. 127 Letter of the Swedish legation, Ottawa to the foreign ministry of Sweden of 18 August 1950, NAS, FM, FS 1920, vol. 1794; cf. Memorandum of the Canadian Delegation to the United Nations, 13 October 1959, NLS, MS, L 108: Östen Undén, vol. 20. 128 Parliamentary Diplomacy. Ottawa: Parliamentary Centre, 2003. 6.
79 CHAPTER 2 the General Assembly, in addition to the sessional appointment of party representatives who were generally not parliamentarians.129
The Netherlands In the Netherlands, the tradition of appointing parliamentarians as members of delegations to the United Nations also dates back to the organisation’s founding days. The practice during the postwar years was to send two to five legislators to the General Assembly from government parties and from the opposition. By the late 1960s, however, criticism was raised by delegates and observers that too much constraint was being felt from the opposition due to their participation in the execution of government policies.130 These constitutional reservations resulted in the Dutch reordering their delegation at the General Assembly in 1971: members of parliament were now appointed as ‘special advisers’ instead of principal representatives. Annually, anywhere between five and nine Dutch parliamentarians have been sent to the General Assembly in this capacity. Some tug-of-war and changing practises as to whether this label implied observer status or regular delegation membership has occurred, but it seems as if the latter interpretation became prevalent.131 Although Dutch parliamentarians retained higher formal status in the national delegation than their Canadian colleagues, they also exemplify the engagement of parliamentarians in order to enhance knowledge about the United Nations with as little compromise as possible regarding the separation of powers principle back home. However, since 2008 Dutch legislators are no longer included in official delegation lists.
Outlook In the General Assembly debate on the cooperation between the United Nations and the Inter-parliamentary Union in November 2000, the Norwegian Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Arne B. H nningstad, claimed that the world needed “a United Nations where citizens feel that they are genuinely represented in their political diversity”. He went on to make the following plea: The United Nations must have a parliamentary dimension. The Nordic countries have chosen to include parliamentarians representing different –––––––––––––– 129 Cf. T rnudd 1967: 48; Keijo Korhonen. Sattumakorpraali: Korhonen Kekkosen komennossa. Helsinki: Otava, 1999. 302–304. 130 Baehr 1969: 3–19; Baehr 1970: on political complaints see 31 note 18. 131 Schermers/Blokker 1997[1972]: 173.
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parties in their delegations to the General Assembly and to special conferences. I would recommend this as a general model, as one element in building a parliamentary dimension. The United Nations would also benefit from drawing more heavily on the political expertise of these parliamentarians in connection with the General Assembly and other meetings.132 It is extraordinary for diplomats to give advice of this kind to sovereign fellow-nations – advice not only on how to design institutions (by convention not the business of other states), but that at the same time runs the risk of appearing smug. While the main thrust of the debate on democratising international affairs seems directed at including members of civil society, involving parliamentary representatives is on the rise as well. In fact, parliamentarians are sometimes considered as representatives of civil society or, in the words of Kofi Annan, as “the institutional bridge between the State and civil society”.133 The construction of a unitary state actor demonstrating national consensus in foreign policy has been the most important reason for parliamentary representation in delegations to the United Nations. Particularly for Western democracies with either a constitutional division of legislative and executive powers relative to foreign policy, such as in the United States, or with a tendency towards minority governments, such as the Nordic countries, there is a strong incentive for major political forces to be represented in delegations in order to assure a stable yet flexible national policy.134 Although integrating legislatures or opposition parties is a common strategy, a government will generally have to pay a price for the ‘nationalisation’ of its foreign policy. A remarkable example of this tendency is the notion of a ‘parliamentary majority’ among delegates opposing government instructions, as once explicitly stated by a Danish delegation.135 Although such a majority is fictitious and in principle not relevant in intergovernmental arenas, it demonstrates that governments are not the only strategic players in international politics. A Dutch commission on the collaboration of government and parliament in foreign affairs concluded that “a delegation must never degenerate into a miniature
–––––––––––––– 132 General Assembly, Official Records 55 (2000) no. 55: 3–4. 133 “Remarks by Secretary-General Kofi Annan.” IPU Event at the United Nations, New York, October 25–27, 1999: Report. Ottawa: House of Commons, 1999. Available at
81 CHAPTER 2 parliament that makes decisions based on the majority of votes”. Among the disadvantages that the commission listed with regard to parliamentary representation in delegations was a reduction of leeway for both the opposition and for the government.136 The practice discussed above has been criticised as creating informal channels between government and the opposition, thereby reducing the public exchange of information and hampering the shaping of public opinion.137 However, the opposite effect – a public discourse benefiting from the cooperation of government and opposition – has also been observed.138 In his “Proposal for a Study on Parliamentarians in Governmental Delegations to International Organizations” (unfortunately never brought to fruition), Peter R. Baehr concludes: “Whether one is in favor of including members of parliament – of both government parties and the opposition – in governmental delegations seems to depend mainly on whether one thinks that the advantage of having well-informed members of parliament in the field of foreign policy should prevail over the disadvantage that their role as critics might be weakened.”139 From the vantage point of the Western ideals of enlightenment and democratic debate, a natural preference would be one of well-informed criticism. Presented as such, the alternatives cited by Baehr are not mutually exclusive: they signify the need to integrate parliamentarians in delegations to the United Nations in a way that satisfies them both. The procedural model of democracy that J rgen Habermas terms ‘deliberative politics’ would be the ideal for this type of involvement. In his words: “‘Dialogical’ and ‘instrumental’ politics can interpenetrate in the medium of deliberation if the corresponding forms of communication are sufficiently institutionalized.”140 The desire to promote a well-informed democratic foreign policy discourse within an intergovernmental setting is as observable in the practice of some Western delegations as is awareness of the dynamics of the separation of powers in foreign affairs. Such practice has not been without complications, but there is sufficient evidence that this legacy of the Western tradition, which might be described as deliberative diplomacy, represents a valuable acquisition for democratic political culture.
–––––––––––––– 136 Eindrapport van de Commissie 1951: 34. 137 Schermers/Blokker 1997: 173. 138 E.g. Dulles 1950: 127. 139 Baehr 1970: 82. 140 J rgen Habermas. “Three Normative Models of Democracy.” The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998b. 239–252, at 245.
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NORDIC DIPLOMACY AT THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS It has been claimed that the creators of the United Nations paid the unsuccessful predecessor, the League of Nations, “a much more profound tribute than any formal eulogy could have expressed: they copied it”. Despite undeniable differences between the organisations there was a “basic identity of objectives and methods, of plan and structure”.141 The manifold references to the League of Nations in early Nordic decision making on matters related to the United Nations are conspicuous. Many of those who became involved with the United Nations frequently drew from their own personal experiences at the League of Nations. Practises such as composing delegations politically–parliamentary or close cooperation with the other Nordic countries were continued. However, there were also changes in attitude as a result of learning from past experience. For example, there was a greater understanding for the pragmatic necessity to keep the great powers pleased with the institutional arrangement of international organisations. In the League of Nations deliberative diplomacy had its first breakthrough. Thus, a discussion of it is valuable for the present discourse on democratic global governance. While the roots of ‘parliamentary diplomacy’ can be traced to the Congresses of Westphalia in 1648,142 the classical definition of this concept concerns multilateral negotiations characterised by institutionalisation, rules of procedure, public debate and the vote on draft resolutions.143 It refers to the adoption of parliamentary methods, in particular in such organs as the Assembly of the League of Nations and the UN General Assembly, not to parliamentary agents or substance. A different understanding designates ‘parliamentary diplomacy’ with reference to the institutional background of persons or bodies involved in diplomatic activities. In this sense, the term ‘parliamentary diplomacy’ has increasingly been used at variance with the established understanding
–––––––––––––– 141 Nicholas 1967[1959]: 14; cf. Chadwick F. Alger. “The United Nations in Historical Perspective.” The United Nations System: The Policies of Member States. Chadwick F. Alger, Gene M. Lyons and John E. Trent (eds). Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1995. 3–40, at 4. This chapter is based on: Norbert G tz. “‘Blue-eyed Angels’ at the League of Nations: The Genevese Construction of Norden.” Regional Cooperation and International Organizations: The Nordic Model in Transnational Alignment. Norbert G tz and Heidi Haggrén (eds). London: Routledge, 2009. 25–46, at 42. 142 Philip C. Jessup. “Parliamentary Diplomacy: An Examination of the Legal Quality of the Rules of Procedure of Organs of the United Nations.” Recueil des Cours 89 (1956) 1: 181– 320, at 240. 143 Dean Rusk. “Parliamentary Diplomacy: Debate vs. Negotiation.” World Affairs Interpreter 26 (1955) 2: 121–138, at 121–122.
83 CHAPTER 2 in international law and studies on international relations, in particular by parliamentarians themselves.144 Both meanings of ‘parliamentary diplomacy’, the first referring to specific methods of decision making and the second referring to a particular type of actor, are independent of one another. ‘Parliamentary diplomacy’ in the first sense might be exercised by diplomats only, and legislatures or legislators might be involved in diplomatic affairs under conditions that do not resemble parliamentary procedures. However, a common historical origin of both understandings becomes evident through the lens of the contribution of the Scandinavian countries. The two dimensions of the term ‘parliamentary diplomacy’ are, thus, historically and functionally closely intertwined.
Conference diplomacy vs. spiders of intrigue The First World War, with its virtual geographical and social universality, is often described as a catalyst of modernity and as the beginning of the ‘short’ twentieth century.145 The war experience led to a breakdown of the old system of international relations based on opposing great power alliances and secret bilateral diplomacy. It made apparent a “vacuum of legitimacy”.146 In view of the unprecedented destructive capacity of humankind that the war demonstrated, it was widely felt that, for the sake of peace, the international system of old had to give way to a new international order. The quest to apply the principles of democracy to foreign policy gained significant momentum. As expressed eloquently by British labour politician Arthur Ponsonby, who himself had earlier been employed at the British legation in Copenhagen: The stuffy hot-house atmosphere of diplomacy must be cleansed by the fresh air of publicity. The spiders of intrigue which have woven undisturbed their tangled webs in secret must be chased out of darkness into the open light of day. […]
But, first and foremost, there must be a general acceptance of the fact that statesmen, however astute they may be, can never establish a permanent, enlightened and pacific relationship between nations, unless they have at their
–––––––––––––– 144 Cf. G tz 2005a. 145 For an extended version of the remaining parts of this subchapter including more detailed references see G tz 2009a. 146 John Lewis Gaddis. We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History. Oxford: University Press, 1997. 4.
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back the co-operation, the approval, and the intense and determined desire of the great mass of the people.147 Thus, proposals were made for the close supervision of government action by parliament and the establishment of parliamentary foreign affairs committees, as well as for the democratisation of the organisation of the foreign service. As a result, parliamentary control of the executive in matters of foreign affairs, as well as the position of commoners in the foreign service, was strengthened considerably in the Scandinavian countries and elsewhere. Nonetheless, in spite of the strengthening of principles of qualification, foreign services remained “partly aristocratic” in spirit and the interwar years, with a glance at the League of Nations in Geneva, have mockingly been described as “the age of the haute école and the inspecteurs des finances”.148 At the same time, a new system of international relations was advocated based on universality, multilateralism, open diplomacy, peaceful conflict solution and common security. The idea of a society of nations was “in the air”.149 The League of Nations became the foremost, although imperfect, expression of the new spirit of ‘diplomacy by conference’. Its principle organs were similar to those of the United Nations today: the Assembly, for all member states; the Council with some permanent great powers, as well as a number of temporarily elected members; and the Secretariat as administrative organ. Unfortunately, the League suffered from two principal defects. The United States refrained from participating in the organisation, which was a creation of her president, Woodrow Wilson, more than of anyone else. Ironically, this retreat was a result of the anti-diplomatic reservations prevailing in the US Senate with its far- reaching foreign policy competence. The other defect was the League’s close connection to interests shared by the victors of the First World War. The Covenant of the League of Nations was an integral part of the Versailles Peace Treaty. Most problematic, the system of sanctions stipulated by the Covenant was rarely implemented against violators of peace, effectively undermining belief in international order. By the end of the First World War, the three Scandinavian countries Denmark, Norway and Sweden had achieved a similar perspective on international organisation. Their common outlook rested on shared if not always harmonious history, close cultural kinship and similar –––––––––––––– 147 Arthur Ponsonby. Democracy and Diplomacy: A Plea for Popular Control of Foreign Policy. London: Methuen, 1915. 114. 148 Moynihan 1979[1978]: 85. 149 Quote: Alf Ross. Constitution of the United Nations: Analysis of Structure and Function. Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1950. 13.
85 CHAPTER 2 political experiences, as well as on their detachment from European power politics in the nineteenth century, on the pan-ideology of Scandinavianism, and on a common policy of neutrality, particularly in the First World War. Communalities had been fostered in peace societies founded in the three countries in 1882/83, which became the nucleus for a dense network of associations arguing for the permanent neutralisation of the North. The establishment of a special Scandinavian branch within the world-wide Inter-parliamentary Union in 1907 and the meetings of the three countries’ heads of state and ministerial conferences during the First World War were particularly significant. The most relevant external stimulus for Nordic cooperation was the First World War, in which the Scandinavian countries were able to hold onto neutrality despite the war’s potential to draw them into different camps on geopolitical grounds. On 8 August 1914, a few days after the beginning of World War One, the governments of Sweden and Norway, in an exchange of identical notes, mutually corroborated their firm intention of maintaining neutrality in the ongoing conflict and to take no hostile measures against the other under any circumstances. The fact that Denmark was not asked to join the agreement led to annoyance on the part of the Danes and has led observers to call this declaration “a mixed blessing” in terms of its contribution to Scandinavian cooperation.150 However, when the King of Sweden invited his fellow Scandinavian monarchs as well as the foreign ministers of the three countries to a summit conference soon thereafter, the Danes were again included. Christian X agreed to participate on the condition that the meeting be held in Malm , as close as one can get to the Danish capital on Swedish territory. While the practical results of the convention of 18–19 December 1914 were humble, the symbolic significance as an expression of the solidarity and neutrality held by the three Scandinavian countries was considerable. During the war, in the context of unsuccessful endeavours to concert the neutral states’ interest articulation, there were a number of other meetings between Scandinavian foreign ministers, and a second meeting of the Scandinavian monarchs was held in Kristiania in November 1917. At the same time, there were privately organised gatherings and examples for the interaction between their collaboration and that of the governments. Most importantly, a joint initiative by the Scandinavian inter-parliamentary groups, aimed at organising a conference of neutral states in order to develop a common postwar strategy, resulted in government appointed
–––––––––––––– 150 Patrick Salmon. Scandinavia and the Great Powers, 1890–1940. Cambridge: University Press, 1997: 128.
86 CHALLENGES AND TRADITIONS committees of the three countries in the beginning of 1918. These committees, with distinguished Scandinavian politicians as members, had the task of preparing the protection of the neutral states’ interests once the war was over. While the Danish government attempted to limit the mandate of its commission and originally chose to only appoint civil servants among its members, the Swedish government safeguarded a comprehensive mandate and involvement of inter-parliamentarian activists in all three national committees.151 By this time, the establishment of an international peace organisation had already become a ubiquitous idea supported by the belligerents of both camps. The preliminary meeting of the three Scandinavian commissions in Copenhagen in May 1918 led to the recommendation that a diplomatic conference of neutral states be tasked with producing a proposal for the establishment of an international organisation. However, the idea was not endorsed by the other European neutrals and the Scandinavian countries had to continue work on their own. Shortly after the armistice in November 1918, the commissions agreed on a draft proposal for an ‘International Juridical Organisation’, which greatly favoured small states in international relations, but was of limited scope otherwise.152 As the Swedish commission put it, permanent international conferences were not to “become a kind of international parliament” because “an authority superior to existing States would, for the moment, be premature” and especially because of the fear of “any sort of graduated scale”.153 The proposal was published in January 1919 and it was generally well received in the countries of origin. However, Scandinavian hopes that this plan would be submitted to the peace conference for consideration were frustrated. As the Scandinavian suggestion was submitted by key figures from the three countries and the commissions had carefully examined existing ideas, it has been maintained that the proposal was nevertheless highly relevant as “the crystallization of the Scandinavian point of view” and that “its supreme merit consists in the high measure of accuracy with which it portrays the ‘common denominator’ of –––––––––––––– 151 Knud Larsen. Forsvar og Folkeforbund: En studie i Venstres og Det Konservative Folkepartis forsvarspolitiske meningsdannelse 1918–1922. Århus: Universitetsforlaget, 1976. 191–192. 152 “Draft of a Convention Respecting an International Juridical Organization: Drawn up by the Three Commissions Appointed by the Governments of Sweden, Denmark and Norway, with an Explanatory Statement Extracted from the Report of the Swedish Commission.” Documents Presented to the Committee Relating to Existing Plans for the Establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice. Advisory Committee of Jurists (ed.). Harrow: Permanent Court of International Justice, 1920. 151–201. 153 “Draft of a Convention” 1920: 165.
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Scandinavian agreement on the question of international organization before the Peace Conference began”.154 However, the proposal reflected what was believed to be realistic, and it ought not be confused with principal wishes.155 There were other, more far-reaching ideas and programmes in Scandinavia at the time. For example, Christian L. Lange, the Secretary General of the Inter-parliamentary Union and Nobel Peace Prize winner 1921, outlined a programme for the organisation of peaceful conflict resolution between states, based on arbitration, conciliation procedures and a permanent court of international justice. Moreover, he proposed a system of sanctions coordinated by an international executive committee.156 The idea of sanctions was in grave conflict with the notion of traditional neutrality and was dropped by the Scandinavian inter-parliamentary groups in a resolution favouring the creation of a Society of Nations adopted in 1918. The so-called ‘Maximum-Programme’ of the radical segment of Swedish pacifists around the social democratic politician Carl Lindhagen sought the creation of a world parliament, complete disarmament and the acceptance of compulsory arbitration for all disputes.157 Similar goals were adopted in the Manifesto of the Dutch–Scandinavian Committee, a wartime derivative of the Socialist International meeting in Stockholm in 1917. The committee held that parliamentary control over foreign policy had to be enhanced in order to overcome traditional diplomacy. The ‘Fourteen Points’ proposal by the Council of the Norwegian League of Nations Association led by Fridtjof Nansen, alluding to Woodrow Wilson’s famous proposal with the same title, suggested a world congress with representatives elected by national assemblies and representation proportional to “population and international importance”, as well as an executive council with members elected by representatives of the world congress and single nations.158
–––––––––––––– 154 S. Shepard Jones. The Scandinavian States and the League of Nations. Reprint. New York: Greenwood, 1969[1939]. 40–41. 155 Larsen 1976: 204, cf. 206. 156 Christian L. Lange. Mellemfolkelige retsmidler: Foredrag holdt i den svenske og den norske interparlamentariske gruppe. Kristiania: Interparlamentarisk Forbund, 1916. 157 Jones 1969[1939]: 32. The title of the programme was a delimitation from the so-called ‘Minimum-Programme’ promoted by the Central Organization for Durable Peace, an international society with participation of prominent Scandinavians. 158 Jones 1969[1939]: 32–33, 44–46.
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Of hangmen and vanguards: Scandinavians and the Covenant In January 1919 the Paris Peace Conference, tasked with drafting the Covenant of the League of Nations, convened with participants from twenty-seven nations that had all either declared war against Germany or had severed diplomatic relations with her. The task of drafting the Covenant was delegated to a commission of fourteen states, headed by Woodrow Wilson. A British–American proposal constituted the basis of discussion, and later, after some modifications, became the Covenant’s final accepted form. The Scandinavian governments had sent a note to the French government in December 1918 underlining the importance of permitting all civilised states to participate in the creation of the League of Nations. They were signalled goodwill and in March 1919 granted participation in two unofficial hearings of a sub-committee of the commission on the League of Nations together with ten other neutral states. By this time, experience of successful Scandinavian war-time policy coordination compared to the disparate appearance of the neutral states in general clearly affected political thought. When the neutrals were given the chance to express their views on the British–American draft, the Swedish representatives were to “get in touch with the representatives of other neutral states in order as far as possible to bring about a common posture on the part of the neutral powers”. They were also given the instruction that “in particular such a cooperation should take place with the delegates of Denmark and Norway”.159 Prior to the hearings, the Scandinavian representatives met with those of Switzerland and the Netherlands and informally agreed to support each other within the scope of what their national instructions permitted. The minutes of the six-hour conventions conducted the following two days show that this idea of mutual support was carried through. While the hearings exercised little influence over the Covenant adopted by the Allies, the discussions anticipated and touched upon later developments of the League of Nations and its successor, the United Nations. Sweden, for example, proposed that states be grouped based on geographical or cultural proximity in order to guarantee a representative choice in the nomination of secondary powers for the Council of the League. The representative of Norway acted as the vanguard of a parliamentarisation of the League, proposing that deliberations of the Assembly be made public, annual meetings of the Assembly, and an increase in the maximum number of delegates for each country from three –––––––––––––– 159 Instructions, probably of 13 March 1919, NAS, FM, FS 1902, vol. 2148a.
89 CHAPTER 2 to five.160 One of the motives for the proposed enlargement of delegations was an attempt to enable the inclusion of representatives from each of the major political parties. A Norwegian suggestion presented at a later stage, adopted by the League and also by the United Nations, held that travel expenses incurred by the principal delegates be reimbursed by the organisation in order to enable small or distant countries to participate in the sessions, not least by sending members of government or parliament in addition to professional diplomats residing nearby.161 On the other side, the Scandinavians, as one observer has described it, “in their detached position above the mêlée of European Power-politics […] desired a League which should be, if one may so express it, as non- political as it was possible to make it”.162 According to Peter Munch, the leading Danish authority on the League and foreign minister 1929 to 1940, the most important modification of the original draft that was achieved by the neutral states was that League members were in practice released from the obligation to participate in military and other sanctions against their own will.163 The repulsion of demands for a more binding system of sanctions was one of the important constant factors of the policies of the Scandinavians, who did not themselves feel in the need of assistance and who strived to avoid to be drawn into the conflicts of others. While the Scandinavian countries did much to support the League of Nations, their reluctance to subscribe to this core element of the Covenant weakened the new world organisation from its inception. The thirteen neutral states that had been consulted in Paris were invited to enter the League of Nations as original members without having to go through the regular application procedure. The condition for this was that accession be made without reservation within two months from the coming into force of the Covenant on 10 March 1920. While all three Scandinavian parliaments approved their country’s accession in the early days of March, their degree of consent differed. The three neutrals became original members of the League of Nations with the deposition of declarations of adherence with the Secretariat of the League, which in the
–––––––––––––– 160 “Document 25: Meetings with the Neutral Powers March 20 and March 21, 1919.” The Drafting of the Covenant, vol. 2. David Hunter Miller (ed.). New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1928. 592–645, at 633–634. 161 Carl Joachim Hambro. Folkeforbundet og dets arbeide. Oslo: Aschehoug, 1931. 59. 162 Alfred Zimmern. The League of Nations and the Rule of Law 1818–1935. 2nd rev. ed. London: Macmillan, 1939[1936]. 350. 163 Peter Munch. “Les États neutres et le Pacte de la Société des Nations.” Les origines et l’œuvre de la Société des Nations, vol. 1. Peter Munch (ed.). Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1923. 161–188, at 184–185.
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Norwegian and Swedish case were supplemented by policy declarations that came close to reservations. In Denmark, both houses of the Rigsdag voted unanimously in favour of joining the League of Nations. However, there was hardly any debate and the votes cast show that a considerable number of members must have been absent or abstaining. A factor that contributed in securing a unanimous vote were the plebiscites in February and March 1920 on the return of parts of the Schleswig province to Denmark, which were made possible by the Allied victory over Germany and which resulted in the transfer to Denmark of the sovereignty over North Schleswig. In Norway, the Labour Party with its radical tradition opposed membership in the League of Nations due to the link to the ‘imperialist’ Versailles Treaty and the lack of provision for thorough disarmament. In the party newspaper, the League was conceived as a “torture chamber, in which the small states become delinquents and the great powers hangmen”.164 One labour representative defied his party line, and was thereafter expelled by his comrades. At the same time, four non-socialist deputies voted against accession to the world organisation, among them Carl J. Hambro, who was to become a prominent figure in Geneva, President of the Norwegian Parliament and of the League’s last sessions in 1939 and 1946. In all, there were one hundred votes for and twenty votes against adherence to the Covenant in the Norwegian Storting. In Sweden the conservatives, who were backed by the agrarians as well as by much of the establishment and military circles and who were also in concurrence with a tiny, left-wing party, opposed League of Nations membership mainly on the grounds of neutrality. In contrast, the governing social democrats and liberals, but also some individual conservative legislators favoured Swedish membership, underlining the lack of binding military obligations and believing that the League would eventually develop into a more universal organisation than it was for the time being. The vote for adhesion to the League was 152 to 67 in the Lower House of the Riksdag and 86 to 47 in the Upper House. This marked variance notwithstanding, all political parties in the three countries viewed the League of Nations as an institution with serious shortcomings. In contrast to the customary description of Sweden and the Scandinavian states as having received the League in unusually high favour, it has therefore been concluded, “if Sweden can justly be described as enthusiastic, other countries must have been chilly to a degree”.165 The –––––––––––––– 164 Omang 1964: 101. 165 Herbert Tingsten. The Debate on the Foreign Policy of Sweden: 1918–1939. London: Oxford University Press, 1949[1944]. 82.
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Scandinavian vision of the League of Nations was that of a non-political, universal and efficient organisation working for disarmament and ensuring the principles of international law with the aim of making the international environment safe for small states. The Swedish conservatives participated unreservedly in League of Nations politics once membership had been decided on. The Norwegian Labour Party was the only major party to remain reluctant and argue for withdrawal from the League up until the Soviet Union’s entry in 1934 changed the parameters. A similar negative stance was also taken by extreme left wing and communist parties in Denmark and Sweden and later by some nazi groups not represented in parliament.
Champions and Tordenskjold’s soldiers: Delegation composition A democratisation of foreign policy corresponded to the Zeitgeist, and a Scandinavian history of multipartite commission work on postwar international organisation contributed to the inclusion of parliamentarians in delegations to the Assembly of the League of Nations. The politics of minority governments and the cooptational mode of policy making typical for small states are also relevant factors. Hence, despite the acceptance of the principle realised in the League of Nations that independent states represented by their governments are the relevant agents in international relations, the Scandinavian countries sent only a minority of professional diplomats. They opted instead to include a large number of politicians – not only from government parties, but also from the opposition. In this way, elements of popular representation found their way to Scandinavian delegations. They were also the only countries to designate women delegates from the onset. Such institutional matches clearly demonstrated parallel development and mutual affinity. However, the inclusion of parliamentarians on delegations to the League of Nations, which has been suggested as a Nordic model,166 has not been consistently applied and both the domestic and international context seem more important than Nordic concord. As has been shown by Erling Bj l, in his memoirs, Danish Foreign Minister Peter Munch (1929 to 1940) falsely recalls that he criticised the composition of his country’s delegation to the second congress in The Hague in 1907 for not having included a representative from parliament or peace organisations. Only in the 1910s, when Denmark prepared its delegation for the third congress in The Hague, were parliamentary –––––––––––––– 166 See e.g. Christian L. Lange. “De nordiske land i det internasjonale politiske samarbeid.” Nordens kalender 8 (1937): 20–36, at 24.
92 CHALLENGES AND TRADITIONS representatives seriously considered and designated.167 However, the congress was cancelled due to the First World War, and this decision never came into effect. After the First World War, propositions were put forth in the Scandinavian nations to let the people elect delegates to the League of Nations directly.168 Moreover, the goal of a ‘world parliament’ gained adherents in Scandinavia, as long as representation was not conceived as proportional to the size of a country’s population. Despite the earlier work of the Inter-parliamentary Union, the idea of popular or parliamentary representation in international diplomacy only achieved its substance in connection with the First World War. It was due to the late arrival of the Swedish and Norwegian parliamentarian appointees that their countries were merely represented by conventional diplomats at the hearing of the sub-committee with the neutrals in March 1919. While the Danish delegation was already on site because of the border issue in Schleswig, Sweden and Norway had been forced to send their delegations to the Paris meeting on too short a notice. Because of this misfortune, Denmark and Switzerland stood alone in having legislators as participants. After the precedent of the Danish– Icelandic negotiations in the summer of 1918,169 the Danish delegation to the Paris peace conference was the second instance in Scandinavian foreign affairs in which parliamentarians participated in government delegations in addition to officials belonging to the executive. Apart from the background sketched above and claims from the parliament for representation in the delegation, the most immediate reason for the Danish government to include a representative of one of the opposition parties was the attempt to pacify political forces at home and to integrate them in its own restrained strategy in the Schleswig question. As revealed by the diary of then minister of defence, Peter Munch, “The present political conditions and the difficulty, which was steadily brought about by claims against the government as pro-German” helped establish the Danish tradition of parliamentary or party delegation.170
–––––––––––––– 167 Bj l 1983: 111, 189, 241. 168 See f.ex. in Sweden a motion by Carl Lindhagen, cf. “F rsta lagutskottets utlåtande Nr. 12.” Riksdagens protokoll, Bihang (1921) 9 saml. 1 avd.; on Norway cf. Stortingsforhandlinger, Stortingstidende 70 (1921): 2941 (Johan Castberg). 169 The Danish–Icelandic negotiations resulted in far-reaching self-government for Denmark’s North Atlantic territory. 170 Peter Munch. Erindringer, vol. 4: 1918–1924: Freden, Genforeningen og de f rste Efterkrigsaar. Copenhagen: Busck, 1963. 61; cf. 48–50, 55; the Danish delegation discussing the future of Schleswig also included trade and finance representatives, a tradition that was upheld at international conferences other than the League of Nations or the United Nations (Bj l 1983: 114, 161).
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A close historical and factual connection exists between the ideas of parliamentary influence on foreign policy and open multilateral diplomacy. Woodrow Wilson, in a speech at the Paris Peace Conference, suggested that governments, in order to meet practically universal demands of public opinion everywhere, might choose their representatives in such a way as to leave the door “open to a variety of representation” and not “confined to a single official body”, that is not solely to government institutions.171 Ironically, Wilson’s position in Paris and his attempt to get the United States engaged in the League of Nations were severely undercut by his strategic mistake of not including a prominent republican in the US delegation to the peace conference, but merely a second-rank party member. Contemporary documentation makes clear that diplomats played a limited role at the peace conference. However, the conference was dominated by representatives of government and war offices instead, while reference to parliamentarians is rare.172 After the establishment of the League of Nations, the International Federation of League of Nations Societies advocated the selection of national representatives on a democratic basis, and specified this as equal representation of all political parties.173 Many countries at the League’s first Assembly featured political, sometimes even broad political, representation. The most prominent example of such an approach was Great Britain, in attendance with a tripartite delegation. A total of twelve countries included parliamentarians in their delegations to the first Assembly. The practice to have one or two parliamentarians on the delegation remained common in many countries throughout the interwar- period. A count of attendence based on the delegation lists of the nineteen regular sessions shows that Denmark and Switzerland always sent legislators to the Assembly of the League of Nations. Sweden has the same factual record, but at two instances these individuals were not identified as members of parliament in the delegation list. The other countries most frequently sending parliamentarians were Italy (16 sessions), France (16), Norway (15), Great Britain (12), Luxemburg (12), Finland (11), Belgium (11), Romania (11), Spain (10), Poland (10), and Australia (10). Among the ranks that follow are some other non-European countries.174
–––––––––––––– 171 Wilson 1986: 174. 172 Harold W. V. Temperley. History of the Peace Conference of Paris, vol. 1. London: Frowde, 1920. 244–245. 173 Sch cking/Wehberg 1924[1921]: 284. 174 Parliamentarians present in the capacity of cabinet member are not taken into consideration. See the delegation lists in the Records of the Sessions of the Assembly, published separately the first three years and as special supplements to the Official Journal (continued)
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It should be noted that the numbers concern attended session by parliamentarians, they say nothing about the appointment procedure (whether parliament had a say in the appointment) or political background in government parties or the opposition. For example, after an incidence of ‘agency loss’ at the second Assembly, the British government excluded the opposition and has, thereafter, made the delegation “a mere sample of the Government of the day”.175 The example of Fascist Italy shows that not all governments including legislators were actually democratic. Furthermore, the numbers do not take into account representatives of political parties that were not legislators. Nonetheless, despite the limited scope of this overview, it provides a reasonable basis for contextualisation of Nordic delegation practises. It highlights communalities, making clear that there was a larger context of ‘parliamentarised’ conference diplomacy. At the same time, the League’s actual status as a conference of governments has never seriously been challenged. At the first sessions, Denmark seems to have been the only country to actually let different political parties appoint delegates to be designated as government representatives. Denmark was therefore discussed as a model for democratic delegation. The background to the Danish approach was again the high politicisation of the delegation’s composition due to the controversy over the Schleswig issue and the insistence of the Rigsdag on appointing delegates in its own right, as opposed to taking its cue from a government decision. With some exceptions that mainly concern Norway, the principle followed in the Scandinavian countries from the beginning was to send representatives of the major parliamentary parties (even those in the opposition), who were usually also selected by these parties and often members of parliament. These representatives were authorised to speak in the name of the government and were thereby obliged to adhere to previously discussed instructions. In this way, the political opposition was given a chance to participate in policy formulation and implementation, but was also constrained by shared responsibility. At the same time, parliamentary ratification of decisions taken in Geneva was made more likely, especially for minority governments. Both the general strive for non- partisan foreign policy and a political culture of consensus in the Scandinavian countries contributed to the establishment of the tradition of sending legislators to the Assembly of the League of Nations. –––––––––––––– of the League of Nations thereafter. Italy sent parliamentarians to all sixteen sessions it attended. 175 Robert Cecil. A Great Experiment: An Autobiography. London: Cape, 1941. 118, 323– 324.
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A general publication on the Assembly of the League of Nations from that time underlines it was important to have a broader party representation for the pursuance of those international policies which were held to be “measurably continuous and permanent”.176 For example, the delegation to the Assembly of the League was left virtually untouched when Sweden underwent a change of government in September 1936. Both the former minister of foreign affairs and his successor simply continued their participation in the delegation – the only alteration being a shuffling of the chairmanship. In Denmark it has been noted that roughly the same parliamentarians who served as their parties’ foreign policy experts were sent to the meetings of the League year after year, resembling ‘Tordenskjold’s soldiers’, that is a small group that lives on the continuous re-launch of its individual members.177 In practice, they functioned as a substitute foreign policy committee, accompanying the foreign minister who practically always participated throughout the whole session of the Assembly. The same tendencies can be observed with regard to the other Scandinavian countries, but even in some third countries. To denounce the Nordic practice of sending multi-partite delegations to Geneva as a mere “manifestation of propaganda”, that is, the outwardly visible demonstration of consensus is to miss both its consensus-creating function and its deliberative potential.178 Among the means to achieving a strong Scandinavian standing in the League was the visit of high-ranking politicians to Geneva. Thereby they contributed to establishing a general culture of prominent visits with a noticeable impact on other countries. Sweden, for instance, was already at the first session represented by her prime minister, the social democratic politician Hjalmar Branting. Generally, Sweden and Denmark, and to a lesser degree Norway, were known for splendid records for sending their prime ministers or foreign ministers to the Assembly. Moreover, while these personalities were often members of parliament in Denmark and Sweden, at the early sessions general international reputation was valued higher in Norway. Although contrary to their own preference for a less politicised, more juridical organisation, the practice of sending prominent representatives did underline the political character and importance of the League. In this connection, the notion of a Nordic mission at the League of Nations evolved, which exists in a personality-oriented and a
–––––––––––––– 176 The Assembly of the League of Nations. Geneva: League of Nations Association of the U.S., 1930. 9. 177 Bj l 1983: 119. 178 Quote: Ingemar Ottosson. Krig i fredens intresse eller neutralitet till varje pris: Sverige, NF och frågan om kollektiv säkerhet 1935–1936. Malm : Gleerup, 1986. 40.
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‘parliamentarised’ version. Edvard Hambro, who later became the President of the twenty-fifth anniversary session of the UN General Assembly, put it this way: With great insistence it is maintained that small states have an important task in Geneva, and that a sheer mystical power is inherent in the words, which are expressed by one of the Nordic representatives. A few regard them as a sort of international noblemen [adelsmennesker], which cannot be praised loud enough for their courage and their independence.179 The example of Christian L. Lange, the long-time Secretary-General of the Inter-parliamentary Union, shows that the Nordic countries started to view themselves as the champions of the parliamentarisation of international relations in both form and substance: More and more the Nordic example [of sending legislators] is followed, so that the Assembly subsequently has a predominantly political-parliamentary character, and this again has influenced the debates, which have become more lively and realistic than what is usual in exclusively “diplomatic” conferences.180 Norway, however, actually deviated from the Scandinavian pattern in that the principle of the political representation of parties in the beginning was secondary to that of choosing men (and one woman) of distinguished character and high international reputation. The “League’s private saint and conscience” Fridtjof Nansen in particular exerted a strong influence on his country’s policy at Geneva.181 As chairman of the Norwegian delegation, Nansen was even formally superior to Prime Minister Otto Blehr at the assemblies of 1921 and 1922, who chose to participate as a regular delegate. In the first years of the League, the Norwegian delegation also maintained a high degree of independence from control by parliament. The attempts to change this situation were characterised by a European or global, rather than a Nordic frame of reference. For example, the day after the League opened its first session, Carl J. Hambro complained in the Storting that the Norwegian national assembly, in contrast to its counterparts in apparently all other European nations, was not represented in the country’s delegation. While he explained that this both applied to Norway’s “neighbouring countries” and to “the other powers”, he did not use the charged terms ‘Scandinavian’ or ‘Nordic’, nor
–––––––––––––– 179 Edvard Hambro. Norge og Folkeforbundet. Oslo: Tanum, 1938. 34. 180 Lange 1937: 24. 181 Elmer Bendiner. A Time for Angels: The Tragicomic History of the League of Nations. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1975. 187.
97 CHAPTER 2 did he go further into neighbourly detail.182 The starting point for his campaign to increase Storting-influence on the Norwegian delegation policy was the demand “that the delegations sent to Geneva in the most possibly developed organic way represent the national assemblies and the will of the people, which is manifest in the national assemblies”.183 Similarly, in 1923, the parliamentary Committee of Foreign Affairs grumbled that, to its knowledge, Norway was the only member of the League that had not yet sent a single member of parliament to Geneva. Perhaps because of this complaint the speaker of parliament was included in the delegation in the same year.184 While parliamentary representation in other delegations to the League of Nations was clearly overestimated in the Norwegian parliament, these observations demonstrate that a ‘Nordic model’ was not relevant in the discussions at the time. Hambro eventually succeeded in extending Storting influence and, as its newly elected president managed to become nominated himself. In the League Assembly he became immediately agitated by what were predominantly diplomatic delegations sent by other countries, pointing out that “The League of Nations cannot become the organ, which it should be, the Council cannot become the organ, which it should be, if a onesided and predominant diplomatic element meets in the Council and in the delegations.” In his view, the general parliamentarisation was to strengthen the League, while the task of the Assembly was to exercise “what one might call parliamentary control”.185 Edvard Hambro, his son, concluded later that the parliamentary culture we have brought with us from our own Storting, our respect for constitutional forms and dignity, which we have also tried to introduce in the League of Nations, have only been of benefit to our reputation and helped the League to advance on a better track.186 However, in addition to the initial occupation with personalities rather than elected representatives, there is also another modification to the principle of non-partisan representation in Norway. The Labour Party voted regularly against the appropriation of membership fees and annually renewed its request over a period of fifteen years that Norway resign from the League of Nations. For obvious reasons this party could not participate in the delegation. When Labour finally came into government in 1935 the Soviet –––––––––––––– 182 Stortingsforhandlinger (1920) 7b: 3626. 183 Stortingsforhandlinger (1920) 7b: 3632. 184 Report by the delegates to the fourth Assembly of the League, St. med. nr. 8, in: Stortingsforhandlinger (1924) no. 2b. 185 Hambro 1931: 12, 60 (quotes); his intervention: League of Nations, Official Journal, Records of the Ordinary Session of the Assembly 8 (1927): 57–58. 186 E. Hambro 1938: 80–81.
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Union had already joined the League of Nations. More important, the Labour Party had adopted a pragmatic attitude by this time.187 Denmark, the model country of parliamentary representation in delegations to international conferences, is also the pioneer of civil society representation. In 1920, it was the only country that accredited a delegate that was solely identified as a representative of civil society organisations, the President of the Danish National Council of Women and Vice-President of the International Council of Women Henni Forchhammer. The only other identification concerned the President of the Union of International Associations, the Nobel Peace Prize laureate Henri La Fontaine. However, in the list of the Belgian delegation he was first described as Senator.188 Forchhammer was reappointed at the first eighteen sessions of the Assembly. When she was replaced in 1938, Bodil Begtrup was listed as Vice-President of the Danish National Council of Women. By this time, the Secretary General of the French trade union federation as well as an Honorary President of a French veterans’ association and a member of the International Red Cross Committee from Switzerland were other representatives identified with civil society. Moreover, Johanne Reutz of Norway was listed as Head of the Statistical Department of the Confederation of Trade Unions. However, she entered the Norwegian delegation upon the suggestion of a group within the international women’s movement and occupied the women’s seat on the delegation.189 Evidently, students of the League of Nations applying a broad concept of civil society affiliation that goes beyond formal identification in delegation lists and includes parliamentarians will get another picture. For example, a contemporary scholar concluded, “A good many delegates belong to private organisations, such as the Labour and Socialist International, the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the Federation of League of Nations Societies”.190
–––––––––––––– 187 Cf. Omang 1964: 101–102; Colban 1961: 159; Jones 1969[1939]: 91–101 83, 260. 188 The Records of the First Assembly: Plenary Meetings. Geneva: League of Nations, 1920. 5, 8. At this time Danske Kvinders Nationalraad was translated as National Council of Danish Women, but already in the interwar years Danish National Council of Women became the common translation, which is used here for the sake of consistency. 189 League of Nations, Official Journal, Records of the Ordinary Session of the Assembly 19 (1938): 15, 17, 21, 25; cf. Reutz Gjermoe, Johanne. For likeverd og fred. Oslo: 1983. 46–47. 190 Charles Howard-Ellis. The Origin, Structure & Working of the League of Nations. London: Allen & Unwin, 1928.
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Open bloc politics and its enemies Ahead of the first session of the Assembly of the League of Nations, Denmark, Norway and Sweden continued their collaboration established during the war. Their three commissions dealing with the postwar world order agreed on a coordinated effort to propose amendments to the Covenant in order to make it better conform with their own ideals.191 The countries also maintained the tradition of foreign minister conventions established during the war. According to the minutes of the meeting held in Copenhagen from 28 to 30 August 1920, the ministers agreed to let the three countries’ commissions jointly discuss the Assembly agenda and considered it desirable to give the Scandinavian delegates to Geneva “instructions on collaboration for common interests, thereunder also the issue of election to the Council of a representative for one of the three countries”. A Swiss suggestion for cooperation between the Scandinavian countries, Holland and Switzerland was met with a lukewarm response. In this larger context, the ministers agreed “to let the cooperation evolve as matters require”. Summarising the discussions, the communiqué passed at the summit announced that there was agreement, without establishing a firm subgroup among League members, to continue the previous collaboration between the three Nordic countries and, in appropriate cases, to try to achieve collaboration with other countries in order to secure to all these countries proper influence within the League and enhance its further development in accordance with the important tasks and ideas of the League.192 In other words, by the time the League of Nations started its work, the experience of a loose community of interests with other neutrals and a well- established tradition of Scandinavian cooperation had shaped a clear hierarchy of partners. The three Scandinavian countries approached the League of Nations in a mutually coordinated manner because they had been left alone by the other neutrals during the war, together they continued to aim for a comprehensive small state collaboration. Moreover, as it had already become manifest at the March 1919 meeting of allies with the neutrals, there was a clear notion of the benefit of pooling small states’ resources in order to express a stronger voice in the international concert. In addition, the Scandinavian countries assumed the roles of spokespersons and defenders of what they conceived as the League’s very essence. –––––––––––––– 191 Cf. Larsen 1976: 234–61; see also the resulting document: “Draft Amendments to the Covenant of the League Proposed by the Danish, Norwegian and Swedish Governments Respectively.” League of Nations, Official Journal 1 (1920): 353–365. 192 NAO, FM, P1-L, 07/20.
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However, Scandinavian collaboration in Geneva was also a contested issue and gave rise to petty jealousy and friction. Despite the intention stipulated at the meeting of foreign ministers, the Norwegian and Swedish representatives came into conflict over who should be represented in the Council.193 Possibly as a result of this failure to reach agreement, none of the Scandinavian countries entered the Council in the first round of appointments. At a session of the Norwegian Storting, a discussion about Nordic bloc politics at the League of Nations evolved the day following the first meeting of the Assembly in Geneva. Foreign Minister Christian F. Michelet succeeded in pouring oil on troubled waters by proclaiming that there is hardly any responsible politician in any of the three countries, who now consents to the idea of group building or entente. The idea that Norway directly and instantaneous would represent any other country in the League of Nations than Norway herself is an idea I react against; likewise, I react against any constellation that possibly restricts our freedom of action in any manner. However, in saying this I also want to express the opinion that, by virtue of the inherent gravity of the issues, the Nordic countries, to a large degree, will pursue the same policy outwards. Yet, if the interests or opinions do not coincide it would be quite meaningless to try to artificially uphold or prolongate them, to have any country make any concession. I have not understood Nordic collaboration in the sense that it should attempt to pursue a single foreign policy, but in the sense that one examines and reviews how long concord lasts – and to that point collaboration will last; where it fails, the collaboration fails, too.194 Apart from the fact that the constrained conception of ‘group’ gives a somewhat distorted picture of what is in reality an active pooling of resources and benefiting from a common ‘brand’, this is an overall valid description of the pragmatic and instrumental starting point of Nordic collaboration in international arenas. Not least, it is worth noting that the quote, despite its function to allay suspicions in regard to the abandonment of sovereignty, leaves room for an indirect representation of one Nordic country by another. Nordic collaboration at the League of Nations retained its status as a contentious issue, particularly in Norway. The underlying question was revealed by a parliamentary intervention after conclusion of the first session of the Assembly: “We do not want to blunder into a union-marked Norway again.”195 When the report on this session was discussed in the parliamentary Committee on Constitutional Affairs, a minority including –––––––––––––– 193 Munch 1963: 261, cf. 345. 194 Stortingsforhandlinger (1920) 7b: 3630. 195 Stortingsforhandlinger (1921) 7: 73 (Johan Castberg).
101 CHAPTER 2 the chairman of the committee had dissatisfaction put on the record, listing what it conceived as instructions to the Norwegian delegation not only by its own government, but de facto also by the collective of the three Scandinavian foreign ministers.196 Only in the long run did criticism on Nordic collaboration begin to wane. Eventually, an explicit formula asking the delegation for Nordic cooperation was even introduced in the Norwegian instructions.197 Nonetheless, the described controversies and the gradual lapse of interest led to the abandonment of the newly established tradition of foreign minister meetings. The Copenhagen summit of August 1920 was the last official such congregation until the institution of Scandinavian foreign minister conferences was gradually revived in January 1932. Nor was there a continuance of any other form of pre- Assembly coordination between Denmark, Norway and Sweden.198 While Nordic cooperation slackened in the postwar era in general, in Geneva it was nevertheless preserved on an everyday basis, with repercussions in the home countries. The interaction took the shape of meetings and close personal contacts between the delegations, as well as exchange of views between the different branches of administration.199 A talk by Peter Munch, delivered in Kiel in early 1929, gives one explanation for the fact that Nordic cooperation prospered in the shadow of the Alps: Disregarding Scandinavian dissimilarities, people from other countries were “inclined to view the ‘Scandinavians’ as a generic concept”.200 In consequence, proposals put forth in Geneva by any given one of the three governments were sometimes referred to as “the Scandinavian proposal” or as “the proposal of the three Northern countries”, and these countries were occasionally perceived as an “Entente of the Northern States”.201 As concluded by S. Shepard Jones, author of the reference work on Scandinavia in the League of Nations, “It was only when Denmark, Norway and Sweden were brought into contact with the outer world, that they realised the true extent of their common heritage and their common outlook towards international organization.” Continuing this thought, he also presented a second reason for the collaboration that made the –––––––––––––– 196 Stortingsforhandlinger (1921) 6a II: Innst. S. LXIV. 197 E. Hambro 1938: 45. 198 Peter Munch. Erindringer, vol. 5: 1924–1933: Afrustningsforhandlinger og Verdenskrise. Copenhagen: Busck, 1964. 164; on the foreign minister meetings cf. Tingsten 1949[1944]: 138, 223. 199 Cf. Finn T.B. Friis. De nordiske Lande og Folkeforbundet. Graasten: Folkung, 1944. 42; Munch 1963: 242. 200 Peter Munch. Die V lkerbundpolitik der drei nordischen Staaten. Berlin: Stilke, 1929. 15. 201 Jones 1969[1939]: 5; last quote: Zimmern, 1939[1936]: 506.
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Scandinavian countries most effective among the secondary powers: “At Geneva they naturally combined to make their influence of greater weight.”202 There are also examples of incidental failures to coordinate politics, which produced unfavourable results for all of them.203 Thus, the general observation of Norden as a set of actors with close cultural and historical affinity yet characterised by weak efforts to unite, also applies to the interwar period. Perceptions from the outside and the instrumental value of Scandinavian collaboration with others were decisive in establishing Geneva, of all places, as the capital of the Nordic Commonwealth at the time.
Bringing Finland and Iceland in What was the status of Finland and Iceland in the Scandinavian collaboration at the League of Nations? Iceland attained internal self-rule in 1918 but continued to be tied to the Danish monarchy in the interwar years and to be represented by the metropolitan country in foreign affairs. Nevertheless, in the summer of 1919 the Icelandic government directed a request to the League of Nations Secretary General, Sir James Eric Drummond, pointing to the country’s sovereignty and self-declared perpetual neutrality. The letter also included query as to whether there was “anything to hinder” League membership and requesting information on “what shall be done by the Government of Iceland to arrange the accession to the League”.204 At the first session of the Assembly, a representative with Icelandic background was for some time attached to the Danish delegation. This delegate had the task of being prepared with information that could have been considered relevant in view of Iceland’s possible adhesion to the League.205 Iceland continued aspirations of becoming a member of the League, regardless of the fact that her foreign policy was primarily handled by Denmark.206 In particular, the issue was raised in connection with the celebration of the millennium anniversary of the Icelandic parliament (Al ingi) in 1930. Yet, despite several Icelandic leaders visiting Geneva on trips aimed for study and tentative negotiation, and despite the conviction –––––––––––––– 202 Jones 1969[1939]: 274. 203 See Jones 1969[1939]: 182 204 “Request from Iceland.” League of Nations, Official Journal 1 (1920): 265. 205 “Beretning angaaende den danske Delegations Virksomhed under Folkeforbundets 1. Delegeretforsamling i Genève den 15. November til 18. December 1920.” Rigsdagstidende, Tillæg A, II (1920/1921): col. 5421–5480; the delegate in point was Professor Magnus Jonsson. 206 Cf. Thorsteinsson 1992 I: 86–99.
103 CHAPTER 2 by some that League membership would be the best guarantee of Icelandic independence, no final steps were taken.207 According to Peter Munch, such plans were looked upon favourably in Denmark because “this would strengthen the Icelanders’ belief that the existing order gives them sufficient sovereignty, and it would result in one more Nordic country in the League”.208 Doubts raised by others regarding Iceland’s actual status were pushed aside by referring to the Act of Union with Denmark and by stating that her position was equivalent to that of the British dominions, which were members of the League. However, the Icelanders never applied for membership due to financial reasons and isolationist strains. Finland gained true sovereignty in the aftermath of the First World War. Although too late to acquire a position among the original members of the League of Nations, the newly established Finnish government soon had to make up its mind whether or not to join the organisation according to the regular procedure of admission. The Finns viewed the League with some suspicion due to the character of an alliance of victorious powers over Germany, a country that had assisted her in achieving independence from Russia. However, the newly created state’s membership in the League of Nations was perceived as a matter of prestige and as an additional guarantee safeguarding its independence and territorial integrity. This was the decisive factor in applying for membership on 30 June 1920.209 At that time, Finland had a dispute with Sweden regarding the sovereignty over the Åland islands. The conflict originated with a petition signed by a large portion of the islands’ population who took Woodrow Wilson’s principle of self-determination literally and expressed the wish to unite with Sweden. On British initiative, the Åland question was brought before the League in 1920, and although Finland was formally not to suffer disadvantages in the settlement with Sweden (a member state), this imbalance greatly hastened the Finnish decision to apply for membership.210 On 16 December 1920, the Assembly of the League of Nations voted unanimously to admit Finland to the world organisation. The main reason for this was her relevance in the anti-bolshevist cordon sanitaire. –––––––––––––– 207 Benedikt Gr ndal. Iceland: From Neutrality to NATO Membership. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1971. 24. 208 Munch 1963: 239, 241, 264; Munch 1964: 167 (quote), 168. 209 Carl Enckell. “Finlands inträde in Nationernas F rbund.” Finland och Nationernas F rbund: Ett tioårsminne. Helsinki: Finlands f rening f r Nationernas F rbund, 1931. 15– 23, at 17–20; cf. “Request for Admission of the Republic of Finland.” League of Nations, Official Journal 1 (1920): 270–271. 210 Bengt Broms. “Finland and the League of Nations.” Finnish Foreign Policy. Helsinki: Finnish Political Science Association, 1963. 84–98, at 85–6; Henrik Meinander. Finlands historia, vol. 4. Helsinki: Schildt, 1999. 73.
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Finland was successful in averting restrictive conditions with regard to the pending Åland question and the request for minority legislation, which had been suggested in the committee investigating the application.211 The dispute was finally resolved in June 1921 by the decision of the Council to recognise the sovereignty of the Åland islands to belong to Finland.212 Although disappointment prevailed in Sweden, the decision was met with level-headedness. The peaceful solution of this conflict between the two Nordic countries implied a good start for the League’s work, and has been described as the organisation’s “greatest triumph in voluntary settlement of conflict”.213 Despite the diplomatic success in the Åland question, the Finnish attitude towards the League of Nations remained restrained and less confident than in the Scandinavian countries.214 In 1923, the Permanent Court of International Justice declined to interpret, by way of an advisory opinion, Article 10 and 11 of the Finnish–Soviet Peace Treaty of Dorpat. In this treaty, an autonomous Soviet territory in Finnish speaking Eastern Carelia had been presupposed. Although the Court had reasons not to take up this question, that is, the lack of comprehensive material on the case due to the Soviet Union’s refusal to cooperate, this dismissal conspicuously muted expectations in the security system offered by the League even in Finnish circles which were otherwise sympathetic with it.215 From the beginning, Finland aspired to the same method of parliamentary delegation as practised by the other Scandinavian countries. When the bill for government authorisation of application for League membership was discussed in the parliamentary Committee for Foreign –––––––––––––– 211 Broms 1963: 87–89; Meinander 1999: 74–75. 212 “Status of the Aaland Islands: (a) Resolution of the Council of the League of Nations.” The United Nations System and Its Predecessors, vol. 2: 19th Century and League of Nations. Franz Knipping (ed.). Bern/Munich: Stämpfli/Beck, 1995. 1240–1242; on the admittance see: League of Nations, Records of the Assembly, Plenary Meetings 1 (1920): 585; cf. Torbj rn Norman. “Slutakt med efterspel: Ålandsuppg relsen, Sverige och Nationernas f rbund.” Väster om skiftet: Uppsatser ur Ålands historia. Sune Jungar and Nils Erik Villstrand (eds). Åbo: Historiska institutionen, 1986. 177–213. 213 Iver B. Neumann. “Tre innfallsvinkler til Norden: Kulturfellesskap, oppdemming for stormaktspolitikk, regionsbygging.” Hva skjedde med Norden? Fra selvbevissthet til rådvillhet. Iver B. Neumann (ed.). Oslo: Cappelen, 1992. 11–30, at 13. 214 Cf. Herman Gummerus. Nationernas F rbund i teorien och praktiken: F redrag vid f reningens Pro Iure Nationum årsm te den 19 februari 1927. Helsinki: F rening f r Nationernas f rbund, 1927. 9. 215 Juhani Paasivirta. “På spaning efter en självständig kurs.” Ilkka Hakelehto (ed.). Finlands utrikespolitik 1809–1966. Stockholm: Prisma, 1968. 71–80, at 79; Kurt Herndl. “Eastern Carelia (Request for Advisory Opinion).” Encyclopedia of Public International Law, vol. 2: Decisions of International Courts and Tribunals and International Arbitrations. Rudolf Dolzer et al. (eds). Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1981. 79–81.
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Affairs, a substantial minority suggested enabling parliament to participate in the selection of Finnish delegates. However, the majority of the committee settled for the ambiguous stipulation that the government take into consideration the confidence selectees enjoyed in parliament.216 The government reserved the right to instruct the delegation on how to vote but allowed for the possibility that “representatives of one and the same country present and defend different views”.217 In practice, most of the Finnish delegations to the League in the 1920s did include a parliamentarian in their ranks. It was only after the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee had become a delegate – thereby attracting criticism for confusing the separation of powers principle by making himself an agent of the executive – that the practice of parliamentary delegates was abandoned.218 While this discussion might have had impact on parliamentarians’ willingness to engage themselves in government delegations, the Finnish democracy crisis of the early 1930s was presumably a more decisive factor. The tradition of parliamentary representation on delegations was revived in 1935, coinciding with the development of closer Finnish collaboration with the three Scandinavian countries. Although the security policy in all four countries rested on the premise of neutrality, a fundamental difference existed between Finland and the other Scandinavian states. Finland had affinity to the League’s sanctionist camp, a trait shared with most of the geopolitically endangered states. While the sanctionists advocated collective security, the non- sanctionists favoured international law. Also tied to this difference was the inclination of the Scandinavian countries to maintain their closest relations among the great powers with Great Britain, while Finland’s policy was oriented toward France.219 Thus, to begin with, the political coordinates of the four countries were adverse. In the early 1920s, Finland pursued a so-called border states policy: a foreign policy that attempted to organise collective action by the newly independent countries formerly reigned by the Czar in their attempt to prevent Russian or world revolution from overflowing over their borders. Thus, as noted in the diary of Peter Munch, Finland features as one of the –––––––––––––– 216 Riksdagen, Handlingar (1920) Prop. 17, Utskottets f r utrikesärenden betänkande N:o 2: 1–2. 217 Riksdagen, Handlingar (1920) Prop. 17: 2. 218 “Är det lämpligt?” Svenska Pressen (24 August 1929); “Retoriken i Geneve gick främst ut på bugningar åt alla håll.” Hufvudstadsbladet (17 September 1929). 219 Jones 1969[1939]: 238; Leena Kaukiainen. “From Reluctancy to Activity: Finland’s Way to the Nordic Family during 1920’s and 1930’s.” Scandinavian Journal of History 9 (1984) 3: 201–219, at 205.
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“four Baltic states” in the company of Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia.220 Nevertheless, Munch’s retrospect declaration, which claimed the Danish delegation to Geneva not only maintained personal contacts with Norwegian and Swedish colleagues from the beginning, but also with peers from Finland, if initially on a smaller scale, reflects more than either an ex post construction or a truism.221 Munch’s own written recollection of the time he became foreign minister in 1929 made mention of his doubts regarding the feasibility of involving Finland in Nordic cooperation, and leaves the impression that Finland was, at least, considered a country deserving of special attention, as well as a potential member of the Nordic group.222 There are indications that could point to special League of Nations relations between the three Scandinavian monarchies and Finland as early as the 1920s. For example, there was interest in the Scandinavian proposals to amend the Covenant in the Finnish foreign ministry, and material on the matter was requested from the Swedish legation in Helsinki.223 A Norwegian report on voting behaviour in Geneva, listed Finland as the only other country in addition to the three Scandinavian states.224 When a Scandinavian initiative was taken in 1930 to establish a Nordic study centre (folkeh jskole) in Geneva, Finland took part in this common enterprise from the outset.225 Finland, in one way or the other, occupied a privileged place in the Scandinavian conscience, both in view of her cultural affinities to the Scandinavian countries and her widely shared history with Sweden. There is also a tradition of at least some low-key practical involvement of the Finns in common Nordic endeavours. Starting in 1924 Finnish parliamentarians participated in the Nordic inter-parliamentary group, in which they discussed League of Nations matters, among other things, with their Scandinavian colleagues.226 After Finland had been elected to the League Council in 1927, Foreign Minister Väin Voionmaa was asked
–––––––––––––– 220 Munch 1963: 262. 221 Munch 1963: 243. 222 Munch 1964: 165. Finnish participation was in particular a Swedish request and has been described as “a price” Munch had to pay to revive Nordic cooperation (Bj l 1983: 273). 223 Letter Georg A. Gripenberg to Wilhelm Tersmeden of 2 October 1920, NAS, FM, FS 1920, HP 24, vol. 1173. 224 Letter of Christian F. Michelet to Foreign Minister Arnold Ræstad of 15 September 1921, NAO, FM, P1-L, V.1a/18. 225 Allan Degerman. Nordiska folkh gskolan i Genève 1931–1956. Stockholm: Genéveskolan, 1957. 226 “Interparlamentariska f rbundets råds m te i Kristiania den 18 maj.” Hufvudstadsbladet (23 May 1924); “Interparlamentarikerna ha dryftat emigrationen: Delegeradem tet är slut.” Hufvudstadsbladet (13 August 1925); cf. Janfelt 2005: 187.
107 CHAPTER 2 whether he would pursue a Scandinavian or a Baltic course in this organ. His answer aimed to cast Finland in the role of mediator and unitor of these two groups of countries, but in the end he chose sides: “With respect to her nature, her culture and her history, Finland is a Scandinavian country; our concept of international life and the League of Nations corresponds nearly to the Scandinavian one.”227 In the perception of others, Finland was also sometimes seen as part of a greater Scandinavia. For instance, a comment by League Secretary Drummond in 1929 demonstrated that he viewed Finland as part of the Nordic rotation with regard to membership in the Council.228 In practice, there was always one Nordic country represented in the Council from 1923 onward, when including Finland in this category. The hope expressed in Great Britain was that Finland would gravitate into “the orbit of the civilized, unbellicose and let us hope permanently neutral Scandinavian bloc”.229 Eventually, by the beginning of the 1930s, Finland adopted a foreign policy similar to that of the Scandinavian countries. By participating in a Nordic dinner in connection with the dissolution of the League of Nations in April 1946, Finnish representatives symbolically left this organisation as a member of the Nordic group.230
Small states – Large frameworks The formal enlargement of the Nordic group partly overlapped with coalition building in a wider framework. The Scandinavian countries pursued a policy often referred to as the ‘small state point of view’. This implied the notion of a broad mandate to speak on behalf of many. However, in practice, the expression ‘small states’ usually referred to the neutral powers of Scandinavia, Switzerland and the Netherlands – not to nations on the Balkan or in Latin American – just as the adverse talk of ‘great powers’ referred to France, Italy and Germany. In contrast to the latter, Great Britain’s policy aims were regarded as compatible with the Scandinavian ones to the point that she was seen “as a more powerful Sweden”.231
–––––––––––––– 227 “Finland i Folkf rbundets generalf rsamling och råd: Utrikesminister Voionmaa uttalar sig entusiastiskt om Finlands framgångar.” Hufvudstadsbladet (28 September 1927). 228 Munch 1964: 167. 229 Minutes by Foreign Office official Esmond Ovey of 26 January 1922, quoted according to Salmon 1998: 198. 230 Sven Grafstr m. Anteckningar 1945–1954. Stockholm: Kungl. Samfundet f r utgivande av handskrifter r rande Skandinaviens historia, 1989. 748. 231 Tingsten 1949[1944]: 186.
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Nevertheless, the “small-State complex” and belief in common interests of small states, which would correspond to the interests of the world at large, have been identified as the driving force behind most Scandinavian initiatives at the League of Nations.232 Reservations in this regard are aptly illustrated by a warning featured in a book by the Danish foreign ministry’s adviser in international law, Georg Cohn: “Of all forms of participation in the efforts to prevent war, that one is the worst which turns over the League and its institutions to the Great Powers, to serve their own policies.”233 Contemporaries characterised Scandinavian repre- sentatives as occupying “the Opposition front bench of the League”.234 The Scandinavian self-conception was acting as the “conscience of the Great Powers” or as a “nanny to the great in Geneva”.235 The role they conceived for small states and identified with has been described as that “of the little boy in Hans Andersen’s fairy tale who alone dared to whisper that the Emperor had nothing on”.236 Moreover, because of their legalistic approach, Scandinavian countries were called “the serious nations”, sometimes with a touch of derision, but also with respect for their seriousness.237 Due to their skillful politics, widely recognised in the literature on the League of Nations, the Scandinavian countries assumed a prominent role, exerting leadership not just as spokespersons for the small states but to some degree as vanguard of the League as a whole. The Nordic tradition of acting as “norm entrepreneurs” in international relations has roots in this approach adopted during the interwar years.238 It was Carl J. Hambro who assumed the role of a “spokesman of a ‘small-State bloc’” most aggressively. Hambro, the president of the
–––––––––––––– 232 Jones 1969[1939]: 109. 233 Georg Cohn. Neo-Neutrality. New York: Columbia University Press, 1939[1937]. 171; cf. Bj l 1983: 89; Bo Lidegaard. “‘Vi opnaaede da, at K benhavn ikke blev bombarderet …’ Tilpasningspolitik, samarbejdspolitik og ikke-blokpolitik.” Fra mellemkrigstid til efterkrigstid: Festskrift til Hans Kirchhoff og Henrik S. Nissen på 65-årsdagen oktober 1998. Henrik Dethlefsen and Henrik Lundbak (eds). Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum, 1998. 673–691, at 677. 234 Sir Alfred Zimmern describing Carl J. Hambro, in: Carl Joachim Hambro. “The R le of the Smaller Powers in International Affairs To-day.” International Affairs 15 (1936) 2: 167– 182, at 179. 235 “Conscience”: Norwegian Prime Minister Ivar Lykke in Stortingsforhandlinger (1927) 7b: 1518; cf. Jones 1969[1939]: 178, 274; “nanny”: E. Hambro, 1938: 37, 81. 236 C. J. Hambro 1936: 177; cf. E. Hambro 1938: 37. 237 Kerstin Hesselgren, Speech “Sverige och Nationernas F rbund”, Gothenburg, September 1936, ULG, WHC, KHC, IIIc:5. The expression “the serious nations” is written in English language in the original. 238 Cf. Christine Ingebritsen. “Norm Entrepreneurs: Scandinavia’s Role in World Politics.” Cooperation and Conflict 37 (2002): 11–23.
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Norwegian Storting, had marked success in altering League procedures in favour of the Assembly, which was dominated by small states.239 Western European small states gathered in the so-called Oslo Group, a name for signatories of the convention concluded on the initiative of the Norwegian prime minister in December 1930. The three Scandinavian countries and the Benelux states were the original members, agreeing to not raise tariffs without prior consultation.240 Finland joined in November 1933 and subsequently participated in the trade negotiations that had already evolved between the Nordic countries and led to the resumption of periodic foreign minister meetings by 1932. At the initiative of Swedish Foreign Minister Rickard Sandler, Finland was included in the second such meeting in September 1934. Oslo was also the site of another alignment initiative, one directly connected to the League of Nations. In the Abyssinian crisis in 1935 and 1936 the Nordic states, including Finland, had acted in close cooperation with each other and realised that the League “began to look like a trap for the innocent bystander rather than a refuge for the weak”.241 This understanding led the neutral countries to seek non-applicability of the League’s sanctions system. Thus, in the Oslo declaration of 1 July 1936, the foreign ministers of the four Nordic countries, as well as Holland, Spain and Switzerland, declared that “so long as the Covenant in its entirety is only applied in an incomplete and inconsequent manner” they would reserve the right to not apply Article 16 with its sanctions apparatus.242 Ironically, it was at this point of general deterioration of the international climate that Nordic collaboration in Geneva reached its most developed stage, in both qualitative and quantitative terms. An excerpt from a talk by the Swedish delegate Kerstin Hesselgren gives a good illustration of how the countries increasingly clung together in the shadow of the looming world crisis and how Finland naturally integrated into the Nordic group: Now we even all live in the same hotel and the cooperation between us has become a recognised fact down there – a fact, which obliges to much more consideration than if we only were a small minor power and, as known, even
–––––––––––––– 239 Jones 1969[1939]: 137. 240 See: Ger van Roon. Small States in Years of Depression: The Oslo Alliance 1930–1940. Assen/Maastricht: Van Gorcum, 1989. 241 Max Jakobson. Finland Survived: An Account of the Finnish-Soviet Winter War 1939– 1940. 2nd enl. ed. Helsinki: Otava, 1984[1961]. 31. 242 Tingsten 1949[1944]: 192.
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Holland, Switzerland and Spain have joined our group – the seven powers, and in some constellations Czechoslovakia and Belgium as well.243 In Geneva, the collective of these states, in a calculation that overlooked Finland, was also known as the “Straight Eight”.244 The fact that this group was an attractive partner is shown, for example, by the words of Alfred Zimmern, professor of International Relations at Oxford. In a discussion with Carl J. Hambro in December 1935, Zimmern wondered whether the members of the Straight Eight had “reached the point where they were prepared to take larger responsibilities? Not necessarily alone, but possibly with some Great Power that would act with them?” In his reply, Hambro pointed to the fact that there had been consultations between Great Britain and small powers in regard to dealing with the Italian aggression against Abyssinia, but that trust would be lost “if a settlement were now made behind the backs of all those States that had been willing to take certain risks”. He was convinced that “it was the smaller and not the great States which would have to pay”.245 The promotion of ‘Nordic neutrality’ and the talk of a ‘Nordic bloc’ or a ‘Nordic peace bloc’, the attempt to revise the demilitarised status of the Åland islands, Swedish rearmament and Danish acceptance of Hitler’s offer to a pact of non-aggression can also be seen in this context.246 In spite of tendencies in the Nordic countries to pursue their cooperation not just as a supplement to but as a compensation for the failed wider cooperation in the League, the former and later Swedish Foreign Minister Östen Undén drew the following conclusion at a meeting of a Committee in Geneva that was to study the application of the principles of the Covenant: “The League is not weakened by the recognition of the actual fact of its weakness. It is weakened rather by affording the peoples of the world repeated opportunities for remarking the difference between theory and practice”.247 The League’s malfunction was a failure of its member states to meet the challenge of installing a sustainable international order and particularly of –––––––––––––– 243 Speech “Sverige och Nationernas F rbund”, Gothenburg, September 1936, ULG, WHC, KHC, IIIc:5. 244 Jones 1939[1969]: 249. 245 Hambro 1936: 179, 182. 246 On Sweden: Tingsten 1949[1944]: 187, 192 (quotes), 188, 193, 233, 235 (here the term “Scandinavian (peace) bloc” is used, but in the Swedish original Tingsten uses the expression “nordiskt (freds)block”, see: Herbert Tingsten. Svensk utrikesdebatt mellan världskrigen. Stockholm: Kooperativa f rbundet, 1944. 327, 329). 247 Quoted from Jones 1969[1939]: 263; regarding Nordic cooperation as compensation: Jakobson 1984[1961]: 33; Tingsten 1949[1944]: 233; Kaukiainen 1984: 216; Kullervo Killinen. “Den nordiska neutralitetslinjen.” Finlands utrikespolitik 1809–1966. Ilkka Hakelehto (ed.). Stockholm: Prisma, 1968. 81–96, at 87.
111 CHAPTER 2 the Great Powers of that time, whether they were members or not.248 However, although “the League’s span of life was short and troubled, its success transitory, and its end inglorious”, it can nonetheless be established that “the ideals which it sought to promote, the hopes to which it gave rise, the methods it devised, the agencies it created, have become an essential part of the political thinking of the civilised world”.249 Even a sceptic with regard to public diplomacy such as Harold Nicolson was already in 1939 convinced that “the League idea is certain, unless force triumphs in Europe, to emerge again”.250 The last major political act of the League of Nations was the expulsion of the Soviet Union after her attack on Finland on 30 November 1939, leading to the so-called Winter War. Finland had appealed to the League with the hope to re-establish contact with the Soviet government. However, the appeal developed its own dynamic, with distant countries as a driving force and the neighbours of the Soviet Union keeping a low profile. Pointing to their known aversion for sanctions, the Nordic countries did not positively vote in the Assembly for further consideration in the Council of a situation in which the Soviet Union had “by its own action placed itself outside the Covenant”. Finland herself did not vote for the resolution of the Council that renounced League membership to the Soviet Union on the grounds of not becoming a judge in its own case.251 At this time, the Second World War had begun. After the break of Hitler with Stalin in June 1941, the Soviet Union became an inevitable member of the allied coalition, which by January 1942 was named United Nations. From a ‘politically correct’ 1940s perspective, the standard historiographical work on the League of Nations confuses attack with action and maintains “The Russian action was not an imperialist move: it was inspired by fear, not by greed.”252
–––––––––––––– 248 Cf. Clive Archer. International Organizations. 2nd ed. London: Routledge, 1995[1992]. 23; Pfeil 1976. 249 Walters 1952: 1, 3. 250 Nicolson 1939: 173. 251 Jakobson 1984: 177–180; Walters 1952: 804–809; Viggo Sj qvist. Danmarks udenrigspolitik 1933–1940. Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1966. 341; “Sovjet-Finnish War 1939– 1940: (a) Resolution of the Assembly of the League of Nations, 14 December 1939, (b) Resolution of the Council of the League of Nations, 14 December 1939.” The United Nations System and Its Predecessors, vol. 2: 19th Century and League of Nations. Franz Knipping (ed.). Bern/Munich: Stämpfli/Beck, 1995. 1370–1374 (quote 1372). 252 Walters 1952: 806.
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Outlook Wheeling and dealing by the great powers became the line of action in the Abyssinian crisis and continued to be the prevalent form of international relations in the subsequent years. Of the Straight Eight, Czechoslovakia was the one to be sacrificed, and while the Soviet Union was expelled from the League of Nations for her attack on Finland, material support for the victim was lacking. Small states’ insistence on certain points of views did not always gain acceptance from the great powers in the League of Nations system. Moreover, while hindsight makes it difficult not to view the Scandinavian opposition of the sanctions system as a realistic assessment of the possibilities of the time, this very opposition also contributed to the weakening of the League’s authority. According to one observation, the Scandinavian states acted on two planes in the interwar years, “one in heaven and the other on earth”.253 The use of the concept of Norden or Scandinavia was an instrument of identity creation “for it made it possible to argue as though the Scandinavian States already formed a united group, even though the subject of the argument was how far they formed or ought to form such a group”.254 The wider setting of small state collaboration or non- collaboration as well as Finland’s rapprochement to the Scandinavian countries underline the dependency of group formation in international organisations on the definition of the national interests of the countries involved. It would be naïve to believe that interests are objectively predefined and waiting to be detected by the rational minds prevailing in the enlightened world. Both Denmark and Finland faced the problem of being a small country bordering a powerful neighbour, yet not only did they approach their neighbour in a contradictory manner, they also both had made the wrong policy choice according to their respective official post- Second World War narrative! Thus, although common sense and plausibility are relevant for the actors involved, the process of defining interests is crucial, and outcomes must not be taken for granted. Rather, as it becomes evident from Nordic collaboration at the League of Nations, both tradition and historical contingency as well as cultural and geographical closeness play a role. Moreover, while overall affinity and established collaboration do not lead to anything near path-dependency, self-sustaining processes are
–––––––––––––– 253 Quote: Erik Seidenfaden. “Scandinavia Charts a Course.” Foreign Affairs 26 (1947/1948): 653–664, at 654. 254 Tingsten 1949[1944]: 241. While the term ‘Scandinavia’ is used in the English version of this book, the original Swedish text uses the term ‘Norden’.
113 CHAPTER 2 likely to set in. Others’ perceptions that they deal with a group rather than with a set of single countries wield considerable political currency as long as interests can be harmonised. The assertion made by Lord Robert Cecil in a conversation with Danish delegates to the Paris Peace Conference, which stated the three Scandinavian countries would resemble a great power if they would associate with one another, is an obvious overstatement.255 Nonetheless, it does contain a grain of truth, in particular in the context of multilateral conference diplomacy. To take the example of the League of Nations, group formation produced added value in regard to voting and bargaining power in the Assembly and led to the persistent collective occupation of one of the Council seats.
UNISEX STATE ACTORS AND THE REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN
Women can be plagued in manifold ways. Inga-Lill and Inga-May do not have an easy time. We are difficult Towards our staff … Miles of telexes have to be written so that the fingers bleed, To the political and to the press division, to the legal and to the development division, and to Ms. S der.256 This description of vertical gender relations is part of a Christmas poem penned by Anders Thunborg, a permanent representative to the United Nations who went on to become Sweden’s Minister of Defense. The poem was written for the political division of the foreign ministry in 1977. As part of an annual Scandinavian tradition by which experiences in United Nations diplomacy are summarised in a humorous way, Thunborg’s lines give witness of a masculine perception of ‘women’s two roles’ in the context of the universal world organisation. Whether as part of the international staff of the Secretariat or as members of national representations, in a gendered environment women typically function as secretaries and providers of services in subordinate positions. For example, according to an observation by the Finnish UN delegate Jutta Zilliacus, the distribution of messages at the General
–––––––––––––– 255 Munch 1963: 68–9. 256 “Hoestfoerklaring.” Cable from Anders Thunborg, to the political division of the Swedish foreign ministry, 20 December 1977, FMAS, HP 48, DD, vol. 20. The Swedish original reads as follows: “Kvinnor kan plaagas paa maangfaldigt saett. / Inga-Lill och Inga-May har det ingalunda laett. / Vi aer svaara / Mot de vaara … / Miltals med telex ska skrivas saa fingrarna bloeder, / Till pol och till press, till raetts och till u, och fru S der.”
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Assembly has been performed by “stylish girls […] on sky-high heels with swinging skirts and bouncing breasts under thin silk” – and “grey haired gentlemen follow[ed] the movements of the maids with hungry looks”.257 The term ‘lady’ as used in foreign ministries has commonly been used as a synonym for ‘typist’. In the verse quoted above, despite the use of the word ‘women’ as a generic term and despite the intended ambiguity, it is likewise associated with typists whose position makes them easy targets for the chicanery of their superiors. Moreover, the notion of ‘ladies’ has been equated at the United Nations with “the gushing brigade […] swarm[ing] about the Headquarters building, collecting printed ‘material’ and demanding to be lectured at”, thereby also being “referred to as the ‘NGO’s’”.258 Nonetheless, there are women who do hold another role at the United Nations: the role of colleague or even superior. In the poem this type of woman is represented by Karin S der, the first female foreign minister in Sweden, who held office from 1976 to 1978. No generalisations are at hand with regard to this second role. Women in these powerful positions are simply not perceived as typical representatives of their sex. Due to the challenge it poses to traditional ways of thinking about diplomacy and international relations, the representation of women is a particularly relevant issue. There is a conflict between the principle of unitary state actorship, which is proclaimed by traditional theories, and women’s organisations’ demand for universal implementation of the principle of equality. This aspiration disturbs the harmony of unisex – in practice gendered – states and implies an attempt to diversify statehood with affinity to pluralist and constructivist theoretical approaches. A particular focus on the practises of the Nordic countries is rewarding in view of the good international reputation they enjoy with regard to gender questions. According to the UN ‘Gender Empowerment Measure’, a composite indicator that tracks female representation in legislative bodies, governments and the private sector, along with a range of income indicators, ‘Norden’ would serve as a synonym for ‘best practice’: In 2009 Sweden ranked first, Norway second, Finland third, Denmark fourth, and Iceland eighth in the world.259
–––––––––––––– 257 Jutta Zilliacus. En bit av det stora äpplet. Helsinki: S derstr m, 1978a. 43. 258 Tavares de Sá 1966: 294. 259 Human Development Report 2009: Overcoming Barriers: Human Mobility and Development. New York: UNDP, 2009. 186.
115 CHAPTER 2
The political agenda and prior research The status of women in positions of authority in international organisations has been on the agenda since the establishment of the League of Nations. As early as 1946 the United Nations institutionalised the “Commission on the Status of Women”, and the issue has undergone increasing politicisation since the 1970s. Both the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Charter of the United Nations include articles that aim to guarantee gender equality, and both organisations have been instrumental in putting feminist issues on the international agenda.260 The series of four United Nations conferences on women in the period 1975 to 1995 and the stated goal of “mainstreaming the gender perspective into all policies and programmes in the United Nations system” were crucial in this respect.261 As summarised by Gertrude Mongella, Secretary-General of the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing (in 1995) and current president of the Pan-African Parliament, the United Nations played a “catalytic role” for women and “has been the political forum where much of the discussion has taken place and many of the decisions reached”.262 While advocacy networks have succeeded in getting gender issues on the agenda of international organisations, women are still not well- represented in these organisations. The inclusion of women as a personnel element among the higher ranks of the League of Nations and in the United Nations system, whether in the international Secretariat or in participating national delegations, has largely been out of the ordinary. As the composition of the Secretariat has been considered a matter subject to international policy making, a body of investigative literature has emerged to illuminate the representation of women in the international civil
–––––––––––––– 260 Carol Miller. Lobbying the League: Women’s International Organizations and the League of Nations. Diss. Manuscript. Oxford: St. Hilda’s College, 1992; Deborah Stienstra. Women’s Movements and International Organizations. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994; Margaret E. Galey. “Forerunners in Women’s Quest for Partnership.” Women, Politics, and the United Nations. Anne Winslow (ed.). Westport: Greenwood, 1995a. 1–10; Leila J. Rupp. Worlds of Women: The Making of an International Women’s Movement. Princeton: University Press, 1997; The United Nations and the Advancement of Women 1945–1996. rev. ed. Blue Books Series 6. New York: United Nations, 1996[1995]; Hilkka Pietilä. Engendering the Global Agenda: The Story of Women and the United Nations. Geneva: UN Non-Governmental Liaison Service, 2002; Angela E. V. King, “Jämställdhet och FN.” Freden som äventyr: Dag Hammarskj ld och FN:s framtid. Sten Ask and Anna Mark- Jungkvist (eds). Stockholm: Atlantis, 2005. 234–245. 261 Quote: “Report of the Economic and Social Council for the Year 1997.” General Assembly, Official Records, Suppl. 3. A/52/3/REV.1(SUPP). New York: United Nations, 1997[1999]. 23. 262 United Nations 1996: xxii.
116 CHALLENGES AND TRADITIONS service.263 Most importantly, reports by the Secretary-General on the “Improvement of the Status of Women in the Secretariat”, published annually since 1985, have provided continuous coverage of the position of women. The fact that these reports were renamed in 2001 and published under the broader title “Improvement of the Status of Women in the United Nations System” bears witness of an increasing awareness that putting sole focus on the Secretariat is not sufficient and that an integrated approach is desirable. However, recent reports reveal that the issue of female representation in national delegations remains largely unexplored, as it is left to the discretion of single governments and international organisations are reluctant to get involved in the internal affairs of their principals.264 At the same time, theories and studies of international relations and international history have disregarded gender issues and have, in their traditional shape, been “antithetical” to feminism.265 The analytical frameworks of the still dominant (neo)realist and (neo)liberal approaches hardly offer more than continuous reaffirmation of traditional concepts of power politics and national diplomacy on the one hand, and international law and international organisations on the other. As part of the second approach, regime theory entails some perspectives on putting gender on the international agenda and establishing a normative framework and better practises on a world-wide scale. However, this is bound to remain superficial as long as it is not pinned to and complemented by constructivist approaches allowing for gender as an analytical category and for accounts –––––––––––––– 263 Cf. Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs, vol. 1. New York: United Nations, 1955. 233; Alexander Szalai. The Situation of Women in the United Nations. New York: UNITAR, 1973; Women in the United Nations: A United Nations Publication on the Occasion of the International Women’s Year. New York: United Nations, 1977; Davidson Nicol and Margaret Croke (eds). The United Nations and Decision-Making: The Role of Women, vol. 1: A Report on the Proceedings of a UNITAR Colloquium at Schloss Hernstein, Austria, 13–16 July 1977. New York: UNITAR, 1978; Hilary Charlesworth. “Transforming the United Men’s Club: Feminist Futures for the United Nations.” Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 4 (1994): 421–454; Kristen Timothy. “Equality for Women in the United Nations Secretariat.” Women, Politics, and the United Nations. Anne Winslow (ed.). Westport: Greenwood, 1995. 117–133; Francine D’Amico. “Women Workers in the United Nations.” Gender Politics in Global Governance. Mary K. Meyer and Elisabeth Pr gl (eds). Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999. 19–40. 264 Hilary Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin. The Boundaries of International Law: A Feminist Analysis. Manchester: University Press, 2000. 174; cf. e.g. Improvement of the Status of Women in the United Nations System: Report of the Secretary-General. Document A/59/357. New York: United Nations, 2004. 265 Sandra Whitworth. Feminism and International Relations: Towards a Political Economy of Gender in Interstate and Non-Governmental Institutions. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997[1994]. 2; cf. Kristin Ljungkvist. “Feminism i internationell politik: Bidrag och utmaningar.” Internationella studier (2007) 4: 52–62.
117 CHAPTER 2 of the historical and socio-political process of bottom-up regime formation.266 Constructivism opens the floor for questions about gender identities, values and the production of meaning, about the dynamism of gender systems, transnational discourses and structures of interaction. It also suggests the role of women’s associations and the gendered background of foreign policy actors be taken into account and entails a perspective on gendered agents and structures being objects to mutual processes of constitution. With a constructivist approach, it becomes possible to embed traditional pluralist research questions regarding the representation of women in culturally rooted practises within larger society. In this type of gender system, sexual balance indicators do not reify essentialist notions of sexual difference, rather they help to pin down systematic deviations from an ungendered situation and thereby prevent constructivism from getting lost in discourse. It is not suggested that taking isolated measures to improve numbers is a sufficient means to realise gender equality. Rather, the underlying assumption takes figures regarding representation as easily measurable indicators for the degree of genderedness of particular environments. This assumption is tied to mathematics of random as well as to feminist standpoint theory. In the words of Rita Mae Kelly and Georgia Duerst-Lahti: Social institutions will be improved by a better balance between masculinist and feminist influence. Because we all live gendered lives, and society still needs to contend with existing levels of gender unawareness and gender power imbalance, we believe it is more likely that women will understand and give leadership to women’s political interests better than men will.267 Asked by me whether she was officially or unofficially conceived as a representative of women and whether she felt as such a representative, Finnish UN delegation frequenter Hilkka Pietilä answered: “I did not feel that way, but I acted in many cases particularly as a woman, although I think I was not appointed as a woman.”268 –––––––––––––– 266 Cf. N ket Kardam. “The Emerging Global Gender Equality Regime from Neoliberal and Constructivist Perspectives in International Relations.” International Feminist Journal of Politics 6 (2004) 1: 85–109; for reviews of literature on gender in international relations see: Craig N. Murphy. “Seeing Women, Recognizing Gender, Recasting International Relations.” International Organization 50 (1996) 3: 513–538; J. Ann Tickner. Gendering World Politics: Issues and Approaches in the Post-Cold War Era. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001. 267 Rita Mae Kelly and Georgia Duerst-Lahti. “Toward Gender Awareness and Gender Balance in Leadership and Governance.” Gender Power, Leadership, and Governance. Idem (eds). Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995. 259–271, at 262. 268 Personal communication.
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In the forefront of progress: Women at the League of Nations Article 7 of the Covenant of the League of Nations decreed: “all positions under or in connection with the League, including the Secretariat, shall be open equally to men and women”. This far-reaching statement on equal opportunity was the result of women’s advocacy networks lobbying at the Paris Peace Conference and their success in convincing the Commission on the League of Nations “to call upon women to help in the great task of building a temple of peace”, as one of the participants in a brief hearing granted to the international women’s organisations put it.269 However, equal participation was beyond what could be realised at the time. Despite the landmark regulation of the Covenant, the women’s voice has been described in a frequently quoted phrase as, in practice, having been “no more than a whisper in the assembly of nations”.270 Thus, the League remained a highly gendered environment, and the Covenant’s stipulation by and large a dead letter. No woman was ever appointed to represent any country in the League Council, and women’s representation within the Secretariat and national delegations to the Assembly was humble. The minority of women, who had a chance to participate as secretariat staff and delegates, were regularly ‘ghettoised’ in organs dealing with social questions, that is, in areas with perceived affinity to the female sphere.271 While many of these women actually shared an interest in social questions,272 there were also complaints that women were “predestined for the Fifth [Social] Committee, a sort of rag-bag of miseries and forlorn hopes”,273 for a committee also caricatured as “La Commission Sentimentale”, regardless of individual interests and qualifications in other fields. According to an anecdote, a female delegate turning up in other committees had to be prepared to face a compassionate question like the one Australian delegate Alice Moss was asked at the eighth session of the Assembly: “Have you lost your way Madam?”274 Despite its substantial shortcomings, the League still offered superior opportunities when –––––––––––––– 269 Miller 1928 II: 361–362; cf. Miller 1992: 23–24; Stienstra 1994: 55–58; Rupp 1997: 211–212. 270 Gertrude Bussey and Margaret Tims. Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom 1915–1965: A Record of Fifty Years’ Work. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1965. 73. 271 Rupp 1997: 215; Miller 1992: 112, 131; Carol Miller. “Women in International Relations? The Debate in Interwar Britain.” Gender and International Relations. Rebecca Grant and Kathleen Newland (eds). Buckingham: Open University Press, 1991. 64–82, at 70; cf. Galey 1995a: 4–5. 272 Miller 1992: 107. 273 Helena Maria Swanwick. I Have Been Young. London: Gollancz, 1935. 384. 274 Miller 1991: 67–68.
119 CHAPTER 2 compared to most countries’ exclusion of women from the regular diplomatic service upheld until after the Second World War.275 According to a count by Carol Miller, at the nineteen regular sessions of the League Assembly women were appointed by national governments as ‘delegates’ in 16 instances, as ‘substitute delegates’ in 160 instances, as ‘experts’ in 42 instances, and as ‘secretaries’ and the like in 153 instances. Their representation peaked in 1931, and came close to approaching that level at the last three sessions. In the 1930s, women accounted for five to six per cent of the appointments as delegates or substitute delegates. Miller accredits most female representatives in these categories to the British Empire, but a recount shows that the Norwegian government was equal active in its placement of a woman to these most prestigious positions on nineteen occasions.276 The difference between the two countries’ delegation record is that the Norwegian governments appointed one woman to each session while the British started to do so from the third session, subsequently compensating the later start with two double appointments. The Danish government also included a female representative to all delegations to the nineteen regular sessions of the Assembly, but at four instances she had the lower status of an ‘expert’. The overall Swedish record adds upp to nineteen appointments as well, four of which as ‘expert’, but no Swedish woman participated at the tenth session in 1929. Finland was represented by a woman ‘substitute delegate’ on five occasions. At the first session, Sweden was the only country other than Norway to send a female ‘substitute delegate’, and Denmark the only country with a female ‘expert’. Apart from Finland, but together with Romania and Australia, the mentioned countries constitute the core of states that most frequently appointed women to their delegations. A closer study of the first session cases reveals that the establishment of women’s representation in delegations to the League of –––––––––––––– 275 Miller 1992: 11. 276 Miller 1992: 101–102, 127; the following information on women’s participation on Scandinavian delegations to the Assembly of the League of Nations is solely based on the delegation lists as part of the Records of the Sessions of the Assembly that were published separately the first three years and as special supplements to the Official Journal of the League of Nations thereafter. However, it should be noted that the official delegation lists do not give a complete picture in all cases, as additional expertise on specific issues might have been added to the delegations on an ‘as needed’ basis. For example, feminist Anna Westergaard’s participation in the 16th and 18th Assembly as Danish representative in the negotiations on the status of women as well as Bodil Begtrup’s appointment at the 17th Assembly are not documented in the regular ‘List of Members of the Delegations’ (cf. Hanne Rimmen Nielsen. “I Folkeforbundets tjeneste: Henni Forchhammers rejsebreve fra Genève 1920–37.” Handlingens kvinder. Grethe Ils e et. al. (eds). Frederiksberg: Roskilde Universitetsforlag, 2001. 165–217, at 205–208).
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Nations can clearly be attributed to lobbying by national women’s organisations in Denmark and Norway and, indirectly, to the work of their international counterparts. Carol Miller also observed that women Assembly delegates frequently “appear to have been appointed as a result of pressure from women’s organizations”.277 For example, the background of the appointment of Henni Forchhammer as an ‘expert’ to the first Danish delegation to the Assembly of the League of Nations was the result of the initiative taken by various women’s organisations referring to Article 7 and to the demands of the international women’s movement.278 While decision makers met requests for representation rather diffidently, they decided to accommodate the women’s organisations.279 Although the latter were not satisfied with the status of an ‘expert’ assigned to their representative, Forchhammer was in practice able to act like a regular delegate and was, on 15 December 1920, the first woman to address the Assembly of the League of Nations.280 What made the Danish representative unique in international comparison is the fact that she was (throughout the history of the League of Nations) identified in official delegation lists by her affiliation to a women’s umbrella organisation, the Danish National Council of Women (Danske Kvinders Nationalråd), and, where applicable, by her function in the International Council of Women. The Danish National Council was also the body that suggested the delegates in point.281 This amounted to an official recognition of a women’s mandate for the female representatives on the delegation. In Norway the appointment of a woman delegate was also the outcome of a campaign conducted by a multitude of organisations. It started off with a request made by Fredrikke Qvam, the chairwoman of the National Woman Suffrage Association, to the government. Having drawn attention to Norway’s leading role in Europe with regard to women’s rights and having considered initiatives put forth in several countries (England in particular) to send a woman to Geneva as a principal delegate, she
–––––––––––––– 277 Miller 1992: 101. 278 Cf. Nielsen 2001: 169–171. 279 Munch 1963: 234–236, 241. 280 Nielsen 2001: 172, 177–182. 281 In 1920, it suggested three delegates, among which the foreign ministry chose the President of the Danish National Council of Women Henni Forchhammer. When the successor of this long-term representative was chosen in 1938 a procedure was applied according to which the foreign ministry asked the National Council to suggest three candidates, one of which was chosen by the foreign ministry. In the intervening years a routine of automatic reappointments seems to have been in operation, cf. memorandum by Ernst Meinstorp, 21 December 1945, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1946.
121 CHAPTER 2 announced the “fair demand” that at least one of the three main delegates should be chosen from among women candidates. Qvam also referred to the treatment of a resolution adopted at the Eighth Congress of the International Woman Suffrage Alliance in Geneva, 6–12 June 1920. The Congress had decided that the League be sent a recommendation to the effect “that a conference of women be summoned annually by the League of Nations for the purpose of considering questions relating to the welfare and status of women”. In practice, this would have implied a far-reaching duplication of the League’s Assembly as well as the recognition of a strong influence of national women’s organisations on the selection of government representatives and private international associations as ‘sovereign’ actors in international relations. When a congress deputation on 15 July 1920 presented the recommendation to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, Sir Eric Drummond, he urged the issue be adjourned until the governments’ choice of delegates to the Assembly was known.282 Qvam read this as giving implied encouragement to governments for the appointment of women delegates. In autumn 1920, various women’s organisations sent letters of support for the suffrage association’s request to the Norwegian government. The most authoritative correspondence, signed by the acting chairwoman of the Norwegian National Council of Women, Betzy Kjelsberg, referred to Article 7 of the Covenant and to the principle of equal civil liberties in Norway. It argued that women were just as interested in the issues dealt with by the League as men were and that the restoration of peace not only mattered more to them, but that they also had better preconditions in practical everyday life to incorporate the idea of peace in the peoples concerned. Her conclusion was “that all these things together entitle us respectfully to request the government to appoint a woman among the delegates”. She thereupon submitted the suggestion to designate zoologist and liberal politician Kristine Bonnevie, Norway’s first female professor and a leading member of the Norwegian League of Nations Association, as this delegate.283 The government took this advice, with the reservation that Bonnevie not be appointed as one of the three principal ‘delegates’, but as a ‘substitute delegate’. In practice the different types of delegates were able to take part in the diplomatic work at the League under
–––––––––––––– 282 Request to the Norwegian Government by Fredrikke Qvam, National Woman Suffrage Association, 12 August 1920, NAO, FM 1905–, P1-L, 07/20; with regard to the resolution see: The International Woman Suffrage Alliance. Report of Eighth Congress, Geneva, Switzerland, June 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 1920. Manchester: Percy, 1920. 51. 283 Request to the Norwegian Government by Betzy Kjelsberg, Norwegian National Council of Women, 22 October 1920, NAO, FM 1905–, P1-L, 07/20.
122 CHALLENGES AND TRADITIONS more-or-less the same conditions as it pleased single delegations – the title assigned to a particular delegate was not as relevant in a formal sense as it appeared to be. Paradoxically, differences in assigned status had their main effect at informal and personal gatherings, as “the delegates were invited to more lunches and dinners than the substitutes or technical delegates”.284 In the case of Sweden, the inclusion of international lawyer Anna Bugge-Wicksell in the delegation to the Assembly was a progression from her involvement as an expert in the commission of inquiry, which was established in 1918 to elaborate on a post-World War world order in which Swedish interests would be safeguarded.285 Upon its foundation, Bugge- Wicksell had also become a secretary of the Swedish League of Nations Association, with one of the regular commission members as chairman. No evidence of requests by Swedish women’s organisations for a woman delegate has been found. Given Bugge-Wicksell’s well-established position, lobbying in this matter might not have appeared necessary.286 The composition of fellow Scandinavian delegations was observed in the foreign ministries. However, the inclusion of women seems to have been reported after the decisions to send a female delegate had already been made in the single countries.287 Thus, in a field where Scandinavian singularity seems particularly manifest, the comparatively women-friendly delegation policy from the first Assembly of the League of Nations, the common profile was not developed collaboratively, but separately. It was the result of an individual indigenous phenomenon or self-affirmation of the progressiveness of one’s own nation on the one hand, or of reference to the larger international scene, namely, England, the Covenant of the League of Nations and the international women’s movement on the other hand. It is in hindsight that the symbolic coincidence of the three Scandinavian countries’ peerlessness regarding the initial inclusion of women has been stylised as a common Nordic phenomenon. Thus, what has been suggested as a significant element of a ‘Nordic model’ in regard to the composition of delegations, the inclusion of women, on closer inspection turns out to be an ex post rationalisation of autonomous national developments.288 –––––––––––––– 284 Munch 1963: 247; “technical delegates” refers to the category of ‘experts’. 285 Cf. Utrikesdepartementet 1919: 4. 286 Cf. the lack of evidence of women’s organisations lobbying in the journal Hertha or in NAS, FM, FS 1920, HP 24, vol. 1172ff. 287 For instance, the Danish discussion with regard to a woman delegate was summarized by the Norwegian legation in Copenhagen in a letter dated 28 October 1920 (and not in earlier letters on the delegation topic) and can hardly have influenced Norwegian decision makers by 29 October 1920, when “Fr ken Professor dr. Kristine Bonnevie” and the other members of the Norwegian delegation were appointed, see NAO, FM, P1-L, 07/20. 288 See e.g. Lange 1937: 24.
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By the end of the 1920s, initiatives to strengthen the position of women in the League of Nations were launched by different actors.289 A result of these efforts was the so-called Spanish Resolution adopted by the Assembly in 1931, which requested the Council “to examine the possibility of women co-operation more fully in the work of the League”. In his speech to the Assembly, the Spanish representative, Salvador de Madariaga, spoke of a tendency “to suggest that women should form part of the delegations” and even underlined his government’s support of this tendency as evidenced by the composition of the Spanish delegation. In agreement with the discussion held in the responsible committee, he also expressed his delegation’s view “that that question was not really the starting-point of its motion and that it might perhaps betray a lack of tact to suggest to Governments what they ought to do when forming their delegations”. He continued by describing the philosophy of the initiative as the idea that the co-operation of women should be restricted, for the time being at all events, to the specific functions of women in their own countries and in their own homes – namely, that they should concern themselves with creating the moral atmosphere indispensable to the League’s success.290 Thus, women were relegated to the role of outside partners or instruments, not of participants. As shown by the report by the Secretary-General, which was produced on the collaboration of women on request by the Council, women’s organisations were opposed to this narrow view and strongly urged for a direct and official participation in the deliberations of League organs.291 As a result, the Assembly in 1932 reconsidered the view adopted previously and unanimously passed a resolution reminding of Article 7 of the Covenant, which has in view the possibility: (a) For the Governments of the States Members to appoint competent women to Assembly delegations, to Conferences and on Governmental Committees of the League; (b) For the Council to appoint competent women on technical League Committees as assessors and experts; (c) For the Secretary-General to include competent women in the higher posts of the Secretariat.292
–––––––––––––– 289 Cf. Miller 1992: 124. 290 League of Nations, Official Journal, Records of the Ordinary Session of the Assembly 12 (1931): 125. 291 Collaboration of Women in the Organisation of Peace: Report by the Secretary-General. Document A.10.1932. Geneva: League of Nations, 1932. 2. I am indebted to the Northwestern University Library, Evanston, IL for a free scan of this 19-page document. 292 League of Nations, Official Journal, Records of the Ordinary Session of the Assembly 13 (1932): 58.
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Evidently, the stress on the request for competence is suggestive in regard to its spread. It is also telling that the peak of women’s appointments to the League had already passed by the time the resolution was adopted. Subsequent initiatives, like that posed by the international women’s organisations in autumn 1936, demanding an amendment to the Covenant according to which “The Members of the League undertake that men and women shall both be members, with full voting powers, of all delegations to the Council and Assembly of the League and to all conferences under the auspices of the League” came to naught.293
From Lutzwaffe to sporadic overbalance: Women in UN delegations International women’s groups expressed dissatisfaction that no women delegates attend the four major allies’ Dumbarton Oaks Conference in 1944, where the first draft of the United Nations Charter was drawn up.294 Thus, preceding the United Nations Conference on International Organisation, which drafted the Charter between 25 April and 25 June 1945, a resolution at the Inter-American Conference held in Mexico City in February 1945 recommended that governments consider “the cooperation of women in the formation of their respective delegations to international conferences”, including that in San Francisco.295 Corresponding lobbying ensued, with both the Liaison Committee of Women’s International Organisations, pointing at the League’s resolution from 1932, and the national women’s organisations, in the United States and Norwegian cases, for example.296 In all, twelve of the fifty nations attending the conference complied with this advice, most of them appointing a single woman to their
–––––––––––––– 293 “Communication from Committee of Representatives of Women’s International Organisations, created in accordance with a resolution of the Council of the League of Nations” to the President of the 17th Session of the Assembly, Carlos Saavedra Lamas, 21 September 1936, ULG, WHC, KHC, II: 44. 294 Stienstra 1994: 77. 295 Russell 1958: 569. 296 With regard to the United States, see Virginia Gildersleeve. Many a Good Crusade. New York: Macmillan, 1954. 350; with regard to Norway see the chapter on the participation of Norwegian civil society on UN delegations.
125 CHAPTER 2 delegation.297 According to a count rendered by the Norwegian delegate Åse Gruda Skard, 14 of the 535 San Francisco delegates were women.298 Skard reports to have initiated a series of women’s gatherings at the conference, but not having been able to prevent fractionation. The seven Latin American women led by Brazilian feminist Bertha Lutz and seconded by the Australian delegate Jessie Street considered themselves representatives of womankind and attempted to include the maximum of provisions on women’s rights in the Charter. In contrast, the delegates from the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada, proclaiming accompolished sexual equality in their countries, considered themselves national representatives and were demonstratively uninterested in posing claims in their capacity as women.299 As Lutz accounts, Virginia Gildersleeve, the US delegate, told her right off to not be so vulgar and unladylike as to ask for anything for women in the Charter.300 Skard reports that, together with Wu Yi-fang, her Chinese friend, she tried to mediate the divergent views but, due to the overall absence of the Anglo-American delegates at the gatherings, in practice this meant trying to convince the Southern women to adopt moderate positions.301 In the Charter of the United Nations provisions specifically mentioning women or the ban of sexual discrimination were included in the preamble as well as in articles 1, 8, 13, 55, and 76. Nevertheless, there has been sufficient reason to diagnose “lip service to the principle of equality by the UN”,302 and the central Article 8 clearly falls short of the old League of Nations provision with the reserved stipulation that states “The United Nations shall place no restrictions on the eligibility of men and women to
–––––––––––––– 297 UNCIO I 1945: 12–78; 1945 II: 575. The titles of delegation members at this conference were not as standardized as at the League of Nations or at the United Nations. Here, counsellors and advisers of different types, but not secretaries, have been included in the category “delegation member”. 298 Åse Gruda Skard. Fulle hender: Ei minnebok 1940–1985. Oslo: Gyldendal, 1986. 94. Her account does not include technical adviser Elisabeth de Miribel who served as press secretary to the French delegation. 299 Skard 1986: 95–96; recent accounts give a harmonising picture of North–South women’s collaboration, see: Charlotte Bunch. “Women and Gender.” The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations. Thomas G. Weiss and Sam Daws (eds). Oxford: University Press, 2007. 496–510, at 496. 300 Rupp 1997: 222–223. 301 Skard 1986: 95–96; cf. Report by Skard of 11 August 1945, NAO, FM 1940–49, 25.2/45. 302 Paula F. Pfeffer. “‘A Whisper in the Assembly of Nations’: United States’ Participation in the International Movement for Women’s Rights from the League of Nations to the United Nations.” Women’s Studies International Forum 8 (1985) 5: 459–472, at 469.
126 CHALLENGES AND TRADITIONS participate in any capacity and under conditions of equality in its principal and subsidiary organs.”303 Gildersleeve, in an even more restrained spirit at the San Francisco conference, impeded the establishment of a separate Commission on the Status of Women that had been proposed by Lutz. According to critics, such a commission would have been in conflict with the aim of anti- discrimination and would have been better served in the hands of the Commission on Human Rights. The difficult atmosphere present during these struggles can be noted in Gildersleeve’s memoirs, where she writes that “Some of the American staff bestowed on Dr. Lutz the nickname ‘Lutzwaffe’ as a humorous adaptation of the German Luftwaffe, which had been devastating Europe.”304 However, the tendency to overlook the existing “colossal problems concerning the status of women” was conceived by many as “purely academic”, and the Economic and Social Council decided as early as 16 February 1946 to establish a Sub- commission on the Status of Women under the Commission on Human Rights.305 Members of the Sub-Commission, headed by Bodil Begtrup of Denmark, immediately requested to raise the status of their commission to that of an independent full commission. After having convinced initially opposed Eleanor Roosevelt, head of the Commission on Human Rights, they obtained endorsement by the Economic and Social Council and formal recognition by the General Assembly on 24 October 1946, the first ‘birthday’ of the United Nations.306 Despite the successful establishment of the Commission on the Status of Women as a policy making body, the United Nations remained “basically a man’s show” and could be viewed as “an exclusive men’s club” for a long time.307 Thus, it has been concluded that “As in the case of the League of Nations […], women’s place in the new public arena was almost invisible, a reflection of their subordinate position in national societies, governments, and world politics.”308 Actually, in the early years of the United Nations the proportion of women delegates was lower than it
–––––––––––––– 303 Cf. Sabine von Schorlemer. “Article 8.” The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, vol. 1. Bruno Simma (ed.). Oxford: University Press, 2002[1991]. 231–246. 304 Gildersleeve 1954: 352–353. 305 Bodil Begtrup. “At UN Equality for Women Marches On.” Independent Woman 26 (January 1947): 14–15, 32. I am indebted to the Business and Professional Women/USA for the free copy of this article. 306 Bodil Begtrup. Kvinde i et verdenssamfund: Erindringer. Viby: Centrum, 1986. cf. Stienstra 1994: 83–84; Margaret E. Galey. “Women Find a Place.” Women, Politics, and the United Nations. Anne Winslow (ed.). Westport: Greenwood, 1995b. 11–27, at 13–14. 307 Tavares de Sá 1966: 4. 308 Galey 1995b: 11.
127 CHAPTER 2 had been during the later years of the League of Nations. At the first session of the General Assembly in London, seventeen women from eleven countries participated in the categories of ‘representatives’, ‘alternate representatives’, or ‘advisers’, as delegates were now classified. At this session, the French initiated a proposal that suggested “feminine participation should occupy a more important place in the various delegations to the next conference of the United Nations”. The spirit behind this proposal submitted primarily for the attention of governments but never put to a vote, was declaredly one “of friendly advice and encouragement”, not one of involvement in the internal business of sovereign countries. During the discussion of this item, Eleanor Roosevelt read an “Open Letter to the women of the world” signed by all women delegates attending the General Assembly. The letter expressed hope that women’s participation in the work of the United Nations would grow in terms of both insight and skill. The language used in the letter was cautious, as not to give the appearance of undue interference with the business of governments, and restricted itself to call on the Governments of the world to encourage women everywhere to take a more active part in national and international affairs, and on women who are conscious of their opportunities to come forward and share in the work of peace and reconstruction as they did in war and resistance.309 At the second session, Iraq had the highest per centage of female delegates, namely, “three dark young ladies with sparkling eyes” as the Swedish delegate Ulla Lindstr m observed, out of a total of nine. The orientalisation of this unexpected incidence of international leadership does not settle with such a surface description. The fact that one of the Iraqi women was married to the foreign minister was interpreted by Lindstr m as support for “the hypothesis that it is by way of marriage that women in certain countries can convince men that they possess discernment”.310 Apparently she missed to observe that the delegation list’s “Mrs. Fadhil Jamali” was a Canadian born academic with the maiden name Sarah Powell. She seems also to have been unaware of the fact that Åse Gruda Skard – the female representative on the Norwegian delegation to the San Francisco conference – was the daughter of former Foreign Minister Halvdan Koht.
–––––––––––––– 309 General Assembly, Official Records 1 (1946) 1: 402–412 (open letter at 403). 310 Manuscript, no title, 1947, NAS, ULA, vol. 7. In fact, Lindstr m maintains that Iraq had the highest absolute number of female delegates. However, according to the official list of delegations four out of fifty-three members of the US delegation were women. The delegation from New Zealand also included three women (out of a total of ten).
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Although the Economic and Social Council adopted a resolution on gender issues in 1948 and in this context recommended member states to “consider women equally with men when appointing their delegations to organs and agencies of the United Nations and to international bodies and conferences”,311 women remained extremely underrepresented for many years to come. According to a report by the Secretary-General on the participation of women in the work of the United Nations of spring 1950, which was a result of the resolution and a request by the Committee on the Status of Women,312 a total of 24 women were among the 588 delegates attending the fourth session of the General Assembly (4 per cent). Four of them, members of the delegations from Canada, Chile, India, and the United States, had been given the highest ‘representative’ status; in addition, there were two ‘alternate representatives’ from Sweden and one each from Belgium, Denmark, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States, as well as two ‘advisers’ from Australia, Iraq, and the Netherlands and one ‘adviser’ from China, France, Israel, the Philippines and Poland.313 Progress in women’s representation in national delegations to the United Nations was slow and gained momentum first in connection with the proclamation of the year 1975 as International Women’s Year. A resolution adopted by the World Conference of the International Women’s Year in Mexico City recommended that United Nations members “seek to increase substantially the number of women in their delegations to meetings held under United Nations auspices” in the current year and “to improve upon it in subsequent years”. It further recommended that women not only be appointed to the Third (social) Committee, but also to the other main committees of the General Assembly.314 By 1979, the General Assembly adopted the ‘Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women’, which calls “States Parties […] to ensure to women, on equal terms with men and without any discrimination, the opportunity to represent their Governments at the international level and to participate in the work of international organizations”.315 –––––––––––––– 311 “154 (VII). Report of the second session of the Commission on the Status of Women.” Resolutions Adopted by the ECOSOC during Its Session (1948) 7: 28–31, at 29. 312 United Nations 1996: 129. 313 Report of the Secretary-General to the Commission on the Status of Women on the Participation of Women in the Work of the United Nations of 16 March 1950 (United Nations Document e/CN.6/132). 314 The resolution is documented in: Nicol/Croke 1978: 158. 315 “34/180: Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.” Resolutions and Decisions Adopted by the General Assembly during Its Session 34 (1979): 193–198, at 195.
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The women’s share among delegates to the General Assembly increased from 3.5 per cent in 1946 to 7.6 per cent in 1974, and rose to 8.8 per cent in 1975.316 By 1991 the corresponding figure had risen to 15 per cent. The general pattern of assignments in national delegations becomes clear from the gendered accreditation to the different committees of the General Assembly in that year: The dominance of men was greatest in the First (political) Committee, with only eight per cent of its accredited members being women, and least in the Third Committee, with 30 per cent of the committee constitued by women.317 An analysis of the ‘List of Delegations to the Sixty-fourth Session of the General Assembly’ shows that by 2009 a total of 1,609 of the 5,633 listed delegates were women – a share of almost 29 per cent. Women’s under-representation in the high-status categories of ‘representatives’ and ‘alternate representatives’ was more obvious than in the lower-status category of ‘advisers’ and the like. This difference is illustrated by the fact that women accounted for 18 per cent of ‘representatives’, while 39 per cent of the countries had the name of a woman at the last position in their list of delegates. Only seven countries did not include any female delegates, namely, Cambodia, China, Malta, North Korea, Moldova, Tuvalu, and Yemen. At the same time, there were a few delegations with parity or overbalance of women, namely, the delegations from Suriname (80 per cent) Bahamas, Jamaica, and Seychelles (67 per cent), Estonia (64 per cent), Belize, Finland, and Trinidad and Tobago (60 per cent), Costa Rica (57 per cent), Australia, and Nauru (55 per cent), Brunei Darussalam (53 per cent), as well as Andorra, Armenia, Iceland, Saint Lucia, San Marino, and Serbia (50 per cent).318 The table provides an overview of the development of women’s participation in Nordic delegations as well as a number of other select countries’ delegations to the General Assembly over time:
–––––––––––––– 316 Margaret K. Bruce. “Women and Policy-making in the United Nations.” The United Nations and Decision-Making: The Role of Women, vol. 2: Papers Presented to a UNITAR Colloquium at Schloss Hernstein, Austria, 13–16 July 1977. Davidson Nicol and Margaret Croke (eds). New York: UNITAR, 1978. 49–99, at 63. 317 Erskine Childers and Brian Urquhart. Renewing the United Nations System. Uppsala: Dag Hammarskj ld Foundation, 1994. 128. 318 The survey included all delegates listed as representatives (including heads of state and foreign ministers), alternate representatives or some sort of adviser or expert, but not those designated as observers and the like, see List of Delegations 2009.
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Table 1. Women in selected delegations to the General Assembly (by percentage)319
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2009
Brazil 0 0 7 19 17 10 39 Denmark 15 20 10 17 31 31 35 Dominican 14 25 18 18 29 36 30 Republic Egypt (UAR) 0 0 0 9 15 4 14 Finland n.a. 13 3 17 34 60 60 France 2 2 10 7 14 18 24 Iceland 0 0 0 0 14 14 50 India 8 0 0 8 4 14 8 Liberia 0 9 18 11 33 32 31 New Zealand 0 13 20 20 45 38 45 Norway 7 5 7 14 30 29 41 Russia (Soviet 0 2 4 2 1 2 10 Union) Sweden 7 18 11 8 30 44 49 Thailand 0 0 0 14 21 19 41 United 3 9 9 20 21 29 36 Kingdom United States 9 10 8 23 25 36 39
The table confirms evidence for a continuous increase in representation of women in national delegations to the General Assembly.
–––––––––––––– 319 Apart from the Nordic countries, the selection is based on countries that have been members of the United Nations throughout the whole period, and takes into consideration importance, geographical distribution and profile in women’s representation. Egypt as in union with Syria 1958–61; Russia as represented by the Soviet Union until 1991. The table is based on the official lists of delegations to the General Assembly published by the United Nations Secretariat and does not take into account ‘secretaries’, ‘observers’ and the like. Some delegations in point were small. Thus, in 1950 seven per cent in the case of Norway and Sweden (and fourteen per cent in the case of the Dominican Republic) corresponded to one female delegate.
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At the same time, it shows that a marked degree of fluctuation is apparent in most individual cases. It seems as if women’s inclusion in delegations is usually the result of ad-hoc decisions in an overall domestic and international climate that is becoming increasingly favorable to equal opportunity. The years 1970 to 1990 are particularly relevant in this respect, as in this period most countries exhibit the highest increase in the per centage of women delegates. Having been a marginal force in earlier years, women from the 1970–1990 period onward have formed a constitutive element of the General Assembly. While the present situation is still not one of equality, the statement that women are “almost invisible” in that organ is no longer applicable.320 One of the surprising findings is the continually low representation of women in delegations from the Soviet Union and Russia. India which, besides Liberia and Bahrain, is the only other country to have contributed with a woman as President of the General Assembly and which also stands for early incidences of high-status women representatives, has a remarkably poor overall record regarding the inclusion of women. Among Western countries, the share of women in French delegations is clearly below average, thereby underlining France’s status as a latecomer with regard to gender equality. Ironically, the French initiative at the first General Assembly, which asked governments for the appointment of women delegates, has been less successful in its country of origin than elsewhere. Among the selected countries, the Dominican Republic displays the most balanced record, with a comparatively high share of women delegates throughout the whole period, and together with evidence from the sixty- fourth session of the General Assembly presented above, the larger Caribbean region appears to merit special attention as a woman-friendly environment in regard to inclusion in international diplomatic activities. A comparatively woman-friendly status can also be ascribed to the Nordic and Baltic region as well as to the Anglo-Saxon countries.321 Swedish men have in the early 1960s pointed to what they believed was a “preference for matriarchy in regard to our representation at international conferences” by the foreign minister.322 There were even outright complaints about the UN delegation maintaining that “It was a little too much of a good thing sometimes, with Ulla as conductor, Alva
–––––––––––––– 320 Quote: Tickner 2001: 111. 321 For example, a combined survey of the Nordic countries shows the representation of women in delegations to the General Assembly clearly above the average for all years looked at here. 322 Riksdagens protokoll, F rsta kammaren (1962) 11: 56 (Erik Boheman). This refers to Foreign Minister Östen Undén.
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Myrdal as first fiddle, and Agda R ssel as ambassador.”323 However, if women’s empowerment independent of particular women’s resources is the ultimate goal, then there is much evidence that it was not as solid at the time as the above interjections would want to make us believe. Even in countries with a universalist tradtion and institutions operating on less gendered premises than elsewhere, recourse to women’s interest organisations would not seem to be an altogether bad idea. There was a notion of a particular women’s seat in Denmark, Sweden, and Norway. However, Denmark was the only country that clearly preserved that particular seat, leaving the nomination to the Danish National Council of Women. For a long time, this contributed to a particularly women-friendly record of Denmark, even in Nordic comparison.324 As delegations have grown in size over the years, so has the diffusion of women to all sectors of society, not least the foreign service. Thus, the significance of a specific women’s seat has diminished, at least in a quantitative sense.
La coque et le poule: Who is who in Nordic delegations? From a women’s empowerment point of view the state prerogative in international relations suggests two strategic perspectives: the attempt to increasingly infuse the state on the one hand, and the attempt to utilise opportunities to voice specific women’s points of view from the platform offered by the state, on the other. The problem here is that these strategies are only partly compatible. While the instrumentalisation of the state is a difficult and long-term endeavor, the expression of a specific women’s voice might immediately make a difference for an issue – but by its nature it also tends to reconfirm the notion of ‘otherness’ and the marginality of women. Thus, Carol Miller points to the dilemma that “the persistence of the idea that women had a special role in international affairs opened some doors but, with few exceptions, kept the more important ones firmly shut.” According to her, it is difficult to ascertain whether the use of this idea by women was reactive or a conscious substitute for the less viable equality argument.325 At the League of Nations female delegates of different backgrounds were often seen and asked to represent women rather than states, and the Secretariat voiced some concern over female delegates’
–––––––––––––– 323 Leif Cassel. Så vitt jag minns: Memoarer. Stockholm: Askild & Kärnekull, 1973. 151. Cabinet Minister Ulla Lindstr m (1954–66) frequently served as one of the deputy chairpersons of the delegation. 324 See the chapter on the representation of Nordic civil societies on UN delegations. 325 Miller 1991: 77.
133 CHAPTER 2 tendency to act on the basis of dual loyalties.326 In contrast, men’s dual loyalty was obscured by their political dominance in public institutions. The pun concocted by two Swedish diplomats on the last name of Swedish UN delegate (and cabinet member) Karin Kock, frequently escorted by her husband, gives a good notion of what happens to a ‘manly state’ when made a platform for the ‘other’ sex and to the representative of that sex when becoming the voice of the state: “la coque et le poule”.327 The history of the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women gives evidence for the hypothesis that in order to achieve universalist goals under the condition of inequality, some measure of particularism in the instruments used is a pragmatic necessity. The successful establishment of gender equality on the international agenda in recent years can be attributed to the two-fold strategy of women to continue “to congregate in limited, women-related sectors even while efforts are being made to promote a gender perspective in all other areas of UN endeavor”.328 The influence of the Commission on the Status of Women is said to have “been unique among UN bodies because of its connection with the international women’s movement”,329 that is, its strategic networking with selected civil society pressure groups. John P. Humphrey, the first director of the Human Rights Division in the Secretariat of the United Nations and critic of the Commission on the Status of Women, gives the following instructive characterisation: More perhaps than in any other United Nations body the delegates to the Commission on the Status of Women were personally committed to its objectives. Although they represented governments under whose instructions they worked, they acted as a kind of lobby for the women of the world. There was no more independent body in the United Nations. Many governments had appointed and continued to appoint as their representatives women who were militants in their own countries.330 To illustrate the ambivalence of the interplay between the perception of others and self-understanding, Kerstin Hesselgren, member of parliament and delegate to numerous sessions of the Assembly of the League of –––––––––––––– 326 Miller 1992: 104, 113, 117. 327 Grafstr m 1989: 935 (the pun was made by UN ambassador Grafstr m and ambassador to Washington Erik Boheman); cf. on the concept of ‘manly states’: Charlotte Hooper. Manly States: Masculinities, International Relations, and Gender Politics. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001. 328 Laura Reanda. “Engendering the United Nations.” European Journal of Women’s Studies 6 (1999) 1: 49–68, at 66. 329 Galey 1995b: 14. 330 John P. Humphrey. Human Rights and the United Nations: A Great Adventure. Dobbs Ferry: Transnational, 1984. 30.
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Nations, provides an example. Hesselgren, despite occupying what was conceived of as the women’s seat on the Swedish delegation, is said to have thought of her role in a gender-neutral manner, as a government representative specialised on labor issues.331 Yet, when the Assembly of the League of Nations discussed the Abyssinian crisis in summer 1936, Emperor Haile Selassie gave a desperate speech to the world – and made her activate her gender identity. As noted in Hesselgren’s diary, the glance she received from the Ethiopian leader after he had left the lectern gave her the feeling that, in his despair, he “appealed to womankind in order to get justice”. And she started to understand that keeping silent on the Italian aggression and on the breakdown of the League’s sanctions system would be to “desert womankind”. Despite initial objections in her delegation that it would leave a dubious impression were a second speech held in addition to the one given by the foreign minister, Hesselgren was permitted to address the Assembly.332 The speech, which was widely observed at the time, opened with the reference that she wanted to say a few words “as an expression of the feeling of women in many parts of the world” and concluded by saying that she could “only voice the intense anguish of women all over the world, and urge you to use every wit and every power to find a solution”.333 Thus, in a critical situation an agent in international relations, framed by international law and academic convention as a system of unitary state actors, switched identity and explicitly chose the role of a representative of womankind. There is evidence for the recognition of the legitimacy of female delegates speaking on behalf of women in world organisations. At the same time, a potential conflict with the interest of governments is evident. For example, the delegate to the last sessions of the Assembly of the League of Nations, Johanne Reutz, was outmaneuvered as Leader of the Women’s Secretariat of the Norwegian Labor Party with specious allegations of collaboration with the Nazis, to the benefit of her rival Aase Lionæs, who was in favour of an accommodating women’s course in the party.334 After the Second World War, Lionæs was rewarded with the traditional ‘women’s seat’ in Norwegian delegations to the General Assembly. –––––––––––––– 331 Alva Myrdal and Malin Bergman. “Internationellt arbete.” Boken om Kerstin Hesselgren: En vänstudie. Ruth Hamrin-Thorell (ed.). Stockholm: Norstedt, 1968. 148–174, at 158, 165. 332 Notes from the League of Nations 3 July 1936, ULG, WHC, KHC, II:65. 333 League of Nations, Official Journal, Records of the Ordinary Session of the Assembly 16 (1936) 2: 63. 334 Tore Pryser. “Johanne Reutz: Fra arbeiderbevegelsen til fredsbevegelsen.” Portretter fra norsk historie. Olso: Universitetsforlaget, 1993. 185–201, at 189–192; Randi Aas. Mellom frontene: Johanne Reutz – pioner og yrkeskvinne i norsk arbeiderbevegelse. Oslo: Pax, 2001. 83–84, 124–128.
135 CHAPTER 2
Independent women’s organisations attempted to win back the right of nomination they had enjoyed at the foundation of the League of Nations and at the San Francisco conference before being stranded.335 Lionæs remained the Norwegian woman delegate for many years to come. However, as she was rarely officially designated as women’s representative, the delegation’s ‘women’s’ seat was eventually lost. From the time she became a deputy member of parliament in 1954, she was listed as stortingsrepresentant in official accounts of the delegation and was also perceived as representative of the Labor Party. A stipulation in a memorandum on the delegation of 1957, which states she “probably most likely represents ‘the female element’”, reveals confusion regarding her status in the foreign ministry.336 Lionæs became a full-fledged member of parliament in 1958, and was replaced by another female Labor Party legislator in the delegation to the General Assembly after 1965. However, the seat was subsequently given to a male politician, and Norway attended the sessions of 1968 and 1969 without any female delegate. Only in the beginning of the 1970s did Norwegian women’s organisations again raise claims for representation and have been attached to the delegation in the inofficial category ‘observers’ since 1972. However, by that time the infusion of the political system and state administration by women had reached a stage that in practice safeguarded the participation of a woman in the delegation even without a special seat. In contrast to the situation in Norway, the Danish National Council of Women and its successor organisation, the Women’s Council (Kvinnerådet), have enjoyed the privilege of suggesting a representative to all delegations to the Assemblies of the League of Nations and the United Nations (until 2006). As this representative’s organisational background has almost always been spelled out in official delegation lists, both the tradition of a women’s seat in the delegation was strengthened and the legitimacy of the representation of women’s interests. Nevertheless, when women’s representative Bodil Begtrup was appointed a minister to Iceland, it was reasoned in the foreign ministry that the Danish women’s organisations right to nominate a female member of the delegation possibly ought to be considered anew.337 In connection with attempts for comprehensive reforms regarding the Danish delegation order, the position of the female delegate was –––––––––––––– 335 See the chapter on the representation of Nordic civil societies on UN delegations. 336 Memorandum on the delegation to the 12th session of the General Assembly by Rolf Hancke, 12 August 1957, NAO, FM 1950–59, 26.5/62. 337 Memorandum by Finn Friis, 22 December 1948, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.b.1948– 49.
136 CHALLENGES AND TRADITIONS reconsidered, too. Despite the fact that one of the starting points of Foreign Minister Jens Otto Krag’s review initiative of 1959 was the observation that women’s representatives were among the most capable delegates, it was reasoned in the foreign ministry that it was no longer objectively necessary to reserve a seat for women’s organisations because the delegation had included women members during the last years in addition to the women’s organisations’ delegate. However, nothing was changed about the delegation order.338 When, some years later, another interest organisation requested representation on the delegation with reference to the representation of women (and trade unions), it was argued internally in the foreign ministry that the comparison halted because the representative of the women’s organisations added to the delegation a certain “women’s knowledge”, which was not safeguarded otherwise.339 Semi-official publications of that time underline the difference between the mere inclusion of female individuals and the representation of women through deputies with a mandate from women organisations.340 Only since the 1970s, with the subsequent inclusion of youth, employers, disability organisations, United Nations associations and the like in Danish delegations, the position of women’s organisations has become just one element in an active, multifaceted civil society representation. While the official status of women’s organisations within the Danish delegation retained a strong element of substantive representation of women’s interests, the increasing overall inclusion of women in delegations to the General Assembly relieves individual women delegates of pressure to act and speak in their capacity as women.341
Outlook Conventional perspectives on international relations rely on models of unitary state actors with anthropomorphic, but hardly ‘female’ qualities. The phenomena of individual state representatives with multiple identities, also a personal gender identity, and the state as a composite entity with diverse mechanisms of exclusion and inclusion, as well as permission or sanction of deviation lie outside the scope of traditional approaches.
–––––––––––––– 338 Memorandum by Foreign Minister Jens Otto Krag, 11 June 1959, memorandum by V.U. Hammershaimb of 12 February 1960 and decree by Krag of 7 March 1960, NAC, FM 1946– 72, 119. D.9.a. 339 Memorandum by Jens Christensen, 20 February 1963, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119. D.9.a. 340 Cf. Finn Friis. “Danmark i FN: Nogle betragtninger om vilkårene for en indsats.” Fremtiden 16 (1961) 1: 29–34, at 29. 341 Cf. Myrdal and Bergman 1968: 165.
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They are alien to both (neo)realist theorising on power and liberal theorising on international organisation with their common emphatic insistence on a domestic–international divide. However, the phenomena mentioned above are obvious starting points for constructivist theorising. This thought does not take the world for granted, but rather as a contingent and ambiguous sphere of meaning open for negotiation and historical change. Engendering the empirical study of practises in the international system provides for an adequate approach within constructivism as well as for other studies in the field of diplomatic history and international politics. In the League of Nations, transnational women’s advocacy networks succeeded in generating a normative framework, which was more advanced than the practice that evolved. But even the humble participation of women realised at the League depended on that framework and on the continuous pressure exerted by women’s organisations. There are significant studies on the international women’s movement and its lobbying at the League of Nations, but much research is still required in order to understand the interaction of the different levels, in particular of domestic and international women’s organisations.342 To begin with, both the Charter of the United Nations and women’s representation in the new world organisation fell behind what had been achieved by the predecessor organisation. In retrospect, the controversy over a particularist versus universalist approach to women’s rights, which impeded more effective lobbying, seems premature for the issues discussed here. It was not until the 1970s that women’s representation started to approach more balanced dimensions in many countries, with the potential of changing the patterns of interaction between individuals of both sexes. The “solid wall of male exclusivity” in the United Nations has been crumbling, at least at some ends.343 By 2009, a few countries actually work with an over-representation of women, and would constitute a body of cases for sociological study to be contrasted with countries practicing the traditional over-representation of men. Research on how the increasing presence of women in the United Nations changes role models is needed as a complement to studies on the diffusion of norms. The 192 country-cases represented in the world organisation at present are a sample with great variance in regard to women’s involvement, and the records of the United Nations provide excellent material for comparisons over time. Whether we talk about relationships between principals and agents or the represented and the representatives, problems of ‘agency loss’ and –––––––––––––– 342 The most important studies are Miller 1992 and Rupp 1997 – unfortunately, Miller’s fundamental dissertation was never published. 343 Quote: Reanda 1999: 53.
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‘crisis of representation’ will always be a factor. But contrary to common belief, this is not only a problem of derivatives not matching masters’ and mistress’ intentions, but also of those master and mistress minds’ patchwork character, their multi-purpose organs and their ambiguity. With regard to the issue of participation of women in international conference diplomacy, representation is what states make of it: It mirrors both gender structures and gender policies in the countries concerned, it might integrate or give an independent platform to individual women’s or women organisations’ point of view, and it might strive to comply with the ideal type of the unitary state actor. The issue of sexual balance in national delegations to world organisations has been neglected by scholars and politicians. The reason for this is that the principle of sovereignty is the fundamental doctrine in both the international system and among its students. Consequently, despite its transnational dimension, the issue of representation is segmented and dependent on the status and mobilisation of women in each civil society. However, there is a political tradition since the days of the League of Nations of transforming the ‘national concern’ into something relevant for the international community, too. As Hilary Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin note, there has been a strong concern in the United Nations with “participation and representation, and concomitant issues of legitimacy”, but “almost exclusively about issues of nationality and regionality”.344 We might have come to a point at which awareness of gender issues in international relations has achieved not only a normative status, but also some normative power. Countries without more or less adequate representation of women in international delegations could be left losing credibility and good-will. The issue can be viewed from a strategic perspective, allowing for the following hpothesis to be considered. Increasing awareness of the key role played by women in society and development should correlate inversely with the perceived legitimacy and the practical negotiation position of governments that are represented by one-sex or flagrantly unbalanced delegations. The inclusion of women in delegations to world organisations provides cultural capital that has contributed positively to the image of the countries that have functioned as trendsetters. For example, continuing male domination in national delegations has been characterised as “a sort of diplomatic stag party of political incorrectness”.345 Nordic diplomats and politicians critically note the –––––––––––––– 344 Charlesworth/Chinkin 2000: 194. 345 Linda Fasulo. An Insider’s Guide to the UN. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004. 93.
139 CHAPTER 2 absence of female members in the delegations of their negotiating partners.346 Today, the refusal to grant substantial access to state functions to a group of citizens that includes approximately half of the population in any country signals a refusal “to belong to the ‘civilized community’ of states”, which shows a stubborn resistance to the emerging global consensus on gender mainstreaming.347 As argued by Ann Towns, such a profile can be expected to have consequences for a country’s position in the implicit international stratification order and evaluative hierarchy, in which gender issues is one of the relevant dimensions assessing performance.348 As particularly evident in delegations interfacing at the international level, it is not by chance that the inclusion of women has become an icon of democracy that offers a win-win perspective for both sexes, and thus also for the governments pursuing an equal opportunity approach.349
–––––––––––––– 346 In a discussion at the Swedish United Nations Association (14 November 2006), the Swedish permanent representative to the United Nations, Anders Lidén, described earlier South Korean delegations as being exclusively or nearly exclusively comprised of male delegates, a shortcoming that made some issues on the agenda simply incomprehensible to the given delegation. Another example comes from comments by two female Norwegian parliamentarians participating in the General Assembly in 2006 regarding the entirely male composition of a Malaysian parliamentary sub-delegation, which limited common ground and made the meeting of the two groups a “special experience” (interviews January 2007). 347 Quote: Thomas Risse and Katheryn Sikkink. “The Socialization of Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction.” The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change. Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp and Katheryn Sikkink (eds). Cambridge: University Press, 1999. 1–38, at 15. 348 Ann Towns. “Women Governing for Modernity: International Hierarchy and Legislature Sex Quotas.” Paper prepared for the 2003 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (Philadelphia, Aug 26–30); Ann Towns. “Inequality of Norms: Stratification and the Global Spread of Women’s Suffrage.” Paper presented at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 24 May 2005. 349 Cf. Reanda 1999; Towns 2003; Kardam 2004.
140 3. PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS
THE SCANDINAVIAN MODEL: DENMARK Due to the unique situation of Denmark at the end of the Second World War, the Danish delegation to the founding conference of the United Nations had a special character. However, aside from being particularly small and carrying an unusually strong political element, it did not represent a break with the country’s tradition of delegations to the world organisation. The composition of the delegation was planned immediately preceding the opening of the conference on 25 April 1945. At this time Denmark had no government, and the officials involved still aimed at an observer status like that held at earlier United Nations conferences.1 At the same time, intense negotiations regarding the composition of the future government of the country went on between representatives of the four cooperating parties (social democrats, conservatives, agrarian liberals, and radical liberals) and the representatives of the resistance movement. The former were discredited by their collaboration with the German occupants until August 1943. During the later part of the war, the resistance movement had become an independent political force with its own foreign policy and the self-conception of representing Denmark as one of the nations fighting Hitler. Under these circumstances, the crucial political dividing line did not separate different political parties, but rather separated the political establishment from the resistance movement. The latter group included the communist party as a whole, as well as independents of various backgrounds and single members of other parties. In the government of liberation cabinet posts were reserved both for representatives of the four cooperating parties and representatives of the resistance movement. Thus, the tradition of representing the most significant political forces on delegations to the world organisation meant something different under the circumstances of 1945 than it did under regular conditions. Until the return to ‘business as usual’ in the aftermath of the elections of autumn 1945, the resistance movement constituted one of two political blocs in Danish politics to be represented in San Francisco. This was both a domestic requirement and a strategic move to restore international confidence and moral capital. Accordingly, roles among the delegates were
–––––––––––––– 1 Cf. G tz 2004.
141 CHAPTER 3 allocated “in such a way that both the period before and after 29 August 1943 appeared in a favourable light”.2 After some complications stemming from Soviet decision making, Denmark was finally invited to join the San Francisco conference on 5 June, three weeks before the signing of the Charter. At that time the delegation had already been sent to the United States. The late arrival due to the initial government vacuum and insecurity over whether the government of liberation would be admitted to the circle of World War Two victors suggested the choice of a ‘symbolic’ rather than a ‘working’ representation. The principle political forces at the time were represented by the delegate of the cooperating parties, Hartvig Frisch, and the delegate of the resistance movement, Erik Husfeldt. Frisch was a professor of classical studies at the University of Copenhagen. A member of the largest parliamentary party, he was appointed as the joint delegate on a common ticket for the four traditional parties. The choice of a person that has later been characterised as “social democracy’s intellectual anti-fascist ‘leading ideologist’, the policy of collaboration’s dauntless yet uncompromised advocate” was a strategic move.3 Frisch also had experience as a delegate to the last sessions of the Assembly of the League of Nations. Erik Husfeldt, the representative of the resistance movement, was a professor of medicine at the same university as Frisch, and had been a member of the Danish Freedom Council during the war. The third delegate and leader of the delegation was the minister without portfolio, Henrik Kauffmann. He held this position, which implied a special mandate to represent Denmark at the founding conference of the United Nations, on the quota of the resistance movement. Thus, one might speak of three political representatives of Denmark at the San Francisco conference. At the same time, Kauffmann’s background was that of a civil servant. As the Danish minister to Washington, Kauffmann had signed, without authorisation by his government, an agreement that allowed the United States to establish military bases in the Danish colony of Greenland. He was therefore dismissed and charged with high treason in spring 1941. However, Kauffmann and his host country refused to accept this decision, which they attributed to the government acting under duress by the German occupants of Denmark proper. From this time, Kauffmann did everything for positioning Denmark in the Allied camp. An accomplishment that provided the central point of reference for all further attempts by Denmark –––––––––––––– 2 Hartvig Frisch. “Rapport over De forenede Nationers Konference i San Francisco.” Rapporter fra de delegerede ved Forenede Nationers konference i San Francisco. Copenhagen: Schultz, 1945. 3. 3 Quote: Lidegaard 1996: 365.
142 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS to become a member of the United Nations came on 2 January 1942 when Kauffmann, at the invitation of US President Franklin D. Roosevelt, was allowed to sign his own declaration stating the Danish Nation would adhere to “the Declaration [of United Nations] of January 1, 1942, as if the Declaration had been signed by a free Danish Government”.4 Besides officially representing the government and its resistance movement branch, Kauffmann, who kept his position as the minister to Washington, represented the diplomatic service and, not least, himself as the man who had paved the way for Danish admission to the United Nations. Multiple roles were not limited to the person of Kauffmann. The resistance movement was a political force in the latter part of the war and in the immediate postwar period. Yet it also acted as a civil society-based extra-parliamentary challenge to the existing polity as well as a moral revolution of the righteous against the dubious compromises that were seen as characteristic of traditional politics. The political philosophy of the resistance movement was based on the idea of anti-politics.5 Hence, its representative embodied a political force, although a force derived from civil society and beyond the scope of party politics. In San Francisco, Erik Husfeldt represented both a short-lived political bloc that soon fell apart under the conditions of peace and civil society vis-à-vis the traditional political parties. Despite the obvious potential for conflict, the mission of the delegation was clearly one of demonstrating and acquiring goodwill. In practice, it was characterised by mutual respect and the development of personal friendships, even.6 The delegation demonstrated unity to the outside world and the domestic audience, doing so in a casual as well as a symbolic manner. It is telling that while the large Norwegian delegation let the signature of its acting head, Ambassador to the United States Wilhelm Munthe Morgenstierne, suffice at the signing the Charter of the United Nations, all three main representatives of Denmark affixed their signature to the document (see cover photo).7 In addition to the three main delegates mentioned above, there were other delegation members and affiliates. The consul general at San Francisco, Axel Sporon-Fiedler, enjoyed the position of a technical adviser.
–––––––––––––– 4 Letter to Joseph C. Grew of 22 May 1945, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.B.2.a. 5 Cf. Gy rgy Konrád. Antipolitics: An Essay. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1984[1982]. 6 Cf. Niels Finn Christiansen. Hartvig Frisch: Mennesket og politikern: En biografi. Copenhagen: Ejler, 1993. 250–251. 7 See e.g. The United Nations Conference on International Organization 1946: 979–980.
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His son, Frans Sporon-Fiedler, and Inger N. Conlan, a lady of Danish descent, acted as secretaries to the delegation.8 In contrast to the San Francisco Conference with its political agenda, the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations, which met in London between 26 November and 23 December 1945, was technical in character. Its mandate was limited to putting forth suggestions to the General Assembly.9 Denmark was therefore represented by a delegation of civil servants only: the director general of the foreign ministry, Frants Hvass, who participated for some days in the beginning; the former permanent representative to the League of Nations, William Borberg; and the secretary in the ministry, Axel Serup.10
Reviving the League of Nations tradition The Danish delegation to the San Francisco conference featured joint party representation. However, it was clear from the beginning that such representation was an exceptional solution under the special circumstances prevailing in spring 1945. Already at the time the new arrangement was made, the principal claim for representation of single political parties was not questioned by Foreign Minister John Christmas M ller, who himself was busy moving back from resistance work to conventional politics.11 When preparations were made for delegation appointments to the first session of the General Assembly, the resistance movement was a diminishing political force. The composition of delegations was prompted by the British legation in Copenhagen, asking how many delegates, advisers and subordinate staff, not already resident in London, the Danish government expected to send to the Preparatory Commission and the first session of the General Assembly.12 Upon this request, Secretary Axel Serup prepared a memorandum in the foreign ministry. His model was the selection of Danish delegates to the first session of the Assembly of the League of Nations in 1920, which he reconstructed in great detail. He also took into account the structure of delegations as proposed by the Executive Committee of the Preparatory Commission, which stipulated the rule that the maximum number of ‘representatives’ and ‘alternate representatives’
–––––––––––––– 8 Frisch 1945: 5. 9 Luard 1982: 70. 10 See NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.B.2.g. 11 See letter by Foreign Minister John Christmas M ller to Member of Parliament Karl B gholm, 14 May 1945, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.B.2.a. 12 Note verbale, 21 September 1945, NAC, FM 1946–72, H.2.a.1946.
144 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS should not exceed five respectively. Serup’s suggestion was to let the four larger parliamentary parties each appoint one representative and one alternate, and to leave it to the government to appoint the delegation chairman as well as the deputy chairman and some technical advisers. Thus, in his answer to London he suggested ten delegates, four advisers, and two subordinate staff members for the General Assembly and one participant in each category for the meetings of the Preparatory Commission.13 Like this suggestion, the reply ignored the Brits’ concern regarding accommodation requirements, and announced that the Danish government expected to send four people to the meetings of the Preparatory Commission and a delegation of about 15 persons to the first session of the General Assembly.14 Simultaneously with the submission of this information, the Danish minister to Oslo was instructed to exact the size and composition of the Norwegian delegation.15 It is characteristic of the differences in the planning culture of both foreign ministries that the Norwegians had something to say about different individuals (and not least about complications due to personal quarrels among them), despite being unable at this stage to respond precisely on the size and structure of the future delegation. The Norwegians also confided that they had considered adapting the delegation model from the League of Nations, and expected “one representative for each of the larger political parties” to be included in the delegation. Moreover, they indicated they would like to see their country and Denmark apply a similar type of representation.16 The first proposal regarding the composition of the Danish delegation to the forthcoming General Assembly meeting in London, which mentioned concrete names, was written shortly after the elections had been held and a proper parliamentary government had been installed. This draft by Serup incorporated the delegation to the San Francisco conference. He proposed that either Minister to London Eduard Reventlow or Minister to Washington Henrik Kauffmann (no longer a member of cabinet) be made deputy chairman of the delegation under the foreign minister. Moreover, the resistance movement representative Erik Husfeldt and his colleague –––––––––––––– 13 Memorandum by Axel Serup, 2 October 1945, NAC, FM 1946–72, H.2.a.1946. The suggestions of the Executive Committee were compiled in November 1946, see: Report by the Executive Committee to the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations 1945: 19. 14 Note verbale to His Britannic Majesty’s Legation in Copenhagen, 8 October 1945, NAC, FM 1946–72, H.2.a.1946. 15 Cable by Axel Serup to the legation in Oslo, 8 October 1945, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1946. 16 Letter by the legation in Oslo to Director General Frants Hvass, 10 October 1945, NAC, FM 1946–72, 11.C.20.
145 CHAPTER 3 from the political establishment, Hartvig Frisch, were among those suggested as ‘advisers’; in addition, four ‘representatives’ and up to four ‘alternates’ were to be nominated by parliament.17 Serup’s proposal was a slight deviation from his previous paper in that it reassigned the authority of nomination from parliamentary parties to Parliament. William Borberg, the former permanent representative to the League of Nations, commented on this idea of appointing the San Francisco delegates: As Hartvig Frisch is a politician it seems appropriate to leave it to the party to select him. To take professor Husfeldt along in the absence of Hartvig Frisch will look like a demonstration, and the 1st part’s [first part of the first session of the General Assembly] constituting function does not require his proficiencies, no matter how good they are. Whereas Borberg dismissed the representative of the resistance movement without further ado (actually utilising personal, not functional arguments), he handled the delicate question of the diplomatic service’s most prominent member of the resistance movement more cautiously. Maintaining it would be hard to disregard Reventlow at the London meetings and even harder to disregard Kauffmann were the second part of the first session to go to the United States, as expected, he underlined the desirability of continuity in the leadership of the delegation. It was left up to the reader of this subtle temporal argument that favoured Reventlow to draw his or her own conclusion. Borberg also took into account that the communists had received more than twelve per cent of the popular vote in recent parliamentary elections, thereby becoming the fourth largest party. His suggestion to ask parliament to choose five delegates (and no deputies for these delegates) prevented a conflict with the communists over delegation membership.18 Some time later, Borberg argued that the delegation should be composed in such a way that it would not cease to function in case all parliamentary representatives suddenly left the field.19 The director of the foreign ministry, Frants Hvass, also prepared a memorandum based on the earlier ideas and communication with the legal expert and League of Nations veteran Georg Cohn. Neither Husfeldt nor the resistance movement was mentioned in this paper. Hvass suggested representation for the large political parties “in the accustomed manner”, but for him this implied that a seat must also be given to the communists. –––––––––––––– 17 Memorandum by Axel Serup, 15 November 1945, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1946. 18 Memorandum by William Borberg, 19 November 1945, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1946. 19 Letter by Borberg to the foreign ministry’s director, Frants Hvass, 16 December 1945, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1946.
146 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS
He reflected on how meaningful it might be to consider the prime minister or foreign minister as a representative of the agrarian liberals (Venstre). Due to concerns about the effective presence of the principal chairman at the assembly, Hvass even pondered the possibility of diplomat and deputy chairman Count Reventlow “representing Venstre”, this phrase being put in quotation marks in the memorandum. Hvass came to the conclusion it might be troublesome for the minister to London to be considered a party representative simultaneously with assuming leadership over a politically composed delegation. These alternatives were discussed in some detail simply due to the rule that restricted the number of representatives to five main representatives, thereby not allowing for the highest status to be given to a cabinet member plus five party representatives. In Hvass’ memorandum, former permanent representative to the League of Nations William Borberg was already labelled permanent representative to the United Nations Organisation. A number of other potential delegates were also mentioned, representing women, economy, social matters, hygiene, and the military.20 Before the new foreign minister, diplomat Gustav Rasmussen, requested party nominations, he received a message from his predecessor, John Christmas M ller, announcing that he and two other politicians had been nominated by the conservative party as substitutes. However, M ller himself did not intend to participate, and asked that inquiries be directed to the first substitute.21 Already the following day, Rasmussen informed the chairmen of both houses of parliament that the government sought to appoint five delegates upon the suggestion of the Riksdag, and asked for their respective nominations.22 The request was modelled after those asking for the nomination of delegates to the Assembly of the League of Nations.23 One day later the newspaper Politiken reported on the nominations by individual parties: social democrat Hartvig Frisch, agrarian liberal cabinet member Per Federspiel, the conservative future foreign minister, Ole Bj rn Kraft, radical liberal world federalist Hermod Lannung, and the communist resistance fighter and former minister Mogens Fog. The delegation was prominently staffed, with all nominees other than Federspiel also serving as members of parliament. The appointments of two tiny parties with less than a handful of parliament members were mentioned, too: the right-wing
–––––––––––––– 20 Memorandum by Frants Hvass, 11 December 1945, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1946. 21 Note by M ller to Rasmussen, 17 December 1945, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1946. 22 Letter by Rasmussen to the chairmen of parliament, 18 December 1945, NAC, FM 1946– 72, 119.H.2.a.1946. 23 Note by Borberg, 19 December 1945, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1946.
147 CHAPTER 3
‘Danish Unity’ and the libertarian Georgist ‘Justice League’.24 However, when the foreign ministry sent material to the party nominees two days before Christmas Eve, only the five larger parties were taken into account.25 The communists later withdrew their nomination of Fog, appointing legislator Ib N rlund in his place.26 On 3 January 1946, the delegation met in Copenhagen. The agenda of the forthcoming session was discussed, and Foreign Minister Rasmussen asked the party appointees to reflect on priorities for a Danish contribution to the general debate of the General Assembly. Moreover, the planned order of chairmanship and delegates’ appointments was explained.27 On the following day the foreign minister and representatives of the four traditional parties were designated as ‘representatives’. The communist representative, as well as the delegation’s deputy chairman Reventlow and the intended future permanent representative Borberg, were designated as ‘alternate representatives’.28 This discrimination was protested by communist leader Aksel Larsen, who pointed to the fact that his party had eighteen representatives in the Folketing (lower house), whereas the radical liberals only had eleven. In his answer, Rasmussen explained that the combined number of representatives in both houses of parliament had been decisive for the assignment of status. He also maintained that the categorical label given to the delegation members was merely a technicality and that the communist representative would enjoy the same status as the other delegates.29 The structure of six main committees working under the General Assembly offered the possibility of assigning one field of main responsibility to the chairman of the delegation and all five parliamentary representatives. N rlund was made responsible for the third committee, which dealt with social matters.30
–––––––––––––– 24 Note on the delegates. Politiken (19 December 1945). The alleged appointees mentioned in the note were reported as members of the Danish delegation to Oslo by the Norwegian minister in Copenhagen, August Esmarch, see the cable, 20 December 1945, NAO, FM 1940–49, 30.5/6. 25 Letters by the foreign ministry to party nominees, 22 December 1945, NAC, FM 1946– 72, 119.H.2.a.1946. 26 Letter by Aksel Larsen to the foreign ministry, 25 December 1945, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1946. 27 Minutes of the meeting of 3 January 1946, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1946. 28 Cabinet decision, 4 January 1946, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1946; on intentions in regard to Borberg cf. the memorandum by Frants Hvass, 11 December 1945, ibid. 29 Letter by Larsen to Rasmussen, 5 January 1946, and reply by Rasmussen, same date, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1946. 30 Cable by Rasmussen to the foreign ministry, 11 January 1946, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1946.
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Parliamentary delegates call the tune … There is agreement that the run of career diplomat Gustav Rasmussen as foreign minister was no success story; he served as foreign minister during the minority governments of the early postwar years, the agrarian liberal government under Knud Kristensen, 1945 to 1947, and the subsequent social democratic government under Hans Hedtoft, 1947 to 1950. To give the leadership of the foreign ministry to Rasmussen, who was a skilled diplomat but a person lacking both political basis and political ambition, has been characterised as a misapprehension. Yet it was a move that enabled Hedtoft to exert greater influence on foreign policy than he would have been able to otherwise.31 According to Thorsten B. Olesen, Rasmussen’s problem could be attributed to the fact that foreign policy in his tenure “was not reserved for the sober considerations of foreign ministry expertise, but was eminently turned into a territory for party political rivalries – a discipline he was in no way trained to handle”.32 Evidence from UN delegations as well as a lack of authority within his own ministry supports this assessment. Director General Frants Hvass reportedly mobbed his boss in front of others at the General Assembly.33 Under these circumstances, the involvement of politicians in the delegation was necessary to give Denmark some manoeuvring room in international relations. An example of this is the drafting of Rasmussen’s main speech at the first part of the first session of the General Assembly, a task assigned to Per Federspiel, the political delegate of the government party.34 In his memoirs, the conservative delegate Ole Bj rn Kraft gave the following explanation: Gustav Rasmussen was a diplomat, his language that of diplomats. But towards this Assembly one had to talk more openly, more directly, if one wanted to be heard. Times had changed, one had to use timely language towards men who understood the times.35
–––––––––––––– 31 Niels-J rgen Haagerup. “Fra Christmas M ller til Per Haekkerup: Om hovedlinien i dansk udenrigspolitik siden 1945 og de skiftende danske udenrigsministre.” Fremtiden 17 (1962) 7: 13–16, at 14. 32 Thorsten Borring Olesen. “Udenrigsminister i indenrigspolitisk klemme: Gustav Rasmussen som udenrigsminister 1945–1950.” Vandkunsten (1994) 9/10: 26–49, at 27. 33 Arne Ording. Dagb ker, vol. 2: 24. juli 1945 – 4. april 1949. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2003. 462. 34 See the minutes of the delegation meeting, 14 January 1946, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2./46/Bilag. 35 Ole Bj rn Kraft. Frem mod nye tider: En konservativ politikers erindringer 1945–47. Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1973. 116.
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Thus, the Danish speech warned of “the grave danger of a German migration spreading over Europe in this direction or that […] as a result of the sheer pressure of population from within”. Moreover, it suggested considering “means of guiding and directing this migration away from the frontiers of the territory assigned to the German people into channels less dangerous to the very future existence of neighbouring peoples”. In retrospect, this principle was said to be applicable to German refugees who had “overflowed into neighbouring territories, not least into Denmark”.36 After his participation in the second part of the session, the former League of Nations delegate Kraft came to believe that politicians formed a more prominent element in the United Nations than they had done in the diplomatically-bound predecessor organisation. In Kraft’s view, this furthered greater liberty, better decision making, and more influence for public opinion.37 It is likely he had in mind his own delegation, in which he had sometimes felt the need to underline the governmental character of the common mission, however.38 It was the politicians who prevented Denmark from taking the untenable position favoured by the colonial administration of Greenland, the foreign ministry, and the government, according to which the delegation should do everything it could to keep Greenland from being “dragged” into the discussions on Chapter XI of the Charter and, if necessary, to maintain the position that the island did not come under its provisions.39 Chapter XI deals with ‘non-self-governing territories’ and, apart from binding them to a number of idealist goals, Article 73 requests –––––––––––––– 36 General Assembly, Plenary Meetings 1 (1946) 1: 129. On German refugees in Denmark see: Jens E. Olesen, “Flucht, Internierung und Isolation: Aspekte dänischer Fl cht- lingspolitik 1945–1949.” Der Ostseeraum: Vom Zweiten Weltkrieg zum Kalten Krieg. Robert Bohn, Thomas Wegener Friis and Michael F. Scholz (eds). Middelfart: Friis, 2007. 243–269. 37 Kraft 1947: 10. 38 Minutes of the delegation meetings, 14 November & 9 December 1946, NAC, FM 1946– 72, 119.H.2.b/46. 39 Whereas differences between the delegation to the General Assembly and the foreign ministry (and even within the foreign ministry) have been noted in scholarly accounts, the role of the political delegates within the delegation has so far been overlooked, cf. Mininnguaq Kleist. “En etisk-politisk analyse af dokumenterne angående Gr nlands indlemmelse i Danmark.” Kilder til Fær ernes og Gr nlands historie. Hallbera West and Maria Amalia Heinesen (eds). T rshavn: Fr skaparfelag, 2004. 128–183, at 132–133; Afvikling af Gr nlands kolonistatus 1945–54: En historisk udredning. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2007. 132–136; another account, which underlines the personal role of Hermod Lannung, does not pay attention to his status as a political representative nor to the role of other political representatives and the political representatives as a group, see Finn Petersen. Gr nlandssagens behandling i FN 1946–54. Odense: Universitetsforlag, 1975. 14.
150 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS the power holders to regularly transmit statistical and other information relating to economic, social, and educational conditions in their colonies. The political delegates found it clear that the Charter provisions applied to Greenland and that there was a necessity for reporting activity.40 In order to change the Danish position, they drew up a letter to the foreign ministry stating that the majority of delegates shared this opinion. They suggested a wait-and-see approach, and to perhaps, after renewed consultations, offer the prospect of a report. Already three days later they sent a second letter stating that, in the light of several inquiries, the delegation now regarded it opportune to announce that a report was to be submitted.41 The ministry gave the go-ahead to hold out the prospect of a report in case the matter was brought on the agenda.42 The parliamentary delegates were far from consensus on all aspects. With their own colony in mind, opinions varied as to how critical Denmark’s comment should be to the suggestion of South West Africa being incorporated into the Union of South Africa.43 There was a controversy over whether the Danish contribution to the general discussion of the Fourth Committee should mention Greenland and whether it should offer unsolicited information about the colony. Thereby the fronts hardened to such an extent that one group underlined the governmental character of the delegation, the other group referring to their authority vested in representing the “majority in the Rigsdag”.44 Some hours later, the Danish representative announced in the Fourth Committee: “As far as Greenland is concerned Denmark has taken the necessary steps to furnish the information called for in the Charter”.45 Differences in the delegation lingered in regard to the Danish colony.46 However, the newly adopted position forced the administration of Greenland to produce a draft titled “Information concerning Greenland as requested under Art. 73 e of the Charter of the United Nations”, which was discussed and edited in the delegation. It stated:
–––––––––––––– 40 Letter by the Administration of Greenland (Gr nlands styrelse) as mentioned in the delegation meeting of 18 October 1946, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.b/46; minutes of the delegation meeting, 26 October 1946, ibid. 41 Letters of 28 & 31 October 1946, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.b/46. 42 Afvikling af Gr nlands kolonistatus 2007: 132. 43 Minutes of the delegation meeting, 11 November 1946, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.b/46. 44 Minutes of the delegation meeting, 14 November 1946, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.b/46. 45 Quoted from: Afvikling af Gr nlands kolonistatus 2007: 134; cf. the summary record in: General Assembly, Fourth Committee 1 (1946) 2 (Trusteeship 1): 109. 46 See the letter by legal adviser Georg Cohn to the director general of the Foreign Ministry, Frants Hvass, 27 November 1946, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.b/46.
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Denmark’s policy in Greenland pursues the sole object of protecting and developing the Greenland population so that in time it may attain an economic and social-ethical standard which will enable it to live in free communication with the rest of the world. For this reason Greenland is a closed area, which means that only ships sent out by the Danish Government, ships holding special permits issued by the Danish Government, or ships authorized to do so by treaty, will be allowed to navigate in Greenland waters. Persons not belonging to the Greenland community will be allowed to enter the country only subject to the permission of the Danish Government. In the delegation, the phrases italicised above were underlined and furnished with question marks in the margin.47 While it has not been possible to assess the influence of politicians on the final wording of the report, it is clear that the political element in the delegation saved Denmark from the embarrassment of a major conflict with the United Nations on a colonial matter that would have thwarted the subsequent initiative in connection with the constitutional reform of 1953, namely, to obtain the approval of the world organisation for the incorporation of Greenland into the ‘mother land’. This move was a rare variant of decolonisation, a delicate matter that had potential to cause irritation within the framework of the United Nations and to become linked with other colonial issues in an undesirable way. The Danish action was sanctioned by the General Assembly on 22 November 1954; this would have been unthinkable had Denmark not shown a cooperative attitude in 1946 (and it would have been unthinkable under all circumstances only a few years later). It was the personal success of the radical liberal politician Hermod Lannung, who managed the Danish work in the Fourth Committee for more than twenty years and skilfully – partly in conflict with the foreign ministry and the strong, then social democratic foreign minister H. C. Hansen, who strived for the same goal – orchestrated Danish demeanour and international recognition.48 –––––––––––––– 47 English-language draft of 30 November 1946, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.b/46; cf. the minutes of the delegation meeting, 5 December 1946, ibid.; cf. on the fate of the report Afvikling af Gr nlands kolonistatus 2007: 136–137; for a summary of the information actually transmitted by the government of Denmark, see United Nations document A/324, 28 July 1947, reprinted in Hallbera West and Maria Amalia Heinesen (eds). Kilder til Fær ernes og Gr nlands historie. T rshavn: Fr skaparfelag, 2004. 201–202. 48 Cf. the appreciation of Lannung’s role by Nils Svenningsen. “Tidsrummet 1919–1961.” Den danske udenrigstjeneste 1770–1970, vol. 2: 1919–1970. Copenhagen: Schultz, 1970. 342; on the questionable nature of Danish proceedings: Ole Espersen. “Summary and Main Conclusions.” The Right to National Self-determination: The Faroe Islands and Greenland. Sj r ur Skaale (ed.). Leiden: Nijhoff, 2004. 1–12; Gudmundur Alfredsson. “Greenland under Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter: A Continuing International Law Dispute.” The Right to National Self-determination: The Faroe Islands and Greenland. Sj r ur Skaale (continued)
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A confused picture of policy making in the delegation of autumn 1946 can be noted for the treatment of the ‘Spanish question’, an issue in which Norway was much engaged. At one of the early meetings, acting chairman Kauffmann had left it to the politicians in the delegation to determine Denmark’s position.49 Later, Rasmussen joined the delegation and decreed a cautious line. The Foreign Minister’s reminder that he, himself, was responsible and his declaration that he was unable to please all delegates again met with the argument of a ‘parliamentary majority’ for a activist position – this time in vain.50 Another instance of confusion regarding authority was apparent at the meeting with the delegation in Copenhagen, in advance of the General Assembly. Hartvig Frisch underlined that one of Rasmussen’s speeches at the session in London had not given voice to the opinion of all delegates. He therefore asked the principle question: To what extent are single Danish representatives responsible for their speeches. The issue was adjourned at the meeting,51 but no follow-up seems to have taken place. When the communist delegate later criticised the acting chairman’s single-handed negotiations with other Nordic representatives, stemming from his fear Denmark might have given the impression of “bloc building”, Frisch defended the chairman’s right to determine participation in such informal negotiations.52 Uneasiness over the presence of a communist in the Danish delegation was palpable at the following session. Nonetheless, Foreign Minister Rasmussen argued against an early departure of political delegates in general, claiming that many important decisions were made at the end of the assembly and that civil servants were uncomfortable with making decisions in intricate situations.53 Decision making in the Danish delegation to the United Nations followed a collegiate style at the time, with Rasmussen in a central but weak position. Given the politicised General Assembly deliberations and the intense lobbying by other delegations, this approach resulted in an at-times
–––––––––––––– (ed.). Leiden: Nijhoff, 2004. 49–94, at 93; on conflicts of Lannung with the foreign ministry and Hansen: S rensen/Haagerup 1956: 106; Petersen 1975: 37–38, 99 note 12; minutes of the UN delegation meeting in Copenhagen, 17 June 1954, NAC, PM, Delivery 1974, 119.D.9. Another matter is that Greenland and the Greenlanders are “the closest Danes come to national repression in a political-Freudian sense” (J rgen Schleimann. “Vor koloni-arv.” Fremtiden 28 (1973) 5: 3–4, at 3). 49 Minutes of the delegation meeting, 18 October 1946, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.b/46. 50 Cf. minutes of the delegation meeting, 10 December 1946, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.b/46. 51 Minutes of the delegation meeting, 18 October 1946, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.b/46. 52 Minutes of the delegation meeting, 23 November 1946, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.b/46. 53 Minutes of the delegation meeting, 21 October 1947, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.b/46.
153 CHAPTER 3 erratic policy. An editorial published in the newspaper Information sympathised with strong individual delegation members: It is about time to put an end to this comedy. Either the delegation to the UN acts according to its own estimation, i.e. as responsible members of the assembly, like everybody ought to act, or else one might play the same game as the other member states and use the delegation as chess pawn. But then the government must know how it wants the pawn moved – not place it over and over again on one field, holding it tight while mumbling hesitantly, and then in the last second moving it over to a completely different place. This is not foreign policy. This is nonsense. And you cannot expect anything else, as long as we have neither a foreign policy nor a foreign minister.54 When the conservative politician Ole Bj rn Kraft participated in his first General Assembly in the capacity of a foreign minister in winter 1951/1952 an observer noted: “Once Denmark has a foreign minister, it has also a foreign policy.”55 Kraft supplemented the general instruction for the delegation to the General Assembly with an explanation that, in the United Nations, only members had the right to vote – and that only states were members. Thus, all statements put forward by the delegates had to conform to the opinion of the Danish state, “and that means […] the current government at a particular point in time”.56 Kraft also changed Danish policy in regard to Security Council membership. Discussions on possible Danish membership in the Council can be traced to the early days of the United Nations, when the problem arose that someone had to occupy and thereby preserve the seat which was reserved for Western Europe by the so called “gentlemen’s agreement” of London 1946.57 Instructions to Danish delegations at that time made clear that Denmark was not interested in becoming a member of the Council and that the delegates should make this understood if necessary.58 The delegation to the second part of the first session, which Kraft was a member of, found this approach too categorical. In a letter to the foreign ministry, the delegation wrote it shared the reserved attitude but, in order to avoid the risk of being outclassed, “Denmark should not contribute in creating the impression that Denmark is not ready to take the full-value responsibilities
–––––––––––––– 54 o. “De kovendte.” Information (12 December 1949); cf. Erling Bj l. “‘Danmark optræder som klovn’!” Information (12 December 1949). 55 Erling Bj l. “Hvorfor DK stemte med Sovjetunionen imod Amerika.” Information (28 January 1952). 56 Instruction, 2 November 1951, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.d.1951. 57 See G tz 2008c. 58 See e.g. the instructions of 7 January 1946 and 17 October 1946, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.46, 119.H.2.b.1946.
154 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS connected to membership in the United Nations by taking a negative stance under all circumstances”.59 Contemporary observers had reason for regarding 1950 as a year in which it would eventually have been Denmark’s turn to run for a seat in the Security Council. However, only two years later, when the foreign minister was the ambitious politician Ole Bj rn Kraft, not the overly cautious career diplomat Gustav Rasmussen, did the Danish government take this step. Denmark was elected to the Security Council by the UN General Assembly on 25 October 1952.60
… but who carries the tune? At the time when the authority of the foreign minister was low and the possibility of political delegates influencing policy high, there was concern in the foreign ministry that the Danish order would lead to internal fragmentation and weaken the country’s performance in international affairs. Moreover, the lack of continuity in delegation work due to temporary parliamentary affiliates troubled the ministry, particularly when periodical assignments were written over from one politician to the other. Thus, when Nordic representation in the United Nations was set on the agenda for the meeting of Nordic foreign ministers in May 1947, the Danish foreign ministry’s legal adviser, Georg Cohn, drafted a background paper underlining the peculiarities of the Danish delegation order. In the paper, he stressed that the delegation was “not a purely government delegation, as the majority of members is nominated by the political parties and in practise feel as representatives of these, to a certain extent”. He saw this model as reminiscent of currents during the First World War, aiming at the establishment of “a real world parliament” with direct representation of the people. Cohn noted that the League of Nations and the United Nations were only based on the representation of governments. As he saw it, the Danish order had the advantage of co-responsibility of parliament, with the disadvantage of fragmentation compared to other countries’ more coherent appearance. He described the Danish approach as unique and something unlikely to be copied by the other Nordic countries unless it were to be introduced on a global level. As a participant of all sessions to the League of Nations, Cohn should have been aware of the common Nordic tradition in regard to the composition of delegations. Moreover, he should have been aware of the –––––––––––––– 59 Letter from the delegation to the foreign ministry, 28 October 1946, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.b/46. 60 See G tz 2005c.
155 CHAPTER 3 political element in Norwegian delegations, not least as he himself had participated in the second part of the first session of the General Assembly. Cohn’s ignorance might have an explanation in the Danish appointment procedure, by which letters were directed to the chairmen of both houses of parliament. This gave a formal precedence to parliament and party groups and therefore had a particular quality. Moreover, while Cohn, in his paper, maintained that the Danish tradition had “attained such customary status that it cannot be changed any more”, a change was exactly what he sympathised with under prevailing conditions.61 When, after the elections of fall 1947 and their poor outcome for the radical liberals and communists, a foreign ministry official suggested the number of parliamentary representatives be reduced to three or four, Cohn commented that one government and one opposition representative should suffice in meeting requirements of control. He maintained that the idea of parliamentary representation was an “outdated” throw-back to the time of the founding of the League of Nations. Now he demonstrated awareness that a few other countries sent parliamentary delegates and observed that in comparison, these countries were “weakened in their ability to act, as it is ultimately the government, and solely so, which has to make decisions and be responsible for them”.62 The next day, Cohn produced an overview of different countries’ practises in delegation composition. He broke down the different types as follows: The group of the four Scandinavian countries that appointed parliamentarians as the primary representatives, although he could not tell whether there was an element of party representation in the non-Danish members of the group. The second group consisted of twelve countries with one or several parliamentarians in the delegation, although he could not tell whether they participated in their capacity as parliamentarians. Finally, the third group consisted of countries with delegations consisting of solely diplomats.63 Despite such reasoning, Foreign Minister Rasmussen asked the chairmen of Parliament to approve the proposal of sending four members of the Danish delegation to the third session of the General Assembly.64 Hence, in 1948 the delegate of the communists was withdrawn, even though their party had barely received 0.1 percentage point and one deputy less in the elections than the radical liberals. However, the right of parties to participate in parliamentary committee work required ten members of
–––––––––––––– 61 Memorandum by Cohn, 6 May 1947, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.D.2.a. 62 Memorandum by J. Rechendorff, 16 April 1948, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.1948; Note by Georg Cohn, 19 April 1948, ibid. 63 Memorandum by Georg Cohn, 20 April 1948, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.D.9.a. 64 Letter by Gustav Rasmussen, 30 April, 1948, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.1948.
156 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS parliament, leaving out the communists with their nine mandates. In its turn, the right to participate in the committee work was regarded a prerequisite for the right to nominate a delegate to the General Assembly. Two newcomers were among the appointed representatives, a trait that Cohn regarded as having led to a “significantly changed composition” of the delegation and having given rise to concern for the continuity in the work and in the perspectives applied. He therefore suggested his own participation.65 Cohn stayed in Copenhagen, but the number of foreign service members on the delegation was doubled from three to six delegates. Upon a newspaper report about attempts by constituents of the conservative delegate Kristen Amby to seek another representative with greater presence at home,66 Cohn got a welcome opportunity to publicly present his view: As matters stand, I, personally, am an adherent of concentrating our participation in the UN work somewhat more here in the foreign ministry, but on the other side, I am not blind to the conflicts with the democratic train of thought lying in the wish for direct contact of the involved government offices, which address the various issues with the parties and the people in the individual countries. Despite what he called a handicap resultant from an unsteady delegation, Cohn suggested a middle way be navigated between the poles represented by the state administration and democratic representation.67 The newspaper Nationaltidende went somewhat further, claiming that participation in international cooperation had “developed into a special subject posing particular demands” not always compatible with parliament mandates or other activities.68 When the appointment of the Danish delegation to the second part of the third session came up on the agenda, the United Nations office in the foreign ministry considered whether it was sufficient to designate one representative for the party in government and one representative for the opposition (in the context of overall slim representation). However, Foreign Minister Rasmussen chose to hear the party representatives on the matter before his decision.69 At a meeting in Copenhagen the majority of the
–––––––––––––– 65 Memorandum by Georg Cohn, 28 June 1948, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.1948; on the appointment cf. the answer of the administration of parliament, 4 June 1948, ibid. 66 On Amby’s constituents: B. “Utilfredsstillende Vilkaar for Danmarks FN-Delegater.” Nationaltidende (23 November 1948). 67 B. “FN-Arbejdet er mere for Diplomater end Politikere.” Nationaltidende (24 November 1948). 68 B. “Utilfredsstillende Vilkaar for Danmarks FN-Delegater.” Nationaltidende (23 November 1948). 69 Memorandum, December 1948 [?], NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.b.1948–49.
157 CHAPTER 3 politicians argued for their continued presence in the delegation – the circle of proponents included Amby, who was seemingly untroubled by the concern over his constituency. In contrast to the political appointees, the trade union representative regarded his own presence unnecessary and suggested the social democratic representative be commissioned with issues of interest for the trade unions.70 When Denmark’s participation in the fourth session of the General Assembly was planned, detailed deliberations of achievements and requirements of Danish delegations took place in the foreign ministry. In a memorandum, official Finn T. B. Friis set out the goal of composing the delegation in such a way and providing it with such working conditions that its performance would be in conformity both with requirements of the United Nations and with “Denmark’s general prestige”. At the same time, he had to meet the budgetary requirement of “holding the number of members in the delegation down to reasonable proportions”. Friis regarded the traditional representation of political parties as likely constituting a “fixed element” with twenty years of tradition at the League of Nations, and conceded that this feature had facilitated smooth cooperation on United Nations issues between the minority government and the supporting and opposition parties. He mentioned two politicians characterised by excellent matter-of-fact performances. However, he also pointed to problems with political delegates and, in particular, the risk that other responsibilities might curtail their participation, possibly even forcing them to return home early. Moreover, he pointed to instances of insufficient language skills, as well as to the tendency of politicians to turn down assignments that seemed uninteresting to them, leading them to cluster in the First (political) Committee instead. Friis went on to note that, in the previous two years, political delegates had not functioned as the interface between the United Nations and the people of Denmark, a role that could have been expected based on the experiences of 1946 and 1947. He excused this failure with “the general pessimism that has surrounded the UN work”. In addition to these reflections on political delegates, Friis questioned the usefulness of including many high-ranking civil servants from the foreign ministry in the delegation. In his view, those who had been present had not been engaged in the committee work to any large extent.71 Asked for comment on the memorandum, former Director General of the Foreign Ministry Frants Hvass explained the richness of detail in his annotation by stating that he had felt “a little uneasy that one might get the –––––––––––––– 70 Minutes of the delegation meeting in Copenhagen, 10 January 1949, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.b.1948–49. 71 Memorandum by Finn Friis, 15 June 1949, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.D.9.a.
158 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS impression from reading the memorandum that particularly the political representatives had not made some prominent effort”. In contrast to Friis, he stressed politicians’ acceptance of various assignments and established that less interesting issues justified less prominent coverage, whereas politically appreciated issues justified intensified coverage, for example by a representative of the government and the opposition, respectively (particularly in the times of a minority government). He also claimed that language difficulties posed no problem and that political representatives continued to facilitate knowledge about the United Nations to the broader population. Finally, he underlined the significance of considering various problems from all angles at delegation meetings, and advocated the inclusion of one higher civil servant to the delegation.72 Subsequent records point to an increased concentration of political delegation members’ interest in the two political committees (First Committee and Ad-hoc Committee, the predecessor of the Special Political Committee).73 By 1951, the former legislator Hermod Lannung was the only politician to remain in charge of his own committee, namely, the Fourth Committee dealing with colonial issues. All other committees were either headed by the foreign minister or by civil servants; Minister to Reykjavík Bodil Begtrup, who was responsible for the Third (social) Committee, presented an ambiguous case as she participated in her capacity of a representative for women’s organisations.74 At the same time, the political representatives were increasingly relieved of writing reports on the committees they attended. In 1953, for the first time, all reports were written by civil servants.75 When, some years later, one of the political representatives suggested he and his colleagues be considered for leadership in committee work, he was reminded that this was the old order, which had been given up upon the political representatives’ own request.76 The system of committee assignments reserved the First (political) Committee for the social democrats, the Special Political Committee for the conservatives, the Second (economic) Committee for the agrarian liberals, the Third (social) Committee for the Justice League and women’s
–––––––––––––– 72 Annotation by Frants Hvass, 30 June 1949, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.D.9.a. 73 Memorandum by the UN delegation, December 1950, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.D.9.a; Memorandum by William Borberg [?], 30 September 1952, ibid., NAC, PM, Delivery 1974, 119.D.9. 74 Outline for the delegation work, 5 November 1951, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.D.9.a. 75 Copy of a letter by permanent representative William Borberg to the foreign ministry, 14 May 1954, NAC, PM, Delivery 1974, 119.D.9. 76 Minutes of a delegation meeting in Copenhagen, 17 June 1954, NAC, PM, Delivery 1974, 119.D.9.
159 CHAPTER 3 organisations, and the Fourth (colonial) Committee for the radical liberals.77 Adding to these ambiguities, legal adviser Cohn was not an out- and-out proponent of civil service dominance in delegations to the United Nations, either. His criticism calling the parliamentary representation model outdated seems to have been the consequence of adaptation to ‘realities’ of international relations in the post-Second World War order – ‘realities’ that he actually disliked.78 He argued in favour of strengthening the foreign service element in Danish delegations, while also working for the dissemination of what could be called ‘the ideas of 1918’. For example, at a meeting of the Danish delegation to the United Nations in Copenhagen in February 1949, Cohn proposed an international discussion address the composition of delegations. The minutes of the meeting give the following summary of his suggestion: 1. The composition of delegations. Denmark was particularly eligible to present proposals about this, as the four leading political parties are represented in our delegation. One could, e.g., suggest to the individual countries that the composition of their delegations ought to give a somewhat more multi-sided representation of various groups of the population. Most countries’ delegations represent only the sitting government, thereby precluding internal collaboration. Hence, one ought to think of representation for women, for workers, for young people, etc. 2. A representation at the United Nations could possibly [should] be created for the Inter-parliamentary Union [Association] or other similar forces, so that not solely governments would be represented during the assemblies. The discussion of these proposals in the delegation and among the political delegates was reserved. On the one hand, the Scandinavian countries and the United States were characterised as countries that had partly realised these goals. On the other hand, there were concerns about the appropriateness of suggesting this to Great Britain, whose government explicitly favoured a solely governmental order, or to France, a country that would have to include communists on the delegation. Yet another argument was that the whole idea failed to work in dictatorships, even if these regimes sent representatives of different social strata and associations.79 Thus, there were times at the beginning of the Cold War that Danish
–––––––––––––– 77 Christian Winther. “Danmark i Forenede Nationer.” Politiken (2 February 1961). 78 See Cohn’s comment on the Dumbarton Oaks proposal, 22 March 1945, NAC, EW, Delivery 1983, 11.C.3. 79 Minutes of the delegation meeting, 23 February 1949, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.b.1948–49. Cohn’s handwritten insertions are italicised.
160 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS politicians did not regard it opportune to go in for societal international relations. Cohn presented similar ideas in the Danish commission convened to discuss the possible revision of the United Nations Charter in August 1954, this time presenting his thoughts as an analysis. In his view, it was possible to attribute the Charter’s failure to unfold along the hoped-for lines to the organisation and construction of the United Nations, which was “based on the official representation by the member states’ governments and [did] not give room to significant socio-political and economical forces directly to maintain their influence”. Social democratic Foreign Minister H. C. Hansen remarked that a general debate on these issues might lead too far, and he suggested limiting deliberations to practical steps regarding the forthcoming conference on Charter revision, a suggestion observed by politicians and others participating in the commission.80 Cohn lamented over the priority of national interests in international negotiations and the inability to see the peoples’ diversity. In an interview, he suggested the United Nations seek the involvement of young people, old people, women, races, the stateless, employers, and workers.81
Making a temporary delegation permanent In response to an international questionnaire in the late 1940s which asked respondents to describe the composition of delegations to the world organisation, the Danish foreign ministry drafted the following answer: As was the case at the Assemblies of the League of Nations the delegations at the General Assemblies of the United Nations include the minister of Foreign Affairs as chairman, 4–5 members of parliament (designated by the main political parties); in addition, a number of officials of diplomatic service or of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs as alternates and advisers. Moreover the delegation includes one member appointed on the suggestion of the women’s organizations. In actual fact there is a considerable degree of continuity, many delegates and advisers being reappointed at several sessions.82 The trade union delegate appointed to all Danish delegations, usually under the category of ‘advisers’, was not mentioned in the draft. The omission probably reflects foreign ministry considerations to abolish this slot for a
–––––––––––––– 80 Minutes of the meeting, 24 August 1954, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.B.6.a. 81 Anders Georg. “Efter ti Aars storpolitisk Hovedpine: FN-Jubilæum med Problemer – men ogsaa med Resultater [Interview with Georg Cohn].” Berlingske Tidende (24 April 1955). 82 Finn Friis. “Elements for reply to the questionnaire attached to document SS/SC.I/1.” [1949?]. NAC, FM 1946–72, 119. D.7.
161 CHAPTER 3 civil society representative.83 Otherwise, the above description gives an apt portrayal of the ideal Danish delegation to the United Nations up to the mid-1960s. The same holds for the following sketch, which was prepared at the same occasion: The main task of the permanent delegates is to follow the work of the United Nations and prepare reports thereon to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Further to act as an intermediary with regard to transmission of official correspondence. The Danish representation at smaller meetings or conferences is sometimes entrusted to the permanent delegate – often in collaboration with special representatives from Denmark.84 The poor status of the permanent representative might have contributed to a Danish foreign ministry obsession with the issue of continuity of delegations, which is in contrast to the more relaxed attitude shown in Norway and Sweden. The bureaucratic rather than ‘charismatic’ Danish approach to delegation planning and delegation work is an important factor. Denmark’s permanent representative to the League of Nations in the years 1928 to 1940, William Borberg, was early conceived as permanent representative at the United Nations by the director general of the foreign ministry.85 Foreign Minister Gustav Rasmussen did not have as clear a notion of membership requirements for the world organisation. After the initial session of the General Assembly in London he maintained that Denmark might establish a permanent mission, underlining at the same time that a final assessment of the necessity of such a step had not yet been made.86 Interviewed upon his return to Copenhagen the following day, the first thing Rasmussen did was announce that Denmark intended to employ a minister at the United Nations: “We had that already at the League of Nations in Geneva, and now […] I find much more reason for it.”87 A memorandum prepared by the foreign ministry in summer 1946 proposed Denmark go ahead with planning and inspecting possible premises by September, but no initiative was taken to this effect.88 Minister William Borberg participated in the Danish delegation in both parts of the –––––––––––––– 83 Memorandum on personnel policy of Finn Friis of 15 June 1949, Comment of Frants Hvass of 30 June 1949, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.D.9.a. Only at the eleventh session of the General Assembly was the trade union representative appointed as ‘alternate representative’. 84 Finn Friis. “Elements for reply to the questionnaire attached to document SS/SC.I/1.” [1949?] NAC, FM 1946–72, 119. D.7. 85 Memorandum by Frants Hvass, 11 December 1945, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1946. 86 E., S. “De forenede Nationers Betydning for Danmark.” Berlingske Tidende (16 February 1946). 87 “Lufthavns-Samtale med den hjemvendte Udenrigsminister.” Berlingske Tidende (17 February 1946). 88 Cf. memorandum by Axel Serup, 20 July 1946, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.D.4.
162 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS first session of the General Assembly, but he filled this role as a foreign ministry official – not as permanent representative. While some exchange of ideas on the future organisation of participation in the United Nations did take place within the Danish delegation to the General Assembly in autumn 1946, these deliberations with the foreign minister did not lead to a concrete notion of when and how to proceed. It was the Minister to Washington, Henrik Kauffmann, who finally got the ball rolling with a 17- page memorandum on Danish (and other) participation in the United Nations. His motivation for the initiative seems to have been the difficulty he and his staff experienced in acting as the substitute communication link to the United Nations. Kauffmann anticipated that the permanent representative to the world organisation would probably hold one of Denmark’s most important observatory posts, and recommended its establishment as soon as possible.89 The Danish permanent mission at the United Nations was established in March 1947.90 In the beginning, Borberg’s position as permanent representative was difficult. Kauffmann was still the Danish ‘Mr. United Nations’, according to his own self-conception and in the understanding of the foreign ministry. In a complaint to the director general of the foreign ministry in early 1948, Borberg reported that Kauffmann described himself as “a kind of Erik Scavenius”. This is a remarkable identification for a leading antagonist of Danish collaboration with the Nazis, with a man who was the foreign and prime minister of Denmark in the early 1940s. However, despite his own critical attitude toward the League of Nations, Scavenius had previously also served as the chairman of the Danish delegation to Geneva in the foreign minister’s absence as Borberg’s superior. The remark suggested a hierarchy between the Ambassador to Washington, Henrik Kauffmann, and the permanent representative in the rank of minister, William Borberg, in United Nations issues. At the same time, Borberg complained about the foreign ministry’s continued communication with Kauffmann on matters that fell in his own domain.91 Kauffmann retained the position as delegation chairman in the absence of the foreign minister at the sessions in New York until 1949, his last session as a UN delegate. His substitution was due to conflicts of his own roles, in which he sometimes had to vindicate points of views that were controversial in his country of accreditation as an ambassador.
–––––––––––––– 89 Memorandum by Minister to Washington Henrik Kauffmann, 19 January 1947, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.D.1.a. 90 Folketingstidende 135 (1983/1984): col. 831 (Uffe Ellemann-Jensen). 91 Kauffmann quoted in a letter by Borberg to Hvass, 2 January 1948, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.D.4.
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At the same time the permanent mission and the UN headquarters in New York were gradually taking shape, the system of engaging the local Danish ambassador as the delegation’s deputy chairman was outdated.92 It has also become generally recognised that heads of diplomatic missions to the host states of international conferences ought not to serve as members of their national delegations, as this double function might be problematic and the host countries of international organisations tend to discourage this practice.93 Starting from 1950, Borberg was regularly appointed as deputy chairman of the delegation and, in 1952, he was promoted to the rank of Ambassador.94 After Borberg’s retirement on 1 January 1956, Karl I. Eskelund became Denmark’s permanent representative and deputy chairman of delegation. Because of his critical attitude towards Western powers he was replaced by Aage Hessellund Jensen, who was a deputy chairman of the delegation and permanent representative from 1958 until spring 1964.95 However, the deputy chairmanship of permanent representatives had already become secondary by 1957, subaltern to that held by a politician. This hierarchy was not established in order to strengthen the position of politicians – it was a result of momentary circumstances. The formation of a majority government in May 1957 resulted in Ernst Christiansen, the cabinet minister without portfolio responsible for the United Nations and the European Council, having to leave the government. When asked whether he would continue to serve on the delegation or not, he set the condition that leadership of the delegation in the absence of Minister of Trade Jens Otto Krag, who later went on to become foreign minister, be left to him. Moreover, by that time Eskelund
–––––––––––––– 92 Memorandum on Danish UN delegations by Eskil Svane, no date [1964], NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.d.1964. 93 Shabtai Rosenne. “Conferences and Congresses, International.” Encyclopedia of Public International Law, vol. 9: International Relations and Legal Cooperation in General, Diplomacy and Consular Relations. Rudolf Dolzer et al. (eds). Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1986. 27–33, at 31. 94 In regard to the year 1950, doubts prevail as to who actually functioned as deputy chairman. However, it has been assumed that the permanent delegate had that function, cf. Memorandum on Danish UN delegations by Eskil Svane, no date [1964], NAC, FM 1946– 72, 119.H.2.d.1964. 95 On Eskelund’s replacement see: Frode Jakobsen. Jeg vil vaere en fugl f r jeg d r. Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1979. 88; regarding the deputy chairmanship of the permanent delegate from the twelfth to the fifteenth Assembly, see the memorandum on Danish UN delegations by Eskil Svane, no date [1964], NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.d.1964 (in the reports to parliament, this status is only mentioned from the sixteenth Assembly).
164 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS had become party to deep antagonism from the foreign ministry.96 After Christiansen’s retirement, the order of a social democratic legislator serving as first deputy chairman of the delegation was preserved in 1961 under Per Hækkerup, who later became foreign minister and in the years 1962–1965 under Frode Jakobsen, the leading social democratic resistance fighter in the Second World War. The government had planned to transfer the deputy leadership of the delegation to the permanent representative in 1962, but Jakobsen took the position as a matter of prestige. Despite an outsider status in his own party and an ungovernable reputation, Jakobsen succeeded.97 The permanent mission to the United Nations was the first multilateral Danish mission established after the Second World War. Despite the permanent representatives’ status problems in the first twenty years, the mission and the position of permanent representative retained a prominent if somewhat chequered role in Danish diplomacy.98 Denmark did not even have a permanent delegate at the United Nations in early 1947, when legal adviser Georg Cohn requested the legations in London, Hague, Brussels, and Oslo to gather information about the extent to which their host countries’ delegations were considered in commission outside General Assembly sessions. He wanted to know “in particular whether it is considered having a kind of permanent status as such, regardless that its composition can vary with political conditions”. In case of a positive answer Cohn wished to be informed about the activities of the delegation between sessions and about the organisation of its cooperation with the foreign ministry.99 The replies were all negative, but in the Norwegian foreign ministry there had been considerations in both the delegation and the ministry to make the delegation “a half-permanent advisory organ”; nonetheless, none of these ideas had yet led to specific measures.100 In Denmark, the conception of the delegation as having a more permanent character was not only put forward by the foreign ministry, but
–––––––––––––– 96 Christian Winther. “Hvis vor FN-politik skal være effektiv: Ambassad ren b r beklæde formandsposten.” Berlingske Tidende (10 June 1966). 97 “Strid i Danmarks delegation i FN om formandspost.” Politiken (15 September 1962). On 12 September 1962 Permanent Representative to the United Nations Aage Hessellund Jensen was appointed as deputy chairman, only on 24 September was Jakobsen appointed as first deputy, see the documents 12 & 24 September 1962, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1962; cf. “Frode Jakobsen ska være formand for FN-delegationen.” Information (17 September 1962). 98 Cf. Bj l 1983: 89, 94–95. 99 Letters by Cohn, 8 January 1947, NAC, FM 1946–72, H.2.a.1946. 100 Note by the Norwegian foreign ministry, 24 January 1947, NAC, FM 1946–72, H.2.a.1946.
165 CHAPTER 3 also by politicians. It seems the notion of permanence and inter-session contact had its origin with political representatives who felt inadequately prepared for their task.101 When it became clear in 1948 that two of four primary representatives of the political parties were newcomers, Cohn expressed his concern about the change in the staffing of the delegation and about continuity in work and views.102 At the same time, the periods between the meetings were seen as increasingly problematic by the foreign ministry.103 By early 1949 such concerns, coupled with the inability of the General Assembly to cope with its agenda in the scheduled time frame, led the Foreign Minister to suggest considering delegates appointed until further notice. At the same time, it was understood that the parties would always have the option of replacing their representatives. The idea of the foreign ministry regularly supplying the political appointees with information seems to have functioned well. The plan to also establish regular meetings once every three months was not realised due to time restraints, but also due to a lack of substantial matters to be discussed.104 The foreign ministry’s attempts to stabilise the delegation were successful. The average number of attended sessions among political delegates rose steadily from 3.3 in 1949 to 8.0 in 1956. With the exception of 1958 – an unusual year with three female appointees among the political delegates – the figure remained above the average mark of 4.0 sessions until 1968. In the years 1949 to 1955 the same four political delegates attended the General Assembly: social democrat Alsing Andersen, conservative Kristen Amby, agrarian liberal Henry L. W. Jensen, and radical liberal Hermod Lannung. Andersen and Amby had additional delegation assignments in the second half of the 1950s, and Jensen and Lannung remained, with short interruptions, delegation frequenters until the end of the 1960s. Jensen was himself a member of parliament only at some sessions, and Lannung merely when he served as representative to the first session of the General Assembly. His only interruption in a series of annual –––––––––––––– 101 Memorandum by Minister to Washington Henrik Kauffmann, 19 January 1947, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.D.1.a; cf. Ole Bj rn Kraft. “Fra Folkeforbund til Forenede Nationer.” Freds-Bladet 56 (1947) 2: 9–10, at 10. 102 Memorandum by Cohn, 28 June 1948, NAC, FM 1946–72, H.2.1948. 103 B. “Utilfredsstillende Vilkaar for Danmarks FN-Delegater.” Nationaltidende (23 November 1948). 104 See the delegation meeting in Copenhagen, 10 January 1949, NAC, FM 1946–72, H.2.1948–49; comment by Frants Hvass, 30 June 1949, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.D.9.a; memorandum by the U.N. delegation, December 1950, ibid; memorandum by J. Rechendorff, 26 January 1951, ibid.
166 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS reappointments to the UN delegation was the period 1957 to 1960, when he spent his second term in parliament. The ideal of permanence was most easily implemented with non-legislators. However, the seemingly similar cases of Lannung and Jensen differ. Whereas Lannung was a skilful delegate, highly regarded in the foreign ministry and in the United Nations, Jensen did not enjoy comparable esteem. Shortly before Jensen’s retirement, an official noted that, in all his years on the delegation, Jensen had never said a word in the committee to which he was assigned.105 Thus, standing party appointments could both express high or low regard of the United Nations assignment; the radical liberals with their affinity to the peace movement installed their own United Nations professional, whereas the agrarian liberals, with their bread-and-butter priorities, simply outsourced the task to a modestly qualified individual in their ranks. While Danish parties usually appointed substitute representatives, the practice of employing them did not become common before 1957. It was not until 1965 that an order was established, defining how the party seat on the delegation was to be shared between two representatives. This aspect of Danish delegation policy can be contrasted with policy in Sweden and Norway, where an alteration model was not regarded as particularly problematic and where it was applied since at least 1950.
A system under reconsideration After the delegation to the thirteenth session of the General Assembly had gathered for a kick-off meeting in Copenhagen, it was noted that the idea of sharing seats between two alternating political delegates on the delegation had gained ground. Apart from the radical liberals, all parties had replaced their delegates at the previous session, and the picture was the same in 1958. This time an official in the foreign ministry pointed to the fact that there was a tradition of appointments for the whole session (with a few exceptions), despite the lack of any formal decree on the matter. She expressed concern both about consequences for the work of the delegation and for the costs occasioned, and asked for a principle decision on the matter.106 In his comment, Director General Nils Svenningsen stated he agreed with Prime Minister Hansen: Ad hoc decision making on this matter should prevail at the coming session, whereas a principle agreement should be made with the party leaders for the next session.107 –––––––––––––– 105 Memorandum by the head of the Political Division, Gunnar Seidenfaden, 16 February 1967, NAC, FM 1946–72, H.2.a.1967. 106 Memorandum by Bodil Begtrup, 29 August 1958, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.D.9.a. 107 Note by Nils Svenningsen, 4 September 1958, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.D.9.a.
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The following year, newly appointed Foreign Minister Jens Otto Krag noted that newcomers were nominated at every session. As he saw it, the patchwork suggested by Svenningsen was no adequate response. Instead, he proposed to “tackle the issue in a radical way and prepare the suggestion for a completely new order”. For this purpose he requested that other countries’ delegations be studied, in particular those of Norway, Sweden, Finland, and the United Kingdom. Krag expressed his conviction that the parliamentary element in the delegation should be preserved, even though its presence might have to be reduced to shorter periods.108 In addition to the countries suggested by Krag, the foreign ministry reviewed practises in the Netherlands and Belgium. Apart from the United Kingdom, all countries of reference regularly included political representatives from the opposition in their delegation. In his conclusions, the head of the United Nations section in the foreign ministry, Venzel Ulrik Hammershaimb, discarded the idea of giving observer status to the politicians as he felt this might give the impression of demotion. In his view, the representation of political parties in the UN delegation was “so time-honoured it is impossible to change it – let alone considerably”. In order to balance the discontinuity in the political part of the delegation and in the light of politicians’ preference for participation in the political committees, Hammershaimb suggested the creation of a “staff of experts, who might become the core of the professional work”.109 Thereupon Krag explained that the overview of other countries’ practises had convinced him the participation of parliamentary representatives should continue without change, except in cases granting mid-session access to alteration and in those where the delegation should include an additional expert.110 After the following session, Krag made his Director General readdress the issues of concern. Due to the parliamentary elections in autumn 1960, the presence of politicians was particularly curtailed. Now the question was raised as to whether the status of observers might be more easily compatible with short-term visits limited to a few weeks or not.111 Reform ideas were flanked by the leading Danish journalist on foreign affairs, Erik Seidenfaden, who claimed it an “open secret that the selection of the Danish parliamentary UN delegation is by and large done like a kind of annual Christmas lottery” – the prize being a visit to the United States. In his opinion, the official explanation for familiarising as many legislators with the United Nations as possible overlooked the need –––––––––––––– 108 Memorandum by Krag, 11 June 1959, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.D.9.a. 109 Memorandum by Hammershaimb, 12 February 1960, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.D.9.a. 110 Decree by Krag, 7 March 1960, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.D.9.a. 111 Memorandum by Svenningsen, 23 November 1960, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.D.9.a.
168 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS for efficiency. He regarded the appointment of a “better delegation” as necessary for improved performance at the United Nations.112 In another article, his journalist colleague and delegate at the previous session, Christian Winther, asked if parliamentary representation in the UN delegation had “outlived its utility”, which he described as a functioning circle of representative consultants for the foreign minister as it had existed at the League of Nations. In his view, the increasing tendency of sending non-parliamentarians as political representatives raised the question of whether parliamentary representation on the delegation should be maintained under the longer sessions in New York. Winther also addressed the issue of continuity at the delegation for members of the foreign service and praised the idea of familiarising as many politicians and civil servants with the UN as possible in the following way: “This is an excellent way of thinking. It is merely destructive in regard to efficiency.”113 A third journalist proposed the adoption of the model of the United States, with the appointment of a politician as permanent representative to the United Nations, possibly with cabinet rank, as well as a representative for the government and for the opposition at the General Assembly.114 In the foreign ministry, a “Law on the Procedure Regarding the Appointment of the Danish Delegation to the General Assemblies of the United Nations” was drafted in early 1961. It stipulated that Parliament, after each election, choose five members to participate regularly “as counsellors” in the work of the delegation. Thus, after the electoral success of the Socialist People’s Party, the number of representatives was adjusted to the number of parties in the foreign policy committee. At the same time it was decreed that elections to the delegation be based on proportionals. For each member, a deputy was to be elected; the deputy was authorised to replace the main member at an ongoing session, if the government found it justified by “weighty considerations”. The draft law further stipulated: It will be the task of the counsellors, elected by parliament in consultation with the representatives designated by the government, to arrange the Danish contribution to the General Assembly in accordance with the governmental instructions as well as supervising its implementation in the plenary and committees.
–––––––––––––– 112 Erik Seidenfaden. “Omkring Danmark i FN: En uddybning af de sidste dages kritiske bemærkninger.” Information (11 January 1961); the remark regarding the prize is taken from a statement of Seidenfaden on TV three years later, see Erik Neergaard Jacobsen. “Nordisk trekamp og dansk tvekamp.” B. T. (20 January 1964). 113 Christian Winther. “Danmark i Forenede Nationer.” Politiken (2 February 1961). 114 Anders Georg. “Vor mand i New York.” Berlingske Tidende (15 February 1961).
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The draft went on to state that former members of parliament were eligible for appointment, if qualified, and that other delegates could also be recruited among various societal groups, not least from business circles. Special mention was made regarding the desirability of political appointees serving for subsequent legislative periods. Finally, it was noted that the introduction of the suggested order did not require the form of a law, but could be based on political consultations and a letter by the foreign minister to parliament asking for the appointment of “five representatives (advisers)” to the UN delegation for the period until the next election.115 A memorandum shows that the choice of the vague term “advisers” (rådgivere) was a conscious one and, according to one reading, stood in contrast to the term “delegates”.116 One of the ideas in this connection, later rejected by the parliamentary committee on foreign service legislation, was to move the political delegates from the Danish seat to the back-seat and advance the civil servants to the front.117 There was principle agreement in the committee as to the desirability of greater continuity, but the proposal was regarded as too rigid because it called for legislators willing to be overseas for four months of the year for four subsequent years. Krag suggested allowing either suggestion for compromise, namely, a model with two alternating long- term delegates for each party and a model that allowed one and the same political delegate to take a two- or three- week break in Copenhagen during the session of the General Assembly. Also discussed was the issue of whether political delegates should act as spokespersons in the committees without being given any clear-cut policy recommendations. Krag believed that a suitable order would stipulate the assignment of routine work to civil servants and the deployment of politicians whenever considered appropriate, after consultation with the delegation chairperson. Some voices were raised to request only current members of parliament be eligible to act as political delegates.118 The committee agreed on the following guidelines:
–––––––––––––– 115 Draft law and remarks, 31 January 1961, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.D.9.a. 116 Memorandum, 1 February 1961, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.D.9.a. Among the ambiguities of the term is the open question of whether it was meant to be read as a descriptive term or as a category of delegates listed in the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, the official Danish translation of the legal term ‘advisers’ being ‘rådgivere’. 117 Letter by the Swedish Ambassador in Copenhagen Stig Sahlin to Foreign Minister Östen Undén, 2 march 1961, FMAS, HP 48 D, vol. 66. 118 Letter by Krag to the parliamentary committee, regarding legislation on the foreign service, 23 February 1961, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.D.9.a.
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1. It is of crucial significance to preserve the combination of politicians and civil servants in the composition of the delegation, firstly for the sake of the work of the delegation, secondly to enable the connection between this work and the parliamentary groups to become as intimate as possible. 2. It is desirable that the Minister of Foreign Affairs spend a somewhat longer period as chairman of the delegation than was the case before the 16th General Assembly. 3. The parliamentary groups ought to aim at letting members represent them, who, by virtue of their position in the groups, can be regarded as representative for their foreign-policy points of view. 4. From the same principle, the party representatives ought to normally be members of parliament and, in any case, active politicians. 5. The groups’ representatives shall, as far as possible, be appointed for a whole legislative period, so that replacement is usually only done after a general election. 6. The groups shall also aim to appoint representatives who can participate for the whole session; only as a rare exception should they alternate during the session’s course. In return, the representatives shall have the right to one journey home during the meeting in order to better enable them to keep in touch with domestic political life and to inform the groups about the course of the General Assembly hitherto.119
These guidelines were implemented at the sixteenth session of the General Assembly, with social democratic member of parliament Per Hækkerup, who soon went on to become foreign minister, acting as chairman of the delegation in the absence of Foreign Minister Krag. Upon his return to Copenhagen, Hækkerup wrote the programmatic memorandum: “A strengthening of the Danish contribution to the United Nations” to address the issues of the delegation’s composition, its relation to the foreign ministry, its everyday work, and its cooperation at Nordic, Western European and Atlantic levels. In regard to the political delegates, Hækkerup noted less alteration than at previous sessions, although he wrongly stated that only two parties replaced their delegate mid-session (in reality the number was three of five). He also pointed to the desirability of greater continuity among other delegates, among civil servants from the foreign ministry in particular, and argued for enlargement of the delegation and the permanent mission.120
–––––––––––––– 119 Quoted from a memorandum by Per Hækkerup, April 1962, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.D.2.b. 120 Memorandum by Hækkerup, April 1962, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.D.2.b; cf. on the alteration of delegates: De forenede Nationers … Plenarf rsamling: Beretning til Rigsdagen 16 (1961): 958.
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Tug-of-war between politicians and diplomats At the eighteenth session of the General Assembly, the Danish delegation became “out of balance” due to the illness of the parliamentary deputy chairman of the delegation, Frode Jacobsen, and the transfer of the acting chairmanship to permanent representative Aage Hessellund Jensen.121 After the session, the long-term delegate from the agrarian liberal party, Henry L. W. Jensen, launched an attack on the foreign minister, the foreign ministry and the members of the permanent Danish mission to the United Nations (thereby exempting Hessellund Jensen from the criticism) for having merely tolerated parliamentary representatives and for excluding them from the flow of information between Copenhagen and New York. He voiced the suspicion that Foreign Minister Hækkerup might strive for the exclusion of non-left-wing politicians.122 In a discussion broadcast on television, he even warned of civil servants “on the way to reintroducing enlightened absolutism”.123 The former conservative foreign minister, Ole Bj rn Kraft, who attended a number of General Assembly sessions in the early 1960s, also indicated there had been problems and that a decision had to be made about whether the opposition should continue participating in the delegation or not. As he saw it, political representation was to be preserved, but explicit rules on the relation of civil servants and politicians were needed and opposition representatives were to be integrated as equals.124 The incident remained a tempest in a teapot. After a discussion with former delegates, organised by the Danish United Nations Association, foreign ministry representative Troels Oldenburg summarised: “All politicians were extremely friendly, almost too friendly, towards the ‘very competent’ civil servants in the foreign service.” He also noted “Especially Henry L. W. Jensen did everything to stress that he had never said anything bad about the civil servants. The conflicts had prevailed among the politicians themselves”.125 Oldenburg had earlier felt the attack might in reality have aimed at the Foreign Minister rather than at the foreign service.126 One reason for the frustration of Henry L. W. Jensen,
–––––––––––––– 121 “FN-kritikken fulgt op af en anden delegeret.” Fyns Tidende (4 January 1964). 122 “Folketingsrepræsentanterne bliver kun lige taalt i FN.” Fyns Tidende (31 December 1963). 123 Erik Neergaard Jacobsen. “Nordisk trekamp og dansk tvekamp.” B. T. (20 January 1964). 124 Vagn Fleischer Michaelsen. “Danmark maa ikke vende sig ensidigt mod Syd.” Jyllands- Posten (14 January 1964); cf. “Dansk splid i FN.” Aalborg Stiftstidende (6 January 1964). 125 Letter by Deputy Head of the Political Division Troels Oldenburg, to Hessellund Jensen, 29 February 1964, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.D.9.a. 126 Letter by Oldenburg to Hessellund Jensen, 23 January 1964, NAC, PM, Delivery 1997, 119.D.9.
172 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS which was not noted at the time, was the refusal of Hækkerup to grant representation on the delegation to a Danish merchants’ organisation (the Grosserer-Societetets Komité) in which Jensen had been a long-time vice chairman.127 Jensen’s expressed dissatisfaction at the United Nations Association discussion with his assignment to the Second (economic) Committee comes as somewhat as a surprise because it both suited his own political profile and had a long tradition.128 The issue of foreign service dominance was not addressed directly in the minutes of a meeting held between party representatives in the foreign ministry in May 1964. Rather, the six principles of 1961 were reviewed. Hækkerup said he believed in the advantage of continuance of political representatives’ participation because it clarified potential differences in opinion and enabled representatives to inform their parties, giving them a chance to call for a meeting of the foreign policy committee. He also said that politicians should act as the delegation’s main spokespersons and the civil servants as their counsellors. Furthermore, he underlined that committee assignments should be made by the chairman of the delegation. There was agreement on these points, but the socialist representative asked for the recognition of a party representative’s option to “give up his status as actual representative in the delegation and rather become an observer” – a recommendation with which the foreign minister agreed.129 At approximately the same time as these discussions were underway, the designated Danish permanent representative to the United Nations, Hans Tabor, began working for a development in the opposite direction. As he described it later the Danish practice of parliamentary representation reminded him “of a sack-race with a couple of dogs jumping around the track”.130 Thus, in a letter to Hækkerup, Tabor expressed “considerable interest” in the prevailing order of chairmanship, according to which a politician was the foreign minister’s main deputy. Tabor wrote that his interest was dictated by the wish to make his tenure as effective as possible and concluded an order installing the permanent representative as –––––––––––––– 127 Letter by Per Hækkerup, 14 May 1963, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.D.9.a. In his initial attack Jensen criticised the lack of inclusion of business, among other things, see “Folketingsrepræsentanterne bliver kun lige taalt i FN.” Fyns Tidende (31 December 1963). 128 This was not part of Jensen’s original criticism, but it was his main point at the U.N.A. meeting, cf. Oldenburg’s letter to Hessellund Jensen, 29 February 1964, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.D.9.a. 129 Minutes of the meeting of 28 May 1964 [30 May 1964], NAC, PM, Delivery 1997, 119.D.9. 130 Hans Tabor. Diplomat blandt Politikere: Erindringer. Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1995. 105.
173 CHAPTER 3 chairman of the delegation in the absence of the foreign minister “would improve Denmark’s possibilities to make the best contacts and thus increase our influence within the UN”. He was informed about Hækkerup’s preferences, writing he was not as pessimistic as the Foreign Minister in regard to the chance of making the politicians accept such a reform.131 In his memoirs, Tabor writes that already before his UN appointment, Hækkerup had let him understand that he considered the composition of the Danish delegation as an obstacle to effective small state participation in international negotiations.132 Part of the story is the strained relation between the social democratic foreign minister and the parliamentary acting chairman of the delegation in the years 1962 to 1965, the former resistance fighter Frode Jakobsen, likewise a social democrat. As reported by Hækkerup’s secretary, his boss regarded Jakobsen as inept in the role of delegation leader and therefore he himself felt compelled to attend the General Assembly for as long as possible.133 The conflict is also expressed in Jakobsen’s memoirs: “I rarely agreed with Hækkerup. This turned into a continuous tug-of-war. But he was stronger. It was he who was foreign minister. It was me who had to yield. This undermined my satisfaction.”134 Whereas sympathisers characterised Jakobsen as the best foreign minister Denmark never got, others doubted his qualification as a political leader. For example, Hans Tabor, underlines his personal appreciation and the benefit he had from Jakobsen’s insights. However, at the same time he describes Jakobsen as a complicated person who failed in providing political synthesis and guidance.135 With this backdrop, a memorandum on the composition of the Danish delegation to the United Nations was produced in the foreign ministry to both describe the subject and attempt to put forth a “theoretical analysis” of arguments for and against the “political element” in UN delegations. Arguments listed in favour were (1) the advantage of representation of the nation and not just of the government; (2) enabling the opposition to exercise control; (3) better information of the parties through
–––––––––––––– 131 Letter by then representative to the European Communities in Brussels, Hans Tabor, to Hækkerup, 31 January 1964, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.D.9.a. 132 Tabor 1995: 104. 133 Minister’s secretary, Bj rn Olsen, according to a strictly confidential memorandum on troubles with parliamentary delegates in Denmark, communicated by press officer Benkt Jerneck of the Swedish embassy in Copenhagen, 24 November 1964, FMAS, HP 48 D, vol. 84. 134 Jakobsen 1979: 92. 135 Tabor 1995: 106; on the characterization by Mogens Camre see: Pasquale. “Forbifarten.” Information (15 June 1966); cf. Jakobsen: J rgen Schleimann. “Attentatet på Frode Jakobsen.” Information (11 January 1966).
174 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS their representatives, and (4) enhancing politicians’ competence in foreign affairs. On the debit side, the memorandum listed (1) the potential of weakening the capacity of the delegation to act; (2) the role conflict caused by the tasks to act as party representative internally and as government representative externally; (3) that it was, in reality, not possible to exert parliamentary control on the spot, and (4) that United Nations politics was not limited to the period of General Assembly sessions, but a perennial phenomenon. Given these considerations, the author of the memorandum suggested a reform of the working mode of the delegation based on the different functions, which the party representatives and the civil servants can be assumed to exercise. Thus, one could acknowledge that a civil servant has the duty to carry out the work imposed by the sitting government, while the political representatives are placed in such a way that they get permission to only express their parties’ view and their personal convictions within the delegation.136 Moreover, the memorandum described the Nordic countries as unique among United Nations members in having strong political representation in their delegations. Denmark was considered special for granting parliamentarians particularly great influence in the delegation work. It assumed that Denmark was the only country to have a parliamentarian who was not a cabinet member as acting chairman of the delegation in the absence of the foreign minister.137 A subsequent memorandum focused on the position of the permanent representative, pointing out that most countries made their permanent representative first deputy chairman of the delegation. The paper called for a Danish adjustment in order to strengthen the position of permanent representative and to achieve conformity with what was customary and practicable.138 A newspaper article by Christian Winther paralleled many of the memoranda’s ideas, and sharpened the argument: Strong parliamentary representation in delegations to the United Nations was a kind of Nordic Sonderweg: “And within the Nordic countries, Denmark has been the only country to give its parliamentarians an almost domineering influence during the General Assembly period and degraded its ambassador to a kind of chief of secretariat.” Arguing against a viewpoint expressed in an article by –––––––––––––– 136 Memorandum by Eskil Svane, [1964], NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.d.1964; in a later copy in (see 119.H.2.d.1966) the crossed through phrase was replaced by the italicised phrase. 137 Ibid. The memorandum also considered Norway and Sweden, but it overlooked that in the Swedish delegation deputy leadership had been assumed by parliamentary delegate Rickard Sandler during the late 1940s and 1950s. 138 Memorandum, 30 July 1965, NAC, PM, Delivery 1997, 119.D.9.
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Hermod Lannung, in which greater leeway was demanded for political representatives, Winther concluded that the foreign minister and his UN ambassador, not the party delegates, were crucial for making Danish interests heard in international negotiations.139 Shortly before the twentieth session of the General Assembly, Foreign Minister Hækkerup submitted a “Memorandum to the Prime Minister”, presenting detailed facts and an array of arguments for a change of the Danish system. Hækkerup claimed Denmark’s permanent representative to the United Nations had been deputy chairman until the eleventh session (a claim that overlooked that the ambassador to the host country of the session had the position as first deputy until the fourth session). He also presented detailed statistics on other delegations, observing that approximately 85 countries had chosen the permanent representative to exercise deputy chairmanship at the previous session. Approximately 30 countries installed another cabinet minister, a deputy foreign minister or under-secretary of state as deputy leader of the delegation. France was registered as the only other country with a parliamentarian as the acting chairman. Hækkerup underlined that all other Nordic countries let the permanent representative act as the foreign minister’s deputy and that there were substantial reasons to follow the majority approach. In particular, he described the perennial character of the work of the world organisation and the presence, intimate knowledge, and status enabling the permanent representative to be the most effective player in Danish UN policy. According to him, the special character of the nineteenth session, which had not been held in a regular way due to financial problems, had enabled the Danish permanent representative to achieve a better position in international negotiations than earlier; Hækkerup believed the position to be endangered if the order with a parliamentary deputy chairman was upheld. Finally, he suggested that the Danish government’s decision to seek membership in the Security Council made it advisable to give the permanent representative more weight. The memorandum ended with the request: to let the permanent representative act as the chairman’s deputy instead of maintaining the present arrangement, which Denmark is completely alone in, which is unintelligible for other countries, and which inevitably weakens Denmark’s day-to-day efforts in the UN.140
–––––––––––––– 139 Christian Winther. “Vi er et særtilfælde i FN.” Information (4 May 1965). 140 Memorandum to Prime Minister Jens Otto Krag from Foreign Minister Per Hækkerup, 23 August 1965, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1965.
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Purloined letters and purloined status For the time being, Frode Jakobsen was reappointed as acting chairman in the absence of the Foreign Minister. However, some months later, in the foreign policy debate of 13 January 1966, he lost his position as the social democratic party’s official parliamentary spokesman on foreign affairs to the benefit of the general party spokesman, Peter Nielsen. There were rumours the next step would be to deprive him of his acting chairmanship of the Danish delegation to the General Assembly.141 In the debate, the role of political delegates was taken under discussion. The cause was Denmark’s endorsement of a resolution that defined South Africa’s apartheid policy as a threat to international peace and security and also asked the Security Council for economic sanctions in conformity with Chapter VII of the Charter. In particular, the lack of coordination with the other Nordic countries gave rise to controversy.142 In this connection the spokesman of the conservative party group, Poul M ller, pointed to “communication disturbances” between the foreign ministry and the delegation in New York and continued: The issue has […] given rise to discussion, also in my party, whether our UN delegation can be regarded reasonably compound. It is like this – as has often been noted in negotiations about the delegation’s points of view, etc. – that those concerned do not represent the parties that have selected them, but the government, and some of the diplomatic contacts, which are to be taken to other countries, might be weakened because it is the party representatives of Parliament without routine, who have the seat and shall conduct these negotiations.143 He might as well have pointed to communication difficulties between the conservative party and its young delegate (the later prime minister) Poul Schl ter, who played a key role in the change of Denmark’s anti-apartheid policy. The radicalisation of policy resulted from the consensus of party delegates in New York and not from a government initiative.144 M ller’s
–––––––––––––– 141 Cf. J rgen Schleimann. “Attentatet på Frode Jakobsen.” Information (11 January 1966); cf. “Frode Jakobsen troede selv, han skulle være ordf rer.” Information (12 January 1966). 142 Cf. Lidstr m/Wiklund 1968: 104–105. 143 Folketingstidende 117 (1965/1966): col. 2583 (M ller); cf. also M ller’s statement col. 2678 and “2054 (XX). The Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa.” Resolutions and Decisions Adopted by the General Assembly During Its Session 20 (1965): 16–18. 144 Cf. Jakobsen 1979: 89; Christian Winther. “Mindre magt til vore FN-politikere: Danmarks repræsentation på FN’s generalforsamling.” Berlingske Tidende (13 June 1966); J rgen Schleimann. “FN-politikeren Christian Winther: Portræt af en naiv kyniker.” (continued)
177 CHAPTER 3 intervention gave rise to a polemic exchange of views on the role of party delegates with the socialist legislator, Kai Moltke (also know as ‘The Red Count’). The latter questioned the claim that the conservative delegates had not represented their party, and made clear that delegates were government representatives only when casting public votes and exercising public functions. “Therefore I do not act publicly and do not vote publicly.”145 Unnoticed by M ller, this confession cast some twilight on Moltke’s theoretical account of the political delegates’ two roles: party counsellors in internal deliberations on the one hand and government representatives to the outside world on the other.146 Evidently, M ller and Moltke shared doubts regarding the compatibility of these roles. By starting a discussion on the role of political delegates, M ller became an “obstetrician” for the new delegation order favoured by Hækkerup.147 In early 1966, permanent representative Hans Tabor started to work systematically for change in the delegation structure. In a memorandum, he presented a detailed overview of the thirteen Western delegations that had included one or several political representatives apart from members of the government at the twentieth session. This time, Italy also had a senator as deputy chairman, but according to Tabor this was solely a consequence of the foreign minister being elected President of the General Assembly and was not a precedent for the future. Moreover, he pointed to the fact that the presence of French parliamentarians in New York was abbreviated by their early departure, with the deputy chairmanship of the speaker of the foreign affairs committee being a mere formality. The rest of the paper was concerned with the position of political representatives, which led Tabor to class the countries into three groups, depending on politicians’ integration into the actual work of the respective delegation. Denmark, together with Belgium, Finland, and Sweden, made up the group in which politicians held ‘the seat’ in the committees. Denmark was described as the only country whose seat-holders in committees did not yield to the permanent representative for important contributions. Tabor gave a particularly detailed account of Norway, where a generation change had taken place at the twentieth session of the General Assembly. Political representatives continued to be appointed in the high status categories of ‘representatives’ and ‘alternate representatives’ but in reality had been given the role of
–––––––––––––– Information (14 June 1966); Kai Moltke. “Danmarks FN-delegation.” Berlingske Tidende (16 June 1966). 145 Folketingstidende 117 (1965/1966): col. 2607 (Moltke). 146 Folketingstidende 117 (1965/1966): col. 2679 (Moltke). 147 Tabor 1995: 108.
178 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS observers. He had also been confidentially informed that the Swedish mission considered a change according to the Norwegian example.148 In an accompanying letter to the Director General of the Foreign Ministry, Tabor expressed the hope that his memorandum might be useful for the organisation and composition of the Danish delegation to the coming session. He mentioned four political delegates from the previous session (Poul Schl ter among them) who agreed with giving deputy chairmanship to the permanent representative as well as with the decoupling of party and governmental representation. At the same time, he described the three ‘old-timers’ Jakobsen, Jensen, and Lannung as obstacles to the establishment of a new order, and suggested individual solutions (dismissal as chairman, ‘wait and see’, and ‘grand finale’). In his view, the issues of acting chairmanship and politicians’ roles were interrelated. The argument for a new order lay in the presumption that qualified civil servants would be more efficient players in the committee work. Another argument was that civil servants, not politicians, would have an easier time following a line of policy that was a compromise between different political points of view. Furthermore, Tabor suggested that a new distribution of labour would enable shorter visits of political representatives, making the trip to New York attractive for top-ranking politicians.149 When the spokespersons of the five larger party groups were invited by Foreign Minister Hækkerup to a meeting on parliamentary participation in the delegation to the United Nations, he was in the position of introducing the change in the role of party delegates as an issue raised by the conservative opposition. As he presented it, giving political delegates the role of advisers would not imply any greater difference in practice, but offer the advantage of providing them with greater freedom of action during their visit to New York. An implication of such a new order was that the permanent representative – not a politician – would have to act as his deputy delegation chairman. According to Hækkerup, the prevailing “mixture of the government’s authorisation and the parliamentary element was wrong in principle and, to his knowledge, was not practised by other countries, not even Norway and Sweden, where the politicians’ status was rather consultative”. In the copy of the minutes preserved in the foreign ministry, the (incorrect) allegation “and Sweden” was cramped and might not have been included in the copy sent to the party groups. It was the conservative spokesman Poul M ller in particular who agreed there was good reason for such a change in the status of politicians,
–––––––––––––– 148 Memorandum by Hans Tabor, 28 February 1966, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1966. 149 Letter by Tabor to Paul Fischer, 28 February 1966, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1966.
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“which freed the parties from that shared responsibility for the government’s position, a consequence of the party representatives’ participation in a government delegation”. Upon his consideration that a new delegation policy might, with some justification, give rise to the public asking what the purpose of the politicians’ stay in New York really was, Hækkerup suggested the educational function for legislators be advertised. From this perspective, of the three principles he portrayed as relevant for appointments, namely, current membership of parliament, continuity over several years, and prominence, only the first would remain relevant. The meeting ended with the leaders of the party groups promising they would discuss these matters in their parties.150 When the foreign ministry sent the minutes of the meeting to the participants, the information included a background paper, which described the Danish system of old, the potential liberties of a new delegation order, and Norwegian arguments for a new policy.151 However, the radical liberals rejected Hækkerup’s suggestion, and a controversy emerged in the social democratic party on the future role of Frode Jakobsen, who was backed by Prime Minister Krag.152 At a party board meeting, the social democrats endorsed Hækkerup’s suggestion – on the condition Jakobsen keep the delegation’s deputy chair.153 The socialist position is even less clear, possibly as a consequence of tensions between delegation frequenter Kai Moltke and party leader Aksel Larsen.154 According to the former, his party merely agreed to the suggestion to install mainly government represen- tatives as spokespersons in the committee work of the General Assembly. At the same time, he sympathised with the idea of appointing a deputy foreign minister, and thereby implicitly suggesting Jakobsen.155 A few months later, Larsen sent a letter to Hækkerup informing him that Moltke was seriously ill and had been replaced by another delegate. He included an –––––––––––––– 150 Minutes of the meeting of 24 May 1966 [dated 25 May 1966], NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1966. 151 Memorandum on political members of the UN delegation, 25 May 1966, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1966. 152 Krag seems to have held the opinion that Jakobsen had to be compensated for the delegation chair in order to be prevented from defecting to the socialist party; cf. Finnish Ambassador Päiv Kaukomieli Tarjanne according to a letter by the Swedish Ambassador in Copenhagen, 6 July 1966, FMAS, HP 48 D, vol. 89. 153 Cf. the articles “Politisk uenighed om sammensætningen af FN-delegationen” Politiken, cited in Udenrigsministeriets avis oversigt (28 May 1966); “Hækkerup har tabt slaget om FN-delegationen.” Information (2 June 1966); Kai Moltke. “Indvælges Danmark i FNs sikkerhedsråd?” SF Bladet (25 June 1966). 154 Cf. Jakobsen 1979: 91. 155 Kai Moltke. “Indvælges Danmark i FNs sikkerhedsråd?” SF Bladet (25 June 1966); cf. Kai Moltke. “Danmarks FN-delegation.” Berlingske Tidende (16 June 1966).
180 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS almost five-month-old letter to the foreign minister, previously unsent. The letter said the socialist party agreed to the adviser status of political representatives as suggested by the foreign ministry.156 By that time, Jakobsen had refused a new appointment as ‘disarmament ambassador’ in Geneva, a post thought of as a refuge for him. However, at the time of his refusal he announced he would no longer be available as delegation chairman in New York, declaring to the Danish news agency: “It has often been difficult for me to endorse the policy that is implemented, and unfortunately there is some indication that it will become even more difficult.”157 In the press he was portrayed as a victim of Hækkerup’s cleansing, and he himself pointed to obstacles that had been put in his way and to his reservations about the political delegates being “reduced to observers, to tourists”.158 When Krag informed Hækkerup, who was in India at the time, that he now intended to offer the position of disarmament ambassador to the radical liberals, the latter suggested the offer be coupled with a request that the party’s position on politicians’ roles in the UN delegation be reconsidered.159 At the same time, Krag had offered the social democratic seat on the delegation to party secretary Niels Matthiasen on the understanding that this appointment did not imply succession of Jakobsen as acting delegation chairman.160 In talks before the opening of the General Assembly, a preliminary new consensus among the parties emerged, with the common thought being that political delegates should participate “as advisers of the government” in the future. A proposal for a detailed set of rules defining the position of the delegates was announced after the Foreign Minister’s return from New York.161 The set of rules was drafted in the foreign ministry over the course of a month. The final draft was characterised by streamlining and, from the
–––––––––––––– 156 Letters by Larsen to Hækkerup, 25 May & 10 October 1966, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1966. 157 Jakobsen 1979: 92–93; cf. “Rene linier i FN.” Aalborg Stiftstidende (14 September 1966). 158 “Hækkerup’s udrensning.” Ekstrabladet (2 September 1966); “Frode Jakobsen: Man lagde mig for mange hindringer i vejen.” Information (3 September 1966). Jakobsen returned as an ordinary delegation member at the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly in 1973. 159 Cable by Krag to Hækkerup, 30 August 1966, and cable by Hækkerup to Krag, 1 September 1966, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1966. 160 Cable by social democratic deputy party group leader Aksel Ivan Pedersen to social democratic party group leader Carl Petersen, 1 September 1966, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1966. 161 Letter by Hækkerup to the leaders of the five party groups, 19 September 1966, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1966.
181 CHAPTER 3 perspective of political representatives, a number of changes for the worse. For example, the first draft said: The political party representatives participate in full extent in the delegation’s internal morning meetings and can, as guidance for the government representatives, make their opinion known in such a way that they only bind their party to a particular opinion, when this is explicitly invoked. In the second draft the first italicised phrase was left out, and in the final draft even the second italicised phrase had gone. Moreover, in the second draft, a rule on professional confidentiality was spelled out. It was combined with the indication that, apart from what this rule implied, party representatives were entitled to continuous communication with their party groups and to publicly express their views. These specifications of delegates’ rights were left out of the two subsequent steps. Other rules stated that representatives of political parties were accredited in the category of ‘advisers’ and eligible to register in and attend committees of their choice. Only if candidacy for the position of chairman, vice-chairman, or rapporteur was sought in one of the committees was the appointment of ‘alternate representative’ effected in order to meet the requirements of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly. It was spelled out that they had the right to view government instructions and requests submitted in the name of the delegation and to “reveal potential dissenting opinions for the orientation of the government”. Moreover, political representatives were allowed to participate in meetings with other delegations upon authorisation by the chairman.162 Due to the extraordinary parliamentary elections on 22 November 1966, party representatives participated in the twenty-first session of the General Assembly only in a downscaled manner. Apart from Hermod Lannung, there were no politicians on the delegation after the beginning of November. The elections are said to have taken Denmark by surprise – this characterisation probably applied most of all to conservative delegate Poul M ller, who enjoyed merely three quarters of an hour in the ‘Big Apple’ before he heard the news and returned to Copenhagen.163 While it had been maintained that the new order with observer status would not necessitate an increased number of civil servants in the
–––––––––––––– 162 Drafts on the role of political parties’ representatives in UN delegations, 11 & 12 October, 9 & 11 November 1966, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1966. 163 Knud B rge Andersen. “J. O. Krags regeringsår og oppositionsårene 1962–71.” Kamp og fornyelse: Socialdemokratiets indsats i dansk politik 1955–71. Jens Otto Krag and Knud B rge Andersen (eds). Copenhagen: Fremad, 1971. 221–397, at 321; cf. De forenede Nationers … Plenarf rsamling: Beretning til Rigsdagen 21 (1966): 1850.
182 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS delegation,164 in reality the attempt to establish a new order was flanked from the beginning by an increase in the number of civil servants. The idea was to approximately double the number of officials from Copenhagen, provided “that the political members of the delegation do not use the secretaries for irrelevant work, including private services, to an unreasonable extent”.165 However, once the planning of the delegation was done in detail, no increase was visible. In a(nother) “‘purloined letter’ (to quote Edgar Allan Poe)”, written in June 1966, Tabor was informed that the pending question of politicians’ status still made planning difficult.166 In practice, it was additional staff from the diplomatic service rather than from the home office that made the delegation function. Whereas there had been six delegates belonging to the foreign service at large, and ten political delegates in 1965, the foreign service was represented by eleven delegates and political parties by six delegates in 1966.167 In many respects 1966 is a “cutting date” in the descending prestige attached to the membership in UN delegations for Danish politicians.168 At the same time as the status of political representatives in delegations was curtailed, Per Hækkerup’s parliamentary status was upgraded. After the election he became the leader of the social democratic party group, an important position due to the (deteriorated) minority status of the social democratic government. However, the price for this progression was that he had to give up the foreign ministry. Social democratic party literature claims Hækkerup had himself asked for the change and that Prime Minister Krag was forced to take over the post of foreign minister in order to show beyond doubt that no change in foreign policy was intended.169 However, the relation of Krag and Hækkerup was strained. Krag later said he believed that Hækkerup left the government in order to see whether the prime minister would break his neck over the newly-established collaboration with the socialists.170 It was with bitterness that Hækkerup’s resigned from his position as foreign minister in
–––––––––––––– 164 “Ny alvorlig strid mellem Hækkerup og Frode Jakobsen.” Information (6 June 1966). 165 Memorandum by Eskil Svane (quote) and comment by Mogens Warberg, 27 January 1966, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1966; letter by Tabor, 17 January 1966, ibid. 166 Letter by the head of the Political Division, Gunnar Seidenfaden, to Tabor, 28 June 1966, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1966. The quote on “the purloined letter” (italics indicate English original), which was resent on 10 August 1966, is taken from the letter by Eskil Svane (foreign ministry) to Skjold Mellbin (permanent mission) of the same date, ibid. 167 In addition, the foreign service was represented by eight members of the delegation secretariat in 1965 and nine members in 1966. 168 Bj l 1983: 257. 169 Andersen 1971: 329–330. 170 Bj l 1983: 348, 417.
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September 1966, shortly after Krag had transferred matters concerning the European Communities from the foreign minister’s responsibility to that of the minister of trade.171 In order to assist Krag in some foreign policy arenas, such as the United Nations, NATO, and developing countries, Hans S lvh j was appointed as a minister without portfolio. He was perceived as a “UN [cabinet] minister”, but never got a chance to attend the General Assembly. Krag himself led the Danish delegation at the beginning of the twenty-second session, having already announced that he would appoint the career diplomat and permanent representative to the United Nations, Hans Tabor, as new foreign minister upon his return.172 Tabor merely enjoyed a four-month term and was succeeded after the parliamentary elections of January 1968 by the agrarian liberal politician Poul Hartling (who was later to become the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees).
Back from the woods On 7 February 1967 the representatives of the political parties and women’s organisations discussed their experiences from the previous session. According to a subsequent draft memorandum to Prime Minister Jens Otto Krag, the participants of the meeting shared the view that the reorganisation has reduced their status in the UN decisively, so that they now have to be regarded as essentially observers, whereas it is the permanent civil servants who ‘hold the chair’ representing the country and who lead the negotiations. According to their recollections, after one of them was authorised to speak for Denmark in one of the committees, it was underlined that this was no precedent for others. Their responsibility had mainly been limited to participation in the daily internal delegation meetings, making them comment that such a placement could not be considered consistent with the dignity of the Folketing. They compared their visit to the United Nations to “a more attractive form of picnic than one is generally familiar with” and felt their possibilities for socialising with other delegations had been reduced. Their request was to reconsider “the issue of political representation at the UN […] with the aim of re-establishing the status of –––––––––––––– 171 Jens Christensen. “F r og efter 1970: Markedsproblemer – udviklingslande – eksportfremme.” Nye Grænser: Den Danske Udenrigstjeneste 1970–1995. Copenhagen: Foreign Ministry, 1996. 31–61, at 36. 172 Folketingstidende 118 (1966/1967): col. 1412 (A.C. Normann); cf. Andersen 1971: 330; Niels-J rgen Haagerup. “Hvor mange danske udenrigsministre?” Fremtiden 29 (1974) 2: 13–15; Kaarsted, Tage. De danske ministerier 1953–1972. Copenhagen: PFA Pension, 1992. 330, 347.
184 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS the politicians”.173 Some weeks later a revised form of the draft was sent to Krag in the form of a letter by his party fellow, chairman of the parliamentary foreign affairs committee Niels Matthiasen. In this letter the request was restated as concerning “the issue of the placement of political representation at the UN”. Rather than a general “change” as requested in the original draft, Matthiasen asked for a “change in status”.174 Thus, the representation of political representation became the core issue. Although the matter was never discussed in parliament, it was made public at the party convention of the radical liberals in the end of May, when Hermod Lannung declared that those parties that had initially been less sceptical of the new delegation order had now been startled up and were ready to support the view of the radical liberals. He revealed the existence of the all-partite letter to Krag, and attributed the weakening position of the political representatives to internal social democratic strife (between Hækkerup and Jakobsen). Moreover, he criticised the foreign ministry for failing to designate sufficiently competent staff for the committees, while “experienced people among the political representatives were idle”. A resolution passed at the convention asked the government to revoke the degradation of the political representatives’ position in the UN delegation […]. The political representatives ought to be given the opportunity, as earlier, to be able to actively participate in the UN General Assembly and in the important committee work.175 In a newspaper article, Lannung added that acting chairmanship and the roles of politicians were separate issues and that Norwegian and Swedish politicians had retained their status of old.176 By that time, the foreign ministry had already reacted to the request by the politicians. The head of the political division, Gunnar Seidenfaden, immediately answered their initial draft with “preliminary remarks” – although merely in a memorandum for internal use. Seidenfaden brought matters to a head by describing politicians’ loss of status as collateral damage of the policy of efficiency enhancement and by asking whether a disregard of efficiency would be reasonable for the sake of politicians’ status and the Folketing’s dignity. However, he did not assume that –––––––––––––– 173 Draft Memorandum to Prime Minister Jens Otto Krag, 15 February 1967, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1967. 174 Copy of a letter by Matthiasen to Krag, 16 March 1967, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1967. 175 “Partierne beder Krag om bedre placering i FN-delegationen.” Information (29 May 1967). 176 Hermond Lannung. “Den danske FN-repræsentation.” Kristeligt Dagblad (13 June 1967).
185 CHAPTER 3 politicians actually strived for a prominent role in New York. Instead he believed that the whole issue was about “status ‘at home’”, a problem he believed could be resolved without jeopardising efficiency. Given the experience that the formal category to which he or she was accredited was “completely irrelevant” for the status of a delegate at the General Assembly, Seidenfaden conceded that one could easily accredit politicians as ‘representatives’ and civil servants as ‘advisers’ if only the latter remained in charge of the committee work. Despite the informal working mode of the General Assembly, Seidenfaden somewhat inconsistently asumed that the (acting) delegation chairman had to be one of the five ‘representatives’ and that the fifth political representative, as well as the civil society representatives, therefore had to “put up with lacking status”.177 Based on these and some other ideas, Seidenfaden drafted a nine- page reply to the letter Matthiasen had sent to Prime Minister Krag on behalf of the politicians. Here, following the Swedish example from the twenty-first session of the General Assembly, Seidenfaden suggested to simply reserve the category of ‘alternate representatives’ for parliamentarians.178 Whereas the draft was discarded in favour of a short letter written in the name of the prime minister by a member of the permanent mission, this idea was preserved and has been in operation ever since.179 In the letter it was underlined that the distinction between ‘representatives’ and ‘alternates’ was subtle and without substance in reality. At the same time, it was made clear that the reconfiguration merely meant a change in status, not a revision of the “existing order”.180 In Hermod Lannung’s view, Krag’s model implied “advances in a formal respect” but it was “not completely satisfactory”. It was likely
–––––––––––––– 177 Memorandum by Gunnar Seidenfaden, 16 February 1967, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1967. At the first eleven sessions of the General Assembly, an ‘alternate representative’ functioned as delegation chairman in absence of the Danish foreign minister. 178 Draft reply to Matthiasen’s letter to Krag by Gunnar Seidenfaden (not used), no date, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1967. 179 After the ‘landslide election’ of 1973, the five ‘alternate representative’ seats have not been sufficient to satisfy the parliamentary demand; therefore, from 1974 on, some politicians have always been accredited in the category of ‘advisers’. Nonetheless, the category of ‘alternate representatives’ has remained a parliamentarian domain. Another implication of the ‘landslide election’ was that representation on the delegation no longer tied to the criterion of party groups’ eligibility for representation in parliamentary committees, but rather granted to all parties, with the smaller parties sharing seats on the delegation; cf. letter by the Speaker of the Folketing Karl Skytte to Foreign Minister Ove Guldberg, 2 September 1974, NAC, FM 1973–88, 119.H.2.a.74. 180 Reply to Matthiasen’s letter to Krag, drafted by Counsellor of Embassy Skjold Mellbin, 4 July 1967, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1967.
186 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS
Lannung’s initiative that led the politicians to consider the changes promised by Krag.181 At a delegation meeting prior to the General Assembly session, it was agreed that parliamentarians interested in specific issues or speeches might replace the responsible civil servants. Moreover, if a parliamentarian was interested in a whole committee or many issues discussed therein, he might be allowed permanent agency, provided particular qualifications were met. In the foreign ministry the prevailing impression was: “The parliamentarians apart from Lannung would use this possibility only to a small degree, but they all agreed Lannung ought to have it.”182 At the session, Lannung added a vice-chairmanship in the Special Political Committee to his personal UN record.183 Final discussion of the issue took place in a series of delegation meetings headed by Prime Minister Krag. The order of parliamentarians’ accreditation as ‘alternate representatives’ was confirmed. It was decided that both a civil servant and a parliamentarian would be accredited as ‘representatives’ in single committees, thereby keeping the latter from being tied to the committee. At the same time a “gentleman agreement” determined that Hermod Lannung hold the chair in his committee, with the civil servant taking the backseat. By this arrangement, which was limited to the twenty-second session of the General Assembly, consideration was given to the special role of Lannung and the desire of other political representatives to avoid the formalisation of two classes of politicians.184 The adopted approach remained in force even later.185 In practice, it also led to an acceptance of mid-session replacements of politicians. At the age of seventy-three, Lannung had his last assignment at the twenty-third session of the General Assembly in 1968, and no politician has been in charge of a committee since. Lannung has been identified as the personality who had the most lasting influence on Denmark’s first two decades in the United Nations.186 His unique role is also illuminated by the –––––––––––––– 181 “Ændret opbygning af vor FN-delegation.” Kristeligt Dagblad (24 August 1967). 182 Note by Janus A. W. Paludan, 15 September 1967, on the meeting one day earlier, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1967. 183 “Hermod Lannung viceformand i FN-komité.” Politiken (10 October 1967). 184 Memorandum, 22 September 1967, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1967; see the margins of the copy in 119.H.2.a.1968 in regard to approbation by the politicians. On the background of the paper cf. the letter by Tabor to Matthiasen, 29 September 1967, 119.H.2.a.1967. 185 Personal letter by UN representative Otto Borch to the Head of the Political Division Troels Oldenburg, 24 September 1968, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1968; cf. “Knud Bro har ikke f lt sig som reservediplomat ved FN.” Information (15 November 1967). 186 Christian Winther. “Hvis vor FN-politik skal være effektiv: Ambassad ren b r beklæde formandsposten.” Berlingske Tidende (10 June 1966). Hermod Lannung was the first person ever to be designated chairman of one of the General Assembly’s committees for four times. From 1962 to 1970 he was the chairman of the organization Een Verden (One World) and (continued)
187 CHAPTER 3 appreciation of his work by Hækkerup and Tabor and by the observation of a civil servant: “What he needs […] is not help but rather control.”187 His retirement from the delegation marked the end of the era of outwardly active party participation in Danish delegations and also the end of continuous reappointment of party experts on the United Nations – the new delegation frequenter, radical liberal Arne Stinus, notwithstanding. The average number of sessions attended by political delegates was merely 2.4 in the period 1969 to 1975; in each of these years the figure was lower than in any year in the twenty-year period spanning from 1949 to 1968.188 Already after the twenty-fifth session a parliamentarian suggested as a novelty what had earlier been agreed upon, namely, the possibility for politicians to deliver speeches on the behalf of Denmark.189 By the second half of the 1970s, parliamentarians occupied the Danish chair during peak staffing problems, at least when no complicated voting situations were to be expected.190
Reconsideration in the first half of the 1970s By the beginning of the 1970s reconsideration of various aspects of the practice of parliamentary participation in Danish delegations to the United Nations took place. For example, League of Nations veteran Finn Friis complained once more about the lack of continuity among political
–––––––––––––– from 1977 to 1987 President of this organization’s mother organization, namely, the World Association of World Federalists (WAWF), cf. Henning Nielsen. “Hermod Lannung 100 år: Et kort biografisk rids.” FN, Europa og Rusland: Et festskrift i anledning af Hermod Lannuns 100 års dag. Thorkild M ller and Henning Nielsen (eds). Odense: Universitetsforlag, 1995. 9–21; personal communication with Tony Fleming. 187 Letter by Paludan to Tabor, 5 February 1966, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1966; on Hækkerup’s appreciation see the strictly confidential memorandum by the press officer at the Swedish embassy in Copenhagen Benkt Jerneck, 24 November 1964, FMAS, HP 48 D, vol. 84; on Lannung’s professionalism see also Tabor 1995: 106–107. 188 The average attendance of General Assembly sessions among party delegates was 5.7 in the twenty-year period 1949 to 1968. 189 Arne Stinus, Minutes of meeting in the foreign ministry with delegates to the 25th session of the General Assembly, 10 March 1971, NAC, PM, Delivery 1997, 119.D.9; the fact that parliamentarians no longer held speeches on behalf of Denmark is also made clear by the cable by permanent representative Henning Hjorth-Nielsen to foreign ministry, 19 December 1975, NAC, FM 1973–78, 119.D.9.a; after the 30th session of the General Assembly Stinus renewed his suggestion, pointing to the fact that the women organisation’s representative had held a Danish speech, see the minutes of the meeting of participants of that session, 17 February 1976, NAC, FM 1973–78, 119.H.2.a.75. 190 Minutes of the meeting with party representatives of the 33rd session of the General Assembly, 15 February 1979, NAC, FM 1973–78, 119.H.2.a.78.
188 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS representatives’ assignments.191 A civil society delegate voiced the opinion that parliamentarians largely failed at the task of informing the population about United Nations issues and Arne Stinus, the radical liberal parliamentarian and chairman of the Danish United Nations Association, described it as embarrassing that the Folketing had no practice of United Nations debates, leaving foreign ministry officials unrestricted by public deliberation.192 On another occasion, Stinus asked for earlier involvement of parliamentary delegates for the preparation of United Nations policy – a request Foreign Minister Poul Hartling sympathised with.193 Whereas this idea referred to early involvement in Copenhagen, Ove Guldberg, one of Hartling’s successors, defined the “special task” for the UN ambassador in New York to involve the “parliamentary delegation” in his considerations early on.194 The background for this view was a scandal caused by Hans Tabor upon his short lived come-back as UN ambassador in 1974. He was removed from his post after he had expressed his personal view in regard to granting the PLO the right to speak at the General Assembly. The example shows that the issue of parliamentary delegation members can be framed as one of mutual checks and balances, rather than merely as a problem of making undisciplined politicians conform to diplomatic standards. A principle debate on the position of parliamentarians in the delegation arose at a meeting in the foreign ministry with delegates to the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly. Socialist deputy Kurt Brauer maintained that parliamentarians were sometimes involved in complicated decision making issues. In his view, they should either be considered mere observers of their parties or be given more support in their daily work at the General Assembly. His party colleague seconded this point by describing his confusion about whether involvement in decision making made parliamentarians jointly responsible for the decisions reached. Politicians, even those in the same party, held different opinions about the influence of parliamentarians in practice. In the discussion, Foreign Minister Hartling advocated a pragmatic approach, maintaining that a clear-cut definition of the function of parliamentarians in the delegation was neither possible nor desirable, but rather subject to individual interests and competence. However, as governmental instructions set the framework for their agency,
–––––––––––––– 191 Finn Friis. “Forenede Nationers fremtid.” Berlingske Tidende (24 October 1970). 192 Youth delegate Uffe Torm, according to the minutes of meeting in the foreign ministry with delegates to the 25th session of the General Assembly, 10 March 1971, NAC, PM, Delivery 1997, 119.D.9; “Pinligt forhold til FN: Embedsmændene fastlægger Danmarks FN- politik, mener folketingsmand Arne Stinus.” Dagbladet (13 June 1970). 193 Folketingstidende 121 (1969/1970): col. 3762–3763 (Stinus), col. 3819 (Hartling). 194 Folketingstidende 126 (1974/1975): col. 968.
189 CHAPTER 3 parliamentarians could not be responsible for Denmark’s policy. Instead, he described this group as a resource for the orientation of the government and civil servants. Moreover, “Their participation in the delegation rested on a historical development and had to be considered inevitable for the ruling political tradition in Denmark.” The head of the political division in the foreign ministry, Troels Oldenburg, added that the civil servants applied in no way “a hostage view of the parliamentarians” and that they would never take advantage of the position of parliamentarians in a given situation.195 Already in connection with the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations, Berlingske Aftenavis suggested a reduction of political representation on the delegation. The conservative newspaper held that the politicians no longer served a practical purpose and scarce resources would be better allocated to the benefit of negotiations on membership in the European common market.196 After the populist Progress Party (Fremskridtspartiet) had gained representation in the Folketing in the ‘landslide election’ of 1973, the party leader and tax rebel Mogens Glistrup directed a parliamentary inquiry to the foreign minister asking: how many participants all in all have Danish taxpayers paid for at the 26th, 27th, and 28th session of the General Assembly, and how many of these were distributed among the various categories like foreign service, diplomatic missions, the Federation of Trade Unions, the Danish National Council of Women, and others. Moreover, information is solicited as to how many [delegates] the foreign minister intends to send to the 29th session of the General Assembly, how these are distributed among the mentioned categories, and what is the latest point at which reductions to the foreign minister’s plan can be enacted.197 Remarkably, the inquiry did not mention the group of parliamentarians. However, the populists regarded it “an indecent gluttony in the administration of compulsory levied funds from other fellow citizens” to send but a few professional diplomats to the General Assembly, and chose, in the first years of their parliamentary life, not to include a representative on the Danish delegation. That said, they were insistent in their requests to save tax payers’ money by not offering the now-empty seats on the delegation to parties in their stead.198 The populists even went so far as to
–––––––––––––– 195 Minutes of meeting in the foreign ministry with delegates to the 25th session of the General Assembly, 10 March 1971, NAC, PM, Delivery 1997, 119.D.9. 196 “De mange FN-gratulanter.” Berlingske Aftenavis (19 September 1970). 197 Folketingstidende 125 (1973/1974): col. 7999. 198 Letters by Glistrup to Foreign Minister Ove Guldberg (quote) and to the Speaker of Parliament, 11 September 1974, NAC, FM 1973–78, 119.H.2.a.74. Their request was approved, see memorandum by Torben Frost, 12 September 1974, ibid. However, by 1975, (continued)
190 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS raise the idea of Denmark leaving the United Nations, and frequently returned with parliamentary inquiries about resources aimed at the United Nations.199 However, this attitude did not prevent the parliamentary group of the populists in full strength, accompanied by their spouses (with the sole exception of Glistrup), to pay a visit to the Danish mission to the United Nations in August 1975.200 In continuation of their discussions in New York, they presented another parliamentary inquiry asking how many countries had sent parliamentarians to the three previous sessions and to what scale.201 From 1977, after their seats had been distributed to other parties for the second time, the populists started to include their own representatives in the delegation. At the thirty-second session of the General Assembly, their first-time representatives showed particular interest in the financial committee of the General Assembly and conceded that the Danish mission to the United Nations functioned well according to the given premises, while at the same time suggesting economy measures should be considered.202 Membership in the European Communities from 1973 and the development of the European Political Cooperation scheme at the time also had an effect on the position of parliamentarians in the Danish delegation, implying the most profound change for the delegation since the mid- 1960s.203 As observed by Stinus, EC speeches and explanations were frequently products of last-minute endeavours. Therefore, orientation often replaced discussion in delegation meetings: “The result has been that more decisions are made by civil servants, the parliamentarians are to some extent taken off the game”, a fact Stinus regarded as unsatisfactory.204 In a
–––––––––––––– their seats were distributed to other parties, see letter by Karl Skytte of the Folketing administration to Foreign Minister K. B. Andersen, 20 June 1975, NAC, FM 1973–78, 119.H.2.a.75. 199 Folketingstidende 127 (1975/1976): col. 3984 (Arentoft); for subsequent inquiries cf. e.g. Folketingstidende 135 (1983/1984): col. 829–833 (three inquiries by Ole Maisted); Folketingstidende 140 (1988/1989): col. 2351–2353 (two inquiries by Anette Just). 200 Cf. the report made on the meeting by permanent representative Henning Hjorth-Nielsen in a letter to Foreign Minister K. B. Andersen, 27 August 1975, NAC, FM 1973–78, 119.H.2.a.75. 201 Folketingstidende 126 (1974/1975): col. 7963 (Arentoft). 202 Minutes of the meeting with the delegation to the 32nd session of the General Assembly, 25 January 1978, NAC, FM 1973–78, 119.H.2.a.77. 203 Christian Winther’s comment in Radioavisen, 15 December 1975, NAC, FM 1973–78, 119.D.9.a. 204 Folketingstidende 126 (1974/1975): col. 2060 (quote), 2128; for an early account of effects of participation in EC consultations for Danish decision making cf. the minutes of the meeting of delegates to the 27th session of the General Assembly, 27 March 1973, NAC, FM 1973–78, 119.D.9.b.
191 CHAPTER 3 later remark on the topic, Stinus pointed to the problem of ‘bloc politics’, namely, the difficulty of taking aggregated political positions under reconsideration. Conceding that it was theoretically still possible for political delegation members to affect and change EC positions, he maintained that this possibility did not exist in practice.205 Another deputy’s suggestion to let parliamentarians participate in EC consultations was answered with a “clear no” by Foreign Minister Knud B rge (“K. B.”) Andersen (1971–1973, 1975–1978).206 Uneasiness in regard to decision making at the European level was particularly shared by left-wing politicians and resulted in the perception that the delegation might be “reduced to slavery by the EC”.207 The debate led Andersen to proudly maintain in a television broadcast that Denmark had often disagreed with EC countries.208 The whole constellation and the related fear that UN politics might be turned into an arena for controversies on membership in the European Communities made journalist Christian Winther suggest the tradition of parliamentary representation in UN delegations be abolished altogether.209 By the mid-1970s, there were some critical developments for the Danish model of parliamentary participation in delegations to the United Nations. In particular, there was an unprecedented politicisation of the General Assembly, with the quest for a new world order and – after the completion of decolonisation – the ‘liberationist’ and anti-Zionist forces. In domestic politics, the solidarity movement with the ‘Third World’ had to be taken into account. At the same time, the delegation model fell into question; UN membership was not left untouched by the populists (and some conservatives), nor was the new European governance level, which disturbed the traditional Danish culture of consensual domestic decision making. The immediate reason for a defensive view was an article suggesting the tradition of political representation be given up due to the irresponsible resolution-making of the General Assembly, published the
–––––––––––––– 205 Folketingstidende 127 (1975/1976): col. 3987. 206 Left Socialist legislator Litten Hansen, according to the minutes of the meeting of the delegation to the 31st session of the General Assembly, 11 January 1977, NAC, FM 1973– 78, 119.H.2.a.76. 207 Report of 11 February 1976 by John Kierulf on the meeting of the United Nations Association, 4 February 1976, NAC, FM 1973–78, 119.H.2.a.75; on left-wing politicians: Bent Albrectsen. “Politikere nsker færre danske som FN-delegerede.” Berlingske Tidende (15 December 1975). 208 Interview with Andersen in Radioavisen, 15 December 1975, NAC, FM 1973–78, 119.D.9.a. 209 Christian Winther’s comment in Radioavisen, 15 December 1975, NAC, FM 1973–78, 119.D.9.a.
192 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS morning of the parliamentary foreign policy debate by a former conservative delegate.210 It was a combination of all these factors that came to play when Foreign Minister Andersen, after the thirtieth session of the General Assembly, expressed his faith in parliamentary delegation: In connection with the often very tricky considerations that precede government policy making in regard to the various decisions in the UN, it is of extraordinary importance during the United Nations session that the government get advice and guidance from the parliamentary representatives at the UN mission in New York. Therefore, I hope the Danish Folketing will continue representation at United Nations sessions. If the political parties have criticism to direct at the working conditions of the elected representatives, we will be very mindful. I intend in the near future – just as I have done previously – to invite the representatives from the recently ended General Assembly to a meeting, where we can discuss experiences and listen to criticism. The decisive thing for me is that we preserve this parliamentary feature in our UN cooperation, so that the government in this way gets the best possible background to make the right decisions.211 In a radio interview, Andersen also expressed strong appreciation for the parliamentary delegation tradition, and suggested parliamentarians have a great amount of influence on government policies, in particular on recent minority governments.212 Permanent representative Henning Hjorth-Nielsen claimed that delegation meetings were considered “a sort of Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs in miniature” and that the presentation of political representatives’ opinions was part of permanent mission reporting routines.213
Subsequent developments The 1967 order of representation in the UN delegation proved stable. Until 1975 it was only object to minor adaptations. They were not followed by subsequent dramatic changes. The permanent representative to the United Nations was always male and always the chairman of the Danish delegation, at least in absence of members of government who exercised chairpersonship ex officio. The only exceptions were Ellen Margrethe L j, a female permanent representative from 2001 to 2007, and her successor, –––––––––––––– 210 Per Bendix. “Danmark og FN-flertallet.” Politiken (15 January 1976); cf. Bent Albrectsen. “Politikere nsker færre danske som FN-delegerede.” Berlingske Tidende (15 December 1975). 211 Folketingstidende 127 (1975/1976): col. 3964–3965. 212 Interview in Radioavisen, 15 December 1975, NAC, FM 1973–78, 119.D.9.a. 213 Confidential letter by Hjorth-Nielsen to Ole Bierring, 22 December 1976, NAC, FM 1973–78, 119.H.2.a.76.
193 CHAPTER 3
Carsten Staur, who was allowed to head the Danish delegation ex officio during his presence in New York at a time when he was a state secretary in the ministry of foreign affairs. The other four positions among ‘representatives’ were reserved for members of the foreign service. In contrast, the category of ‘alternate representatives’ was mostly occupied by party representatives. There were only a few sessions at which a member of the foreign service was appointed as ‘alternate representative’. The impression is not far-fetched that this was the case when new parties, such as the Centre Democrats (Centrum Demokraterne), were to be kept from getting a delegate with alternate status or to downgrade the populist Progress Party (Fremskridtspartiet) to the category of advisers. Starting with the forty-seventh session, party representatives always had four ‘alternate representatives’ seats, while the fifth was reserved for alternating representatives of the autonomous regional governments of the Faeroer and Greenland. Moreover, from this session onward, the two autonomous territories also shared the position of ‘adviser’. Usually, the delegates chosen by these territorial units were members of the regional legislature. In the category of ‘advisers’, the mixture of civil society and foreign ministry representation as introduced in 1967 was continued, as was the representation of minor parties introduced in the wake of the landslide election. The names and number of parties represented varied over time, following the tides of voter decisions. However, from the mid-1980s, the number of party representatives has almost always been kept at twelve. In later years, from the mid-1990s, there has been a tendency to reflect representation in parliament proportionally when composing the delegation, and to detach the positions available from particular parties. This tendency can be traced to 1974, when a system was introduced with different parties sharing the position of one delegate for the first time. At the fiftieth session the social democrats were given an ‘adviser’ position in addition to both of their alternating ‘alternate representatives’. From the fifty-second session it became common for the largest parties to be given one and a half seats, that is three delegates, in the category of ‘alternate representatives’, while others had to content themselves with only half a position. The collaborative Danish practice continued to serve the relaxation of political tensions. This became particularly evident in the 1980s, when a conservative–liberal minority government was forced by a left-wing parliamentary majority to pursue the so-called “footnote policy”, a policy characterised by reservations in regard to Western security arrangements. Before Denmark began her tenure as a member of the Security Council in 1985, Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen at several occasions voiced
194 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS the opinion that the Danish government might be better served by refraining from taking its seat because the majority in the Folketing was in favour of a foreign policy with which he disagreed.214 However, in hindsight he was pleased with the collaboration, which he characterised as work for pragmatic solutions and as disregard for empty demonstrations.215 When permanent representative to the United Nations, Ole Bierring, explained why Denmark had been capable of acting in the Security Council without the disturbance of obstructive footnotes, he referred in particular to the established practice of including legislators in delegations to the General Assembly, not least representatives of the opposition parties, which had fostered a common understanding of the possibilities and limits of Danish agency in the United Nations.216 The most important change undertaken in the last quarter of the twentieth century concerned the reduction of the parliamentarians’ visiting period. Whereas a request by former Prime Minister Jens Otto Krag in 1970 to share the social democratic seat on the delegation between more than two representatives was not passed, most parties let three deputies share the seat at the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly. At the twenty- ninth session of the General Assembly, the Justice League was allowed to split their half-session seat on the delegation into two parts.217 In 1977, three parties were granted a corresponding split, but it was made clear that this was not to become a model. When the Justice League in 1981 once again asked for a split, the request was denied by the majority of party group leaders.218 At the same time, there were proposals to do away with the idea of covering the whole session period of the General Assembly with parliamentary participation. Thus, in 1979 the conservative delegate Helge Hultberg suggested to reduce the length of party delegates’ stay from two shifts of six weeks to visits of about two weeks. As he saw it, parliamentarians had no means to exert influence in the decision making process and shorter visits would suffice to get acquainted with the UN apparatus as such. The suggestion was not endorsed by the other legislators –––––––––––––– 214 Folketingstidende 136 (1984/1985): col. 3456 (Pelle Voigt), here according to Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Årbog 6 (1984): 253. 215 Uffe Ellemann-Jensen. “Udenrigsminister Uffe Ellemann-Jensens nytårsudtalelse.” Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Årbog 8 (1986): 176–178. 216 Ole Bierring. “Danmark i Sikkerhedsrådet 1985–86.” Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Årbog 8 (1986): 100–112. 217 Note, 8 October 1970, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.D.9.a; note, 26 September 1974, NAC, FM 1973–78, 119.H.2.a.74. 218 Memorandum by Benny Kimberg on parliamentary representation at the 37th session of the General Assembly, 2 June 1982, NAC, FM 1973–78, 119.D.9.a.
195 CHAPTER 3 or by Foreign Minister Andersen. A foreign ministry memorandum noted that the government attached great importance to taking note of various party political views in its own decision making and that this consultative role would be endangered were the length of legislators’ stay decreased.219 Hultberg’s suggestion might not have been intended to succeed in the first place. At a ‘yellow pea arrangement’ (follow-up meeting with political delegation members after the General Assembly, named after the dish served at the end) his opinion that legislators had “too little real influence on the decision making process” was shared by a social democratic and a populist politician. However, the minutes of the meeting suggest implicitly it was not shared by the other seven parliamentary delegates. The minutes also show that there were divergent views within various of the parties on the suggested length of legislators’ stay in New York.220 A new attempt to reconfigure the presence of parliamentarians in New York was made by then Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen in 1986. He asked the Speaker of the Folketing to consider continuance of the practice of including two sets of nine to ten parliamentary and civil society representatives in the delegation – but for three instead of six weeks. His argument was that after the curtailing of the civil servant part of the delegation the previous year, the only undamaging way to pursue further cost-cutting would be to draw “the parliamentary delegation into the attempt of securing fulfilment of established saving goals”.221 The idea was declined by a large majority of the leaders of the party groups, the arguments being parliamentary coverage and the value of working experience in international cooperation for members of parliament.222 The counter-proposal to debit the Folketing with the expenses of parliamentary participation in the General Assembly, was not realised.223 However, such an order has been established by the twenty-first century. Another change concerned the accreditation of political representatives in United Nations committees, routinely done until at least 1987. A general scepticism about more closely following the committee work is reported from feed-back meetings with parliamentary delegation –––––––––––––– 219 Memorandum on points of criticism by delegation members, 14 February 1980, NAC, FM 1973–78, 119.D.9.b; cf. letter by permanent representative Wilhelm Ulrichsen to Benny Kimberg, 12 December 1979, NAC, FM 1973–78, 119.D.9.a. 220 Minutes of the meeting with the delegation to the 34th session of the General Assembly, 14 February 1980 [put into writing 5 September 1980], NAC, FM 1973–78, 119.D.9.b. 221 Letter by Ellemann-Jensen to Svend Jacobsen, 18 March 1986, NAC, FM 1973–78, 119.D.9.a. 222 Letter by Svend Jacobsen to Ellemann-Jensen, 12 May 1986, NAC, FM 1973–78, 119.D.9.a. 223 Cf. the note “Svar-fn”, no date [1988], NAC, FM 1973–78, 119.D.9.a.
196 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS members, and one of the parliamentarians is cited as saying “I do not want to die in the committee”. With this backdrop, the permanent mission asked for a decision to refrain from accrediting parliamentarians in single committees. Nobody defended this relict of old, and prior registration was not needed for access to the meetings anyway. Thus, it was only apt to create confusion in other countries intending to invite “relevant representatives of Denmark”.224 The order of 1967 gave a certain status, but no particular relevance to parliamentary delegates. The general tendency, somewhat delayed in the radical liberal party, to develop orders of rotation safeguarding the chance for all party group members to get an appointment as delegate to New York, undermined the remaining potential of participation. This did not go unnoticed among parliamentarians. From a permanent mission perspective, the feedback meetings from 1987 were summarised as follows: In the general, final discussion, the parliamentarians agreed it was probably an illusion that the parliamentarian delegation ‘should have a practical effect on the actual work at the General Assembly’ (Ruth N rthen). It was the common perception that the trip to N.Y. served a number of other aims, not least to increase the parliamentarians’ knowledge of a cornerstone in Danish foreign policy and the practical conditions surrounding its implementation. The parliamentarian delegation could probably most likely be regarded as ‘the Foreign Policy Committee’s antenna’ in New York. It could assist with clearing the problem area, so that only crucial political problems, if any, were presented in Copenhagen. In turn, it was also only there, and not in N.Y., that such issues could be tackled. […] I took the opportunity to repeat the Ambassador’s earlier remark that the mission staff also enjoyed and benefited from being together with the parliamentarians, a privileged source of impressions of the political conditions, under which (also) the foreign service must work.225 Thus, after the mid-1960s, the Danish delegation to the United Nations turned from a body dominated by representatives of parliamentary parties that resembled a foreign policy committee road-show with substantial decision making capacity to an ordinary diplomatic endeavour with merely a humble antenna for the foreign policy committee. By making parliament –––––––––––––– 224 Note by Peter Br ckner on feed-back conversations with the parliamentary delegation, 14 & 15 December 1987 [note of 21 December 1978], NAC, FM 1973–78, 119.D.9.b. 225 Note by permanent mission member Peter Br ckner on feed-back conversations with the parliamentary delegation, 14 & 15 December 1987 [note of 21 December 1978], NAC, FM 1973–78, 119.D.9.b. It is worth noting that N rthen was not one of the legislators, but rather a delegation frequenter nominated by the Danish National Council of Women, who exercised some influence in her field.
197 CHAPTER 3 pay for the visit of its representatives in New York, their detachment from the regular delegation has been strongly emphasised in the years since 2004.
AN ANACHRONISM AND PARLIAMENTARY STRONGHOLD: NORWAY The promotional brochure Norway in the United Nations, published in three editions between 1963 and 1971, provides an overview of Norwegian statements on various agenda points of the world organisation. The booklet, designed as a tool for students involved in Model United Nations simulations, focuses on policy declarations and does not discuss political institutions. It addresses issues such as disarmament, nuclear weapons, colonial questions, apartheid, conflicts in the Middle East, and development. Amidst these topical issues one comes across a page that may seem like the odd man out in the children’s game of ‘which picture does not belong’. The page features a photograph with the following caption: “The building of the Norwegian Parliament (Stortinget) in Oslo. The Norwegian Delegations to the UN General Assemblies always include several members of the Storting.” The booklet makes practically no other mention of the Norwegian government and Parliament, and nothing is said about delegations; yet in the 1971 edition of the publication there is, among the appendices of the brochure, a detailed table on the composition of the Storting for all elections since 1945.226 Hence, delegation practice and party strength are addressed without even so much as an attempt to integrate them into a plausible context. This unexpected information is illuminating in regard to the political culture of Norway and the country’s self-perception as a parliamentary democracy and composite agent in international relations. Norway was a Nordic latecomer in sending parliamentarians to the League of Nations. Nonetheless, the Storting managed to become the dominant provider of delegates, a tradition revived after 1945. The Storting established itself as the central institution of Norwegian government in the nineteenth century’s personal union under the Swedish King. It nourished a deep-seated mistrust of government participation in ‘high politics’ on the international floor, even after independence in 1905. The (disparaging) Norwegian concept of Stortingsregjereri (Storting-governance) has its roots in this political culture. As pointed out by Olav Riste, strong parliamentary control of –––––––––––––– 226 Bj rn Jensen. Norway in the United Nations. Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1963. 33 (quote). Bj rn Jensen. Norway in the United Nations. Oslo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1971. 7 (identical quote), 35.
198 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS foreign policy is a common trait of the Scandinavian countries, but it is particularly pronounced in Norway for these reasons, as well as the absence of an established foreign policy making tradition, and the occurrence of minority governments and a strong emphasis on foreign policy consensus.227 Critics of the tradition have gone so far as to explain Foreign Minister Halvdan Koht’s lack of preparedness on 9 April 1940, the day Nazi Germany attacked Norway, by pointing to the fact that his democratic conviction prompted him to devote all energy to troublesome parliamentary meetings on the previous day instead of taking efficient command of the problems impending from abroad.228 There is a strong notion in Norway that the political culture of the country is characterised by its particularly strong demands for parliamentary feedback, not least in regard to foreign affairs.229 Despite the almost nonexistent debate on the ratification of the Charter of the United Nations in 1945 and later complaints about too little debate on actual United Nations policies, subsequent Storting deliberations on participation in the United Nations were far more frequent and substantial than in parliaments of the other Nordic countries.230 As Knut E. Eriksen and Helge Pharo point out, it was the close interplay of the government with the foreign policy committee of the Storting, in particular, that made the Norwegian case special. 231 According to Olav F. Knudsen the Storting has become seriously engaged in the field of foreign policy and increasingly relevant in policy making, although mostly in a consultative capacity, over the last decades.232
–––––––––––––– 227 Riste 1989: 70–71, 77–78. 228 Jens A. Christophersen. “Avgj relsesprosessen i norsk utenrikspolitikk.” Internasjonal Politikk (1968): 662–700, at 676–677; on stortingsregjereri e.g. Fredrik Sejersted. “Om Stortingets kompetanse til å regjere over regjeringen.” Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift (2003) 3: 281– 296; Stein Ørnh i. “Om stortingsregjereri og regjeringsmakt.” Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift (2003) 4: 429–432. 229 Cf. Stortings forhandlinger, Stortingstidende 95 (1951): 168 (Carl J. Hambro); Stortings forhandlinger, Stortingstidende 101 (1957): 2014 (Halvard Lange); Colban 1961: 309. 230 My own observation; cf. on Norway: Bj rn Skogmo. “Norge i FN: Illusjoner, virkelighet og visjon.” Norsk utenrikspolitikk. Johan J rgen Holst and Daniel Heradstveit (eds). Oslo: Tano, 1985. 145–166, at 165; Knut Frydenlund. Lille land – hva nå? Refleksjoner om Norges utenrikspolitiske situasjon. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1982. 25. 231 Knut E. Eriksen, and Helge Ø. Pharo. Norsk utenrikspolitikks historie, vol. 5: Kald krig og internasjonalisering 1949–1965. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1997. 18–19, 415. 232 Olav Fagelund Knudsen. “Beslutningsprosesser i norsk utenrikspolitikk.” Norges utenrikspolitikk. Torbj Knutsen, Gunnar M. S rb and Svein Gjerdåker (eds). Oslo: Cappelen, 1995. 59–78, at 59, 61, 66, 72–73. The reason for increased parliamentary influence is the last decades’ tendency towards minority governments; cf. on the relevance of the Storting: Halvard Lange. “Om avgj relsesprosessen i norsk utenrikspolitikk: Noen (continued)
199 CHAPTER 3
Former Minister of Defence Anders C. Sjaastad notes in a research article that the Storting functions as an inconspicuous clearinghouse that depoliticises foreign policy and creates consensus. For Norway, as a state that gained independence in the twentieth century, consensus on diplomatic conduct was not pre-established – it had yet to be developed: “Therefore the Storting did not become an antipode to the government with its foreign service, but rather a sort of substitute for a diplomatic tradition.”233 Unlike their colleagues from other Nordic countries, Norwegian parliamentarians have kept their position in delegations to the United Nations without qualifications until the present – at least from a formal point of view. Although parliamentarians serving on delegations to the General Assembly today are largely relieved of practical duties, they continue to be appointed to the two highest categories of delegates, namely, ‘representatives’ and ‘alternate representatives’. Even though the Foreign Minister and the permanent representative occupy the two top positions, an otherwise uninformed student of delegation lists would get the impression that Norwegian delegations to the General Assembly are (still) dominated by parliamentarians. In short, Norway showcases its parliamentary system in the world organisation. The legitimacy of people’s representatives continues to overlay a functional perspective on the structure of the delegation and the division of labour within. However, in light of the current discourse about cosmopolitan democracy, the general observation by Hans Magnus Enzensberger that the Norwegians are backwoods-persons and cosmopolitans rolled into one while Norway oscillates between an ethnographic museum-type anachronism and a futuristic laboratory might be relevant: Norway actively champions the inclusion of parliamentarians in UN delegations, waving the Nordic countries’ practice as a model for the world to see.234 This self-image as international vanguard dates back to the inter-war years. In a de-nationalised fashion it was expressed by the first Secretary-General of the United Nations, Trygve Lie, in a New Year’s address to the Norwegian people in 1946: One of the most delightful aspects of the UN as I see it is […] that numerous member states send representatives from the most diverse strata of the
–––––––––––––– randbemerkninger om utenriksministerens rolle.” Internasjonal Politikk (1969) 6: 664–669; Moe 1969. 233 Sjaastad 2006: 20. 234 Hans Magnus Enzensberger. “Norwegische Anachronismen.” Ach, Europa: Wahrnehmungen aus sieben Ländern – Mit einem Epilog aus dem Jahre 2006. Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1989. 235–314, at 311; cf. General Assembly, Official Records 55 (2000) 55: 3–4 (Arne B. H nningstad).
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people: workers, intellectuals, politicians of all political views, liberals, conservatives, and communists. Many have dreamed about an international parliament of humankind, and might not the UN now stand at the beginning of the creation of such a parliament, for which we have hoped for so long – a parliament built from the best principles of national parliaments.235 A neglected aspect of the Norwegian tradition of holding parliamentarism in high esteem is that this appreciation might become so strong as to distort scholarship and scientific mapping of the world. Remarkably, well-known International Relations scholar Iver B. Neumann has made the following observation: It is interesting to note that the most sceptical attitude towards the League of Nations prevailed in the conservative party, the main bearer of the etatist representation of Norway (Fure 1997). One reason for this can be precisely that collaboration within the League of Nations was limited to only concern parliaments, and thereby did not include those parts of the state that were historically speaking something with crucial significance for the etatists, namely, the bureaucracies.236 One of the problems with Neumann’s statement is that his reference work is imbalanced in regard to single parties’ attitudes towards the League of Nations. It mentions that twenty members of the Storting voted against accession, with the well-known conservative politician Carl J. Hambro among them.237 But it does not mention that among those who voted against accession were three conservatives and sixteen labour politicians. Nor does it mention that the Labour Party voted against the appropriation of membership fees and annually renewed its request for Norway to resign from the League of Nations for fifteen years.238 Had the chapter reported anything on the composition of delegations or mentioned that it was Hambro who insistently fought against the government’s etatist approach and for the inclusion of parliamentarians, it would have saved Neumann some embarrassment.239 However, Neumann’s misconstruction of the League of Nations as a body only concerning parliaments is at least equally –––––––––––––– 235 Trygve Lie. “Alt ser meget lysere ut enn da FN. ble åpnet: FN. innledningen til fremtidens internasjonale parlament?” Aftenposten (31 December 1946). 236 Iver B. Neumann, Norge – en kritikk: Begrepsmakt i Europa-debatten. Oslo: Pax, 2001. 112. 237 Odd-Bj rn Fure. Norsk utenrikspolitikks historie, vol. 3: Mellomkrigstid 1920–1940. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1996. 184. 238 Cf. Omang 1964: 101–102. 239 Cf. Stortingsforhandlinger (1920) 7b: 3626 (16 November 1920) (Hambro); on the remarkable silence regarding the Labour Party’s policy of obstructing the League of Nations – not only in memoirs of labour politicians, but also in research literature cf. Helge Seip. “Historieskriving og utelatelser.” Dagbladet (24 October 1999).
201 CHAPTER 3 remarkable. It does not seem far-fetched to attribute the blunder to the author’s socialisation in an environment in which the virtual catch phrase ‘parliament of man’ has more reality than the actual operation of the international organisation. Ironically, in a book that critically examines the concept of Norway, the author shows himself as being so deeply biased by a Norwegian perspective of the world that the parameters of international relations are subject to a fantastic change of meaning.
With spectacle and low profile to San Francisco In February 1945 the Norwegian government agreed on the main delegates to represent Norway at the United Nations Conference on International Organisation under the leadership of Foreign Minister Trygve Lie. Despite opposition against the nomination of the President of the Storting Carl J. Hambro by two cabinet members, his name came second after the foreign minister in the minutes of the meeting.240 This order was changed when the foreign ministry informed the appointees. The assignment of the title “vice chairman” to the Norwegian ambassador in Washington, Wilhelm Munthe Morgenstierne, was crossed out in the concept of a telegram sent to the embassy. However, the fact remained that Morgenstierne appeared second on the list of delegates.241 What followed then has been described as a “spectacle about the delegation to San Francisco”.242 In the letter accepting his nomination, Hambro noted that no vice chairman had been named. At the same time, he recalled the Norwegian tradition at the League of Nations. He maintained that already in 1926 a controversy over status between him and a diplomat had been decided in his favour, as the President of Parliament and the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee. He commented the then quarrel by claiming: “This was a consideration one owed the Storting, irrespective of individuals.” He also maintained having been appointed chairman or vice chairman to all subsequent delegations and that there had never been discord in the delegations or between the delegation and the foreign ministry. Further, he pointed to his status as President of the Assembly of the League of Nations and Chairman of the League’s executive committee, and that he owed consideration not least to these high
–––––––––––––– 240 Minutes of the cabinet meeting, 27 February 1945, NAO, PMO, CM, vol. 3. 241 Confidential telegram to the embassy in Washington, 27 February 1945, NAO, FM 1940–49, 25.2/45. 242 Arne Ording. Dagb ker, vol. 1: 19. juni 1942 – 23. juli 1945. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2000. 488 (entry of 9 March 1945); cf. on the background Johan Hambro. C. J. Hambro: Liv og dr m. Oslo: Aschehoug, 1984. 264.
202 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS offices. Given all this, he assumed it was the intention he be appointed vice chairman and asked the foreign ministry to confirm this. At the same time, he argued against the inclusion of Morgenstierne in the delegation by pointing to the tradition of not appointing to international conferences the accredited representative in the country, where the conference takes place (due to the constrained liberty of action opposite the host). Moreover, he requested to replace Morgenstierne by the ambassador to Moscow, Rolf Andvord – the latter offering contacts and language competence enhancing communication with Russian and Spanish speakers, whereas Morgenstierne’s Anglo-American connections were common property among Norwegians.243 The delegation was formally appointed in several steps in the end of March 1945.244 Only the appointment of the home front representative took some extra time. In contrast to the advisory status of other civil society representatives, he received status as a main delegate.245 Formally, no vice chairman was designated, but Hambro was moved to the second position on the list and chaired a few delegation meetings in the absence of Lie. However, as he left San Francisco together with the Foreign Minister on 5 May, Morgenstierne became the acting chairman for the larger part of the conference. In retrospect, the delegation was perceived as multilaterally (allsidig) composed.246 The three largest parliamentary parties were represented by Foreign Minister Lie (labour), the President of the Storting Hambro (conservatives), and professor Jacob Worm-M ller (liberals). According to the Swedish minister to the Norwegian government, the main idea behind the composition of the delegation appeared to be the inclusion of the various political parties, in particular Hambro “in order to disarm potentially rising criticism from the right”.247 However, after two out of a total of three active politicians on the delegation had left San Francisco after one and a half weeks in order to participate in the resurrection of Norway upon liberation, Foreign Minister Lie described the remaining
–––––––––––––– 243 Letter by Hambro to the foreign ministry, 8 March 1945, NAO, FM 1940–49, 25.2/45; on the problematic personal relationship of both protagonists cf. the letter by Morgenstierne to Hambro, 17 March 1944, NAO, Personal Archive 260: Carl J. Hambro, vol. 11. 244 Cf. minutes of cabinet meetings, March 1945, NAO, PMO, CM, vol. 3. The upgrade of Hambro was made on the suggestion of Lie on 23 March 1945, with eight against four votes. 245 “Innhentelse av Stortingets samtykke” 1945: 3. On the process of the appointment of the home front representative Øystein Thommessen cf. NAO, FM 1940–49, 25.2/45. 246 Cf. Trygve Lie. Hjemover. Oslo: Tiden, 1958. 199. 247 Strictly confidential letter by Johan Beck-Friis to the Chief of the Political Department Eric von Post, 15 March 1945, NAS, FM, FS 1920, HP 24, vol. 1167.
203 CHAPTER 3 delegation in a radio speech as multilaterally composed, representing various insights in international cooperation.248 This apolitical perspective was probably influenced by his own disinclination to participate in the San Francisco Conference and the disposition to portray the delegation as ‘complete’ after his own departure.249 In spring 1945 it was more attractive for politicians to advance positions at home than to participate in drafting the Charter of the United Nations. Those who stayed or had to stay had a “dreary job now that so much happened home in Norway” and had their minds, as one of the delegates remembers, at home rather than on the job.250 It is telling that Worm-M ller, the political representative who chose to remain on the delegation, despite being leader of the liberal party, never succeeded in securing the popular vote for a parliamentary mandate in Norway. A politician of the agrarian party, who participated in the San Francisco conference as an observer for the United Nations Interim Commission on Food and Agriculture, complained in a letter to Lie: “The composition of the Norwegian delegation to the conference is probably not based on political considerations, but as it happens are all our larger political parties represented there – with the exception of the agrarian party.” Thus, he requested “a fully representative composition of the delegation” and offered his own service for free.251 By that time, Lie had already talked to him and suggested his appointment as adviser to the Norwegian delegation. Hambro and another delegate requested consultation of the United Nations Interim Commission on Food and Agriculture. There it was deemed impossible to act simultaneously as observer for an international organisation and as an adviser to a national delegation.252
The delegation to the first session of the General Assembly Norwegian planning for the (first part of the) first session of the General Assembly, held in January and February 1946 in London, was triggered by an inquiry submitted by the British embassy in Oslo in late September 1945, asking how many delegates, advisers and subordinate staff not already resident in London were intended for assignment to the upcoming General Assembly. The answer from the foreign ministry stated that, while –––––––––––––– 248 Radio speech by Foreign Minister Lie, 13 May 1945, NAO, FM 1940–49, 25.2/45. 249 Cf. Lie 1958: 198. 250 Håkon Lie. Krigstid: 1940–1945. Oslo: Tiden, 1982. 272. 251 Letter by Anders Fjelstad to Foreign Minister Lie, 7 May 1945, NAO, FM 1940–49, 25.2/45. 252 Minutes to the delegation meetings, 30 April 1945 & 2 May 1945, NAO, FM 1940–49, 25.2/45.
204 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS the delegates had not yet been appointed, the intention was to send a delegation of twelve members.253 Internally, Foreign Minister Trygve Lie expressed hope he would be excused from those duties but in the view of Per Prebensen, secretary general of the foreign ministry, Lie’s comments were not meant seriously and he would likely chair the Norwegian delegation.254 When the Danish embassy in Oslo asked for the size and composition of the Norwegian delegation a few weeks later, the Norwegian foreign ministry replied that more personnel was required than initially believed and that the delegation would be composed according to the practice at the League of Nations. It was said the members of the delegation to San Francisco and “reasonably, a representative for each of the larger political parties” were also thought of as the delegation body. In this connection, the head of the Political Department, Rolf Andersen, expressed interest that Denmark and Norway act along the same lines. It was clear from the start that the Foreign Minister would serve as delegation chairman. At the same time, complicated and somewhat confused reasoning concerned the president of the Storting, Hambro – the expected solution to imagined protocol problems brought on by his participation was that he would indubitably cease holding his post after the elections.255 Hambro’s chairmanship in the Supervisory Commission responsible for the transfer of the tasks and assets of the League of Nations to the successor organisation was regarded by the foreign ministry as likely ruling him out as a potential member of the Preparatory Commission. At the same time, the question of whether he might be appointed as a member of the delegation to the General Assembly or not was left open.256 When the British Embassy in Oslo directed a second request to the Norwegian foreign ministry in regard to the approximate size of the delegation, they received word it would likely consist of the members of the delegation to the Preparatory Commission and four others, including the Foreign Minister and his private secretary.257 The Norwegian Embassy in London was informed that the other two members would be the diplomat –––––––––––––– 253 Note by the British embassy, 21 September 1945, and reply by the Norwegian foreign ministry, 24 September 1945, NAO, FM 1940–49, 30.5/4. 254 Letter by the Swedish minister to Oslo, Johan Beck-Friis, to the chief of the Political Department, Eric von Post, 24 September 1945, NAS, FM, FS 1920, HP 48, vol. 1781. 255 Copy of a letter from the Danish legation in Oslo to the director of the foreign ministry, Frants Hvass, 10 October 1945, NAC, EO, Delivery 1974, 11.C.20. 256 Memorandum by Rolf Andersen on a meeting at the foreign ministry one day earlier, 17 October 1945, NAO, FM 1940–49, 30.5/4. 257 Note verbale by the British embassy, 26 November 1945, and reply, 13 December 1945, NAO, FM 1940–49, 30.5/6.
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Hans C. Berg and Hambro, who had by now become President of the Odelsting, the ‘lower house’ of the Storting. Thereupon the delegation to the Preparatory Commission impressed on the foreign ministry that it might not be feasible to have a delegation member who, in the capacity of a representative of the League of Nations, might negotiate with the United Nations. The delegation also announced that Øystein Thommessen, the home front representative to the Preparatory Commission, would not be able to attend the General Assembly for personal reasons.258 At about the same time, a Norwegian member of the Preparatory Commission reported that the Danes were planning a delegation to the General Assembly that would be comprised of fifteen members, including clerks, and that the five largest parties were to be represented. As noted in the report, this make-up implied that “a communist will be among the main delegates”, whereas, according to his knowledge, this was not foreseen in the Norwegian delegation.259 The same day this report was sent from London, the principal Norwegian delegates were tentatively set in the foreign ministry: In addition to Trygve Lie as delegation chairman and Ambassador to London Erik Colban, the proposed list of delegates included labour politicians Terje Wold and Finn Moe, the conservative politician Carl J. Hambro, the chairman of the liberal party, Jacob Worm-M ller, and finally, the communist representative Johan Strand Johansen. Some of these delegates represented Norway at the Preparatory Commission and, except for Worm-M ller, all political appointees were members or deputy members of parliament. In the relevant cabinet meeting, Lie suggested the appointment of Hambro and Strand Johansen as representatives of the parliamentary foreign policy committee. The agrarian party, represented in parliament by only one member less than the communists, did not get a seat on the delegation. On 21 December, the delegation was formally appointed, and the foreign ministry was authorised to complete the delegation by appointing the technical advisers and secretaries deemed necessary.260 By the end of December, a ‘definite’ note on the composition of the delegation was transmitted to the Foreign Office, which included the aforementioned representatives as well as five additional members belonging to the foreign service; three of the additional members were
–––––––––––––– 258 Cable from the foreign ministry to the embassy in London, 12 December 1945, and confidential reply, NAO, FM 1940–49, 30.5/6. 259 Letter by Erik Dons to Hersleb Vogt, 17 December 1945, FM 1940–49, 30.5/4. 260 Memorandum on the delegation, 17 December 1945, note on the cabinet decision, 21 December 1945, NAO, FM 1940–49, 30.5/6; minutes of the cabinet meeting, 18 December 1945, NAO, PMO, CM, vol. 4.
206 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS chosen from the staff of the embassy in London.261 Soon thereafter, the delegation was expanded by three civil society representatives but remained clearly understaffed. Early on, Hambro found fault with too little competent foreign service staff on the delegation.262 After two weeks, several delegates returned to Oslo and others fell ill. Hence, the practice of a daily delegation meeting had to be discontinued by the end of January, and not a single meeting was held in the time span 31 January to 7 February.263 Foreign Minister Lie was among those who returned to Oslo; elected Secretary General of the United Nations on 1 February 1946, Lie became “the most highly qualified representative of the international spirit”, as complimented by President of the General Assembly Paul-Henri Spaak on the occasion of Lie’s installation the following day. Spaak’s presentation of Lie’s qualifications for the job did not reveal that the Norwegian foreign minister was the least common denominator of the great powers and that he had been outvoted in the beginning of the assembly when he was nominated by the Ukraine as a candidate for General Assembly President per acclamation. Rather, Spaak started with a general remark on Lie’s background (before going on to become personal): “You belong to one of those northern countries in which democracy has happily developed in order and prosperity, in which the most generous and the most just ideas and the bold ones have become living realities.”264 In his own main speech in the General Assembly, Lie, then still in the capacity of Foreign Minister, had described the Norwegian approach to the United Nations in concord with the low-key line of action that had characterised her reaction to the Dumbarton Oaks proposals and her policy at the San Francisco Conference. Whereas he said that the great powers should be given the constitutional influence that corresponded to their great responsibilities, he assigned to small nations the role of “cementing the peace” by realising their cultural and economic ambitions. As he envisioned it, and as assumed by the Norwegian doctrine of bridge-building at the time, small nations’ foreign policy was to aim at “making a sincere contribution to the mutual understanding and confidence of the Great Powers”. In this connection, he expressed hope that the other Nordic countries become members of the United Nations at the earliest opportunity, countries he described as collaborating with Norway in
–––––––––––––– 261 Cable of 29 December 1945, NAO, FM 1940–49, 30.5/6. 262 Letter from Hambro to the chief of the Political Department, Rolf Andersen, 17 January 1946, NAO, FM 1940–49, 30.5/6. 263 Cf. the minutes of the delegation meetings, NAO, FM 1940–49, 30.5/6. 264 General Assembly, Plenary Meetings 1 (1946) 1: 324 (Spaak).
207 CHAPTER 3 economic and cultural matters without “any bearing on their relations to any other Powers”.265 Lie’s successor as foreign minister, Halvard Lange, in his own words “refrained from taking the opportunity” to immediately visit the General Assembly.266 The son of long-time secretary of the Inter- parliamentary Union Christian L. Lange continued the low-key bridge- building foreign policy approach of his predecessor.267 While Lie’s election as Secretary-General corresponded to the Norwegian policy, it was at the same time a breach “in the trend to isolation which was so marked in the first six months after liberation” – and moreover, in the first postwar years.268 Lie’s adviser Arne Ording believed it would not be particularly advantageous for Norway to contribute its own representative as the Secretary-General of the United Nations. However, Lie had already made up his mind to accept the position and secured government backing on the issue.269 The United Nations Organisation figured more prominently in the mind of Lange than it had initially in that of Lie – but with a different starting point. With Lie elected Secretary-General, Norway had a vested interest in the success of the United Nations, and the foreign policy of the country now aimed to keep from making international relations more complicated for him. However, Lie was not always satisfied with the strength of applause from Norway, and ‘not complicating matters’ implied a continuation of the established cautious approach.270
Decision making, disagreement, and Cold War politics One week after the opening of the first session of the General Assembly, Trygve Lie, still Norwegian foreign minister at the time, gave a radio address from London directed to the audience at home. He said there had –––––––––––––– 265 General Assembly, Plenary Meetings 1 (1946) 1: 143 (quotes), 142 (Lie). 266 Halvard Lange, Manuscript version C., 3 October 1969, p. 6, FMAO, HLA, unnumbered volume. 267 See Lange’s speech, 4 February 1946, FMAO, HLA, vol. 10; cf. Jakob Sverdrup. Norsk utenrikspolitikks historie, vol. 4: Inn i storpolitikken. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1996. 206. 268 Quote: Finn Moe. “Norway and the United Nations.” The Norseman 4 (1946) 2: 107– 110. 269 Ording 2003: 72 (entry of 29 January 1946); cf. minutes of the delegation meeting, 25 January 1946, NAO, FM 1940–49, 30.5/6; minutes of the cabinet meeting, 28 January 1946, NAO, PMO, CM, vol. 4; Sverdrup 1996: 204. 270 Interview with Halvard Lange, probably autumn 1969, FMAO, HLA, unnumbered volume; cf. Nils Morten Udgaard. Great Power Politics and Norwegian Foreign Policy: A Study of Norway’s Foreign Relations November 1940 – February 1948. Oslo [et al.]: Universitetsforlaget, 1973. 148–149; on Lie’s literal dissatisfaction with cautious Norwegian applause: Ording 2003: 299 (entry of 23 September 1947).
208 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS always been complete agreement in the Norwegian delegation on the policy line to be pursued. He added: “This does not say little in view of the multilateral [allsidig] composition of the Norwegian delegation.”271 The only indication of quarreling within the delegation at this session could be read from a remark by communist delegate Strand Johansen at the last delegation meeting. He declared that a delegate had publicly babbled internal matters, and reserved the right to take up the issue in parliament.272 He did not deliver on the threat. When the Storting dealt with the report on Norway’s participation in the Preparatory Commission and the General Assembly, Strand Johansen, in the capacity of chairman of the foreign and constitutional affairs committee (!), merely recommended taking note of the report.273 There is no sign that the consensus vanished at this part of the session that mainly dealt with organisational and technical matters. The Norwegian instructions lacked virtually any substance and were later published as part of the report to the Storting on participation in the General Assembly. In print, they comprised two columns in length.274 Also published were the instructions for the second part of the first session, which took place in New York from 23 October to 16 December 1946. While the length had increased to six columns, the additional information was mainly a simple listing of all forty points on the agenda, twenty-four of which were commented by the cue ‘no remarks’. Primarily, the instructions to the delegation were to vote according to its own judgement – on the understanding it request further instructions if it considered itself unable or unqualified to decide on its own.275 Even the instructions of the following years, no longer made public, were short and based on similar formulae.276 The assumption was that overly detailed instructions might put the foreign minister in conflict with his own directives (as the instructions were based on secretary-level work in the foreign ministry), but the preparation of agenda points in the foreign ministry was deficient, too.277
–––––––––––––– 271 Radio speech, 18 January 1946, NAO, FM 1940–49, 30.5/6. 272 Minutes of the delegation meeting, 14 February 1946, NAO, FM 1940–49, 30.5/6. 273 Stortings forhandlinger, Stortingstidende 90 (1946): 940. 274 “Om Norges deltakelse i de Forente nasjoners Forberedende kommisjon og i f rste del av de Forente Nasjoners f rste Generalforsamling m. v.” Stortings forhandlinger, Proposisjoner og meldinger 90 (1945/1946) St. meld. nr. 15: 5–6. 275 “Instruks for delegasjonen til annnen del av de Forente nasjoners f rste generalforsamling.” Stortings forhandlinger, Proposisjoner og meldinger 90 (1945/1946) St. meld. nr. 36: 60–62. 276 Instructions, 3 September 1947 & 14 September 1948, NAO, FM 1940–49, 30.5/6. 277 Cf. memorandum by senior labour politician and later judge at the Supreme Court, Terje Wold, 20 December 1948, NAO, FM 1940–49, 30.5/6A; see also: Letter from Terje Wold to the foreign ministry, 23 February 1949, NAO, FM 1940–49, 30.5/20.
209 CHAPTER 3
The era of supposed bridge-building was short and Norway was among the founding member of NATO, the Western defence organisation, in 1949. This move had already loomed in the instructions to the third session of the General Assembly, requesting the delegation to smooth great power differences without loosing sight of “the need to mark that Norway will fight for political freedom and freedom of thought”.278 The following year, when NATO membership was a fact, these goals were supplemented with a request to the delegation, asking the group to choose sides “and not to abstain from voting, except in instances in which it is clear that the reason is that one, on grounds that should preferably be explained to the General Assembly, cannot accept the suggestions at hand”.279 These stipulations make clear that not only had there been many abstentions earlier, but there had also been a hidden agenda behind them. One of the former principles had been to not necessarily vote along the lines of what was considered right in the abstract, but vote in support of “the great cause: To prevent the break-up of the United Nations”.280 By 1950, with an ongoing war between the United Nations and North Korea, the stipulations of 1948 with the supplement of 1949 were crossed out in the first draft and replaced with a request to strengthen the United Nations, to work for the solidarity of democratic countries, and to merely avoid contributing to an “unnecessary aggravation of antagonisms” between the great powers.281 Rules for decision making in the delegation varied. The main criterion was simple majority, but in 1946 a two-thirds rule was applied in some instances.282 Whereas all types of delegates had voting-rights in 1947, instructions in the following year made it clear that only appointees of the categories ‘representative’ and ‘alternate representative’ were eligible to cast a vote. Moreover, it was stated that the vote was consultative and the final decision was in the hands of the delegation chairman.283 In the ‘working instructions’ passed soon thereafter, it was specified that decisions were made by simple majority.284 The initial stipulation about the chairman’s power of decision seems to have been deleted upon a comment by the senior labour politician and delegation frequenter Terje Wold. In his –––––––––––––– 278 Instruction, 14 September 1948, NAO, FM 1940–49, 30.5/6. 279 Instruction, 15 September 1949, NAO, FM 1940–49, 30.5/6. 280 Minutes of the delegation meeting (Morgenstierne), 3 October 1947, NAO, FM 1940–49, 30.5/6. 281 Draft instructions, no date, 12 September 1950, NAO, FM 1950–59, 26.5/13. 282 Cf. minutes of delegation meeting, 2 December 1946, NAO, FM 1940–49, 30.5/6. 283 Instruction 14 September 1948, NAO, FM 1940–49, 30.5/6; cf. minutes of the first delegation meeting, 1947, NAO, FM 1940–49, 30.5/6. 284 The working instruction was probably approved by the Cabinet on 30 March 1949, NAO, FM 1940–49, 30.5/20.
210 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS opinion, the idea seemed reasonable as long as the Foreign Minister chaired the delegation. However, in other cases all delegates seemed to share the same responsibility, and once collective decision making had been institutionalised the best idea would be majority rule, not least in an attempt to strengthen responsibility. According to Wold, the delegation chairman still had an exit option in case “he” held a deviant opinion: it was possible to present the issue to the Foreign Minister, whose decision was binding.285 Consensus in the delegation had already vanished by the second part of the first session of the General Assembly when it came to discussing political matters. As domestic discourse developed in postwar Norway, taking a tough stance against the Franco-regime in Spain acquired an almost ‘religious’ quality.286 Hence, in his speech in the general debate, Foreign Minister Lange called for “common action” against the Spanish government in order to institute the “elimination of a stronghold of fascism and of a constant source of international friction”.287 He remembered this speech, the activist spirit of which attracted international attention, as having been “the result of a collaboration in which a large part of the members in the Norwegian delegation had yielded a contribution”.288 However, he also described himself as having gone too far, excusing himself by pointing to pressure from the delegation, the members of which he suspected in some cases of having been pushed by Trygve Lie.289 Moreover, on several occasions the conservative representative Carl J. Hambro internally expressed that he “completely disagreed” with the sanctionist line of action employed by the Norwegian delegation.290 Strong doubts about this policy surfaced among other delegates and even in the foreign ministry.291 The Spanish question continued to haunt the Norwegian delegation, leading to a split among moderate and radical labour representatives.292 Norway succeeded in making the General Assembly condemn the Franco- regime, but recommendations in regard to concrete measures were humble. Trade dependency on Spain forced the Norwegian government to beat a
–––––––––––––– 285 Letter by Terje Wold to the foreign ministry, 23 February 1949, NAO, FM 1940–49, 30.5/20. 286 Cf. Ording 2003: 226, 228 (entries of 18 & 23 February 1947). 287 General Assembly, Plenary Meetings 1 (1946) 2: 753–758, at 755. 288 Halvard Lange, Manuscript version C., 3 October 1969, p. 6, FMAO, HLA, unnumbered volume; cf. Sverdrup 1996: 249. 289 Ording 2003: 247 (entry of 15 April 1947). 290 Quote: minutes of the delegation meeting, 29 October 1946, NAO, FM 1940–49, 30.5/6. 291 Frede Castberg. Minner om politikk og vitenskap fra årene 1900–1970. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1971. 126. 292 Cf. minutes of the delegation meeting, 2 December 1946, NAO, FM 1940–49, 30.5/6.
211 CHAPTER 3 slow retreat on the issue. The Spanish question turned into a political flop for Norway, later described by Lange as “a bitter experience for me as Foreign Minister”.293 In a subsequent parliamentary debate on United Nations policy, a conservative legislator remarked that he refrained from taking up the disagreement in the delegation “because we should show a unified face to the outside”.294 Another issue that gave rise to controversial discussions within the Norwegian delegation in autumn 1946 was the presence of foreign troops on the territory of other states.295 Tensions can also be read from the discussion regarding the extent to which single delegates were allowed to deliver comments to the US press.296 Jakob Sverdrup maintained that, whereas the second session of the General Assembly in autumn 1947 was tension-filled in general, a high degree of consensus was nonetheless present within the Norwegian delegation, differences being of nuance at most.297 However, he himself had been a delegate only at the following session, in a delegation already purged of the communist delegate. It is true that the delegation of 1947 maintained an unspectacular profile overall. Nonetheless, the minutes of delegation meetings, the accounts of delegates Frede Castberg and Arne Ording, and subsequent parliamentary debates reveal that opinions diverged on a number of issues. For example, distinct disagreement prevailed in regard to questions on Greece, Korea, Palestine, Spain, and the installation of a ‘little Assembly’ continuing the work of the General Assembly. Moreover, the status of Nordic consideration and coordination for decision making was controversial. Although it was the communist delegate Strand Johansen in particular, shunt off to the committee on Palestine, who frequently expressed disagreement and reservations in regard to various decisions taken by the delegation, other lines of disagreement were evident, as well.298 Ording’s diary provides notes such as “Clash between Strand –––––––––––––– 293 Halvard Lange, Manuscript version C., 3 October 1969, p. 45, FMAO, HLA, unnumbered volume; cf. “39 (I). Relations of Members of the United Nations with Spain.” Resolutions and Decisions Adopted by the General Assembly During Its Session 1 (1946): 63–64; Sverdrup 1996: 245–256; Edgeir Benum. Maktsentra og opposisjon: Spaniasaken i Norge 1946 og 1947. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1969. 294 Stortings forhandlinger, Stortingstidende 92 (1948): 50 (Frithjof Bettum). 295 Minutes of the delegation meetings, 23 & 27 November 1946, NAO, FM 1940–49, 30.5/6. 296 Minutes of the delegation meeting, 21 November 1946, NAO, FM 1940–49, 30.5/6. 297 Sverdrup 1996: 218. 298 Minutes of delegation meetings 1947, NAO, FM 1940–49, 30.5/6; Castberg 1971: 134– 135, 148, 323; Ording 2003: 299–327; Stortings forhandlinger, Stortingstidende 92 (1948): 38 (Johan Strand Johansen), 44 (Halvard Lange), 51 (Frithjof Bettum); “Innst. S. nr. 216.” Stortings forhandlinger 92 (1948): 513–514; cf. also Stortings forhandlinger, (continued)
212 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS
Johansen and Terje Wold at the delegation meeting”, “Fortunately Strand Johansen was absent, so the whole thing went smoothly”, and a remark that shows he felt uncomfortable and even unable to talk freely as long as Strand Johansen sat behind him.299 Despite all this, Ording noted that Strand Johansen himself strived for a low profile.300 His strategy amounted to suggesting abstention rather than plainly following the Soviet line – thereby approaching Norwegian mainstream policy at the time.301 Yet, when the official report on Norway’s participation at the second session of the General Assembly was discussed in the parliamentary foreign and constitutional affairs committee one year later, Strand Johansen put the following dissent on record: “The majority of the delegation took a pro- American standpoint and contributed in this way to widening the gap between the great powers and to endangering the very existence of the UN.”302 When the report was later discussed in Parliament, he declared complete disagreement with the policy pursued by Norway at the session and he also declared this disagreement as having persisted all along.303 The second session of the General Assembly took place at a time when the development of the Cold War gained momentum and a country such as Afghanistan was derided as “Abstentionstan”. When Foreign Minister Lange returned to the General Assembly after a visit home, he reported that a critical attitude towards the work of the delegation prevailed in Norway, not least within the Labour Party, due to pronounced political “abstinence”. As he realised, this brewing conflict marked the first time a controversy about foreign policy loomed on Norway’s horizon.304 Given this outlook, the ruling Labour Party was quick in aligning its policy with Ording’s reflection on the second session of the General Assembly: “It is all right for a small country to creep under the table once in a while, but it should try not to take permanent residence there.”305 At a meeting of the –––––––––––––– Stortingstidende 101 (1957): 2023 (Finn Moe); on the overall profile: Letter from Tor Myklebost, Royal Norwegian Information Services, New York Office to Jens Schive, press office of the foreign ministry, 10 October 1947, NAO, FM 1940–49, 30.5/6; on Strand Johansen’s committee assignment: “Om Norges deltakelse i de Forente Nasjoners f rste ekstraordinære generalforsmaling og i den annen ordinære generalforsamling.” Stortings forhandlinger 92 (1948) St. meld. nr. 47: 10. 299 Ording 2003: 324 (entries of 30 & 31 October 1947). 300 Ording 2003: 316 (entry of 18 October 1947). 301 Cf. Sverdrup 1996: 218. 302 “Innst. S. nr. 216.” Stortings forhandlinger 92 (1948): 513–514, at 513. 303 Stortings forhandlinger, Stortingstidende 92 (1948): 1987 (quote), 1989 (Johan Strand Johansen). 304 Ording 2003: 317, 326–327 (entries of 18 October & 5 November 1947). 305 Halvard Lange, Manuscript version C., 3 October 1969, p. 63, FMAO, HLA, unnumbered volume. Emphasis English in the original.
213 CHAPTER 3 party’s parliamentary group, the foreign affairs committee chairman and UN delegate Terje Wold argued to “more strongly and sharply than before uphold our view in regard to political freedom, personal security and rule of the people”. He also suggested discontinuing collaboration with communists in domestic politics.306 By that time, in a closed meeting of the Storting, Lange had already implied the bridge-building policy might have to be revised.307 He followed up on this theme in an oral report to Parliament on the recent General Assembly session, tying the previous low-key policy to expectation that the United Nations would become an effective system of collective security.308 He still operated with this “working hypothesis” in early 1948, but broke the attachment upon the Sovietisation of Czechoslovakia in early 1948.309 Thus, in a situation of increased tension around the world, the Norwegian government suddenly accepted election to the Security Council – something it had previously refrained from in order to avoid being drawn into great power politics. (As a member of the Security Council from 1949 to 1950, Norway was among the nations sanctioning United Nations operations in the Korean War.) At the same time, the government concluded that the United Nations was not to be regarded an effective security organisation and that other security options had to be examined.310 When negotiations on a Scandinavian Defence Union failed the following year and the Storting authorised the government to sign and ratify the North Atlantic Treaty, there was hardly a speaker that did not contrast the Western military alliance with the impotent United Nations –––––––––––––– 306 Report delivered by Terje Wold, 19 November 1947, NAO, FM 1940–49, 30.5/6. 307 Halvard Lange, Manuscript version C., 3 October 1969, p. 66, FMAO, HLA, unnumbered volume. 308 Stortings forhandlinger, Stortingstidende 91 (1947): 2088–2100, at 2099; debate on the report: Stortings forhandlinger, Stortingstidende 92 (1948): 30–59. 309 Halvard Lange. “Norsk politikk i FN: Foredrag i Bergen 24. januar 1948.” Norsk utenrikspolitikk siden 1945: Foredrag og debattinnlegg. Oslo: Tanum, 1952. 29–33, at 31; cf. Halvard Lange, Manuscript version C., 3 October 1969, p. 68, FMAO, HLA, unnumbered volume. For the significance of Czechoslovakia see: Philip C. Brooks. “Oral History Interview with Halvard M. Lange, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Norway, 1946–65, Oslo, Norway, May 22, 1964.” Available at
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Organisation that had left hopes of many unanswered.311 Evidently, this perceived similarity did not keep the organisations from being seen as two sides of the same coin, with both aiming at the maintenance of peace for Norway and the world at large.312 The overall change in policy did not entail blind loyalty to the West on all issues. An approach seeking balance continued to be notable. Thus, the Swedish permanent representative concluded, based on the Norwegian voting record in the United Nations in spring 1949: “The Norwegians, in order to relieve the hangover after the festivities around the signing of the Atlantic Treaty, felt compelled to empty a couple of glasses vodka in rapid succession.”313
Ambiguous representatives and changes in the delegation order After the third session of the General Assembly, foreign affairs committee chairman Terje Wold drafted a memorandum regarding the work of the Norwegian delegation. Presumably, his motivation was to position himself to succeed Finn Moe as permanent representative to the United Nations.314 He noted that the delegates to date had been appointed on the grounds of political considerations, and recommended the continuation of such appointments. Without further explanation, he suggested: “It certainly has meaning that appointed representatives (not professional diplomats) participate in the discussions and work in the UN.” It becomes clear from the memorandum that Wold held stage experience in higher esteem than detailed expert knowledge. At the same time, he called for better preparation of significant issues within the foreign ministry, for the employment of more advisers in the delegation, and for continuity in the address of particular matters. He thereby underlined that “advisers should be used as advisers”, that is they should be at the disposal of the ‘representatives’ and ‘alternate representatives’ in charge of particular committees. Moreover, he argued for lean instructions and for the Norwegian standpoint to be determined on the basis of negotiations at the General Assembly. While stressing leeway for the Foreign Minister, a notion of the delegation as a substitute foreign policy committee shines through in his account. The memorandum expressed dissatisfaction with the foreign ministry’s preparation work and advice for the delegation and
–––––––––––––– 311 Stortings forhandlinger, Stortingstidende 93 (1949): 655–712. 312 Explicitly in Stortings forhandlinger, Stortingstidende 94 (1950): 1724. 313 Letter by Sven Grafstr m to the chief of the Political Department in the Swedish foreign ministry, Sven Dahlman, 19 May 1949, NAS, FM, FS 1920, HP 48, vol. 1791. 314 The presumption is based on a letter by the Swedish ambassador to Oslo, Johan Beck- Friis to Dahlman, NAS, FM, FS 1920, HP 48, vol. 1800.
215 CHAPTER 3 stands in the context of the abandonment of the passive ‘bridge-building’ approach.315 The memorandum was not successful in helping labour politician Wold (Minister of Justice from 1939 to 1945) land the job of permanent representative. The labour government gave precedence to the liberal politician Arne Sunde, another former minister of justice and colleague of Wold in the government in exile in London. Nor did the memorandum help raise the number of advisers assigned to subsequent sessions. The prevailing philosophy was to maintain only the staff “strictly necessary” at any given time.316 Whereas the practice of political appointments continued, the standard clause on the desired minimisation of the delegation seems never to have been qualified with a perspective on maintaining a minimum degree of political balance within the delegation. Nonetheless, the Norwegian point of departure is clear: In summer 1946, Foreign Minister Lange described the planned structure of the delegation using the following place markers: The Foreign Minister, a representative of the Labour Party, the conservatives and the liberals as well as Norway’s permanent representative to the United Nations […]. A representative for the Communist Party, for the Norwegian Employers’ Association, for the Federation of Trade Unions, for women’s organisations and [international lawyer] Professor Castberg will be appointed as alternate representatives. Further, the necessary advisers for the delegation will be appointed. This list was sent to the ambassador in Washington, Wilhelm Morgenstierne, together with the explanation that the government considered it detrimental to appoint the highest diplomatic representative in the host country of the United Nations as a member of the delegation to the General Assembly.317 Upon Morgenstierne’s protest, he was included as number two in the delegation, thereby pressing the liberal representative past the permanent representative to the category of ‘alternate representatives’. Moreover, no employer and trade union representatives
–––––––––––––– 315 Memorandum, 20 December 1948, NAO, FM 1940–49, 30.5/6A. Emphasis underlined in the original. 316 The stipulation in point was introduced with the appointment of the delegation to the third session of the General Assembly, cf. “Om Norges deltakelse i de Forente Nasjoners annen ekstraordinære generalforsamling og i f rste del av den tredje ordinære generalforsamling.” Stortings forhandlinger 93 (1949) St. meld. nr. 32: 2). 317 Cable by Foreign Minister Lange to Morgenstierne, 8 July 1946, NAO, FM 1940–49, 30.5/6.
216 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS attended the fall 1946 session due to the repeated postponement of its opening.318 Morgenstierne also attended the second session of the General Assembly, but this time Minister of Communications Nils Langhelle became Foreign Minister Lange’s deputy. The Swedish minister to Oslo suspected that this order was chosen to obviate disputes on deputy leadership between Morgenstierne and senior politician Carl J. Hambro.319 From that time until the early 1960s, cabinet members in addition to the Foreign Minister were frequently appointed to Norwegian delegations, whereas the second General Assembly session marked the last time that the ambassador to Washington participated. What makes the listing quoted above fuzzy, apart from the fact that it mirrors a plan that was revised in the new light of demands and cancellations? The primary problem was not that “the communist, Strand Johansen, was considered by many rather as a speaker for the Soviet Union than for Norway”, as a delegate notes from the second session of the General Assembly.320 Instead, the answer lies in the lack of a transparent procedure for the selection of representatives and in the confusion about what some representatives actually stood for. An early example regarding the chairman of the liberal party, the historian (not a legislator) Jacob Worm-M ller, is telling. After appointments to San Francisco, to the Preparatory Commission, and to both parts of the first session of the General Assembly, his name was listed in a foreign ministry memorandum as a suggested delegate for the second session.321 Worm-M ller, however, announced he would turn down the assignment if he could be sure to be nominated the following year. He said this to his colleague from the department of history at the University of Oslo, the foreign ministry’s adviser Arne Ording, and there is no indication that he thought of his own party as the nominating body. What is more, a few days later Labour Party member Ording made the following note about a conversation he had had with Foreign Minister Lange: “Agreement that I travel to UNO this time and Worm-M ller next, if nothing unforeseen happens.”322 Although another liberal representative was designated for participation in the delegation, the incident shows that the nomination of –––––––––––––– 318 Letter from Morgenstierne to Lange, 17 July 1946, NAO, FM 1940–49, 30.5/6; “Om Norges deltakelse i annen del av de Forente Nasjoners f rste generalforsamling.” Stortings forhandlinger 91 (1947) St. meld. nr. 36: 1. 319 Letter by Johan Beck-Friis to Foreign Minister Östen Undén, 28 June 1947, NAS, FM, FS 1920, HP 48, vol. 1788. 320 Castberg 1971: 135. 321 Cf. memorandum by Rolf Andersen, 29 May 1947, NAO, FM 1940–49, 30.5/6. 322 Ording 2003: 261 (entry of 13 & 16 June 1947).
217 CHAPTER 3 delegates was not regarded a party matter at the time and that, in the mind of key decision makers, an individual otherwise perceived as a party representative could be substituted by a professional colleague with different party affiliation. Sources on nominations for the first sessions give the picture of a combination of two approaches, namely, precedence of individual appointments and arbitrariness – both leaving it to the foreign minister or the foreign ministry to nominate representatives. Tellingly, the abstract picture of the delegation described by Lange, as quoted above, was no blueprint to later be filled in with names. The structured presentation was merely a device to make it clear to Morgenstierne that there was no space for him on the delegation. The starting point for the planning of the delegation was the memorandum by a civil servant that was to a large extent copying the names from the prior part of the session, which were, in turn, mainly based on representation on the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations.323 Likewise, the ministry’s suggestion for the second session was a replication of the names to the prior session.324 The same applies to the nomination of delegates to the third session of the General Assembly, which took place in autumn 1948 in Paris. However, two exceptions should be noted. Instead of Morgenstierne, the ambassador to Paris, Rolf Andvord was on the list as the local foreign service representative. Moreover, the name of the communist delegate was replaced with four dots. It seems the suggestion to exclude him predated reflections on what his seat on the delegation actually stood for. A handwritten comment in the margin of the line with the dots reads: “Here we should maybe place a representative, preferably a member of parliament, from one of the smaller parties (Peasants’ Party, Christian People’s Party).”325 The records in the foreign ministry suggest that there was more communication regarding appointments to the third session than there had been before. There was an exchange with the Agrarian Party on its representative, which ended with the waiver of a party seat and the appointment of a Christian democrat.326 Further, conservative party leader Carl J. Hambro suggested his own deputy be appointed to the delegation.327
–––––––––––––– 323 Memorandum by Rolf Andersen, 1 June 1946, NAO, FM 1940–49, 30.5/6. 324 Memorandum by Rolf Andersen, 29 May 1947, NAO, FM 1940–49, 30.5/6. 325 Memorandum, 11 May 1948, NAO, FM 1940–49, 30.5/6. 326 Letter by secretary general of the agrarian party, Einar Houdhaugen, to Lange, 23 August 1948, NAO, FM 1940–49, 30.5/6. 327 Memorandum by the head of division in the foreign ministry, Ivar Lunde, 10 July 1948, NAO, FM 1940–49, 30.5/6.
218 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS
In general, however, the foreign ministry continued to approach individuals directly rather than ask party institutions for nominations.328 The decree announcing appointments to the delegation implied a right being bestowed upon the appointees; it begins with the words: “The opinion of the foreign ministry is that, like last year, one should appoint a copious and representative delegation.”329 In the first postwar years, a communist had been appointed to the delegation and there is no evidence to imply that the inclusion of representatives of the agrarians or the Christian democrats or that minor party representatives could alternate with each other were ever considered. Although the communists with their eleven parliamentary seats had merely one seat more than the agrarians and three more than the Christian democrats, the communist representative was allowed to attend the General Assembly at numerous consecutive sessions. Interest in a seat on the delegation seems to have been modest in these other parties. Nonetheless, after the notion of ‘bridge-building’ had been abandoned in early 1948 there was no longer a need to favour the communists. A report by the Swedish ambassador to Oslo is revealing in regard to the existence of a hidden agenda and the ad hoc creation of a delegation philosophy: According to what we have been told by the local foreign ministry, the exclusion of the communist, if necessary, was intended to be justified outwardly in the following way: The three large parties – the Labour Party, the conservatives and the liberals – were permanently represented in the delegation. Of the smaller parties only the communists had been represented so far. It had been felt that in their place one should include a parliamentarian from another small party, namely, Mr. Wikborg of the Christian People’s Party.330 In a subsequent letter, the ambassador reported that the change in delegation order had hardly been noted in the Norwegian press. Only the communist newspaper Friheten ran an editorial and an article, titled “Strand Johansen shut out: ‘Purge’ also in the delegation to the UN”.331 By 1948, the communists might have felt comfortable being excused from –––––––––––––– 328 Memorandum, 11 May 1948, NAO, FM 1940–49, 30.5/6, cf. letter from Lunde to the chairman of the liberal party, Jacob Worm-M ller, 9 July 1948, NAO, FM 1940–49, 30.5/6. 329 Decree, 27 August 1948, NAO, FM 1940–49, 30.5/6. This formula was actually used throughout the period examined here, or at least until 1975. 330 Confidential letter from Johan Beck-Friis to Sven Grafstr m, 28 August 1948, NAS, FM, FS 1920, HP 48, vol. 1790. 331 Letter by Johan Beck-Friis, 10 September 1948, NAS, FM, FS 1920, HP 48, vol. 1790. It is worth noting in this context that the advisory Enlarged Foreign Affairs Committee was temporarily abrogated in 1948 and replaced by a special committee in order to get rid of Strand Johansen (Sjaastad 2006: 33–34).
219 CHAPTER 3 participating in a delegation that increasingly strived to profile itself within the camp of Western democracies. The formerly communist seat alternated in the period 1948 to 1953 between the Christian democrats and the agrarians. After electoral success in 1953 enabled both parties to catch up with the liberal party, they were both granted a permanent seat on the delegation.332 In the meantime, the electoral defeat of the communists in the elections of 1949 made the idea of a larger circle of potential delegates obsolete. Whereas the seat on the above-mentioned delegation was object to redefinition, it was always clear that those who occupied the seat represented their parties (even though then Foreign Minister Trygve Lie initially appointed Strand Johansen in the capacity of a member of the parliamentary foreign affairs committee). It was unclear as to what some of the other delegates represented or the capacity in which they were entered into the delegation had fallen into oblivion. They started as representatives of civil society and ended as party representatives, without their transformation being accompanied by any reflections on change. Eventhough the personalities of the female labour politician Aase Lionæs and the chairman of the Federation of Trade Unions, Konrad Nordahl, were at the core of the issue, their cases also demonstrated the overriding significance of the Storting in Norwegian politics. When both long- standing members on the UN delegation were elected to parliament, their prior raison d’être was simply forgotten. As a consequence, the organisations or fields they had initially represented lost their privilege and had difficulties getting back on the delegation later. A seat had been reserved for women’s organisations. At the first part of the first session this seat had been occupied by the chairwoman of the Norwegian Women’s Organisations Committee for Cooperation (Norske Kvinneorganisasjoners Samarbeidsnemnd). As described in detail later, the chairwoman of the Labour Party’s women’s secretariat, Aase Lionæs, succeeded in outmaneuvring this delegate by the second part of the first session, resulting in what seemed to be an annual reappointment until the mid-1960s. Lionæs eventually became a deputy parliament member in 1954 and a full-fledged member in 1958. From 1954 she was listed as stortingsrepresentant (Member of Parliament) in official accounts of the delegation, and started to be perceived as a representative of the Labour Party. In the foreign ministry uncertainty regarding her status came about and she was seen as “probably, most likely” representing “the female
–––––––––––––– 332 Cf. the memorandum on the delegation by Per Vennemoe, 13 May 1954, NAO, FM 1950–59, 26.5/20.
220 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS element” in a memorandum on the composition of the delegation in 1957.333 However, a male labour legislator had already functioned as a personal substitute two years earlier and she had been associated with the Labour Party seat one year earlier.334 Later, Lionæs was replaced on the delegation by another female Labour Party legislator, but the seat was subsequently given to a male colleague. As a consequence, not a single woman served on the Norwegian delegations to the twenty-third and twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly. When Norwegian women’s organisations again raised claims for representation in the beginning of the 1970s, they were unaware of historical precedence and only managed to receive semi-official observer status. In a similar fashion, Konrad Nordahl, who participated in eleven sessions of the General Assembly between 1946 and 1962, squandered the seat of the Norwegian Federation of Trade Unions to the Labour Party when he accepted being identified as member of parliament instead of trade union representative. When the trade unions later pointed to their long-time representation on the delegation and expressed disappointment for not having been asked to nominate a delegate, the foreign ministry was forced into precision. A memorandum determined that Nordahl had been a (simple) delegation member until the twelfth session of the General Assembly and then, at the thirteenth session and afterwards, he had been a parliamentary representative on the delegation.335 Nordahl had served as a member of the Storting from 1957 on and this status was noted on the lists of the members of Norwegian delegates to the General Assembly. Overlooking the question on the capacity in which various delegates were appointed (as well as overlooking foreign service appointees), another foreign ministry memorandum observed: From the records, a reason cannot be seen as to why exclusively members of parliament have been appointed since the 13th General Assembly. The principle of distribution among different political groups has been applied from the very 1st General Assembly.336
–––––––––––––– 333 Memorandum on the delegation by Rolf Hancke, 12 August 1957, NAO, FM 1950–1959, 26.5/62. 334 Memorandum on the delegation, 1 September 1955, NAO, FM 1950–1959, 26.5/60; Confidential memorandum on the delegation by Per Vennemoe, 24 April 1956, NAO, FM 1950–1959, 26.5/61. Not least, Foreign Minister Lange associated her with the Labour Party seat, cf. letter by Per Vennemoe to the permanent mission to the UN, 31 May 1956, ibid. 335 Letter from Nordahl’s successor as chairman of the Federation of Trade Unions, Parelius Mentsen, to the foreign ministry, 18 September 1965, FMAO, 1960–69, 26.5/72b; Memorandum by Kaare Sandegren, 16 October 1965, ibid. 336 Memorandum by Kaare Sandegren, 19 October 1965, FMAO, 1960–69, 26.5/72b.
221 CHAPTER 3
The fact that Nordahl was the first Norwegian parliamentarian and one of very few ever appointed to the official category ‘adviser’, his standard place in the delegation before he became a member of parliament puts this unambiguous interpretation in question.337 Thus, in retrospect, the delegation history, streamlined in the foreign ministry, was a history of providing representation for political parties and parliamentarians, whereas the history of civil society representation was actively forgotten. In the confused and inconsistent analysis of delegations to various sessions, which the memorandum was based on, the names of delegates not representing parties or the foreign service were underlined in red. Delegation frequenter Lionæs received one red line as a member to the delegation to the fourth session of the General Assembly, whereas her earlier and later participation was not qualified. However, a wavy blue line was placed under this red line, calling into question the recollection that Lionæs had entered the delegation on the ticket for women’s organisations.338 On the basis of this account in the foreign ministry, it could be argued that Lionæs was never a representative for women or women’s organisations, whereas Nordahl represented trade unions until the twelfth session. However, by accepting ex post categorisations made in the foreign ministry, the crucial insight would be missed: In Norway, the consecutive appointments of one and the same individuals clouded the representatives’ institutional background and made the justification of their presence on the delegation contingent. Membership in the Storting was a personal quality with overriding power. Whereas the overall context is ambiguous and Lionæs and Nordahl might be qualified as (Labour Party) personalities on the delegation, here they are regarded as Labour Party representatives only from the time ‘Member of Parliament’ was attached to them in delegation lists. The case of Norway can be contrasted with that of Denmark, where the chairman of the Federation of Trade Unions was always listed as delegate in this capacity, despite his other status as a member of parliament.
–––––––––––––– 337 This statement does not take into account parliamentarians substituting for colleagues. As a member of parliament, Nordahl was first appointed as ‘alternate representative’ at the thirteenth session of the General Assembly. However, at the fourteenth and fifteenth sessions he was appointed in the category of ‘advisers’. 338 Supplement to Kaare Sandegrens memorandum, 19 October 1965, FMAO, 1960–69, 26.5/72b.
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Political representation in the ‘civil servant state’ What might be called the ‘personality factor’ was strong in the early years of Norwegian delegations to the General Assembly, whereas the records of the foreign ministry show that the practice of asking parliamentary party groups for nominations slowly gained ground from the late 1940s onward.339 Foreign Minister Lange played a significant role in conveying information regarding various parties’ representatives on the delegation. In the course of the 1950s the appointment process was gradually bureaucratised, and the planning of the delegation was increasingly handled by foreign ministry officials. At the same time, there was a shift from qualified (and suggestive) guesses in the foreign ministry on likely party representatives towards direct communication with the party groups.340 An early measure to standardise the claims parties have on delegation seats included a formula being written into the appointment decrees, according to which representatives of political parties would be replaced by other representatives of the respective parties should the need arise.341 This was only occasionally the case, even once it was formally codified. But this is not to imply that the party representatives who went to the General Assembly actually stayed the whole length of the session. Partly encouraged by another stipulation of the appointment decree, according to which only those members necessary for the work of the delegation at any given point in time should sojourn New York, the party representatives often stayed shorter than the foreseen three-month period. By 1955 a perception emerged in the foreign ministry that there were “problems with the substitution of delegation members”.342 Thus, it was suggested that all parties nominate a reserve candidate to be called on in case the main candidate was compelled to leave. However, in effect the session was simply divided into two parts, with the party representatives and even some of the civil servants being given part-time assignments.343 –––––––––––––– 339 In his account of the Norwegian practice of assigning parliamentary delegates to the General Assembly, Jostein Mykletun began with the fourth session in 1949. While he did not explain his omission of the earlier sessions, the reason may be the diffused status of delegates in the first years (cf. Jacobsen/Mykletun 1973 III: 4–7). 340 See NAO, FM 1950–59, 26.5. Even in cases where it is known that Lange had consultations with the party groups, the premises for the talks are unclear; cf. the letter by the Chief of the Political Department Johan Georg Ræder to Counselor of Embassy Erik Dons, 6 January 1953, NAO, FM 1950–59, 26.5/15. 341 Introduced with the decree, 5 October 1951, NAO, FM 1950–59, 26.5/14. 342 Letter by Counsellor of Embassy in Copenhagen, Conrad Hofdal, to Rolf Hancke, 13 June 1955, NAO, FM 1950–59, 26.5/60. 343 Memorandum by Per Vennemoe, 31 May 1955, delegation plan, no date, NAO, FM 1950–59, 26.5/60.
223 CHAPTER 3
It was the suggestion of a civil servant that led to the establishment of an additional party seat after the agrarians and Christian democrats had almost caught up in terms of the number of liberal legislators in the parliamentary elections of 1953.344 It was a civil servant who initiated a specification for the boundaries of political representation. Upon a nomination by the Christian democrats, the secretary general of the foreign ministry, Rasmus B. Skylstad, questioned: “Is it desirable that civil servants are appointed as representatives of political parties (e.g. Chief of Division [in the ministry of trade Peter] Koren)?”345 The question can be seen in the context of the strict separation of powers required by the Norwegian constitution, which excludes civil servants working in the central administration from being elected to parliament.346 However, the foreign ministry went yet further with the restriction, urging party nominations be limited to only members or even only active members of parliament. The latter variant excluded deputy members of parliament, one of the peculiarities of Norwegian polity. In effect, whereas Koren’s appointment was accepted, practically all party delegates after 1956 were legislators.347 Even the redefinition of the civil society representatives as parliamentary representatives was an element in this standardisation. Foreign ministry preparations for the delegation of 1956 show that requests/emphasis on the proper character of party representation were triggered not only by constitutional concerns, but also by a contradictory blend of instrumental considerations on the utility of a certain type of political representatives, on the one hand, and the desire to put political representatives in their place, on the other hand. In a confidential memorandum, the chief of the Political Department, Per Vennemoe, predicted (accurately, although not reckoning with the issues of Hungary and Suez) that the eleventh session of the General Assembly might become more dramatic than any previous session and that Norway could become torn between NATO loyalty and “our natural instincts and traditions”. He argued that, given this situation, “a solid political weight” would be beneficial during the first part of the session and that the main representatives of the party, preferably persons with United Nations experience, be present then. His suggestion that it should be made clear to
–––––––––––––– 344 See Lange’s comment on Per Vennemoe’s suggestion, memorandum on the delegation, 13 May 1954, NAO, FM 1950–59, 26.5/20. 345 Handwritten note on a draft decree regarding the appointment of the delegation, 15 June 1955, NAO, FM 1950–59, 26.5/60. 346 Cf. Colban 1961: 158–159. 347 The only exception in the period 1956 to 1975 was the conservative ex-legislator Erling Norvik in 1974.
224 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS the chairpersons of the party groups that the parties only be represented by parliamentarians amounted to a request for a truly senior delegation. However, the memorandum went on to admit that, in some instances, language difficulties could arise from the requested system. Moreover, the memorandum stated that there was no obstacle to including single party representatives as “parliamentary observers” without being actively engaged in the committee work. Reference was made to the model applied by Canada by which politicians belonging to opposition parties acted as observers as well as to the precondition of a delegation sufficiently strong at the working level. At the same time, Vennemoe articulated his personal opinion that three of the technically or juridically oriented committees should be taken care of by civil servants. A note in his own handwriting added that this applied to the fifth (financial) committee insofar as Hambro was not on the delegation. Finally, he suggested only one set of parliamentarians be appointed at first, as he saw a chance the second half of the session would be manageable with a plain civil servant work force. An important background was the massive budget problem facing the foreign ministry at the time.348 In the margin of the memorandum, State Secretary Dag Bryn commented on the request for parliamentary party representatives: “I think we should behold this as a request to the parties. If it cannot be realised, then we should have more civil servants instead.” In another note, the secretary general of the foreign ministry, Rasmus B. Skylstad announced that he largely agreed with the suggestions in the text, which included detailed reflections on the participation of individual civil servants and a proposed delegation list. Foreign Minister Lange’s only comment was that he had discussed the budget with the Minister of Finance.349 Whereas the internal communication of the foreign service reveals that the parties “accepted” that political weight be put on the first part of the session (in 1956 this meant from mid November until Christmas), the communication between the foreign ministry and individual political delegates suggested that the representatives of the Storting wished to come before Christmas and stay at home during the second part of the session.350 By autumn 1956 the budgetary problems had intensified, leaving the foreign ministry to ponder how to justify limiting the participation of legislators to three individuals. The fourth parliamentarian, Hambro, was listed on the understanding that he would not attend. A letter by Hambro –––––––––––––– 348 Confidential memorandum, 24 April 1956, NAO, FM 1950–59, 26.5/61. 349 Ibid. 350 Letter by Vennemoe to the Permanent Mission, 31 May 1956, Letter by Rolf Hancke to Carl J. Hambro, 11 July 1956, NAO, FM 1950–59, 26.5/61.
225 CHAPTER 3 was simply ignored; the letter had indicated personal health problems and that another legislator would represent the conservative party at the first and possibly second part of the session. In regard to the nominated liberal representative, the suggestion was to argue that delegation appointments were made on the precondition that only full members of parliament – no deputy legislators – be nominated, a rule that left him outside.351 In the end, both the conservative substitute for Hambro and the liberal deputy participated, but the latter was shunt off to the second part of the session and the whole affair was given negative attention in the press.352 When the issue of parliamentary representation made its way to the foreign policy committee, a meeting was called with the leaders of the party groups, and Prime Minister Einar Gerhardsen voiced his concern about the marked increase in expenses incurred through international cooperation. The minutes of the meeting show that while Foreign Minister Lange mainly focussed on the discussion of costs involved with substituting parliamentary delegates during an ongoing session (he also pointed to increased expenditures for secretary help due to the language difficulties of parliamentarians), he “adumbrated” the order that part-time engagements of parliamentarians be continued at the eleventh session of the General Assembly. He suggested the Labour Party be given two and the other parties one representative each “with alteration for the Christian People’s Party and the Peasants’ Party”. The leaders of the party groups were in disagreement with these ideas, asserting: participation in the UN General Assemblies is our foremost foreign policy task, it is of invaluable significance that the different political views are represented on the delegation, and preferably all representatives should be present for the whole session. Instead of the proposed restriction on the number of representatives, the group leaders suggested expenses be cut in conjunction with participation in other international organisations, such as the Council of Europe and the Nordic Council (both comprised of parliamentarians). They also noted “a
–––––––––––––– 351 Memorandum by State Secretary Dag Bryn, 25 September 1956, cf. letter by Hambro to the foreign ministry, 13 July 1956, NAO, FM 1950–59, 26.5/61. Aase Lionæs was also merely a deputy member of parliament at the time but, in contrast to Seland as a deputy, she was a long-time acting member of parliament, see: Trond Nordby (ed.). Storting og regjering 1945–1985: Biografier. Oslo: Kunnskapsforlaget, 1985. 352 Cf. memorandum by Rolf Hancke on a conversation with liberal deputy Johanes Seland, 18 October 1956, NAO, FM 1950–59, 26.5/61. “UD reduserer sitt budsjett: Bare tre stortingsmenn I FN’s generalforsamling.” Morgenbladet (10 October 1956); “Magrere kost for norske FN-delegater?” Morgenbladet (12 October 1956); “Har vi ikke råd til full representasjon i FN?” Verdens Gang (10 November 1956).
226 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS tendency for unnecessary large participation of experts, in particular civil servants from the ministries, during these assemblies”. The Prime Minister summarised the discussion by pointing to the wish that all five democratic parties be represented on the delegation and that all representatives should, if possible, be present at the whole session.353 This was the status quo ante to the experiment at the eleventh session. The government conceded additional funds, thereby enabling the foreign ministry to guarantee full- scale parliamentary participation on the delegation.354 Remarkably, this concession was made at a time when the Storting was calling on itself to take over the responsibility of reimbursing parliamentarians’ participation in the Nordic Council, the Council of Europe, and the annual conference of NATO parliamentarians. Perhaps the mixed character of delegations kept the same demands from being placed for participation in the General Assembly. However, there was another cost involved for parliamentarians. In a debate on the budget, Carl J. Hambro called upon his colleagues “to make the sacrifice” of time by participating in the General Assembly for longer intervals.355 The parliamentary election of October 1957 made it difficult to put these words into practice – not least for the preacher himself. Hambro was among the four of seven appointed parliamentary representatives who did not attend the General Assembly. Even though most were replaced by substitutes, the report to Parliament on the work of the delegation nonetheless noted that most of the Storting representatives were prevented from participating for the whole session.356 Nor did the two cabinet members appointed to the delegation visit New York this time, prompting one of the foreign ministry’s premises for the planning of the next delegation to read: “This time we should try to avoid getting in the same situation as last year, when [UN] Ambassador [Hans] Engen was the only one of the appointed [five main] delegates present at the General Assembly.”357 At the same time, the Storting requested an arrangement that would allow for the replacement of representatives during an ongoing session; the party group leaders agreed to an order stipulating that, in the case party representatives only stayed for a limited amount of time, the delegation should nevertheless always include a minimum of one representative from –––––––––––––– 353 Minutes of the meeting in the Storting, 12 March 1957, NAO, FM 1950–59, 26.5/62. 354 Stortings forhandlinger, Stortingstidende 101 (1957): 1305 (Halvard Lange). 355 Stortings forhandlinger, Stortingstidende 101 (1957): 1304. 356 “Norges deltakelse i De Forente Nasjoners 12. ordinære Generalforsamling samt i den gjenopptatte 11. Generalforsamling (1957).” Stortings forhandlinger 102 (1958) St. meld. nr. 21: 1. 357 Memorandum on the delegation by Rolf Hancke, 24 May 1958, NAO, FM 1950–59, 26.5/63.
227 CHAPTER 3 the Labour Party and two representatives from the opposition.358 Things did not work out as planned at the following session. While a maximum of sixteen delegates were in place at times, in the end only eight stayed on – none of these a party representative. (One reason for this was that the ‘Christmas boat’ back to Europe left New York too early to allow the delegates to finish their work). Some of the parliamentarians did not fully serve the committees assigned to them, concentrating on agenda points they personally considered to be more interesting. And yet again, others were handicapped by their lack of language competence. As a result, most of the work to be done in the various committees landed on the civil servants. A memorandum commented on this by saying: “As a matter of course, a Storting representative has much more weight than a junior civil servant in the question of presenting the Norwegian delegation’s views, for example, or in trying to accomplish changes in draft resolutions, etc.”359
Outsiders In early 1961, preparations were complete for the cabinet to appoint former Secretary-General of the United Nations Trygve Lie, as chairman of the Norwegian delegation to the second part of the fifteenth session of the General Assembly. However, the ‘comeback’ was left unrealised. The files of the foreign ministry only included the handwritten note: “Draft decree written but not used, as the decision about Trygve Lie was revised.”360 Apart from this incident, the files indicate that appointments in the years around 1960 were made in a simple, routine manner. For this reason, the memorandum on the working order of the delegation prior to the seventeenth session of the General Assembly comes as a surprise – even though it shows that the problems of old lingered. The memorandum was a product of foreign ministry talks by permanent representative Sivert A. Nielsen. It described the Norwegian delegation’s performance in the committee work of the General Assembly as seriously handicapped, a shortcoming attributed to language and technical deficiencies of the parliamentarians acting as principal delegates in all but the first committee. The reasoning went on to say:
–––––––––––––– 358 Notes by Hans Engen (no date) and Halvard Lange (7 June 1958) on Rolf Hancke’s memorandum on the delegation of 24 May 1958, NAO, FM 1950–59, 26.5/63. 359 Memorandum by Rolf Hancke on the composition of the delegation, 30 January 1959, NAO, FM 1950–59, 26.5/64. 360 Memorandum by Georg Kristiansen, 15 February 1961, letter to Lie by Cabinet Minister Arne Skaug, 18 February 1961, handwritten note by Per Borgen, no date, FMAO, 1960–69, 26.5/65.
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Some of the Storting representatives are aware of the weaknesses of the present order of accrediting committee representatives and acting in the committees. They acknowledge the desirability of Norway occupying her place in Western collaboration and in the world organisation as such. Those of them with language difficulties or lack of UN-experience will probably wish to avoid blocking, without any fault of their own, our freedom of action in the committees. There is therefore reason to believe that if one could find a reasonable solution to this problem and present it to the Storting representatives in an appropriate way, the solution would gain the understanding and approval of Storting representatives. Despite the sharp words, the suggestion was not revolutionary. It was based on the practises of the United States and Canada in regard to those delegation members the paper referred to as “these ‘outsiders’”. The idea was to formally preserve the position of parliamentarians in the committee work, but at the same time accredit a senior foreign service official to instantly take over the delegation seat once activity beyond formal routines was required. The memorandum closed by going one half step further, making clear that the proposed guiding lines do not speak to the basic principles for the participation of Storting representatives in the delegation to the General Assemblies. Thus, they do not deal with to what degree it was originally intended the Storting representatives participate in the daily representation work in the committees or to what degree they should be regarded as political advisers for the delegation and, moreover, by their rotation contribute giving the Storting a fund of first hand knowledge of the United Nations’ activity. This indirect questioning of the existing order was seemingly retracted in the last sentence, suggesting there was hardly any point in trying to change the established practice.361 This assessment was shared by the chief of the Political Department, Georg Kristiansen, who wrote his remarks onto the memorandum itself. As he saw it, the way to proceed was not to change the general guidelines, but create awareness of the need to instil active and organic change with a senior accompaniment to the parliamentarian representative. The words “In agreement” were the comment of both the secretary general of the foreign ministry, Johan Georg Ræder, and Foreign Minister Halvard Lange.362 It took three years until the matter was taken up anew. In a memorandum the head of the United Nations Division in the foreign ministry, Per Ravne, repeated the well-established points of criticism in –––––––––––––– 361 Memorandum by Leif Edwardsen, 29 August 1962, FMAO, 1960–69, 26.5/68b. 362 Notes on the memorandum by Leif Edwardsen of 29 August 1962, FMAO, 1960–69, 26.5/68b.
229 CHAPTER 3 regard to legislators’ foreign language deficiencies, lack of training in international negotiation techniques, as well as lack of insight regarding the problems addressed by the General Assembly. He then reintroduced the idea of offering the parliamentary delegates status quo in regard to their appointment as ‘representatives’ and ‘alternate representatives’ while also dispensing with the duty to sit in a particular committee. He held out the prospect of freedom to circulate and follow any topic of particular political interest. This proposed directive rested on the prerequisite that civil servants take over the daily work in the committee. Ravne expected mostly newcomers among the parliamentary representatives, and saw a chance they might be open to accepting the unfettered position of observers. In a handwritten comment, the chief of the Political Department, Einar Ansteensen, noted this solution could not mean the Norwegian legislators be reduced to observers as would be the case under the Canadian model. As he expressed it, “The understanding, of course, is that our parliamentarians would still have full status as members of the delegation with the right of voting at delegation meetings.” Despite this remark, Ravne noted that the foreign minister had agreed with his conclusions and had asked him to mention the possibility of representatives observing the session without committee assignments when contacting the parliamentary groups.363 After the election defeat of the Labour Party in September 1965, the conservative politician John Lyng succeeded Lange as foreign minister. Irrespective of this change in government, Ravne’s plan was realised. In a memorandum two sessions later he noted that the parliamentary representatives had in practice not participated in the daily work of the delegation in the last years and instead functioned as political observers and advisers. He now suggested encouraging them to reduce their individual stay to about six weeks and send replacement delegates. He believed this idea would expediently make it seem natural for parliamentary delegates to be appointed “as their own Storting delegation, linked to that appointed by government”. He pointed to the Canadian ‘model’, as well as to the Danish demotion of all parliamentary delegates to the category of ‘advisers’. This one-time status depression in 1966 had, in turn, been promoted in Denmark by pointing to the change in the function of Norwegian parliamentarians the previous year. Ravne added considerations on freedom for parliamentary delegates and improved possibilities for them to link Norwegian United Nations policy with the will of the people. He also suggested civil servants had the greatest utility and need for participating in the committee work of
–––––––––––––– 363 Memorandum, 6 July 1965, FMAO, 1960–69, 26.5/72b.
230 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS the General Assembly. This time Ansteensen noted agreement with his subordinate’s report.364 However, Ravne’s successor as head of the United Nations Division, Arne Arnesen, noted the following about the deliberations Foreign Minister Lyng had had with the delegates during the previous session: The Canadian model was not met with approval and it was recommended the Norwegian practice of old be continued, including the principle appointment for the whole session of the General Assembly and accreditation of the parliamentary members as the principal delegates in the committees. Some parliamentarians had expressed an interest in committee- jumping, and it was agreed that committee work be organised in the most practical manner.365 Despite this proposed serving of parliamentary delegates for the whole session, the period has been divided into two halves ever since and, even in the year of its proclamation, only one out of thirteen legislators was actually appointed for the entire session.366 The stay of one other appointee was prolonged after agrarian legislator Erik Braadland had backed away from joining the delegation due to his disagreement with the Norwegian instructions on China, which continued recommending the mainland government as being the legitimate representative of China despite the excesses of the so-called great proletarian cultural revolution. Whether the reason is authentic or not, it would be premature to regard this case of principal–agent conflict with a parliamentarian on a government delegation – unique to Norway – as corresponding to the ideal-typical scenario. Braadland was a member of the party that held the office of Prime Minister at that time and his career as a parliamentarian (outsider) was preceded by a diplomatic career, which included such high-ranking appointments as ambassador to Moscow and to London.367
–––––––––––––– 364 Memorandum, 27 January 1967, FMAO, 1960–69, 26.5/74b; cf. on the use of the ‘Norwegian model’ in the Danish discussion: Memorandum regarding political members of the UN delegation, 25 May 1966, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1966. 365 Memorandum, 7 September 1967, FMAO, 1960–69, 26.5/74b. By this time, Ravne had become the Norwegian deputy permanent representative to the United Nations. 366 Decree on the delegation, 15 September 1967, FMAO, 1960–69, 26.5/74b; whereas the legislator in point was a member of the conservative party, in subsequent years usually one of the Labour Party delegates stayed throughout the session, cf. memorandum on the composition of the delegation by Tom Vraalsen, 30 May 1974, FM 1970–79, 26.5/81b. 367 “Stortinget, FN og UD.” Morgenbladet (2 June 1973); cf. the letter by the leader of the agrarian parliamentary group Lars Leiro, 13 October 1967, FMAO, 1960–69, 26.5/74b.
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An amateur-satellite with a human face On the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the ratification of the Charter of the United Nations, the internationally known peace researcher Johan Galtung spoke before the Norwegian Students’ Society (Det Norske Studentersamfund). In the speech titled “The UN and Imperialism” (FN og imperialismen), he attacked Norwegian policies in the United Nations. He saw Norway’s role as one of “the amateur satellite with a human face”, an observer watching the match from the sidelines and ready to run in with a stretcher as soon as one of the players was injured. In Galtung’s view Norway orbited two entities: the United States and domestic big business. He described the delegation as a “little gang sitting in the San Carlos Hotel near the UN, piecing together resolutions”, suggesting their work was done at the hotel bar. Each time Norway voted in the United Nations, Galtung maintained, the vote represented not the country but a little clique from the foreign ministry and the foreign policy committee, with the backing of the Norwegian Ship Owners’ Association (Norges Rederforbund) and the Export Council. As he made clear in the discussion following the speech, he no longer saw any meaning in talking with those in charge of Norwegian foreign policy, as he had come to see them as enemies. In this connection his rage was particularly directed at foreign ministry officials, describing them as a closed caste with a world view that was accurate in the 1930s at best, with many officials suffering from the 9th of April syndrome (the day Norway was attacked by Nazi Germany, and also a cipher for the justification of Norway’s NATO-alignment), which inflicted “serious brain damage that can only be cured by retirement”.368 In a cable sent to the permanent mission in New York as well as to the embassies in Washington and Moscow, the secretary general of the foreign ministry, Thore Boye, commented on Galtung’s characterisation of the delegation. First he noted that the description of policy making was “grotesque”, not least because the reference to a hotel that no longer housed the delegation showed that the speaker was not up to date. He continued by analysing the speech as follows:
–––––––––––––– 368 “‘En liten klikk bak Norges FN-politikk’: Johan Galtung i Studentersamfundet.” Aftenposten (26 October 1970) (gang-quote); “‘Vi er amat r-satelitten med det humane ansikt’: Norge spiller USA’s spill i FN, sier Johan Galtung.” Dagbladet (26 October 1970) (brain damage quote); Årstein Skiftun. “Johan Galtung poste malurt i begeret: Naiv modell preger FN og vårt eget UD.” Arbeiderbladet (26 October 1970); as regards the bar, see: Arne Treholt. “Norsk politikk i FN.” Internasjonal Politikk (1972) 3: 421–439, at 435; cf. on the role of the Norwegian Shipowners’ Association: Nils Vogt. “[Comment].” Internasjonal Politikk (1968): 701–703.
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Probably not G.’s intention to be taken seriously. At times helpful to turn things upside-down, that forces the administration to think through matters once again. In the old days there were court jesters whose task it was to put a drop of bitterness in the cup; they jumped about with cap and bells and spread wicked distortions around themselves. The jester surely had a mission in society back then, and perhaps he still does.369 As Knut Frydenlund, foreign minister in the years 1973–1981 and 1986– 1987 noted, the wave of democratisation that swept across Norway in the 1970s did not stop at the door of the foreign ministry.370 Clearly, the societal climate after 1968 had the administration on the defensive and, even if civil servants had difficulties in always taking their critics seriously, they had to consider their criticism. It seems the civil servants were open for interaction with non-professionals as parliamentarians, even those with a leftist background regularly expressed satisfaction with the staff of the permanent mission in New York. One interpretation of Galtung’s ideas was presented by Arne Treholt, a youth observer to the UN delegation in 1971; he was later counsellor at the permanent mission and, yet later, convicted of espionage for the Soviet Union and Iraq. Ironically, of all the students of Norwegian United Nations policies, Treholt was the one to argue most forcefully for extended parliamentary control of the delegation. Treholt attached great importance to putting civil servants on the delegation in opposition to heralds of Norwegian domestic debate. He viewed the practice of having parliamentarians on the delegation as likely boosting the political function as a corrective against the “small-scale politicising popes” (småpolitiserende paver) of the permanent mission. However, it was his impression that they did not in reality function as a “reliable counterpoise to the civil servants and expertise of the delegation” and instead played the role of “spectators” and “decoration”. In arguing that nobody was served by parliamentarians acting as “amateur participants”, Treholt urged the Storting and its representatives to engage or be engaged seriously in United Nations affairs, thereby also involving political parties and public opinion.371 In the debate that followed, although not everyone agreed with Treholt’s description, there was wide consensus that more societal input to Norwegian policy making at the United Nations was desirable.372
–––––––––––––– 369 Cable, 29 October 1970, FMAO, 1970–79, 26.6/47. 370 Frydenlund 1982: 10, 22. 371 Treholt 1972: 432–439 (quotes: 435–437, 439). 372 Anders J. Guldvik. “Norsk politikk i FN: Svar til Arne Treholt.” Internasjonal Politikk (1973) 1: 109–112; Knut Frydenlund. “Korte betraktninger om et stort emne.” Internasjonal (continued)
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Unlike the situation in the 1960s, the process for appointment to the General Assembly had changed: In the 1970s it was no longer foreign ministry officials who drafted models for parliamentary participation in the Norwegian delegation to the General Assembly. It was the Storting itself that now addressed the matter. Given the criticism and redress by Galtung and Treholt, given changes in the domestic political landscape after the election in September 1973, and given the radicalisation of politics in the United Nations in the mid-1970s, United Nations policies became more politicised than in the previous decade. In a parliamentary foreign policy debate in early 1972, the former diplomat and later Foreign Minister Knut Frydenlund (labour) requested a more principle Storting debate on the United Nations than those that followed the annual reports on Norwegian participation in the General Assembly.373 When such a debate was finally held, he pointed to criticism of the Storting’s treatment of United Nations issues and Norwegian UN policies, and expressed the opinion that this criticism was justified. Yet, he saw it as largely applicable to matters concerning Norway and international organisations, and he claimed the situation, despite not being satisfactory, was somewhat better in the United Nations due to the many Storting representatives who had joined the delegation for extended periods.374 Treholt’s article had not been published at the time Frydenlund called for the debate; nonetheless, the status of delegates was probably among the issues on his mind when he requested it. The point in question addressed “what status the representatives of political parties on UN delegation should have. Should they merely be consultative members or should they be able to express dissenting views?” As the statement goes on, the confusion of status and instruments for personal reservations continues: “So far, the party representatives have played the role of an advising observer, but situations could arise in which it might become necessary for party representatives to mark a deviant approach.”375 The status of parliamentary representatives was addressed by participants of the Storting’s United Nations debate in summer 1973. Early in the debate, labour politician Tor Oftedal questioned whether parliamen- tary representatives should continue to be appointed as delegates and act as representatives subject to government directives, suggesting that an
–––––––––––––– Politikk (1973) 1: 112–114; Arne Arnesen. “Norsk politikk i FN.” Internasjonal Politikk (1973) 1: 114–117; Mykletun 1975b: 645. 373 Stortings forhandlinger, Stortingstidende 115 (1971/1972): 1902. 374 Stortings forhandlinger, Stortingstidende 116 (1972/1973): 3405. 375 Kåre Kleivan. “Norden gikk ulike veier i FN i h st: Samkj ringen burde kunne bli bedre.” Verdens Gang (3 February 1972).
234 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS appropriate status would be that of advisers. His ideas were unclear despite his background in the foreign service, which included service on the UN delegation. Nevertheless, his obvious intention was to contrast regular members of the delegation with a version of observers. Oftedal said he did not raise the issue for practical reasons, as he saw Norwegian UN policy as “political common property” unaffected by party politics. However, as a member of the political opposition he felt uncomfortable in principle working for the sitting government – despite the instrument of putting protest and disagreement on the record. He closed his statement by underlining that it was not “out of personal experiences of real conflicts in loyalty for Storting representatives on the UN delegation that I have these concerns”.376 Although similar suggestions were occasionally returned to the agenda, in the debate that followed in the summer of 1973 no one agreed with listing the parliamentary delegates as advisers. The closest thing to consent came from a conservative politician who felt there was no need to change the system to benefit the vocalisation of dissenting views, as it would only lead to a babble of voices. As he saw it, if a change in the status of parliamentarians were to be considered, it would have been to make their true status as agents who were not responsible for government policies transparent.377 All others who addressed the status of delegates were unreservedly positive about the existing system, even if many pleaded for better preparation of prospective parliamentary delegates. The conservative legislator and later assistant administrator of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Paul Thyness, even asked for longer and recurrent terms of service and for the exclusion of interest in travel as a selection criterion. Moreover, he summed up the general theme of the debate with a remark on the idea to give “adviser” (i.e., observer) status to parliamentarians: “I believe such a change in status might possibly induce the Storting representatives to feel freer in relation to the government’s authority of instruction than they actually should.”378 A conservative who had been on the UN delegation the previous year argued that there were sufficient valves for parliamentarians to express disagreement on the delegation, including the right of refusal to give particular speeches and the possibility of putting reservations about a topic or position on the record. He also pointed to advantages of the high official status of parliamentarians for establishing unofficial contacts.379 –––––––––––––– 376 Stortings forhandlinger, Stortingstidende 116 (1972/1973): 3399–3400. 377 Stortings forhandlinger, Stortingstidende 116 (1972/1973): 3406 (Otto Lyng). 378 Stortings forhandlinger, Stortingstidende 116 (1972/1973): 3426. 379 Stortings forhandlinger, Stortingstidende 116 (1972/1973): 3417 (Martin Buvik).
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Two representatives of the Labour Party, like the conservatives in opposition at the time, put forth similar views. They also argued in support of the possibility of giving speeches, as these strengthened their position. They maintained that the delegation operated on the premise of teamwork, not civil servants’ control of parliamentarians. Both expressed the idea that it was “a step in a general process of democratisation that politicians and not civil servants dominate the various international forums”. At the same time they saw an element of truth in the claim that the administration was in control, whereas the Storting played the role of “whitewasher” (sandpåstr ere). In accordance with other participants in the debate, they sought attention for United Nations affairs through the Storting, which was the institution blamed for whatever deficits in democracy there might be in this regard.380 This view was shared by the conservative newspaper Morgenbladet, which came close to Galtung’s description of the foreign ministry’s dealing with the United Nations: “Here there are apparently tendencies towards a more private foreign policy conduct, out of step with the general feeling for a right and objective approach.”381 Many of the debaters pointed to an interview with permanent representative to the United Nations Ole Ålgård, who, a few days before the issue was taken up in parliament, had expressed support for maintaining Storting representatives’ status as primary delegates. His stance was based on the observation that “Norwegian views in the UN get much more weight when presented by Storting representatives instead of by civil servants from the foreign ministry.” Ålgård also argued against the allegation that parliamentarians were merely stooges (nikkedukker) on the delegation for policies predefined by civil servants: “If I know Norwegian Storting representatives right, they do not let themselves be dominated by the civil servants.” He did ask for strong delegates who were well-prepared, possessed good language skills and would preferably return for subsequent sessions (although he admitted the Storting might best be served by acquainting the greatest possible number of its members with the work of the United Nations).382 The general consensus on the Norwegian system of parliamentary representation as seen on the delegations to the General Assembly remained intact after the split and marginalisation of the liberal party in 1972–1973 and the success of the Socialist Electoral League in 1973. The
–––––––––––––– 380 Stortings forhandlinger, Stortingstidende 116 (1972/1973): 3415, 3421 (quotes)–3422 (Osmund Faremo, Liv Aasen). 381 “Stortinget, FN og UD.” Morgenbladet (2 June 1973). 382 Arne Arnesen. “Ambassad r Ole Ålgård: Norsk FN-politikk bestemmes ikke av embetsmennene i UD.” Arbeiderbladet (24 May 1973).
236 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS routine practice of recording everyday disagreements in an unspectacular way was nixed in connection with the twenty-eight session of the General Assembly when a special note was prepared in the foreign ministry on the various issues about which socialist representative Berit Ås had officially voiced reservations.383 Nonetheless, in parliament Ås announced her appreciation of the civil servants’ work and expressed both my satisfaction and my confidence [trygghet] in regard to the system Norway is an adherent of in terms of the delegation composition. It amounts to granting representation on the delegation to several parties, not just government parties or the civil servants of the permanent mission, as we often find for other countries. Our system appears to me both democratic and fruitful. In her view, while a potential for conflicts of conscience did exist, such conflicts were avoidable. She underlined that it had been a political necessity to put her opinion on how Norway should have voted on record, and she suggested that the right to refuse giving particular speeches be formalised.384 Even other socialist representatives on the delegation expressed their gratitude about being allowed to follow Norwegian work at the United Nations from within.385 In the early 1970s the tendency for extensive recording of dissenting views seems to have gained popularity among representatives of other parties, as well.386
The fight to keep Norway from gliding into the ‘maelstrom’ The most volatile issue of Norwegian policy at the United Nations in the early 1970s concerned the voting strategy. Around the time of Johan Galtung’s venture, Thorvald Stoltenberg, the International Secretary of the Norwegian Federation of Trade Unions who was soon to become State Secretary, wrote an article for the newspaper Arbeiderbladet, in which he called for a revision of Norwegian (and Nordic) United Nations policy. Instead of abstaining on resolutions that had agreeable overall goals but unrealistic provisions (and expressing whatever agreement with the general tendency there might be through subsequent statements on the vote), he pleaded for votes of approval accompanied by statements, in which
–––––––––––––– 383 Memorandum by Tom Vraalsen, 4 December 1973, FMAO, 1970–79, 26.5/80. 384 Stortings forhandlinger, Stortingstidende 117 (1973/1974): 3681. 385 Stortings forhandlinger, Stortingstidende 120 (1976/1977): 952 (Hanna Kvanmo). 386 Stortings forhandlinger, Stortingstidende 118 (1974/1975): 460 (Lars Korvald).
237 CHAPTER 3 reservations about the passing of mere “paper resolutions” were to be expressed.387 Already one year (or, one government) later, a labour participant on the delegation expressed her satisfaction with this new and increasingly employed practice.388 Nonetheless, the old doctrine was still valid in most instances. It was reconfirmed in a softened version by then Foreign Minister Dagfinn Vårvik as well as by many speakers in the United Nations debate in the summer of 1973.389 It was only in the following year that the government was ready for a greater adaptation. In debating a resolution on colonialism the government hesitated about whether to abandon the traditional Norwegian voting philosophy or not. The delegation opted not to initiate such a fundamental change in United Nations policy without prior consultation with Parliament.390 The issue was then raised in the Foreign and Constitutional Affairs Committee discussion covering the report on Norway’s participation in the General Assembly. Apart from the three conservative members, the committee subscribed to the following view: The majority wants to raise the question if one, on the part of Norway, has put sufficient emphasis in recent years on the image of Norway projected to the outer world by the votes in the UN. Perhaps one should attach greater attention to the main content of draft resolutions. That single elements in a suggestion cannot be accepted should usually not preclude that one votes for a draft resolution as a whole. As the majority sees it, in such situations one should, to a greater extent, use dissenting votes on the single paragraphs as well as statements on votes, and then vote for the draft resolution as a whole.391 The majority illustrated this view with the so-called colony resolution – the real title of the resolution was “Activities of Foreign Economic and Other Interest which are Impeding the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Southern Rhodesia, Namibia and Territories under Portuguese Domination and in all Other Territories under Colonial Domination and Efforts to Eliminate Colonialism, Apartheid and Racial Discrimination in Southern Africa”. It was also employed in the resolution bearing the title “Reduction of the –––––––––––––– 387 “Thorvald Stoltenberg til Arbeiderbladet: Norges FN-politikk moden for revisjon.” Arbeiderbladet (21 December 1970); cf. the related reflections: Thorvald Stoltenberg. Det handler om mennesker. Oslo: Gyldendal, 2001. 154. 388 Stortings forhandlinger, Stortingstidende 115 (1971/1972): 1970 (Liv Aasen). 389 Stortings forhandlinger, Stortingstidende 116 (1972/1973): 3183, 3395–3429. 390 Stortings forhandlinger, Stortingstidende 117 (1973/1974): 3665, 3690 (Knut Frydenlund); some civil servants were also in favour of the adaptation of new principles, cf. ibid. 3674 (Thor Gystad). 391 Stortings forhandlinger 117 (1973/1974) Innst. S. Nr. 285.
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Military Budgets of States Permanent Members of the Security Council by 10 Per Cent and Utilization of Part of the Funds Thus Saved to Provide Assistance to Developing Countries”. The parliamentary debate on the matter showed that not all those in favour of a new policy regarded the latter example, which referred to a Soviet propaganda phantasmagoria, as good.392 The changing voting practice stands in the context of the emerging consensus norm in the United Nations, as well as of the crumbling Nordic resistance to mainstream initiatives and fading mutual solidarity. As stated by committee chairman Tor Oftedal in the parliamentary debate: “More and more countries in our closest company [omgangskrets] obviously seem to reckon it is more important to strengthen a world opinion than to act with strict correctness in concord with domestic concepts.” At the same time, he suggested the new policy did not imply a revolution, but merely concerned a “tactically accentuated detail”. According to him, it was indicated by the committee that, in fairly few cases, doubt might operate in favour of the general intentions of resolutions.393 The labour government and Foreign Minister Knut Frydenlund had an ally in the former agrarian prime minister Per Borten, who was the driving force in Parliament for the new guidelines. An adherent of the new voting philosophy even called them “lex Borten”.394 This was mildly ironic, as Borten himself regarded the new guidelines particularly applicable as long as resolutions had the “character of a manifestation of attitudes rather than of binding enactments of international law”.395 By 1974, the year of the most controversial session in the history of the United Nations, Norway was ready for a new, acquiescent profile, and the delegates were enabled to participate on equal terms in the politics of emotions waged in the General Assembly. In the parliamentary discussion, one of the conservative committee members described the change as follows: “We are about to be drawn into the maelstrom that everybody should be getting out of.”396 Subsequent developments support his interpretation. The new guidelines slipped into the instructions for the Norwegian delegation to the twenty-ninth session in the following fashion: –––––––––––––– 392 Cf. Stortings forhandlinger, Stortingstidende 117 (1973/1974): 3677 (Petter Furberg); 3677 (Johan Vikan); 3659 (Tor Oftedal). 393 Stortings forhandlinger, Stortingstidende 117 (1973/1974): 3658–3659; on the consensus principle cf. Stortings forhandlinger 117 (1973/1974) Innst. S. Nr. 285. 394 Stortings forhandlinger, Stortingstidende 120 (1976/1977): 946 (quote), 945 (Arne Kielland); cf. Stortings forhandlinger, Stortingstidende 117 (1973/1974): 3653–3654 (Per Borten). 395 Stortings forhandlinger, Stortingstidende 117 (1973/1974): 3653. 396 Stortings forhandlinger, Stortingstidende 117 (1973/1974): 3660 (Otto Lyng).
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The starting point for Norwegian voting in the General Assembly must […] be that only those draft resolutions be supported that Norway herself can and wants to comply with. However, in single instances it might be desirable for Norway to contribute with a positive vote to strengthen a world opinion even if it is clear that the resolution will merely be an expression of opinion and not be implemented in accordance with its content. It is therefore necessary to follow a pragmatic line in voting matters and value each suggestion individually. On the part of Norway, it has been regarded a task of close collaboration with other interested countries to try to work toward making stipulations in resolutions to achieve a wording that makes them as unifying as possible.397 The effect was dramatic. The new principle was a “self-evident” reference for Foreign Minister Frydenlund’s decision to enable affirmative voting on a resolution inviting the Palestine Liberation Organisation as the representative of the Palestinian people to plenary meetings of the General Assembly on the question of Palestine.398 Even before Yasser Arafat had given his speech at the General Assembly, the positive vote was highly controversial in Norway. When the decision was made, representatives of the non-socialist parties on the UN delegation made their reservations public record, and once the vote was final a parliamentary inquiry into the matter was directed to Frydenlund.399 The whole matter, which also led to the reassignment of the Danish permanent representative to the United Nations, did not become any less controversial after Arafat closed his speech on 13 November 1974 with the words: I appeal to you to enable our people to establish national independent sovereignty over its own land. Today I have come bearing an olive branch and a freedom-fighter’s gun. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand. I repeat: Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand. War flares up in Palestine, and yet it is in Palestine that peace will be born.400 Henceforth, Frydenlund had to publicly counter the notion that Norwegian foreign policy stuck ‘on glide’ (på glid). The fact that he had acted against
–––––––––––––– 397 Instruction, 17 September 1974, FMAO, 1970–79, 26.5/81b. 398 Stortings forhandlinger, Stortingstidende 118 (1974/1975): 457; cf. “3210 (XXIX): Invitation to the Palestine Liberation Organization.” Resolutions and Decisions Adopted by the General Assembly During Its Session 29 (1974): 3. 399 On the disagreement of the non-socialists: Stortings forhandlinger, Stortingstidende 118 (1974/1975): 1057 (Asbj rn Haugstvedt); for the inquiry see: Stortings forhandlinger, Stortingstidende 118 (1974/1975): 456–460. 400 General Assembly, Official Records 29 (1974) 2282nd Plenary Meeting. The olive branch is not only as a general symbol for peace, but also as an element of the emblem of the United Nations. The last sentence is often not quoted, even in otherwise complete documentations of the speech.
240 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS the advice of all non-socialist parliamentarians on the delegation, who had recommended Arafat not be given the floor, made the affair delicate. In addition, opposing views on the matter were obvious within the Labour Party itself. The ‘no confidence’ sought against the Foreign Minister by a populist legislator was rejected by Parliament, with a vote tally of 136 to 1. Nonetheless, Frydenlund was taught a lesson and was called to testify at the speaker’s booth and say that with the benefit of hindsight he would have been tempted to vote differently. He also claimed that something as simple as lack of time resulted in decision making without consultations being held on a larger scale.401 The introduction of follow-up meetings with parliamentary delegates after the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly demonstrated the good-will of the Foreign Minister; the preparation of delegates and advance communication with Parliament were improved as well. The agenda for the first follow-up meeting included points such as concrete policy issues, but also the decision making process in Norwegian UN policy, the working order of the delegation, relations between delegation and ministry, and the delegation’s connection to the organs of the Storting.402 According to Frydenlund, decision making on Norwegian policies at the General Assembly largely took place within the delegation in New York, with the foreign ministry following the given advice in more than 90 per cent of the cases. In this connection, he defined the function of the parliamentary representatives as setting the advice of the delegation in a “Norwegian political framework”.403 No minutes of the meeting are preserved, but apparently the parliamentarians were of the opinion that the –––––––––––––– 401 On the non-socialist advise: Stortings forhandlinger, Stortingstidende 118 (1974/1975): 459–460, 1039, 1057 (Kåre Willoch, Lars Korvald, Paul Thyness, Asbj rn Haugstvedt); on the Labour Party ibid. 1030 (Tor Oftedal); vote of confidence ibid. 1115 (the initiator of the vote was the later long-time chairman of the Progress Party Carl Hagen); Frydenlund’s declaration: ibid. 1055; Frydenlund on timing: ibid. 457, 459; Frydenlund’s decision to vote in favour of allowing Arafat to take the podium was based on the recommendation of permanent representative Ålgård, cf. Rolf Tamnes. Norsk utenrikspolitikks historie, vol. 6: Oljealder 1965–1995. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1997. 378. 402 Letter by Frydenlund to the parliamentarians on the delegation to the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly, 28 January 1975, FMAO, 1970–1979, 26.5/81b; a background paper explicitly confirms that the meeting of 12 March 1975 was the first time such a follow-up took place, paper of 11 March 1975, ibid.; on improved preparation see the various documents referring to the meeting 29 August 1975, FMAO, 1970–1979, 26.5/82b; on advance communication with parliament: Minutes of the meeting in the foreign ministry of 13 January 1976 [the document falsly says 1975], ibid.; moreover, the request by the foreign minister to the single party groups was given a more formal, written form, see his letters, 15 May 1975, ibid. 403 Draft for Frydenlunds’ speech for the meeting scheduled 12 March 1975, FMAO, 1970– 1979, 26.5/81b.
241 CHAPTER 3 advice offered by the delegation was frequently ignored by the foreign ministry.404 There were also differences within the foreign service. In a cable sent from the permanent mission it was stated that one had to face the fact that the United Nations “today mirror the world as it is, and that the Western countries are a minority”. These words were underlined in the foreign ministry, with a “No” written in the margin.405 In a joking telegram exchange, the foreign ministry commented on the permanent mission’s lament over having been haunted by “several acute instances of ‘instructitis’” by replying that the disease was caused by “bad orientation, environmental and liver damages, louse plague and scabies in the beard root”.406 The permanent mission, in turn, used the presence of parliamentarians on the delegation as an argument for greater latitude in policy making by the delegation.407 As a result of the controversies that arose early on, the Norwegians at the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly remained cautious with their vote. A comparison of Norwegian and Swedish voting on the “Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States”, prepared by the permanent mission, explicitly denounced the prudence of the new policy guidelines: The mission observed that the Norwegians, displaying a positive overall attitude in their statement on abstention, were better off than the Swedes, who “made so many reservations that the effect of the yes-vote vis-à-vis the Group of 77 was severely hampered”. The mission concluded that abstentions accompanied by sympathetic statements often made a better and more authentic impression on developing countries than the practice of automatically following the principle of a combination of affirmative votes and statements of reservation.408
–––––––––––––– 404 This is made clear by a reference in the minutes of the follow-up meeting one year later, Minutes of the foreign ministry meeting of 13 January 1976 [the document falsly says 1975], FMAO, 1970–1979, 26.5/82b. 405 Confidential cable, 31 January 1975, FMAO, 1970–1979, 26.5/81b. 406 Cable by Permanent Representative Ole Ålgård to the foreign ministry, 19 December 1974 [the document falsly says 1973], FMAO, 1970–1979, 26.5/81; cable by Head of Division Tom Vraalsen to the permanent mission, 20 December 1974, ibid. The two telegrams show how much the permanent mission of Norway to the United Nations was in the defensive at the time; for example Ålgård asserts that Norway’s flag continued to fly at the world mast and closes by wishing “Merry Christmas in spite of it all”. 407 Cable from the permanent mission to the foreign ministry, 31 January 1975, FMAO, 1970–1979, 26.5/81b. 408 Confidential cable, 31 January 1975, FMAO, 1970–1979, 26.5/81b; cf. “3281 (XXIX): Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States.” Resolutions and Decisions Adopted by the General Assembly During Its Session 29 (1974): 50–55. The Group of 77 is a caucusing (continued)
242 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS
At the following session, the moderate Norwegian profile was preserved. The approval of the resolution by the General Assembly that equated Zionism with racism was described by the former long-time labour delegate to the United Nations Aase Lionæs as a logical consequence of the invitation extended to Arafat (and thus of the foreign policy of the Norwegian labour government).409 However, the Arafat incident was generally regarded as an “accident at work” and the consternation over the anti-Zionism resolution was widely shared, even though not everybody agreed with the conservative legislator who wanted to renounce the rule that Norway’s seat on United Nations organs always be occupied.410 The same legislator argued it was important to expose Norwegian parliamentarians to the international environment at the United Nations and its stimuli in order to correct their overly narrow world view. He also spoke of “this very special environment that has unfolded at the UN, of which even a Storting representative after only six weeks sojourn will often get lasting impressions”.411 One of the conservatives who had actually attended the thirtieth session of the General Assembly recommended parliamentary presence on the delegation as an “effective cure for illusions”.412 The Zionism incident is relevant as an example in which presence on the delegation worked to the political benefit of the opposition. Attempts to reproach the socialists for anti-Israeli views were easily rejected by Hanna Kvanmo, the delegate who presented the speech in which it was first announced that Norway would not support the resolution.413 The context of the Arafat and Zionism issues demonstrated the potential of parliamentary delegates to the General Assembly in seizing the initiative.414 This can be gathered from the statement made by a conservative legislator who expressed his satisfaction with the voting of the Norwegian delegation to the thirtieth session of the General Assembly and remarked that there had been some issues on which Norway was close to making the wrong
–––––––––––––– group of countries from the southern hemisphere; cf. Karl P. Sauvant. The Group of 77: Evolution, Structure, Organization. New York: Oceana, 1981. 409 Stortings forhandlinger, Stortingstidende 119 (1975/1976): 883; cf. “3379 (XXX): Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination.” Resolutions and Decisions Adopted by the General Assembly During Its Session 30 (1975): 83–84. 410 Stortings forhandlinger, Stortingstidende 118 (1974/1975): 1060, 1087 (identical quotes) (Erik Gjems Onstad, Lars Roar Langslet); Stortings forhandlinger, Stortingstidende 119 (1975/1976): 828 (Paul Thyness). 411 Stortings forhandlinger, Stortingstidende 120 (1976/1977): 949 (Paul Thyness). 412 Stortings forhandlinger, Stortingstidende 120 (1976/1977): 944 (quote), 945 (Lars Roar Langslet). 413 Stortings forhandlinger, Stortingstidende 120 (1976/1977): 952 (Hanna Kvanmo). 414 Cf. Frydenlund 1982: 26.
243 CHAPTER 3 decision.415 From the opposite perspective, one of the socialist legislators on the delegation complained that Norway had been considerate of the group of Western countries and of “the grass-roots of the Storting, in a way the Israel-lobby”. Further, he maintained that while the foreign affairs leadership tried its best, wide parliamentary circles revolted and, in the end, “the Israel lobby of the Storting completely took command” of the delegation.416 In a joking Christmas telegram from the permanent mission in New York to the foreign ministry, these tendencies were expressed as follows: Incidentally, it is not only upcoming Christmas, which calls the delegation to peacefulness, but also the fact that the official greeting of the delegation has become shalom. The delegation’s summary of the now-finished session should be seen as purely provisional – in the same way the delegation has learned to look at all instructions from home. Indeed, also the delegation has problems with gaining clarity on the part of Denmark and Israel. But our standpoint shall of course be corrected and, if necessary, be totally revised, as soon as such clarity is on hand. Indeed, the ministry’s practice has been fully adopted by the delegation. The main conclusion of the delegation is that this session must have put an end to the myth that Norwegian foreign policy is “on glide”. It has been excessively demonstrated that it is, in fact, “in tow”, with the well-navigating Danish UN ambassador as tug-captain. There, one has nothing to fear – it heads due west. […] Even though Norway came out of the session as the brightest lad in the whole Israel-class all in all and although a number of the delegation members speak with a broad Hebrew accent, Israel is still angry that Norway did not vote against the world as such, but was content with abstaining. That shall be set aright until the next session, if the whole delegation lets itself be circumcised. With wishes for a Happy Hanukkah. 417 An analysis prepared in the foreign ministry shows that votes on issues for which there was no Nordic concord left Norway approximately equidistant from Sweden and Denmark (and, for that matter, from the majority of the European Communities) at the twenty-eighth and twenty-ninth sessions of the General Assembly. At the thirtieth session, Norway voted with Denmark in 77 per cent of the cases in such issues, with Iceland in 61 per cent, with Sweden in 42 per cent, and with Finland in 19 per cent. Concord with Denmark was exceeded by that with the European Community majority, namely, in 80 per cent of the cases. Whereas there was a balance of changes in Norwegian votes on recurrent issues going in a permissive –––––––––––––– 415 Stortings forhandlinger, Stortingstidende 120 (1976/1977): 949 (Paul Thyness). 416 Stortings forhandlinger, Stortingstidende 120 (1976/1977): 945–946 (Arne Kielland). 417 Cable, 18 December 1975, FMAO, 1970–1979, 26.5/82.
244 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS and a restrictive direction between the sessions of 1973 and 1974, all changes between 1974 and 1975 led to a more restrictive stance and brought Norway closer to Denmark, Iceland, and the European Community majority.418 The presence of parliamentarians in Norwegian delegations made a difference at a critical juncture in United Nations history by increasing pressure on the government to ‘glide back’.
Overview and outlook Parliamentarians remained an important element in Norwegian delegations to the General Assembly throughout the period 1945 to 1975 despite their de facto detachment from the ‘working delegation’ in the mid-1960s. The never-ending complaints about the lack of Storting interest in the work of the United Nations are but proof of what they aim to contradict. The parliamentarians on Norwegian delegations were always appointed to the high-status categories of ‘representatives’ and ‘alternate representatives’; they continued to be actively involved in the work of the committees of the General Assembly, and they were formally and practically involved in policy making. The ‘circumcision’ of the work of the delegation by parliamentary members at the point in time one of them described as the “absolute low point so far in the reputation and moral integrity of the UN” is a succinct expression of this involvement.419 It is also worth noting that parliament at large was annually informed about Norwegian participation in the work of the General Assembly by way of reports published as parliamentary records, and these reports were regularly discussed in the foreign policy committee and in the plenary of the Storting. Politicians’ entry into Norwegian delegations took place attendant to appointments to the ‘Dumbarton Oaks commission’ and the San Francisco conference and with reference to national and Nordic practises at the League of Nations. Whereas the nature of the appointments was not always clear in the first decade, a practice evolved according to which parliamentary party groups nominated the representatives. Not least due to the standardisation pushed by the foreign ministry, the circle of appointees was by and large limited to current members of parliament after the mid- 1950s. Seats on the delegation that had earlier been reserved for representatives of women’s organisations and trade unions were subsequently understood as belonging to the category of parliamentary representatives. As a consequence, a system with one representative for each of the larger parties evolved into a formally proportional system, with –––––––––––––– 418 Memorandum by Johan L. L vald, 8 January 1976, FMAO, 1970–1979, 26.6/47. 419 Cf. Stortings forhandlinger, Stortingstidende 120 (1976/1977): 944 (Lars Roar Langslet).
245 CHAPTER 3 three seats for the Labour Party and one seat for each of the other major parties. The main principle during the first two decades was appointment of parliamentarians for full sessions, but their rotation was handled in a pragmatic manner. The outdated principle was reconfirmed by the parties in 1967, when the rotation became the de facto rule for appointments. After that year, one of the three labour representatives usually stayed throughout the session, while his or her party comrades, as well as the representatives of the other parties, alternated with each other for approximately six-week periods. Thus, the increase in the number of parliamentarians on the Norwegian delegation to the United Nations from 1967 on does not indicate increasing presence of parliamentarians. Even more important for the continuity of parliamentarians’ appointments to the delegation was the sending of individuals to several subsequent sessions. This practice was never as firmly rooted in Norway as it was in Denmark or Sweden, but for the first decade and a half all parties strived for the re-nomination of a small circle of experts. This tendency was most pronounced in the Labour Party; between 1946 to 1975, the labour delegates were appointed to five and a half sessions on average, whereas their non-socialist colleagues attended approximately two sessions or less. A background to this difference is the long-lasting era of a labour government, which left labour politicians with a greater potential to influence decision making than their colleagues. It was also an element of what a later foreign minister has called the “Lange-model” in reference to long-time office holder Halvard Lange, meaning the strict separation of foreign policy from domestic politics.420 Lange had more of an opportunity to keep constant the labour element in delegations, as opposed to the appointees chosen by other parties. Only by 1970 did the Labour Party proceed to a consistent application of the principle that had been applied by the non-socialist parties since at least the early 1960s: namely, granting the delegation assignment to as many legislators as possible. The intra-session alternation of delegates, a practice that was not uncommon even before becoming the model in 1967, and inter-session alternation, a tendency that picked up in the mid-1950s, called into question the traditional structure of the delegation. Evidently, these developments implied that ever-more responsibility was being placed on the foreign service. The change in the political weight of the parliamentarians attending the General Assembly had a similar effect. As shown by Jostein Mykletun, parliamentarians of high political stature were appointed at the early sessions, whereas their colleagues of low political stature started to become
–––––––––––––– 420 Stoltenberg 2001: 91.
246 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS more numerous from the second half of the 1950s. By the early 1970s the practice of appointing parliamentarians of high stature had practically ceased. Among the reasons for these changes are the perceived relevance of the United Nations, an increasing insistence on the appointment of legislators, and the wide range of language skills and knowledge about international affairs among the younger generation of legislators.421 As a result, several attempts were made in the foreign ministry from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s to exclude parliamentary members from the working delegation and to assign to them the status of observers. However, Norwegian parliamentarians were not willing to abandon their position in high-status categories and their participation at an operative level. But the system was flexible, and it was left to the individual legislator to decide how much he or she wanted to engage himself or herself. In a poll, thirty of the parliamentary representatives in the years 1969 to 1972 (out of forty-nine) answered the question of whether they had given at least one speech in one of the United Nations organs: Seventy per cent answered ‘yes’, and thirty per cent ‘no’.422 By the 1970s, there were no more discernible attempts by civil servants to establish a new delegation order. Some quarters questioned what was perceived as dominance by civil servants. Neither the files of the foreign ministry nor parliamentary records back this claim, apart from the advantage professionals had over frequently substituted generalists. Parliamentarians were usually self-critical enough to understand that deficits in democracy were due to deficiencies in the dealings between the Storting and the United Nations and in actual delegation assignments (in an overall situation of scarce political resources to deal with all relevant matters), not due to administrative conspiracy. Parliamentarians on the delegation were able to apply substantial pressure on the permanent mission and the Foreign Minister in the years 1974 and 1975, critical junctures in the history of the United Nations. The parliamentary representatives on the Norwegian delegation have maintained the highest formal status of their Scandinavian colleagues, still being appointed in the categories of ‘representatives’ (until 2006) and ‘alternate representatives’ (until today). Moreover, despite the abbreviated terms of service for parliamentarians on the delegations (with stays shortened from six to four weeks), Norwegian parliamentarians on General Assembly delegations still serve for longer stints than their Nordic counterparts today. Nowadays, two sets of six members of the Storting,
–––––––––––––– 421 Jacobsen/Mykletun 1973: III 6, cf. 8, 11, 39 note 4. 422 Jacobsen/Mykletun 1973: III 26.
247 CHAPTER 3 their composition distributed according to the parliamentary strength of the respective party groups, attend the first and second month of the General Assembly. Interviews conducted with four of the parliamentarians who were members of the delegation to the sixty-first session of the General Assembly in 2006 suggest that parliamentarians usually consider their de facto role as being that of observers. This applied even to a (twenty-two- year-old) legislator from the governing Labour Party. In contrast to his colleagues, senior legislator Hallgeir Langeland of the governing Socialist Left Party underlined that parliamentarians on the delegation might make a difference. He personally took contact from New York with party comrades in the development section of the foreign ministry in an attempt to affect a change in instructions on several points of the agenda. While his initiative was not successful, it nonetheless implied a politicisation of Norwegian United Nations policies because of parliamentary presence on the delegation. Thus, the feed-back Langeland received from the diplomats on the delegation was that parliamentarians implied tension, an idea he was content with.423 Parliamentarians today are no longer involved in regular policy making processes in Norwegian delegations to the General Assembly. Nonetheless, the Norwegian delegation system continues to allow individual parliamentarians to exert influence. In the interviews, the parliamentary delegates were satisfied with their high-status appointment and found that it helped to establish them as personalities within the United Nations system and to improve their status in internal delegation meetings.
ROUTINE, SQUEEZE-OUT, ROUTINE: SWEDEN Östen Undén, the chairman of Sweden’s parliamentary Foreign Policy Committee, who later became Foreign Minister, discussed the new world organisation’s human resources in 1943. He argued in favour of limited national sovereignty and criticised delegates at the League of Nations who had acted according to pre-cast government instructions. Undén’s suggested alternative was that delegates not be parliamentarians or politicians, but instead be experts who would convene in more determinate conferences than those ineffective meetings of the Assembly. His intent was to question the merely governmental character of international relations. However, the criteria of individual competence and character,
–––––––––––––– 423 Interviews with Hallgeir Langeland, Solveig Horne, Anna Ljunggren, and Olemic Thommessen, 15 & 16 January 2007.
248 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS which Undén held in higher esteem than governmental authenticity, do not a priori rule out the agency of parliamentarians.424 Two years later, the political scientist Herbert Tingsten resurrected the idea of the League of Nations extending member states’ representation beyond the sphere of government in an anthology, edited by the Swedish Institute of International Affairs for a semi-official input to the San Francisco conference. His reflections on this matter were as follows: The idea of an Assembly representing different national groups and sections of opinion within the States concerned, or, alternatively, of some sort of representation of this kind collateral to the Assembly, has found some support earlier, in Sweden as well as elsewhere. It seems incontestable that this is an idea to be borne in mind in so far as an international organization, if it is to develop into a real world State, must represent more than the States belonging to it; only when opinion within the organization is able to break through the frontiers of the States, will the conditions necessary for a welding together be attained. But clearly the time is not yet ripe for such an arrangement; it would be sheer utopianism to recommend it now. Moreover, the universal democracy which is a necessary condition for the election of delegates within the various States, does not yet exist; while in States governed by the people a real election might be possible, in States differently governed it would be a meaningless formality and, consequently, the States would in practice be represented on entirely different bases.425 Despite these concerns, Tingsten proposed a purposeful transformation of the Charter reflective of a world federalist plan that aimed at a system with two chambers, “one representing the States and the other the peoples”.426 Whereas Tingsten’s considerations were inspired by the idea of supranational democracy, another strand of thought was connected to domestic democracy. In the pioneering Swedish postwar foreign policy debate in parliament on 22 October 1945, the conservative politician Martin Skoglund expressed hope that the principle of concord would continue in Swedish foreign policy even after a party government replaced the grand coalition of national unity of the World War era. As he saw it, a country the size of Sweden could not afford to be split on such vital questions, and he pointed to the fact that “the possibilities for concord would be facilitated considerably by the government through good information and contact even with those parties and strands of opinion, which do not participate in the –––––––––––––– 424 Undén 1943: 165–166. 425 Herbert Tingsten. “The Structure of the International Organization.” Peace and Security After the Second World War: A Swedish Contribution to the Subject. Swedish Institute of International Affairs (ed.). Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1945b. 34–65, at 56–57, cf. on the League of Nations: 35. 426 Tingsten 1945a: 33.
249 CHAPTER 3 government”.427 While this was a statement without particular reference to the United Nations, it gives evidence of the wider discourse Swedish practises were anchored in at the world organisation. The same idea had also been presented one year earlier by Gunnar Myrdal: “It would be a great advantage if we could, in the stern years to come, understand that, irrespective of how our interests and opinions diverge in domestic politics, we are closely conjunct in foreign policy.”428
The atypical first delegation The composition of the Swedish delegation entered the agenda with the neutral country’s admission to the United Nations. The backgrounds of potential delegates were analysed in the press immediately following the Security Council’s approval of Sweden’s entry in late August 1946. Thus, the liberal newspaper Vestmanlands Läns Tidning underlined the significance of careful selection, stressing that only the best were good enough, considering the challenging task of representing Sweden. The main message of the article was that party politics had to “yield for the concern that Sweden is represented in the UN, its committees and sub-committees in a dignified and effective way”. This characterisation did not rule out a delegation of diplomats, but it did seem to suggest a political delegation and a consensual all-party solution. The article also suggested that representation “be put in the hands of judicious and deliberate men and women”. At that time it was far from self-evident that women should be considered in such a context, at least in an international perspective.429 The issue of diplomatic versus political representation was discussed explicitly by the liberal newspaper G teborgs-Tidningen: In the great game we will soon again be a small pawn. Many of the tasks that earlier rested so heavily on our diplomats will be taken over by those who represent our country in the UN. This can hardly be but an improvement. Our gentlemen and ladies of legation can return to the more innocent work, which their education qualifies them for. In the future, nobody will attach too much importance to unguarded words and naïve expositions. The more strenuously our delegates will be watched in New York. It will be they who then become accountable for the good name and reputation of Sweden in international politics. It remains to be seen, whether the foreign minister succeeds in filling the delegation with men other than the Prime Minister’s old henchmen, who
–––––––––––––– 427 Riksdagens protokoll, Andra kammaren (1945) 34: 9. 428 Gunnar Myrdal. Varning f r fredsoptimism. Stockholm: Bonnier, 1944. 17. 429 Vestmanlands Läns Tidning (30 August 1946); here quoted in a press review by the Swedish foreign ministry, 5 September 1946, NAS, FM, FS 1920, HP 48, vol. 1783.
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have readily done jobs in these disastrous years. It would be too great to see Mr. Richert or Mr. G nther among our people. Or Allan Vougt, or Sk ld. No, it will hardly be that bad. Not least because neither the Scanian dialect nor German are likely to be among the most practicable languages in the new Assembly.430 In mentioning the wartime Envoy to Berlin, Arvid Richert, and the wartime Foreign Minister, Christian G nther, as well as his colleagues from the region of Scania, Defense Ministers Per Edvin Sk ld and Allan Vougt by name, the author of the article blends diplomats and politicians, and presents examples of compromised politicians. Nonetheless, the starting point is clear: The United Nations was seen as a stage for politicians – not for diplomats, and this development was understood as a turn for the better. The example of Consul-General in New York, Lennart Nylander, shows that the Swedish tradition, dating to the League of Nations, of sending parliamentarians to the Assembly was taken for granted. In the absence of Foreign Minister Undén, the first Swedish delegation to the General Assembly was estimated to consist of 12 to 14 persons.431 Nylander assumed the delegates to be the minister to Washington, Herman Eriksson, possibly two representatives of the foreign ministry, and some typists. In a letter to the foreign ministry he tried to coax a better picture of the delegation: “The problem will be to find lodging for the remaining delegates, who can be assumed to be parliamentarians?”432 Nylander’s assumption proved wrong. After approval of the positive Security Council recommendation the General Assembly decided on 9 November 1946 “Afghanistan, Iceland and Sweden be admitted to membership in the United Nations”.433 Three days later the Swedish delegates were appointed: Foreign Minister Undén, Minister of Supply Axel Gj res and the Minister to Washington Herman Eriksson. Moreover, the foreign ministry’s acting Expert on International Law, Gunnar Sandberg, and the acting Head of the United Nations Division, Östen Lundborg, were designated as experts, the latter also serving as secretary.
–––––––––––––– 430 G teborgs-Tidningen (1 September 1946), here quoted according to a press review by the Swedish foreign ministry, 5 September 1946, NAS, FM, FS 1920, HP 48, vol. 1783. 431 Cable by the acting Head of the United Nations Division Östen Lundborg to Nylander, NAS, FM, FS 1920, HP 48, vol. 1786. 432 Letter from Nylander to Lundborg, 28 August 1946, NAS, FM, FS 1920, HP 48, vol. 1786. 433 General Assembly, Plenary Meetings 1 (1946) 2: 943.
251 CHAPTER 3
In addition, two assistant secretaries were named, the later permanent representatives to the United Nations Sverker Åstr m and Olof Rydbeck.434 Despite sending a few high-ranking principal delegates, the Swedish approach was reserved. The first delegation to the General Assembly was smaller than initially expected by foreign ministry officials and, apart from cabinet members, it did not include any representatives of parliament. Was this departure from what had been expected an attempt to discard the tradition of a strong parliamentary element in delegations to the world organisation altogether? No evidence in support of such an assumption has been found. It seems Undén’s retrospective statement is accurate: “As I have been the Swedish delegation’s chairman and responsible for its composition throughout Sweden’s UN membership, it goes without saying that I have considered and do consider it desirable to have this element of parliamentarians in the delegation.”435 Rather, Undén’s limitation of the first UN delegation to a priori governmental representatives was due to the special circumstance of Sweden being admitted in the course of an ongoing session. Undén’s maiden speech at the General Assembly can be interpreted as including the suggestion of a multi-stakeholder approach: In the great country which is offering its generous hospitality to our Organization, Sweden is often referred to as “the land of the middle way”. Whoever coined that expression would appear to have had in mind the methods adopted in Sweden for the solution of domestic problems, especially in the social field. We gladly accept that description, and would like to justify it in our attitude to the international problems which set countries one against the other.436 The key concept in this declaration is the word method, indicative of a framing of the ‘middle way’ as an institutional and procedural approach, a matter of polity rather than policy. A look at the work of journalist Marquis Childs, who initially coined Sweden as the country of the ‘middle way’, supports this interpretation. The approach advocated by Childs heralded
–––––––––––––– 434 F renta nationernas generalf rsamlings f rsta ordinarie m tets andra del, New York 1946, m.m. Stockholm: Fritzes, 1947. 8; cf. the excerpt from the minutes of the cabinet meeting, 12 November 1946, NAS, FM, FS 1920, HP 48, vol. 1786. 435 F rst draft of the government statement for 24 November 1959, NLS, MS, L 108: Östen Undén, vol. 20; cf. Cf. Riksdagens protokoll, F rsta kammaren (1959) H stsessionen 27: 10. 436 General Assembly, Plenary Meetings 1 (1946) 2: 969.
252 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS pragmatic, cooperative institution-building and collective bargaining as central features of the Swedish and Scandinavian model.437 While Undén’s speech to the General Assembly gives only an indirect clue to his attitude toward parliamentarians, there are direct statements as well. For example, before the foreign minister’s return from the first session of the General Assembly to Sweden, a correspondent of the newspaper Dagens Nyheter reported that Undén assumed parliament representatives would be included in the next UN delegation. At the same time, the foreign minister announced that experience supported the wisdom of his decision to “this very first time indicate, by means of a limited delegation, that Sweden was not ready to participate fully in the task of taking a stand on sundry issues of which one had not participated in preparing”.438 This reasoning suggests that, according to Undén, full- fledged representation to the United Nations presupposed parliamentary participation. Not least, the answer to a question put forth in parliament by the conservative politician James I. A. Dickson in May 1947 implied that Undén found it natural to include legislators in Swedish delegations. Asked whether a parliamentary dimension in the representation to the United Nations was aspired and, if applicable, how many parliamentarians would be chosen at what point in time, Undén gave a curt reply: I answer yes to the first question. To the second question my answer is that the number of members of parliament in the prospective delegation has not yet been laid down; to the third question, the delegation will be appointed in good time before the September [General Assembly] meeting. In his response, Dickson explained his question’s background, voicing the curiosity he and many others felt about how this issue would be tackled, especially considering the need for sufficient preparation time.439
Reviving the practice from the League of Nations Responsible for the lodging of the delegation, even the Swedish Envoy to the United Nations, Gunnar Häggl f, started to wonder about the delegation size and structure. In view of the representation of Denmark and Norway to the previous session, he figured a Swedish counterpart might be comprised
–––––––––––––– 437 Marquis W. Childs, Sweden: The Middle Way. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1936; cf. Marquis W. Childs, This is Democracy: Collective Bargaining in Scandinavia. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1938. 438 Sven Åhman. “Sverige beh ver kontaktman i FN.” Dagens Nyheter (9 December 1946). 439 Riksdagens protokoll, Andra kammaren (1947) 22: 42; my addition in brackets.
253 CHAPTER 3 of five representatives, five alternate representatives, two experts and five or six staff members for the delegation secretariat.440 Soon thereafter Undén noted in his diary that he had “after one week of trouble” fixed a delegation to the General Assembly.441 No sources reveal the political process behind individual nominations at that time, but it seems as if Undén did discuss the matter with the leaders of the single parties (probably with the exception of the social democrats, his own party).442 Evidently, contact was only made with parties represented in the Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs and in the Committee on Foreign Affairs. This practice left the communists without representation in the Swedish delegation to the United Nations until the Cold War was over – more precisely until 1989, the year before they changed their name from Left Party Communists to Left Party. 443 The core delegation was appointed at the cabinet meeting of 30 May 1947, exhibiting the exact structure as suggested by Häggl f;444 the representatives were Undén, Minister of Supply Axel Gj res, Chairman of the Parliamentary Foreign Policy Committee Rickard Sandler, Minister to Washington and Permanent Representative to the United Nations Herman Eriksson, and conservative legislator G sta Bagge. Agrarian legislator Vilmar Ljungdahl and his liberal colleague John Bergvall, Head of the Swedish Mission to the United Nations Gunnar Häggl f, Minister to Moscow Rolf Sohlman, and social democratic parliamentarian Ulla Lindstr m were appointed as alternate representatives. A conversation between Undén and women’s activist Hanna Rydh suggests Lindstr m was designated in her capacity as a “female representative” – not as a representative of parliament.445 However, this was not spelled out clearly, and perceptions vary. Finally, Vice President of the Swedish Trade Union Confederation Gustav Vahlberg and the foreign ministry’s acting Expert on International Law Gunnar Sandberg were designated as advisers. The delegation secretariat was appointed two and a half months later; comprised
–––––––––––––– 440 Letter Häggl f to Grafstr m, 20 May 1947, NAS, FM, FS 1920, HP 48, vol. 1787. 441 Östen Undén. Anteckningar, vol. 1: 1918–1952. Stockholm: Kungl. Samfundet f r utgivande av handskrifter r rande Skandinaviens historia, 2002. 199 (29 May 1947). 442 In connection with considerations regarding the system with parliamentary delegates in the Danish foreign ministry, the embassy in Stockholm acquired the information that it had always been the party leaders who had suggested the delegates in Sweden, see letter of 6 October 1959, NAC, UM 1946–72, 119.D.9a. 443 Even then they were not admitted to the council. Neither was the Green Party, which was given access to the U.N. delegation simultaneously. The greens got a deputy seat in the council in 1994, the ex-communists entered in 1998 (Riksdag Information Service). 444 Cable on the cabinet decision, 30 May 1947, NAS, FM, FS 1920, HP 48, vol. 1787. 445 Undén 2002 I: 199.
254 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS of four members, it was somewhat smaller than the permanent representative had suggested.446 By the time the General Assembly had come into session, Häggl f had formally succeeded Eriksson as permanent representative. Of the appointees, Eriksson and Gj res were prevented from meeting in New York.447 After some of the remaining delegates had travelled home, the chief secretary of the delegation, Richard Hichens- Bergstr m, was advanced to alternate representative status in order to formally qualify for a General Assembly assignment.448 Judgements about the quality of the delegation varied. The Norwegian minister to Stockholm reported that junior delegates who would be trained for the task of representing Sweden at international conferences had been included. He also pointed to the fact that the leaders of the liberal and agrarian parties did not participate (the conservatives were represented by an ex-party leader). The Norwegian minister noted that three experienced diplomats particularly qualified for assignments in drafting committees were members of the delegation.449 In contrast to this sceptical evaluation, feedback from Secretary-General of the United Nations Trygve Lie was unreservedly positive. In a conversation with Häggl f, he claimed “to be very happy the Swedish government had revived the tradition from Genevese times to send ‘very representative delegations’”.450 By any standard, the parliamentary delegates from Sweden were not particularly junior. The exception was the up-and-coming talent Lindstr m, who was sent to New York on the women’s ticket. In retrospect, Foreign Minister Undén characterised the collaboration within the Swedish delegation as “very good”.451 After his return to Sweden, chairmanship was given to Sandler, with opposition representative Bagge tagged for appointment next.452 However, Bagge fell ill and had to return home early.453 Undén declined candidature for the –––––––––––––– 446 Press notice, 16 August 1947, NAS, FM, FS 1920, HP 48, vol. 1788. 447 On Gj res cf. cable Prime Minister Tage Erlander to Undén, 12 September 1947, NAS, FM, FS 1920, HP 48, vol. 1788; on Eriksson: Grafstr m 1989: 830, 871–872. 448 Letter Sandler to Undén, 7 November 1947, NAS, FM, FS 1920, HP 48, vol. 1788. 449 Letter Birger Bergersen to Foreign Minister Halvard Lange, 31 May 1947, NAO, FM, 1940–49, 30.5/6. 450 Confidential letter Häggl f to Grafstr m, 18 June 1947, NAS, FM, FS 1920, HP 48, vol. 1787. 451 “Det nordiska samarbetet i FN är fruktbringande.” Morgontidningen Socialdemokraten (2 November 1947). 452 Per Persson. “Exc. Undén gillar icke den ppna diplomatin.” Svenska Dagbladet (31 October 1947). 453 Letter by Sandler to Undén, 7 November 1947, NAS, FM, FS 1920, vol. 1789; cf. Hichens-Bergstr m, Richard. Spillror från en sällskapsresa. Stockholm: Norstedt, 1989. 74– 75.
255 CHAPTER 3 presidency of the General Assembly, despite being tipped by UN circles and within the (unenthusiastic) State Department.454 Nonetheless, at the second session Sweden’s politics in United Nations were far less reserved than the previous year. In his diary, the Chief of the Political Division in the Foreign Ministry, Sven Grafstr m, commented on an earlier statement by Undén for a domestic audience, saying the privilege of small states was that they did not have to choose sides in matters of contention between great powers. His point was that the foreign minister had taken advantage of this privilege parsimoniously. Most controversial was the independent Swedish initiative on the Greek problem, which had to be revoked due to lack of support. In this connection, opposition voices called for consultation with the Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs. Prime Minister Tage Erlander prepared for a meeting, but was curbed by Undén, who saw no reason for such a step.455 When the Council met upon the Foreign Minister’s return from New York, he was merely confronted with questions, not subject to a debate on the standpoint taken by Sweden.456 However, a parliamentary foreign policy debate did follow, and Undén presented exhaustive reports on the United Nations. While there was altogether little response on this topic in the Riksdag, it was devoted more attention in the first chamber, where most of the parliamentary delegates to the United Nations were seated. Both Sandler and Lindstr m referred to the work of the delegation, and the opposition politician Bergvall even offered some critical remarks on its leadership. Whereas he maintained agreement with Undén’s position in the majority of cases, he did assert doubt in some instances and pointed to inconsistencies between the Foreign Minister’s deeds in New York and his words in Stockholm. As he saw it, in contrast to the objective approach proclaimed by Undén, the Swedish stance on Greece had actually been dictated by the wish to end up halfway between the power blocs.457 According to Undén, Bergvall had actively opposed the delegation’s line of action while participating in its work.458 Despite the parliamentary composition of the Swedish delegation, the United Nations was of no particular interest in the foreign policy debate of 4 February 1948. What did occupy the minds of Parliament was the emergence of the Cold War in general. Nonetheless, it can be said that this initial Swedish parliamentary discussion with delegates sent to New York
–––––––––––––– 454 Cf. various documents in NAS, FM, FS 1920, HP 48, vol. 1788. 455 Grafstr m 1989: 836. 456 Undén 2002 I: 207. 457 Riksdagens protokoll, F rsta kammaren (1948) 5: 49 (Sandler), 53 (Bergvall), 60 (Lindstr m). 458 Riksdagens protokoll, Andra kammaren (1948) 28: 47 (Undén).
256 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS contradicts the hypothesis of mere co-optation of parliamentary delegates. Instead, the discussion illustrates the relevance of parliamentary control as well as the importance of experience and knowledge acquired on the spot. It offered both the ability of immediate intervention and of later taking a critical approach. At the same time, the group’s experience of travelling together and conjunctly meeting the outside world might have contributed to the soft guise in which Bergvall presented his criticism to the public. The Swedish foreign policy debate of 1948 might serve as an argument for parliamentary participation in delegations as well as one for criticising the atmosphere of consensus it fostered. However, in view of the Swedish policy style in general and the foreign policy tradition of national unity that dates back to the League of Nations and the Second World War’s government of national unity, it seems that consensus and conciliatory attitudes prevailed from the outset.459
Why waste time? The course of the second session of the General Assembly was strongly influenced by the hardening fronts of the early Cold War. Looking back, Foreign Minister Undén felt its work had not been characterised by peace and security, but by growing conflict.460 Hence, he returned to Stockholm in a pessimistic mood.461 He expressed his disappointment frankly on several occasions and said in his speech presented on United Nations Day the following year: “As long as negotiations and discussions go on, no damage has been done, other than that a multitude of delegates have wasted time that might have been better used.”462 This perspective remained the Swedish perception of the United Nations at least throughout the 1950s. Chairman of the parliamentary foreign policy committee and General Assembly frequenter Rickard Sandler phrased it with a particularly colourful metaphor in the discarded section of a radio speech at the end of the eighth session. Having pointed to the fact that the Assembly had taken an unreasonable amount of time, as usual, and that this was only in part due to its heavy agenda, he had originally intended to give vent to his impatience with the following –––––––––––––– 459 Riksdagens protokoll, F rsta kammaren (1948) 5: 12–81; Riksdagens protokoll, Andra kammaren (1948) 5: 10–113. Only the communists were not part of this consensus on foreign policy. 460 Per Persson. “Exc. Undén gillar icke den ppna diplomatin.” Svenska Dagbladet (31 October 1947). 461 Grafstr m 1989: 837; cf. Undén’s speech in Gothenburg, 19 November 1947, NLS, MS, L 108: Östen Undén, vol. 43. 462 Speech manuscript for 24 October 1948, NLS, MS, L 108: Östen Undén, vol. 19.
257 CHAPTER 3 remark: “The discontentment has grown into a mountain, which has brought forth a little negligible mouse [råtta], not worth detailed description.” This Horatian outcry is the expression of an insider’s frustration with the United Nations. The tendency towards “unrealistic resolution making”, which Sandler criticised in this context, became increasingly significant for the criticism of Swedish and other Western representatives at the United Nations.463 At the second session of the General Assembly, delegation secretary Richard Hichens-Bergstr m remembers that the committee work sometimes reached the “pain threshold of what a young diplomat can bear in terms of dullness” – but to visit New York was “fun and stimulating”.464 The issues of ‘use of time’, ‘relevance’, and ‘tourism’ get a particular twist when discussed before legislator-delegates. Even parliamentary delegate Ulla Lindstr m was critical; not only did she consider the long daily journey to United Nations headquarters at Lake Success a waste of time, but she perceived the committee work in the same way, at best.465 As outlined in a letter to her partner, the “honour” of being a delegate and getting a front seat in the global political drama was “absolutely not worth 8–10 weeks”.466 In another letter, she revealed rational personal choices: I look cynically upon my task out here. I do not have any possibility to affect world peace. Instead, I try to get the greatest possible material currency out of these months, buy Christmas presents and useful things and […] aim at setting aside a little money for a piece of land on [the island of] Husar : The advantage with the money I save from the daily allowance is, as we know, that it is tax-exempt. As it looks now, I should have a chance to save more than 1,000 Kronor – provided that nothing unforeseen occurs. […] I use my time according to the same guideline: Buy goods after thorough sounding in the shops, write articles to the Lärarinnef rbundet [Journal of Female Teachers], which I can get paid for after coming home (sent 2 pcs. last Monday) and butter up the social democratic delegates (Undén, Sandler & Vahlberg) whom I can benefit from in the future back home in Sweden, with kind listening, praise, etc. But I do not waste any time on irrelevant foreigners. I know the programme sounds cynical, but this is a programme, the implementation of which gives the realistic part of my personality a certain satisfaction in balance to all the wasted time in the UN. If this journey gives me some useful and entertaining experiences, a valuable practice in
–––––––––––––– 463 Manuscript for radio speech 10 December 1953, FMAS, HP 48 D, vol. 42. 464 Hichens-Bergstr m 1989: 75, cf. 184 on a similar comparison in regard to work and leisure at United Nations headquarters. 465 Letter Ulla Lindstr m to Martin Lindstr m, 9 October 1947, NAS, Ulla Lindstr m’s archive (ULA), vol. 7. 466 Letter Ulla Lindstr m to Martin Lindstr m, 21 September 1947, NAS, ULA, vol. 7.
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English and some profit in cash, then it cannot be regarded as altogether futile.467 It is an open secret that rather than being compelling of its own merit, becoming a delegate in New York is attractive to individuals for tourist, material and social reasons. However, whereas diplomats are educated for, paid for and accepted as touring and ‘wasting time’, semi-professionals are not. This difference particularly applies if there is suspicion that the latter disregard their official assignment – in other words, that they actually stop to ‘waste time’, letting the desire for personal gains in the Big Apple impede their work, however useless their tasks might appear. What makes the issue delicate in regard to parliamentarians is their accountability to the electorate, not the state administration. This raises the question whether their doings are consistent with their position of trust, but at the same time makes it difficult to impose concrete obligations and duties upon them and balance their assignment’s benefits of pleasure and comfort, accordingly. Viewed from this angle, Lindstr m is not a particularly suspicious case, except for portraying herself as cunning and for giving a trenchant account of an individual’s psychological survival mechanism in a tedious institutional environment. When she wrote this letter, Lindstr m did not know that she would attended every session of the General Assembly in the period 1947 to 1966 with one exception. Already in the fourth session she was elected vice chairperson of the third committee. This shows her popularity among colleagues and recognition of her work at the United Nations.468 In the early 1960s, as a Minister without Portfolio of Family and Consumer Affairs, Development Aid and Refugees, Lindstr m was a key actor in putting over-population on the United Nations agenda.469 Although Lindstr m’s unclear status (representing women and/or parliament) before becoming a cabinet minister makes for a complex case, her private confession brings up the question whether parliamentarians kept on ‘wasting their time’ in the Swedish delegation for reasons in line with the ones mentioned in her letter. This question is not easily answerable – not even in her own case, let alone in regard to colleagues who did not leave equally blunt accounts for posterity. However, it is obvious that tourist and material interests have been an important motivation to strive for the status of delegates to the General Assembly. Until the early 1960s –––––––––––––– 467 Letter Ulla Lindstr m to Martin Lindstr m, 9 October 1947, NAS, ULA, vol. 7. 468 Cf. letter Ulla Lindstr m to Martin Lindstr m, 23 September 1949, NAS, ULA, vol. 7. 469 Ulla Lindstr m. “När FN väcktes f r f delsekontrollen.” FN-vardag: En bok om internationellt samarbete. Stockholm: Sveriges Radio, 1965. 57–68; Ulla Lindstr m. Och regeringen satt kvar! Ur min politiska dagbok 1960–1967. Stockholm: Bonnier, 1970. 49– 50, 86–90, 123–128.
259 CHAPTER 3 the Nordic states had economic motives of sending legislators, too: The daily allowance of legislators was a insignificant post compared to the alternative at a time when the staffing of the foreign ministry was humble and without greater margin for diplomacy by conference: employing approximately five additional senior civil servants (on a year-round basis!). In some of the earlier delegations there are even examples of altruistic spouses being allowed to serve on the delegation without compensation.470 It should also be noted that a practical solution was found to relieve bored parliamentarians from the burden too heavy for them to bear. Already at the third and fourth session of the General Assembly, the representatives of the liberal party left the delegation early, subsequently being replaced by another representative. From the fifth session, the principle of two shifts was generally practised by the Swedish delegation, both among parliamentarians and most members of the foreign service. The long-time parliamentary delegate Sten Wahlund commented on the split of the assignment by explaining: “The sessions are too long and the eloquence is too great for even a Swedish riksdagsman used to slumberous speeches to be able to endure for three months.”471
Östen Undén’s regime of parliamentary participation Under Östen Undén the main body of the Swedish delegation remained parliamentary in character. According to Gunnar Jarring, permanent representative to the United Nations 1956 to 1958, he simply did not like sending higher ranks of his ministry to conferences. Jarring’s explanation for this conservatism, “Travelling diplomacy, which is so popular now, had not been invented”, might be followed up with the observation that at least it had not arrived in Stockholm.472 An analysis of the delegation structure proves the prominence held by the parliamentary element throughout Undén’s tenure as foreign minister. In overview, the delegations designated in the years 1947 to 1961 included the following groups of deputies: 1. Usually two cabinet ministers. Undén participated himself in all regular sessions of the General Assembly and was regularly accompanied by a Minister without Portfolio tied to the foreign ministry. Dag Hammarskj ld participated in the latter capacity in 1951 and 1952, and Ulla Lindstr m from 1954 on. By 1949 another cabinet minister,
–––––––––––––– 470 Cf. Kalrsson 1965: 29. 471 Karlsson 1965: 8. My emphasis. 472 Cf. Gunnar Jarring. Rikets f rhållande till främmande makt: Memoarer 1952–1964. Stockholm: Bonnier, 1983. 76.
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Minister of Supply Karin Kock had already formed part of the delegation.473 2. The permanent representative to the United Nations. Under Undén this post was occupied by Gunnar Häggl f (1947–1948), Sven Grafstr m (1948–1952), Oscar Thorsing (1952–1956), Gunnar Jarring (1956– 1958), and Agda R ssel (1958–1964). 3. One to three representatives from the foreign ministry. One of these appointees was always an international lawyer: In the years 1948 to 1961, the representative was Sture Petrén, who headed the foreign ministry’s legal department for most of this period (and who was later to become a judge at the International Court of Justice).474 4. One to three ambassadors. Throughout the period, Undén’s close friend, Ambassador to Moscow Rolf Sohlman, was among this type of appointees.475 5. Five to eleven politicians representing the four non-communist parties of the Riksdag. Most notably, Rickard Sandler, the chairman of the parliamentary Foreign Policy Committee, a social democrat who had previously served as prime minister and foreign minister, participated in all sessions of the General Assembly in the period 1947 to 1960. Agrarian legislators Sten Wahlund and Torsten Bengtson also attended ten or more sessions under Undén. While not all representatives of the major parliamentary parties were current members of parliament, the social democrat and later Permanent Representative to the United Nations Agda R ssel was the only party representative without parliamentary background. 6. One trade union representative (with an interruption in the years 1951 to 1956). 7. Other experts. Particularly from 1952 to 1960, the lawyer and former parliamentary delegate Åke Holmbäck, and, from 1954 onwards, the political scientist Brita Skottsberg-Åhman.476
–––––––––––––– 473 Kock’s predecessor Axel Gj rres was, after having participated in the delegation to the first session of the General Assembly, also designated as delegate for the second session but did not attend it. The tradition to include regularly cabinet ministers other than the foreign minister in the delegation was unusual in the United Nations and was continued by Undén’s successors, cf. cable Permanent Representative Olof Rydbeck to foreign ministry, 12 September 1974, FMAS, HP 48 DD, vol. 16. 474 Petrén was not able to attend the twelfth and thirteenth sessions of the General Assembly. 475 However, the Hungarian crisis kept Sohlman from attending the eleventh session of the General Assembly.
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Under Foreign Minister Undén, the average delegation was comprised of sixteen members, namely, eight party representatives, four members of the Foreign Service (home or abroad), two cabinet ministers and two representatives of civil society or external expertise. In addition, the delegation secretariat was comprised of an average of five members. There was a rise in the number of delegates from approximately thirteen in the 1940s to seventeen in the 1950s, but due to the introduction of the rotation schedule described above, this increase in numbers was not accompanied by increased presence. Even the secretariat’s expansion from four to six or seven members in 1952 was in part put into perspective by merely temporary association with the delegation. Nonetheless, it seems the broad rule was applied henceforth, according to which a secretary was to sit behind every delegate, tasked with providing “perfect service” to the latter.477 An increase in the number of party representatives is notable until 1956, when eleven representatives of this category participated in the General Assembly. The main reason for this increase was, again, the division of labour. In 1957, parallel to the re-admission of a trade union representative and to the inclusion of Ambassador to Oslo Rolf Edberg (an ex-legislator who had earlier represented the social democratic party in the delegation), the foreign minister withdrew the social democratic party’s privilege of sending more representatives than the other parties. The number of party representatives decreased further in 1959 and 1960, due to the boycott of the delegation by the Conservative Party.478 The circle of legislators and party representatives participating in the delegations was comparatively small. The 116 appointments of party representatives in the period 1947 to 1961 were shared by 35 individuals. These individuals were often chosen from among members of the parliamentary foreign policy committee and included high-ranking politicians. Continuity in appointments differed significantly among the parties. Whereas social democratic appointees served an average of 5.3 sessions and agrarians 4.5 sessions, their conservative and liberal colleagues served for 2.1 and 1.8 sessions, respectively. The high score of
–––––––––––––– 476 The others to be appointed were: in 1948, military counsellor U. A. J. Brunskog of the Civil Administration of National Defence, in 1950 the Head of Division in the Ministry of Justice B. Lassen, in 1958, the medical physicist Rolf Sievert for the agenda-point on effects of atomic radiation. Moreover, in 1961 the foreign ministry’s future Expert on International Law Hans Blix might still be counted among the external delegates. 477 Letter from Permanent Representative to the United Nations Gunnar Jarring to the Head of the Staff Department Erland Kleen, 12 October 1956, FMAS, HP 48 DD, vol. 2. 478 This incidence will be treated in subsequent sections.
262 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS the social democrats reflects, first of all, Östen Undén’s appointment policy. He named former party delegates to weighty positions, advocating Ulla Lindstr m’s appointment to cabinet, appointing Rolf Edberg an ambassador, and Agda R ssel a permanent representative to the United Nations. In the sense that he continued to call them to the Swedish delegation in their new capacities, the social democratic score still underestimates the continuity of (oblique) social democratic appointments. However, the example of Åke Homberg, a delegation frequenter in the 1950s, who was a lawyer and former liberal legislator, shows that Undén’s policy of continuity was not merely due to partisan considerations. It seems likely that the higher educational background and foreign language proficiency of liberal and conservative legislators, against the social democratic and agrarian legislators contributes to the explanation of the greater variation in the appointment of the former. It is more problematic to interpret the numbers in terms of interest in and valuation of the United Nations. Ironically, both continuity and frequent change might signal interest in appointment. Continuity could reflect the party’s high regard for the United Nations or, conversely, outsourcing the task to one individual might signal a lack of real interest. There is reason to believe the relatively high agrarian score can be explained by the latter, but even the social democratic score might not be free from this tendency. The fact that the liberal party leader Bertil Ohlin, and the conservative party leader, Jarl Hjalmarson, participated in the delegation, whereas their colleagues from other parties did not, is one indicator in this respect. Over time, there was an overall increase in the experience level of delegates, which peaked in 1960. In 1950, party delegates had, on average, participated in 2.8 previous sessions of the General Assembly. By 1955 the corresponding figure had risen to 3.9. The party delegates of the fifteenth session of the General Assembly in 1960 had an experience of 7.2 earlier sessions. However, this last figure is not fully comparable to that of other years due to the conservative party’s mentioned boycott of the delegation. When the Danish embassy asked the foreign ministry in Stockholm about the appointment of Swedish delegates, the answer given by the Chief of the Political Division, Sverker Åstr m, was that, from the beginning, it had always been the party leaders who suggested the delegates.479 This information ignored that the social democratic delegates were selected directly by the Foreign Minister. At the same time, there is an example of Undén contacting a long-term delegate of another party directly, asking whether he could count on his presence without deferring to the party
–––––––––––––– 479 Letter, 6 October 1959, NAC, UM 1946–72, 119.D.9a.
263 CHAPTER 3 leader.480 Examples of collective decision making also exist. The party group’s board (f rtroenderådet) seems to have regularly been the relevant body in the case of the liberals. At least, it was this board which in 1952 designated the party candidates and in 1953 defined a circle of six preliminary party candidates. In 1961 it formally decided the appointment of delegates, although upon the suggestion of party leader Ohlin.481 A review of the minutes taken by various party groups and their leadership provided almost no information regarding the selection process for party representatives, nor did the records of the foreign ministry. During a parliamentary debate in 1959, a legislator and ex-diplomat deplored the obscurity of the designation process in the postwar period as compared to Sweden’s practice at the League of Nations.482 It is also telling that, in 1965, a student of Swedish parliamentary delegates to the General Assembly was not able to precisely reconstruct the practice under Undén. His study based on interviews and parliamentary minutes, coincides with this author’s conclusion drawn from archival survey: namely, that the system of designation under Undén was informal. One of the parliamentary delegates at that time suggested that Undén paid more attention to personality and less to the role of parties than his successor as foreign minister.483
A violated period of grace, a hostage, and the averted Wedén case The only example of a party leader ringing up the Swedish foreign ministry and leaving a message for the Foreign Minister on his party’s recommendation for a United Nations appointment was the liberal party leader Bertil Ohlin in June 1952.484 The one well-documented case of party appointment in the archives of the foreign ministry is one that did not work out as intended. The name of one of the appointees, parliament member Sven Wedén, does not reappear in connection with the seventh session of the General Assembly. When the delegation was formally appointed three weeks later, the liberal legislator for the second term, Manne Ståhl, was not preceded by Wedén, but by the lawyer Åke Holmbäck.485 –––––––––––––– 480 Cable Undén to Sten Wahlund (Agrarian Party), 7 August 1957, FMAS, HP 48 DD, vol. 2. 481 Memorandum by Östen Undén, 5 June 1952, NLS, MS, L 108: Östen Undén, vol. 19; Minutes of party group meeting, 12 May 1953, NAS, LPG, A 1, vol. 2; minutes of the party group’s board meeting, 30 May 1961, ibid., A 2, vol. 1. The latter series only starts in 1960. 482 Riksdagens protokoll, F rsta kammaren (1959) H stsessionen 27: 16 (Erik Boheman). 483 Karlsson 1965: 8. 484 Memorandum by Bengt Odhner, 9 June 1952, NAS, FM, FS 1920, HP 48, vol. 1798. 485 Cabinet decision, 30 June 1952, NAS, FM, FS 1920, HP 48, vol. 1798.
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A short look at the diaries of two key decision makers in Swedish politics at the time suggests that the disappearance of Wedén’s name was of political and not personal nature. Some time after Wedén’s return from the fifth session of the General Assembly, where he had been a member of the delegation, Foreign Minister Undén noted: “Saturday evening I got a longed-for opportunity to assail the liberal Wedén, who has for some time written articles and attacked me – probably inspired by [the Swedish ambassador to Washington] Boheman during the visit to New York.”486 A few weeks later, Prime Minister Erlander noted that John Lundberg, a social democratic politician, urged him to remove Rickard Sandler and Sven Wedén from the Swedish UN delegation and documented his reaction parsimoniously: “I went against the former idea.”487 Before Ohlin’s telephone conversation with the civil servant in the foreign ministry, he had been asked by Undén for thoughts on “candidates” to staff the UN delegation. Upon hearing the liberal party’s suggestion, the Foreign Minister remarked: The name Wedén did not appeal to me. The last time he was a delegate he directed violent attacks against me immediately after returning, with reference to what he thought about my attitude in New York. This had been conspicuous and inappropriate. Despite acknowledging his party comrade’s “faux pas”, Ohlin started to argue. Undén classed Wedén as a heretic in relation to his own liberal party and found exculpatory evidence merely in the fact that Wedén had lately taken a low profile and remained silent.488 It was this matter, Wedén’s affinity to Western alignment that was to become the (unofficial) explanation for his exclusion, not undue behaviour in an implicit period of grace after participation in the delegation.489 The conversation ended with Ohlin conceding that, upon consultation with the liberal party, the decision was at the discretion of the government.490 Against this backdrop, his subsequent turn to the foreign ministry might not be due to the minister’s absence at that time; instead it seems to have been intended as an explicit note for the record.
–––––––––––––– 486 Undén 2002 I: 345 (entry of 15–21 January 1951); cf. Riksdagens protokoll, Andra kammaren (1951): 164–166 (Undén). 487 Tage Erlander. Dagb cker: 1950–1951. Hedemora: Gidlund, 2001b. 239 (entry of 28 February 1951). 488 Memorandum by Östen Undén, 5 June 1952, NLS, MS, L 108: Östen Undén, vol. 19. The heresy of Wedén refers to sympathies with NATO. 489 Cf. Karlsson 1965: 11. Interviewed by Karlsson, Wedén was convinced that if he had criticised Undén somewhat later, there would have been no irritation. 490 Memorandum by Östen Undén, 5 June 1952, NLS, MS, L 108: Östen Undén, vol. 19.
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When the delegates were formally appointed, Undén noted that the cabinet had agreed with his suggestion: “We should keep Holmbäck and not take Wedén.”491 Remarkable about this exchange of candidates is that, by substituting Holmbäck for Wedén, Undén chose a delegate from the liberal party of whom he knew his party did not want him assigned to that post. In a telephone conversation, Ohlin had pointed to the discontent liberals felt toward their delegation member the previous year. As the party leader described it, Holmbäck did not command a sufficiently political mind to identify the issues critical to his party. In particular, Ohlin felt that Holmbäck should not have voted on the German question (about which Undén had launched a controversial initiative) without first consulting his party. Given the emergence of a situation in which the social democratic press pitted the delegate’s stance against his party’s, Ohlin argued: “It was a legitimate interest for the liberal party to have a representative who followed the intentions of the party leadership.”492 Holmbäck thus provides an illustration of a delegate co-opted by his assignment, thereby handicapping the parliamentary opposition. In the debate regarding the United Nations in February 1952, he tried to “show […] that we have had a Western orientation in the General Assembly of the United Nations”, thereby mutating into a spokesman for the government.493 In the subsequent debate, it was questioned whether delegates to the General Assembly, apart from representing their country to the rest of the world, participated in a private capacity or as deputies of their parties. Prime Minister Erlander replied that delegates did “not represent themselves as private persons, but that they represent their parties”. According to him, the participation of party representatives opened up the “possibility collaboratively to establish a uniting Swedish foreign policy line even in questions of detail”. In this connection Erlander made it clear that it was not “as hostages”, but as co-policy makers that their engagement was requested.494 The measure of ambiguity in this proclamation did not go undetected. Despite regarding the representation of party views in the delegation “as an exceptionally valuable thing”, a former opposition –––––––––––––– 491 Undén 2001 I: 409 (entry of 30 June 1952). 492 Memorandum by Östen Undén, 5 June 1952, NLS, MS, L 108: Östen Undén, vol. 19. What was meant by ‘voted’ (“hans r stning i tyska frågan”) is not entirely clear. It probably referred to Holmbäck’s acquiescence to Undén’s line of action at internal delegation meetings. Even in parliamentary debate, the party representative’s stance was pitted against the party, see: Riksdagens protokoll, F rsta kammaren (1952) 7: 22 (Sten Wahlund), 42 (Ulla Lindstr m); Riksdagens protokoll, Andra kammaren (1952) 7: 45 (Rolf Edberg). 493 Riksdagens protokoll, F rsta kammaren (1952) 7: 24, cf. 20. 494 Riksdagens protokoll, F rsta kammaren (1952) 7: 22 (Sten Wahlund), 45–46 (Tage Erlander).
266 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS member of the delegation established that the participation of single party representatives in ad-hoc decision making was not to foster an expectation of blind discipline (“kadaverdisciplin”) from their respective party.495 Evidently, the refusal to appoint Wedén and the reappointment of Holmbäck party belies Erlander’s claim of a party-oriented Swedish approach. Nonetheless, from the perspective of Erlander and Undén, the requested party representatives were those “who can independently participate in the work based on the fundamental understanding represented by their own party”.496 This is why the accusation of heresy was central in the case of Wedén, even though the actual misdoing was a lack of discretion one and a half years earlier. Wedén had been admitted as a delegate in 1950, after a parliamentary maiden speech the year before, which had been interpreted as a plea for NATO membership. After that, social democrats gained the impression that his views had moved increasingly toward the non-aligned position of the Swedish mainstream.497 Nonetheless, Ohlin had signalled early on that he would accept the government decision, and no attempt was made to scandalise or exploit the refusal politically.498 The liberals simply sent one instead of two representatives to New York. Whereas from the government perspective this incidence appeared as the replacement of one liberal politician with another, Holmbäck cannot be regarded as a proper representative for the liberal party at the seventh session of the General Assembly.499 No support has been found for Yngve M ller’s claim that Wedén’s substitute in the delegation was nominated by the liberal party. All available evidence points to a government decision in direct contradiction to the wishes of the liberal party.500 Holmbäck was annually reappointed as a lawyer and senior delegate by Undén, but his party continued to decide about trustees on its own. The fact that he was sometimes perceived as a representative of the liberal party is a different matter.501 A second instance of refusal to accept a liberal candidate has so far been overlooked in the backwater of the so-called Hjalmarson affair
–––––––––––––– 495 Riksdagens protokoll, F rsta kammaren (1952) 7: 49 (Knut Ewerl f). 496 Riksdagens protokoll, F rsta kammaren (1952) 7: 52 (Tage Erlander). 497 Cf. Riksdagens protokoll, Andra kammaren (1952) 7: 44 (Rolf Edberg); for Wedén’s maiden speech see: Riksdagens protokoll, Andra kammaren (1949) 5: 49–53. 498 Wedén himself doubted that this would have been a reasonable option (Karlsson 1965: 11). 499 In regard to the government perspective, see the manuscript “Sveriges utrikespolitik: Strid eller samverkan?”, 1959, NLS, MS, L 108: Östen Undén, vol. 20. 500 Cf. Yngve M ller. Östen Undén: En biografi. Stockholm: Norstedt, 1986. 441. 501 See e.g. Cassel 1973: 149.
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(Hjalmarsonaffären).502 This affair, concerned the refusal of the government to let the conservative party’s leader participate in the delegation to the United Nations in 1959 and 1960, and the limits of what was politically tolerated in Sweden at that time. The existence of a parallel case can be gathered from Östen Undén’s diary. For the cabinet meeting of 27 July 1959, which authorised the foreign minister to appoint the delegation, he noted: “All those pres. agreed that Hjalmarson should not be appointed now and that Kilsmo (lib) should be replaced by another liberal, member of parl.”503 The ex-delegation member and ex-legislator Karl Kilsmo’s replacement was done in the quiet. Two liberal legislators, Manne Ståhl and Einar Rimmerfors, were appointed as members of the delegation, suggested by and enjoying the confidence of their party. As remarked by party leader Bertil Ohlin in a parliamentary debate on the Swedish delegation policy, there was no reason to oppose the government request that delegates be members of parliament, if this was going to be a principled practice. Apart from this, however, he viewed appointments as the business of the single parties.504 What Ohlin concealed in the debate was that the Foreign Minister had initially called up another former liberal delegate – bypassing the liberal party – to offer him a seat on the delegation. When the legislator realised this, he answered Undén by giving him Ohlin’s telephone number.505
The Hjalmarson affair Jarl Hjalmarson, schoolmate of Dag Hammarskj ld and student of Östen Undén, was the leader of the conservative party in the period 1950 to 1961. As a Swedish representative he participated in the ninth and in the eleventh sessions of the General Assembly without causing trouble. However, he was known on the domestic scene as an advocate of closer collaboration with the West and as a captious critic of the Soviet Union. In 1959, preceding and paralleling the fourteenth session, he was at the centre of the fiercest quarrel over foreign policy in Cold War Sweden. Hjalmarson actively participated in a campaign against the visit of the Soviet –––––––––––––– 502 There are other cases, cf. “Hr Svärd avsl jar.” Bohusläningen (15 September 1959); Riksdagens protokoll, Andra kammaren (1959) H stsessionen 27: 23 (Jarl Hjalmarson); Erlander’s speech, 17 September 1959, NLS, MS, L 108: Östen Undén, vol. 20. 503 Östen Undén. Anteckningar, vol. 2: 1952–1966. Stockholm: Kungl. Samfundet f r utgivande av handskrifter r rande Skandinaviens historia, 2002. 586. 504 Riksdagens protokoll, Andra kammaren (1959) H stsessionen 27: 38. 505 Jan-Olof Sundell. “Ur Gunnar Heckschers dagbok: Hjalmarsonaffären 1959.” Brobyggare: En vänbok till Nils Andrén. Leif Leifland et al. (eds). Stockholm: Nerenius & Santérus, 1997. 137–156, at 143 (entry of 9 September 1959).
268 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS government leader Nikita Khrushchev to Stockholm, scheduled for August of that year. The motive for Hjalmarson’s engagement was moral indignation and the avenue it offered to demonstrate Sweden’s belonging to the West, despite the nation’s policy of military non-alignment, which no party dared to question.506 The course of events went as follows: On 3 June 1959, upon Undén’s request, Hjalmarson transmitted the conservative party’s suggestion of posting two UN delegates to the Under-Secretary of State, who promised to forward the message to the foreign minister. According to the preference of the party, Knut Ewerl f was to be appointed to the first shift and either Gunnar Svärd or Jarl Hjalmarson to the second shift, depending on their availability.507 Before the delegation was appointed, on 19 July, the Swedish government received a Soviet memorandum, informing the Swedes that Khrushchev’s visit to the Nordic countries had been “postponed until a more favourable date”. The text referred to the campaign against the visit and mentioned Hjalmarson, among others.508 On 27 July, the cabinet meeting took place, authorising the foreign minister to designate members of the delegation. At this meeting in the middle of the summer, Undén only dealt with the second guard. The Prime Minister and the most important cabinet members were absent and had not been informed about the drastic step he was about to suggest. Most colleagues were sceptical when they heard about it afterwards, although they backed the foreign minister politically.509 In her diary Ulla Lindstr m gave the following account of the meeting, apparently interspersed with her own reflections and fantasies: There we all shared Undén’s opinion that Hjalmarson’s presence in the government delegation to the UN would appear provocative both for Swedish and foreign opinion so promptly after Hjalmarson, with frenzy and a vocabulary that caused a stir even beyond our borders, had opposed the government’s understanding of a neutral country’s polite dealings with its great power neighbour. It might certainly look like the government identified with Hjalmarson or due to indulgence accepted his conduct, and give cause
–––––––––––––– 506 Bjereld 1997: 28, 83–84. 507 Riksdagens protokoll, Andra kammaren (1959) H stsessionen 27: 64 (Leif Cassel); cf. Bjereld 1997: 91. 508 “Memorandum handed by the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, Mr. Semjonov, to the Swedish chargé d’affaires in Moscow, Mr Ryding; 19th July.” Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy (1959): 86–88, at 88. 509 Cf. Tage Erlander. 1955–1960. Stockholm: Tiden, 1976. 347–348; Bj rn von Sydow. Kan vi lita på politikerna? Offentlig och intern politik i socialdemokratins ledning 1955–60. Stockholm: Tiden, 1978. 344–345, 347; Olof Ruin. I välfärdsstatens tjänst: Tage Erlander 1946–1969. Stockholm: Tiden, 1986. 296–298; Bjereld 1997: 132; Undén 2002 II: 587, 592.
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for misunderstanding when we sit adjacent to the Soviet Union (SSR– Sweden) in the United Nations and have Hjalmarson alongside, wildly unpredictable and insolent, when curious journalists ask him about the Swedish opposition’s contribution to the cancelled Krusse-visit[.]510 In his account of the Hjalmarson affair, Ulf Bjereld stressed the ‘legitimate’ and subjectively rational elements of Undén’s course of action, the Foreign Minister’s belief that the campaign against Khrushchev’s visit was the reason for its cancellation, and that the measure was required for safeguarding the credibility of Sweden’s policy of neutrality.511 He did not reflect that Undén might have nurtured this belief because he disliked his former student or because he actively suppressed the knowing that he himself had recently given a speech that made the Soviets realise the visit would be pointless.512 Hence, the lock-out of Hjalmarson was likely but an impetuous decision by a frustrated Foreign Minister making his opponent the scapegoat, with underestimated elements of complaisance to the Soviet Union (as Lindstr m’s account illustrates). When he heard about the cancelled visit, Prime Minister Erlander noted in his diary “we all hope now that this is the true reason and that the visit to Scandinavia is not whisked away by a high political cross-current”. But he was suspicious that Undén’s speech might have influenced the Soviet decision and he was aware that the cancellation might have been made in expectation of a great power summit of greater relevance to Khrushchev. At the same time, Erlander’s diary suggests that Undén believed in the ‘Hjalmarson-explanation’.513 The letter received by Undén from his friend Ernst Wigforss in those critical days, a text that Yngve M ller regarded as a possible source of inspiration for immediate action, demonstrates how a psychological shift could occur as a result of –––––––––––––– 510 Entry 23 August 1959, NAS, ULA, vol. 1:5; emphasis by the author, ‘Krusse’ means Khrushchev (an edited version of the entry has been published in: Ulla Lindstr m. I regeringen: Ur min politiska dagbok 1954–1959. Stockholm: Bonnier, 1969. 331). 511 Bjereld 1997: 115, for a discussion of motives see 89–120, 146, cf. also 158 for evidence on a hidden agenda. Bjereld’s legitimising explanation is supported by a member of the foreign ministry, see: Leif Leifland. “Hjalmarsonaffären än en gång.” Internationella Studier (1998) 4: 94–99. An earlier study on the Hjalmarson affair, conducted by a scholar who was to become a social democratic president of parliament, had come to a more cautious conclusion: “It seems likely – but cannot be confirmed – that Undén decided to exclude Hjalmarson from the UN delegation with the aim of accentuating the trustworthiness of the social democratic policy of neutrality” (Sydow 1978: 350). 512 “F redrag av utrikesministern vid f reningen Nordens kongress den 26 juni.” Utrikesfrågor (1959): 22–26; for an English translation see: Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy (1959): 22–26. 513 Tage Erlander. Dagb cker: 1959. Hedemora: Gidlund, 2009. 146 (quote), 147 (entry of 20 & 21 July 1959).
270 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS acknowledging a substantial reason for the cancellation: Wigforss starts off in the letter pondering that perhaps Undén’s speech was the impetus for cancelling Khrushchev’s visit, but as the letter continues so does the reasoning, eventually coming to the conclusion that the campaign against the visit and the resulting political atmosphere were to blame, providing “reason enough” to cancel the visit.514 Whether a deeper psychological reason was at the base of Undén’s rancour, say Hjalmarson’s campaign making him reject Khrushchev’s agenda of the Baltic Sea as a sea of peace in his speech more categorically than he would have otherwise, is a question that must remain open. Despite his ‘rational choice’ interpretation of Undén’s step, Bjereld’s allegory is accurate: “If Undén was the sorcerer of the policy of neutrality, then, by his suggestion to exclude Hjalmarson from the UN delegation, he lost control for a while over those forces he was supposed to control.”515 Nonetheless, Hjalmarson’s position was weak, and the affair did not turn into an ‘Undén affair’.516 As noted in the diary of his successor as conservative party leader on the occasion of the parliamentary debate on this matter: “Obviously Hjalmarson lost some of his balance during the debate”.517 Prime Minister Tage Erlander speculated retrospectively that the circumstances of the affair led to the resignation of Hjalmarson as conservative party leader two years later.518 The damaging effect was already anticipated by actors at the time.519 Once the decision not to appoint Hjalmarson had been made, Undén offered the previous year’s conservative delegate, Nils Agerberg, a seat in the delegation. When the latter discovered he had not been recommended by his party, he took pause for respite and replied that business matters prevented him from accepting the position at that time.520 Thereupon, Hjalmarson wrote a personal letter to Undén, presuming that the second part of the conservative suggestion had been lost, but at the –––––––––––––– 514 Letter from Wigforss to Undén, 21 July 1959, according to: M ller 1986: 443; cf. Undén’s speech of 26 June 1959, NLS, MS, L 108: Östen Undén, vol. 36. 515 Bjereld 1997: 115. 516 Undén’s speech on Erlander’s sixtieth birthday acknowledges his own frailty: “Among your splendid qualities is that you readily reach out to colleagues who are under attack and that you have a feeling for the significance of solidarity within the government circle. I personally experienced the value of these qualities when suddenly a furious quarrel about foreign policy flared up in 1959. You did a great job at that time, which I have reason to be deeply grateful for.” Manuscript for 13 June 1961, NLS, MS, L 108: Östen Undén, vol. 43. 517 Sundell 1997: 156 (diary of Gunnar Heckscher, entry of 2 December 1959). 518 Erlander 1976: 350. 519 Letter Sven Wedén to Bertil Ohlin, 16 September 1959, NAS, BOA, E, vol. 15. 520 Undén 2002 II: 586; cf. Riksdagens protokoll, Andra kammaren (1959) H stsessionen 27: 65 (Leif Cassel), 68 (Undén).
271 CHAPTER 3 same time asking for a few lines on the Foreign Minister’s point of view.521 In his reply, Undén confirmed receipt of Hjalmarson’s original request, but made it clear that he had merely asked for “a suggestion” and that he did not consider himself bound to follow it.522 Thereupon Hjalmarson wrote to Prime Minister Erlander asking for an explanatory statement in case he was not considered an eligible delegate to the United Nations. Moreover, he announced that Gunnar Svärd was not able to participate in the forthcoming session of the General Assembly.523 He also requested a meeting.524 Once the decision not to appoint Hjalmarson had been made, Undén was informed that Khrushchev on short notice decided to visit the United States in September, something that likely influenced his decision to cancel the planned two-weeks-trip to Scandinavia. Despite knowledge of all these developments, Östen Undén issued a decree on the composition of the delegation on 10 August 1959; the list included not only the conservative representative Knut Ewerl f, but also Svärd.525 The following weeks were characterised by the search for a maintainable, face-saving “gentlemans agreement” (sic!); various attempts were made to master what was still a “subterranean burst in the field of foreign policy”.526 The compromise was to suggest Hjalmarson and Svärd themselves had decided not to participate in the delegation on the account of other commitments. However, due to a large number of confidantes, this first agreement was in reality a “retreat on the part of Hjalmarson”.527 Subsequently, no secondary agreement could be reached for fear that the government’s initial rejection of Hjalmarson would leak out. Given the invested prestige and the deadlocked positions, the conflict got out of hand despite the fact that both parties would have preferred to keep it below the surface of public attention.528 On 10 September 1959, the conservative party publicised a declaration addressing the government’s refusal to accept its leader as a delegate to the General Assembly due to his championship of the conservative party’s view on the Khrushchev visit. At the same time, the conservatives also announced that the party no longer wished to be
–––––––––––––– 521 Letter Hjalmarson to Undén, 29 July 1959, NLS, MS, L 108: Östen Undén, vol. 20. 522 Letter Undén to Hjalmarson, 3 August 1959, FMAS, HP 48 DD, vol. 4. Emphasis originally underlined. 523 Letter of 6 August 1959, see: Sydow 1978: 344. 524 Undén 2002 II: 587. 525 FMAS, HP 48 DD, vol. 4. 526 First quote (English in the original): Undén 2002 II: 588; second quote: Ulla Lindstr m’s diary, entry of 23 August 1959, NAS, ULA, vol. 1:5. 527 Ulla Lindstr m’s diary, entry of 23 August 1959, NAS, ULA, vol. 1:5; cf. Bjereld 1997: 139. 528 Bjereld 1997: 140.
272 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS represented in the UN delegation, and the party delegate already posted to the United States was called back.529 In his public reply, the Foreign Minister declared: Representatives to the UN General Assembly are appointed by the government, and their instructions are issued by the government. Thus, they represent the Swedish government and its foreign policy, not their respective parties. Nonetheless it has been regarded as desirable that Sweden, in contrast to the majority of countries, participates in the General Assembly with a representative from all democratic parties. However, the prerequisite is evidently that there is agreement in the delegation about the guiding lines for Swedish foreign policy. On several occasions, in particular in connection with the planned visit by Mr. Khrushchev, the conservative leader Mr. Hjalmarson, has directed sharp attacks against Swedish foreign policy in its practical shaping and has been strongly engaged in the planned demonstrations against this visit. The policy of neutrality, which aims at keeping Sweden outside a future war, calls for a certain amount of responsibility and judgement from its representatives.530 This statement not only referred to Hjalmarson’s initiative against the Khrushchev visit, but also to his conduct generally; yet Hjalmarson, at the request of Erlander, had withdrawn a clause that claimed his general criticism of the politics represented by Khrushchev was among the reasons for his exclusion.531 It is remarkable that the Swedish system of parliamentary participation in the national delegations to the General Assembly survived the Hjalmarson crisis unscathed. It is particularly noteworthy that: 1. The liberal and agrarian parties, despite their declared lack of understanding for the government decision, did not consider a boycott of the delegation. As analysed by Ulla Lindstr m: By this, these parties indicate that despite their sympathetic claps on Hjalmarson’s martyr crown, dissociation from the conservative leader’s foreign policy excursions in practice isolates the conservatives and makes the party a burden as a coalition partner in a bourgeois government
–––––––––––––– 529 Communiqué of the board of the conservative party group, 10 September 1959, FMAS, HP 48 DD, vol. 4. 530 “Yttrandefriheten står utanf r diplomatlagar.” Sydsvenska Dagbladet (11 September 1959). 531 Sundell 1997: 145 (diary of Gunnar Heckscher, entry of 10 September 1959).
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alternative, should it attempt avoid giving foreign countries the impression of a change of course in the policy of neutrality.532 2. The affair disturbed Nordic cooperation. Both conservative members of the Danish delegation refused to participate in Nordic meetings at the fourteenth session of the General Assembly, and at least Nils Gottschalck-Hansen declined collaboration with Swedish represent- atives in the work of his Committee.533 Due to his obstruction, the affair also put a spanner in the works of Nordic collaboration among governmental actors, with a delaying effect.534
3. The affair was drawn into the election campaign of 1960 due to the renewed Conservative request to include Hjalmarson in the delegation to the fifteenth session of the General Assembly. The government refused to end his excommunication at that time. It is telling that the conservatives, when discussing their nomination, saw a strong need to express their commitment to the non-aligned “principal line” (huvudlinje) of Swedish foreign policy.535 The decision to send an unofficial observer to the fifteenth session of the General Assembly – at the conservative party’s own expense – was motivated by the desire to “show one’s interest in the UN task, although one objected to the government’s dealing with Hjalmarson”. On closer look, the move gives the impression of desperation, a need to demonstrate belonging to the community of the respectable. Consequently, the conservative observer participated in the daily meetings of the Swedish delegation.536 Although the General Assembly convened after the election had been held on 18 September 1960, the popular vote gave an indication of the sex appeal of power as opposed to the fear of it.
4. Hjalmarson, having been personally offered the discharge of his “quarantine” by Undén ahead of the sixteenth session of the General Assembly, accepted the offer. The rehabilitation was propelled by Undén, even though he had created a situation convincing both
–––––––––––––– 532 Ulla Lindstr m’s diary, entry of 26 September 1959, NAS, ULA, vol. 1:5; cf. on the lack of coordination among opposition parties: letter Sven Wedén to Bertil Ohlin, 16 September 1959, NAS, BOA, E, vol. 15. 533 See the minutes of the Danish delegation meetings, 6 October & 13 November 1959, LMAC, ECA, vol. 22 (F 2); cf. “En demonstration.” Information (18 September 1959). 534 Cf. the letter by Ambassador in Copenhagen Stig Sahlin to the Head of the Political Division Sverker Åstr m, 15 October 1959, FMAS, HP 48 A, vol. 16. 535 E.g. “H gerbojkott vid FN: Hjalmarson ‘underkänd’.” Dagens Nyheter (6 August 1960). 536 Karlsson 1965: 13.
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Erlander and himself that this step would signal to the Soviets a sliding to the West. It seems simply Undén wanted to get the affair off the table before his retirement.537 The spirit of national reconciliation under social democratic leadership, which prevailed in 1961, inspired Bertil Ohlin to suggest the re-nomination of Sven Wedén, the delegation outcast from 1952.538 According to the diary of Ulla Lindstr m, the style of the comebacks differed: Jarl Hjalmarson, released from the burden of his leadership of the conservative party, has been sunny, relaxed, and loyal. With high spirits we heard him confess to having been tempted to vote with the Soviet Union, which delivered such judicious cost-saving suggestions in regard to the UN secretariat’s driving and telephone charges. It was a real effort of will for me, Jarl said smilingly, to follow the government instructions and instead vote with the Advisory Committee (which we used to do because this was the budget draft supported by the Secretary-General, and we have always supported Hammarskj ld). The liberal party’s Sven Wedén has been more sophisticated and equivocal. But even among us, peaceful relations prevailed.539 In addition to ex-party leader Hjalmarson and future party leader Wedén, who was later forced to resign due to government abuse of power,540 the future Prime Minister Olof Palme also attended the sixteenth session of the General Assembly. As noted by an observer, Palme was to study the work at the United Nations in order to be able “to stand by for the higher duties, which Erlander so obviously has in prospect on his account”.541
The Jante debate on United Nations delegations Naturally, the burst in Swedish foreign policy, which the Hjalmarson affair partly uncovered and partly effectuated, led to a challenge and discussion of the delegation model. This discussion started in August 1959 when the rejection of Hjalmarson became known to the leadership of the conservative party, and intensified once the rejection became public in September. At that time, the Foreign Minister went to New York, where he –––––––––––––– 537 Undén 2002 II: 636; cf. “Hjalmarson till FN: Undén underrättade själv h gerledaren.” Svenska Dagbladet (27 May 1961). 538 Minutes of the board of the liberal party group, 30 May 1961, NAS, LPG, A 2, vol. 1. 539 Entry of 15 October 1961, NAS, ULA, vol. 1:6. 540 Cf. Hans Lindblad. Hemlig(s)tämpeln: Sven Wedén och det hemliga brevet: En skrift om systematiskt missbruk av hemligstämpeln – från Hjalmarssonaffären till IB. Stockholm: Bertil Ohlin institutet, 1998. 541 Ulla Lindstr m’s diary, entry of 15 October 1961, NAS, ULA, vol. 1:6.
275 CHAPTER 3 strengthened his authority by accepting the vice presidency of the General Assembly, earlier having declined similar honours.542 The debate reached its peak in connection with interpellations on the affair in both chambers of parliament in November. Related manoeuvres have been described as “gr nk pingsmässiga” (Gr nk ping-esque), referring to a fictitious parochial town popularised by a satirical magazine.543 However, the debate that followed is more trenchantly characterised by the so-called Law of Jante, the Nordic codex of conformist behaviour and its generation through soft measures of terror by representatives of the collective will.544 The government ignored the advice of a social democratic foreign policy expert who suggested not to “squeeze the lemon [krama citronen] to the last drop”.545 Instead, it debated ad hominem Hjalmarson and on the limits of tolerable attitudes on non- alignment and the policy of neutrality. On this occasion, the policy was spelled out more hypocritically than before, making the debate formative for the doctrine of the following three decades.546 In contrast to the successful political squeeze-out of Hjalmarson and the tightening of security political correctness, the exchange of ideas on the delegation to the United Nations came to nothing. No change or formalisation of the practice was agreed upon, although the autonomy of the parties to nominate delegates was in practice respected by Undén’s successors. The hegemonic position of the government at the time is underlined by the fact that the generally expected parliamentary debate on the matter, which both the conservatives and Östen Undén would have preferred to adjourn until a later foreign policy debate, was finally initiated by the interpellation of a social democratic legislator in one chamber, hastily followed by a conservative colleague in the other. The initiator was John Lundberg, the politician who once had suggested to ban Sven Wedén from the delegation. For his role in the Hjalmarson affair, Lundberg has been characterised as “the Sven Duva of the second chamber, who never allows
–––––––––––––– 542 Cf. cable by S. Frychius to the foreign ministry’s press division and the press agency TT, 25 September 1959, FMAS, HP 48 D, vol. 57. 543 Riksdagens protokoll, F rsta kammaren (1959) H stsessionen 27: 18 (Erik Boheman). 544 Cf. Bernd Henningsen. “Jante, or the Scandinavian Law of Mediocrity: On One Factor in the Identity of the Welfare State.” The Swedish Success Story? Kurt Almqvist and Kay Glans (eds). Stockholm: Axel and Margaret Ax:son Johnson Foundation, 2004. 161–173, 308–310. 545 The advice was given by Yngve M ller in a letter to Tage Erlander, see: Yngve M ller. Mina tre liv: Publicist, politiker, diplomat. Stockholm: Tiden, 1983. 251. 546 On the uniqueness: Commission on Neutrality Policy. Had There Been a War: Preparations for the Reception of Military Assistance 1949–1969. Statens offentliga utredningar 1994:11E. Stockholm: Fritze, 1994. 269.
276 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS an enemy to pass over the bridge”. However, in order to ensure the interpellation suit the government, it was drafted in the Prime Minister’s office.547 The answer presented by Undén in the first chamber and Erlander in the second chamber resembled the speech of a Crown prosecutor in a witch trial, and ended with a battery of four questions and a number of sub- questions, to which Erlander insistently exacted answers throughout the debate.548 The reply was distributed in advance to a conservative politician, who willingly accepted the turn of the tables and obediently delivered answers to the suggestive questions; it was not delivered to independently minded politicians.549 The tone of the debate was set by Lundberg in his introductory statement, in which he accused the conservatives of systematically trying “to turn democracy into a despicable spittoon”.550 A look at various drafts of the government response to the interpellation shows that, while the section dealing with the party delegates to the United Nations remained practically unaltered, there was a movement from merely echoing ‘rumours’ about Hjalmarson to the presentation of ‘pieces of evidence’ and the development of ‘standards’ he failed to meet.551 In the first draft, the attempt is still made to convict him on the basis of secondary sources. There is a lengthy reference to a book by conservative political scientist Elis Håstad, in which “pure neutrality” with affinity to social democratic and agrarian strands of thought is distinguished from neutrality in the sense of non-alignment as liberty of action, which is identified with Hjalmarson. The only other state witness at this stage was journalist Gunnar Unger’s article in a conservative journal, in which Hjalmarson was lauded for attempting to lead Sweden away from the dead end of the neutrality policy; this article was one that Hjalmarson refused to disclaim.552 –––––––––––––– 547 Ulla Lindstr m’s diary, entry 24 November 1959, NAS, ULA, vol. 1:5. Sven Duva is the hero of a poem in Johan Ludvig Runeberg’s The Tales of Ensign Stål; for the interpellation see: Riksdagens protokoll, Andra kammaren (1959) H stsessionen 26: 3–4. 548 See: Riksdagens protokoll, Andra kammaren (1959) H stsessionen 27: 5–95; for an English translation of the formal government reply and Hjalmarson’s main contribution to the debate see: Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy (1959): 44–63. 549 Cf. Riksdagens protokoll, F rsta kammaren (1959) H stsessionen 27: 12 (Knut Ewerl f); Riksdagens protokoll, Andra kammaren (1959) H stsessionen 27: 32 (Bertil Ohlin), 84 (Gunnar Heckscher). 550 Riksdagens protokoll, Andra kammaren (1959) H stsessionen 27: 16. 551 In the parliamentary debate Undén presented what he called a “corpus delicti”, that is Hjalmarson’s suggestion of a government declaration on the delegation, mid-August 1959, cf. Riksdagens protokoll, F rsta kammaren (1959) H stsessionen 27: 28. 552 First draft of the government statement for 24 November 1959, NLS, MS, L 108: Östen Undén, vol. 20; cf. Gunnar Unger. “Undén och vår utrikespolitik.” Svensk Tidskrift (1956): (continued)
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In the second draft both of these sections reappeared in a condensed form, and were supplemented by a third witness of the prosecution, journalist Johannes Wickman. He was quoted in regard to the Acheson plan, the tool by which the Security Council was outmanoeuvred in the Korean War – a measure that had been supported by Undén. The quote expressed Wickman’s opinion that Hjalmarson’s position on this plan was “a transparent disguise” for demanding Sweden join affiliation with the Western bloc. Neither Håstad nor Wickman was able to comment on the use of their ratings, as they were deceased by the time of the debate. The second draft included quotes of Hjalmarson from 1952, 1954, and 1956, in which he demonstrated an elastic understanding of non-alignment and affinity to the West. One of his critical comments on the Khrushchev visit was also reproduced. It was claimed that these statements had not been cited in order “to carry fuel to a stake”, but rather to demonstrate the considerable difference between Hjalmarson’s long-term standpoint and the government’s standpoint on foreign policy. The fact that Hjalmarson had represented the Swedish government at the General Assembly even after all of these statements had been made was explained by the government having been “exceedingly tolerant and hoping for reform” (bättring).553 Some general remarks on the policy of neutrality had already been added in the second draft. This section was much expanded in the final draft edited by Olof Palme.554 The speech, which was presented before Parliament by the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, contains the claim that, for neutral Sweden, “preparations and consultations for military cooperation with members of a great power alliance are completely out of the question”.555 According to the official Swedish Commission on Neutrality of 1994, this statement by the Prime Minister “conveyed a deliberately erroneous picture of what had actually occurred”. Disputes with proponents of apologetic views have concerned the question of whether this statement would be most aptly characterised as a ‘lie’, an ‘untruth’ or a ‘misleading statement’.556 A recent account of the history of
–––––––––––––– 190–206; Hjalmarson later expressed distance to Unger’s article and explained that he had not dissociated himself publicly due to his friendship with the author (M ller 1986: 444). 553 Second draft of the government statement for 24 November 1959, NLS, MS, L 108: Östen Undén, vol. 20. “Dessa citat anf ras inte f r att bära bränsle till ett kättarbål.” 554 Erlander 1976: 349. 555 Riksdagens protokoll, F rsta kammaren (1959) H stsessionen 27: 6 (Östen Undén); Riksdagens protokoll, Andra kammaren (1959) H stsessionen 27: 6 (Tage Erlander); the official translation to English downplayed the matter: “preparations for military co-operation with members of one of the Great Power alliances, and talks to this end, are thus quite out of the question”, see: Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy (1959): 45. 556 Commission on Neutrality Policy 1994: 269; cf. Bjereld 1997: 163–164.
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Swedish foreign policy quotes the decisive words incompletely and is apologising; it talks of possibly intended “unclarity”.557 In the 1959 parliamentary debate, an utterance by Per Edvin Sk ld, member of the inner circle of social democratic power holders, was not taken literally and went unnoticed: “We know it is possible to conceal such things from the Swedish people, but it is not possible to keep it secret from foreign countries’ intelligence”.558 Hjalmarson, despite his vague knowledge of the government’s duplicity and earlier threats of disclosing it, refrained from using this knowledge.559 The government’s advantage was its opponents’ disinterest to put pressure on Swedish security collaboration with the West. While the speech’s section on neutrality was expanded into an orthodox catechism that the preachers themselves did not adhere to, some elements were dropped. This refers to the section on Håstad and some of the striking phrases from the second draft, characteristic of Undén’s way of thinking. For example, the image of the “stake” was omitted, and the term “bättring” was modernised to read “change in his attitude”. Moreover, other dropped passages included those in which the government was cited as aspiring to be an “objective surveyor” (objektiv bed mare) in international relations, to implement a “policy of the middle way”, and to reserve the right to not allow a fox to keep the geese for fear that Hjalmarson would play the role of the fox.560 In the debate Undén reintroduced Håstad, referring to the scholars’ opinion that “Mr. Hjalmarson represents a line of neutrality that differs from other lines in the policy of neutrality”. He also accused the conservative party leader of having made “political statements” in connection with the Khrushchev visit. He described the government’s exclusion of Hjalmarson as a counter- demonstration against his demonstrative opposition to governmental politics.561 Erlander’s rhetoric was characterised by repeatedly describing Hjalmarson as “creeping away” in the debate.562 Moreover, he delightfully elaborated on an allegory introduced by a conservative legislator,
–––––––––––––– 557 Ulf Bjereld, Alf W. Johansson and Karl Molin. Sveriges säkerhet och världens fred: Svensk utrikespolitik under kalla kriget. Stockholm: Santérus, 2008. 177–178. 558 Riksdagens protokoll, Andra kammaren (1959) H stsessionen 27: 77. My emphasis. “Such things”, refers to “informal and secret alignments”. 559 Cf. Sydow 1978: 94–95, 347. 560 Second draft of the government statement for 24 November 1959, NLS, MS, L 108: Östen Undén, vol. 20; cf. Riksdagens protokoll, Andra kammaren (1959) H stsessionen 27: 6 (Tage Erlander). 561 Riksdagens protokoll, Andra kammaren (1959) H stsessionen 27: 87; Riksdagens protokoll, F rsta kammaren (1959) H stsessionen 27: 27. 562 Riksdagens protokoll, Andra kammaren (1959) H stsessionen 27: 24, 26,49.
279 CHAPTER 3 describing the conservatives’ role in Swedish politics as being that of a “naughty child, which the government locked in a wardrobe and once in a while asks whether the child has reformed [bättrat sig], to be allowed to come out and play with the other children”.563 The leaders of the liberal party and of the agrarian party, despite criticising the government for the exclusion of Hjalmarson, indicated that they had difficulties imagining him as a future coalition partner. Agrarian leader Gunnar Hedlund went as far as ascribing pariah qualities to Hjalmarson, making it risky to consort with the latter.564 It has been concluded that Hjalmarson’s “great sin” was that he said in public what was understood as belonging to the behind-closed-doors part of Swedish security policy.565 It was in this two-faced atmosphere and with this link to the doctrine of neutrality that the most detailed discussion on the principles of composition of the Swedish delegation to the United Nations took place. The government statement stressed that delegates to the General Assembly were instructed agents of the government, and maintained that the inclusion of members of parliamentary opposition parties in Swedish delegations had been considered desirable on the basis of shared principled beliefs. According to this view, the parliamentarians in the delegation not only formally represented the government, but also its parliamentary support in the field of foreign policy. At the same time, it was claimed that the right of delegates to later state deviating opinions in public, for example in parliamentary debates on UN policy, had never been questioned (a period of grace was not mentioned). The argument for the model, namely, the possibility it offered opposition members to closely follow Sweden’s policy in the United Nations, was nonetheless criticised for potential limitation of the delegation members’ freedom of action. A converse restriction, it was argued, was troublesome, as the government did not wish to appoint politicians who had publicly opposed important aspects of the official foreign policy. By tying the Hjalmarson affair to this objection, the government took the starting point for its rejection from principle criticism of the Scandinavian delegation model. Paradoxically, at the same time it commented on the suggestion to consult on the principles of the composition of the UN delegation by making it clear that no changes in
–––––––––––––– 563 Riksdagens protokoll, Andra kammaren (1959) H stsessionen 27: 92. 564 Riksdagens protokoll, Andra kammaren (1959) H stsessionen 27: 33–4 (Ohlin), 45, 47 (Hedlund). 565 Wilhelm Agrell. Fred och fruktan: Sveriges säkerhetspolitiska historia 1918–2000. Lund: Historisk media, 2000. 163.
280 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS practice were sought, and that it would be regretted were any of the democratic parties to stop participating in the delegation.566 In contrast to this approach, which opened the door to arbitrary manipulation by the government, Jarl Hjalmarson argued that not even in foreign affairs was the opposition to be understood as a parliamentary basis for the government, and that a fundamental choice had to be made: Either a solely governmental delegation was to be installed, implying the representation of the government but not necessarily of the country as such; or, a model with representation of the democratic parties was applied, leaving the ultimate choice of delegates to the parties, although he did not object to “the government making certain requests or […] these be treated with due and reasonable regard”. According to Hjalmarson, the foreign minister was not to demand playing “follow-my-leader” (“gåsmarsch”) behind himself and determine the appropriateness of delegates. Democracy and common sense would suggest that it be left to the individual discretion of delegates to determine whether they found sufficient communalities enabling them to serve under the foreign minister or not.567 Another conservative contribution to the debate characterised the perspective of the government as formalistic and reintroduced the idea of the delegation as a clearinghouse for compromises between various parties.568 Yet another claimed that the delegates, even if they themselves were members of the government, did not solely represent the government or the foreign minister, but the joint authority, which was generated by the foreign policy consensus of all democratic parties. He claimed this authority had irresponsibly been impaired by the government.569 Communist speakers in the Swedish parliament frequently used the affair as an illustration of discord among the democratic parties on foreign policy not only in this debate, but also in the following years.570
–––––––––––––– 566 Riksdagens protokoll, F rsta kammaren (1959) H stsessionen 27: 10–11 (Undén); (identically:) Riksdagens protokoll, Andra kammaren (1959) H stsessionen 27: 11 (Erlander); English translation in: Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy (1959): 51–53. 567 Riksdagens protokoll, Andra kammaren (1959) H stsessionen 27: 22–23, 28; English translation: Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy (1959): 61–63. 568 Riksdagens protokoll, F rsta kammaren (1959) H stsessionen 27: 13–14 (Knut Ewerl f). 569 Riksdagens protokoll, Andra kammaren (1959) H stsessionen 27: 85 (Gunnar Heckscher). 570 Riksdagens protokoll, F rsta kammaren (1959) H stsessionen 27: 24 (Gunnar Öhman); Riksdagens protokoll, Andra kammaren (1959) H stsessionen 27: 57 (Gustav Johansson); Riksdagens protokoll, F rsta kammaren (1960) 10: 31 (Gunnar Öhman); Riksdagens protokoll, Andra kammaren (1959) 10: 156–157 (Hilding Hagberg); Riksdagens protokoll, F rsta kammaren (1961) 14: 107 (Helmer Persson).
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The most informative contributions in the parliamentary debate were those of liberal politicians Erik Boheman and Bertil Ohlin. Boheman was himself a former diplomat who had been removed from the UN delegation by Undén, due to his divergent views (his civil servant status at that time makes this case a different matter).571 He pointed to the double role for parliamentary representatives, who outwardly serve as representatives of the government while inwardly serving as party representatives and observers. He also underlined that no parliamentarian was forced to act as a delegate on matters in which he or she disagreed with the government line and that a system allowing for detailed formal reservations of parliamentary delegates had been applied at the League of Nations.572 Boheman considered the principles of the delegation model to have become less clear in the postwar period than at the League; the reasons for increased ambiguity being the longer sessions of the General Assembly, social democratic dominance resulting in a lack of need to be considerate of the opposition, as well as the length of tenure and authoritarian disposition of Foreign Minister Undén. Boheman called for a return to “the former, more stringent order”, which had respected both inward and outward functions, and suggested that the government had instrumentalised a foreign policy matter for domestic purposes, thereby damaging the national interest.573 Ohlin reminded those present of Prime Minister Erlander’s statements from 1952, which had advocated not only the inclusion of all parties in the delegation, but also of their participation in decision making – a concept that led Ohlin to frame the delegation as “a sort of continuation […] of those deliberations, which had taken place in the Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs”. He also supplemented the characterisation of delegates as mere government representatives by pointing to the fact that they represented the government outwardly and acted on its instructions as conceived after the (constitutionally) required consultation with the Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs, a body with members such as Hjalmarson and others who the government might actually not appreciate sitting there. Indicating specific views on practical matters, Ohlin refrained
–––––––––––––– 571 Sverker Oredsson. “Erik Boheman.” Svenska diplomatprofiler under 1900-talet. Gunnar Artéus and Leif Leifland (eds). Stockholm: Probus, 2001. 169–211, at 199. 572 As parliamentarian delegate in the following year, Boheman reintroduced the reservation system, see the memorandum on his deviating views, 15 December 1960, FMAS, HP 48 D, vol. 65. 573 Riksdagens protokoll, F rsta kammaren (1959) H stsessionen 27: 16, 19.
282 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS from spelling out a concrete vision of the future delegation policy as he felt this should be left to negotiations between the parties.574 The meeting regarding the delegation order never came about – not least because the liberals themselves did not follow up on their own idea. The observation on the Swedish delegation practice, “the institution has declined and does not nowadays hold what its appearance promises”, did not call forth initiatives for ‘reform’.575 Only when the continuation of Hjalmarson’s ban became known in August 1960 did Ohlin once again call for negotiations among the parties; but also this time he expended no effort to ensure it would be realised.576 This implied that the introduction of the Canadian delegation model, although suggested by various quarters was repudiated. The Canadian order, which had played a role in Swedish discussions already the year before, foresaw the participation of ‘Parliamentary Observers’ with a lower level of integration in the delegation, thereby also placing low expectations for overall conformity of opposition members. After having taken over the leadership of the conservative party, Gunnar Heckscher, who had introduced the idea of adopting the Canadian model as early as August 1959, declared that he was not willing to accept international assignments that would force him to take orders from the Erlander administration. This was a personal stance, and did not carry with it consequences for his party’s participation in the delegation. The reluctance to serve the government raised immediate doubts regarding his reliability on matters of foreign policy, in turn forcing Heckscher to assert that there was no disagreement, the only issue being the government’s exploitation of its advantage over Hjalmarson.577 Ironically, after his resignation as party leader in 1965, Heckscher served the social democratic government as an ambassador, first to Japan and then to India, and participated in the latter capacity in the Swedish delegation to the thirtieth session of the General Assembly in 1975.
–––––––––––––– 574 Riksdagens protokoll, Andra kammaren (1959) H stsessionen 27: 33, 37–38. 575 Cf. “Regeringen och FN-delegationen.” G teborgs Handels- och Sj fartstidning (9 August 1960). 576 Cf. “H gerbojkott vid FN: Hjalmarson ‘underkänd’.” Dagens Nyheter (6 August 1960). 577 Axel Waldemarson. “Heckscher ej villig ingå i FN-delegatifonen under herr Erlander.” Svenska Dagbladet (7 September 1962); “Gunnar Heckscher: Ingen utrikespolitisk oenighet bakom oviljan bli FN-delegat.” Svenska Dagbladet (8 September 1962). For Heckscher’s early advocacy of the Canadian model see his intervention at a party group’s board meeting in August 1959, documented in Sundell 1997: 139.
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The discreet charm of bureaucratic rationality, 1962 to 1970 Östen Undén resigned on 19 September 1962 at the age of 76, the day after the beginning of the seventeenth session of the General Assembly. His legacy was a delegation list on which his successor, social democrat Torsten Nilsson, left the remark “No objections.” The list made it clear that the aged patriarch had asked the leaders of the other parties for their suggestions and that the need to add another delegate might later arise.578 Formally, the delegation was appointed by Nilsson on 21 September.579 Given Nilsson’s deference to Undén’s selection, a delegation policy characteristic of Torsten Nilsson might only be expected to have been implemented the following year. Nonetheless, the most characteristic feature of Nilsson’s tenure as foreign minister from 1962 to 1971 was the striking increase in the number of Foreign Service members serving in the delegation, as could already be noted from his debut delegation. Permanent representative Agda R ssel initiated this development. She took advantage of the change in foreign ministers to immediately write a letter to Nilsson, asking for a timely delegation with an enlarged staff able to participate in the increased unofficial and technical meeting activity of the United Nations under equal conditions with other delegations. Concretely, she asked for a few heads of division or deputy heads of division from the foreign ministry, for a delegate with a background in the Geneva disarmament negotiations, and for a representative of the foreign ministry’s trade division.580 Upon this request, Nilsson initiated a second round of appointments, which brought four more representatives of the foreign service to New York: Under-Secretary of State Leif Belfrage, disarmament negotiator Alva Myrdal, Chief of the Political Division Sverker Åstr m, and his deputy, Per Lind.581 Eight members of the foreign service participated in the seventeenth session of the General Assembly – more than at any previous one, but less than at any of those that followed. In Undén’s delegations the average number of foreign service members had been four, and this number was also foreseen in his delegation plan for 1962. In Nilsson’s delegations, the average number of members of the foreign service jumped to thirteen, the peak being nineteen in 1970.582 In contrast to the rapid increase in the number of professional –––––––––––––– 578 Delegation list of September 1962, NLS, MS, L 108: Östen Undén, vol. 21. 579 Document, 21 September 1962, FMAS, HP 48 DD, vol. 6. 580 Letter R ssel to Nilsson, 26 September 1962, FMAS, HP 48 DD, vol. 6. 581 F renta nationernas generalf rsamlings ordinarie m te 17 (1962): 7. 582 In this section, the delegation to the nineteenth session of the General Assembly is treated as if it had actually attended the session as planned (the session took place in a downscaled manner and many delegates, in particular foreign service members, did not attend).
284 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS diplomats, the other categories of delegates remained steady apart from the Federation of Swedish Industries being granted the right of representation alongside the Confederation of Trade Unions from 1964 onwards. The number of government representatives was kept to an average of two, although the first visit to the United Nations by a Swedish Prime Minister, Olof Palme, raised this number to four in 1970. Most notable in this category were, after Ulla Lindstr m’s resignation 1966, cabinet ministers Alva Myrdal and Ingemund Bengtsson, who both had a background in the delegation in different capacities. Except for the 1962 session, when Palme – despite being appointed – did not attend the General Assembly as a social democratic legislator, there were always eight party representatives included in the delegation: two for each of the democratic parties. Thus, the increase in the average size of the delegation, from sixteen members under Undén to twenty-seven under Nilsson, is almost exclusively due to the increase of delegates with a foreign service background. Apart from the slightly down-sized delegation serving during the recession year 1967, the overall delegation grew continuously in size and almost doubled from nineteen to thirty-six members between 1962 and 1970.583 The increase in number of foreign service members was notable in all categories. During Undén’s tenure the permanent mission had contributed more than one delegate only once, namely, in 1961. In that year the permanent representative was accompanied by a counsellor of legation, a newly installed position. Under Nilsson, the number of delegates with a background in the permanent mission increased to an average of four. This growth could be attributed to the enlarged staff of the permanent mission, which assisted permanent representatives Agda R ssel and her successors Sverker Åstr m (1964–1970) and Olof Rydbeck (1970–1976). In addition, two to five ambassadors from other places served in Nilsson’s delegations as compared to one to three under Undén. These diplomats returned to subsequent sessions frequently, but there was nothing like the permanent position that Undén’s protégé Sohlman had enjoyed, and the size of this subgroup was subject to frequent shifts.584 The remaining group consisted of foreign ministry staff, represented by four to ten individuals in the period 1962 to 1970, as compared to one foreign ministry representative in most of Undén’s delegations.
–––––––––––––– 583 These numbers are related to the whole regular session period of the General Assembly; they do not address the size of the delegation at any particular point in time. 584 Alva Myrdal’s assignment in all of Nilsson’s delegations only belongs in the category of diplomats in the years 1962–1966, her later participation was in her capacity as cabinet member.
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The delegation secretariat did not grow in correspondence to that of the foreign service segment of the regular delegation. Whereas the secretariat had consisted of an average of five members under Undén, it rose to six under his successor. If the delegations from the 1940s are excluded from the comparison, no increase can be noted at all. While the two-delegates-for-each-party model remained stable under Nilsson, it was practically restricted to legislators and became more transparent.585 The novelty of a letter sent by Foreign Minister Nilsson to the leaders of the three opposition parties in June 1963 signalled a new style, with the letter stating that the government wished to include representatives of the opposition parties already represented in the Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs, and that it was a matter of course that these be appointed after consultation with respective party leaders.586 Delegates noted that Nilsson was more interested than his predecessor in ensuring the party backing of appointments.587 While such a directed letter remained a single occurrence, improved documentation on party appointments can be found in the archives of the foreign ministry. Whereas it is not possible to reconstruct all details of the appointment process from these documents or those in party archives, it seems the coordinating function had moved from the person of the foreign minister to the administration in the foreign ministry by the mid-1960s.588 It is also worth noting that all parliamentarians appointed in the period 1962 to 1970 served on the delegation for more than one session of the General Assembly. Improved documentation for the liberal party can be seen from the 1960s, showing that the party group’s board was the organ designating the candidates for the delegation. In the period 1962 to 1970 an increase can be seen in the average number of attended sessions by liberal delegates, the number increasing from 1.9 in the previous period to 3.3. Most notable among its representatives were the former ambassador Erik Boheman and the later ‘NGO ambassador’ Olle Dahlén. For the conservative party, the party group’s board also seems to have generally been the organ responsible for selecting candidates.589 The number of the conservative
–––––––––––––– 585 The only exception was social democrat Valter Åman in 1962, who left parliament a few months before his assignment as a delegate. 586 Letter of 17 June 1963, FMAS, HP 48 DD, vol. 6. 587 Karlsson 1965: 8. It is worth noting that Nilsson himself and one of the social democratic delegation frequenters in the 1960s, Yngve M ller, were highly critical in regard to their party’s line in the Hjalmarson affair, cf. Sydow 1978: 344–345, 347; M ller 1983: 251. 588 Cf. e.g. Memorandum by Marc Giron, 6 July 1967, FMAS, HP 48 DD, vol. 8. 589 This is made clear for at least two instances by Gunnar Heckscher’s letters to Nilsson, dated 19 June 1963 & 25 September 1964, FMAS, HP 48 DD, vol. 6; cf. in general Karlsson (continued)
286 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS legislator’s appointments increased slightly from 2.1 at the earlier sessions to 2.3 on average in the period 1962 to 1970. The conservative representative to most frequently attend the General Assembly in this period was Allan Hernelius, the legislator and editor of the newspaper Svenska Dagbladet, with five appointments. In general, the delegation philosophy of the conservatives has been characterised by their attempts to impart international experience to as many individuals as possible.590 For the agrarian party, all evidence points to the sole decision making ‘body’ of party leader Gunnar Hedlund himself.591 Not least, this interpretation seems plausible in light of the fact that the already well- established representatives Torsten Bengtson and Sten Wahlund continued to be the sole appointees of the party throughout the period. By the late 1960s they were clearly the most experienced delegates, raising the average number of sessions attended by their party to 15.1 on average in the period 1962 to 1970. Whereas the delegation might have benefited from their experience, their routine appointment had an adverse effect. Bengtson’s argument that the general disinterest of agrarian legislators in United Nations issues was due to a lack of time fails to rebut the claim of a student of the Swedish delegation model, namely, that poor interest was probably also an effect of the “somewhat peculiar [säregen] monopolisation of representation, which two of the group’s members have enjoyed for over a decade”.592 It has also been noted that a whole generation of younger agrarian legislators actually interested in foreign policy felt blocked from the United Nations by the party veterans.593 In contrast to the records of the opposition parties, there is no documentation regarding the appointment of social democratic representatives in the archives of the foreign ministry, except for a single note en passant that “the soc. dem. party is of course taken care of by the foreign minister himself”.594 Already in 1963, Torsten Nilsson installed a new duo of representatives, Yngve M ller and Ingemund Bengtsson, the former serving for the remainder of Nilsson’s tenure and the latter for every session before his eventual appointment as Minister of Agriculture in
–––––––––––––– 1965: 8. In the foreign ministry documentation of telephone conversations can be found, vaguely referring to party representatives. 590 Cassel 1973: 149. 591 See the documents in FMAS, HP 48 DD; cf. Karlsson 1965: 8. 592 Karlsson 1965: 9. 593 M ller 1983: 252. 594 Memorandum by Marc Giron, 6 July 1967, FMAS, HP 48 DD, vol. 8.
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1969.595 Nilsson personally asked these legislators whether they would be interested in serving on the delegation, and no evidence has been available to support M ller’s assumption that he had done this only after consultation with the Prime Minister.596 M ller’s appointment was the result of advocacy by delegation veterans Ulla Lindstr m and Rickard Sandler.597 Among other indicators for the stability of the parliamentary part of the delegation under the tenure of Nilsson, it can be noted that parliamentarians continued to be appointed to the categories of ‘representatives’ and ‘alternate representatives’. Independently from this status at the General Assembly, they also continued to be registered in the senior category of ‘representatives’ in their respective committees. Apart from a number of individual deviations, committee assignments usually conformed to the following scheme: Social democratic parliamentarians were in charge of the Special Political Committee (political and security matters) and the Second Committee (economic matters); the agrarians were assigned the Third Committee (social matters); the liberals the Fourth Committee (decolonisation); and the conservatives the Fifth Committee (administrative and budgetary matters). The First Committee (political and security matters) was run by the delegation chairperson, and the Sixth Committee (legal matters) by the foreign ministry’s expert on international law, Hans Blix.598
Civil servant domination and the ‘truth’ about delegates’ roles The increase of delegates with a background in the foreign service in the 1960s was discreet, largely below the surface of formal status, and explicable in the work load to be mastered by the delegation as well as in professionalising subsidiary functions earlier left to the main delegate (if not to the altruism of spouses).599 However, it was not the secretariat section that expanded, but the delegation body. The large majority of civil servants belonged to the category of senior officials. Arne Karlsson, student
–––––––––––––– 595 Bengtsson continued to be appointed to the delegation in his capacity as cabinet minister from 1969–1973. He presided over the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment 1972 in Stockholm. 596 Cf. Karlsson 1965: 9. 597 Cf. M ller 1983: 249. 598 See e.g. the list over committee allocation, 30 September 1970, FMAS, HP 48 DD, vol. 11; cf. Karlsson 1965: 17. This order has roots in the Undén era and even at the League of Nations. 599 Karlsson 1965: 29. Sten Wahlund’s wife served as his secretary in the delegation without compensation at earlier sessions; such functions were later taken over by civil servants.
288 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS of Swedish delegation practice in the mid-1960s, titled one of the sections of his manuscript “domination by civil servants?” (tjänstemannavälde?). His findings were not unequivocal. In the foreign ministry he was told that the parliamentarians were not always whole-heartedly engaged in their tasks. He was also told that they left much work to civil servants and sometimes had to be virtually enticed into making statements in their committees. The interviews in the foreign ministry gave him the impression of a patronising attitude. Even so, of the legislators interviewed, only the deputy leader of the conservative party, Leif Cassel, was straightforward in his acknowledgement that civil servants “guided the parliamentarians with kid gloves” (silkesvantar). Most parliamentarians refused to admit that they were dominated and claimed their own superiority in political matters. However, there was agreement that most of the issues dealt with by the delegates were not essentially political in nature and that civil servants had the upper hand in technical matters. Much depended on the circumstances, though, and one of the parliamentarians with extensive experience in the delegation remarked that the civil servants were usually “more green” than he was. A converse example is the role of the external adviser Brita Skottsberg-Åhman, her long experience of managing the delicate Fourth (decolonisation) Committee was well over the heads of the (mostly liberal) legislators who were her formal superiors. There was no clear-cut conclusion, but the study suggests that civil servants, regardless of their usually lower formal status, were not only servants but, to varying degrees, supervisors and guides of the parliamentary delegation members.600 There was little open conflict in the Swedish delegation between the groups of civil servants and legislators in regard to status and functions. Thus, a civil servant praised this model for holding foreign policy separate from party politics when the Japanese became interested in it.601 Parliamentary delegates could even stand out as a resource for a permanent mission dissatisfied with instructions issued by the foreign ministry. Thus, in 1975 when permanent representative Olof Rydbeck expressed his dissatisfaction with Nordic coordination, producing a domino effect with Denmark following the European Communities, Norway following Denmark, and Sweden following Norway, he underlined his quest for new instructions by pointing to the parliamentarians on the delegation as having taken “a fairly strong position against Sweden voting Nordic even when our matter-of-fact view does not coincide with that of the other Nordic –––––––––––––– 600 Karlsson 1965: 19–21. Cassel speaks of civil servants as “instructors” (handledare) (1973: 149). 601 Memorandum by Wilhelm Wachtmeister on a conversation with Counsellor of embassy M. Nishimiya, 7 August 1963, FMAS, HP 48 DD, vol. 6.
289 CHAPTER 3 countries”.602 Humorous Christmas poetry, directed to the foreign ministry from permanent representatives in the mid-1970s, points to friendly relations with parliamentarians, but also to an element of debate they brought into the delegation.603 It is indirect, partly with reference to remote or even odd examples that a tension is sometimes perceptible. For example, the memoirs of a civil servant who served as a secretary in the Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs in the second half of the 1940s suggest an abyss between the foreign service and parliamentarians: The first time I got into contact with Swedish parliamentarians was in the Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs. The experience was shocking. The matters dealt with were, throughout, far beyond the horizon of all but a handful. The only one who really understood all items and expressed relevant views was Bertil Ohlin. Had I not been so conscious about the parliamentarians possessing great expertise in other fields and had my democratic conviction not been as firmly rooted, my feeling for the representative system might have been undermined.604 The Advisory Council was the organ for discussing instructions to the UN delegation, and a large portion of Swedish parliamentary delegates sat on this body. The critic quoted above was also a member of the delegation in 1970. Nonetheless, the observation is not directly related to the United Nations and the parliamentary element in diplomacy on the world floor. A more direct, but ambiguous example of tensions stems from a staff member of the permanent mission to the United Nations. In early 1953 he sent the home office a newspaper article titled “If Ivory Coast Voters Ate Senator They’re Entitled to Pick a New One: But Bones Found in His Precinct Cannot Be Identified, So Paris Is Unable to Rule that Long-Lost African Legislator Is Dead”. The accompanying commentary went as follows: Is a voter entitled to eat up his riksdagsman and then demand new election, is a question, which can rise for the United Nations. The problem in point, described in the enclosed clipping from New York Times, has not been considered ripe for comment by the mission before our riksdagsdelegater have had a chance to give their opinion.605
–––––––––––––– 602 Cable by Rydbeck to the foreign ministry, 27 October 1975, FMAS, HP 48 D, vol. 140. 603 E.g. cable by Rydbeck to the foreign ministry, 17 December 1974, FMAS, HP 48 DD, vol. 16; cable by Permanent Representative Anders Thunborg to the foreign ministry, 20 December 1977, ibid., vol. 20. 604 Lennart Petri. Sverige i stora världen: Minnen & reflexioner från 40 års diplomattjänst. Stockholm: Atlantis, 1996. 173. 605 Letter by First Secretary of Legation G ran von Otter to Head of Division Claes Carbonnier, 6 February 1953, FMAS, HP 48 A, vol. 15; The article is a clipping from the (continued)
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In reality, there was no reference in the article to the United Nations, nor was there anything that required comment. Evidently, whether the coupling of the content of the article with the United Nations and the Swedish parliamentary delegates in the mind of the letter writer was merely an expression of sublime humour, or also revealing in a Freudian sense, is a question that cannot be answered here. However, permanent representative Sven Grafstr m, who did not mince words in his diary, offers but a few modestly critical remarks on the perspiration and lack of judgement of individual parliamentarians. Only once did he distinguish parliamentarians as a particular group, writing about “this year’s parliamentary delegates (first seating)”.606 It did not make much sense to contrast them with the other categories of delegates when the main body of the delegation consisted of parliamentarians. According to a newspaper article, Grafstr m’s successor in the period 1964 to 1970, Sverker Åstr m, in “candid moments” agreed with the view of liberal legislators that parliamentary delegation to the United Nations was a “feel-good assignment [trivseluppdrag], in practice altogether meaningless”.607 Åstr m reacted with alarm when he learned about the imputation and asked the heads of the foreign ministry’s political and press divisions to show a cable to the foreign minister, in which he maintained that, to his knowledge, he did not know the author, had never spoken to him and evidently did “not hold such a stupid opinion as the participation of parliamentarians being meaningless, etc.”608 Despite some nuances of his statement, like the negative wording and the laconic “etc.”, there is evidence that it was not merely an expression of the political correctness owned by the “foreign ministry’s ‘wonder boy’” and guardian of the doctrine of neutrality, but that he had a sense for the genuine role of parliamentarians.609 Already at the first General Assembly session he attended as a permanent representative, Åstr m suggested the foreign ministry send political delegates. The issue arose due to the circumstances of the
–––––––––––––– New York Times (4 February 1953) and concerns the fate of the French Senator and former witch doctor Victor Biaka-Boda. 606 E.g. Grafstr m 1989: 893, 905, 966, 1009 (quote). 607 Lars-G. Holmstr m [Insider column on the liberal party]. Aftonbladet (12 February 1970), here as quoted in a cable by Lars Gyllenhaal, press department of the foreign ministry to Åstr m, 13 February 1970, FMAS, HP 48 DD, vol. 11. 608 Cable Åstr m to Wilhelm Wachtmeister and Sten Sundfeldt, 16 February 1970, FMAS, HP 48 DD, vol. 11. 609 M ller 1983: 264. Emphasised phrase English language in the source. Cf. the booklet, published in several languages: Sverker Åstr m. Sweden’s Policy of Neutrality. Stockholm: Swedish Institute, 1977.
291 CHAPTER 3 nineteenth session, with the financial crisis of the United Nations frustrating ordinary routines. Even though Åstr m considered the presence of political representatives in December 1964 as unnecessary, he proposed the idea be considered in order to enable them to “fill their role as political observers”. He also pointed out that political delegates from Denmark and Norway had already arrived and that “for reasons of coverage and comity one should have some delegate occupying the Swedish seat during the general debate”.610 Whether the designated parliamentary delegates from Sweden realised the emptiness of the role intended for them by Åstr m or not, it was decided at a delegation meeting in Stockholm they would not travel to New York at this stage.611 Another instance in which Åstr m suggested the inclusion of politicians in the Swedish delegation was the fifth special session on South West Africa and for peace-keeping in spring 1967. This time he proposed a departure from the tradition of letting the permanent mission alone manage special sessions and emergency special sessions, instead engaging “a somewhat larger delegation, maybe even with a parliamentary element”. His argument was that the agenda concerned two issues that Swedish public opinion had been particularly engaged in.612 Even this time, Åstr m’s quest for political delegates failed. Foreign Minister Nilsson did not expect satisfying results at the extra session, and therefore did not want to stoke up expectations through an “extraordinary representation”.613 Åstr m’s communication later that year highlighted developments of delegation practises in the light of the increasing presence of senior officials from the foreign ministry in the 1960s. At the same time it also accentuated his vision of the political mandate within the delegation. Reacting to conservative delegate Ivar Virgin’s wish, upon his second term as a delegate, to be registered in one of the interesting political committees, Åstr m sent the following cable to the foreign ministry: I tend to believe that Virgin himself will be just as content being registered as usual in only one of the technical committees and not having to be that in one of the political ones, too. In conformity with many of the new delegates, he sees his main task as an observer and, as such, follows the work with those questions he is particularly interested in the political committees, but without outwardly wanting to appear a government representative.
–––––––––––––– 610 Cable by Åstr m to the foreign ministry, 1 December 1964, FMAS, HP 48 DD, vol. 7. 611 Cable by the foreign ministry to the embassies in the Nordic countries, 2 December 1964, FMAS, HP 48 DD, vol. 7. 612 Letter by Åstr m to the Head of the Political Division Richard Hichens-Bergstr m, 17 January 1967, FMAS, HP 48 DD, vol. 8. 613 Letter by Hichens-Bergstr m to Åstr m, 17 February 1967, FMAS, HP 48 DD, vol. 8.
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At the same time, the other parliamentary delegates might of course begin to wonder about one of them being placed in one of the political committees, usually reserved for civil servants or representatives of the government party. Under these circumstances I wonder whether it would not be most natural that you had a talk with Virgin, telling him that even this year we intended to apply the “traditional” division of the parties in regard to the committees, thus implying the conservatives are again placed in the fifth committee, accordingly. This would obviously not imply any obligation to actually sit through these technical questions, rather we presume that, like last year, he feels absolutely free to follow the more important political issues that he is particularly interested in. It would surprise me a lot if Virgin were not completely content with such an answer. I consider it almost out of question that he himself would advance the idea of active participation in one of the political committees.614 This was an outline for a modernised understanding of parliamentary delegates’ roles at the General Assembly, enhancing their freedom of movement – at the expense of integration into the actual work of the delegation. The answer cabled to Åstr m by the foreign ministry was held in telegram style: “We d’accord your reasoning concerning Virgin”.615 A document by Åstr m’s successor as a permanent representative, Olof Rydbeck, shows that the foreign ministry tried to organise the delegation in a way that would enable parliamentarians to become freer agents, that Virgin was not a singular case, but also that there was not a clear policy at the time, leaving the implications of parliamentary delegation open to negotiation. Thus, in his suggestion on committee assignments for 1971, Rydbeck paid tribute to the wish expressed by parliamentarians in the previous year, to acquaint themselves with the work of all committees. The innovation suggested and approved by the foreign ministry was to register at least one civil servant in the status category of ‘representatives’ in each committee in order to avoid that parliamentarians felt “locked to the committee in question”.616 In addition to the incipient detachment from the practical work of the delegation there was another price to be paid for the application of Åstr m’s ideas, namely, the acceptance of a gap between informal practises and formal procedures. When the Swedish delegation to the General
–––––––––––––– 614 Cable by Åstr m to the foreign ministry, 11 September 1967, FMAS, HP 48 DD, vol. 9. 615 Cable by the foreign ministry to the permanent mission, 14 September 1967, FMAS, HP 48 DD, vol. 9. The emphasis signifies French language in the source. 616 Cable by Rydbeck to the foreign ministry, 13 September 1971, FMAS, HP 48 DD, vol. 12. The only exception among the committees with no civil servant registered was the fourth committee, in which Brita Skottsberg-Åhman was a functional equivalent to a civil servant. Cf. the reply by First Secretary Jan Romare to Rydbeck, 15 September 1971, ibid.
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Assembly’s sixth special session on raw materials and development was appointed in April 1974, party representatives were included in the delegation to this type of session for the first time – as ‘alternate representatives’.617 Yet, when the foreign ministry cabled the composition of the delegation to the permanent mission, the party representatives were listed as “observers”.618 The degradation was not an accident. A few days after the incident, the head of the United Nations office in the foreign ministry, Örjan Berner, informed Åstr m, by then under-secretary of state: The question has come up as to how the representatives of the political parties should be registered at the special session. It is to be noted that one of them, Birger M ller, is not a member of parliament and that the representatives of the agrarian party and the social democrats are younger = new members of parliament. Probably none of them will be present in New York for the whole session. I find it most natural to register them in the delegation as observers, not as alternate representatives. The character of the assembly is a particular argument for such an order.619 In his reply, Åstr m agreed with the idea on objective grounds, but was apprehensive of the “political overtones” such a discussion might carry. For this reason, he preferred not to change the status of political delegates at that time. However, he suggested it would be something completely different to “possibly” proceed to an order according to which parliamentarians would be registered as observers even at regular sessions, something that could be discussed “later on”. He reported that the foreign minister had read his above remarks without comment.620
Disintegration of parliamentarians, 1971–1975 and beyond After Torsten Nilsson’s resignation on 1 July 1971, two other foreign ministers took office before the national elections in autumn 1976 ended a period of forty years of social democratic rule. These foreign ministers were Krister Wickman and, from 3 November 1973, Sven Andersson. While Olof Palme, Prime Minister since 14 October 1969, was known for his controversial and profiled interest in international relations, he did not get directly involved with the delegation, apart from attending the twenty- fifth anniversary session and the thirtieth session of the General Assembly.
–––––––––––––– 617 Decree on the composition of the delegation by the foreign minister, 5 April 1974, FMAS, HP 48 DD, vol. 15. 618 Cable by first secretary Hans von Knorring to the permanent mission, 5 April 1974, FMAS, HP 48 DD, vol. 15. 619 Cable of 8 April 1974, FMAS, HP 48 DD, vol. 15. Birger M ller was a MP, 1971–1973. 620 Cable by Åstr m to Berner, 9 April 1974, FMAS, HP 48 DD, vol. 15.
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The trends notable from the previous period continued for the Swedish delegation in these years, and stable features largely remained so. Only a first look at the development of the size and the composition of the delegation gives a diffuse impression. Most of this effect disappears once one takes into account that the delegation of autumn 1972 had a special profile due to Sweden’s hosting of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment. Only for this reason did the size of the Swedish delegation peak with 41 members at the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly, among them a civil servant representing the Ministry of Trade and two representing the Ministry of Agriculture. In the period 1971 to 1975, it was only in the last year that an equal number of delegates were sent to New York, and even then the peak was caused by an artificial effect, with a larger number of social democratic legislators being sent for reduced visiting periods. Since the 1960s all party representatives have been members of parliament, practically without exception.621 The number of Foreign Service officials on the delegation increased slightly in the period 1971 to 1975: from 19 in 1970 to 23 in 1974 (by 2000 this number had further increased to 102 Foreign Service officials).622 Despite the continuity, one change did take place. The early 1970s witnessed a widespread drop in General Assembly attendance among individual parliamentarians. The average parliamentary delegate participating in the twenty-fifth session (1970) attended his eighth session (the average number of sessions was at 7.8 – an all-time high). By 1974, this figure had dropped to 1.4 sessions, the lowest rate of seniority of any session after 1947. The radical decline in experience of parliamentary delegates to the General Assembly was first of a number of indicators pointing to a decreased integration of parliamentarians in the Swedish delegation. The figures for the single parties suggest this change was more than generational in scope. Thus, by bundling the figures in relation to the tenures of foreign ministers, the average number of delegation assignments for members of the agrarian party dropped from 15.1 assignments in the period 1962–1970 to 4.5 assignments in the period 1971–1973, dipping yet further to 1.3 in 1974 and 1975. General Assembly experience among social democrats dropped slightly from an average of 4.1 sessions in the period 1962–1970 to 4.0 in the years 1971–1973, but fell further, to 1.5 sessions, in 1974 and 1975. For conservative parliamentarians the drop was –––––––––––––– 621 Apart from social democrat Valter Åman in 1962 the exception was the green spokeswoman Lotta Nilsson Hedstr m in 2000. 622 This number was particularly high due to the Swedish EU presidency that year; in 2006 the number of foreign service officials on the delegation had been 69.
295 CHAPTER 3 from 2.3 sessions for the period 1962–1970 to 1.5 sessions in the period 1971–1973, and to 1.3 in 1974 and 1975. The exception to this tendency was found in the attendance of the liberal party, which increased its average experience from 3.3 attended sessions 1962–1970 to 4.0 in the period 1971–1973, followed by a slight drop to 3.5 in 1974 and 1975. While the overall development was dramatic at the time, a look at the delegation lists of subsequent years gives the impression that continuity was eventually resumed in the second half of the 1970s before passing into a second phase of sharp decline in the 1990s. While this might be interpreted as an indicator for the re-integration of parliamentarians in the late 1970s and 1980s, it is difficult to make an overall assessment, as other disintegrating forces were also at work. In regard to the designation of parliamentary delegates, an element of enhanced transparency was introduced in the early 1970s, with names of candidates submitted in writing. The request sent by the head of the United Nations office in the foreign ministry asked for two parliamentary representatives but was not directed to the party group in parliament. Instead it was sent to the secretaries of the various parties’ main organisations. Answers were often given by telephone.623 Whereas the request was only sent to the opposition parties under Wickman, the circle of recipients was widened to include the social democrats under Andersson. Nonetheless, in 1974, the appointment process of the party remained obscure. The secretary of the social democratic party group in the Riksdag informed the foreign ministry that “one” wished (man nskar) to appoint two specified nominees.624 However, no decision is on record in the minutes of the party group (which did not even meet in the relevant period) or in that of the party group’s board.625 However, in 1975 the board gave the following account of the nomination of delegates to the General Assembly: “The working group suggested, after consultation with the foreign minister […] The board decided in accordance with the suggestion.”626 The actual decision was unusual and suggests that the board’s working group had a say in the consultation with Andersson. Because the thirtieth session of the General Assembly followed closely upon the seventh special session, this time the foreign ministry had simultaneously
–––––––––––––– 623 See FMAS, HP 48 DD, vol. 13–16. 624 Memorandum, 5 September 1974, FMAS, HP 48 DD, vol. 16. The request was sent to party secretary Sten Andersson, but that the reply came from the party group’s secretary Carin Beckius. 625 See LMAS, SDPG, A 2, vol. 17 & A 1 A, vol. 7. 626 Minutes of 28 May 1975, LMAS, SDPG, A 1 A, vol. 7.
296 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS requested nominations for both sessions. It had asked for two or three delegates, depending on whether the parties wished to let one and the same delegate cover both the seventh special session and the first part of the thirtieth session.627 What the social democrats did was let a delegate cover the special session and the first part of the regular session, but also kept this first part short and appointed three more rotating delegates for the remaining part of the General Assembly. In her letter to the foreign ministry, the party group’s secretary forestalled unwelcome questions by underlining that the Foreign Minister had been involved in the nomination.628 In effect, the number of social democratic delegates doubled in comparison to previous years and to other parties – although at any given point in time there was only one representative present for each party. This exclusive type of representation was altered at the following session in 1976, which the social democrats divided into three shifts. The first shift was on duty after the electoral success of the opposition, but before the resignation of the government. It was attended by one social democratic legislator. For both the second and third shifts, after the centre– right government had assumed power, three social democratic legislators were appointed.629 Thus, for the first time since the mid-1950s an element of proportionalism was introduced by raising the number of social democratic legislators in the delegation to mirror the party’s strength in parliament. This was an adaptation of the model to a situation in which a large opposition party faced a government of several comparatively small parties. Once introduced, the feature was not revised when the social democrats came back to government in autumn 1982. Proportional representation was further strengthened in 1989 by granting representation to all parties represented in parliament, that is giving the communists and the greens a seat on the delegation; in 1991 by adjusting the number of representatives; and in 1994 by establishing proportionalism as the guiding principle for the allocation of parliamentary seats on the delegation. In recent times, proportionalism has been weakened, but this is mainly an effect of the reduction of the overall number of parliamentary representatives from 20 to 10–12 since the year 2002. The downsizing of the parliamentary part of the delegation in that year was a consequence of the suggestion from within the foreign ministry to let the Riksdag, not the
–––––––––––––– 627 Copy of letter by Örjan Berner to Sten Andersson, 16 May 1975, FMAS, HP 48 DD, vol. 16. 628 Letter by Carin Beckius to Örjan Berner, 28 May 1975, FMAS, HP 48 DD, vol. 16; cf. minutes of the social democratic party group’s board of 28 May 1975, LMAS, SDPG, A 1 A, vol. 7. 629 Memorandum by Lars-Olof Lindgren, 4 November 1976, FMAS, HP 48 DD, vol. 19.
297 CHAPTER 3 ministry, account for the travel expenses of parliamentarians participating in the delegation. According to the then head of the foreign ministry’s department of global security, Hans Lundborg, his reason for launching the initiative was “only to save my budget”.630 Parliament rejected the change of the funding model at the time, but the matter was taken up by a commission on the working methods of the Riksdag in connection with a discussion of inter-parliamentary activities. In its final report, in the spirit of new public management, the commission suggested the Riksdag might take responsibility for members’ costs in government delegations and consultations to be held between government and parliament administration on the matter. 631 In 2006 the funding of parliamentarians’ travel expenses and requesting party group nominations was moved from the foreign ministry to the administration of the Riksdag – a significant detachment from the rest of the delegation. As no conflicts or attempts to influence the choice of parties have become known since the days of Foreign Minister Undén, it seems doubtful whether the increase in autonomy bears any practical relevance, as has been suggested in this connection.632 There are other indicators pointing to the disintegration of parliamentary delegates in Swedish delegations since the early 1970s, too. Increasingly proportional representation is among these, because it implied the replacement of the functional representation of respectable political parties and strands of thought within the delegation by a self-referred and pre-consensual parliamentary arithmetic. Earlier, the logic of political balance within the delegation had been perceived in an integrated way, that is a few social democratic legislators plus cabinet members and civil servants and others outbalanced numerous parliamentarians from the opposition. The situation was ambiguous in the years 1976 to 1982, when the social democrats were in opposition. However, their return to government, which was not accompanied by a readjustment of the number of their representatives on the delegation, makes clear that the matter of political balance had become a question of plain governmental delegates on the one hand and an internally balanced body of parliamentary delegates on the other hand. Proportional representation of various opinions suggests a de-coupling from delegation routines and not a strengthening of the positions of the segments represented.
–––––––––––––– 630 Personal communication. 631 Riksdagen i en ny tid: Huvudbetänkande av 2002 års riksdagskommitté. Stockholm: Riksdagen, 2005. 8, 84–85. 632 Cf. personal communication with Lars Starell, International Department of the Swedish Parliament.
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Another aspect that points to less involvement of parliamentary delegates is the conversion from the traditional model of two shifts to an order with three or more shifts, or an otherwise smaller presence of individual parliamentarians on the delegation from 1975 onwards. This change reduced possibilities to deeper involvement in the delegation and increased affinity to an observer status. The social democrats chose to have four shifts in 1975 and three shifts from 1976; the centre–right parties adopted the three-shift model in 1981. The fact that two models of organising the representation of parliamentary parties existed alongside each other in the period 1975 to 1980 indicates the detachment characteristic of the parliamentary delegation members. At the same time, the new system reduced the delegation assignment length from five or six weeks to four weeks.633 By the mid-1990s, parliamentarians’ visits had been cut to three weeks, and today are organised in two shifts of ten days each.634 Thus, the idea of letting parliamentary delegates cover the session has been abandoned. Moreover, in recent times the status of parliamentarians on the delegation has also diminished. In 1997, the category ‘special advisers’, not foreseen in the rules of procedure of the General Assembly but used for some civil servants the previous year, was now exclusively reserved for parliamentarians. The official category ‘alternate representatives’ was also exclusively staffed by parliamentarians, and two legislators were ranked among the ‘representatives’.635 This addition was an adjustment to the rule that delegations of member states should consist of no more than five representatives and five alternate representatives; the rule had earlier been evaded by employing a footnote that presented a complex replacement order. All three categories within the internal Swedish appointment hierarchy, including ‘special advisers’, continued to be bunched together under the heading ‘representatives and alternate representatives’ (ombud och ersättare f r ombud).636 However, by 1999, the formal internal order was adjusted, and those parliamentarians presented as ‘special advisers’ for United Nations purposes were also appointed in the new category “särskilda rådgivare” in the Swedish context.637 Since 2002, the year of the discussions on financial liability and reduction of the number of parliamentary delegates, the category ‘special
–––––––––––––– 633 Cf. M ller 1983: 250. 634 Interview with social democratic parliamentary delegate 1996 and 2006, Sonia Karlsson. 635 Provisional List of Delegations to the Fifty-second Session of the General Assembly. ST/SG/SER.C/L.601. New York: United Nations, 1999. 103. 636 F renta nationernas generalf rsamlings ordinarie m te 52 (1997): 226. 637 F renta nationernas generalf rsamlings ordinarie m te 54 (1999): 61.
299 CHAPTER 3 advisers’ has evolved (in both domestic and international contexts) into a position congruent with the group of parliamentary members of the delegation, thereby clearly singling out this group for the first time.638 The degradation effect was made less obvious by leaving vacant the positions of ‘representatives’ and ‘alternate representatives’. No concurrent upgrade of civil servants was made. The category ‘special advisers’ was always placed above the categories used for practically all civil servants, namely, ‘senior advisers’ and ‘advisers’. According to Hans Lundborg, the parliamen- tarians’ re-categorisation was accompanied by a redefinition of their role from participating to observing members of the delegation, and at the same time they were made subject to a particular instruction programme on United Nations issues. As maintained by Lundborg, the reason for the change was Sweden’s participation in the European Union’s continuous coordination in New York, which did not leave space for parliamentarians.639 This deserves to be taken with a grain of salt: Given the ever increasing observer-like role for parliamentarians on the delegation since the 1970s, the European Union, a well-known scapegoat – if it had any effect at all – would most appropriately have to be seen as the catalyst uncovering the mature life-lies of the Swedish delegation practice. A new peak of the ‘disintegration’ of parliamentarians on Swedish UN delegations was reached at the sixty-fourth session of the General Assembly in 2009. Due to the extra work load occasioned by the Swedish presidency of the European Union, the Swedish foreign ministry asked parliament not to send legislators to that session. Thus, no parliamentarians were included in the Swedish delegation for the first time since 1946.640 The foreign ministry was unaware of a Finnish precedence for not sending political delegates to the United Nations while holding the EU-presidency. In Sweden the visit of the parliamentarians was postponed until early 2010, at which time they followed the work of the United Nations Commission for Social Development and the Commission on Status of Women. The acting head of the International Department of the Swedish Riksdag, Åsa Ekwall, maintained that the practice of inviting parliamentarians (as paying guests) to join government delegations to a wide variety of United Nations conferences has gained ground in recent years both as a result of the
–––––––––––––– 638 List of Delegations to the Fifty-seventh Session of the General Assembly. ST/SG/SER.C/L.597. New York: United Nations, 2002. 114. 639 Personal communication. 640 It was maintained that this was an exception both by the head of section in the foreign ministry, Anders Wallberg, and the acting head of the International Department of the Swedish Riksdag, Åsa Ekwall, personal communication.
300 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS government’s inclusiveness and the interest of parliamentarians in international affairs.641
BETWEEN LILLIPUTIAN AND FULL-SCALE REPRESENTATION: ICELAND With a total population of about 133,000, less than half of that of Luxemburg (the least among the founders), Iceland was the smallest member state of the United Nations when she entered the world organisation in November 1946, two years after having declared independence from Denmark. While numerous micro-states have since been admitted and while the population figure of Iceland has approached the 300,000 individuals mark by the beginning of the twenty-first century, limitations in human and financial resources have regularly left their imprint on Iceland’s participation in the work of the United Nations. The size and composition of Icelandic delegations to the General Assembly has been object to a comparatively high degree of fluctuation over time.642 At the time the first delegation was composed, a marked polarisation among and within political parties disturbed Iceland’s polity.643 The so-called Keflavík Agreement, which had been negotiated with the United States and been sanctioned by a parliamentary vote on 19 September 1946, foresaw the withdrawal of all remaining military forces from Iceland, but also the continued presence of United States personnel at Keflavík airport in connection with US obligations to maintain a control regime in Germany.644 The affirmative vote caused the Socialist Party to leave the cabinet on 10 October and cast the country in a crisis of government, which was only resolved 4 February the following year, when the agrarian Progressive Party entered the cabinet.645 While the government aspired to send an all-party delegation to the second part of the first session of the General Assembly, this plan was frustrated by the socialists, who refused to participate on grounds that no consensus had been reached on a veto right for single members of the delegation. They claimed this demand justified in view of the delegates
–––––––––––––– 641 Personal communication. 642 An overview of the material conditions of the foreign service of Iceland is given by Páll Ásgeir Tryggvason. “Nordens minste og yngste utenrikstjeneste.” Fra Diplomatiets Verden. Ingegerd Galtung and Alf R. Bjercke (eds). Oslo: Atheneum, 1983. 77–80. 643 Elfar Loftsson. “Den f rställda hotbilden: Island under det kalla kriget.” Den kolde krig og de nordiske lande: Rapporter til den XIX nordiske historikerkongres, vol. 2. Erling Ladewig Petersen (ed.). Odense: Universitetsforlag, 1984. 41–54, at 47–48. 644 Elfar Loftsson. Island i NATO: Partierna och f rsvarsfrågan. G teborg: F rfattares Bokmaskin, 1981. 84, 140. 645 Handb k Al ingis 1999. Reykjavík: Skrifstofa Al ingis, 2000. 241–242.
301 CHAPTER 3 designated by the conservatives and social democrats being particularly notorious as “agents for the United States”. According to a Danish observer, this confrontational course was to be seen as a move in the domestic bargaining game in connection with the crisis of government.646 At the same time, there were speculations that the hurry to get the delegation off the ground before the vote on admission of Iceland had actually been taken by the General Assembly found its explanation in the desire to be excused from including a ‘communist’.647 Despite the absence of a socialist member, the first Icelandic delegation to the General Assembly had the character of a representative and high-ranking expedition. Thor Thors, the minister to Washington and brother of the Prime Minister, served as chairman, being accompanied by Finnur J nsson, social democratic minister of justice and social affairs, Bjarni Benediktsson, conservative mayor of Reykjavík and chairman of the parliamentary foreign relations committee, and Ólafur J hannesson, legal adviser to the cooperative union and member of the agrarian party. Thus, an important parliamentarian was included, in addition to a member of parliament who served in the capacity of a member of government as well as a non-legislator representing the agrarian opposition.648 By composing the delegation in this way, the Icelandic government complied with the multipartite Scandinavian model at its entry-session – while, for once, simultaneously admitted Sweden choose a purely governmental approach. The broadly representative Icelandic quartet can be contrasted with the unpretentious three-man delegation, which Sweden commissioned to attend the welcome ceremony and to undertake the first steps in New York. Diplomat Thor Thors, who had been a conservative member of parliament in the 1930s and who was appointed as the permanent Icelandic representative to the United Nations on 2 August 1947 in addition to his duty in Washington, remained the fulcrum of Icelandic delegations to the General Assembly until his death in 1965. He even served as principal chairman of delegation in but one instance, in which Icelandic foreign ministers attended the session. During his tenure, the permanent Icelandic mission to the United Nations had its address at the embassy in –––––––––––––– 646 Letter by Carl A. C. Brun, Danish Legation to Reykjavík, to Foreign Minister Gustav Rasmussen, 15 November 1946, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.E.7. 647 Cable of Herman Eriksson, Swedish Minister to Washington, to Foreign Ministry on speculations in the State Department, 7 November 1946, NAS, FM, FS 1920, HP 48, vol. 1783. 648 General Assembly, Plenary Meetings 1 (1946) 2: xxviii; cf. Letter by Carl A. C. Brun, Danish Legation to Reykjavík, to Foreign Minister Gustav Rasmussen, 15 November 1946, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.E.7; letter by Otto Johansson, Swedish Minister to Reykjavík, to Foreign Minister Östen Undén, 7 November 1946, NAS, FM, FS 1920, HP 48, vol. 1783.
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Washington, D.C., and was confined to only one member of staff, namely, Mr. Thors, thereby being the smallest permanent mission of all.649 He is said to have always been on the run, from one meeting to another, thereby aquiring the nickname “The flying Icelander”. As the story continues, “people had to take care that they would not be in his way in the corridors, especially near corners”.650 The appointment of his successor, Hannes Kjartansson, the consul general in New York, moved the mission closer to the East River. Ever since have the consulate general and the permanent mission shared facilities. By 1966, Kjartansson was also granted a deputy permanent representative.651 Thors’ tenure coincides largely with the period of capricious composition of Icelandic delegations to the General Assembly, which came to a conclusion with a more consistent adoption of the Scandinavian model in 1967. While looking almost identically composed as the initiation deputation at the first glance, the delegations to the second and third session differed in one respect: Now the agrarians formed part of the government coalition and, thus, the recurrence of sending a conservative, a social democratic and an agrarian politician to New York obscures the different character of the delegation in view of the government–opposition divide. Nonetheless, the first three delegations share the character of high-ranking political delegations. The second and the third delegation were staffed almost identically. Thor Thors as chairman was accompanied by his brother Ólafur Thors, multiple conservative prime minister and at that time chairman of the foreign relations committee of the Al ingi, by social democratic legislator Ásgeir Ásgeirsson, a former prime minister who was to become the President of Iceland, and by another multiple prime minister, the agrarian member of parliament Hermann J nasson. In addition, at the third session Finnur J nsson, social democratic parliamentarian and returnee from the first delegation, served as a replacer for Ásgeirsson.652 In the domestic debate, the comparatively sumptuous Icelandic representation at the early sessions of the General Assembly met with criticism and led to a radical trimming of the delegation. Thus, despite the fact that even four delegates hardly sufficed to crew all committees, only two representatives were sent to the fourth session in 1949: permanent
–––––––––––––– 649 Cf. Thorsteinsson 1992 I: 321, II: 660; Permanent Missions to the United Nations (1964) 171: 63; in a comparative perspective: Pedersen 1961: 256. 650 J n Ögmundur Þorm sson, personal communication. 651 Thorsteinsson 1992 II: 666. 652 General Assembly, Plenary Meetings 2 (1947): xxviii; General Assembly, Plenary Meetings 3 (1948) 1: xxvii.
303 CHAPTER 3 representative Thors, accompanied by the foreign ministry’s adviser in international law, Hans G. Andersen.653 At the three following sessions, Iceland continued to let two civil servants take care of the country’s representation at the General Assembly. Until the return in 1967 to the principle of broad political representation, periods of reliance on non- political delegations continued to alternate with periods, in which politicians belonging to parties in government were included in the delegation. These were often parliamentarians appointed on the request of the party groups.654 The exception to the rule is Þ rarinn Þ rarinsson, editor of the newspaper Tíminn and agrarian legislator from 1959, who became an annually returning delegation routinier in the years 1954 to 1958, serving even in sessions without any other political appointee, and returning to the delegation in 1960, despite the fact that the agrarian party was in opposition at that time. His service in a number of subsequent sessions belongs to a period when an order with all-party representation was observed.655 From 1953 to 1956/1957, the number of delegates was raised to five to eight including two or three politicians belonging to parties in charge of the government, some of them with a parliamentary background. This period started with a critique by the socialist and social democratic opposition of the “very free hand in connection with voting” given to political appointees, in consequence of an Icelandic vote on the issue of Tunis deviating from an agreed on common Nordic position.656 According to the socialist press, the latitude given to delegates was exploited by the United States, and a parliamentary question posed in the Al ingi by the social democrats highlights the anti-colonial resentments in the young republic. The parliamentary discussion raises the question whether the autonomy of political delegates was used as a pretext by Prime Minister Ólafur Thors in order to take the heat of his brother, the permanent representative to the United Nations.657
–––––––––––––– 653 Letters by Torgeir Anderssen-Rysst, minister in Reykjavík, to Norwegian foreign ministry, 7 & 15 September 1949, NAO, FM 1940–49, 30.1/15; cf. General Assembly, Plenary Meetings 4 (1949): xv. 654 Thorsteinsson 1992 II: 669. 655 A letter by Torgeir Anderssen-Rysst, Norwegian minister to Reykjavík, to the foreign ministry, 16 September 1954, who fails to mention Þ rarinsson among the political delegates also indicates that he did not participate in a partisan capacity, NAO, FM 1950– 59, 26.5/20. However, in the late 1960s and 1970s he participated in delegations as agrarian representative. 656 Quote taken from “Oracle concerning Tunis”, translation of an article published in the socialist newspaper Þj viljinn, 13 November 1953, FMAS, HP 48 D, vol. 41. 657 Cf. letter by Leif Öhrvall, Swedish charge d’affairs in Reykjavík, to Foreign Minister Undén, 28 October 1953, FMAS, HP 48 D, vol. 41.
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The period expired with the eleventh session of the General Assembly, when the newspaper headline “Communist delegate for Iceland in the UN. – A decision, which is a national disgrace” discredited the idea of political delegates. At a time when the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian uprising evoked bitterness and eventually a revision of the government’s programme of expelling foreign troops from Iceland, the call of the socialist/communist People’s Alliance coalition partner for representation in the delegation had initially been turned down by the foreign minister. However, the party eventually managed to get a first time delegation assignment, which was executed by Finnbogi R tur Valdimarsson, the party’s foreign policy expert.658 After this incident, the tripartite agrarian–social democratic– socialist government reduced the number of delegates to four to five and abandoned the practice of including political appointees among them. A conservative parliamentarian was sent to the General Assembly only when a change of government took place on 20 November 1959, the date of inauguration of a conservative–social democratic coalition which was to last for almost twelve years. Even at the following three sessions this government included legislators in the delegation, which in this period was limited to five to six members. In 1963, the legislators to complete the by then well-established delegation trio of Thor Thors, the Cultural Counsellor Kristján Albertsson and the Consul General Hannes Kjartansson were replaced by two Supreme Court associates and by another “Judge”, the writer Þ r Vilhjálmsson. At the following session, the number of delegates was reduced to four, but this is to be seen in connection with the nineteenth General Assembly’s failure to come off due to the then quarrels about United Nations finances. The tenure of Hannes Kjartansson as permanent representative in 1965 began, again, with a delegation of five, but now two political appointees were included. A deputy permanent representative was installed in 1966. Moreover, in that year the number of delegates was doubled to ten, although some alteration took place between those members. Furthermore, from this year, almost every session of the General Assembly has been attended by an Icelandic foreign minister.659 In 1967, the Scandinavian model was adopted, with appointees from all major parties, including the
–––––––––––––– 658 Letter by Torgeir Anderssen-Rysst, Norwegian minister to Reykjavík, to foreign ministry, 4 February 1957, which in Norwegian translation quotes an article published in the conservative newspaper Morgunbla i , 3 February 1957, NAO, FM 1950–59, 26.5/61. 659 This applies for the period 1966 to 1975, with the exeption of 1968. Later years have been randomly checked and usually included a foreign minister. Earlier years of foreign minister attendance are 1954, 1955, 1957, 1958 and 1962.
305 CHAPTER 3 leftist People’s Alliance with a backing of roughly one fifth of the electorate. The session was split in two tranches of three to four weeks for the party appointees, raising the total number of delegates to twelve.660 At the same time, the practice introduced in Denmark in 1967, namely, to neatly gather political delegates in the General Assembly procedural category of ‘alternate representatives’, was simultaneously adopted in Iceland. The difference was that the Icelanders did not proceed in an equally consistent manner. They had also a comparatively large share of non-legislators, roughly speaking 50 per cent, among their political appointees in the late 1960s and first half of the 1970s. A letter to the foreign ministry by the Communist delegate Ragnar Arnalds, which is quoted in a semi-official reference work on the Icelandic foreign service, indicates that (some) party representatives might have seen their primary task at the General Assembly in gathering information for their parties. At the same time, it shows, despite explicit disagreement with the official Icelandic policy on a number of points, true appreciation of the “foresight, to grant the opposition parties possibility of participating in the work of the General Assembly”. In the eyes of Arnalds, “this self-evident” if unusual arrangement was “a credit for our country”.661 The fact that formal instructions to the delegations issued by the foreign ministry were introduced as late as 1967 can be seen in the context of overall modernisation of Iceland’s representation at the United Nations at that time. The multipartite approach, which was chosen simultaneously and which included the designation of representatives of opposition parties, was an important incentive for the formalisation of United Nations policy. The 1967 instructions show that much leeway continued to be given to the delegation, but also the necessity to underline discipline: If no common opinion can be reached within the delegation, the delegation has to consult the foreign ministry. It shall be emphasised once again that the Icelandic delegation to the General Assembly of the United Nations participates in the negotiations on authorisation by the foreign minister. Therefore the delegation as a whole as well as the single delegation members have to follow his instructions.662 Already in 1968 the size of the delegation was cut down for financial reasons and, thus, the first tranche of political representatives was subject to cessation.663 However, this was a temporary setback. In the years 1969 to –––––––––––––– 660 Cf. Thorsteinsson 1992 II: 669. 661 Quoted according to Thorsteinsson 1992 II: 670. 662 Thorsteinsson 1992 II: 671–672. 663 Letter of the Danish embassy in Reykjavík to the foreign ministry, 3 October 1968, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.E.7.
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1975, the delegation included an annual total of eleven to eighteen members, with a hard core of about five foreign service officials and usually alternation among two sets of political appointees staying for three to four weeks.664 Except for the presence of one more foreign service official the delegation order as developed in the late 1960s and early 1970s has been maintained.665 However, a significant change occurred in the end of the 1980s, when the foreign ministry discontinued to reimburse the travel expenses of party delegates and also stopped to use them in the work of General Assembly committees. Since that time, the Al ingi has payed for the travels of its members.666 In addition, the increasingly fragmentary documentation of parliamentarians’ participation indicates a decline in status. 1997, and then again 2001, were the last years they have officially been registered as delegation members in United Nations documentation. The last entry of a parliamentarian bothering to document participation in the General Assembly in her parliamentary CV concerns the year 2000.667 Until 2008, annually six members of the Al ingi (that is: ten per cent of its members) attended the General Assembly, being accredited as advisers. Non-legislators are not any longer eligible to represent parliamentary party groups. The parliamentary observers travelled in two groups of three, each group staying two weeks, and attended meetings according to their individual preferences.668 In 2009, the number of participants from the Al ingi has been reduced from six to four. 669 After the announcement of Iceland’s first time candidature to the Security Council for one of the non-permanent seats allocated to the Western European and Other States Group in April 2000, Iceland’s engagement in the United Nations was stepped up, not least by increasing the number of foreign service officials on the delegations to the General Assembly. The delegation of 2005 included fourteen members of the foreign service, among them nine staff members of the permanent mission, in addition to four members of the prime minister’s office as well as both excellencies themselves, Foreign Minister Daví Oddsson and Prime
–––––––––––––– 664 On the length of stay: Thorsteinsson 1992 II: 669. 665 Cf. the official delegation lists to the General Assembly and the CV’s provided by the Al ingi: “Þingmenn í stafr fsr 1875–2009.” Reykjavík: Al ingi, 2009. Available at
307 CHAPTER 3
Minister Halld r Ásgrímsson.670 Then Foreign Minister Ásgrímsson, in a report to the Al ingi on the Icelandic Security Council application in 2003, reminded of the “long tradition of participation by members of parliament in the work of the UN General Assembly” and expressed “the wish of the Foreign Ministry to increase this participation still further in co-operation with the Althing” in order to “give the Althing an opportunity to monitor closely the preparations for the candidacy and, later, Iceland’s work in the Council”. He concluded his speech remarking that “the Althing, as the national legislature, the parliamentary parties and individual members of parliament all have a role to play” in connection with the Icelandic candidacy.671 However, in autumn 2008 Iceland was not chosen as candidate of the Western European and Other States for the term 2009– 2010.
METAMORPHOSIS OR PARLIAMENT LOST: THE FINNISH SONDERWEG Finnish Foreign Minister Ahti Karjalainen once described his country’s inclusion of political representatives from various backgrounds in delegations to the General Assembly as an attempt “to build a sort of democratic bridge between the ‘world parliament’ and parliamentary circles”.672 One of his successors, Keijo Korhonen, referred to this idea as “a certain self deception, fiction or – wish” as the imagery does not see the United Nations as a forum for diplomatic negotiations, but conceives a body representing the people of the world, and an organisation that “could figuratively function as a kind of world parliament, at least in the basic sense of the word parliament (parler = talk)”.673 There has been a persistent ambition in Finland to heave parliamentarians to the stage of the General Assembly. This was a response to the corresponding practice in neighbouring Sweden and the other Nordic countries, but it is also an expression of the significance attached to the Finnish delegation and the world organisation in their own right, as forums for the representation of internal political diversity and outward national unity. There was an independent advantage of multipartite representation,
–––––––––––––– 670 List of Delegations to the Sixtieth Session 2005: 64. As by 13 May 2009, the web-site of the permanent mission of Iceland to the United Nations listed a staff of six persons (excluding the driver). Available at
308 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS too: the inward creation and outward demonstration of national unity transcending everyday political divisions. This constituted moral capital for actors confronted with constraints of unpopular decision making and exterior negotiation partners. The Finnish delegation to the negotiations in Moscow regarding the ‘Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation, and Mutual Assistance’ of 6 April 1948 was composed in a multipartite way for such political reasons.674 In the perception prevalent during the 1950s, the General Assembly was a forum with a high potential for putting the Finnish government face-to-face with embarrassing choices between Western ideals, on the one hand, and the preservation of good neighbourly relations with the Soviet Union, on the other. Therefore, an independent rationale for a multipartite approach existed. At the same time, legislators made only rare appearances in Finnish delegations to the General Assembly in practice, leaving the floor to proxies vaguely related to parliament. In this ambiguous situation, further complicated by the blurred boundaries of executive and legislative sources of power in common delegations, the neologism ‘polegate’ (polegaatti), a contraction of the term ‘political delegate’, eventually emerged as an unofficial metaphor for the peculiarities of Finnish delegation policy.675 However, the concept of ‘Parliament’ kept haunting a largely non- parliamentary practice, subsequently becoming a chiffre for aspirations attached to actors and practises with no parliamentary background of their own. A metamorphosis took place, turning parliamentarians into polegates and polegates into parliamentarians.
Finland encounters the Scandinavian model Swedish examples have remained relevant for political institution-building in Finland after the separation of both countries in 1809.676 From the outset, there were aspirations in Finland to apply the method of parliamentary delegation as established in Sweden and the other Nordic countries. Already when the bill that authorised the Finnish government to apply for
–––––––––––––– 674 Cf. Juho Kusti Paasikivi. Dagb cker 1944–1956, vol. 2: De farliga åren (12.2.1947– 16.2.1950). Helsinki: S derstr m, 1986. 182–183, 186. 675 Both variants “polegaatti” and “poligaatti” exist in the Finnish language, in Swedish language only “polegat” seems to be in use. Whether one speaks of “polegates” or “poligates” makes a certain difference for the sound of the word, with a stronger emphasis on dependend delegation or independend politics respectively. 676 Cf. Jussi Kurunmäki. “The Reception of Political Concepts in the Wake of Finnish Parliamentary Life in the 1860s.” Zeit, Geschichte und Politik – Time, History and Politics: Zum achtzigsten Geburtstag von Reinhart Koselleck. Jussi Kurunmäki and Kari Palonen (eds). Jyväskylä: University, 2003. 291–310.
309 CHAPTER 3 membership in the League of Nations was discussed in the Foreign Affairs Committee in May 1920, a substantial minority suggested parliament participate in the selection of delegates. The majority of the committee settled for the ambiguous stipulation that the government consider the confidence selectees enjoyed in parliament. Most Finnish delegations in the 1920s did include a legislator. This tradition was revived in 1935, coinciding with the development of closer Finnish collaboration with the Scandinavian countries. It seems the inclusion of parliamentarians was conceived as a marker of Nordic identity at that time. As a so-called enemy state of the former wartime coalition, Finland applied for United Nations membership in September 1947. However, controversies stirred among the great powers regarding the admittance of new members, thereby forcing the Finns to wait until the ‘package deal’ in December 1955, which resolved the membership issue.677 Upon Finland’s admittance to the United Nations, it was pointed out in the press that criteria for the composition of the delegation, which had to be appointed by the following session of the General Assembly, were not yet known.678 While press comments and assumptions revealed expectations regarding the participation of politicians, remarks quickly delivered by the foreign ministry left the matter blank: According to the ministry, the composition of the delegation was to be suited to the agenda and the President would decide on nominees put forth by cabinet in line with the practice applied to forming other delegations tasked with international negotiations.679 Some weeks before admission, the Finnish foreign ministry had sent an inquiry to its sister institution in Sweden. Questions included: “How is the Swedish delegation to the General Assembly appointed. How is it composed (chairman, members, experts, secretaries, etc.)?” The Swedish ministry kept to a technical answer and – with the exception of mentioning diplomats – did not go into the possible alternative backgrounds of delegation members.680 The view that the delegation should be composed solely of members of the foreign service had been advanced in the Finnish ministry early on.681 Thus, the decision to include politicians was a political one. The background of the matter is illuminated in the memoirs of former –––––––––––––– 677 See G tz 2008b for the details. 678 “Konsekvenser av invalet.” Hufvudstadsbladet (16 December 1955). 679 “FN-representanter blir ambassad r.” Hufvudstadsbladet (23 December 1955); in regard to press assumptions see: “Storspektakel i FN.” Vasabladet (15 December 1955); “Finland i F renta nationerna.” Jakobstads Tidning (16 December 1955). 680 Memorandum on Swedish administration of United Nations issues, 15 November 1955, FMAH, 113 O, vol. Suomen liittyminen YK:hon. 681 Cf. Valtiopäivät (1957) P ytäkirjat: 2915 (20 December, Johannes Virolainen).
310 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS diplomat Max Jakobson, who suggests that the inclusion of parliamen- tarians of different parties in the delegation to the General Assembly was a move to highlight Finland’s belonging to the Nordic group of countries.682 According to a statement made in 1956 by Foreign Minister Ralf T rngren, Finland’s United Nations policy was “largely to follow her befriended Nordic nations in all matters, in which the interests of the Soviet Union were not – on an opposite line – directly identifiable by Soviet action or otherwise self-evident”.683 The composition of the Finnish delegation was clearly not the business of the powerful neighbour to the East. When appointing the first delegation, T rngren notified the public that “at the designation, in accordance with the other Nordic countries, party representation will partly be observed”.684 Despite this rhetoric, the model chosen for the first Finnish delegation differed in a significant respect from that practised by the Scandinavian countries: It did not formally include any representatives of the opposition. In the remark cited above, T rngren delivered a misleading portrait of the Scandinavian model, suggesting it be characterised by merely a limited form of party representation. Not every tiny parliamentary party in the Scandinavian countries had been granted representation in delegations to the General Assembly. Nevertheless, this fact, with the exclusion of Communist parties as the main consequence, was technically justifiable by stipulating representation in the parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee as the criterion for eligibility. Due to the strength of the People’s Democrats, such a subtle mechanism, implicit in all versions of the Scandinavian model from 1948 onwards, did not work in Finland. The desire to keep Communists out was the main reason for granting only representation to the parties of the government coalition consisting of Social Democrats, Agrarians, and Liberals.685 In addition to the representatives of these parties (denominated as parliamentarians in the delegation list), Nils Meinander of the Swedish People’s Party in Finland was appointed to the delegation in the capacity of “expert”. The delegation list characterised him simply as a professor and
–––––––––––––– 682 Max Jakobson. Den finländska paradoxen: Linjer i Finlands utrikespolitik 1953–1965. Helsinki: Schildt, 1982. 84 683 Quote: Foreign Minister Ralf T rngren in a confidential talk at Finland’s Swedish Press Club on 8 December 1956 according to a letter by Hans Olav, Ambassador in Helsinki, to the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, 12 December 1956, NAO, FM 1950–1959, 26.5/61. 684 “FN-delegationen utses nästa vecka.” Hufvudstadsbladet (12 October 1956). 685 Foreign Minister T rngren confidentially to Hans Olav, Norwegian Ambassador to Helsinki, according to Olav’s letter to his foreign ministry, 23 October 1956, NAO, FM 1950–1959, 26.5/61.
311 CHAPTER 3 ignored the fact that he was also a Member of Parliament.686 Foreign Minister Ralf T rngren, who served as a cabinet member in private capacity, was another prominent legislator of the Swedish People’s Party to figure in the delegation. In a parliamentary discussion, T rngren countered the perception that his party was represented in the delegation by pointing to his capacity as foreign minister on the one hand and Meinander’s role as “adviser, that is to say expert, economic expert” on the other, the auspices under which they had participated in the General Assembly. In reality, the conceptual gliding concerning Meinander’s role, from a legal United Nations term to a term describing the internal function within the Finnish delegation, is not conclusive.687 Some documents produced by the foreign ministry in retrospect listed Meinander as a legislator representing the Swedish People’s Party.688 In effect, apart from the People’s Democrats only the conservative National Coalition Party was excluded from the Finnish delegation of 1956. Comments published in newspapers affiliated with these parties showed that T rngren’s initial announcement on partial party representation had not been comprehended. Prior to the appointment of the delegation, the leftist Ty kansan Sanomat suggested, for obvious reasons and representativeness, high-status delegation assignments be given to the three largest parliamentary groups (to which the People’s Democrats belonged), and lower-status positions be given to smaller parliamentary groups as well as to the required civil servants. The conservative newspaper Uusi Suomi even anticipated the eventual request for a delegation that would reflect parliamentary strength. Against such an approach, Uusi Suomi underlined that national interests were to be valued higher than party interests.689 Once the delegation had been appointed, satisfaction was voiced over the “realistic” choice made, crossing the fear that “the delegation would be completely composed on parliamentary basis, thereby probably relegating expertise to second priority”, and particularly over the exclusion of the People’s Democrats, who were identified with party squabbling.690 Leftist papers took an adverse position. Vapaa Sana deplored the narrow –––––––––––––– 686 Yhdistyneiden kansakuntien yleiskokouksen 11 (1956/1957): 5–6. 687 Valtiopäivät (1956) P ytäkirjat: 1761 (12 December). The term adviser (my italics) is used in the English original, although inflected: adviserina. 688 Letter from Ralph Enckell, Permanent Representative to the United Nations, to Max Jakobson, Head of the Political Division in the Foreign Ministry, 8 June 1962, FMAH, 113 B 1, vol. 34; Memorandum by Enckell, 26 July 1962, ibid. 689 Articles in Ty kansan Sanomat and Uusi Suomi, according to “Hur Finlands delegater i FN skall väljas.” [Press review] Nya Pressen (19 October 1956). 690 “Finland och F renta nationerna: Reflexioner på FN-dagen.” Jakobstads Tidning (24 October 1956).
312 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS governmental approach taken in forming the delegation, and maintained that the ability to pursue a stable foreign policy in the United Nations required a delegation that “in miniature […] represented the Finnish people and their opinions”. The news daily was optimistic that only a matter of time was required to correct the mistake.691 The National Coalition Party criticised the inclusion of other parties’ representatives in the Finnish delegation while generally keeping mum about their own exclusion. Hence, the party used a parliamentary debate to criticise the designation of a “giant delegation” and the supplementing of civil servants from the foreign ministry with political appointees.692 On the other hand, a parliamentary question was directed to the foreign minister, asking why conservative parliamentarians had “completely been set aside in the composition of the delegation”. T rngren’s answer was ambiguous. In acknowledging “the view that parliamentary circles should be represented in the delegation to the highest possible degree”, he pointed to the narrow parliamentary representation in delegations that was practised by many countries, as well as to the necessity of parsimony and expertise, and to the governmental character of the task.693 In a later debate, the foreign minister maintained that only the fixed number of three seats were available for political appointees, and further explained, “Because the UN delegation foremost represents the government and its policy, it is most natural to include representatives of those parties participating in the government in the first place”. The deputy who had posed the question commented on this by observing that the exclusion of the National Coalition Party violated the political principle “that the nature of foreign policy issues is so constituted that domestic points of view should in no way affect them, and the more homogenous we act outwardly the greater the impact”.694
Re-Scandinavianising the adopted model Not only did the partially adopted Scandinavian model give rise to criticism of excluded parties, it was met with reservation in the foreign ministry. In advance of the appointment of the second delegation in 1957, Ralph Enckell, the chief of the ministry’s political division, relaunched the proposal that the delegation be composed solely of experts. However, his
–––––––––––––– 691 Article in Vapaa Sana, according to a letter by G sta Engzell, Ambassador in Helsinki, to Swedish Foreign Minister Östen Undén, 26 October 1956, FMAS, HP 1 Af. 692 Valtiopäivät (1956) P ytäkirjat: 1760, 1762 (12 December, Johannes Wirtanen). 693 Valtiopäivät (1956) P ytäkirjat: 1423 (15 November). 694 Valtiopäivät (1956) P ytäkirjat: 1761 (12 December, Felix Seppälä).
313 CHAPTER 3 attempt prompted Foreign Minister Johannes Virolainen to alarm the parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee that political representation and parliamentary experience were endangered.695 Upon his return from the General Assembly, Virolainen asserted that, from a Finnish horizon, the President could not easily define a conclusive position for New York. Therefore, the chairman of the delegation was the key policy-maker for whom it became “natural to hold confidential discussions with all delegation members”. An implicit suggestion in this connection was that parliamentarians would add an indispensable element of political overview to such discussions.696 This was a view rejected in the foreign service. In his diary, the first permanent representative to the United Nations, Georg Gripenberg, revealed that he considered the majority of the 1957 delegation, “the radicals and politicians” in particular, as “illicitly weak”.697 Given this categorisation, the logical dividing line stood between politicians and civil servants, not between executive and legislative powers, as is sometimes suggested in the literature.698 Gripenberg noted “a sigh of relief” among civil servants in advance of Virolainen’s departure, because then “the friendly, but extremely superficial and politically imprudent and ignorant foreign minister would no longer complicate our activity”.699 As shown by the nomination of delegates for autumn 1957, with four members of parliament among the appointees, the legislature was sufficiently engaged in mobilising to counter Enckell’s move.700 Parliament was suffering under a notion of waning control over Finland’s international affairs at that time, and the conflict with the foreign ministry was interpreted as a struggle for influence and power. In the debate regarding the foreign ministry’s budget in December 1957, Irma Karvikko, an earlier representative of the Liberals in the Finnish delegation, underlined the importance of including parliamentarians in delegations to the General Assembly because of their greater flexibility and adaptability as compared to civil servants. Pointing this out as the reason why the Scandinavian countries choose half of their delegates from parliamentarians, she expressed the hope that the same practice would take hold in Finland. Karvikko proposed a revision of the decision making process. Declaredly –––––––––––––– 695 Soikkanen 2003: 202. 696 Valtiopäivät (1957) P ytäkirjat: 2915–6 (20 December). Virolainen, foreign minister from 27 May 1957 to 29 November 1957 and 29 August 1958 to 4 December 1958, was an ordinary member of parliament by the time of the debate. 697 Entry of 23 September 1957, NAH, GGC, vol. VA Y 3481. 698 E.g. Soikkanen 2003: 202. 699 Entry of 24 October 1957, NAH, GGC, vol. VA Y 3481. 700 On the delegation of 1957 see: Yhdistyneiden kansakuntien 12. yleiskokous New Yorkissa 17.9.–14.12.1957. Helsinki: Ulkoasiainministeri , 1958. 7.
314 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS submitting to the view that the delegation must follow government instructions, she suggested all such instructions be stipulated within the delegation by vote or, more favourably, by negotiation.701 Referring to the time difference between New York and Helsinki and the resulting difficulty in communication, Tyyne Leivo-Larsson, a Social Democrat and member of both prior delegations, seconded this suggestion by urging for authoritative parliamentary composition of the delegation in order to enable responsible decision making – or at least revision making – on the spot.702 Leivo-Larsson, who was to become ambassador in Oslo, is remembered as a delegate of particularly high- handed performance in regard to government instructions. In order to keep her in line, a member of the permanent Finnish mission to the United Nations was appointed specifically to function as her personal “aid”, sitting at her back and, if need be, forcing her to adhere to the instructions.703 In her parliamentary speech, Leivo-Larsson also called attention to an element of the Scandinavian model, which was hitherto and also later neglected by Finnish actors. As she saw it, the practice of Sweden and the other Nordic countries to include high-ranking representatives of trade union federations was a relevant form of providing delegations with expertise, particularly concerning humanitarian issues.704 Despite his conventional understanding of government instructions, Lennart Heljas, a former delegate representing the Agrarian League, was another politician to take the offensive in the same debate. According to his argument, the reproach by leading foreign ministry officials, claiming that legislators represented virtually no expertise on foreign policy, missed an essential point. According to the Finnish constitution, the parliament not only had the right and responsibility to follow foreign policy, it also wielded decision making power on the most relevant issues. Moreover, by pointing to the parliamentary working mode of the General Assembly, which involved plenary sessions, committees and supporting experts, Heljas underlined the affinity of legislators to the United Nations and ranked expertise as a secondary quality in the political process. His observation that Finland had followed the practice of all Scandinavian countries gave further weight to his argument for the inclusion of
–––––––––––––– 701 Valtiopäivät (1957) P ytäkirjat: 2914f (20 December). 702 Valtiopäivät (1957) P ytäkirjat: 2916f (20 December). 703 Alholm 2001: 112, quotation marks in the original; cf. also Soikkanen 2003: 204. Leivo- Larsson participated in the first Finnish delegation to the General Assembly in 1956 as a cabinet minister, i.e. in a position directly linked to government power. There is independent evidence that the incident described above dates from the following year. 704 Valtiopäivät (1957) P ytäkirjat: 2917 (20 December).
315 CHAPTER 3 legislators in the delegation. Although Heljas did not address the issue as being about a proper adoption of the Scandinavian model, his speech provided one of the rare occasions in which the initial Finnish deviation was noticed and criticised: “I deem the neglect of opposition parties in last year’s delegation a mistake. In this year’s delegation the wrong has been righted, with the result that criticism of the delegation has decreased.”705 Representatives of opposition parties have been included in the delegations ever since the second instance of Finnish participation in the General Assembly (1957). This rapprochement with the Scandinavian model has several causes. There is the point indicated by Heljas, the need for increased legitimacy in order to counter Enckell’s attack on political appointments. In addition, the earlier protest against the exclusion of the opposition and the fact that a minority government ruled at the time also played a role. However, while the pro-government social democrats and liberals as well as the opposing communists and conservatives were granted parliamentary delegates in New York, the Agrarian League and the Swedish People’s Party were not. This might have been a negligible issue for the former, with party member President Urho Kekkonen holding the ultimate decision making power, and with another party member as foreign minister and chairman of the delegation while attending the session in New York. In contrast, the parliamentary group of the Swedish People’s Party puzzled over whether the appointment of G sta Mickwitz, a non-legislator and professor in economics, was a decision by the executive or whether it had been suggested by one of its own leaders. Thus, on the same day as the names of delegates were made public, the Swedish People’s Party decided to “protest against the offence […] and demand completion” – after the possibility of party involvement in the decision had been ruled out. Internally, it was established that matters of party representation were to be decided by the parliamentary group, not by single party officials.706 While no document has been found that would resolve the confusion regarding the designation process, all available evidence points to Mickwitz’ nomination by the executive.707 When former foreign minister Virolainen suggested that all parliamentary groups of the Eduskunta had been represented in the
–––––––––––––– 705 Valtiopäivät (1957) P ytäkirjat: 2913f (20 December). 706 Minutes of the parliamentary group, 27 August 1957, SCAH, SPP. 707 “14 finländare till FN: Virolainen i spetsen.” Hufvudstadsbladet (27 August 1957); Yhdistyneiden kansakuntien 12. yleiskokous 1958: 7. Mickwitz’ discussion of what he conceived as a “squabble about prestige” between the parliament and the foreign ministry does not reveal greater identification with parliament or the Swedish People’s Party (G sta Mickwitz. “Finlands representation vid FN.” Finsk tidskrift 163/164 (1958): 25–26).
316 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS delegation, a conservative legislator who had earlier criticised political appointments did not question this claim. However, he did heckle: “What did one represent there, then?”708 Not only was the appointment of party delegates inconsistent, there was also confusion regarding their function.
Frictions in the application of the model G sta Mickwitz, the delegate of 1957 with a particularly ambiguous nomination background, intervened in the conflict between the Parliament and the foreign ministry by writing an article about Finland’s representation in the United Nations. He argued for depoliticisation of the notions of the United Nations and parliamentary representation in the national delegation. While he underlined differences of policy making in the General Assembly and parliament, he acknowledged the importance of including legislators or civil servants from other ministries in the delegation, members with better knowledge of domestic conditions than that held by professional diplomats. He also mentioned the advantage of having delegates with the capability of estimating the chances for the parliamentary acceptance of international obligations and the benefit in experience for members of the Foreign Affairs Committee. However, in his view, Parliament as such – not parties – should be represented in the Finnish delegation: “Some parliamentarians, nominated independently of their party, should […] suffice. The rest of the delegation can reasonably be composed of diplomats and other ‘non- political’ experts.”709 The subsequent development was the reverse of this suggestion. The parliamentary dimension deteriorated rapidly in the years that followed, yet the idea of broad political representation was maintained and turned into a channel at the disposal of party organisations. As suggested by former foreign minister and permanent representative to the United Nations, Keijo Korhonen, the right to nominate a delegate to the General Assembly was soon construed by the political parties as an established privilege and mainly used to reward up-and-coming talents.710 The instrument was even employed to “recruit new promising young people” to political parties without necessarily requiring party membership.711 Academics, journalists, civil servants, civil society activists and salaried party employees were the main groups from which delegates were
–––––––––––––– 708 Valtiopäivät (1957) P ytäkirjat: 2915 (20 December, Johannes Virolainen, Johannes Wirtanen). 709 Mickwitz 1958: 25–26, quote at 26. 710 Korhonen 1999: 307. 711 Olavi Borg, delegate for the Liberal Party in 1964, personal communication.
317 CHAPTER 3 recruited. The shift from a parliamentary representation model towards a party representation model is underlined by the fact that the only instances in which parliamentary parties were not represented as such in Finnish delegations to the General Assembly after 1957 were a few occasions in which the foreign minister belonged to that particular party. Yet, despite the differences mentioned above, the evolving practice corresponded in one important respect to the line proposed by Mickwitz: The substitution of professional politicians by mostly junior affiliates with political colour but without a popular mandate implied a depoliticisation of Finnish delegations to the United Nations. The prevailing view at the Finnish foreign ministry was that a delegation heavy on experts was preferred over one of politicians. Nonetheless, after the initial discussions, a temporary stabilisation of the delegation model took place in the late 1950s, and foreign ministry officials “backed off from making adjustments in the existing order of representation of all political parties”.712 Finnish actors also backed off from a contemporary modification introduced in the other Nordic countries. There, the participation of time-pressed parliamentarians was eased by dividing the three-month General Assembly sessions into two shifts served by different individuals. In the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Finnish parliament, it was established as early as 1960 that it was more difficult than ever to be absent from Parliament’s autumn session for a period of three months.713 Yet, despite knowledge of the revised Scandinavian model and the propagation of two shifts by the Swedish People’s Party, the idea to shorten the term of service was not endorsed.714 The decreased term applied only in the years 1977 and 1978, when, after several years of parliamentary abstention, it attracted one legislator. In all, there seems to be truth to the assessment that there were other reasons for the unpopularity of the delegation assignment among members of parliament, in addition to the parallelism of the General Assembly and the Finnish budget debate.715 Nor is the characterisation of Finland as “the land of shaky governments and unforeseen political changes of wind” sufficient explanation.716 While the formal order was preserved around 1960, there were limits to party autonomy in nominating representatives to the Finnish –––––––––––––– 712 Report by the Danish Embassy in Helsinki to the Danish Foreign Ministry, 7 October 1959, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.D.9.a. 713 Minutes of the parliamentary group of the Swedish People’s Party in Finland, 12 May 1960, SCAH, SPP. 714 Minutes of the parliamentary group of the Swedish People’s Party in Finland, 12 May 1960, 3 & 6 September 1963, 9 June 1965, 28 June 1966, SCAH, SPP. 715 Korhonen 1999: 307. 716 Cf. Jutta Zilliacus. “FN m nstret.” Astra 60 (1978b) 1.
318 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS delegation. In 1959, the delegate proposed by the Swedish People’s Party was rejected by the government. No issue was taken with the replacement of non-legislator Ragnar Meinander (who was renominated and accepted as the party’s delegate the following year) by a pro-Kekkonen parliament member, made in a cabinet decision in which the Swedish People’s Party participated.717 A delicate incident that same year involved the government’s refusal to sanction the decision of the Social Democratic Party board to nominate Väin Leskinen, a leading parliamentarian known at that time for his anti-Soviet profile and enmity with President Kekkonen. However, Leskinen had not been nominated without dissent, and he declared publicly, “there was no reason to make a big deal out of the affair”. Thus, the Social Democrats simply substituted him with someone else.718 Because of the immediate low-key settlement, the conflict has more in common with the Swedish Wedén-case of 1952 than with the hotly debated parallel rejection of Jarl Hjalmarson, the leader of the Conservative Party in Sweden, in 1959. The participation of Reinhold Svento, a Russian-born, left-wing, informal presidential adviser on Soviet affairs, was a “distinctive and at the same time very telling” feature of Finland’s delegation to the General Assembly.719 A variety of humorous explanations circulated as to why this flamboyant and much-noticed figure, who adhered to a turn-of-the-century Czarist official’s dress-code, was included in the delegation in the years 1956 to 1961: He was claimed to be the author of the Finnish national epic Kalevala, or the man who assassinated the Russian Governor-General in Finland, Nikolai Ivanovich Bobrikov, in 1904; others said he was there to “still represent the deceased President Paasikivi”.720 There are also conflicting accounts of which party he represented, formally or informally, in the delegation.721 In reality, Svento had been included in the Finnish delegation upon the intervention of President Kekkonen, for whom he –––––––––––––– 717 Minutes of the parliamentary group of the Swedish People’s Party in Finland, 1 October 1959, SCAH, SPP. The nominee was Verner Korsbäck, who was close to the circle of President Kekkonen. 718 Letter by Counsellor Lars von Celsing, Embassy Helsinki, to Sverker Åstr m, Chief of the Political Division of the Swedish Foreign Ministry, 17 September 1959, FMAS, HP 48 D, vol. 56; cf. Urho Kekkonen. Päiväkirjat, vol. 1: 1958–62. Helsinki: Otava, 2001. 266– 269 (entries 31 August & 4, 7, 8 September 1959); on Kekkonen’s view of Leskinen as “irresponsible rowdy rascal” see his letter to Eero A. Wuori, Ambassador in Moscow, 31 August 1958, in: Urho Kekkonen. Mina brev 1956–1975. Stockholm: Rabén & Sj gren, 1977. 34–40, at 39. 719 Alholm 2001: 107. 720 Jakobson 1982: 84 (quote), 85; Korhonen 1999: 297. 721 Various documents exist attributing to him membership in the leftist People’s Democratic League, the Social Democratic Party, and the Agrarian League.
319 CHAPTER 3 served as personal representative.722 As the President’s prefect, Svento reported from New York, “our fools and blockheads should be held in stricter political discipline”. The foreign ministry’s strong man in Finnish United Nations policy, Ralph Enckell, tried to keep him in a good mood and finally managed to get him sent into retirement. However, according to the diplomat Bj rn Alholm, this was but the beginning of Kekkonen’s “Gleichschaltung”. According to Alholm’s remembrance, in the 1950s, before “‘watchdogs’ like Svento started to be omnipresent” and civil servants consequently kept their mouth shut, they still dared to express deviant ideas and were not obligated to official liturgy.723 An authoritative study on the history of the Finnish foreign ministry found deviation from the Scandinavian model of broad, parliamentarian-composed delegations to be a consequence of the different foreign policy decision making pattern, namely, the concentration of power in the hands of the President.724 The modest interest of Finnish parliamentarians to join delegations indicates structural problems with the adaptation of the Scandinavian model. With the exception of the anniversary session of the General Assembly in 1970, dignified with symbolic short-time parliamentary presence of all parties, the number of four delegates in 1957 marked the all-time high of parliamentary participation. Among the six to seven party delegates to participate annually, there were three members of parliament in 1958 and 1960, and two members of parliament in 1959, 1961 and 1962. Only two parties, the National Coalition Party and the Swedish People’s Party, nominated predominantly parliamentarians in the period 1956 to 1962. In the case of the latter, the reason was the party’s affinity for common Scandinavian practises; in the former, it seems based on the commitment of a single legislator, the delegation frequenter of the years 1957 to 1961, Kyllikki Pohjala.725 In her memoirs, the later minister for social affairs gives clues to why she was not succeeded by one of her colleagues: “Arriving from a free parliamentary atmosphere, […] in the UN one becomes aware of having ended up in an isolated atmosphere and a certain anxiety disturbs the work. At least in Finland’s delegation”. She substantiated this claim by pointing –––––––––––––– 722 Letter by Kekkonen to Svento, 25 October 1956, documented in Alholm 2001: 103–104. I am indebted to Jukka Jäntti for clarification of various aspects in regard to Svento. 723 Alholm 2001: 106 (quotes, my emphasis, the Svento-quote is taken from a letter to Kekkonen, 20 December 1956), 101, 105–107. 724 Soikkanen 2003: 203. 725 See the minutes of the parliamentary group of the Swedish People’s Party in Finland, 3 & 6 September 1963, 22 October 1964, 9 June 1965, 28 June 1966, SCAH, SPP; see also: Kyllikki Pohjala. Kuljin tietäni. Porvoo: S derstr m, 1966. 257.
320 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS to the interdiction of writing newspaper articles, the suppression of dissenting opinions at delegation meetings, and the self-annihilating code of conduct of most foreign service officials.726 Pohjala’s experience was shared by Albin Wickman, a member of the Swedish People’s Party’s parliamentary group, who maintains in his memoirs that he had never “taken part in any event that had an equally pronounced ‘der F hrer’- regime”. He claimed that had he known in advance what he was to witness during his stay at the United Nations in 1962, he probably would have “stayed at home in the Finnish parliament to enjoy a domestic citizen’s freedom and rights”.727 In summary, the setting of Finnish delegations to the United Nations was Kafkaesque in the Cold War period, in particular for parliamentarians – an assessment sustained by the observations of civil servants. Language barriers are frequently identified as a significant obstacle to the participation of Finnish parliamentarians until recently.728 Parliamentarians and civil servants had different mindsets. To give just one example: According to permanent representative to the United Nations, Ralph Enckell, Wickman became completely confused and disoriented in New York and seemed to believe “that his task is to sit on his chair and that it is up to the civil servant allotted to him to function as brain and as translator”. Thus, Enckell asked for a “representable [representations- fähigt] guard of collaborators”, not a politically representative delegation, including a “gallery of persons, who should never have got the responsible and honourable task of representing Finland at the General Assembly”.729 He and his successor, Max Jakobson, have called attention to what one might call the metamorphosis of legislators functioning as agents of governments – according to Jakobson, a skin they desperately tried to shed once they understood its implications: in particular, the acquiescence to the Soviet Union, a trait that was expected of them yet which was repulsive to the domestic audience.730 Such specific factors can be seen in the larger context of declining representation of parliamentarians in state committees. Thus, the late 1950s have been identified as a turning point, followed by a dramatic cross-sectoral drop in the participation of Finnish parliamentarians
–––––––––––––– 726 Pohjala 1966: 258–259. 727 Albin Wickman. Frihet är det bästa ting. Helsinki: S derstr m, 1967. 232. 728 Korhonen 1999: 307; cf. Georg C. Ehrnrooth. Simma med krokodilerna: En oliktänkare i Kekkonens republik. Espoo: Schildt, 1999. 150. 729 My emphasis, letter of UN-ambassador Ralph Enckell to Minister of Justice Johan Otto S derhjelm, 13 December 1962, FMAH, REC, vol. 5. 730 Literally, Jakobson uses the metaphor of a hook (1982: 84).
321 CHAPTER 3 in state committees – a development that had no parallel, for example, in Sweden.731
The Fennisation of the model In 1962, officials from the foreign ministry deemed the time ripe for change. The initiative to adopt a new order better adjusted to Finnish conditions came from Max Jakobson, the head of the ministry’s political division. In a memorandum that was distributed to the President and cabinet members, he observed that it had not been possible to follow the other Nordic countries’ practice of including “parliamentarians proper” in Finnish delegations. His description of the actual situation further understates both the modest share of legislators among party representatives and the number of legislators who had attended more than one session of the General Assembly. The memorandum continued by pointing to the difficulty of finding other delegates who were both acceptable to party groups and sufficiently qualified for the task. Thus, in Jakobson’s conclusion, “Finnish UN delegations have, in fact, neither represented parliamentary opinion, as originally intended, nor the best possible expertise”. Therefore, he suggested the delegation sent to the forthcoming General Assembly be composed of civil servants and experts, representing notably the fields of economy, social policy and international law, and that parliamentary observers appointed from Parliament be capable of following the UN General Assembly and the work of our delegation for such a period of time as permitted by parliamentary work.732 In a background paper produced in this connection, delegates are classified according to the categories “foreign ministry officials”, “permanent mission officials”, “members of parliament” and “other persons”. The latter category included cabinet members, Kekkonen’s personal proxy Reinhold Svento, independent experts, and non-parliamentarians among the party representatives.733 Another background paper compared Swedish, Norwegian, Danish and Canadian practises. While not mentioning the detail that parliamentarians belonging to governing parties participated in the regular Canadian delegation at that time, this country’s practice of also –––––––––––––– 731 Johanna Rainio-Niemi. “On Borders of the State and Civil Society: The State Committees in Finland in a European Perspective.” Nordic Associations in a European Perspective. Risto Alapuro and Henrik Stenius (eds). Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2010. 241–267. 732 Memorandum by Max Jakobson, 11 May 1962, FMAH, 113 B 1, vol. 34. 733 Memorandum “Suomen YK-valtuuskuntien kokoonpanot yleiskokouksen 11.–16. istuntokausilla”, no date, FMAH, 113 B 1, vol. 34.
322 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS sending parliamentary observers, a solution reserved for members of the opposition, was suggested as an overall favourable model.734 In a letter to Jakobson, the permanent representative to the United Nations, Ralph Enckell, also belittled the record of parliamentary participation. His approval of Jakobson’s suggestion is based on the incorrect assumption that “none of our parties has viewed the seat in the delegation as an acquired privilege in the sense that it would have been occupied regularly by members of parliament”. In contrast to the main intention of the Scandinavian model, that is the maintenance of domestic consensus on foreign policy, Enckell framed the practice of political delegation as a complication of foreign affairs, which did not blend in well with the strive for efficiency and which, in his insinuation, was alien to Finnish polity. The emphasis on efficiency allowed Enckell to turn the implication of the Scandinavian model upside-down, suggesting the need for a different institutional design in order to approach the Nordic neighbours with substance. Thus, he called attention to the fact that the other Nordic countries’ position, their name, their image, is better established than ours. They are on level ground; we still go uphill. Thus, they do not have to direct as much attention to their activity in the UN as we do.735 In a subsequent memorandum, Enckell addressed the delegation issue in detail in the context of what later became known as the passage from passive to active Finnish foreign policy in the early 1960s, enhancing the demand for competence and continuity among delegates. In his view, if required, the adoption of the Canadian parliamentary observer model was appropriate, provided it meant a short-term visit to New York.736 The foreign ministry asked the party groups for a detachment of parliament from the Finnish delegation in autumn 1962. However, at this point there was no general compliance with the request. While it might have contributed to the break of the National Coalition Party’s tradition of always sending a legislator to New York, the Swedish People’s Party’s group appointed one of its members to the delegation. In addition, the Agrarian League decided to send a legislator for the first time since 1956, namely, Matti Kekkonen, the President’s son.737 Despite this declination of the terms of nomination suggested by the foreign ministry, the refusal to accept them was not sustained and might
–––––––––––––– 734 Memorandum by Kai Somerto, 26 June 1962, FMAH, 113 B 1, vol. 34. 735 Letter Enckell to Jakobson, 8 June 1962, FMAH, 113 B 1, vol. 34. 736 Memorandum by Enckell, 26 June 1962, FMAH, 113 B 1, vol. 34. 737 Cf. “Vår man i New York.” Österbottningen (5 December 1962).
323 CHAPTER 3 have had its own, special reasons in the case of the Agrarian League. When the foreign ministry, prior to the next session of the General Assembly, repeated its request that legislators not be included in the delegation, only “non-parliamentary party people” (oparlamentariska partimänskor) were actually nominated.738 In the parliamentary group of the Swedish People’s Party the “elimination of the parliamentarians” was envisioned and the request of the foreign ministry was considered non-binding. Nonetheless, no nominee more to the point was found than one proposed on grounds that he was a former member of parliament.739 Thus, in the letter of nomination the party group confined itself to underlining “even if the group does not nominate a member of the group this time, the group adheres to its principle opinion that a parliamentary mandate may not form an obstacle for the eligibility of delegates”.740 In practice, Ralph Enckell’s struggle for a non-parliamentary delegation had finally led to success: The concept of non-parliamentary political delegates had become the norm, even if one of the delegates of 1963 remembers that they “had not yet been given the nickname ‘polegates’”.741 The delegates participating that year received a bouquet of compliments from Finland’s permanent representative at the United Nations: “At last we have a delegation whose members, in morning meetings, do not look like pike, hit in the neck with the oar”.742
Adding a pinch of Canada Legislators were not nominated to the delegations of 1963 and 1965, and no legislator actually attended the General Assembly in 1964. However, the struggle regarding parliamentary influence over the Finnish delegation continued. The nomination procedure of 1963 had been overshadowed by the never officially explained refusal of President Kekkonen to approve Victor Procopé, the nominee of the parliamentary group of the Swedish People’s Party. It is presumed he was negated due to closeness with one of Kekkonen’s political enemies, Georg C. Ehrnrooth.743 In this situation, cabinet minister Johan Otto S derhjelm, in accordance with the chairman and vice chairman of the party group, revealed the name of the group’s internal reserve candidate, newspaper editor Frank Jernstr m. Against the –––––––––––––– 738 Frank Jernstr m. Sju liv. Espoo: Schildt, 1994. 197. 739 Minutes of the parliamentary group of the Swedish People’s Party in Finland, 3 September 1963, SCAH, SPP. 740 Letter of nomination, 3 September 1963, FMAH, 113 B 1, vol. 35. 741 Jernstr m 1994: 198. 742 Quoted by Korhonen 1999: 296. 743 Letter by G sta Engzell, Ambassador in Helsinki, to the Swedish Foreign Ministry, 24 September 1963, FMAS, HP 48 D, vol. 78.
324 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS decision of the parliamentary group, the trio of S derhjelm and party leaders also invited him to jump in to safeguard the representation of the party.744 While Jernstr m was designated as a delegate by acting Foreign Minister Ahti Karjalainen, the passed-over party group made a public statement noting “with disappointment that the request of the group did not lead to the intended result”.745 The characterisation of the event as an expression of “directed democracy”, a codename for presidential intrusion in parliamentary affairs, summarises the newspaper debate that followed.746 In 1964, Jernstr m was renominated – by the foreign ministry, without prior consultation with the parliamentary group of the Swedish People’s Party. His return to the delegation was simply assumed and, as he writes in his memoirs, was possibly “an attempt by the foreign ministry to make the delegation permanent and avoid inconvenient and intrusive parliamentarians”.747 However, this bypassing provoked resistance. Thus, Kristian Gestrin, one of the group members, declared his willingness to join the Finnish delegation to the General Assembly. By nominating him, the group enhanced the credibility that it adhered to the principle of eligibility of parliamentarians and that parliamentary groups’ pronouncements should be obtained in good time.748 However, despite the retreat of the executive, Gestrin did not actually attend the General Assembly due to the special circumstances and reduced activity level of the nineteenth session.749 In view of the forthcoming election the following March, the Swedish People’s Party parliamentary group did not deem it proper to appoint one of its members in autumn 1965. This time the group nominated the foreign ministry’s favourite, Jernstr m. At the same time, it decided to “try as before to get Finland’s UN representation split into two periods in order to give parliamentarians, in accordance with the other Nordic countries, the possibility of also participating in UN sessions”.750 Not least, in advance of his renomination in 1966, Gestrin suggested to Foreign Minister Karjalainen that such a delegation order be introduced. While the minister was reportedly dismissive of the idea, Tyyne Leivo-Larsson, a
–––––––––––––– 744 “FN-delegationen.” Västra Nyland (10 September 1963). 745 Minutes of the parliamentary group of the Swedish People’s Party in Finland, 6 September 1963, SCAH, SPP. 746 “Vieraan sana.” Helsingin Sanomat (8 September 1963); on the debate cf. Brages Press Cutting Archive, Helsinki (BPCAH), vol. 744A. 747 Jernstr m 1994: 205. 748 Minutes of the parliamentary group of the Swedish People’s Party in Finland, 22 October 1964, SCAH, SPP. 749 Cf. “Finland i FN.” Västra Nyland (20 January 1965). 750 Minutes of the parliamentary group of the Swedish People’s Party in Finland, 3 & 9 (quote) June 1965, SCAH, SPP.
325 CHAPTER 3 former Social Democratic delegate, cabinet minister and ambassador, was interested.751 Both Gestrin and Leivo-Larsson (the latter as a Member of Parliament for the social democratic opposition party), were nominated and attended the twenty-first session of the General Assembly.752 Thus, after a three-year break, two legislators were again included in the delegation. At the same time, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Eduskunta decided to send an observer delegation to the General Assembly for a shorter period. Thus, with some delay the adoption of the Canadian parliamentary observer model was requested by the Finnish legislature – but this in addition to the established right of the party groups to appoint political delegates.753 The observer delegation was introduced in the context of the regeneration and electoral success of the Social Democratic Party in 1966, which had consented to endorse the essentials of President Kekkonen’s foreign policy line, but simultaneously requested an atmospheric ‘new foreign policy’ based on open and realistic domestic debate, with traits of peace activism and third world solidarity. The first proposition of this policy’s manifest reads: “Foreign policy should be participatory” – save that it neither talks of parliamentarians as such nor of the people, but instead of politicians and various kinds of experts.754 When the “so-called 10-day journeys to the UN” were adopted, they were viewed as supplementing the regular delegation, not as a formal substitute for the inclusion of legislators. At the same time, they were regarded as “a compromise, which meets halfway the wish to see Parliament represented in the regular Finnish UN delegation”.755 The approach implied a functional division between political appointees to the regular delegation, who were supposed to connect the political grass roots, and the flying parliamentary visitors, who were supposed to safeguard contact with the various party groups. In the first years, the visit of parliamentary observers was an experiment in addition to what continued to
–––––––––––––– 751 Minutes of the parliamentary group of the Swedish People’s Party in Finland, 28 June 1966, SCAH, SPP. 752 On the nomination of Gestrin: Minutes of the parliamentary group of the Swedish People’s Party in Finland, 29 June 1966, SCAH, SPP. 753 Cf. T rnudd 1967: 48. 754 Paavo Lipponen. “Suomen ulkopolitiikan tulevaisuudennäkymät.” Kohti Eurooppaa. Helsinki: Tammi, 2001. 20–24, at 22 [originally published in autumn 1966]; cf. Mikko Majander. “Post-Cold War Historiography in Finland.” The Cold War – and the Nordic Countries: Historiography at the Crossroads. Thorsten B. Olesen (ed.). Odense: University Press of Southern Denmark, 2004. 58. 755 Minutes of the parliamentary group of the Swedish People’s Party in Finland, 15 September 1966, SCAH, SPP (first quote); “I vår krympande värld.” Västra Nyland (16 September 1966) (second quote).
326 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS be portrayed as compliance with the Nordic model of including delegates representing various political opinions.756 However, already by the end of the 1960s, the observer delegations were assigned the status of “accepted custom” that had proven useful for all parties involved.757 Finnish parliamentarians have visited the United Nations in the capacity of observers ever since, and have combined their trip to New York with visits to government and research institutions in Washington.758 At the same time, the instances in which legislators have later participated in Finnish delegations to the General Assembly can be counted on the fingers of one hand: the Swedish People’s Party was represented by members of parliament in 1968 and 1977, the Rural Party in 1970 and 1971, and the Green League in 2005.759
The establishment of an advisory board on UN affairs While parliamentarians gradually disappeared from Finnish UN delegations in the 1960s and 1970s, the conflict between party representatives and civil servants continued. Their profiles and roles were increasingly contrasted with one another. Despite a generally recognised more friendly bearing, Max Jakobson, who succeeded Ralph Enckell as permanent representative to the United Nations in April 1965, sharpened the distinction between civil servants and political delegates by introducing daily informal meetings that excluded the latter.760 Common delegation meetings became rare, and political delegates criticised both the foreign ministry, “whose information ahead of the journey was in practice plus minus zero”, and the staff of the permanent mission for not consulting them and thwarting discussions and votings, as well as exercising a control regime.761 A memorandum written by Jakobson in January 1968 was a renewed attempt to abolish the practice of political delegation altogether. With a starting point in the quest for professionalism and efficiency, he portrayed the political delegates as having “only haphazard contact with parliamentary activity, if any” and the established practice as “not […] consistent with any party’s benefit, neither
–––––––––––––– 756 Cf. “Ulkoasiainministeri Ahti Karjalaisen lausunto YK:n 23. yleiskokouksesta Helsingissä 18.12.1968.” Ulkopoliittisia lausuntoja ja asiakirjoja (1968): 228–229, at 229. 757 “Ulkoasiainministeri Ahti Karjalaisen lausunto YK:n 24. istunnon päätyttyä Helsingissä 19.12.1969.” Ulkopoliittisia lausuntoja ja asiakirjoja (1969): 279–283. 758 Cf. Jutta Zilliacus. Vägskäl. S derstr m, 1986. 160. 759 In regard to parliamentarians participating in the 25th session of the General Assembly, see infra. 760 Jernstr m 1994: 205. 761 Report by Birger Th lix of 13 December 1967, appendix to the minutes of the parliamentary group of the Swedish People’s Party in Finland, 18 December 1967, SCAH.
327 CHAPTER 3 the government’s, nor the Eduskunta’s”. In contrast, he regarded the temporary observer visits of members of the parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee as “satisfactory for everybody”. He concluded by adumbrating to a potential benefit of political members in the regular delegation “in the sense” of schooling representatives of the young generation in international negotiations, but at the same time indicating that he reckoned the financial cost of such a programme unreasonably high.762 Evidently, Jakobson’s reappraisal was out of time, and seems never to have been considered. A social democratic working group on UN matters presented a different suggestion to satisfy the demand for professionalisation: Delegates should be appointed in good time, and their duty should not be restricted solely to participation in the session of the General Assembly, but instead should preferably cover a period of one year at a time. Other enhanced effects of such a model were seen for “democratic control” (kansanvaltainen valvonta) and participation in “decision making in issues of principle”. At the same time, the working group suggested the composition of the delegation reflect parliamentary strength in order to obtain a fairer distribution of foreign policy training. The party organ Suomen Sosialidemokraatti noted that only three out of nine regular delegates came from the left – relying on contemporary readers’ knowledge, both that the social democrats led the government coalition and that the parties from the left formed a majority in parliament. However, the calculation amounted to a politicising of two independent legal experts, Erik Castrén and Helvi Sipilä. According to the daily, if these delegates were to be regarded as “pure experts” they should not have been appointed to the category of delegation “members” (jäsenet), but to that of “experts” (asiantuntijat), which is the Finnish equivalent of the legal UN term ‘adviser’.763 Thus, with the exception of the chairman and vice chairmen, the concept of delegation member was made a synonym of ‘political delegate’; the category of delegation member tends to coincide with the UN terms ‘representatives’ and ‘alternate representatives’, which are allotted a limited number of seats. At the twenty-third session of the General Assembly, the political delegates joined forces and made their lack of preparation a political issue. Thereupon Foreign Minister Karjalainen, a member of the Centre Party (former Agrarian League), promised to tackle the issue.764 Karjalainen took up the question of professionalising the work of the delegation in the –––––––––––––– 762 Memorandum by Max Jakobson, 30 January 1968, FMAH, 113 B 1, vol. 50. 763 “Yksipuolinen YK-valtuuskunta.” Suomen Sosialidemokraatti (15 September 1968). 764 Kaarlo Tetri. Viipurista maailmalle: Muistelmia elämästä ja ty stä valtionjohdon tuntumassa. Hämeenlinna: Karisto, 1995. 361.
328 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS foreign ministry, requesting an improvement of the information of delegates and an earlier retrieval of party nominations. Moreover, he instructed the political division of his ministry to investigate the idea of an Advisory Board on UN affairs, tasked with the distribution of documents and the arrangement of information and discussion meetings. The board membership was meant to be politically diverse and aimed at persons conceivable as members of the delegation to the General Assembly.765 In a presentation of his view on the matter, Max Jakobson acknowledged the possibility of improving political delegates’ orientation by arranging spring appointments and early division of labour as well as by providing study materials and holding information meetings. He framed this issue solely as one of political delegates’ job satisfaction and, for once, remained silent on efficiency. According to Jakobson’s view, experience of continuous contact with political delegates could eventually lead to the consideration of an advisory board. He also maintained that such an organ should not only include party representatives, but officials and representatives of civil society as well.766 While a reference work on the Finnish foreign service portrays Max Jakobson as initiator of the advisory board,767 his memorandum on the matter reveals an intention to slow down the process. Despite his hesitant attitude, a comprehensive approach was taken and combined an early appointment of political delegates, improved information and meeting activity with the institutional framework of an advisory board in effect on 15 May 1969. The board, which can be seen as a social democratic acquirement to balance the foreign policy decision making power of President Kekkonen, consisted of two foreign ministry officials as chairmen, the political delegates for the upcoming session, and a number of former and forthcoming delegates of various backgrounds representing expertise. The latter were appointed for two-year terms.768 According to Karjalainen’s assessment made after the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly, the improvement in the delegates’ preparation had been
–––––––––––––– 765 Memorandum by Yrj Väänänen, 15 January 1969, FMAH, 113 Ö, vol. 1399. Karjalainen suggested the Advisory Board as a small scale copy of the Advisory Board on Foreign Trade, established in 1964. According to Hilkka Pietilä, the idea of the Advisory Board goes back to Social Democrats Jaakko Kalela and Paavo Lipponen, both active in the Finnish United Nations Association. 766 Memorandum by Max Jakobson, 20 February 1969, FMAH, 113 Ö, vol. 1399. 767 Soikkanen 2003: 203–204. 768 “Delegation tillsatt f r FN-ärenden.” Hufvudstadsbladet (17 May 1969); cf. “Utrikesutskottet: FN-delegation b r få studera i f rväg.” Hufvudstadsbladet (30 March 1969); UAV: “Poliitiset jäsenet tarpeen Suomen YK-valtuuskunnassa.” Suomen Sosialidemokraatti [?] (29 March 1969).
329 CHAPTER 3 prolific for the delegation.769 Nonetheless, delegates complained that the internationally recognised diplomat Jakobson had not been a “particularly inspiring leader for the Finnish UN team” at this session and that “information was often rather scanty and the will for active collaboration at times weak”.770 Also the following year it was noted that the foreign ministry had “not overworked itself in regard to the preparation work”.771
Parliamentarisation without MPs In 1970, Finland was represented by a complete set of parliamentarians from all party groups at the General Assembly. This unique instance was meant as a tribute to the United Nations in commemoration of its twenty- fifth anniversary and as a demonstration of the importance attached to the work of the world organisation.772 However, while parliamentarians dominated the visible upper positions of the Finnish delegation list, their presence in New York was limited to a period of two weeks, calling forth the characterisation of “a kind of honorary delegation” (heders- delegation).773 In addition to the parliamentarians’ flying visit, all parties were granted a second representative for the regular work, a person distinguished from the parliamentary colleague by being assigned one of the bottom ranks in the adviser-section of the delegation list. Thus, the Finnish delegation to the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly was a merger of the parliamentary observer group model with the regular delegation, the parliamentary observers being assigned a particularly symbolic quality while the other political representatives were objects of a reciprocal symbolic downgrade.774 A leading article, in which the latter delegates were overlooked, drew attention to the danger that a Finnish divergence from the Nordic pattern of politicians actively participating in the delegation could lead to communication problems in these countries’ dense collaboration effort due to the “different wavelength” of civil servants and politicians.775 The Finnish delegation of 1970 was the singular instance in which an authentic all-parliamentary presence was achieved, although merely in –––––––––––––– 769 “Ulkoasiainministeri Ahti Karjalaisen lausunto YK:n 24. istunnon päätyttyä Helsingissä 19.12.1969.” Ulkopoliittisia lausuntoja ja asiakirjoja (1969): 279–283, at 281. 770 G ran von Bonsdorff. “Inf r FN-dagen 1971.” Hufvudstadsbladet (23 October 1971). 771 Memorandum by Bengt Bergman, editor, no date, FMAH, 113 Ö, vol. 1400. 772 “Grels Teir till FN.” Västra Nyland (12 September 1970). 773 “Finland i FN.” Västra Nyland (28 October 1970); cf. Hufvudstadsbladet (20 September 1970); Tetri 1995: 376. 774 Yhdistyneiden kansakuntien yleiskokouksen 25 (1970): 13. 775 “Finland i FN.” Västra Nyland (28 October 1970).
330 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS place for a short-term symbolic instance that left the groundwork to secondary representatives. Nonetheless, a re-parliamentarisation of the delegation was considered by the beginning of the 1970s. In this process the parliamentarisation without parliamentary participation-problematique remained central, although an approach opposite the one taken at the anniversary meeting did eventually emerge: Instead of symbolic parliamentarisation without genuine parliamentary substance, the working mode of the delegation was parliamentarised, without salient reference to parliament. Characteristically, terms like “political delegate” (poliittinen valtuutettu) or “party representative” (puolue edustaja) were regularly used, while the more precise label “parliamentary party representative” (eduskuntapuolue edustaja) was rare.776 In the beginning of February 1972, the Advisory Board on UN Affairs discussed the further improvement of the working conditions of the delegates nominated by the parliamentary parties. It was decided that the foreign ministry would send an inquiry to all parties represented in parliament, asking for their view on this matter and, in particular, for 1. results, which the party expects of the activity of its delegate 2. selection criteria for the delegate nominated (parliamentarian, position in the party, education) 3. how long the delegate can stay in the UN (whole session, a shorter period of time, several delegates from each parliamentary party for a shorter period) 4. point in time when the delegation is appointed 5. the possibilities of the delegate to participate in the meetings of other UN-organs, apart from the General Assembly 6. how the delegates shall be acquainted already before the session with the issues, which might be brought up to discussion 7. should one and the same delegate in principle be appointed for several subsequent (2–3) sessions or should the delegates be annually replaced. The inquiry concluded by emphasising that there was no intention of a binding rearrangement, and that the initiative was to be seen as an attempt to gather ideas on how the participation of political delegates in the General Assembly “better than at present can be made to satisfy the interest of both the parties and the foreign ministry”.777 A concrete background of the –––––––––––––– 776 The term eduskuntapuolue edustaja is, for example, used in a list of the Finnish delegation to the 27th session of the General Assembly, no date, FMAH, 113 B 1, vol. 61. Even the term puoluedelegaatti (party delegate) could be used, see: Karjalainen 1967: 65. 777 Letters to the parliamentary parties, 17–21 February 1972, FMAH, 113 B 1, vol. 63.
331 CHAPTER 3 initiative is provided by an internal memorandum prepared in the ministry, which established “that it would be important both for the parties and for the foreign service that the contact of the UN delegation’s political members with parliamentary activity be solid”. It was left open as to how this desire related to the memorandum’s description of the parliamentary observer model, culminating in the assessment that, while in New York, the observers not only participated in meetings of the regular delegation but that they were thereby enabled to become acquainted with the practical exercise of Finnish UN policy “in detail”.778 At least one commentator interpreted the foreign ministry’s questionnaire as an indication of “certain occupational problems” within the regular delegation.779 Of all contacted parties, only the Swedish People’s Party endorsed the call for participation of parliamentarians in principle, by announcing “it would be desirable that the direct contact between the delegation and parliament be maintained by at least one or some of the members being parliamentarians”.780 Even the National Coalition Party had a positive notion of the participation of parliamentarians, but underlined the lack of necessity to appoint them. The answer of the Centre Party was characterised by similar ambivalence, the difference being the instrumentalisation of the issue for different reasons. The argument went as follows: As long as the political delegates were assigned a largely passive role, there was no reason to release parliamentarians or other significant persons from domestic duties for a quarter of a year. Other parties commenting on the issue either claimed autonomy on it or spoke to the lack of appropriateness of parliamentarians’ participation. The Centre Party coupled the issue of sending parliamentarians with an explicit demand for greater decision making capacity for political delegates. This was a position also put forward by the Communist Party, which likewise complained about the “almost pure observer position” of political delegates.781 The principle difference between short-time observer visits and regular work in the delegation was thereby cast into doubt by perspectives different from that of the foreign ministry’s. The statements of –––––––––––––– 778 Memorandum by Arto Tanner, Secretary of the Advisory Board on UN Affairs, for the Foreign Ministry, 17 February 1972, FMAH, 113 B 1, vol. 63. 779 Letter by Birger Th lix, newspaper editor and former delegate to the General Assembly, to Henry Olander, Secretary-General of the Swedish People’s Party, 3 March 1972, FMAH, 113 Ö, vol. 1400. 780 Memorandum by Kristian Gestrin for the Swedish People’s Party, 13 March 1972, FMAH, 113 Ö, vol. 1400; the letters of the other parties from March and April 1972 are documented in FMAH, 113 B 1, vol. 63. 781 Letter by Aimo Haapanen, Secretary-General of the Finnish People’s Democratic League, 10 April 1972, FMAH, 113 B 1, vol. 63.
332 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS the Social Democrats, the Swedish People’s Party and the Christian League shared the understanding that political delegates should participate in decision making, but they did not address the matter as a desideratum. While the Conservatives, Liberals and the populist Agrarian League disregarded this point, all parties argued for early appointment, systematic preparation and, usually, for an assignment that spanned the entire length of the session. Only the Swedish People’s Party relaunched Sweden’s model for discussion: the appointment of delegates for several sessions, subdividing each session into two periods. Nevertheless, as stated in an unofficial background paper, there was awareness that adoption of this model would “completely finish the parties if their representatives only come on flying visits”.782 The desirability of assignments for consecutive sessions was not contested in principle by any party, yet all parties except the Liberals put forward qualifications on the matter. Regarding the issue of what results the parties expected from their political delegates, the individual learning experience was given greater emphasis than the functions of providing an information channel and participation in decision making. While the parties deemed the presence of legislators in the delegation unnecessary, the partly requested participation of political delegates in decision making implied nevertheless a re-parliamentarisation of the delegation. The Social Democratic Party even requested that the “so- called political delegates should be designated on the basis of the parliamentary strength of the parties”783 – a demand dismissed by the Liberals and the Conservatives. After the discussion in the Advisory Board (two weeks before he became prime minister), Social Democratic Party leader Rafael Paasio proposed the introduction of a graded system analogous to the domestic practice of allotting seats for parliamentary committees and to the practice of the other Nordic governments when appointing UN delegations. According to the formula suggested by Paasio, four seats would have gone to the bourgeois parties and three seats to the left, two of which were to be reserved for the Social Democrats.784 As a result of this initiative, while the number of bourgeois seats was not reduced, the Social Democrats were granted two representatives in 1972
–––––––––––––– 782 Letter by Birger Th lix, newspaper editor and former delegate to the General Assembly, to Henry Olander, Secretary-General of the Swedish People’s Party, 29 February 1972, FMAH, 113 Ö, vol. 1400; similarly the memorandum by Bengt Bergman, editor and former delegate to the General Assembly, no date, ibid. 783 Memorandum of the Social Democratic Party, sent to the foreign ministry 13 March 1972, FMAH, 113 B 1, vol. 63. 784 Letter by Rafael Paasio, 10 February 1972, FMAH, 113 B 1, vol. 63.
333 CHAPTER 3 and 1973. A closer correlation to parliamentary strength and committee proportionalism was reserved for the composition of the Advisory Board on UN Affairs.785 In 1974, upon a renewed initiative by Paasio, a formula for the delegation allotted four seats to the left and five seats to the bourgeois parties, with a rotation scheme for the smaller parties.786 While the parliamentary strength of the Social Democrats exceeded that of the Communists in a ratio of three to two, the former were granted three delegates while the latter had to settle for one delegate, in compliance with representation of equally strong and some smaller bourgeois parties. Despite the absence of parliamentarians and the rough formula, it was increasingly justified to talk of a distinct “political delegation” (poliittinen valtuuskunta) within the Finnish delegation, tantamount to a “mini- parliament” (pienoisparlamentti).787 This picture is complicated by the designation of experts and diplomats who were not nominated as political representatives despite being affiliated with a particular political party. The chances of former political delegates of the Centre Party for renomination in a non-political capacity seem to have been particularly high.788 The role and influence of the Finnish delegation was brought up repeatedly at the time of the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly, the majority of discussants deeming competence an issue ripe for reconsideration.789 Thus, in the bulletin of the Finnish United Nations Association, the former representative of the Swedish People’s Party, Ernest Granskog, established that the function of the political UN delegation had not yet been sufficiently understood, maintaining that delegates were kept guessing about what was expected of them and what possibilities there were for them to develop initiative. With a point of departure in his own idea that the UN delegation should “in part be a consultative organ, in part an organ shaped by the foreign ministry and the parliamentary parties, which directly and autonomously takes decisions”, he suggested an investigation into the matter, to be headed by the political
–––––––––––––– 785 See list on board members, no date [1972], FMAH, 113 B 1, vol. 63. 786 Letter by Rafael Paasio, 5 February 1974, FMAH, 113 B 1, vol. 71. 787 “Ernest Granskog, RKP.” YK-tiedote (1974) 1. 788 For example, in the delegation to the 30th session of the General Assembly the former party delegates Keijo Korhonen and Kaarlo Tetri returned in a non-political capacity. In addition, the delegation frequenter Hilkka Pietilä, Secretary-General of the Finnish United Nations Association and Centre Party representative in the Advisory Board on UN Affairs, participated in this session; see: Yhdistyneiden kansakuntien yleiskokouksen 30 (1975): 12– 13. 789 Letter by Ernest Granskog, newspaper editor, to unknown member of the parliamentary group of the Swedish People’s Party, no date, SCAH, SPP, Minutes of the parliamentary group 1974.
334 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS parties in collaboration with the foreign ministry. This mutual inquiry was meant to establish “1) rules defining and regulating the competence of the political delegation, and 2) object programmes covering issues, which are on the agenda of the UN General Assembly for the moment”. Granskog’s quest for multi-session appointments and his concluding remark that Finland had many competent officials in New York, whose time should not be wasted by “lay delegates” (maallikkodelegaatti), signalled a framing of the issue in terms of efficiency and not as a matter of democratic participation.790 In a leading article published in his newspaper, it was suggested that “it should even be the foreign ministry’s interest that lay diplomats be used to the fullest extent”. Rather than the parties supplying “diplomatic cannon fodder to the UN-couloirs”, the idea should be to train a “reserve of experts experienced in international conferences, who are also versatile in non-UN contexts”.791 By June 1974, a working committee of the Advisory Board on UN Affairs presented suggestions for the formalisation of political delegates’ participation in decision making. The paper submitted by the committee combined a disenchanting inventory of the prevailing practice of political delegation with an offensive request for upgrading the position of the representatives concerned. Its starting point was the observation that, while the position of civil servants and experts in the Finnish delegation to the General Assembly was unproblematic, that “of party representatives has not become fully clear, despite discussions for almost 20 years”. It was noted that political delegates had been informed about points on the agenda at delegation meetings (the so-called “morning prayers”, aamuhartaudet) several times a week, however, usually without having a chance to participate in decision making or preparation of statements either collectively or individually. In respect to purposes of including party representatives in the delegation, only the goal of increasing foreign policy awareness among parties was considered achieved. In contrast, goals such as enhancing the delegations’ expertise, advancing the contact of foreign policy and domestic decision makers, and generating broad political support for Finnish foreign policy were considered as left largely unattained. The paper concluded in regard to the last point: “In this respect, the role of party representatives has in practice remained nominal. Only in exceptional cases have they been able to express their opinion on decisions taken.” Moreover, an argument for an increased role of party representatives in decision- making was spelled out, based on the following
–––––––––––––– 790 “Ernest Granskog, RKP.” YK-tiedote (1974) 1. 791 Ernest Granskog. “Skolning av FN-delegater.” Österbottningen (25 January 1974).
335 CHAPTER 3 advantages: democratisation in general and by influence according to parliamentary strength in particular, enhancement of policy coherence and predictability, strengthening of delegates’ motivation, exploitation of their expertise and a better return for invested resources. The working committee, not failing to point to an increase of responsibility for parties to appoint competent representatives and keep in touch with them were its suggestions to be followed, submitted the following proposal: 1. Party representatives should be heard when Finnish viewpoints are prepared. 2. In case a 2/3 majority of party representatives disagrees with given instructions, they should get the option to express their dissenting opinion with an explanation to the foreign ministry for a reconsideration of the matter.792 These principles were adopted and have been lauded for having contributed to the improved efficiency of Finnish delegations.793 However, conflicting opinions remained. According to Ilkka Pastinen, permanent representative to the United Nations in the years 1977 to 1983, the system of including “parties’ young talents known under the designation ‘poligates’” in the delegation “functioned fairly well until the idea of ‘new foreign policy’ and with that the request for democratisation of foreign policy decision making became fashionable in Finland”. While this author of memoirs with the title His Excellency Upstairs suggests that the procedure on reassessment of instructions upon request by two-thirds of the polegates failed to have practical relevance, he also blames the procedure for having served as a gateway for domestic politics and as a source of friction and disagreement between civil servants and poligates as well as among poligates themselves.794 A balanced picture was given by Klaus T rnudd, a later permanent representative: “This rule has not been applied frequently, but it has not remained a dead letter either; such procedure has led to revision and new instruction at least once every now and then.”795
–––––––––––––– 792 Memorandum by the Working Committee of the Advisory Board on UN Affairs, 5 June 1974, FMAH, 113 B 1, vol. 71. 793 Kaija Helo. “Ulkopoliittiset Luottamusmieselimet.” Ulkopolitiikka (1976) 4: 31–37, at 32. 794 Ilkka Pastinen. Yläkerran ylhäisyys: Tuokiokuvia neljältä vuosikymmeneltä ulkoasiainhallinnossa. Helsinki: Otava, 1994. 63. Cf. earlier remarks on the words “polegate” and “poligate”. In the context of politicisation described by Pastinen “poligaatti” makes more sense than “polegaatti”. 795 Klaus T rnudd. “Kunskap om utrikespolitik.” Ord och handling: Utrikespolitiska uppsatser. Helsinki: Schildt, 1982. 111–124, at 121.
336 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS
The ‘polegate’ and the erosion of the concept ‘parliamentarian’ Despite the participatory approach, with its mechanism for issuing a caveat, and despite the preservation of a nominal high-status integration of political representatives in official delegation lists, the reform did not lead to a clearer vision of delegates’ function, nor to better preparation in advance; nor did it lead to greater influence for them. In a book on her experience as a delegate, Jutta Zilliacus, the only parliamentarian to participate in a Finnish delegation to the General Assembly in the period 1972 to 2004, reports that the political delegates of 1977 kept on complaining about the vague role allotted to them, despite the existence of some defining “diplomatic” stipulations. She also describes herself as ill-prepared by the foreign ministry and criticises the seminars organised by the Advisory Board on UN Affairs for being unparliamentary by nature: such events are almost reminiscent of catechism in the provinces. Wooden and stiff and reticent and solemn as anything. Those who know something often find it difficult to express themselves, and those who do not would rather die than reveal their lack of knowledge. One speaks clipped and low- voiced, begins in the middle of a sentence, coughs and hawks and does not dare to look into the others’ eyes. According to Zilliacus, the atmosphere did not improve when the delegates met in New York. In her account, the established patterns of ambition for political interference with either activist (left) or depoliticising (right) intentions, on the one hand, and administrative repulsion of alien influx, on the other, left no room for constructive collaboration. At the same time, occasional showdowns between the permanent mission and political delegates, while said to have usually resulted in capitulation by the latter, have also been characterised as “rather stimulating”. Yet, upon having been met “with a father’s mild understanding” by Finland’s permanent representative to the United Nations, political delegates are said to have settled for the pattern of behaviour fixed for them in advance: “It consisted primarily of shutting up”. Zilliacus notes without sorrow that “the task was to be a listener and inquirer” and “the speedier one finds the way to one’s observer or apprentice role, the better for oneself and one’s reputation”.796 In such a framework, the democratisation of delegation procedures, which opened a formal channel for influence to political delegates, was a pyrrhic victory further boosting dissociation from the regular delegation. Its main effect was the reinforcement of the separation of what had started to be seen as a particular “political delegation” (poliittinen valtuuskunta) or
–––––––––––––– 796 Zilliacus 1978a: 18, 19, 26, 62, 64, 65.
337 CHAPTER 3
“polegate-delegation” (polegaattivaltuuskunta) from the main body of the delegation.797 A development sustaining this partition was the increase in the number of delegates annually sent to New York on a non-political ticket, providing a new basis for the division of labour.798 The establishment of separate meetings for political delegates in addition to common meetings, as well as the formal appointment of their own speaker tasked with serving as a communication link to the rest of the delegation, were features that stepped up fragmentation.799 Frank Jernstr m, who attended the thirty-third session of the General Assembly as a hermaphrodite nominated by the foreign ministry to allay the Swedish People’s Party’s trouble with the rotation scheme for small parties, gave a tangible description of the this new divided delegation concept: The proper mission’s localities and that of the political delegates had been separated by a door, which could be opened from the civil servants’ side. It was like a one-way pump valve. The political delegates […] had taken or been given the disparaging or benign nickname ‘polegates’.800 Jernstr m’s confrontation of the ‘mission proper’ with ‘political delegates’ is equally misleading as that of ‘political delegation’ and ‘permanent delegation’ in the book by Zilliacus.801 The delegation to the General Assembly is appointed for one session at a time and includes, in addition to the staff of the permanent mission, civil servants from the foreign ministry’s home office and other civil servants as well as various experts. While political delegates have not been renominated as frequently as other delegates have, in the 1970s they often attended at least a second session. Considering the multifaceted background and temporality, former –––––––––––––– 797 While the composition of the Finnish delegation had earlier been planned under the common heading “UN delegation” in the foreign ministry, even in instances when solely the nomination of party delegates was the issue, the concept of “poliittinen valtuuskunta” was used in the title of a memorandum by Olli Mennander, 27 January 1976, FMAH, 113 B1, N.S. vol. 16 (The concept had been used earlier, e.g., by Granskog 1974); the term “polegaattivaltuuskunta” was used by: Harriet Lonka. “Matkakertomusta tiistailta.” Lue poliittisen valtuuskunnan terveiset YK:n yleiskokouksesta! Helsinki: Suomen YK-liitto, 2000. No longer available from
338 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS delegates’ portrayals of political delegates as opposed to a homogenous other characterised by ‘mission’ status or ‘permanence’, gives proof of the alienation political delegates contended within the larger delegation. Zilliacus believes that “political delegates” had simply been “a troublesome, long denotation, which was later shortened”. Yet, the terminological change took place at a time when an official jokingly pointed out to Zilliacus that diplomats were not fond of gatecrashers in their “own sandpit” where they had “their own in-games for their own in- circles and their own in-language”. It took also place when what she herself described as a “caste division” was further formalised and entrenched.802 The substitution of the term ‘political delegate’ with ‘polegate’ had potential to strengthen the dichotomy between the delegation proper and a body of proxies, whose belonging to the former was questionable. According to a contemporary witness, the term poligaatti was probably concocted in the foreign service and contaminated by a contemptuous flavour, one polegates were not necessarily aware of.803 Although the gap between the two branches of the delegation had firmly been established by the mid-1970s, political delegates’ dissociation from the main delegation was never finalised. Pooling them in a separate category in delegation lists was an additional element in constructing them as an entity of their own, but at the same time, it retained their space in the larger delegation. While political representatives had not been identifiable as a group in earlier lists, in the period 1978 to 1992 they were made identical with the category of delegation “members” (jäsenet). Whereas a double half-session shift for political delegates was applied in 1977 and 1978, in the period 1979 to 1991 the term of political delegates was reduced to a single shift of six to seven weeks. According to a foreign ministry official, “due to financial reasons and uselessness” their presence was further cut down to four weeks in 1992 and two weeks since 1993.804 By 1993, political delegates were formally downgraded and blended with the category of experts (asiantuntijat). However, from 1995 they have been gathered in the new category “special advisers” in lists submitted to the United Nations, while either visually or nominally (erityisasiantuntijat) being detached from the rest of the experts in domestic white books. In addition, from 1995, the party affiliation of the political delegates has been spelled out in delegation lists submitted to the United Nations, an exceptional practice in regard to delegations to intergovernmental organisations. A statement on party affiliation is more meaningful than the –––––––––––––– 802 Zilliacus 1978a: 16, 19. 803 Osmo Apunen, personal communication. 804 Personal communication.
339 CHAPTER 3 earlier hotchpotch of individual attributes like “Deputy Chief Information Officer” or “Licentiate in Philosophy”. It serves as a functional equivalent for the practice used by other countries to indicate delegates’ parliamentary status. Legislator Anni Sinnemäki was merely listed as “Representative of the Green League of Finland” among other party representatives in the delegation to the sixtieth session of the General Assembly in 2005.805 This is a unique incidence of concealment of the parliamentary status of a Finnish delegate formally appointed as representative for a parliamentary party. A bizarre occurrence is the fictitious stylisation of the political delegates to the fiftieth session of the General Assembly as members of the legislative branch of government. In the white book, all of these delegates are not merely identified by party affiliation, but also titled kansanedustaja, literally meaning “people’s representative”, the Finnish term for “Member of Parliament”. None of these representatives occupied a seat in parliament, and none of them had ever done so in his or her life. Thus, the term kansanedustaja was stretched to function as denomination for “represent- ative for parliament” or “people’s representative” in an extended sense.806 This was a symbolic demonstration of commitment to the cause of the world organisation on the occasion of the half-centennial anniversary of the United Nations concurrent with that demonstrated twenty-five years earlier. However, this commitment evidently suffered from a lack of substance. This is remarkable for a country in which the declaratory character of much in United Nations politics and the misuse of the world organisation as a stage for plots targeted at the satisfaction of domestic audiences is frequently criticised for increasing the sense of unreality surrounding the world organisation. In the end, the erosion of the concept ‘parliamentarian’ captures the essence of Finnish delegation history at the General Assembly. Confusion of terms like ‘parliamentarians’, ‘parliamentary representatives’ and ‘party representatives’, as well as misleading conceptions regarding ‘non-
–––––––––––––– 805 See Yhdistyneiden kansakuntien yleiskokous (white book), all vol. (i.e. 11–53 (1956– 1998) plus the manuscripts for 1999 and 2000 available in the library of the Foreign Ministry; (Provisional) (List of) Delegations to the Session of the General Assembly 48–60 (1993–2005). 806 Yhdistyneiden kansakuntien yleiskokous 50 (1995): 5. The understanding of kansanedustaja as fully synonymous with ‘member of parliament’ has been confirmed by Special Researcher Eivor Sommerdahl of the Research Institute for the Languages of Finland. In the official delegation list for 1995 published by the United Nations, solely the party affiliation of the Finnish political delegates is given.
340 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS parliamentarian’ can be traced to a number of documents from the 1970s.807 However, as yet, the foreign ministry’s orchestration of a parade of Potemkin villagers in New York in autumn 1995 marks the pinnacle of the Finnish loss of parliament.
Outlook According to the current strategy paper on the United Nations by the Finnish foreign service, “the participation of representatives of political parties in the delegation to the General Assembly is a tradition that should be continued”.808 This statement is noteworthy in several respects. (1) It was made against the backdrop of the ambiguous history sketched above. (2) It was made after the end of the Cold War and after attained membership in the European Union had largely removed incentives for Finnish governments to maintain a Nordic profile in international relations. (3) It was made after a process of re-evaluation of the United Nations for Finnish politics, which led to the dissolution of the Advisory Board on UN affairs in 1991, to the categorical downgrade of political delegates in 1993, and to the termination of the annual publication of a white book documenting Finnish activities in the General Assembly in 1998. (4) It was also made after a first-time instance of suspension of political representation in a delegation to the General Assembly. In both 1999 and 2006, years in which Finland held the EU presidency, the inclusion of European Union representatives in the ranks of the Finnish delegation in effect ousted the domestic political delegation. The reason for this was the foreign ministry’s challenging task of coordinating EU activities and the belief that the simultaneous presence of domestic political delegates and EU representatives would be difficult to manage. By 2009, the Swedes have abstained from including parliamentarians at times of their EU presidency by the same token. The factors mentioned above constitute potential threats to the Finnish model of political delegation, which in all ambivalence is encapsulated in the neologism ‘polegate’. At the same time, there is both a long and adaptive domestic tradition and a recent international trend sustaining the political underpinning of diplomatic delegations. While the –––––––––––––– 807 Memorandum by Bengt Bergman, editor, no date [spring 1972], FMAH, 113 Ö, vol. 1400; Ernest Granskog. “Skolning av FN-delegater.” Österbottningen (25 January 1974); letters by Foreign Minister Ahti Karjalainen to various parliamentary parties, 23 January 1975, FMAH, 113 B 1, N.S. vol. 10. 808 Ulkoasiainhallinnon YK-strategia. Helsinki: Foreign Ministry, 2001. 11. Available at
341 CHAPTER 3 focus of the reform discussion on international institutions, triggered by the end of the Cold War, concerns effectiveness, the issues of representation and participation have also been put on the agenda. When the role of civil society in United Nations activities is discussed, the traditional participation of “representatives of political parties” in Finnish delegations largely substitutes for what could have been a participation of civic associations.809 According to a recent international report on parliamentary involvement in foreign affairs, the Eduskunta asserts that in Finland “representatives of the parliament are usually included in the government delegations to ministerial or summit meetings which conduct important international negotiations”.810 Not only does this claim leave the initiative to the government and the question open of how ‘importance’ is to be understood, but in the Finnish context the seemingly evident implication of the expression ‘representative of parliament’ is far from clear; it might serve as a camouflage concept for both members and proxies of parliament. Reportedly, Speaker of Parliament Paavo Lipponen redescribed the matter in a less ambiguous way: “The Finnish Parliament […] was active in strengthening parliamentary networks and the parliamentary dimension of multilateral organizations, for instance by including its members in national delegations to global negotiations.”811 However, the participation of a legislator in the delegation to the sixtieth session of the General Assembly was one of the exceptions to the established rule, not a new beginning of parliamentary participation in Finnish work for the world organisation. The present Finnish practice of forming delegations to the General Assembly has its origin in the time of the Cold War. It was an element of the then-developed political fabric around presidential rule, derived to satisfy government and party interests in international relations, notwithstanding the weak position of the Eduskunta and its Foreign Affairs Committee, in a manner as low-key and de-politicised as possible.812 Moreover, it was a solution that made the exit of parliamentarians acceptable, a quasi-parliamentarian demonstration of loyalty as a substitute for involvement. In the meantime, as new questions and challenges arise, –––––––––––––– 809 Ulkoasiainhallinnon YK-strategia 2001: 11–12. 810 Parliamentary Involvement in International Affairs: A report by the Inter-parliamentary Union (IPU) to the Second World Conference of Speakers of Parliaments, New York, 7–9 September, 2005. Geneva: Inter-parliamentary Union, 2005. 14. Available at
342 PARLIAMENT AND UN DELEGATIONS some institutional answers have been given in Finland; for example the disempowerment of the President and the liquidation of the Advisory Board on UN Affairs. Whether the polegate system as a virtual representation of parliament is an adequate solution for the future remains to be discussed. Inquiries into participatory challenges as well as evaluations of the prevailing Finnish practice would have to develop precise notions of the status of parties and parliamentary party groups in what Frank Ankersmit has called the “aesthetic gap between voter and representative (the state)”.813
–––––––––––––– 813 Frank Ankersmit. Political Representation. Stanford: University Press, 2002. 118.
343
4. THE PARTICIPATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY
SCANDINAVIAN MODEL REVISITED: DENMARK The pioneer country of civil society representation in delegations to world organisations was Denmark. She was the only country at the first Assembly of the League of Nations to accredit a delegate solely as representative of a voluntary organisation. Appointed was Henni Forchhammer, president of the Danish National Council of Women and vice-president of the International Council of Women. A representative of the National Council served on Danish delegations throughout the history of the League of Nations. The notion of UN delegations as composite units with seats for various parties or groups was clearer in Denmark than in the other Nordic countries. Danish appointments to the United Nations were characterised by transparency and consequence, a feature that did not escape civil society appointments. Although not even Danish appointments were free of ambiguity, never was it unclear what or whom a particular civil society representative of Denmark actually stood for. This is in particular contrast to Norway, but also to the case in Sweden. In Denmark there were no interruptions in the appointment of representatives of particular societal groups. Such features and sure-handedness justify regard for Denmark as a model of civil society inclusion among its Scandinavian members. The background for the strong position of civil society organisations on delegations is a consequence of the strong position associations hold in Danish society. State interventionism during the First World War and later, during the economic depression of the inter-war years, functioned as a catalyst for a tightly-knit interaction between civil society, on the one hand, and politicians and civil servants on the other. This tradition of ‘administrative corporatism’ was consolidated in the postwar decades, but has been subject to change since the 1980s when the direction pointed toward increased pluralism of civil society organisations and the decreasing institutionalisation of their part in political- administrative decision making processes.1
–––––––––––––– 1 Peter Munk Christiansen, Asbj rn Sonne N rgaard and Niels Chr. Sidenius. “Dänemark: Verbände und Korporatismus auf Dänisch.” Verbände und Verbandssystem in Westeuropa. Werner Reutter and Peter R tters (eds). Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 2001. 51–74, at 62 (quote), 51, 71.
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Two unequal pillars of Danish civil society representation Danish participation at the San Francisco Conference and in the work of the United Nations Preparatory Commission was limited, and no associations were represented on the respective delegations. The Danish National Council of Women requested to be included in the delegation to the founding conference and was subsequently turned down.2 Even the first foreign ministry-prepared draft proposal on the composition of the delegation to the General Assembly, although explicitly borrowing from the Danish tradition at the League of Nations, did not suggest the appointment of a representative for women’s organisations (or any other associations).3 However, the one to bring up comment on this draft was the former permanent representative to the League of Nations (and later permanent representative to the UN), William Borberg. According to female delegate Bodil Begtrup, he was “a true women’s rights man” (en sand kvindesagsmand).4 A memorandum penned by Borberg included the remark: “One might even find it appropriate to appoint a woman as expert (social matters).”5 The director general of the foreign ministry, Frants Hvass, agreed with this idea, stating that in the case none of the nominated party representatives were women, a female representative should be appointed anyhow. He referred to the League delegation and even suggested considering appointing her ‘alternate representative’, not merely a technical expert (i.e. ‘adviser’). The posting of a representative for women is listed in his summary as well, and there is a handwritten notation that reads: “poss. Mrs. Begtrup”.6 With the foreign ministry considerations for female representation on the delegation centring on women per se, and not on their organisations, the Danish women’s organisations were alert and ready to lobby. In a joint letter to the foreign minister, the chairwomen of the Danish National Council of Women and the Danish sections of Open Door International and the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom maintained that it was significant for women to get as much access as possible to delegations representing Denmark, and suggested themselves as well as Begtrup as delegates to the coming session of the General Assembly.7 The Danish Women’s Society (Dansk Kvindesamfund) followed suit in a –––––––––––––– 2 Begtrup 1986: 46. 3 Memorandum by Axel Serup, 15 November 1945, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1946. 4 Begtrup 1986: 67. 5 Memorandum by Borberg, 19 November 1945, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1946. 6 Memorandum by Hvass, 11 December 1945, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1946. 7 Letter by Kirsten Gloerfelt-Tarp, Else Zeuthen, and Anna Westergaard, 20 December 1945, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1946.
346 THE PARTICIPATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY partially identical letter, putting forth the chairwoman and the vice chairwoman of the National Council, Kirsten Gloerfelt-Tarp and Bodil Begtrup, respectively, as suggested delegates.8 It seems these letters had yet to find an audience in the foreign ministry when a memorandum was prepared on the “possible appointment of a female member to the delegation to the first General Assembly of the United Nations”. In the exhaustive working mode characteristic of the Danish foreign ministry, the procedures on the appointment of the female delegates to the League of Nations were revisited. In both 1920 and 1938, the time of a generational shift in the delegation, the Danish National Council of Women had suggested three potential delegates, from among whom the foreign ministry made the final selection. Hence, the author of the memorandum concluded that if the intent was to include a woman in the delegation, a letter calling for nominees should be sent to the National Council.9 However, by the time the letter was on its way, the unprompted suggestions had already been received. Foreign Minister Gustav Rasmussen seems to have sent a reply only to the National Council, informing the organisation that Begtrup had been selected as an appointee to the delegation.10 Nonetheless, when Begtrup herself was contacted and invited to participate in an informational meeting, mention was made that she had been selected after being requested by name on behalf of four women’s organisations.11 Begtrup was placed in the Third Committee, which dealt with social matters.12 By summer 1946, Bodil Begtrup inquired of the foreign ministry whether women’s organisations should each submit a new request asking for attachment to the delegation; the initial reply was that the appointment of ‘advisers’ had not yet been decided.13 When the Foreign Minister gave his view, he said he intended to ask the National Council of Women for representation on the delegation once more, whether as an ‘adviser’ or ‘alternate representative’ remained to be seen.14 The organisations that had asked for representation last time now submitted a joint letter requesting
–––––––––––––– 8 Letter to the foreign ministry, 21 December 1945, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1946. 9 Memorandum by Ernst Meinstorp, 21 December 1945, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1946. 10 Letter, 22 December 1945, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1946. 11 Letter by the foreign ministry, 28 December 1945, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1946. 12 Cable by Rasmussen to the foreign ministry, 11 January 1946, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1946. 13 Memorandum by Axel Serup, 29 June 1946, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.b.1946. 14 Memorandum by Director General Frants Hvass, 8 July 1946, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.b.1946.
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representatives of women’s organisations as alternates or advisers become members of the Danish delegation to the United Nations, as we find it reasonable for a delegation that is to represent Danish society in international negotiations to consist of both women and men. They suggested the same four women named earlier.15 Similar letters were directed to the foreign ministry annually, but as Begtrup was regularly reappointed, by 1948 the women’s organisations confined themselves to suggesting Begtrup “as candidate for the job”.16 The point of departure was different for the Federation of Danish Trade Unions, which had no tradition of representation and was not even considered when the delegation to the first session of the General Assembly was planned. The letter from Louis Saillant, the secretary-general of the World Federation of Trade Unions, to the Danish foreign minister, in which he sought support for his organisation’s cause of getting its own representation in United Nations organs, as well as trade union representation in the national delegation of Denmark, came too late to be taken into consideration.17 However, the issue of trade union representation was raised by the social democratic and communist delegates at a meeting of the Danish delegation the day of the General Assembly’s opening. Having noted that the Norwegian delegation included a trade union representative, they suggested Denmark consider a similar arrangement. In the discussion that followed there was agreement that the delegation (which included the Foreign Minister) was not entitled to enlarge its composition, at least not by a ‘representative’ or ‘alternate representative’. There was consensus to take the matter in its present standing to the government and to parliament. It was believed employers’ organisations might seek representation as well, and it was thus decided that the issue would be taken up again after closer scrutiny of the official list of delegates.18 At the next meeting, the Foreign Minister described that the Norwegian delegation included a trade union and an employers’ representative, the French delegation included a trade union representative,
–––––––––––––– 15 Letter by Danske Kvinders Nationalraad, Dansk Kvindesamfund, Den aabne D r and Kvindernes internationale Liga for Fred og Frihed, Dansk Afdeling to the foreign ministry, 16 July 1946, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.b.1946. 16 Letter by the four women’s organisations, 10 June 1948, 16 July 1946, NAC, FM 1946– 72, 119.H.2.b.1946. 17 Letter by Saillant to the Foreign Minister, 4 January 1946, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1946. The letter was transmitted to Rasmussen by the Danish legation in Paris and not discussed before the delegation meeting, 17 January 1946, cf. the minutes of the meeting, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2./46/Supplement. 18 Minutes of delegation meeting, 10 January 1946, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2./46/Supplement.
348 THE PARTICIPATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY and Russia and Great Britain included a minister or high-ranking official on labour issues. Most of the Danish delegates expressed their opinions, but no decision was made. It was claimed that appointment to an ongoing conference presupposed positive proof that there was an acute need for a trade union representative, for example. The suggestion was made to adjourn the issue until the second part of the first session.19 This stance was also Rasmussen’s position when the matter was discussed at the delegation meeting five days later, even though he had in the meantime received the letter from Saillant, as well as a bundle of documents compiled by former Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations Gladwyn Jebb in regard to the request of the World Federation of Trade Unions. Rasmussen found that representation of all significant parties on the delegation, unusual in international comparison, might suffice for the moment. Moreover, he indicated that he was troubled by the idea of possible requests for the representation of big business. Nonetheless, the communist and social democratic delegates argued for the inclusion of a trade union representative as soon as possible; Ib N rlund called for the introduction of trade union representation on a regular basis, and Hartvig Frisch suggested that balance with employers would not be required in case of the appointment of an ‘adviser’. Frisch maintained that, whereas objections might be raised against independent trade union representation in the General Assembly, the rejection of this view would make it natural to accept their representation in the delegations of individual countries. Upon Rasmussen’s suggestion that a letter on the matter be written to the Prime Minister and that he would also take it upon himself to inform the government orally, a “compromise” was found according to which Rasmussen would not make additional mention of the matter unless disagreements in the cabinet were notable.20 In a subsequent delegation meeting, the other cabinet minister on the delegation, agrarian liberal politician Per Federspiel, expressed concern about steps being taken that might set a precedent for the position of the International Labour Organisation. It was therefore decided to suggest an ad hoc appointment, which would not bind the government in regard to future sessions.21
–––––––––––––– 19 Minutes of delegation meeting, 12 January 1946, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2./46/Supplement. This presentation of data was later supplemented, e.g. a Soviet trade union representative was identified, see Rasmussen’s cable to the foreign ministry, 23 January 1946, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1946. 20 Minutes of delegation meeting, 17 January 1946, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2./46/Supplement. 21 Minutes of delegation meeting, 19 January 1946, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2./46/Supplement.
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The letter to the Prime Minister provided a detailed description of the campaign of the World Federation of Trade Unions, of the Norwegian example, and of the Danish delegation’s internal discussions. From the letter it becomes clear why those in favour of trade union representation were against supplementary information being provided by the Foreign Minister. Despite the reserved attitude held by many of the delegates and not least the representatives of the liberal agrarian minority government, the overall suggestion by the delegation was “that a trade union representative, who can be consulted by the delegation at the current convention of the General Assembly, be appointed ad hoc as technical adviser”. Moreover, the delegation acknowledged the “value of being able to get direct access to such views and the special expertise that Danish trade unions represent”, going on to suggest “this question be taken up for discussion by the government” as quickly as possible.22 Parallel to these discussions in London, communists and social democrats in Copenhagen lobbied for the inclusion of a representative of the Federation of Danish Trade Unions (De Samvirkende Fagforbund) in the delegation, directing high-profiled requests to Prime Minister Knud Kristensen. Thereupon, Kristensen independently gave the order that an overview of other countries’ inclusion of labour representatives be presented, while also asking for the foreign minister’s opinion. As the delegation’s letter arrived late, it was a telegram that formed the basis for decision making. This telegram by Rasmussen gave a more correct and detailed picture of trade union and labour ministry participation on other countries’ delegations than the profile discussed earlier. Hence, he renewed his request to include a Danish trade union representative as “technical adviser ad hoc” in light of international patterns. Kristensen then asked the director general of the foreign ministry to contact the trade union chairman, Eiler Jensen, to arrange for the appointment of a trade union representative as technical adviser to the delegation.23 It was Jensen himself, who was appointed two weeks into the session of the General Assembly. However, his stay in London lasted merely two full days. A few days after his return to Copenhagen, he was replaced on the delegation by another trade union representative.24 –––––––––––––– 22 Letter by Rasmussen to the Prime Minister, 19 January 1946, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1946. 23 Memorandum by Hvass, 25 January 1946, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1946; for the quote: cable by Rasmussen to the foreign ministry (with a request to inform the Prime Minister), 23 January 1946, ibid. The requests were submitted by the chairman of the communist party Aksel Larsen and former social democratic prime minister Vilhelm Buhl. 24 Note to the Danish news agency Ritzaus Bureau, 25 January 1946, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1946; minutes of the delegation meeting, 26 January 1946, NAC, FM 1946–72, (continued)
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When Jensen asked Rasmussen, some time after this, whether he could expect a request for the appointment of a trade union nominee for the second part of the first session, he learned that no decision had been made, but that he could expect to participate as technical adviser.25 Although he was appointed in this capacity, the ad hoc-nature of the appointment was nonetheless apparent. When plans for the future composition of the delegation were aired in the foreign ministry in spring 1947, it was observed that the number of trade union representatives had already dropped at the second part of the first session of the General Assembly, and it was further argued: As the questions regarding the World Federation of Trade Unions, which were probably the main reason for the enlistment of a consultative representative of the Federation of Danish Trade Unions to London in January 1946, are now basically exhausted, it will probably be hardly necessary to include such a representative in the delegation. The foreign ministry planned to neither invite the trade unions for participation nor to reject their request.26
Ambiguities, challenges, and outward appearance Women representative Bodil Begtrup was reappointed every year until 1952. Apart from the first part of the first session, she was always appointed to the category of ‘alternate representative’. The background of her promotion is not clear, but it might be related to the fact that she had become the first chairwoman of the United Nations (Sub-)Commission on the Status of Women. In the same period, the other civil society seat alternated between trade union chairman Eiler Jensen and his deputy Ejnar Nielsen, who were always appointed to the category ‘adviser’. Despite such consistent appointments, two factors at the time had the potential to disturb the continuity of civil society representation. First, a reduced size of the delegation or a limited time budget of the routine appointees of civil society at times led to considerations on the transfer of the representational task to a priori members of the delegation, and thus to a more loose form of representation. Second, the representatives in question had a background rich in attributes that invited redefinitions of the delegation order.
–––––––––––––– 119.H.2./46/Supplement; cable by Rasmussen to the foreign ministry, 28 January 1946, 119.H.2.a.1946; note to Ritzaus Bureau, 1 February 1946, ibid. 25 Memorandum by Rasmussen, 27 May 1946, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.D.9.a. 26 Memorandum by Finn Friis, 16 April 1947, with comments 7 May 1947, NAC, FM 1946– 72, 119.D.9.a.
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The first point became an issue when the delegation to the second part of the third session of the General Assembly had to be nominated. The foreign ministry planned reduced Danish participation, and it was suggested that no women’s or trade union representative be sent to New York due to the “special circumstances” of this convention.27 At a meeting of delegates to the first part of the session, Begtrup and Jensen said they were unable and that it was unnecessary that they attend the second part of the session. Both suggested their representational task be transferred to other members of the delegation. Begtrup underlined the importance for a “representative of women” to be on board and “suggested to possibly let Mrs. Wright take care of women’s interests in the delegation”. Nonny Wright was the secretary of the permanent Danish mission to the United Nations – a diplomat, not a representative of women’s organisations. At the same time, Jensen suggested social democratic parliamentarian Alsing Andersen as someone who “could possibly take care of matters of trade union interest”.28 Whereas Begtrup actually ended up attending the second part of the third session, Jensen did not. There is a variety of evidence in regard to the representatives’ own multi-functional backgrounds and the resulting potential to confuse representation. Eiler Jensen was, in addition to his position as president of the Federation of Danish Trade Unions, also a member of parliament, but he was always listed in the former function in both national and international delegation lists, never as legislator. Hence, unlike the trade union seat on the Norwegian delegation that was lost as a consequence of a similarly overlapping background and with nominal accreditation being listed as parliamentarian, the Danish seat always remained clearly identifiable as belonging to the trade unions. However, things were different with the women’s seat. Until the first part of the third session of the General Assembly, Begtrup was always identified as the representative of the Danish National Council of Women. Once she had become Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Reykjavík in the beginning of 1949, delegation rosters listed her by her professional title. Before Begtrup had even begun her new job as the first female top-diplomat of Denmark, women’s representation on the delegation was put into question. Foreign ministry official Finn T. B. Friis reasoned as follows: “Mrs. Begtrup’s appointment as civil servant in the foreign service might imply that the question of Danish women’s organisations’ by now time-honoured right to request a female delegation member possibly ought –––––––––––––– 27 Memorandum by Finn Friis, 22 December 1948, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119. H.2.b.1948–49. 28 Minutes of the meeting in the foreign ministry, 10 January 1949, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119. H.2.b.1948–49.
352 THE PARTICIPATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY to be reconsidered.”29 In reality, Begtrup seems always to have considered herself the delegate of the National Council of Women, and the fact that she resigned from her post as the organisation’s chairwoman when becoming an ambassador makes her listing as Ambassador seem a nominal matter of title, and not an indicator of representation.30 This type of accreditation continued once it had become practice to mention the female delegate’s occupation instead of her affiliation with the National Council of Women. Only after one of the subsequent delegates had become the chairwoman of the Council was the organisational title (and, thus, background) publicised again.31 In connection with other changes in the delegation order at the twenty-first session, the Danish National Council of Women was again mentioned in delegation lists as the organisation being represented. From then on, the National Council (or its successor organisation, the Women’s Council, Kvinnerådet) has always been listed by name. This naming strengthened the identity of the seat, but posed the danger of reinforcing segregation from the main body of the delegation. At the same time as the organisation had its nominal return, the women’s seat was downgraded to the category of ‘adviser’. Whereas the parliamentarians, who shared this fate, reinstalled themselves as ‘alternate representatives’ at the following session, the women’s organisations’ seat has remained among ‘advisers’ ever since – no longer privileged over the trade union seat. In the end of the 1940s, downsizing of the delegation endangered civil society participation. In view of financial constraints foreign ministry official Friis noted, in a memorandum on UN delegations, that only by way of exception had the participation of the trade union representative been of considerable significance hitherto, and that it would seem “most natural” to make a cut here. Even the women’s representative might possibly be cancelled in the future, and he suggested it might be considered whether one should continue to ask the National Council of Women for nominations or appoint Begtrup without consultation. In his comment, the former director general of the foreign ministry, Frants Hvass, agreed that the representative for the trade unions be withdrawn, but suggested the women’s representative seat be preserved. In his view: “It will hardly be correct – or politically feasible – at this time to exclude the women’s organisations from sending a representative.” A request by women’s
–––––––––––––– 29 Memorandum by Finn Friis, 22 December 1948, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.b.1948–49. 30 Begtrup 1986: 52. 31 This applies to Gudrun Refslund Thomsen in 1962 and 1963. However, when her predecessor as chairwoman of the Council, Else-Merete Ross, was a UN delegate in 1959 this information was not included in the delegation lists.
353 CHAPTER 4 organisations to appoint Begtrup as a delegate was also received by the foreign ministry, even though such a nomination had not been solicited.32 When the ministry, in 1952, simply informed the National Council that it intended to appoint Begtrup to the delegation, the Council agreed but at the same time informed the ministry it wanted to retain the right to stand free in regard to future nominations.33 When Friis, at that time, had to prepare an overview of the Danish delegation practice, he mentioned parliamentarians and “one member appointed on the suggestion of the women’s organizations”. However, he made no mention of the trade union delegate who remained part of all Danish delegations to the General Assembly.34 He participated in 1949, and when the issue of cancellation was raised once again in 1950, the delegate in question had already made preparations for participation on the delegation. It was therefore suggested by the foreign ministry’s adviser in international law, Georg Cohn, to accept the trade unionist for the coming session and to reconsider the issue of trade union and women’s organisations representation for the following year. Foreign Minister Rasmussen agreed to this suggestion,35 but there is no indication that such reconsideration occurred. A paper by the permanent mission suggests that both the trade union and women’s representatives were more seriously involved in the practical work of the delegation than many of the political delegates.36 A member of the foreign service, Begtrup might appear the exception. However, when Foreign Minister Jens Otto Krag suggested considering “a completely new order” of the Danish delegation some years later, he noted his impression that women’s organisations’ representatives had been among the most capable delegates, referring in particular to Esther Ammundsen and Gudrun Refslund Thomsen.37 Despite this praise, the officer in charge in the ministry came to the conclusion that it was no longer objectively necessary “to have a proper representative for women in the delegation” because other women had actually been members of the delegation during the last years in addition to the delegate sent by the –––––––––––––– 32 Memorandum by Friis, 15 June 1949 (including comments by Hvass, 30 June 1949, and no date), NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.D.9.a. 33 Memorandum by Per Overbeck, 30 June 1975, NAC, FM 1973–88, 119.H.2.a.1975. 34 Finn Friis. “Elements for reply to the questionnaire attached to document SS/SC.I/1.” NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.D.7. 35 Note by Georg Cohn and resolution by Foreign Minister Rasmussen, 20 June 1950, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.D.9.a. 36 Memorandum, 1 December 1950, NAC, PM, Delivery of 1974, 119.D.9; cf. Memorandum (probably by William Borberg, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1952. 37 Memorandum by Krag, 11 June 1959, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.D.9.a.
354 THE PARTICIPATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY women’s organisations. Nonetheless, nothing changed.38 Nor were any changes made in regard to the regular appointment of a trade union representative. Already in the mid-1950s, the president of the Federation of Trade Unions, Eiler Jensen, failed to show up at two consecutive sessions. In the beginning of the 1960s he broke his own record by not attending five consecutive sessions, only once being replaced by another trade union delegate. Trade union representation was not called into question, despite the striking practice demonstrated by its “permanent adviser”.39 Whereas the president of the Federation of Trade Unions was always invited to participate personally or alternatively suggest someone else, in the period 1953 to 1980, the Danish National Council of Women was always asked to suggest three to four appropriate candidates, from whom the ministry would choose an appointee. There was concern in the ministry that one might be bound by a single nomination and left without the possibility to check the suitability of the offered replacement.40 However, a practice was introduced by the mid-1960s according to which the chairwoman of the National Council submitted by mail a ‘neutral’ list of names in alphabetical order. Only in a subsequent telephone conversation was the chairwoman to reveal her preferences to the respective foreign ministry official, upon which the ministry would then base its appointment. “Outward appearances” (optiske grunde) were explicitly mentioned by one of the chairwomen as among the reasons for being listed as a women organisations’ nominee.41 That said, these steps were at the request of the National Council, not the foreign ministry; the practice of asking for alternative nominations became pointless for the foreign ministry in this way. By 1975, an official suggested women be granted the right to specific nominations, a right that was already being utilised by trade unions and even youth organisations by that time.42 Despite the intervention, this particular discrimination of women was not adjusted before another five years had passed.43 Whether this system of
–––––––––––––– 38 Memorandum by V.U. Hammershaimb, 12 February 1960, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.D.9.a; resolution by Krag, 7 March 1960, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119. D.9.a. 39 The quote is taken from a letter from Jensen to the foreign ministry, 5 September 1966, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1966 40 Memorandum by Per Overbeck, 30 June 1975, NAC, FM 1973–88, 119.H.2.a.1975. 41 Confidential memorandum by Gunnar Seidenfaden on telephone conversation with Gudrun Refslund Thomsen, 8 July 1966, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1966; on this occasion, probably the first instance of two-pronged nomination, the telephone conversation preceded the letter; cf. letter by Thomsen to the foreign ministry, 2 August 1966, ibid. 42 Memorandum by Per Overbeck, 30 June 1975, NAC, FM 1973–88, 119.H.2.a.1975. 43 See the letter by Foreign Minister Kjeld Olesen to the Danish National Council of Women, 11 May 1981, NAC, FM 1973–88, 119.H.2.a.1981.
355 CHAPTER 4 surplus nominations might have functioned also as an instrument put in place by the leadership of the Danish National Council of Women to buffer internal demands for representation is a question that cannot be answered from the available records.
The long and winding road to the inclusion of a youth delegate A remark by Georg Cohn, the foreign ministry’s expert on international law, was probably the first time the idea of including a youth representative on the delegation was voiced. According to the minutes of a meeting of the Danish delegation in Copenhagen in February 1949, Cohn proposed an international discussion to address the composition of delegations. He argued for “a somewhat more multi-sided representation of various groups of the population”, thereby suggesting in particular that “one ought to think of representation for women, for workers, for young people, etc.”44 The words emphasised here are Cohn’s handwritten insertions in the minutes. No one followed up on the idea at this time. It was not until 1965 that youth organisations themselves started lobbying for representation on the Danish delegation to the General Assembly. At a weekend seminar arranged by the world federalist organisation Een Verdens Ungdom, thirty-two youth leaders from the island of Bornholm adopted a resolution, making the claim that it is natural that youth organisations get the opportunity to exert direct influence on the policy pursued also in this field, and as a consequence thereof we suggest the government allow youth to be represented in the Danish UN delegation, with the said representative being nominated by the Danish Youth Council [Dansk Ungdoms Fællesråd]. This suggestion was coupled with the general recommendation to a new procedure for composing the delegation, one that aimed to secure a closer connection to the population. The idea was to staff the delegation with “experts elected by the people”, the candidates being nominated by organisations such as the Danish United Nations Association, the Youth Council, and others.45 In the foreign ministry’s reply it was argued that the existing delegation order, with representatives of the major parties, a representative for the women’s movement and of the trade union movement, respectively, seemed to do justice to the quest for the closest possible contact between the population and the delegation. The message
–––––––––––––– 44 Minutes of the delegation meeting, 23.2.49, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.b.1948–49. 45 Resolution, 17 January 1965, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1964.
356 THE PARTICIPATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY was: “Unfortunately, the foreign ministry does not see any possibility to further enlarge the delegation.”46 Three and a half years later, when the international youth revolt reached its zenith, a new request was registered with the foreign ministry. This time it was the Danish Youth Council itself that asked for participation. In a letter to Foreign Minister Poul Hartling, dated the day of the opening of the General Assembly, the Council called on the government to consider including “a youth representative” on the delegation. The request was augmented by pointing to then current youth issues on the agenda of international organisations and to the observation that associations could be represented on the delegation. It was claimed that such representation would strengthen the position of the United Nations “among youth organisations – and, thus, youth – to the benefit of foreign policy debate and interest in these circles”.47 Hartling’s reply was understanding in tone, but unapproachable in substance. On the one hand, he pointed to the complexity of decision making processes and claimed that organisational view points were continuously fed into departmental policy making. He mentioned the ‘party channel’ on the delegation as an additional possibility to “directly” make their views effective. On the other hand, he described the participation of the trade union federation and women’s organisations on the delegation as a firmly rooted tradition not transferable to other sectors of society, as the all-purpose profile of the United Nations would attract myriads of organisations, leading to an inexpedient enlargement of the delegation.48 Some months later, the Youth Council requested the government give Danish youth representation in the delegation to international meetings, in which important youth problems are addressed, such as in the Danish UN delegation to the UN General Assembly 1969/1970, where youth problems will be on the agenda.49 It seems this resolution was not received by the foreign ministry until the following year.50 By that time the initiatives of youth organisations to gain
–––––––––––––– 46 Letter by the foreign ministry, 4 February 1965, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1964. 47 Letter by Tue Rohrsted to Hartling, 24 September 1968, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1968. 48 Letter by Hartling to the Danish Youth Council, 17 October 1968, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1968. 49 Resolution adopted at the council meeting of the Danish Youth Council, 17/18 May 1969, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.D.9.a. 50 Letter by the Danish Youth Council to the foreign ministry, 23 March 1970, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.D.9.a; cf. Memorandum by Bent S ndergaards, 13 April 1970, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.D.9.a.
357 CHAPTER 4 access to the UN delegation coincided with global preparations for the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations, to be held in 1970, with the activation of young people as one of its foci. In the resolution preceding the celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary, the General Assembly invited the “Governments of Member States to consider the inclusion of representatives of youth in their delegations to the twenty-fifth session”.51 The subsequent memorandum produced in the foreign ministry found the points made in the 1968 letter to the Youth Council still valid. Nonetheless, it went on to say that Denmark had supported the resolution on the celebration, that the activation of youth was a central issue, and that there was a substantial interest in the inclusion of a youth representative, as the resolutions to be adopted by the World Youth Assembly held in New York in July 1970 were to be presented to the General Assembly later that year. The memorandum suggested appointing a youth delegate who would have also participated in the World Youth Assembly, and made reference to the General Assembly resolution on the event of the anniversary celebration, underlining that this was to be a one-time appointment. Some reflections of a general nature were also made: The employer’s association might sooner or later ask for representation, and this would be hard to deny in view of trade union participation. The request of the Youth Council, which was regarded “well-founded in the concrete situation”, was seen as difficult to reject, not least in view of the participation of women’s representatives.52 Such a context entailed the seed to a more permanent representation of youth than the temporary inclusion actually suggested. In effect, the Contact Committee for Youth Organisations and State Administration (Kontaktudvalg mellem ungdomsorganisationerne og stats- administrationen) was authorised to propose a delegate to the General Assembly, who would also serve as the Danish representative at the World Youth Assembly.53 Development expert Uffe Torm, who later went on to be editor of the journal FN-orientering (UN-orientation), was chosen to represent the Danish Youth Council at the events in New York.54 With this appointment in the anniversary year 1970, Denmark became the forerunner of youth representation in the General Assembly, together with Ghana, –––––––––––––– 51 "2499 (XXIV): Celebration of the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the United Nations.” Resolutions and Decisions Adopted by the General Assembly During Its Session 24 (1969): 1–3. 52 Memorandum by Bent S ndergaards, 13 April 1970, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.D.9.a. 53 Letter from Foreign Minister Poul Hartling to the Danish Youth Council, 22 May 1970, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.D.9.a; cf. on the World Youth Assembly: Office of Public Information. Everyman’s United Nations: A Summary of the Activities of the United Nations during the Five-year period 1966–1970. New York: United Nations, 1971. 135–136. 54 Cf. on Torm: "Ungdomsdelegaten.” Politiken (16 September 1970).
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Tanzania, the United States, and Yugoslavia.55 However, unlike these other countries but in concert with the Netherlands and Norway, which followed suit in 1971, Denmark has had youth delegates ever since. In his report from the delegation to the General Assembly, Torm described his participation as “not […] 100% successful” due to insufficient preparation means and confusion about his role in a government delegation. However, he regarded the first point as merely a practical matter and the second as having been clarified at a follow-up meeting when the Foreign Minister said the delegation was no hostage of the government’s United Nations policy. Thus, Torm strongly argued for a continuation of sending a youth delegate. His reflections were as follows: I think it is in agreement with something of the best in the democratic tradition of Danish people’s rule [folkstyre] that not only those in power, but also the political opposition as well as popular movements and organisations and different sections of the population are drawn into collaboration in societal matters. The composition of the Danish UN delegation reflects this tradition by including representatives from all larger political parties, workers’ and women’s organisations and in 1970 also from youth organisations. This is a tradition that should be continued, renewed and developed further as an ever-more required counterbalance against the risk of expert and civil servant rule of societal processes, nationally and internationally.56 When Torm presented his report to the Contact Committee for Youth Organisations and State Administration, the foreign ministry representative at the meeting was of the impression that the interest shown in the United Nations by Torm and the committee chairman was not shared by the members of the committee.57 Nonetheless, there was interest in sending a youth delegate to the General Assembly the following year. In 1971, the Youth Council directed a new request for a youth representative to the foreign minister, and the same was done by the organisation Internationalt Forum and the Danish United Nations Association.58 The reply from Foreign Minister Hartling was a negative one, but he offered a compensatory three- to four-week study visit to be attended in the status of observer, without further explaining what the status of such a delegate
–––––––––––––– 55 Supplement 2 to the memorandum, 21 February 1978, NAC, FM 1973–88, 119.D.9.a. 56 Report by youth delegate Uffe Torm, 19 April 1971, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1971. 57 Memorandum by Birger Lehmann Nielsen, 27 April 1971, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1971. 58 Letter by the Danish Youth Council to Hartling, 15 June 1971, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1971; letter by chariman of International Forum Christian Dorph, 19 May 1971, ibid.; letter by the Arne Stinus, Danish United Nations Association, 29 April 1971, ibid.
359 CHAPTER 4 would entail.59 It was later established that such an observer should neither be apprehended as a member of the delegation nor become a permanent institution.60 In his report, the appointed observer defined his task as one “that did not aim at influencing, but at being influenced”. He was pleased with his status and the time span of his visit, whereas later delegates complained that four weeks were too short of a ‘study period’.61 According to a note in the foreign ministry, the appointment process for youth delegates was as follows. The Danish Youth Council asked forty-two national organisations to submit nominations for the position of youth representative. In the first half of the 1970s, approximately fifteen of the organisations answered the request; of the nominees put forth, three were invited for interviews.62 Whereas the selection of candidates rested on the Youth Council in practice, the decision was formally made by the Contact Committee for Youth Organisations and State Administration. From 1979, after the Contact Committee had ceased to exist, the nomination became the responsibility of the Youth Council.63 Every second youth delegate chosen in the 1970s was a student at the Department of Political Science at the University of Århus (which offers a specialty programme in international organisations).64 The Danish youth delegates frequently mentioned collaborating on activities with their Dutch and Norwegian peers. The delegate to the thirty- third session of the General Assembly reportedly took part in daily meetings within this group. However, apart from the anniversary session in 1970, the Danish observer was not included in national or international delegation lists and was merely allowed to stay for a period of four weeks. In contrast, Dutch and Norwegian youth delegates were officially accredited as ‘advisers’ or ‘observers’ on the delegation, and covered the whole session.65 The foreign ministry rejected the proposal that had been put forth by the Danish Youth Council on several occasions; the council –––––––––––––– 59 Letter from Hartling to the Danish Youth Council, 22 June 1971, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.D.9.a. 60 Memorandum by Knud-Arne Eliasen, 21 January 1972, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.D.9.a; cf. memorandum by F. Kiær, 16 September 1972, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1972. 61 Report by Henrik Vestergaard, 17 March 1972, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1971; cf. e.g. report by Hans Korne Rasmussen, 4 February 1973, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1972. 62 Note, 18 July 1974, NAC, FM 1973–88, 119.H.2.a.1974. 63 Letter by the secretary general of the Danish Youth Council, Carsten Andersen, to Foreign Minister Henning Christophersen, 22 May 1979, NAC, FM 1973–88, 119.H.2.a.1979. 64 Report by Bjarne Ibsen, March 1979, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1979. The observation might be added that either all or almost all of them were male. By 1981, the appointed youth delegate was a female, Kirsten Jensen. 65 Report by Bjarne Ibsen, March 1979, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1979.
360 THE PARTICIPATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY had suggested two youth representatives be appointed to thereby enable them to alternate attendance and cover the whole session (as practised in the Norwegian delegation).66 Despite his weaker status, one of the Danish youth delegates had the impression that he was more “obliged” to ministries and youth organisations than his more freestanding Norwegian colleagues were.67 It seems the Danish tradition of assigning seats on the delegation according to stricter terms of organisational affiliation than was the case in Norway balanced out their formal status. The ‘study visit’ model was continued in the following years, and the low status of Danish youth delegates did not prevent diplomats from boasting in United Nations forums that “for the preceding few years a representative of Danish youth organizations had been attached to the Danish delegation to the General Assembly”.68 There was also a chance for the youth delegate to contribute in matters concerning youth, and youth delegates reported to have been allowed to participate in the work of the delegation on equal terms. Yet, whereas policy declarations suggested that youth was no isolated sector of society, but a cross-section relevant in all fields covered by the United Nations, access for representatives of youth was largely limited to youth policy in the narrow sense.69 By 1981, the Youth Council lobbied for upgrade in status for its representative. In a letter to the foreign ministry, the secretary-general of the Council maintained that the youth delegate had in reality acquired a status of equal footing with the delegates of other associations. Not least, he underlined that the youth delegate had delivered the official Danish speech on youth matters. Thus, the following request was directed to the foreign ministry: In order to avoid later problems concerning the status of the representative of the Danish Youth Council at UN General Assemblies, we would like to ask the Minister to get this [de facto status] formalised, so we can act on equal footing with the other interest organisations.70
–––––––––––––– 66 Letter by the secretary general of the Danish Youth Council, Jens Clausager, to Foreign Minister Ove Guldberg, 7 June 1974, NAC, FM 1973–88, 119.H.2.a.1974; reply by Guldberg, 18 July 1974, ibid.; letter by Executive Secretary of the Danish Youth Council Hanne Paulsen to Foreign Minister K. B. Andersen, 18 June 1976, NAC, FM 1973–88, 119.H.2.a.1976; reply by Andersen, 9 July 1976, ibid. 67 Report by Bjarne Ibsen, March 1979, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1979. 68 General Assembly, Third Committee 27 (1972): 413 (Johannes F ns Buhl). 69 Cf. report by youth delegate Max Kruse, 16 January 1975, NAC, FM 1973–88, 119.H.2.a.1974; report by youth delegate Bjarne Ibsen, March 1979, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.H.2.a.1979. 70 Letter by Secretary General of the Danish Youth Council Carsten Andersen to the foreign ministry, 20 May 1981, NAC, FM 1973–88, 119.H.2.a.1981.
361 CHAPTER 4
The foreign ministry merely discussed this in terms of funding a prolonged stay.71 A negative reply was written, but never sent.72 Instead, the Foreign Minister informed the Youth Council that the status was changed from a study visit to participation in accordance with other interest organisations. It was noted that the minister had made clear that this decision was in no way a precedent for other organisations,73 but from that point on, youth representatives were appointed to the official category of ‘advisers’ and included in official delegation lists at all subsequent sessions (apart from the fifty-ninth session, in 2004, and the sessions since 2008). Since 1982, youth organisations have nominated two alternating representatives in accordance with the practice applied for other organisations. In later years the length of these representatives’ stay in New York was reduced to two stays of three weeks in congruence with other organisations and parliamentary representatives.
Industry and cosmetics, or ‘How to unlock the gate’ No other civil society organisations gained access to formal representation on Danish delegations to the General Assembly before the end of the 1970s – that is, other than those characterised in the report of a youth delegate as representing “precisely the three large sections of the population: workers, women and youth, that are traditionally underrepresented in the public decision making processes”.74 The triad of civil society representation on the delegation once envisioned by Georg Cohn had become reality by the early 1970s. There was only one other request to increase civil society representation in this period. In 1963, a merchant’s association (the Grosserer-Societetets Komité) asked for representation in the Danish delegation to the General Assembly by pointing to the United Nations increasing relevance for business and by requesting equal treatment with trade unions and women’s organisations. Foreign Minister Per Hækkerup rejected the request, referring to the “deep-seated tradition” in the named cases, pointing to problems of precedence and explaining that there were no direct business representatives on the delegations of other countries. In an internal memorandum it was argued that the comparison did not hold up
–––––––––––––– 71 Memorandum by Hans Grunnet, 1 June 1981, NAC, FM 1973–88, 119.D.9.a; memorandum by J rgen Reimers, 26 June 1981, ibid. 72 Letter to Carsten Andersen, 3 June 1981, NAC, FM 1973–88, 119.D.9.a. 73 Letter from Foreign Minister Kjeld Olesen to Carsten Andersen, 1 July 1981, NAC, FM 1973–88, 119.D.9.a; note, 1 July 1981, ibid. 74 Report by Max Kruse, 16 January 1975, NAC, FM 1973–88, 119.H.2.a.1974.
362 THE PARTICIPATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY because the representative of the women’s organisations “adds to the delegation a certain ‘women’s knowledge’, which it cannot be assumed to have in advance.”75 The memorandum suggesting the appointment of a youth delegate also voiced the opinion that Danish employers might at some point ask for representation, and that this wish would be hard to deny in view of trade union participation.76 By 1974, upon an informal request by the Confederation of Danish Employers (Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening), the bias of the prevailing tradition was made subject to a review in the foreign ministry, with the question asked being: “Why is the Confederation of Danish Employers not represented in UN delegations?” The suggested answer was that no such request had ever been submitted, other than the one query by the Grosserer-Societetets Komité. At the same time, the Norwegian and Swedish practice of at least occasionally including big business was noted.77 Four years later, politicians started wondering aloud about the absence. In a parliamentary inquiry the centrist politician Arne Melchior (Centrum Demokraterne) asked Foreign Minister K. B. Andersen whether he was willing to extend one more invitation to the Confederation of Danish Employers (Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening) to participate on the delegation, an offer he believed the employers had rejected earlier. In the foreign ministry, there was reluctance to expand the delegation, but it was assumed that a rejection might be difficult in view of a ‘labour market balance’ argument. According to the answer Andersen gave in Parliament, there had never been an invitation to the employers, but any request coming from the Confederation would have been subject of consideration.78 Referring to the testimony Andersen gave before Parliament, the director of the Confederation of Danish Employers, Arne Lund, some weeks later requested an open invitation to send representation in all future delegations to the General Assembly, with the right to answer once the agenda of the respective session was known.79 Thereupon, Andersen sent
–––––––––––––– 75 Letter by Foreign Minister Per Hækkerup to the Grosserer-Societetets Komité of 14 May 1963 and memorandum by Jens Christensen of 20 February 1963, NAC, FM 19746–72, 119. D.9.a. 76 Memorandum by Bent S ndergaard, 13 April 1970, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.D.9.a. 77 Memorandum, 30 September 1974, NAC, FM 1973–88, 119.D.9.a; on the background cf. memorandum, 21 February 1978, ibid. 78 Folketingstidende 129 (1977/1978): col. 7202–7203; cf. the background memorandum, 21 February 1978, NAC, FM 1973–88, 119.D.9.a. 79 Letter from Lund to Andersen, 17 April 1978, NAC, FM 1973–88, 119.H.2.a.1978.
363 CHAPTER 4 him the provisional agenda of the coming session, inviting him to nominate an ‘adviser’ for the delegation.80 Lund expressed his gratitude that the Foreign Ministry has introduced a practice […], according to which the Employers’ Confederation ahead of the UN General Assemblies and in light of the agenda for these has the opportunity for representation by an adviser in the Danish delegation, and we look forward to receiving corresponding inquiries in the years to come. However, after having studied the provisional agenda, he rescinded the request for participation in the thirty-third session of the General Assembly.81 Only at the following session did Lund express interest on behalf of the Confederation of Danish Employers, nominating himself as the first delegate.82 Representatives of employers have been represented on practically every Danish delegation to the General Assembly since 1979. Once the employers had been admitted, the next request for participation in the delegation was not long in coming. Shortly before the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly, an official informed a colleague from the foreign ministry that Minister of Social Affairs Ritt Bjerregaard attached great importance to the inclusion of a representative of the Danish Council of Organisations for Disabled People (De Samvirkende Invalideorganisationer), considering the agenda point regarding the International Year of Disabled Persons (1981). Initially, the foreign ministry official suggested that extra-delegation consultation should suffice, but the official from the Ministry of Social Affairs offered cost absorption and argued that overriding political considerations applied in this case. Moreover, he did not insist that “the representative in question needed to be a member of the delegation, if only the purely ‘cosmetic’ was achieved so that the person concerned was present in the UN”. Thereupon the foreign ministry official suggested the following offer be extended. In his words, the disability representative will be able to follow the debates from the gallery, will be able to discuss all issues concerning the International Year of Disabled Persons continually with the Danish delegation, and will be able to expect assistance from the Danish UN mission to establish contacts in UN circles.83
–––––––––––––– 80 Letter from Andersen to the Confederation of Danish Employers, 17 May 1978, NAC, FM 1973–88, 119.H.2.a.1978. 81 Letter from Lund to Andersen, 1 June 1978, NAC, FM 1973–88, 119.H.2.a.1978. 82 Letter from Lund to Foreign Minister Henning Christophersen, 29 June 1979, NAC, FM 1973–88, 119.H.2.a.1979. 83 Memorandum, 26 August 1980, NAC, FM 1973–88, 119.H.2.a.1980.
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The decree on the matter by the Foreign Minister was more generous, but inconsistent. It suggested representation on the delegation in line with that of the National Council of Women, for instance. At the same time, the ministerial decree underlined that this participation only concerned the agenda point of the International Year of Disabled Persons and that the approval was based on the fact that the request came from a government ministry and was combined with an offer to cover the costs incurred.84 Out of worry that a precedent might inadvertently be set for other interest organisations, the nominee Holger Kallehauge was not listed as a delegate and, as clarified by a subsequent memorandum: “strictly factual was not included in the delegation”. Nonetheless, Kallehauge delivered an official speech in the Third Committee, and his appointment marked the beginning of a temporary, informal Nordic scheme of rotation, with a Norwegian disability representative following in 1981, and a Swedish colleague in 1982.85 The records of the foreign ministry suggest that Kallehauge was nominated by disability organisations.86 However, in his own account he remembers that social minister Bjerregaard had decided to send him to the United Nations General Assembly, after his earlier appointment as chairman of the Danish National Committee for the International Year of Disabled Persons. According to Kallehauge: The intention, without having been made explicit, seems to have been that I, as a wheelchair user, in 1980/1981 should come along and demonstrate that Denmark took the UN Year of Disabled Persons solemnly by including handicapped persons in the work.87 Kallehauge maintains he had no idea “the UN discovered me” and even less that he “influenced the UN in any way”. However, he wheeled around United Nations Headquarters for two weeks. Shortly after his return from New York, the attempted display of consensus for the domestic audience was disturbed by the fact that Kallehauge resigned from the Danish
–––––––––––––– 84 Note on the decree of the foreign minister, 30 August 1980, NAC, FM 1973–88, 119.H.2.a.1980. 85 Memorandum, 22 February 1982, NAC, FM 1973–88, 119.D.9.a; cf. on Nordic rotation the letter from Social Minister Bent Hansen to Foreign Minister Kjeld Olesen, 3 February 1982, ibid.; cf. on the anxiety regarding unintentionally setting a precedent the reply by Olesen to Hansen, 23 February 1982, ibid. 86 Cable from Hans Grunnet, foreign ministry to the permanent mission, 16 September 1980, NAC, FM 1973–88, 119.H.2.a.1980. 87 On my request, Mr. Kallehauge had the courtesy to prepare a memorandum on his participation in the Danish UN delegation (in the following referred to as Kallehauge- memorandum). I received it with an accompanying letter, 29 July 2004.
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National Committee and became chairman of The Alternative Committee for the Year of Disabled Persons (Den alternative Handicapårskomité). The background for this was the introduction of means testing for the provision of handicapped services by the sitting government. As recalled by Kallehauge, Bjerregaard was outraged over what she considered a breach of confidence by “her designed protégé”. Hence, a reappointment as delegate to the General Assembly in 1981 was out of question.88 After a change of government and continuous lobbying by Kallehauge for the integration of disability policy in development aid, he returned to the delegation in 1986 and participated for about two and a half weeks in all sessions of the General Assembly in the period 1988 to 2002, as well as in 2006 and 2008. His assignments were to lobby for the cause of disabled persons both within the Danish delegation and within the United Nations system and to pass on information to the Danish and Nordic disability organisations. Moreover, he was allowed to participate in negotiations and drafts related to disability issues, as well as to write and hold the Danish statement. As he recalls, “My contribution was not really censored by the foreign ministry, but read and approved, usually with just a few changes.” His experience with that ‘Danish statement’ shows the potential for interaction of state and civil society actors in international forums that do not foresee the agency of the latter: By and large, the foreign ministry was very liberal in accepting what I proposed, as one referred to that who was speaking was neither the foreign ministry nor the Danish government, but a representative for the Danish disability organisations. The breaking point was statements that could have caused difficulties for the foreign ministry / the government. A demand, which was easy to respect without becoming ineffective, not least because a good and matter-of-fact discussion and a little dexterous wording practically always solved the problems to the satisfaction of both parties. Kallehauge was also obliged to submit his statement to the Ministry of Social Affairs, which he believed to remain sceptical and against his reappointment and would have preferred its own seat on the delegation.89 Kallehauge’s status on the delegation remained unclear and in a letter to this author, he contrasted what he believed would have been a principled and unambiguous Swedish approach with Danish improvisation and pragmatism, as apparent from the history of his participation in the UN delegation.90 It is obvious that the Danish disability organisations’ path to
–––––––––––––– 88 Kallehauge-memorandum. 89 Kallehauge-memorandum. 90 Letter, 29 July 2004.
366 THE PARTICIPATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY participation on the delegations was first dependent on government agencies (initially the Ministry of Social Affairs, then the foreign ministry), and second, on the personality of Holger Kallehauge himself. Despite his name appearing on delegation lists from 1989 onwards, Kallehauge felt that he had not been regarded as “an official member of the UN delegation” for many years. Nor did he feel accepted as a genuine representative of the Danish Council of Organisations for Disabled People. He was nominated by the foreign ministry, not the Council and, at a time when the representatives of other interest groups in national delegation lists were identified as ‘representative for …’, he was merely identified by the title ‘High Court Judge’ (Landsdommer). Nonetheless, Kallehauge claims that it was generally known in Denmark that he held a “disability mandate of both personal and organisational nature” and that he always aimed at the long-term goal of gradually creating a permanent seat for disability organisations that could be taken over by a successor. In his account, he was “both an NGO and a civil servant”, in the latter capacity also helping the delegation on matters unrelated to disability issues. However, over the course of his tenure he saw his role become “less and less civil servant and more and more NGO, as well as [somewhat paradoxically more and more] a permanent member of the delegation”. After seats on the delegation were granted to new types of organisations in the 1990s, gate-keeping by denial of status to disability organisations no longer made sense. Thus, the Danish Council of Organisations for Disabled People has been granted the right to nominate a delegate every year in the period 1999 to 2006, and throughout this time (as well as in 2008) Kallehauge was listed as having this affiliation.91 In the period 2003 to 2005 the disability seat was occupied by other representatives.
Culmination and termination As indicated above, the 1990s saw new types of civil society organisations gain access to the Danish UN delegation. In 1994, Foreign Minister Niels Helveg Petersen included the Danish United Nations Association (FN- forbundet) and later, in 1998, the Danish Centre for Human Rights (Det Danske Center for Menneskerettigheder). The background to these appointments is two-fold. First, they correspond to what might seem plausible in a corporatist model attuned to the policy agenda of the United Nations. Tellingly, some years earlier, an official in the foreign ministry made the following note in a document margin when facing a Swedish inquiry about whether Denmark intended to include representatives of the –––––––––––––– 91 Kallehauge-memorandum. Cf. The delegation lists.
367 CHAPTER 4 peace movement in its delegation: “If one was to extend the del., the UN Association would seem most natural – but can NGOs be included in gov.- delegations?”92 In light of the tradition of civil society participation in Danish delegations, the question posed is surprising and may be interpreted as an occupational habit of drawing a border line vis-à-vis non-state actors. Second, the enlargement of the delegation in the 1990s can be seen in the light of the internationalist agenda of the radical liberal party, to which Helveg Petersen belonged, with a close relationship to the peace movement and organisations with world federalist affinities. One might even argue that the radical liberals had previously ‘outsourced’ their participation in the General Assembly to such associations.93 In the first two decades of the United Nations, the radical liberals were almost always represented by world federalist activist Hermod Lannung, chairman of the Danish organisation Een Verden in the period 1962 to 1970 and president of the international mother organisation World Federalist Movement in the period 1977 to 1987. Apart from the first session of the General Assembly, he was a member of the delegation only as the radical liberal representative at the times when he was not a member of parliament.94 His substitute as radical liberal delegate in the late 1950s and first half of the 1960s was Peter Veistrup, chairman of one of the Danish United Nations Associations at that time (Forening for Forenede Nationer). In 1958, the radical liberal representative was parliamentarian Else Zeuthen, who was at that time chairwoman of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) and later became chairwoman of another United Nations Association (Dansk Samråd for Forenede Nationer).95 After Lannung’s retirement, the radical liberals were represented by parliament member Arne Stinus, long-time president of the Danish United Nations Association (FN-forbundet), an organisation created through the merger of most of the above-mentioned organisations in 1970. Sharing the delegation assignment with an alternating party fellow, he participated in every session from 1968 to 1976. Thus, the expanded participation in the delegation to the General Assembly in 1994 was the final breakthrough and formalisation of a corporatist model that had existed earlier, in at least the first three decades of the United Nations. The deputy chairperson and first delegate of the United Nations Association (UNA) of Denmark interpreted the 1994 move
–––––––––––––– 92 Handwritten note, 16 July 1985, on the memorandum concerning the inquiry, 5 July 1985, NAC, FM 1973–88, 119.D.9.a. 93 Cf. on corresponding tendencies at the League of Nations: Bj l 1983: 199–200, 202. 94 Nielsen 1995. 95 Bussey/Tims 1965: 9.
368 THE PARTICIPATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY as follows: The opportunity to participate in the delegation was an expression “of the appreciation of the great work the association does, on behalf of the foreign ministry and politicians”.96 Since their initial inclusion in the delegation, the UNA and human rights delegates have almost always been represented. In the second half of the 2000s, representation has become more irregular. At the same time, new organisations such as the World Wildlife Fund, Greenpeace, Churchaid and the Jewish Community have had singular appointments. While civil society participation was extended from the 1970s onwards, it was made subject to scrutiny. The populist Progress Party (Fremskridtspartiet), which entered the Folketing in the ‘landslide election’ of 1973, was critical of large delegations to the General Assembly and of membership in the United Nations. In a parliamentary inquiry, party leader and anti-tax rebel Mogens Glistrup asked the Foreign Minister for the numbers of delegates in the different categories of delegates, explicitly mentioning the Federation of Trade Unions and the Danish National Council of Women.97 More directly formulated were the inquiries directed by populist politician Annette Just to Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann- Jensen in 1988. First, Just asked how much money could be saved by limiting participation on Danish UN delegations to strictly politicians. The rationale behind her line of questioning was that interest organisations should pay for their participation in the General Assembly. In her second question, she asked whether the Foreign Minister would limit the delegation to strictly parliamentarians. Here she argued (mistakenly) that the United Nations was a parliamentary convention, and that government and Parliament were responsible for foreign policy, and not arbitrarily selected interest organisations. In his answer, the Foreign Minister stated that the cost for participation per organisation was approximately a half million Danish Kroner annually and that the given organisations were “broadly representative of Danish societal groups”. In his view, it was “a good and valuable practice” to include these organisations for several reasons: their interest in the agenda points negotiated in the General Assembly, the government’s interest in their viewpoints, and the benefit of gaining an international outlook for their work at home.98 By the beginning of the twenty-first century, the populist agenda had been adopted by the political mainstream. The fact that the United Nations has started to figure less prominently in Danish foreign policy –––––––––––––– 96 Bente Nielsen. “Den travleste periode i FN-forbundets historie.” FN-Bladet (1996) 5: 11– 13, at 12. 97 Folketingstidende 125 (1973/1974): col. 7999. 98 Folketingstidende 140 (1988/1989): col. 2351–2353.
369 CHAPTER 4 making is obvious from the government’s stance in the Iraq War and from the cessation of documentation on Danish participation in the General Assembly, with 2003 being the last year covered by a report. By 2004, the Danish government had also decided to cancel financial support for the participation of parliamentary representatives and associations in UN delegations. Ironically, when conservative Foreign Minister Per Stig M ller announced the elimination of subsidies in 2004, he also announced financing of civil representation would be temporarily maintained for 2005 and 2006. M ller justified this by stating the government aim to “secure Danish NGOs very valuable participation in the debate”.99 However, by 2007 the period of grace was over and the invitation to the traditionally represented organisations for participation on the delegation had been accepted only by those commanding solid finances: the Employer’s Confederation, the Confederation of Trade Unions, and also by the Danish Youth Council. Thus, three civil society representatives participated on the Danish delegation in 2007, compared with nine representatives one year earlier. Even trade unions and youth organisations reduced their participation from the two delegates they had on the previous delegation. Ever since then, new well-financed organisations such as Greenpeace and the World Wildlife Fund have bought their way into the Danish UN delegation. For some of the more traditional organisations, associated costs have been described as “prohibitive”.100 Hence, for the first time since 1920, there was no representative of women’s organisations in the delegation of 2007. In the short run, the observation communicated to the Foreign Minister in a letter from a women’s organisation seems correct: “That all members of the delegation shall pay for themselves favours well- off institutions (members of the Folketing) and organisations (trade union, employers’ association) and in an undemocratic manner excludes, e.g. the Women’s Council, which does not have financial means to cover all costs itself.”101 In the long run, the principle ‘pay for the visit’ might undermine the legitimacy of an order that grants civil society participation on national delegations more fundamentally. It would also seem that what has been described as a more serious involvement of civil society organisations in the work of the delegation, as compared to that of politicians, might now come to an end. Whereas
–––––––––––––– 99 “Fjerner FN-st tte til ngo’er.” Accessed 25 March 2010. Available at
370 THE PARTICIPATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY political party representatives have long ceased to speak on behalf of Denmark in United Nations organs, some of the civil society delegates have regularly delivered speeches in their particular fields. At times, this has applied to women organisations’ representatives, in recent times in particular to the representatives of youth organisations and disability organisations.102 The fact that civil society organisations have been given the opportunity to present official ‘Danish speeches’ has even been cited as an example for parliamentary delegates.103 The same applies to the idea of recurrent representation by one-and-the-same delegate, that is, a working and not a studying appointment, which seems to be the noticeable trend for some organisations.104 The self-paying Danish youth representative had been allowed to address the General Assembly in 2007. However, the ‘privatisation’ of participation in the delegation might not leave the quality of the involvement untouched over time. Another question is whether Denmark, as the traditional ‘model country’ in regard to Nordic UN delegation, will also serve as a model for the downscaling and privatisation of civil society participation. Austerity programmes, whether conducted in times of economic crisis or boom, will always make it tempting to treat NGOs as alien ‘non-governmental organisations’.
THE RETURN OF THE BODY-SNATCHED: NORWAY Norway belongs to the Scandinavian family of societies with blurred boundaries between state and society. As Walter Rothholz notes, associations “play a specific role in political representation” in Norway. They maintain a relation based on partnership with the state, and with every inhabitant of Norway being a member of at least three associations on average, the prevalence of civil society in the country is exceptionally high.105 Comparative studies indicate that Norway might be the country with the strongest corporatist arrangements in the world, ahead of Sweden,
–––––––––––––– 102 Kallehauge-memorandum; interview with parliamentary delegate Frank Aaen. 103 Radical liberal representative Arne Stinus according to the minutes of the meeting of participants of the 30th session of the General Assembly, 17 February 1976, NAC, FM 1973–78, 119.H.2.a.75. 104 E.g. letter by Jens J rgen Bolvig to Foreign Minister Kjeld Olesen, 11 November 1981, NAC, FM 1973–78, 119.D.9.a. 105 Walter Rothholz. “Norwegen: Korporatismus und die politische Kultur des Wohlfahrtsstaats.” Verbände und Verbandssystem in Westeuropa. Werner Reutter and Peter R tters (eds.). Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 2001. 311–334, at 311 (quote), 319.
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Austria, and Denmark.106 Stein Rokkan developed his famous formula votes count, but resources decide in a case study on Norwegian corporatism.107 The combination of a dense network of civil society organisations enjoying a strong position with political impetus and a close relation to the state suggests a flourish in civil society participation on delegations sent by Norway to the General Assembly. Since the 1970s Norway has regularly included a high number of associations and representatives of civil society on its delegations. However, whereas civil society has had greater presence on Norwegian delegations than on their Danish or Swedish counterparts, these representatives have not formally been assigned the same status as their Nordic colleagues. They have been accredited in the home-made category of ‘observers’ from the year 1970 – not in one of the three official status categories or a derivative thereof. Although Norwegian observers, unlike the Danish youth observers, were always included in official delegation lists, quantitative gains might have been achieved at the expense of qualitative losses. While in practice the loss is mainly a matter of title, it is nonetheless a relevant marker of a comparatively greater distance of state and civil society. The representation of civil society in Norwegian delegations of the postwar period was numerically weaker and institutionally more precarious than in those of Denmark and Sweden. The proliferation of civil society on Norwegian delegations in later years resembled the return of actors ‘body- snatched’ by the political system some decades earlier. The representatives of women’s organisations and trade unions who participated in the early years of the United Nations eventually lost their identity as civil society representatives. Their seats on the delegation were re-framed after the fact, as seats of political parties and parliament. The blurring of boundaries between civil society and the state carries the risk of a take-over – whether hostile or ‘benevolent’. Given the early integration of civil society representatives in delegations to the General Assembly and their high-numbered but low- status return, it also becomes clear that the claim by Iver B. Neumann and Halvard Leira needs to be modified. They held that the Norwegian foreign ministry had become ever more accomodating vis-a-vis representatives
–––––––––––––– 106 Arend Lijphart. Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty- six Countries. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999. 177. 107 Stein Rokkan. “Norway: Numerical Democracy and Corporate Pluralism.” Political Oppositions in Western Democracies. Robert A. Dahl (ed.). New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966. 70–115, at 105.
372 THE PARTICIPATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY from non-governmental organisations.108 Rather, cycles were varied in their responsiveness toward civil society organisations. In the mid-1940s such organisations were given high status on Norwegian delegations, with some being invited to participate by the foreign ministry. This high was followed by a drop in status that can be attributed to a number of factors. Negligence by civil society organisations themselves and the active redefinition in the foreign ministry of civil society seats as parliamentary seats were most instrumental in this change. Evidently, Rokkan’s formula is not without relevance for the explanation of this development, nor is it without merit for the larger subject discussed here. He speaks of ‘counting’: The General Assembly is an organ that counts, not one that decides. The largely noncommittal outcome of parliamentary diplomacy at the General Assembly has affinity with the outcome of elections – rewarding programmes and not leading to authoritative decisions. Like the trend of parliamentarians going from being high-status participants to backbenchers in Nordic delegations, a change also occurred in the profile of high-ranking civil society delegates, such as chairmen for trade union or employers’ federations being appointed to lower ranks and shorter appointments. The withdrawal of these organisations can largely be attributed to the gap that emerged in the 1940s between the prestige of an appointment to a United Nations delegation and its potential for pratical achievements. Only in the aftermath of the cultural revolution in Western societies in the wake of 1968 did the low-key appointments become feasible, thereby making participation attractive for civil society. This implied a shift from high-ranking to low-ranking representatives within those sectors of civil society that commanded resources, as well as an increase in participation of representatives of rank- and-file associations. Not least, this change meant an increase in participation on the part of associations with agendas close to that of the United Nations: the United Nations Asssociation of Norway, peace organisations, and human rights organisations.
‘Tripartite’ civil society representation Civil society organisations were active in promoting themselves as members of the Norwegian delegation to the San Francisco conference. First out was the chairman of The Norwegian Association of Trade Unions (London Office), Konrad Nordahl. While attending the World Trade Union Conference, which convened in February 1945 in London, he announced –––––––––––––– 108 Iver B. Neumann and Halvard Leira. Aktiv og avventende: Utenrikstjenestens liv 1905– 2005. Oslo: Pax, 2005. 401.
373 CHAPTER 4 early on that he would send a letter requesting representation for the trade union movement.109 He sent this letter to Prime Minister Johan Nygaardsvold with a copy to Foreign Minister Trygve Lie, stressing the importance of such participation in light of intense discussions at the conference on the coming peace order and on the position of trade unions. Nordahl’s interpretation of the conference outcome was sweeping. The conference document asked for the world trade union movement to be accredited to the San Francisco conference in an advisory and consultative capacity and for the movement to also be represented in the organs of the United Nations. A further-reaching amendment had been repudiated, in which the introduction of the independent tripartite labour–government– employer representation by country at the United Nations had been requested, similar to representation at the International Labour Organisation. As Nordahl described it, there was a strong push for the advisory representation of trade unions at the conference, and “it has been decided to demand such representation from the governments of the single countries.” Hence, he requested representatives from the Federation of Trade Unions (Arbeidernes Faglige Landsorganisasjon) be appointed in the capacity of advisers to the Norwegian delegation to the San Francisco conference and later conferences related to the coming peace order.110 As shown by the cabinet decision on the delegation make-up, the ILO model was vivid in the minds of Norwegian decision makers. Among the appointees was the president of the Seamen’s Association, Ingvald Haugen, with “in addition, someone from the employers”.111 Previously, in a letter to Nordahl, Haugen had offered to add the San Francisco assignment to his imminent travels to New York in case Nordahl himself did not want to travel. Nordahl accepted the proposal, but informed Lie that Haugen might be called back before the end of the conference.112 The details of the appointment of the employers’ representative are obscure, but the choice fell on ship owner and whaling magnate Lars Christensen, who
–––––––––––––– 109 Ording 2000: 483 (entry of 27 February 1945). As pointed out earlier, Johanne Reutz had been accredited as a trade union representative at the 17th, 18th, and 19th session of the Assembly of the League of Nations (“Head of the Statistical Department of the Confederation of Trade Unions”). However, she entered the Norwegian delegation upon the suggestion of a group within the international women’s movement and occupied the women’s seat on the delegation (cf. Reutz 1983: 46–47). 110 Letter by Nordahl to Prime Minister Nygaardsvold, 10 March 1945, NAO, FM 1940–49, 25.2/45; cf. Report of the World Trade Union Conference, County Hall, London, February 6th to 17th, 1945. London: Trades Union Congress, 1945. 185, 191, 193, 239. 111 Minutes of the cabinet meeting, 22 March 1945, NAO, PMO, CM, vol. 3. 112 Diary of Konrad Nordahl, LMAO, KNA, F, vol. 1 (entry of 19 March 1945); cable from Nordahl to Lie, 28 March 1945, NAO, FM 1940–49, 25.2/45.
374 THE PARTICIPATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY also served as a financial counsellor to the embassy in Washington at the time and sponsored an early study on Norwegian postwar reconstruction.113 Thus, labour market representation on the delegation was extended in San Francisco in an ad-hoc manner. At a delegation meeting the day before the start of the conference, Foreign Minister Trygve Lie declared that the president of the Norwegian Chamber of Commerce in London, Norman B hn, and Social Affairs Attaché Håkon Lie were willing to attend the San Francisco conference in a “purely advisory capacity” without compensation from the state. Whereas the minutes of the meeting state that Trygve Lie also suggested appointing them as ‘technical advisers’ for Christensen and Haugen, respectively, the Storting president and conservative delegation member Carl J. Hambro, known for his observance of constitutional forms, provided a corrigenda: Only after his protest against assignment in any other capacity were the newcomers appointed as personal technical advisers.114 However, upon Haugen’s return to Norway, Håkon Lie was formally made an adviser to the delegation by cabinet decision.115 In his memoirs, Håkon Lie is agnostic about the background of his appointment, which kept him from returning to Norway, where much was going on after liberation. He guessed he was made a member of the delegation because Trygve Lie might have wanted to inform him personally about the death of his (Håkon Lie’s) brother in the Nazi concentration camp of Dachau, and possibly offer some sort of compensation.116 The day after the decision had been made to include a trade union and an employers’ representative on the delegation, Arne Sunde, who was later to become a permanent representative to the United Nations, proposed the cabinet appoint a lady as an advisory member of the delegation. The suggestion was rejected, with a vote count of eight to four.117 Nonetheless, half a week later the delegation was extended to include a representative for women’s organisations, namely, Åse Gruda Skard, former Norwegian delegate to conferences of the International Education Assembly and to the ILO.118 Her appointment, which implied the extension of a two-partite representation model of civil society by a third party, was requested by the –––––––––––––– 113 Lars Christensen and Warner Marshall. An Outline for Norwegian Post-war Reconstruction: Together with Proposals for Pre-peace Action. S.l. 1942. 114 Minutes of the delegation meeting, 24 April 1945, NAO, FM 1940–49, 25.2/45; letter by Hambro to Trygve Lie, 7 May 1945, ibid. 115 Minutes of the cabinet meeting, 15 May 1945, NAO, PMO, CM, vol. 3. 116 H. Lie 1982: 267, 272. 117 Minutes of the cabinet meeting, 23 March 1945, NAO, PMO, CM, vol. 3. 118 Minutes of the cabinet meeting, 27 March 1945, NAO, PMO, CM, vol. 3. Skard was the daughter of former foreign minister Halvdan Koht. On her participation in earlier international conferences cf. Skard 1986: 82, 85.
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Committee of Norwegian Women in Great Britain in a letter dated the same day of her appointment.119 Already a week earlier, the Liaison Committee of Women’s International Organisations had approached Prime Minister Nygaardsvold with a serial letter calling for the appointment of female delegates and reminding him of related recommendations by the Assembly of the League of Nations.120 Skard was thankful for her appointment, while bringing to light considerations faced by female delegates and illuminating problems that arise for persons from the private sphere posted to temporary government delegations. Skard informed the government that she was able to be present in San Francisco for one month at the most due to “personal reasons”; rationalising that she had to employ someone to take care of her children and her house, she maintained that such expenses were appropriately to be taken over by the state.121 The government tasked Foreign Minister Lie with making it clear to Skard that the state could not offer houshold- compensation, but Skard, despite noting “great displeasure” with the government on the matter, insisted. To judge by her memoirs, her argument seems to have been that all other delegates were on the payroll of the government, whereas she did not have such income, nor did she have additional income during the time of the conference – not to mention that she had to pay for hired help in her absence on top of it. Skard, who was formally listed as Member of Advisory Committee on Cultural Relations, Norwegian Embassy, Washington, suspected that she got her way because the government shied away from retracting the appointment. But in contrast to the representatives of the labour market organisations, she did not get a ‘technical adviser’ and was not replaced by another women’s representative once she left the conference. The ‘personal reason’ for her departure from the delegation in the end of May was that she was an expectant mother, with the baby due the following month. As she recalls in her memoirs, it happened that she had to excuse herself in the middle of meetings in order to throw up “everything I had eaten”.122 Despite such adversities, Skard seems to have been an efficient delegate. She was specifically tasked with advancing women’s interests and getting the word ‘education’ included in the Charter in some form or –––––––––––––– 119 Letter by Secretary Ragna Hagen to Prime Minister Nygaardsvold, 27 March 1945, NAO, FM 1940–49, 25.2/45. 120 Letter by Hon. Secretary Elsie M. Zimmern to Prime Minister Nygaardsvold, 20 March 1945, NAO, FM 1940–49, 25.2/45. 121 Confidential cable by the embassy in Washington, 3 April 1945, NAO, FM 1940–49, 25.2/45. 122 Skard 1986: 89, 97 (quotes), 98; on the government tasking Lie: Minutes of the cabinet meeting, 4 April 1945, NAO, PMO, CM, vol. 3; for the formal title see UNCIO I 1945: 52.
376 THE PARTICIPATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY another, not least by stirring opinions within and beyond the conference. Skard notes in her memoirs that the delegation was composed of ‘full delegates’ and ‘advisers’ and that she was listed last in the latter category. Nonetheless, she maintains never to have felt discriminated against as a woman and that the delegation had a democratic character, with all having equal rights to voice their opinions. Moreover, in regard to her work on women’s issues, Skard claims to have always had the backing of the Norwegian delegation. Evidently, this overall situation did not rule out the following incident, which might not only have been related to a gendered outlook on the world, but also to a difference in perspective among persons on the government payroll and other actors: Once I got the whole delegation enraged against me. This was when I maintained that if an international organisation should come to mean anything at all, we would indeed all have to give up a bit of our national sovereignty. There all men cried out with such noise that I rapidly crept back into my shell.123 Of the reports prepared by Skard on her work at the conference, the one on collaboration with women from other nations is particularly relevant. While the few women delegates at the conference could be broken down into the categories of Latin feminists (supported also by an Australian woman) and Anglo-Saxon anti-feminists, Skard maintained an intermediate position and actively engaged herself in the establishment of a women’s platform, which included journalists and distinguished women outside the conference. Her transnational networking activity provided her with valuable information about the delegations of other countries, which she claims benefited the work of the Norwegian delegation. At the same time, women’s lobbying at the San Francisco conference was instrumental in getting references banning sexual discrimination included in the Charter. In her report, Skard directed a request to her own foreign ministry; nonetheless, in light of the composition of delegations that followed, her proposal proved to be ahead of its time: Skard believed countries with a reputation for social progress should include women in their delegations. She explicated this by underlining that she meant ‘women’ in the plural and that at least one of them should have the status of a principal delegate, as this would strengthen her position opposite other nations and make her more valuable in both women’s networks and the committee work.124
–––––––––––––– 123 Skard 1986: 91 (quote), 92, 95. 124 Report by Åsa Gruda Skard, 11 August 1945, NAO, FM 1940–49, 25.2/45; Skard 1986: 95–96.
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Outmanoeuvring independent women’s organisations No representatives of civil society were included in the Norwegian delegation to the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations in 1945 and, initially, there was no plan to include such representatives in the delegation to the constitutive session of the United Nations. Nor was the appointment of a female delegation member foreseen in general.125 However, according to Konrad Nordahl, a discussion regarding the make- up of the delegation was ongoing at the time. This discussion revolved around the question of whether the delegation should be comprised of only parliamentarians and foreign service officials or also include represent- atives of important organisations and individuals with insight in international affairs (the latter category referring to political representatives who were not members of Parliament). According to Nordahl, Trygve Lie supported the latter idea.126 In reality, a few days after a ‘definitive’ list of the Norwegian delegation had been sent to London, Prime Minister Einar Gerhardsen announced at a cabinet meeting that the Federation of Trade Unions had requested representation on the delegation. Only at this point did Lie suggest both the Norwegian Employers’ Association and the Federation of Trade Unions be represented by Managing Director Finn Dahl and Federation President Konrad Nordahl, respectively. He also suggested appointing “a female representative” to the delegation, with the only female cabinet member Aaslaug Aasland proposing Head Mistress Frieda Dalen, the chairwoman of the Liaison Committee of Norwegian Women’s Organisations (Norske Kvinneorganisasjoners Samarbeids- nemnd), for the position. The cabinet approved all of these suggestions, justifying its actions by pointing to reports from London that made it seem likely a greater workload was in store for the Norwegian delegation than initially expected.127 Although the three civil society delegates did attend the founding session of the United Nations, not everybody felt represented as had been intended. On the day of the opening of the General Assembly, the women’s secretariat of the Labour Party adopted a declaration maintaining that in all years under bourgeois rule no woman from the labour movement had been granted the privilege to represent Norway to the world. It was argued that, given a labour government with a majority of the popular vote, the –––––––––––––– 125 See the delegation list that was submitted in reply to the request for a definite list: cable by the foreign ministry to the embassy in London, 29 December 1945, NAO, FM 1940–49, 30.5/6. 126 Konrad Nordahl. Med LO for friheten. Oslo: Tiden, 1969. 225. 127 Minutes of the cabinet meeting, 3 January 1946, NAO, PMO, CM, vol. 4; cabinet proposal, approved 4 January 1946, NAO, FM 1940–49, 30.5/6.
378 THE PARTICIPATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY appropriate action would have been to send a woman from the Labour Party to London. Moreover, it was argued that the female representative on the delegation had revealed herself as unqualified by having avowed herself as “apolitical”, and that no labour representative was on the board of the liaison committee. This declaration, submitted to the government, ended suggesting the appointment had been a mistake in a class struggle-type situation.128 The Prime Minister reported on this protest before the cabinet. The minutes of the meeting give no indication the absurdity of the statement was made a topic in which it was claimed that non-socialist governments had not appointed labour women129 – yet it was the Norwegian Labour Party itself that had cultivated a boycott of the League of Nations throughout most of the interwar years. It seems the government decided to ask the women’s secretariat to submit a list of names with “female party comrades for poss. public appointments”. However, the secretariat decided to work on such a list for internal use only, regarding it inadvisable to submit this list for use by the foreign ministry “because this could easily give rise to misunderstandings among our members”.130 It seems the secretariat – or more precisely, its head, Aase Lionæs – was eager to keep full control over whoever was to be appointed. The minutes of the meetings give no indication that the secretariat ever discussed or formally decided who was to be the nominee for the delegation to the General Assembly.131 In the first memorandum on the Norwegian delegation to the second part of the first session, the woman delegate to the first part, Frieda Dalen, was still listed. However, her name was bracketed in pen, with the name “Mrs. Aase Lionæs” written next to it.132 This replacement did not contradict the request sent to the government by the Liaison Committee of Norwegian Women’s Organisations asking for appointment of women to the delegation in the categories of delegates with full rights and as advisers and experts.133 Nevertheless, the appointment of Lionæs did contradict the description of the coming delegation by Foreign Minister Halvard Lange,
–––––––––––––– 128 Minutes of the meeting of the women’s secretariat, 10 January 1946, LMAO, LPA, Ae; Statement to the government, dated 16 January 1946, ibid. 129 Minutes of the cabinet meeting, 17 January 1946, NAO, PMO, CM, vol. 4. 130 Minutes of the meeting of the women’s secretariat, 1 February 1946, LMAO, LPA, Ae. 131 This observation is based on a screening of the agenda points of the minutes of the women’s secretariat from 1946 to 1948 (LMAO, LPA, Ae). 132 Memorandum by Rolf Andersen, 1 June 1946, NAO, FM 1940–49, 30.5/6. 133 Letter by the chairwoman of the Liaison Committee of Norwegian Women’s Organisations, Frieda Dalen, to the government, 22 June 1946, NAO, FM 1940–49, 30.5/6.
379 CHAPTER 4 as he spoke of a representative “for women’s organisations”.134 The Norwegian Labour Party and Lionæs had chosen not to (re)establish a separate and independent women’s branch, as might have been expected according to its own traditions and the model of Danish and Swedish social democrats, merely forming a secretariat tightly attached to the main organisation of the Labour Party, instead.135 In addition to Lionæs, the woman later appointed to the second part of the first session was the historian Ingrid Semmingsen. For many years to come this remained the only instance with two females on the delegation, and there is no indication that Semmingsen was viewed as a representative of women’s organisations. Early in 1947 Dalen, on behalf of the Liaison Committee of Norwegian Women’s Organisations, sent a package of eleven lists on various policy fields to Foreign Minister Lange. The names of competent and qualified women who were considered by the women’s organisations to being particularly fitting as members in committees and commissions were listed therein, including Dalen herself and Aase Gruda Skard among others. However, the responsible secretary in the foreign ministry made the following notation on the cover letter: “I cannot find Mrs. Lionæs on the list”.136 When this secretary, who had himself served on the delegations to both parts of the first session, called Dalen and thanked her for the list, he also mentioned that he had not seen the name Lionæs on it. Dalen replied that the women’s organisation of the Labour Party had not submitted any names, despite a reminder. Thereupon the secretary expressed the hope for a supplement with the labour women’s proposed names. He also expressed displeasure over seeing Johanna Reutz on the list. Reutz was the former woman delegate to the League of Nations who was outmaneuvered as Leader of the Women’s Secretariat of the Labour Party as a result of false allegations accusing her of collaboration with the Nazis, much to the benefit of her rival Aase Lionæs, who was in favour of a more accommodating women’s course in the party. The rumours worked: Ms. Dalen remembered that there had been something with her [Reutz] during the war, but she did not remember which organisation had suggested her. The committee had not made a critical selection, but had only forwarded
–––––––––––––– 134 Cable by Foreign Minister Halvard Lange to the ambassador in Washington, Wilhelm Morgenstierne, 8 July 1946, NAO, FM 1940–49, 30.5/6. 135 Cf. Aas 2001: 81–83. 136 Letter from Dalen to Lange, with supplements, 24 February 1947, NAO, FM 1940–49, 30.7/22.
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the suggestion of the organisations on the understanding that the organisations themselves had valued the candidates.137 At this point, Dalen and the Liaison Committee of Norwegian Women’s Organisations (which ceased to exist in 1952) seem to have given up fighting for representation on the delegation to the General Assembly. Lionæs was reappointed annually until the mid-1960s, but upon having set foot into parliament it was eventually forgotten that she had entered the delegation on the seat for women’s organisations. No action seems to have been taken by the Women’s Secretariat of the Labour Party to preserve the seat. Thus, the women’s seat was lost, and not a single woman served on Norwegian delegations to the General Assembly in the 1968 and 1969 sessions – two instances that mark an all-time low in women’s representation, not only in domestic history but also in the perspective that includes the three larger Nordic countries, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden.138
Retreat and a McCarthy-induced comeback After three weeks at the opening session of the General Assembly in London, both trade union representative Konrad Nordahl and employers’ representative Finn Dahl left the delegation.139 This was symptomatic of their participation. However, the representation of trade unions on the Norwegian delegation cannot be understood without reference to the struggle faced by the World Federation of Trade Unions in achieving representation of itself, independently of governments, in United Nations organs. It is not clear whether Nordahl’s initiatives for representation on Norwegian delegations were meant as a preliminary substitute or as a permanent complement to such independent representation. At the same time, WFTU tried to utilise Nordahl’s personal connection with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. In a letter to Trygve Lie written in May 1946, Nordahl reported that the Secretary-General of the WFTU, Louis Saillant, had asked him to contact Lie in order to solicit help, if
–––––––––––––– 137 Memorandum by Erik Dons regarding a telephone conversation with Frieda Dalen, 4 March 1947, NAO, FM 1940–49, 30.7/22; on Reutz and Lionæs cf. Pryser 1993, 189–192; Aas 2001, 83–84, 124–128. 138 The presence of labour legislator Rakel Seweriin as a personal substitute for Lionæs on the delegation in 1965 and as a delegate from the outset in 1966–1967 might be interpreted as a continuation of the tradition. However, Lionæs had earlier been replaced by male delegates, and by the time Seweriin left the delegation the tradition of women delegates had been forgotten even as a merely informal requirement. 139 Minutes of the delegation meetings, 29 & 30 January 1946, NAO, FM 1940–49, 30.5/6.
381 CHAPTER 4 possible, for establishing WFTU participation in the Economic and Social Council.140 In the same letter, Nordahl reckoned that he would attend the coming meeting of the General Assembly in New York. He was reappointed to the delegation for the second part of the first session, joined by the president of the Norwegian Employers’ Association, Christian Erlandsen. As the beginning of the convention was postponed several times Nordahl, who had planned to combine the visit to New York with his attendance of the International Labour Conference in Montreal, expressed doubt whether he could stay in North America for the time-span that now appeared requisite. Thereupon Foreign Minister Lange wrote to Nordahl, imploring him to attend the General Assembly, stating that participation was the only right thing to do, not least in view of Norway’s membership in the Economic and Social Council. Lange went on to point out that the initiative for representation on the delegation had come from the trade unions themselves, and maintained that the Federation of Trade Unions did not see any obstacles to a longer stay by Nordahl and that they had nobody else to send.141 Nonetheless, two weeks later, the foreign ministry was informed that neither Nordahl nor Erlandsen would attend the General Assembly.142 When Lange informed the cabinet about these drawbacks, he suggested going ahead without asking for another representative from the employers’ side, as the trade unions did not have an alternative delegate.143 When the delegation to the second session of the General Assembly was planned, Lange instructed an official to ask Nordahl and Erlandsen whether they would accept an appointment. The reply was revealing: He [Erlandsen] maintained that he was very much interested in participation. Purely in general terms he wanted to mention that the participation of the Employers’ Association in the delegation had to be seen in connection with the participation of the Trade Union Federation. Erlandsen kept to his personal opinion that there would be little particular reason for the Employers’ Association to participate in case the Trade Union Federation, for her part, would find no reason for it. This statement, as well as the fact that no agenda points of special interest for the labour market organisations were expected, made the official suggest their representatives be appointed as ‘advisers’, not ‘alternate
–––––––––––––– 140 Letter from Nordahl to Lie, 18 May 1946, LMAO, KNA, D, vol. 1. 141 Letter from Lange to Nordahl, 18 September 1946, NAO, FM 1940–49, 30.5/6. 142 Letter from Finn Moe to the foreign ministry, 30 September 1946, NAO, FM 1940–49, 30.5/6. 143 Minutes of the cabinet meeting, 1 October 1946, NAO, PMO, CM, vol. 4.
382 THE PARTICIPATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY representatives’ as had been the case at both parts of the first session.144 With ‘adviser’ status Erlandsen and Nordahl were later appointed. Informed that Nordahl would not come to New York before the end of September, Erlandsen asked permission to arrive later as well, arguing that advisers would only be needed some time after the constitution of the General Assembly.145 In the end, he did not meet at all – possibly a wise decision. In his memoirs, Nordahl writes that on his return to Norway from the session he resolved to say ‘no’ if asked to participate on the delegation the following year: “The stay this time had appeared so depressing for me that I did not, at the moment, see any great future for the UN.”146 When the composition of the delegation to the third session was planned, the labour market representatives were not listed on the first draft, but a handwritten note was subsequently made, saying that the issue of including Nordahl and Erlandsen might come up.147 When Erlandsen was asked whether he would serve as the Employers’ Association’s representative he accepted and said he planned to be present for most of the session, pointing to labour issues on the agenda of the General Assembly.148 While Nordahl was nominated by the secretary of the Federation of Trade Unions, he later presented a model to the foreign ministry according to which two trade union representatives would share a seat.149 Mutual dissatisfaction evolved at this session. In the comprehensive memorandum written by Terje Wold on the work of the delegation, it was suggested trade union and employers’ appointees be required to stay throughout the period in which their issues were discussed.150 International lawyer Frede Castberg, also a delegate, wrote in his diary about employers’ and trade union representatives “who themselves hardly realise why they are actually here”.151 In effect, the tradition of including representatives of labour market organisations was abandoned. When Norway presented its delegation model in a report one and a half years later, it was mentioned that representatives of private groups had participated in the first three sessions
–––––––––––––– 144 Memorandum by Rolf Andersen, 29 May 1947, NAO, FM 1940–49, 30.5/6. 145 Letter by Erlandsen to Chief of Division in the foreign ministry, Ivar Lunde, 14 July 1947, NAO, FM 1940–49, 30.5/6. 146 Nordahl 1969: 246. 147 Memorandum on the delegation, 11 May 1948, NAO, FM 1940–49, 30.5/6. 148 Memorandum by Lunde, 21 June 1948, NAO, FM 1940–49, 30.5/6. 149 Letter by Gunnar Bråthen to Foreign Minister Lange, 8 July 1948, NAO, FM 1940–49, 30.5/6; Memorandum by Dons on a telephone conversation with Nordahl, 20 July 1948, ibid. 150 Memorandum, 20 December 1948, NAO, FM 1940–49, 30.5/6A. 151 Castberg 1971: 143.
383 CHAPTER 4 but that financial constraints had forced a reduction in the number of delegates, causing such representatives to be excluded for the time being. At the same time, it was maintained that private organisations were represented whenever possible at major international conferences on international economic collaboration.152 The fact that women’s organisations were not taken into account in the report even despite Aase Lionæs’ continued presence on the delegation is a telling clue about the altered perception of the seat held by the female delegate. Whereas no representative of the Employers’ Association returned to the delegation, the Federation of Trade Unions had a remarkable come- back in the mid-1950s. Nordahl participated as a trade union ‘adviser’ on Norwegian delegations to the General Assembly in the years 1952, 1954, 1956, and 1957. Had he changed his mind about the utility of the United Nations? Possibly, as the Korean War and the Suez Crisis were watersheds in the world organisation’s history. However, the actual reason for Nordahl’s request to return to the Norwegian delegation was his desire to visit a trade union meeting in the United States without having to go through the border regime imposed by McCarthyism.153 He later recalled that by 1952 he had become used to the behaviour of the ‘Russians’. It no longer felt as shocking as it had in 1947, when he experienced the beginning of the Cold War.154 Nordahl was appointed a member of the delegation a few more times in the end of the 1950s and early 1960s, but in those years his appointment was in the capacity of a parliamentary member; or should we say this was his status as determined in hindsight. After Nordahl’s last appointment in 1962, his seat was given to another labour parliamentarian.
Trying to bring trade unions back in After Konrad Nordahl had resigned from the chairmanship of the Federation of Trade Unions in 1965, his successor Parelius Mentsen directed a letter to the foreign ministry maintaining that a tradition existed by which a trade union representative was regularly appointed to Norwegian delegations to the General Assembly. (Mentsen himself had –––––––––––––– 152 Extract from the “Report on the Administration of Norway’s Participation in international Organizations”, Supplement to a letter by Finn Friis, 13 June 1950, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.D.9.a. 153 Konrad Nordahl. Dagb ker, vol. 1: 1950–1955. Oslo: Tiden, 1991. 154–155 (entries of 20 & 22 August 1952). Nordahl had been a member of the Communist Party of Norway in the 1920s. 154 Konrad Nordahl. Dagb ker, vol. 2: 1956–1975. Oslo: Tiden, 1992. 85 (entry of 26 December 1956).
384 THE PARTICIPATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY actually been one of the trade union delegates at the third session of the General Assembly.) The letter, written the day after the delegates had been designated, expressed Mentsen’s regret that no trade union representative had been appointed and that the Federation had not been asked to nominate a representative. He underlined the significance of member states’ trade unions being represented on the delegations and made the point that this was a request by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.155 Upon receipt of this letter a memorandum was prepared in the foreign ministry stating that Nordahl had been a trade union representative until the twelvth session of the General Assembly and later functioned as a parliamentary representative. However, it was pointed out that the foreign ministry had been authorised to appoint ‘advisers’, thus making it possible to appoint a trade union ‘adviser’.156 Ahead of a cabinet decision expected from the newly established centre–right coalition government, a representative of the ministry of finance asked for background information from the foreign ministry. He voiced the opinion that inclusion of representatives from the Federation of Trade Unions on the delegation would lead to demands for participation from other organisations.157 Nonetheless, the cabinet decided to accommodate the trade union request. Foreign Minister John Lyng asked the Federation to nominate a representative, who would then be posted as an ‘adviser’. The following trailer followed the account of the positive decision: For the sake of order, the foreign ministry wants to call attention to the fact that the question of representation of the Norwegian Federation of Trade Unions in the delegation to the 21st General Assembly cannot be decided upon at this stage and that this issue must be subject for later discussions.158 In his communication with the trade unions, the respective official in the foreign ministry had already indicated that the best solution would be for trade unions to be represented by a member of parliament.159 However, this time it was the plain trade union economist Jon Rikvold who on 11 November 1965 joined the Norwegian delegation.160
–––––––––––––– 155 Letter from Mentsen to the foreign ministry, 18 September 1965, FMAO, 1960–69, 26.5/72b. 156 Memorandum by Kaare Sandegren, 16 October 1965, FMAO, 1960–69, 26.5/72b. 157 Memorandum by Sandegren on a telephone conversation held one day earlier with Kjell Mathisen, head of division in the Ministry of Finance, 19 October 1965, FMAO, 1960–69, 26.5/72b. 158 Letter by Lyng, 22 October 1965, FMAO, 1960–69, 26.5/72b. 159 Memorandum by Sandegren, 21 October 1965, FMAO, 1960–69, 26.5/72b. 160 “Norges deltakelse i De Forente Nasjoners 20. ordinære Generalforsamling.” Stortings forhandlinger 109 (1965/1966) St. meld. nr. 41: 1.
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In a memorandum on the parliamentary nominees to the delegation to the twenty-first session of the General Assembly, it was noted that the three Labour Party representatives had been nominated after consultation with the Federation of Trade Unions. However, it was also noted that the Federation intended to take up the issue of independent representation with the foreign ministry, with the aim of finding “a solution in accordance with last year’s guidelines”.161 The two-pronged approach undermined the plausibility of the demand. The trade unions’ formal request to nominate a representative arrived in the foreign ministry some weeks later, upon which an official noted the names of the three labour representatives.162 The request triggered a redetermination of whom Nordahl had represented at various sessions, which differed from the account given the previous year: He was no longer described as a parliamentary representative from the thirteenth session of the General Assembly. According to the new foreign ministry document, Nordahl was listed as having been occasionally appointed as one of the three Labour Party representatives from the seventh session (i.e., after the interruption of trade union representation in 1949).163 If this was a subtle suggestion that the cabinet should reject the request, it worked halfway. In the reply to the Federation, it was announced that Rikvold had been appointed as ‘adviser’ and had been directly informed. The nomination was masked as being based on individual merit and the need of the delegation for expertise on social and labour matters. It was underlined that the appointment did “not imply that an order has been established according to which single organisations are granted direct representation”.164 In the following year, some days after the General Assembly had convened, trade union chairman Mentsen made a renewed attempt to establish a new order. Possibly banking on the inexperience of the non- socialist government, he claimed that the Federation of Trade Unions had been asked every year from 1945 onwards to nominate a representative for the delegation to the United Nations and that it had occasionally sent a delegate. As no such inquiry had come in 1967, he himself requested “very firmly” a representative on the delegation.165 The request received an –––––––––––––– 161 Memorandum, 27 June 1966, FMAO, 1960–69, 26.5/73b. 162 Letter by trade union official Tor Aspengren to the foreign ministry, 11 August 1966, FMAO, 1960–69, 26.5/73b. 163 Memorandum prepared by the foreign ministry for the cabinet meeting one day later, 17 August 1966, FMAO, 1960–69, 26.5/73b. 164 Letter by Einar Ansteensen (for the Foreign Minister) to the Federation of Trade Unions, 30 August 1966, FMAO, 1960–69, 26.5/73b. 165 Letter by Mentsen to the foreign ministry, 23 September 1967, FMAO, 1960–69, 26.5/74b.
386 THE PARTICIPATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY affirmative answer, but was again furnished with the qualification that no order for individual organisations had been established.166 This time the appointment went to a more high-ranking trade union representative, the leader of the joint negotiating organisation for state employees, Odd H jdahl. However, it seems the trade unions now wearied of the annual struggle for representation. They did not direct a request for representation to the foreign ministry during the next two and a half years. H jdahl was the last civil society representative ever appointed as a regular member of the Norwegian delegation to the General Assembly.
The installation of civil society ‘observers’ When the General Assembly planned the celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations it also adopted a resolution inviting governments to consider the inclusion of “representatives of youth” to the forthcoming session.167 The provision inspired forty-nine youth organisations participating in a national Norwegian youth conference in December 1969 to direct an inquiry to the government, calling for the inclusion of representatives of youth organisations in the delegation to the General Assembly. Another request was submitted by the National Committee for International Youth Work (Nasjonalkomitéen for Internasjonalt Ungdomsarbeid) in April 1970, in which the committee asked to send an observer group of four or five persons to United Nations headquarters for three to four weeks.168 The idea of introducing ‘observers’ had been aired in the foreign ministry earlier, but that was in reference to parliamentarians; the idea in connection with the unrecognised civil society representation was new. ‘Observer’ became the term for all future civil society representation on Norwegian delegations to the General Assembly. In the parliamentary debate on Norway’s participation in the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly, Knut Frydenlund, the later labour foreign minister, recognised the signs of the times and called for the inclusion of a representative of youth organisations. He saw one cause for
–––––––––––––– 166 Letter by Einar Ansteensen (for the Foreign Minister) to the Federation of Trade Unions, 28 September 1967, FMAO, 1960–69, 26.5/74b. 167 “2499 (XXIV): Celebration of the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the United Nations.” Resolutions and Decisions Adopted by the General Assembly During Its Session 24 (1969): 1–3. 168 Memorandum by Erik Tellmann, 5 July 1971 (including a long quote from the letter by the National Youth Committee of 17 April 1970), FMAO, 1970–79, 26.5/78b; the request by the youth conference (Statens 37. ungdomskonferanse) was sent to the government 17 December 1969, cf. Stortings forhandlinger, Stortingstidende 114 (1970/1971): 2095 (Knut Frydenlund).
387 CHAPTER 4 the youth rebellion of that time as being the lack of channels into decision making processes, in particular into the field of foreign policy with its exclusive reliance on “‘Establishment’, the established machinery”. Not assuming that a youth representative would prevent activists from using demonstrations and protests as primary tools, Frydenlund nevertheless believed that furnishing them with an inside channel would provide an indication of the lines along which one should start thinking.169 The idea of youth representation at the anniversary session was supported by another legislator. However, when a third discussant in the parliamentary debate had pointed to the risk that this might encourage other organisations to claim a seat on the delegation, she made clear that it was specifically “a youth representative from the Norwegian Storting” that she had in mind.170 In the same debate, another labour politician called for the inclusion of women and their organisations. Not mentioning the fact that no women had been included on the last two Norwegian delegations, he pointed to increased female participation at the United Nations. In this connection he made particular mention of Angie Brooks of Liberia, the first female president of the General Assembly, of Turkia Ould Daddah of Mauretania, of a delegate from Guyana, and of Alva Myrdal of Sweden.171 A foreign ministry official commenting on these suggestions noted that the ministry’s UN division was of the opinion that women’s representation was a matter for the parliamentary party groups to take into consideration when nominating their representatives to the Norwegian delegation. Aside from that, the division deemed it “hardly expedient to appropriate a seat especially for women”. As to the issue of youth representation, it was noted that the ministry already considered the matter in connection with the current General Assembly resolution.172 The foreign ministry’s memorandum on the request for participation of youth representatives on the delegation turned out to be favourable. Pointing to the General Assembly resolution, requests by individual political youth organisations, and the parliamentary debate, division chief Arne Arnesen suggested the inclusion of a youth delegate as “an effective means in the task to engage youth in the work of the UN”. Moreover, he suggested that in order for such an order to be effective, it
–––––––––––––– 169 Stortings forhandlinger, Stortingstidende 113 (1969/1970): 2608. Emphasis English in the original. 170 Stortings forhandlinger, Stortingstidende 113 (1969/1970): 2622–2623 (Liv Aasen & Karl J. Brommeland). My emphasis. 171 Stortings forhandlinger, Stortingstidende 113 (1969/1970): 2614–2615 (Alfred Henningsen). 172 Memorandum, 14 May 1970, FMAO, 1970–79, 26.5/76b.
388 THE PARTICIPATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY should not be a one-time event, but one employed on a regular basis. In regard to the worry that other organisations might also become interested in a seat on the delegation, Arnesen argued that while this possibility might be a relevant problem in principle, the explicit recommendation by the General Assembly limited the current agenda to activating youth. Arnesen pondered a joint nomination of the representative by the National Youth Council (Statens Ungdomsråd) and the National Committee for International Youth Work in accordance with the procedure to the World Youth Assembly in the summer of 1970. However, he suggested limiting the offer to only political youth organisations, which he believed were best qualified and likely to benefit most from the suggested order. He presumed it was unnecessary to confine the circle to organisations whose parent parties were represented in parliament or the foreign policy committee analogous to the representation of the party groups. The memorandum concluded with his suggestion that youth representatives on the delegation be “appointed as observers”. No reflections on the possible implications of such an appointment were made.173 Despite the supportive thrust of his memorandum, Arnesen’s claim that “the suggestion to introduce an order with representatives of the political youth organisations came from civil servants” colonised a complex history.174 Although the chief of the Political Department largely agreed with the suggestions put forth by Arnesen, they were not approved by the new conservative foreign minister, Svenn Thorkild Stray. A note on the backside of the memorandum indicated the crux of the argument, well in line with the Norwegian tradition of body-snatching civil society: “There are among the Storting representatives a number of younger persons.”175 When Stray was later questioned in parliament about whether the government intended to accommodate the request, he answered that although no direct representation was in place, the delegation did include sufficient numbers of “those who I want to call speakers of the youth”. He did not want to promise more than that the government would consider the inclusion of youth representatives at conferences with a particular youth agenda.176
–––––––––––––– 173 Memorandum by Arne Arnesen, 21 May 1970, FMAO, 1970–79, 26.5/77b. My emphasis. 174 Arnesen 1973: 116. 175 Memorandum by Arne Arnesen, 21 May 1970 (including handwritten note of 29 June 1970), FMAO, 1970–79, 26.5/77b. There was one 30-year old, one 37-year old, and one 38- year old legislator on the delegation (cf. “Norges deltakelse i De Forente Nasjoners 25. ordinære Generalforsamling.” Stortings forhandlinger 114 (1970/1971) St. meld. nr. 29: 1). 176 Stortings forhandlinger, Stortingstidende 114 (1970/1971): 2096.
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Thus, no women’s organisations and – despite backing from different quarters – no youth organisations were represented on the Norwegian delegation to the anniversary session of the United Nations. It was left to parliamentary delegates with the appropriate demographic profile to co-represent these groups (not only were some of the political representatives participating in 1970 “younger” but, after a two-year period of all-male delegations, now there were two women among them). The failure of new associations to get access to the Norwegian delegation did not mean the Norwegian contingent was altogether bare of civil society representation at the anniversary solemnities. Shortly after the foreign ministry memorandum had recommended an order that would include a youth observer on the delegation on a regular basis, the new chairman of the Federation of Trade Unions, Tor Aspengren, directed a request on behalf of his organisation to the foreign ministry. Pointing to the increasing internationalisation of trade union activity and the earlier participation in the delegation, he asked that a trade union representative be included in this year’s UN delegation “as an observer”; moreover, he asked for the possibility of letting two representatives share such an observer seat.177 The foreign ministry memorandum on the issue recommended approving the request for an observer seat, but did not dwell on what this new concept meant. The memorandum did not differentiate between the requests of the mid-1960s, and recommended a parallel treatment of the matter – not least, repetition of the clause that no new order with direct representation on the delegation had been introduced.178 However, the reply to the request underlined that the appointment implied “status as observer”.179 Hence, the category called ‘observers’ was introduced in domestic documents on the appointment of delegates and in instruments of accreditation submitted to the United Nations, and has been the ‘home’ of civil society on Norwegian delegations to the General Assembly ever since. There was another difference between the treatment of this trade union request and that of the mid-1960s. A question written in the margin of the memorandum pondered whether a corresponding order should be applied to the Employers’ Association. When Foreign Minister Stray decided to give a positive answer to the trade unions, he implied a similar
–––––––––––––– 177 Letter by Aspengren to the foreign ministry, 28 May 1970, FMAO, 1970–79, 26.5/77b. My emphasis. 178 Memorandum by Ketil B rde, 22 June 1970, FMAO, 1970–79, 26.5/77b. 179 Letter by Thore Boye (for the Foreign Minister) to the Federation of Trade Unions, 10 July 1970, FMAO, 1970–79, 26.5/77b. The alteration of trade union observers was granted, with a reservation in regard to additional costs such an order implied. While two trade union observers were appointed, only one of them came to New York.
390 THE PARTICIPATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY request by the Employers’ Association would also have to be granted, if one were to come.180 Thereupon the foreign ministry informed the Employers’ Association of the seat.181 Approximately one month later, its director, Kaare N. Selvig, sent a request “for participation” by two alternating representatives in the coming Norwegian delegation to the General Assembly. In this connection, he pointed to the Association’s active participation in the International Labour Organisation, in the board of the United Nations Association of Norway, and in the Norwegian committee on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations. Despite noting that it was a very long time ago that his organisation had been represented on the delegation, he claimed the Association regarded it very helpful to be able to become reoriented in the United Nations “at certain intervals”. He explained the request by pointing to the compatibility of such an appointment in that particular year with the working program of the Employer’s Association, and added: “We have great interest in participation in the anniversary year.”182 The cabinet proposal for the delegation appointments to the twenty- fifth session of the General Assembly referred to the tradition of including representatives of “the two organisations”, a tradition that began in the early years of the United Nations. It was with this proposal formally put into effect on 28 August 1970 that the new category of ‘observer’ took on official character.183 No reference to the presence of ‘observers’ was made in the delegation’s working instructions.184
The new deal ‘The two organisations’ did not request representation on the delegation the following year. However, by 1971, a new actor took to the stage – one who might be regarded the ideal civil society representative on national delegations to the United Nations, at least from a (neo)corporatist point of view. The United Nations Association of Norway asked for an observer seat based on the upcoming agenda point regarding the review and reappraisal of United Nations information policies and activities, among other things.185 Upon the request, the secretary-general of the organisation, Anders J. Guldvik, was appointed as an observer for the entire session. –––––––––––––– 180 Memorandum by Ketil B rde, 22 June 1970, including notes in the margin and the note on the reaction of the foreign minister, 3 July 1970, FMAO, 1970–79, 26.5/77b. 181 Memorandum by Arne Arnesen, 5 August 1970, FMAO, 1970–79, 26.5/77b. 182 Letter by Selvig to the foreign ministry, 4 August 1970, FMAO, 1970–79, 26.5/77b. 183 Cabinet proposal, put into force 28 August 1970, FMAO, 1970–79, 26.5/77b. 184 Working instructions, 2 September 1970, FMAO, 1970–79, 26.5/77b. 185 Memorandum by Ketil B rde, 26 August 1971, FMAO, 1970–79, 26.5/78b.
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Thereby reference was made to the Association’s central role in disseminating information about the work of the United Nations.186 The UNA representative was not to remain the sole civil society observer that year. In 1971 a labour foreign affairs expert had asked the Foreign Minister a parliamentary question regarding his intention to accommodate the youth organisations’ earlier request for representation.187 Thus, when the Labour Party came into government five weeks later, it was committed to the cause. This time, when the issue was prepared in the foreign ministry, the idea was a one-time appointment analogous to that of the two labour market organisations the previous year. Another idea put into effect was to let the National Committee for International Youth Work nominate two representatives, preferably from political youth organisations, including non-member organisations of the Committee, such as the youth organisation of the socialist party.188 In the letter directed to the Committee it was underlined that such participation was a trial order and it was assumed the youth organisations of all political parties were consulted on the nomination.189 The final choice fell on the chairman of the youth organisation of the agrarian party, Svein Sundsb , and the representative of the Labour Party’s youth organisation, (the future spy) Arne Treholt. In the report submitted to the foreign ministry after the Assembly, the youth delegates expressed their satisfaction with the practical application of the observer model. Not only did they stay at the same hotel as the other delegates, but they also received the same daily allowance and other benefits as the rest of the delegation. To use the words of Sundsb and Treholt: “The observer order provides, apart from the right to speak in the UN, the same rights as those enjoyed by the permanent members of the UN delegation and the travelled Storting representatives.” The observers had access to all types of meetings, including meetings of the Security Council and informal meetings as those of the ‘Western European and Others Group’. They had the “full right to take part in the debates at the delegation meetings and therefore also certain possibilities to influence the final decisions”. At the same time, they admitted to having used their right with moderation, as they felt their function was “more one of self- informing than actively participating and influencing”. They appreciated the observer status not least for the lack of duties. Although sometimes asked to jump in for other delegates in the committee work, the youth
–––––––––––––– 186 Cabinet proposal, adopted 10 September 1971, FMAO, 1970–79, 26.5/78b. 187 Stortings forhandlinger, Stortingstidende 114 (1970/1971): 2095–2096. 188 Memorandum by Erik Tellmann, 5 July 1971, FMAO, 1970–79, 26.5/78b. 189 Letter by Arnesen to the National Committee, 27 August 1971, FMAO, 1970–79, 26.5/78b.
392 THE PARTICIPATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY delegates did not have the responsibility of a formal committee assignment as those carried by the parliamentary representatives. They also felt less identifiable with the decisions made by the delegation and suggested that giving youth representatives delegate status would probably result in frequent reservations in the records. Sundsb and Treholt argued emphatically for the continuation of the youth observer order, not least by pointing to the interest it had been met in a number of other delegations. Overlooking that there had been Danish and other youth delegates at the previous session, they characterised Norway as having played the role of a pioneer country, something that implied “certain obligations for the future”.190 The report was received enthusiastically by the Norwegian foreign ministry. Early on, the chief of the United Nations division sent the report to his Nordic colleagues, noting that, although no formal decision on the permanence of the order had yet been made, there was hardly any doubt it would be continued, as the trial run had turned out to the full satisfaction of both the participants and the foreign ministry.191 Despite this prediction, when the foreign ministry answered a renewed request by the National Committee for International Youth Work, it combined a positive answer with the remark that no precedence for the future had been made. Moreover, the ministry insisted on nominees coming from the youth organisations of political parties, a limitation the Committee had hoped to abandon.192 The memorandum prepared in the foreign ministry on the composition of the coming delegation indicated that the non-permanency clause was mainly seen as an instrument to limit the number of observers in case previously represented or new organisations would come to request participation.193 Despite these considerations, in a speech in the Third Committee of the General Assembly in winter 1972, the Norwegian representative announced that his government intended to continue the arrangement of sending youth delegates in years to come.194 The report by the youth representatives had not yet been written when the snowball effect that had been predicted in the parliamentary debate twenty months earlier came into play. In a letter directed to Foreign Minister Andreas Cappelen, the Norwegian National Council of Women –––––––––––––– 190 Report by Sundsb and Treholt, 10 February 1972, FMAO, 1970–79, 26.5/78b. 191 Letters by Ketil B rde, 8 March 1972, FMAO, 1970–79, 26.5/78b. 192 Letter by Chief of the Political Department Einar Ansteensen to the National Committee for International Youth Work, 14 June 1972, FMAO, 1970–79, 26.5/78b; Letter by the Committee to the foreign ministry, 6 April 1972, ibid. 193 Memorandum by Ketil B rde, 30 May 1972, FMAO, 1970–79, 26.5/79b; cf. Ansteensen’s note on the memorandum. 194 General Assembly, Third Committee 27 (1972): 424 (Bj rnar Utheim).
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(Norske Kvinners Najsonalråd) noted that observers from various societal groups participated in UN delegations every autumn. The Council expressed its regret that it had not yet been included in this order and remarked bluntly, “It should have been a matter of course to prioritise women’s organisations – ahead of youth organisations.” The Council’s argument was that the former had greater need for information and a better capacity for the dissemination of information. The Council also stressed that it represented most Norwegian women’s organisations and had a constituency of approximately 500,000 members. Moreover, it pointed to the Danish delegation order, which incorporated regular representation of its sister organisation, and also to the consultative status of the International Council of Women at the ECOSOC. No reference was made to the fact that Norwegian women’s organisations had been represented at the time of the founding of the United Nations.195 The Council’s request was granted in line with the established observer model, and included an option of mid- session rotations and reference to the non-permanency of the order.196 Like the reports submitted by the youth observers, writings by the observers of women organisations offered insights on corporatist politics at the General Assembly. The first report by Birgit Wiig and Berit Frigland made clear that they had a self-understanding of providing the link between the International Council of Women and their national UN delegation in both directions. In addition, they participated in women’s networking more generally. Moreover, they emphasised their special competence in women’s issues, views otherwise only humbly represented in Norwegian political institutions. In this connection, they pointed to one of their campaigns that had been mentioned in a Norwegian speech at the General Assembly and spurred lively interest in other delegations, with their organisation supplying additional material distributed in the committee. Wiig and Frigland both commented on having learned much that would make their work more efficient and maintained that the “broader influence by the people [folkelig innflytelse] with representatives of other groups than our top politicians can possibly contribute to a softening of forms of debate and give international work a new deal [ny giv]”. They expressed hope for the establishment of a permanent observer order for political youth organisations and women’s organisations, pointing to deficiencies in both groups’ influence in decision making organs. Similar to the previous year’s youth observers, Wiig and Frigland noted that they enjoyed equal rights
–––––––––––––– 195 Letter by “Chairman” Birgit Wiig, 15 January 1972, FMAO, 1970–79, 26.5/79b. 196 Letter by Ansteensen, 14 June 1972, FMAO, 1970–79, 26.5/79b.
394 THE PARTICIPATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY with the other delegates, not least in internal meetings.197 The report by the second contingent of youth observers shows that the delegates proper were nonetheless ‘more equal’ than the new category of observers: Although the latter had full rights to express their opinion in delegation meetings, they still lacked the right to take part in the internal voting on controversial matters.198 While new organisations were granted participation in Norwegian UN delegations in the early 1970s, limits did exist. The foreign ministry was explicit on this point when political scientist Jostein Mykletun requested “observer status” on the delegation. His interest lay in research for his dissertation project, with a focus on researching the activity and attitudes of parliamentarians, in particular.199 In preparing a reply to the request, the responsible official made reference to the fact that the foreign ministry, for various reasons, had followed “a very restrictive line” in dealing with such requests from individuals and organisations. It was decided that the foreign ministry would support Mykletun by way of providing contacts and participation in delegation meetings, but not by granting him the status of an ‘observer’.200
Involving people by civil society recruitment Youth organisations and women’s organisations regained representation on the Norwegian delegation at the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly. This time their stays were limited to six weeks each, and
–––––––––––––– 197 Report, no date (received by the foreign ministry 10 August 1973), FMAO, 1970–79, 26.5/79b; examples for collaboration between the National Council of Women, the International Council of Women, and ECOSOC are given in the supplement to a letter by the Secretary General of the National Council, Randi Bagge-Skarheim, to the foreign ministry, 4 June 1975, FMAO, 1970–79, 26.5/82b. 198 Report by Thorleif Egeland and Terje I. Olsson, 9 February 1973, FMAO, 1970–79, 26.5/79b. This report also gives evidence of the networking activity of youth delegates at the twenty-seventh session. Thus, the Norwegian delegates mention good contacts with youth observers from the Netherlands, Denmark and a “student politician” from Finland. They also point to contacts with the few other youth observers, from the Khmer Republic among others. The idea of a meeting of youth observers was thwarted by the short periods of appointment for some members of the group. This report also makes it clear that observers were granted compensation for lost income during the time of their appointment (upon application). For further networking attempts in regard to youth representatives cf. the letter by the (Dutch) Political Youth Council (Politiek Jongeren Kontakt) to the Norwegian Embassy in The Hague, 23 July 1975, FMAO, 1970–79, 26.5/82b. 199 Letter by Mykletun to the foreign ministry, 9 January 1974, FMAO, 1970–79, 26.5/81b; cf. Mykletun 1973, 1975a, 1975b, 1976, Riggs/Mykletun 1979. 200 Memorandum by Tom Vraalsen, 4 February 1974, FMAO, 1970–79, 26.5/81b.
395 CHAPTER 4 financial constraints meant compensation for lost income was no longer possible.201 Due to the significance attributed to the dissemination of knowledge on the United Nations and Norwegian policies at the world organisation, the foreign ministry was willing to re-expand civil society participation at the following session. The idea of half-session appointments had also gained ground. Apart from the earlier balancing of requests by trade unions and employers’ representatives, for the first time the foreign ministry took the initiative to recruit particular organisations. Thus, in a first memorandum on the delegation it was suggested a half- session seat be offered to the United Nations Association, which was considered ripe for return to the delegation, a half-session seat to the National Council of Women and two half-session seats to the National Committee for International Youth Work. Pointing to a protest letter by the world-federalist En Verdens Ungdom, one of the member organisations of the Committee considered “non-political”, it was also suggested youth organisations accepted to the delegation in the future not be limited to representatives of political organisations. In his notes in the margins, Under-Secretary of State Arne Arnesen suggested that the National Council of Women, having had representation for two subsequent years, should go on hiatus, not least in view of its representation at the Third World Population Conference in Bucharest that same year. Arnesen had current issues related to raw materials on his mind, and proposed half-session seats be offered to the Federation of Trade Unions and either the Employers’ Association or the Federation of Norwegian Industries (Norges Industriforbund).202 After a speech at the United Nations Association by then Foreign Minister Knut Frydenlund, the earlier advocate of youth representation, the attendant member of the National Council of Women got the impression “ever more importance is attached to voluntary organisation’s activities” and that the foreign minister appeared to pledge “a natural observer seat on our UN delegation”.203 When the Council was informed, by telephone, that women’s organisations would not be represented on the coming delegation, –––––––––––––– 201 The files on the delegation of 1973 (26.5/80b) could not be found in the archives of the foreign ministry, but reference is made to the order of the 28th session, among others, in the following document: Memorandum by Tom Vraalsen, 30 May 1974, FMAO, 1970–79, 26.5/81b. 202 Memorandum by Tom Vraalsen, 30 May 1974, FMAO, 1970–79, 26.5/81b; in regard to the appreciation of the observers for the dissemination of knowledge cf. the memorandum on the composition of the delegation of the following year, 30 May 1975, FMAO, 1970–79, 26.5/82b. 203 Letter by Berit Frigland, 14 May 1974, FMAO, 1970–79, 26.5/81b.
396 THE PARTICIPATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY the disappointment was considerable. In an indignant letter to Frydenlund one of the previous observers pointed both to the increasing relevance of women’s issues and participation on the agenda of the United Nations, not least preparations for the International Women’s Year in 1975, and to its own work in internationalising the outlook of Norwegian women’s organisations. In conclusion, she claimed this was an improper moment to cut off women’s organisations from representation and requested at least a shared seat with the youth organisations, in keeping with the model at the previous session.204 Upon this initiative, a half-session seat was granted to the Council at the expense of youth organisations, with particular reference to the International Women’s Year.205 The idea to invite the United Nations Association was not realised in 1974, but the suggestion on trade unions and business was put into practice. Whereas the trade unions gladly accepted the offer of an observer seat, the Federation of Norwegian Industries declined due to “completely special working conditions in the coming autumn”. The reaction in the foreign ministry to the implied imbalance was an observation that now the Employer’s Association had to be asked; the Association agreed to share a seat with the trade unions.206 The fact that the presence of the Association on the delegation was based on an invitation from the foreign ministry to both labour market partners might have contributed to a new, more service- minded attitude among the invited participants. The employers’ observer wrote a feed-back letter in which he not only pointed to the “somewhat different standard in cleaning” at the hotel and the lack of Norwegian newspapers available to the delegation, but also made it clear that he would have appreciated help in establishing contacts with the US community and that a common trip to Washington should have been better prepared. The fact that he did not stay for his whole six-week period also points to the evolution of the new type of demanding observer.207 By early 1975 the United Nations Association asked for renewed consideration of its information secretary, who had been discussed as an
–––––––––––––– 204 Letter by Frigland, 20 June 1974, FMAO, 1970–79, 26.5/81b. 205 Letter by Arnesen to the National Council Of Women, 8 July 1974, FMAO, 1970–79, 26.5/81b. 206 Letter by the Chairman of the Federation of Trade Unions Tor Aspengren, 25 June 1974, FMAO, 1970–79, 26.5/81b; letter by the Director of the Federation of Industries Jan Didriksen, 28 June 1974 (including the handwritten note by Arnesen of 12 July 1974), ibid.; letter by the Director of the Norwegian Association of Employers Kaare N. Selvig, 12 August 1974, ibid. 207 Letter by Ragnar Evensen to the foreign ministry, 7 November 1974, FMAO, 1970–79, 26.5/81b; The participation was planned for the period ca. 22/23 September to 23/24 October, see the letter by Selvig, 28 August 1974, ibid.
397 CHAPTER 4 observer the two previous years; their hope was to get her acquainted with Norwegian work at the United Nations. A foreign ministry official commented on the request by pointing to the ever-increasing influx of Norwegian delegations to international conferences and the financial strains connected to that. However, he also valued the request, and stated more generally: “I believe it is reasonable practice to involve people [folk] in our multilateral operations in the ‘field.’”208 Hence, the foreign ministry suggested offering a half-session seat to both the UN Association and to the youth organisations. In view of the International Women’s Year and the expected agenda in this connection, representation for the whole session was targeted to women’s organisations.209 However, this suggestion came in conflict with the foreign minister’s prioritisation of the participation of youth representatives. In a subsequent memorandum, it was considered to give two half-session seats to the National Committee for International Youth Work at the expense of the United Nations Association.210 Whereas the National Committee for International Youth Work, in a letter to the foreign ministry, predicted “damages in the relation between the foreign ministry and the [youth] organisations if a limited representation to the UN General Assembly is perpetuated”, the National Council of Women combined its request for full-time representation with detailed explanations on internal matters. Among other things, the Council dwelled upon its intention to nominate a woman belonging to the national minority of Sami people for one of its half-session seats.211 In effect, the foreign ministry announced that “after evaluation of the requests that have come in” youth organisations were given full-time representation, whereas the women’s organisations had to share their observer seat with the United Nations Association.212 Thereupon the National Council of Women divided its half-session seat into quarters, bearing extra expenses. However, now it was the Council’s two “vice chairmen” who shared the assignment.213 Sami
–––––––––––––– 208 Letter by the Secretary General of the United Nations Association of Norway Anders J. Guldvik to the foreign ministry, 31 January 1975, including the handwritten comment by Leif Edwardsen, 5 February 1975, FMAO, 1970–79, 26.5/82b. 209 Memorandum, 30 May 1975, FMAO, 1970–79, 26.5/82b. 210 Memorandum, 10 June 1975, FMAO, 1970–79, 26.5/82b. 211 Letter by the Secretary General of the National Committee Bj rn Jaaberg Hansen, 13 June 1975, FMAO, 1970–79, 26.5/82b; letter by Secretary General of the National Council Randi Bagge-Skarheim, 4 June 1975, ibid. 212 Letter by the head of the Political Division, Kjeld Vibe (in the name of the Foreign Minister), 27 June 1975, FMAO, 1970–79, 26.5/82b. 213 “Norges deltakelse i De Forente Nasjoners 30. ordinære og 7. ekstraordinære Generalforsamling.” Stortings forhandlinger 119 (1975/1976) St. meld. nr. 62: 8; cf. letter by vice chairperson Laila S moen, 4 June 1975, FMAO, 1970–79, 26.5/82b. Already at the (continued)
398 THE PARTICIPATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY women were to wait another twenty years before attending the General Assembly.214 The choice of representatives by the umbrella organisations became critical for the youth observers as well. In a letter to the National Committee for International Youth Work, with a copy to the foreign minister, the conservative youth organisation (Unge H yres Landsforbund) protested against the nomination being given to a labour youth delegate for the third time. In its reply, the Committee pointed to the difficult internal balancing in a long-term perspective and at the individual session, and to the voting procedure in its working committee that the nomination was based on.215 The women’s delegates to the thirtieth session of the General Assembly declared to have enjoyed the feeling “that we have been heard and that we were permitted to participate in shaping”.216 Even in light of already showing satisfaction, the women’s organisations were given the opportunity for expanded participation at the following session. They were now granted two half observer seats, a position they have maintained but for a few occasions since. In the 1980s a practice developed by which one of these half seats went to a member organisation of the National Council of Women and the other to a non-member, often a more radical women’s organisation. By 1989, the Council ceased to exist, resulting in women’s seats now being given to individual organisations. The somewhat disturbing impression given by the listing of the Ministry for Children and Family Affairs in the list of observers for the delegations of 2001 and 2002 has a simple explanation: It was not another attempt of body-snatching, or of transforming a category reserved for civil society into something more governmental (at least not in the bold sense of joining civil society). It served as a wildcard for the women’s organisations’ nominees that the ministry was late in submitting. Similar to the case of women’s organisations (but without the Ministry for Children and Family Affairs getting involved), youth organisations have continued to be represented by two observers at almost all sessions. On its homepage, the Norwegian Children and Youth Council (Landsrådet for Norges barne- og ungdomsorganisasjoner) as the –––––––––––––– two previous sessions, the National Council of Women had divided its half-session seat further, breaking it down into terms of three weeks. 214 Sami (women’s) organisations had an observer seat on the Norwegian delegations to the General Assembly in 1994 and 2000. 215 Copy of a letter by Chairman Per-Kristian Foss of the conservative youth organisation, 18 August 1975, FMAO, 1970–79, 26.5/82b; copy of the reply by Secretary General Hansen, 22 August 1975, FMAO, ibid. 216 Report, 23 June 1976, FMAO, 1970–79, 26.5/82b.
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(successor) umbrella organisation responsible for the nomination of youth delegates for many years, points to the career potential of such an appointment: Former youth delegates among current cabinet members include Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg, Minister of Education Kristin Halvorsen, Minister of Justice Knut Storberget, and Minister of the Environment and Development Cooperation Erik Solheim.217 The Federation of Trade Unions and the Employers’ Association (since 1990, the successor organisation Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise, Næringslivets Hovedorganisasjon) have each been represented by one observer to practically all sessions of the General Assembly since 1976. The United Nations Association was represented irregularly in the beginning, but has usually been granted two observers since 1984, sometimes sharing the assignment with related organisations. By 1981, a new organisation was granted observer status: the Norwegian Federation of Organisations of Disabled People (Funksjonshemmedes Fellesorganisasjon). This was part of an informal Nordic rotation scheme of disability organisations in the years 1980 to 1982. Whereas the disabled have rarely had observers on the delegation afterwards,218 one or two representatives of various religious denominations have usually enjoyed observer status since 1982. Most of these representatives had their background in the Council on Ecumenical and International Relations of the Church of Norway, but there have also been representatives of other religious communities, including representatives of the Jewish and Bahá’i denominations. From 1983 onward, two represent- atives of the Advisory Council for Arms Control and Disarmament were among the observers on the delegation, a tradition discontinued after the end of the Cold War. In recent times, representatives of peace organisations have returned to the delegation on a regular basis. Since 1996, the participation of human rights and refugee organisations has also become a regular feature. In contrast, an environmental organisation was only represented on the delegation in 2005. Aid and development organisations have increasingly been granted observer status on the delegation in the past few years. However, thereby the traditional women’s, youth, church, and
–––––––––––––– 217 “På vei til FN i New York.” Oslo: Norwegian Children and Youth Council, 2007
400 THE PARTICIPATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY even human rights slots have been used. As yet, aid and development organisations have not achieved representation in their own right. Whereas the field of represented organisations and the number of observers has increased since the 1970s, the depth of their experience on the delegation has diminished. In the past years, observers have merely stayed for two-week periods. By the beginning of the twenty-first century a form of light involvement of civil society has emerged, bringing about substantially different appointments than those seen in the first post-war years.
CORPORATISM AND DOUBLE UNIVERSALISM: SWEDEN Like Denmark and Norway, Sweden is a country with civic traditions rooted in the popular movements of the nineteenth century. There is a tradition of participation, according to which these movements were represented corporately in public administration when most of their individual members did not yet have the right to vote. For instance, this was the case in the fields of employment offices, social insurance or social issues in general.219 Civic associations are regularly consulted in public inquiries, law making, and other decision making processes and often play a significant role for policy outcomes. The term Organisationssverige (Organisation-Sweden), frequently used in discussions of the third sector in Swedish society, gives a notion of the at-times peculiar blend of state and society typical of the country’s political culture. On the other side, two-partite solutions excluding the state are not uncommon either. In contrast to the stereotype of a big government welfare state, it is the two-partite corporatism that is particularly characteristic of Sweden.220 As observed by Pauli Kettunen, “Collective agreements were regarded as a higher, more desirable form of regulation than the direct state intervention through legislation.” This was especially true in the field of industrial relations.221 At the same time, there are domains classically known for their statist character, such as foreign affairs. For example, a Swedish governmental report recently claimed that foreign policy belongs
–––––––––––––– 219 Bo Rothstein. Den korporativa staten: Interesseorganisationer och statsf rvaltning i svensk politik. Stockholm: Norstedts, 1992. 82–90. 220 Tim Tilton. The Political Theory of Swedish Social Democracy: Through the Welfare State to Socialism. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990. 190. 221 Pauli Kettunen. “The Society of Virtuous Circles.” Models, Modernity and the Myrdals. Pauli Kettunen and Hanna Eskola (eds). Helsinki: University, 1997. 153–173, at 166.
401 CHAPTER 4 to the policy fields that are “clinically free” from corporatism.222 Due to the primacy of states in international relations, the two-partite model did not play a role in this field. However, in contradiction to the statist doctrine of international relations, tripartite and multipartite corporatism has been relevant for Sweden’s representation in international arenas. It has almost always been a pertinent trait in the delegations to the UN General Assembly. Thereby Swedish governments – more so than Danish and Norwegian ones – were reluctant to go beyond the involvement of labour market organisations.
Universalism and a glimpse of civil society In a representative anthology about Sweden’s status and future, published in 1943, the then chairman of the parliamentary Foreign Policy Committee, Östen Undén, discussed the balancing of national sovereignty and its limitations in the new world organisation. In his view, practises at the League of Nations had entailed too strong of a semblance to the former Polish parliament’s “liberum veto”, giving advantage to the principle of sovereignty. Undén suggested a better balance would be achieved by staffing international organs according to competence and character, not by nationality. While this idea only was applicable to international bureaucracies, Undén went further by establishing that the activities of the League of Nations had “often been paralysed in that delegates for governments acted in this capacity and according to instructions given in advance”. He suggested that policy increasingly relied “on ‘technical’ solutions to international problems rather than on political ones”. This suggestion indicated his preference for expert conferences over engagement in a ponderous Assembly apparatus that he described as concealing its lack of effectiveness behind sterile discussions.223 Undén, as the foreign minister from 1945 to 1962, did not put into practice the expert approach he had advocated (an approach which is partly compatible, partly in conflict with civil society representation). When the General Assembly decided on Swedish UN membership in 1946 Undén sent a solely governmental delegation to New York. By that time, at least two requests from private organisations had come in. A letter to Undén from the (women’s) Fredrika Bremer Association, already in March 1946,
–––––––––––––– 222 Avkorporativisering och lobbyism: Konturerna till en ny politisk modell. Statens offentliga utredningar 1999:121. Stockholm: Fakta info direkt, 1999. 243; on de facto corporatism in Swedish foreign policy see Lindberg 1999. 223 Östen Undén. “Efter kriget: Några framtidsproblem.” Svensk ordning och nyordning: En orientering. Stockholm: Natur och Kultur, 1943. 157–166, at 165–166.
402 THE PARTICIPATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY underlined “the weight that also women are appointed as members of the Swedish delegation” to the United Nations. Their argument stated that the agenda points were of equally vital significance for both sexes, and therefore had to be tackled collaboratively. The letter conceded that the number of competent women who would accept the assignment was still far lower than that of men. That said, it was pointed out that several known women in Sweden would meet the requirement.224 Some months later, the Swedish Association for International Cooperation for Peace (F reningen Mellanfolkligt Samarbete f r fred) directed a letter to the government, in which it explained its status as an umbrella organisation for twenty-eight voluntary associations representing 2.6 million members nation-wide, and then relayed the decision of its annual meeting in which it requested the government appoint to UN delegations “persons who by their deeds have demonstrated interest in international cooperation for peace”. In addition they noted “Women should be given due space in those delegations […] belonging to the UN system”. The letter also provided the names of appropriate candidates, namely, former League of Nations delegate Kerstin Hesselgren and women’s activist Signe H jer.225 However, the low-key approach chosen by Undén when joining the United Nations did not match the call for women’s appointments which still had the touch of an extraordinary marker. In due time, before the delegation to the second session of the General Assembly was appointed, Hesselgren wrote to the Foreign Minister in her capacity as chairwoman of the Women’s Organisations’ Committee for International Questions. She also claimed representativity for her organisation, pointing to eighty member organisations with half a million members. Having done this, she underlined the significance of the fact that competent women, from the beginning, be given the opportunity to participate in the work of Swedish delegations to meetings of various United Nations organs and organisations. She also submitted a list of names, based on the suggestions of member organisations, for female appointees to UN delegations in the narrow sense, as well as to the meetings of the International Labour Organisation and UNESCO. She requested the foreign ministry to “take maximum possible consideration of these suggestions by the women’s organisations”.226
–––––––––––––– 224 Letter by chairwoman Ebba Odhner to Foreign Minister Undén, 11 March 1946, NAS, FM, FS 1920, HP 48, vol 1775. 225 Letter to the government, 31 July 1946, NAS, FM, FS 1920, HP 48, vol. 1866. 226 Letter by Hesselgren to the foreign minister, 7 March 1947, NAS, FM, FS 1920, HP 48, vol. 1866.
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The woman with the highest implicit ranking on the list was a professor in economics, Karin Kock, who became the first female Swedish cabinet minister just one month later; she was nominated as a member of the delegation to the United Nations by five women’s organisations. She later attended the fourth session of the General Assembly. However, as a relatively recent appointment to the cabinet, she was not a choice for the second session. Another high-ranking nominee, suggested by three organisations, was the chairwoman of the Fredrika Bremer Association, Hanna Rydh, who had been on the delegation to the League of Nations in 1938. Some weeks after receiving the list, Undén recorded a visit by Rydh in his diary: “She talked about a post in the UN secretariat that she had in mind. However, she likely wanted to remind me of herself for the UN delegation”.227 Undén also noted in his diary that he had informed Rydh that Ulla Alm (Lindstr m) should come along as a “female representative”. As Ulla Alm had been on the list suggested by the Swedish Women’s Leftist Association (Svenska kvinnors vänsterf rbund), a list Undén had seen, Alm Lindstr m can be seen not merely as a female representative on the delegation, but a representative of women’s organisations.228 Curiously, the earlier and later chairwoman of the Swedish section of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom Signe H jer, who met Alm Lindstr m in New York when the latter served on the delegation, identified her as a delegate from her own organisation’s youth group. Thus, she wrote that Alm Lindstr m “also represents us”.229 H jer herself had been nominated by four organisations, among them the Women’s International League. Apart from these incidences, there is no evidence that Lindstr m was perceived as a civil society representative, despite her annual reappointment. The delegation list never described her as a nominee of women’s organisations, but instead as a member of the upper chamber of the Riksdag. In private letters to her husband, many written during her first appointment, she identified with being a social democrat and not a representative of women’s organisations.230 At the same time, she did see things from a female perspective. In an article manuscript from 1947 she noted the following observation:
–––––––––––––– 227 Undén 2002 I: 199 (entry of 30 May 1947). 228 Undén 2002 I: 199 (entry of 30 May 1947); Undén’s initials are on the letter from Hesselgren to the foreign minister, 7 March 1947, NAS, FM, FS 1920, HP 48, vol. 1866. 229 Signe H jer. Mitt i livet. Stockholm: LT, 1982. 122. 230 NAS, ULA, vol. 7.
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When one comes to the United Nations’ huge, air-conditioned, chilly meeting room, where the 550 representatives and alternate representatives of 55 countries crouched with their headphones on their ears and under fire of spotlight and curious film equipment from the gallery, the General Assembly undeniably gives a highly technical and masculine impression.231 Thus, Lindstr m might serve as an example for the feminist-standpoint theory. However, her distance from civil society activities was substantial. When participating at a conference of the World Federation of United Nations Associations as a representative for the Swedish United Nations Association, she penned a letter characterising the meeting as terribly useless. When I hear certain fellows talk there, I have to think all of the time of what someone once said about the tenants movement: “an organisation where those who failed in the trade union movement try to excel”. Of course I do not know where these people have failed, and some of them are doubtlessly able and prominent and others are young, pristine and maybe promising, but those most noticeable in the debates are old professors and misses who remain bound in adolescent naïveté and idealism and talk ardently and in unworldly manner about resolutions that lack practical relevance. This resolution-making is an officious Lilliputian-duplication of the UN’s great discussion machinery, which sometimes seems so meaningless, too.232 In 1948, the chairwoman of the Social Democratic Women’s Organisation (Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Kvinnof rbund), Disa Västberg, sent a sort of manifesto to Foreign Minister Undén. After having made clear that Sweden had “a social and cultural standard, surpassed nowhere” she expressed regret that so few women representatives attended the United Nations and its organs, and appealed to the government: “Sweden also in this point will take its place among the most developed democratic nations”. However, the manifesto did not become more concrete than this.233 In contrast to delegations from Norway, the Swedes have always included women in their delegations to the General Assembly, despite the lack of a seat designated specifically for women’s organisations. Sweden was also the first of the Nordic countries to install a female permanent representative to the United Nations: Agda R ssel served in this position from 1958 to 1964. Comparing the share of women on Danish and Swedish delegations in the period 1946 to 1975, no significant difference can be noted even though Denmark’s delegation did have a seat reserved for
–––––––––––––– 231 Manuscript, autumn 1947, NAS, ULA, vol. 7. 232 Letter to Martin Lindstr m, 16 August 1948, NAS, ULA, vol. 7. 233 Letter by Västberg to Undén, 28 June 1948, NAS, FM, FS 1920, HP 1, vol. 44.
405 CHAPTER 4 women’s organisations.234 Thus, there is no record to determine the effect of a designated seat for women’s organisations. While such representation might have helped prevent regression as seen in Norway, it was not a stringent necessity to maintain a special seat for women’s organisations for achieving a comparatively high number of women on the delegation even in the first postwar decades. The average share of women on the Danish delegation was 13.6 per cent (2.6 individuals) in the period 1946 to 1975. The corresponding numbers were 13.3 per cent (3.1 individuals) for Sweden and 6.8 per cent (1.4 individuals) for Norway.235 By 1974, eleven members of the agrarian party put forth a motion in parliament asking for the Swedish UN delegation to be expanded to include representatives of women’s organisations and youth organisations. In regard to a seat for women’s organisations, the motion argued for domestic and international strategies of enhancing equal opportunity. The motion also pointed to the decision taken in Norway to establish a seat for women’s organisations and mentioned the problem that there was no national umbrella organisation in Sweden. The proposed expansion of the delegation was said to serve the purpose of disseminating information and providing experience for the respective organisations, and to increase the Swedes’ understanding of the United Nations.236 The parliamentary foreign policy committee reacted by pointing to the Commission on the Status of Women and UNESCO as the principal bodies for issues related to women and youth, and by referring to the promotion already given these groups; nor did it go unmentioned that women, as a result of spontaneous developments, had played a prominent role on Swedish UN delegations. The committee agreed that the involvement of women and youth was important, but also suggested no measures be taken.237 This position was passed in the Riksdag without debate.238
The installation of the classical (neo-)corporatist model At the second session of the General Assembly, the deputy chairman of the Swedish Federation of Trade Unions (Landsorganisationen), Gustav –––––––––––––– 234 Denmark had a greater share of women than Sweden at sixteen of the relevant sessions and session parts; Sweden outdid Denmark at fourteen sessions, and one session was tied. 235 Only in the years 1967, 1972, 1974, and 1975 was there a female member on Icelandic delegations. The Finnish record cannot be compared because of Finland’s late entry into the UN. However, comparing the period 1956 to 1975, it can be said that the Finnish record is slightly better than, but nonetheless in a class with that of Norway. 236 Riksdagens protokoll (1974) Mot. 1270. 237 Riksdagens protokoll (1974) Utrikesutskottets utlåtande 2. 238 Riksdagens protokoll (1974) 40: 27.
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Vahlberg, was included on the delegation as ‘adviser’. Neither the records of the foreign ministry nor Östen Undén’s diary gives a clue to the background of this appointment. However, it was likely an adaptation of the models provided by Norway and Denmark. According to a letter by Ulla Lindstr m, she and another parliamentarian, Rickard Sandler, as well as Vahlberg were “as social democrats, a natural grouping” within the delegation.239 When the composition of the delegation to the third session was planned, the initial idea in the foreign ministry was to reappoint Vahlberg.240 However, in the end it was the trade unions’ press officer, Ragnar Casparsson, who was appointed. According to the memoirs of Casparsson, the procedure was that he received a phone call from Undén, who asked if he would like to participate. Casparsson felt honoured by the offer, but evidently had to ask his employer before accepting the posting.241 He did accept, and went on to participate in the Swedish delegations to the third, fourth, and fifth sessions of the General Assembly. It is unclear why the tradition to include a trade union representative was discontinued after 1950, but even here there is a parallel with Norway. One reason might have been Casparsson’s low utility as a delegate. According to letters written by Ulla Lindstr m, Casparsson was of no use in the delegation.242 Lindstr m described an incident upon the death of Swedish King Gustav V in 1950 that is telling. It was Casparsson who was assigned the task to hold a “standard speech of thanks” in reply to the condolences. Thereupon Casparsson panicked and refused to go to the morning meeting at Lake Success that he and I had earlier agreed he should attend […]. However, I insisted relentlessly on the agreement, and in this way, it came about that the former syndicalist Casparsson, after three years of silence, held his maiden speech out here on the topic “mourning a revered King”. Hilarious, if you ask me.243 Lindstr m wished Casparsson would become a provincial governor (landsh vding), a post known as a prestigious retreat for politicians, “so he does not return for another year”.244 He did not return in 1951 and did become provincial governor in 1952. However, Casparsson’s problems in New York seem to have stemmed from difficulties with the language.245 –––––––––––––– 239 Letter to Martin Lindstr m, 6 October 1947, NAS, ULA, vol. 7. 240 Memorandum, 11 June 1948, NAS, FM, FS 1920, vol. 1789. 241 Ragnar Casparsson. Brinnande horisonter. Stockholm: Tiden, 1963. 241. 242 Letters to Martin Lindstr m, 2 November 1949 and 25 October 1950, NAS, ULA, vol. 7. 243 Letter to Martin Lindstr m, 1 November 1950, NAS, ULA, vol. 7. 244 Letter to Martin Lindstr m, 25 October 1950, NAS, ULA, vol. 7. 245 Cf. letter to Martin Lindstr m, 21 October 1950, NAS, ULA, vol. 7.
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According to Prime Minister Tage Erlander, there was hardly anyone in the social democratic party who could rival Casparsson’s skill as an orator when appearing before the Swedish public.246 The practice of including a trade union representative on Swedish delegations to the General Assembly ceased for some time after 1950. No documents illuminate the background of this development, likewise, no information has been found to explain the re-emergence of a trade union delegate in 1957, after which a trade union representative has been included on the delegation every year. In the years 1957 to 1959 the trade union representative position went to secretary Otto Westling, in 1960 to 1968 to international secretary Bertil Bolin (son-in-law to Ulla Lindstr m), in 1969 to 1973 Chairman Arne Geijer, and in 1974 to 1982 to international secretary Thorbj rn Carlsson. The archives of the foreign ministry and of the Confederation of Trade Unions offer little of interest that would cast light onto the activities of these delegates. However, two documents provided exceptions and a brief glimpse of insight. After the eighteenth session of the General Assembly, Bolin wrote a memorandum on the United Nations and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). Whereas the ICFTU had consultative status with ECOSOC and was engaged in lobbying activities in New York, according to him the ICFTU had little contact with the trade union representatives in the delegations of individual countries. However, it seems there were not many such representatives to speak of. Other than Sweden, the memorandum pointed to the regular appointment of trade union representatives in the Netherlands and Norway (not noting that Konrad Nordahl had started to be seen as a parliamentary delegate). It mentioned the regular appointment of a trade union delegate in Denmark who rarely showed up. Also mentioned was a Canadian trade union representative who had participated in the previous session. Despite these limitations, the memorandum claimed that trade unions, in particular the Swedish trade unions, had become well known in the United Nations. In contrast to trade union delegates who acted as advisers, their Swedish colleague had been appointed as the main representative in the Second (Economic) Committee. Bolin’s memorandum underlined that developing countries were sympathetic to the opinions of trade unions and that trade union representatives had always succeeded in passing stipulations in support of trade union participation.247
–––––––––––––– 246 Erlander 2001: 354 (entry of 15 September 1951). 247 Memorandum by Bertil Bolin, 13 April 1964, LMAS, FTU, F 09 C, vol. 21.
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The second document is a report by Carlsson “on certain problems in the UN, aid policy and international trade union activity”, written in early 1976. The report described most of the countries of the world as dictatorships, most of these with systems resulting in increased differences between the rich and the poor, and which steer and suppress trade union activity in ways similar to what had been the case in the colonial period. Carlsson suggested this as the reality backdrop against which the discussions on the new international economic order had to be seen, in particular the idea of closing down industries in developed countries to the benefit of developing countries. Carlsson noted that he had expressed the following opinion within the Swedish UN delegation: that further engagement by the government for the proposed new world order must be preceded by necessary consultations with the labour market partners; that Sweden should contribute to bringing the question of fairer distribution within developing countries to the fore in connection with coming deliberations about the economic world order; that in these deliberations, as well as in the design of development policy in general, Sweden should forcefully call attention to the fundamental prerequisite for economic and social development constituted by measures to promote employment. Further, Carlsson argued that interference with internal issues was no valid argument against this view, as the new economic order highly interfered with internal matters in developed countries. He also urged delegates to keep in mind that solidarity should benefit populations, not primarily governments, and maintained that it was only natural for the Swedish position to differ from that of third world governments.248 It seems, in the mid-1970s, the trade union representative functioned as a reminder of Swedish economic interests, standing up to a government uncritically adjusting to the agenda of the developing countries. The only official extension of the delegation before the 1980s was made in 1964, when the Federation of Swedish Industries (Sveriges Industrif rbund) was given a seat on the delegation. It was the former chief of the foreign ministry’s political department, Sven Dahlman, now international secretary of the Federation, who expressed interest in gaining representation for his organisation at the General Assembly. He pointed to the fact that a trade union representative had been included for several years.249 However, the specific event that likely triggered the request was the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, established the –––––––––––––– 248 Report by Thorbj rn Carlsson, probably 6 February 1976, LMAS, FTU, F 09 C, vol. 12. 249 Memorandum by Wilhelm Wachtmeister, 7 March 1964, FMAS, HP 48 D, vol. 82.
409 CHAPTER 4 same year. There were always one or two representatives of the Federation of Swedish Industries present on the Swedish delegation to the General Assembly in the years 1964 to 1993 and 1995 to 1999. In addition, a representative of the Swedish Employer’s Federation (Svenska Arbetsgivaref reningen) was often included in the delegation from 1993 on. The organisations merged into the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise (Svenskt Näringsliv) in 2001, and this new organisation has consistently sent representatives to the UN delegation, as well. The principal representatives were Dahlman until 1969 and Director Helge Berg in the years 1970 to 1989. The order established in 1964 implied that elements of (neo-) corporatism, the classical model for which is the collaboration of employees, employers (or big business), and governments, were integrated in the composition of UN delegations. Only in the 1980s were other organisations granted formal access to the delegation. These organisations included the white-collar Confederation for Professional Employees (Tjänstemännens Centralorganisation), which has been represented on all delegations since 1986.
Extended participation and invention of the ‘NGO-ambassador’ When the idea of increasing civil society representation on the delegation was discussed for the first time, it was in reference to sending youth representatives to the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly. The call upon governments to consider the inclusion of youth representatives in their delegations seems to have been a Swedish idea; the idea was put forth in the resolution on the celebration of the United Nations anniversary. Torsten Örn, the first counsellor of embassy at Sweden’s permanent mission to the UN, maintained that he only had younger (political) delegates in mind when he suggested the stipulation. Yet, he also noted that several countries considered the inclusion of a youth representative on the delegation analogous to the Danish practice of appointing a representative of women’s organisations. Örn suggested that, were such an approach to be adopted by Sweden, the appointed representative should be one of the five Swedish representatives to the World Youth Assembly held in New York in July 1970. At the same time, he prompted the foreign ministry to consider that such an arrangement could easily establish a practice for the future. He maintained that although this might not necessarily be a disadvantage, one should nonetheless be aware of it.250 The communication of the Danish –––––––––––––– 250 Letter from Örn to the chief of the UN division in the foreign ministry Kaj Sundberg, 12 August 1970, FMAS, HP 48 D, vol. 106.
410 THE PARTICIPATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY foreign ministry with its counterpart shows that the Swedish government had no clear strategy in this matter. As no request by youth organisations was submitted to the government, no decision in favour of youth organisations was made.251 A motion was raised in Parliament by members of the agrarian party in 1974 asking for an expansion of the Swedish UN delegation so that it include representatives of women’s and youth organisations. While the motion discussed women’s representation at greater length, it made clear that the existence of an umbrella for youth organisations (Sveriges Ungdsomsorganisationers Landsråd) made the practical handling of representation of youth easier than that of women, for which no such umbrella organisation existed.252 The parliamentary foreign policy committee reacted by discussing the inclusion of youth in a variety of contexts, not least in recent UNESCO delegations. However, the committee recommended no youth representative be installed on the UN delegation, a recommendation the Riksdag followed.253 Also, in 1974, the Swedish United Nations Association asked Foreign Minister Sven Andersson to be allowed to send a representative to shadow at the General Assembly for a few weeks. The request was granted, and the political department in the ministry explicitly expressed its interest in acquainting the secretary of the organisation, Lars Eriksson, with the United Nations and the Swedish delegation. However, a subsequent discussion emerged in the foreign ministry, addressing whether Eriksson should be accredited as ‘adviser’ or merely as an observer, not least because the different status had a different effect on budget items within the ministry. It was decided that he would not be formally included in the delegation, being assigned observer status instead. Whereas the ministry did not want to decide whether this status should permit participation in delegation meetings, the permanent mission saw no reason to object.254 In the report from this mission, Eriksson maintained that his two weeks had been rewarding, but that his was too short of a visiting period. He also wrote that the purpose of his visit had probably been to deepen his knowledge about the United Nations in order to make him a better promoter on the organisation. However, despite having had a full
–––––––––––––– 251 Cf. The memorandum by Danish foreign ministry official Bent S ndergaard, 12 May 1970, NAC, FM 1946–72, 119.D.9.a. 252 Riksdagens protokoll (1974) Mot. 1270. 253 Riksdagens protokoll (1974) Utrikesutskottets utlåtande 2; Riksdagens protokoll (1974) 40: 27. 254 Memorandum by Folke L fgren, 19 September 1974, FMAS, HP 48 Ö, vol. 18; cable by minister Kaj Sundberg to the foreign ministry, 25 September 1974, ibid.
411 CHAPTER 4 programme (not least due to meetings with staff of the Secretariat and of NGOs), he felt his function had been too passive. In his view, the future role of organisation representatives was to be more than merely becoming acquainted with the organisation. Eriksson sketched a comprehensive alternative programme for civil society involvement in the Swedish delegation with the United Nations Association as the pivot: A representative of the UN Association should be able to more actively contribute to the Swedish UN delegation, if he or she would concentrate on one or a few issues on the agenda and prepare himself or herself thoroughly through studies in advance. Some form of consultation with the members of the association, i.e. the larger part of Organisation-Sweden, would give extended representativity to the delegate’s contributions to the discussions in the delegations. The views the delegate is mandated to express would in advance be submitted to the government and the parliamentary parties by the UN Association. If this view on the function of the UN Association was accepted, it would imply that there is the same reason to include an adviser from the UN Association to the delegation as one from the Federation of Trade Unions and the Federation of Industries. This would contribute to Sweden’s UN policy getting a broader popular base.255 A similar vision had been conceptualised by Bengt Gustafsson, the chairman of the UNA at the time, who might have inspired the report, which came late. In October 1975, Gustafsson directed a letter to the government, in which he pointed to the association’s broad membership, “including the heavy trade union, cooperative, and agrarian organisations” as well as local UN societies. He maintained that having earlier functioned as a one-way transmitter of information directed towards the public, the association had since become more of a two-way channel, also open to suggestions originating from the other direction, from the members to the government. In order to enable the association to better perform its functions, Gustafsson requested higher state subsidies and “continuous representation of the association in working groups that prepare Sweden’s policy on UN issues as well as in delegations representing Sweden at the various UN conferences”. Gustafsson also expressed his disappointment that no representative of the UNA had been included in the delegation to the thirtieth session of the General Assembly and requested a dialogue with the government.256 Thereupon he was granted a conversation with Under Secretary of State Sverker Åstr m. According to the memorandum prepared in the –––––––––––––– 255 Report by Lars Eriksson on his participation in the 29th session of the General Assembly, 6 October 1975, FMAS, HP 48 Ö, vol. 19. 256 Letter by Gustafsson to the government, 10 October 1975, FMAS, HP 48 Ö, vol. 19.
412 THE PARTICIPATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY foreign ministry about the discussion, it was agreed that the task of the UNA was primarily to provide information about United Nations issues, yet the association also had significance as a channel for members’ opinions. The association’s possible participation in consultative groups was to be considered. Finally, Åstr m made it clear that the foreign ministry did not wish to grant the association a permanent seat on the delegation, instead preferring to treat corresponding requests in an ad hoc manner.257 In a follow-up letter, Åstr m promised to provide better information to the UNA, but added that after careful consideration the ministry found principle and practical reasons that would severely limit the possibilities for granting direct access to decision making.258 Whereas no representative of the United Nations Association was allowed to return to the delegation in 1975, an unofficial observer position was made available to the Swedish Peace Council (Sveriges Fredsråd). The former (and later) chairman of the organisation, Ulrich Herz, was given the chance to follow disarmament negotiations at the General Assembly.259 When the Foreign Minister agreed to the visit he explicitly stressed that the observation subject was limited to the field of disarmament.260 In 1976, the Peace Council reappointed Herz, after having been asked by the foreign ministry if the council was interested in nominating an observer.261 In the following year, two observer seats were made available: one representing the Swedish United Nations Association, and the other one the Swedish branch of Amnesty International. UNA observers were given the chance to take a closer look at the United Nations in subsequent years, as well.262 The described tendencies of the mid-1970s corresponded to the Zeitgeist, an observation not least obvious from the Danish and Norwegian developments. However, they were also a merit of the work by church activist and former liberal parliamentarian Olle Dahlén, who had attended the General Assembly as a Swedish party representative on seven occasions in the years 1958 to 1972. In 1973 Dahlén had spent two weeks in New York for the World Council of Churches meeting and became the first individual to get an observer position on the Swedish delegation to the General Assembly.263 With the example of domestic corporatism in mind, it –––––––––––––– 257 Memorandum by Örjan Berner, FMAS, HP 48 Ö, vol. 19. 258 Letter from Åstr m to Gustafsson, 15 December 1975, FMAS, HP 48 Ö, vol. 19. 259 Cable by foreign ministry official Folke L fgren to the permanent mission, 9 September 1975, FMAS, HP 48 Ö, vol. 19. 260 Memorandum by L fgren, 10 September 1975, FMAS, HP 48 Ö, vol. 19. 261 Letter by the chairman of the Peace Council, Karl-Axel Elmquist, to foreign ministry official Olle Dahlén, 26 August 1976, FMAS, HP 48 Ö, vol. 19. 262 FMAS, HP 48 Ö, vol. 20–21. 263 Cable by Örn to the permanent mission, 29 October 1973, FMAS, HP 48 DD, vol. 15.
413 CHAPTER 4 was Dahlén who first envisioned engaging the Swedish government in international associations. In his view, the significance of such organisations in terms of public opinion made it desirable to establish “better channels to them, stronger ties with them”. Dahlén recalled: When pondering on this idea it became clear to me that there was a need to create a position in the Ministry [for Foreign Affairs] in order to get something started. In short, that was what I suggested to the Prime Minister, Mr Olof Palme.264 Social democrat Palme accepted the idea, not without making some party political considerations (and possibly strategic considerations for Sweden’s period in the UN Security Council in 1975–1976). Dahlén, who had already left parliament and party politics, was made “Ambassador at large at the disposal of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to deal specifically with matters concerning Non-Governmental Organizations”.265 He served in this capacity from 1974 to 1983, thereby participating in the Swedish UN delegation from the twenty-ninth to thirty-seventh sessions of the General Assembly. Dahlén’s appointment was to specifically deal with the fields of disarmament and human rights. According to his diary for 1980, he travelled abroad for eighty days, not least to Geneva and New York, and held sixty-one meetings with international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) and thirty-eight meetings with Swedish NGOs. His own interpretation of the task was that of a “liaison officer”, a link between NGOs and the ministry, who would spell out “the views of ‘my NGOs’”, similar to the reporting activity of conventional ambassadors. He had no objection to being regarded as “a kind of ombudsman for INGOs – not as an advocate of all their ideas and proposals but as an advocate of their right to put forward those ideas and proposals”. One of his initiatives was to send the report on Sweden’s participation in the UN General Assembly to about eighty Swedish organisations, asking for their comments. The feedback thus received was summarised and put into the dossier of background material for the coming UN delegation. In Dahlén’s own account, his activities resulted in increased attention to Swedish positions by international associations, and it served as a model for similar French and Norwegian appointments. In his view, the goal was not “impressive
–––––––––––––– 264 Olle Dahlén. “A Governmental Response to Pressure Groups: The Case of Sweden.” Pressure Groups in the Global System: The Transnational Relations of Issue-Oriented Non- Governmental Organizations. Peter Willetts (ed.). London: Pinter, 1982. 148–170, at 155. 265 Dahlén 1982: 156; the quote is taken from a note from the Swedish permanent representative to the UN Secretary-General, 21 May 1974.
414 THE PARTICIPATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY action”, but channelling “influence like water seeping through the various strata of opinion and power – anywhere and everywhere”. In the Swedish foreign ministry, the scepticism that likely existed seems not to have caused open controversies.266 The most remarkable feature of Dahlén’s appointment was undoubtedly its internationalist outlook, transgressing not only the state– society divide in international relations, but also the divide between domestic forces and foreign influences. This was an institutional underpinning of not only unconventional flows of information, but also of Sweden’s role as the world’s conscience. Thus, there was a double universalistic approach to civil society participation in Swedish UN delegations in the mid-1970s: On the one hand, a restrictive attitude prevailed in regard to the inclusion of individual organisations, leaving it to the delegation proper, not least to elected politicians and the two principal corporatist pillars of labour relations, to represent society at large. On the other hand, an ambassador-ombudsman was installed and tasked with representing Sweden to the world of non-governmental organisations, and at the same time reflecting this world back to the Swedish government and the Swedish UN delegation. Apart from establishing an alliance between a national government and domestic as well as foreign non-state actors, Dahlén’s appointment was important in two other respects. It seems he was involved in establishing regular foreign ministry briefings for Swedish associations; these included briefings on United Nations issues. Moreover, the practice established in 1974 to include unofficial observers on the delegation had also been Dahlén’s suggestion.267 Yet, at the same time, he might have posed an obstacle to a better-acknowledged and more direct representation of individual organisations. In a letter requesting representation for the Swedish United Nations Association Bengt Gustafsson praised the work of Dahlén while also pointing to the limitations of the latter’s mandate: It is therefore of utmost importance that the member organisations of the UN Association can channel their views on UN issues also through the association and, thus, in this way make themselves heard in direct deliberations with the government in the making of the Swedish standpoints.268
–––––––––––––– 266 Dahlén 1982: 157, 164–165, 169 (quotes), 158–160, 167; in 2002 an NGO-ambassador was appointed in Japan. 267 Dahlén 1982: 167. 268 Letter by Gustafsson to the government, 10 October 1975, FMAS, HP 48 Ö, vol. 19.
415 CHAPTER 4
It was mainly when Dahlén’s mandate expired that new organisations were granted direct access to the delegation with ‘adviser’ status.269 Thus, in 1982 a representative for disability organisations participated on the delegation (and again in 1993). Youth delegates have been included in the delegation in the years 1983–1985, 1995, and since 1999. Even in 2009, when no other civil society representatives or legislators were included in the UN delegation because of the work load occasioned by Sweden’s EU presidency, the seat of the youth delegate was preserved. The Swedish Peace Council was represented from 1986 to 1988, and in 1990; this seat was subsequently given to the UN Association, which was represented in the years 1988 to 1989, and then again since 1991. Women’s organisations, or more precisely the Forum for Co- operation of Women in Sweden (Samverkansforum f r kvinnor i Sverige), the predecessor of The Swedish Women’s Lobby (Sveriges kvinnolobby), requested a seat on the UN delegation as late as 2002. However, pointing to the already large size of the delegation, as well as to the large proportion of women, not to mention a slue of practical and financial reasons for a limitation of the number of delegates, Foreign Minister Anna Lindh refused an opening. At the same time, she wrote that she was convinced that civil servants and parliamentarians on the delegation would look after the interests represented by the Forum. Lindh also wrote that particular organisations were invited to participate on the delegation when special issues were under discussion; for example, questions related to disability, youth, and equal opportunity would involve possible participation of representatives from those groups. However, women’s organisations have never been represented on Swedish UN delegations. A telling aspect of Lindh’s reply was that she spoke of only one permanent seat for private organisations (enskilda organisationer), thereby referring to the seat for the Swedish United Nations Association. In contrast, the employers’ and trade union representatives were not included in this category but were mentioned in the same breath with the parliamentary representatives.270
SHORT STORIES: FINLAND AND ICELAND Roughly speaking, Finland’s delegations to the UN General Assembly have been appointed on the same principle as those of her Nordic sister –––––––––––––– 269 According to the Swedish foreign ministry, after Dahlén’s retirement in 1983 it took three years until Annie Marie Sundbom was appointed the next NGO ambassador. She remained in this office until the early 1990s. It does not seem that she had a successor. Only in 1996 and 1997 was she appointed a member of UN delegations. 270 Letter from Anna Lindh to the chairwoman of the Forum, Anki Elken, 11 June 2002, FMAS, HP 48 DD.
416 THE PARTICIPATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY countries: In addition to diplomats and civil servants they have always included representatives of society at large. However, despite the practice of a peculiar onward delegation by the party, society at large, at least in a formal sense, has regularly read as ‘parliamentary parties only’ in the Finnish case. Thus, in Finland civil society has mainly been involved indirectly. Nonetheless, the task of representing political parties in Finnish delegations to the General Assembly has frequently been delegated to persons with a standing in civil society. In addition, the practice to appoint external experts from academia, which is more pronounced in Finland than in the other Nordic countries, is also source of ambiguity. Depending on the definition, the experts appointed might be looked at as representing civil society. Moreover, they were frequently affiliated to political parties or organisations. At times confusion about the status of particular delegates arose. For example, in the Swedish People’s Party in Finland there was uncertainty whether party members G sta Mickwitz and Ragnar Meinander, representatives to the General Assembly in 1957 and 1960, where to be seen as party representatives or government appointees who happened to have affinity to the Swedish People’s Party.271 In recent foreign ministry memoranda, civil society participation in Finnish delegations to United Nations conferences is claimed to be something both practised and desirable. Civil society organisations have always been accredited as members of delegations to the General Assembly since the Millennium Assembly in 2000. Yet, while established practice justifies identifying the inclusion of representatives of political parties as “a tradition, worth pursuing”, poor substance in regard to civil society participation is mirrored in the sentence: “Civil society organisations’ possibility to participate and present their views in the various organs of the UN and in world conferences and in their follow up is also supported”.272 Today’s proclaimed guiding principle is to make delegations “as representative as possible”. A closer look at the context in which this principle is raised reveals that it is “expertise” and not mass organisations or the people that the foreign ministry says is to be represented.273 This –––––––––––––– 271 Minutes of the parliamentary group of the Swedish People’s Party, 27 August 1957, SCAH, SPP. 272 Memorandum “Ulkoasiainhallinnon YK-strategia.” [28 March 2001]. 11f, cf. 16. Available at
417 CHAPTER 4 approach is in line with the strong belief in technical necessity, a characteristic of Finnish political culture, as well as the marked tradition of state control over civil society – a trait that distinguishes Finland from the other Nordic countries.274 The Finnish ‘polegate’-system has led to a tradition of including independent technical experts and academics rather than personalities with backing in broad strata of society or such backing at least through the procedure of appointment. The ‘polegate’-system allowed for an informal representation of civil society activists in the cloak of party delegates. However, relations of ‘tertiary’ representation have not been reflected in the records of the foreign ministry and cannot be reconstructed from the material analysed here, with two notable exceptions. These exceptions concern delegates not formally appointed as representatives of civil society organisations, but their de facto involvement in such organisations and their partial perception in the foreign ministry as representatives of these organisations bring ambiguities in the appointment of delegates out into the open. First, in a memorandum on the composition of the Finnish UN delegation prepared in the foreign ministry in advance of the twenty-third session of the General Assembly, delegate Vilho Koiranen is identified as representative for the Association for the Promotion of National Defence (Maanpuolustuksen Tuki). Due to special circumstances, Koiranen is not to be considered as a genuine civil society representative: Thus, it is conspicuous that the memorandum lists no representative for the conservative party, thereby grossly violating Finland’s well-established appointment procedures that have been accepted through present day.275 Koiranen is mentioned as a representative for the conservative party in a letter by the Swedish ambassador in Helsinki.276 Moreover, he was listed as conservative representative in a corresponding memorandum on the
–––––––––––––– 274 On the political culture of technical necessities: Kettunen 1997: 157; cf. Henrik Stenius. “Är konsensuspolitiken i Finland ny eller gammal? En jämf relse mellan konsensus- kulturens r tter i Finland och Österrike.” Medstr ms – motstr ms: Individ och struktur i historien. Tom Gullberg and Kaj Sandberg (eds). Helsinki: S derstr m, 2005. 226–243, at 243; on Finnish civil society in comparison: Pertti Lappalainen, and Martti Siisiäinen. “Finnland: Freiwillige Vereinigungen in der Gesellschaft und Gewerkschaften im politischen System.” Verbände und Verbandssystem in Westeuropa. Werner Reutter and Peter R tters (eds). Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 2001. 103–123, at 105; Martti Siisiäinen. “Voluntary Associations and Social Capital in Finland.” Social Capital and European Democracy. Jan W. van Deth et al. (eds). London: Routledge, 1999. 120–143, at 140. 275 Memorandum by Seppo Pietinen on the Finnish delegation to the 23rd session of the General Assembly, 30 August 1968, FMAH, 113 B 1, vol. 50. 276 Letter from Ingemar Häggl f to the Swedish Foreign Ministry, 17 September 1968, FMAS, HP 48 D, vol. 97.
418 THE PARTICIPATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY composition of the twenty-fourth session.277 In sum, it seems that Koiranen had already represented the conservative party at the previous session, despite the different organisation cited in the memorandum. The second case concerns Hilkka Pietilä, secretary general of the Finnish United Nations Association from 1963 to 1990 and delegate to five sessions in the period 1965 to 1975 (as well as numerous later sessions). An internal foreign ministry document from 1965 included Pietilä’s name, with the added specification “YK-liitto” – UN Association.278 This denotation was a one-time incident that did not recur in the period of focus studied here. However, Pietilä’s own description of her delegation career supports the idea of singling out the year of her entry on the delegation: “In 1965 I was first of all a disciple from the UNA learning about the UN, its aims and principles, procedures and policies, for my work at home in the UNA.” For the following years, her self-image corresponds to that of an expert.279 Her appointments in the 1970s, for which she was no longer listed with her academic title, but with the title of Secretary General, give rise to new ambiguity. Moreover, Pietilä writes she was sometimes appointed as ‘adviser’ “just for updating my touch with UN issues as the SG of the UNA” (and sometimes as a political delegate for the agrarians).280 In all, there is reason to consider the Finnish United Nations Association as having been represented by Pietilä. Nonetheless, here Pietilä is not regarded as a genuine civil society representative because her organisation was not mentioned in delegation lists (just as common in Finnish delegations today as it was in the Nordic neighbour countries at the time). Moreover, the rare reference to the UNA in the Finnish foreign ministry also suggests that she was seen as an expert and not as an organisational representative. Ambiguities similar to those of the United Nations Association might apply to the Finnish Confederation of Trade Unions, which Pietilä recalls as having been regularly represented on the delegation.281 Whereas no evidence for such representation has been found in the documents, it seems plausible that left-wing parties would have an inclination to nominate trade unionists. According to Pietilä, the presidents of the Finnish United Nations Association were often members of the delegations. However, they were nominated by political parties, not by the association.282 For example, Helvi
–––––––––––––– 277 Memorandum by Ensio Helaniemi, 29 April 1969, FMAH, 113 B 1, vol. 53. 278 Delegation list from 1965, FMHA, 113 B 1, vol. 39. 279 Personal communication. 280 Personal communication. 281 Personal communication. 282 Personal communication.
419 CHAPTER 4
Saarinen participated as social democratic nominee in the twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh session. It took almost four decades until the listing of Sirpa Pietikäinen as chairperson of the Finnish United Nations Association gave this organisation an independent channel at the Millennium Assembly in 2000. The association returned to the delegation in 2009. The Finnish Youth Cooperation Allianssi (Suomen Nuorisoyhteisty Allianssi) has been officially represented by a represent- ative on all delegations since 2001. Youth delegates have been appointed since 1997, but were not formally included in delegation lists of the earlier years. The youth delegate stays for a period of two weeks and is mainly supposed to discuss the annual youth resolution of the General Assembly with other youth delegates and government officials, in particular within the Finnish delegation. At home, he or she is supposed to inform Allianssi’s member organisations, go to schools, meet with various stakeholders, write articles, and influence Allianssi’s UN strategies.283 One reason why youth organisations have been preferred for inclusion by the Finnish government was articulated by the youth delegate to the fifty-eighth session of the General Assembly: “Including a youth representative in the delegation raises the country’s profile.”284 Only two occasions have civil society organisations other than those mentioned been included on the Finnish delegation, namely, two representatives of women’s organisations as well as the representative of a peace organisation in 2002 and the representative of a religious organisation in 2007. The Icelandic record is even shorter, limited to one single entry in the official lists of delegations published by the United Nations: The chairman of the United Nations Association of Iceland, Ingvi S. Ingvarsson, participated in the General Assembly in 1998.285 However, the fifty-third session was not his first one. Ingvarsson’s experience included the service as Permanent Icelandic Representative to the United Nations in the years 1973 to 1977.
–––––––––––––– 283 Cf. “Youth Representatives to UNGA: Information Kit.” New York: United Nations, 2003. 6. Available at
420 5. CONCLUSIONS: ON THE WAY TO DELIBERATIVE DIPLOMACY
Current discourse underlines the relevance of global governance and democratic deficit in international relations. Attempts are being made to strengthen the voice of ordinary people, their elected representatives, and those actively engaging in civil society in the process of globalisation. The fundamental problem is how to make democracy and foreign policy compatible with each other, that is, how to make democracy work in foreign affairs and international relations. Constructivists would not aspire to a grand design for general emulation in order to achieve an ‘easy’ solution to this problem, yet some of them would give weight to discourse at the expense of institutional practice.1 The historical record of Nordic incremental politics muddling through the course in order to establish structures reconciling democracy and foreign affairs illuminates the problem. The study of concrete procedures and related discussions provides parallel logs as to the way the ‘how’ question has been dealt with – under the domestic conditions and the international configurations that effectively defined the latitude of action. It illustrates a “pragmatic cosmopolitanism” based on political leadership and representative practices.2 As shown by the continuous campaigning for a world parliament and the glorification of the do-it-yourself approach of ‘NGOs’, there is no end to imagination. Yet, tangible progress in cosmopolitan democracy is slow and sometimes ambiguous, and seems to have stagnated or regressed in the last decade. What has been lacking is historical perspectives on current issues. Actual experiences made by legislators or civil society representatives in international contexts are largely unknown. So are sideways and informal orders that might function as substitutes or replacements for more comprehensive arrangements of representation, or the interaction between state- and non-state actors in the face of hybrid identities. Setting up a balance sheet of concrete experiences related to parliamentary and civil society participation in world affairs seems more meaningful than accumulating well-meaning proposals. In fact, utopian thinking can benefit from a substantial dose of historical awareness.
–––––––––––––– 1 E.g. John S. Dryzek. Deliberative Global Politics: Discourse and Democracy in a Divided World. Cambridge: Polity, 2006. 2 Daniel Bray. “Pragmatic Cosmopolitanism: A Deweyan Approach to Democracy beyond the Nation-State.” Millennium 37 (2009) 3: 683–719; cf. also Molly Cochran. “A Democratic Critique of Cosmopolitan Democracy: Pragmatism from the Bottom-up.” European Journal of International Relations 8 (2002) 4: 517–548.
421 CHAPTER 5
The issue of Nordic diplomatic delegations to the General Assembly of the United Nations deserves particular attention for a number of reasons. The institutions of the United Nations and the General Assembly are as close to a democratic superstructure or ‘parliament of man’ as one can get in the modern world. In a historical perspective, the United Nations has always been a catalyst for the imagination on world order. It is an ‘imagined community’ of nations and peoples and an institution belonging to what I have described as the ‘Alpine System’ of global governance.3 As such, the United Nations transcends both the anarchic (Westphalian) state system and its own shortcomings at any given point in time. Both the illustrious aura and the lacklustre condition have contributed to the United Nations’ usefulness in the containment of global conflicts. The demeanour of the United Nations in the Iraq War (an attempt to infuse foreign policy with ideals connected to democracy) shows that this ambiguous role is not limited to the constellation of the Cold War – it is a general trait associated with the ‘sacredness’ of the United Nations.4 The ambiguity of the United Nations as a highly valued yet insufficient and corrupted framework for global governance permeates Nordic discourses. There is a huge gap between Nordic governments’ litany of the United Nations as a cornerstone of their foreign policy on the one hand, and the pronounced disinterest in the world organisation in scholarly works on the other. While it is not the task of scholars to guilelessly follow the rhetoric of politicians, the indifference of scholars seems to be due to a positivist notion of what they are trained to accept as ‘reality’ and a corresponding ignorance of the symbolic dimension of politics. What is needed is a greater understanding of the United Nations as a semiotic system and individual governments as actors within that system – actors who clothe themselves with specific attributes when appearing before domestic and global audiences, and who calculate the meaning they assign to the United Nations. Thus, the ‘cultural turn’ implied by a constructivist research agenda is essential for taking the United Nations and the agents that constitute it as research topics for critical examination. Despite the qualifications implied above, the Nordic countries have been committed to the United Nations. A mythology has been spun around Nordic conduct in international affairs (including the United Nations) – such a narrative is based on their material and immaterial contributions to the world organisation and international peace. The Nordic countries have –––––––––––––– 3 Norbert G tz. “Epilogue: The ‘Alpine System’: Creating Space for Regional Cooperation.” Regional Cooperation and International Organizations: The Nordic Model in Transnational Alignment. Norbert G tz and Heidi Haggrén (eds). London: Routledge, 2009d. 248–260. 4 Cf. O’Brien/Topolski 1968.
422 CONCLUSIONS: ON THE WAY TO DELIBERATIVE DIPLOMACY understood the United Nations as a legitimiser and as the expression of the aspirations of humanity. Nordic politicians took the world organisation seriously, adopting policies that frequently supported it by acting as bridge- builders and by supporting the United Nations in seeking the least common denominator in a divided world. This constructive approach is why the Nordic countries attained an excellent reputation in the United Nations system, and has been an important factor contributing to their popularity in the world at large.5 An important element of the Nordic understanding of the United Nations is reflected in the constitution of their delegations. Never have the Nordic governments regarded representation at the plenary forum of the world organisation merely as a matter of diplomatic presence. Hence, throughout the life span of the League of Nations, Scandinavian countries were represented by a circle of high-ranking politicians, including members of opposition parties. Moreover, these countries also reserved a seat on their delegations for a female member, who was in part nominated by women’s associations and was listed officially with regard to her organisational function. With the advent of institutionalised conference diplomacy, diplomats played a subordinate role in Scandinavian delegations. Scandinavian, in particular Danish, governments introduced the principle of societal representation to the Assembly of the League of Nations, something that had no parallel in other countries. For them, the term ‘parliamentary diplomacy’ evidently implied more at the League of Nations than merely adopting parliamentary procedures in multilateral negotiations: it meant drawing their parliament or its trustees into the diplomatic process, thereby creating a new type of hybrid agent who formally represented his government, but also acted for major societal groups. Given the novelty of multilateral diplomacy at the time, there was no diplomatic establishment that obstructed such a political approach.6 How did this Scandinavian variant come about? What sustained its practice? Was it democratic? There are no straightforward answers to these questions, although a number of factors may be cited. First, there was an international quest for democracy and democratic diplomacy in the wake of the First World War. Second, international and national women’s organisations lobbied continuously for the appointment of female delegates.
–––––––––––––– 5 Cf. Elgstr m 1982. 6 The Swedish diplomat, Erik Boheman, remembers a lack of interest in and considerable scepticism towards the League of Nations and multilateral diplomacy among his colleagues in the foreign service. As a consequence, this area was left to him, although he was initially one of the most junior members of the department (Erik Boheman. På vakt: Från attaché till sändebud: Minnesanteckningar. Stockholm: Norstedt, 1963. 61).
423 CHAPTER 5
Third, Scandinavian inter-parliamentary groups played a crucial role in the governments’ appointment of committees dealing with the postwar world order that became a pool for the recruitment of delegates. Fourth, a general tradition of corporatist decision making and multipartite commission work had already emerged in the Nordic countries by the nineteenth century. (It can be subsumed under the heading ‘consensual political culture’, implying experience in the collective management of state affairs regardless of the divide between a government and its opposition.) Fifth, representation by high-ranking politicians and personalities beyond the circles of the sitting government was regarded as an instrument for strengthening a country’s own position and the world organisation as a whole. Sixth, in the Danish case the inclusion of politicians belonging to the opposition was a move to contain the domestic controversy over the Schleswig issue. Thus, it is obvious that instrumental reason played a role for the Scandinavian delegation practice, as realist international relation theories would predict. Moreover, a plurality of domestic actors and international influences were relevant, in agreement with what liberal theories would project. Combined, these theories tend to explain the emergence of the Scandinavian delegation order. In regard to the third question, the one about its democratic character, their answers would both be ambiguous and contradictory: Realists would reformulate it and ask: Was the Scandinavian practice apt to subdue inherent self-destructive tendencies of democracy in order to strengthen the respective countries in their external relations? To this question the answer would likely be an unreserved ‘Yes’. Liberals would appreciate societal forces making themselves relevant for decision making and control of the government, but would also warn of inducing conformity at the expense of political pluralism. Hence, realists would regard concord on the Schleswig issue a vital national interest (recommending a defensive line of action to a small state bordering a large neighbour); liberals would view it as an overly hasty closure of democratic debate. Constructivists would not ask whether the practice of the Scandinavian delegations was democratic, but would rephrase the question as: Democratic in what way? The answer is that societal representation on delegations to the Assembly of the League of Nations was constructed as participatory and democratic and that accorded with Nordic political culture. Finally, societal representation was made an integral part of Scandinavian (democratic) self-understanding on the international floor. Thus, the most important reason for Finnish governments to adopt the Scandinavian model in the mid-1930s and mid-1950s was the desire to demonstrate their allegiance to the greater Nordic group. The constructivist would find that there could be no more powerful determinant sustaining the
424 CONCLUSIONS: ON THE WAY TO DELIBERATIVE DIPLOMACY
Nordic delegation practice than achieving an integrated part of Nordic identity. Constructivists would account for Scandinavia’s uniqueness by pointing to the political culture of consensus seeking and compromise, as well as to an understanding of the expressive quality of sending a high- ranking delegation representing all of society to the League of Nations. There is a dramatic difference between the League of Nations and the United Nations: Whereas the Assembly of the League of Nations convened annually for approximately four weeks, by its third session the UN General Assembly lasted for twelve weeks, and then had to be supplemented by a six week extension. Since then, there has been a constant struggle to prevent the agenda of the General Assembly from getting out of hand by adopting efficient procedures and limiting a meeting period to three months. The Scandinavian tradition that stemmed from the League of Nations involved sending their countries’ leading politicians to the United Nations for the whole meeting period, year-after-year. After 1945, not only were major political parties represented, but members of parliament were increasingly chosen as delegates. Thus, Scandinavian delegates were heavily tasked and under great stress at the United Nations from its inception. ‘Rationalist’ theories such as realism or liberalism have difficulty explaining why outmoded ideals were upheld in the face of such adverse conditions. By contrast, the constructivist approach, with its perspective on identity and its representation in the world of phenomena, would find this an instance of traditions by which one has come to identify oneself not being easily abandoned. Those Scandinavian ideals were never dismissed until 1975, the end of the period we have been considering in depth, although they were increasingly abandoned in practice. There was more intra- and inter-session change than the delegation model intended. More backbenchers and non- legislators were appointed to delegations and political representatives often left everyday obligations to sit on the diplomatic staff. After the mid-1960s diplomats were the dominant element on delegations and systematic rotation among members became an accepted routine. This adjustment allowed the goal of appointing parliamentarians to be realised. Political delegates now went from being generalists with expertise in United Nations issues fulfilling diplomatic functions to participants in an advanced training course, observers, disseminators, and perhaps sparring partners with one’s diplomats or alarm clock for the government.7 It implied a de-hybridisation or differentiation of the delegation. Iceland did not generally adopt the
–––––––––––––– 7 This is a shift from one principle of allocating international assignments to another, cf. Jerneck 1990: 180–181.
425 CHAPTER 5
Scandinavian delegation model until these changes went into effect. Finland is another special case: President Kekkonen’s foreign policy regime drove parliamentarians away from the delegation as early as the beginning of the 1960s. They were replaced by staff from the parties’ administration and scholars or journalists with affinity to particular parties. These so-called polegates (i.e., political delegates) were representatives of society and observers, as were their Scandinavian colleagues, but they lacked the legitimacy of being elected representatives of the people. The reasons for the de facto shift in the Nordic delegation practise of the 1960s from an assignment as a delegate to one as an observer were as follows: First, a generational shift took place among political delegates and a number of long-standing delegation members and foreign ministers resigned from their posts. At the same time, the new cohort of legislators was better educated and linguistically more proficient than the preceding one, thereby enlarging the circle of potential delegates and challenging the status of long-term incumbents. Second, the United Nations was subject to a constant decline in prestige until the mid-1980s, a trend that made it unattractive as a field for ambitious politicians. Third, increasing standards of living in the Nordic countries made long-term assignments in New York less desirable than the situation had been in the postwar years. Fourth, there was a generational shift in the foreign service along with the expansion of the public sector in the 1960s that affected the number of senior staff. Fifth, younger diplomats were acquainted with the peculiarities of multilateral diplomacy and had a clear professional notion that ‘parliamentary diplomacy’ – in the sense of conference diplomacy – was their own territory, not that of parliament members. Sixth, the foreign service, serving mostly social democratic governments during this period, increasingly broadened its recruitment base to include individuals with social democratic backgrounds, thereby gradually turning distrust, which was particular strong in Sweden, into a relationship of mutual trust. At this point, adherents of ‘realist’ or ‘liberal’ views might ask whether the ‘rational’ explanations for Scandinavian delegation practice being transferred from the League of Nations to the United Nations in the 1940s are not implicit in the above changes that affected it in the 1960s? If so, would this really suffice to explain the preservation of the League model? In that case, why was the de facto change in the delegation order not followed by the next logical step of removing parliamentary delegates from the official high-ranking categories ‘representatives’ and ‘alternate representatives’ and calling them by their actual function, namely, ‘observers’, as was the Canadian practice? There was some turbulence in the organisation of the Danish delegation in the 1960s, and civil society representatives in Norwegian delegations were shifted to the self-made
426 CONCLUSIONS: ON THE WAY TO DELIBERATIVE DIPLOMACY category of ‘observers’. However, no more profound formal changes were made until Finnish and Swedish governments in the 1990s and early 2000s decided to pool political representatives in the self-coined category of ‘special advisers’, thereby reserving the positions with higher status for senior civil servants. This terminology still placed these political representatives within the regular delegation hierarchy at a rank above the bulk of diplomats in the official category of ‘advisers’. At an informal level, some significant changes took place in the 1990s and later. The annual documentation of the individual Nordic countries’ activities at the General Assembly was radically downscaled or abandoned, a clear indication of the revaluation of the United Nations’ significance in the foreign policy mapping of these countries after the end of the Cold War.8 The same tendency can be seen in the abandonment of the principle of coverage of the whole session of the General Assembly by parliamentary delegates, which was preserved in principle although executed by a succession of individuals. Selective coverage of the session period and the transfer of financial responsibility from the foreign ministry to parliaments and associations, strategies pioneered by Iceland and adopted by the other Nordic countries by the 1990s, show the decrease in the integration of societal representatives in Nordic delegations. The dissonance between the pragmatic approach to international relations generally advocated in the Nordic countries and the false pretence of societal representatives’ inclusion in the work of the delegation points to a hidden agenda. It can be uncovered by asking constructivist questions about political culture, identity and semiotic content. The Nordic type of consensual and participatory democracy and the legitimacy accorded to parliament as the centre of the body politic were given manifestation in an inclusive manner. It was made visible to the domestic public and abroad, even at the expense of transparency and authenticity. It followed naturally from the Nordic notion of being particularly committed devotees of the world organisation and representatives of superior democracies. The arrangement with societal representatives has been the subject of endless debate about practitioners’ misuse of the assignment as mere ‘political tourism’. However, the aura of the world organisation and of democracy itself has left the system in place. Only with the termination of the Cold War and European Union membership of the majority of the Nordic countries has the United Nations so depreciated in significance for these –––––––––––––– 8 In the Norwegian case, a more subtle development concerned the change of the language in which the reports were written. Formerly published in the primary Norwegian language (Bokmål), but from 1997 on they were only published in the variety used by a linguistic minority, namely, New Norwegian (Nynorsk).
427 CHAPTER 5 countries that it might lead to formal readjustments of the titles under which societal delegates are accredited in delegations to the General Assembly. It is characteristic of the present situation that the Norwegian delegation, which remains independent of the European Union, keeps closest to Nordic traditions at the United Nations. The tradition of formally appointing parliamentarians to high- ranking official status opened the field to some influence by them. In the period examined here, there have been instances of parliamentary delegation members not only monitoring their countries’ activities at the United Nations, but also influencing decision making. In effect, they constituted a feedback loop for the diplomats of the permanent mission and for the government, broadening on-the-spot deliberations as well as United Nations discourse at home. The redefinition of the model from a few annually returning parliamentary experts to interludes by mainstream parliamentarians might not be a disadvantage in this respect. It implies that diplomats socialised in the United Nations system are confronted with common political sense instead of with colleagues. It is also noteworthy that even today a few societal delegates, in particular representatives of civil society organisations, continue to deliver speeches on behalf of their countries or have been engaged in drafting and negotiating with other countries’ representatives in their fields of expertise. The main impression gotten from the eleven interviews conducted with parliamentary delegation members to the sixty-first session of the General Assembly was that the role of the observer was largely accepted. This was also implied when parliamentary and civil society representatives were described as constituting one group on the delegation. At the same time, some voices considered civil society representatives more peripherally and some more deeply involved in the work of the delegation.9 One Norwegian and one Danish respondent suggested that parliamentarians politicised the work of their delegations by exerting pressure at home or by challenging the diplomats and forcing them to state their views more precisely and deliberately. A Swedish parliamentarian expressed a similar
–––––––––––––– 9 Fredrik Olovsson, a Swedish social democrat, pointed to the common ground of both groups in a corporatist society. He and some others drew attention to the longer stay on the delegation and the opportunity for youth delegates and other civil society representatives to address the General Assembly. In contrast, a Danish social democrat, Pia Gjellerup, assigned a more passive role to associational representatives and pointed to the fact that only parliamentary members elected the formal ‘leader’ of the societal section of the Danish delegation with a mandate to also represent civil society delegates. Swedish conservative Ewa Bj rling mentioned the overly assertive demeanour of NGOs in general, but said this had not been a problem on the Swedish delegation.
428 CONCLUSIONS: ON THE WAY TO DELIBERATIVE DIPLOMACY activist view but, in contrast to his colleagues, was reportedly rebuffed openly.10 Opinions on the role for parliamentarians on the delegation varied. Everybody had suggestions for improvement, in particular concerning the educational programme for parliamentarians. Yet, all respondents were positive or even enthusiastic about the model as such (with possible reservations in regard to the overly touristic approach taken by certain colleagues). By contrast, only two respondents favoured the idea of a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly.11 The general feeling was that such an institution would merely establish another talk-shop, duplicating existing structures and complicating the already sluggish United Nations machinery. In regard to their own learning experience, the Danish and Norwegian respondents expressed their satisfaction with the wider knowledge they had acquired. Swedish respondents, some self-declared United Nations sceptics among them, acknowledged the positive changes in their own attitudes. This might have been the result of the work of Anders Lidén. The Swedish permanent representative to the United Nations told how he took the presence of parliamentarians on the delegation as an “opportunity for indoctrination” (indoktrinationsm jlighet), that is, a chance to light the flame of enthusiasm of politicians for the United Nations.12 Only the rebuffed legislator mentioned above went home with a “mixed” overall picture and grievances about unfair treatment by members of the diplomatic corps. This incident, where a representative found himself outside the social democratic–bourgeois “spirit of consensus” (samf rståndsanda) is exceptional in that societal representatives on UN
–––––––––––––– 10 The proponents of an ‘activist’ philosophy were the socialist Hallgeir Langeland of Norway (who used the socialists in the development section of the foreign ministry), social democrat Pia Gjellerup of Denmark, and socialist Hans Linde of Sweden. The difference in how they were met by the establishment may have been conditioned by the fact that the former two were senior politicians, whereas the latter was a parliamentary freshman. Others, like liberal Johan Pehrson of Sweden, underlined the lack of opportunity for influencing decisions, but at the same time spoke of the importance of confronting professionally blinkered diplomats with home-based realism and making them reflect accordingly. Norwegian populist Solveig Horne cited another classical function of parliamentarians that set them above mere observer status, namely, the exercise of financial control. Swedish social democrat Sonia Karlsson reported to have had talks about influencing policies with the then social democratic government in connection with an earlier tenure on the delegation. 11 Socialists Frank Aaen of Denmark and Hallgeir Langeland of Norway. 12 In a discussion at the Swedish United Nations Association (14 November 2006). When I later asked liberal politician Johan Pehrson (who began his tenure on the delegation with an almost “cynical” view of the United Nations) about this statement, he confirmed it and conceded that Lidén had to a certain extent succeeded.
429 CHAPTER 5 delegations generally praise diplomats for their courtesy, in both memoir literature and in the interviews.13 In fact, Nordic diplomats have an established routine of hosting societal delegates that generally instills a feeling of mutual receptiveness and trust. The question arises as to whether the practice of Scandinavian and Nordic delegations corresponds to the ideal of deliberative diplomacy, following Habermas’ concept of deliberative politics as a strategic instrument and normative guideline in pursuit of cosmopolitan democracy. This concept presupposes procedural arrangements that institutionalise the combination of dialogical and instrumental politics in the medium of deliberation. The role it assigns to societal delegates to the General Assembly is that of well-informed critics of their country’s United Nations politics. Evidently, there is a role conflict, that is, a “co-optation trap”. Jens Steffek suggests that the two dimensions of democracy, namely participation and the creation of public debate, cannot be maximised simultaneously.14 Thus, it would be wise to balance them. According to the ideal of deliberative diplomacy, the power-enhancing function of the inclusion of societal representatives should not override their democratic participatory and monitory function. Those who have warned against violation of the separation of powers principle and the establishment of societal representatives (in particular legislators) as agents of the executive can refer to occasions in which Nordic parliamentarians have felt or been made co-responsible for government policies and weakened in their role as critics. It brings to mind the case of the Swedish parliamentarian who publicly criticised his Foreign Minister after returning from the delegation in 1950. The legislator in question was later rejected as a delegate by the government, despite having been nominated by his party. While a measure of confidentiality and civility must be assumed by all diplomatic agents, problematic conduct was never cited as a reason for reassignment. Instead, the government listed his sympathy for Western military alignment for not sending him back to the United Nations. In this way, the refusal to reappoint was used as a disciplinary means in an entirely different context. Other examples exist in which politicians nominated by their parties were not seated by the government for activities that had no relation
–––––––––––––– 13 Left-wing delegates also tend to express their personal satisfaction in relations with diplomats. 14 Jens Steffek. “Zähmt zivilgesellschaftliche Partizipation die internationale Politik? Vom exekutiven zum partizipativen Multilateralismus.” Leviathan 36 (2008) 1: 105–122, at 118 (quote) 119, cf. 107.
430 CONCLUSIONS: ON THE WAY TO DELIBERATIVE DIPLOMACY to the United Nations.15 In one instance, which escalated into the so-called Hjalmarson affair, the leader of the Swedish conservative party was rejected as a delegate. This illustrates the danger for democracy when participatory channels are manipulated by a government. Despite the informality of Scandinavian practises that allowed them to adjust to a variety of external circumstances, the opposition remained dependent on the goodwill of the ruling government party. The principles of the delegation model were too vaguely worded to guarantee the model’s functioning as a neutral channel for societal inclusion. In the case of doubt, the government benefited at the expense of the opposition. The “Law on the Procedure Regarding the Appointment of the Danish Delegation to the General Assemblies of the United Nations”, drafted in 1961 but never voted on or adopted, was the only attempt at a legislative solution. Norms of a lower order would probably have sufficed to prevent the Swedish and Finnish governments from overruling party appointments. However, no precise rules of conduct applicable to either side appeared. For Nordic democracy, common sense strength and legal weakness, unfortunately, appear to be two sides of the same coin. Once again, Habermas’ insistence that procedures of democratic deliberation and decision making need to be legally institutionalised in order to gain sufficient strength to withstand administrative power comes to mind.16 In a democratic perspective, malfunctions with regard to societal representatives are exceptions from a period when parliamentarians were to serve as the principal delegates of their countries. Parliamentary delegates from Australia once described the system as working well in Scandinavia, praising it as the expression of a mature understanding of democracy.17 Consensus was reinforced by experiences on the delegation. In contradiction to some claims in the literature, consensus is a precondition for democracy. At the same time the enunciation of dissent by representatives of parliament was in no way suspect on Scandinavian delegations to the United Nations, and institutionalised ways for manifesting such dissent were routinely used. Left-wing socialists who did not partake in the overall foreign policy consensus of their countries have been represented on Danish delegations since the 1960s, on Norwegian –––––––––––––– 15 Whether the exclusion of Communists in the 1940s should be discussed in this context is debatable. There is a difference in that their exclusion concerned parties and not individuals, that is, it was technically justifiable in view of voter support, and also it concerned parties whose loyalty to democratic principles was questionable. Some small non-socialist parties were also not offered seats on their country’s UN delegation at the time. 16 Habermas 1998b: 249. 17 “Report of the Parliamentary Advisers to the Australian Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly: Thirty-third Session, 1978.” NAC, FM 1973–88, 119.H.2.a.1979.
431 CHAPTER 5 delegations since the 1970s, and on Swedish delegations since the late 1980s.18 More than others, these ‘outsiders’ described their inclusion in the delegation as good democratic practice. Societal delegates provided effective feedback to members of the foreign service and the government. Inevitably, they widened their own field of vision. In parliamentary debates addressing United Nations issues, the number of speakers with personal knowledge of the world organisation has been considerable and improved the quality of Nordic discourse. One aspect of their work, depending almost entirely on their own goodwill, has been to share what they had learned at the United Nations with the public. The parliamentarians with whom I spoke reported writing factual or personal articles for newspapers, posting weblogs, giving interviews to newspapers, having press conferences, delivering oral reports at meetings with their constituents or party fellows, and submitting written reports to their party group. Radio and television appearances and participation in panel discussions, usually organised by the respective United Nations Association should also be mentioned. All this does not exactly add up to the idea that “Everybody’s a delegate”. But these examples do offer methods for adapting the principle of popular self-government to global political life, a problem that is not resolved in a democratic way by installing a representative government or withdrawing power in four-year cycles. As Hanna Pitkin has written, simply calling a representative system a democracy “only adds insult to injury” if this system becomes a substitute for popular self-government instead of functioning as its enactment.19 The challenge is to find avenues that make democracy work for a globalised world also in an actual – not purely formal – sense. As noted earlier, Harold Nicolson, in his classic study on diplomacy, observed that democratic diplomacy had not yet found its own formula. The continuous attempts to find ways to include societal representatives since 1920 demonstrates that Scandinavians have not discovered the magic formula either. In the Nordic countries, the participation of societal representatives in delegations to the United Nations has been a constant source of friction. Yet despite many changes and a tendency to move from hybrid politician-diplomats toward functional
–––––––––––––– 18 Socialists have participated in Finnish delegations since the 1950s, but in Finland they had more voter support and the official national foreign policy consensus was based on a good- neighbour policy with the Soviet Union, drawing lines of conflict that differed from those of other Nordic countries. 19 Hanna Fenichel Pitkin. “Representation and Democracy: Uneasy Alliance.” Scandinavian Political Studies 27 (2004): 335–342, at 340.
432 CONCLUSIONS: ON THE WAY TO DELIBERATIVE DIPLOMACY differentiation, it has remained a persistent challenge to open the diplomatic sphere to democratic deliberation. The inclusion of parliamentary and civil society representatives has always implied a linkage of diplomacy at the world organisation with what Habermas calls “the higher-level inter- subjectivity of communication processes that unfold in the institutionalized deliberations in parliamentary bodies, on the one hand, and in the informal networks of the public sphere, on the other”.20 In light of adverse conditions and a hostile intergovernmental environment, the survival of the principle of societal involvement almost appears like a miracle. Perhaps it may best be explained by a constructivist theoretical approach. The decisive point is the meaning of the practises studied here, which for the Nordic countries have always been a powerful symbol of engaging oneself with the world in a democratic manner. The inclusion of societal delegates embodies the aspiration of enshrining democratic deliberation within the field of international relations, something that had been conventionally subordinated to the discretionary power of governments. The progressive practice challenges the anarchical non-democratic order of the world, or at least provides sustenance for a more democratic counter-vision. With regard to the future, there have been many signs of a relative downgrade of the United Nations in the Nordic countries since the Cold War. The European Union as a collective entity that includes the majority of the Nordic countries complicates the picture. How to engage societal representatives in processes of multilevel governance is as yet an open question. Finland and Sweden no longer appoint political delegates to sessions during which they hold the EU presidency. Despite many positive appraisals regarding the inclusion of parliamentary representatives in Nordic delegations, the formal integration of such representatives has been deteriorating for many years. The next step might be for them to become nominally (and thus semiotically) what they are for the most part in practice: ‘observers’. Developments regarding the inclusion of civil society are more ambiguous, but traditionally the participation of civil society representatives on delegations has been more limited than that of legislators. Even if the ultimate goal is the achievement of cosmopolitan democracy its basis is still in nation states. The discourse on global governance needs to take this into account. Even if the idea of a world parliament is not premature, the nation state would remain the most important level for the practice of democracy, whose effects can be expected to reach beyond its borders. Hence, the inclusion of societal
–––––––––––––– 20 Habermas 1998b: 248.
433 CHAPTER 5 representatives in national delegations to the General Assembly will remain a relevant issue from the perspective of democracy on a global scale. However, not only is Nordic interest in the United Nations declining: it is also questionable whether the ‘revitalisation’ of the General Assembly will succeed in the future. In this situation, an alternative ‘revitalisation’, that of the idea of holding topical world conferences under United Nations auspices, would seem to be a promising way to proceed. World conferences have a greater dynamic potential for spontaneous development than does the General Assembly, with its ingrained routines. Characterised by their focused agenda, world conferences offer more attractive forums; they possess greater appeal for the general public opinion and for associations or parliamentarians with a special interest in the field under discussion. Moreover, appointments to themed conferences are less likely to run the risk of degenerating into a system of touristic rewards for devoted party service at the expense of taxpayers.21 The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment that convened in Stockholm in the summer of 1972 has been characterised by a Swedish diplomat as the ultimate legacy of his country’s postwar foreign policy.22 What he had in mind was the elevation of global politics to a new level of ecological awareness. At the same time, the conference was also a starting point for more intense interaction between the United Nations (and the intergovernmental system) with civil society.23 All these aspects, advances in political subject matters and procedural matter of arrangements for exclusion, parallelism, and inclusion are tightly intertwined. While it is still unproven that world conferences are effective instruments of global governance, the 1990s have shown that they can get people to begin thinking globally and contribute to the development of world polity. A decade before the United Nations began reinventing itself announcing its declamatory ‘millennium development goals’ (MDGs) Anthony Judge made the following observation: Beyond any structural modifications, the key to the success of future strategies appears to lie in the imaginative manner in which valid, but incompatible, initiatives are woven together. […] It is metaphors which provide the imagination with “keystones” to balance the tensions between tendencies which, without such integrative elements, would appear incompatible. World governance in this sense is a question of “imagination
–––––––––––––– 21 Cf. Lindberg 1999. 22 Sverker Åstr m. Ögonblick: Från ett halvsekel i UD-tjänst. Stockholm: Bonnier, 1992. 173. 23 Chadwick F. Alger. “The Emerging Roles of NGOs in the UN System: From Article 71 to a People’s Millennium Assembly.” Global Governance 8 (2002) 1: 93–117, at 95.
434 CONCLUSIONS: ON THE WAY TO DELIBERATIVE DIPLOMACY
building” rather than “institution building”. Governance of United Nations at the highest level should therefore focus attention on the emergence and movement of policy-relevant metaphors – that are capable of rendering comprehensible the way forward through complex window of opportunity. The challenge lies in marrying new metaphors to models to ensure the embodiment of new levels of insight in appropriate organizational form.24 In this vision, deliberative diplomacy may be a useful metaphor in a dynamic system of concepts seeking to promote democracy on the world stage. However, the international community awaits a more convincing model than it has seen thus far.
–––––––––––––– 24 Anthony Judge. “The Identity of the United Nations: Experimental Articulation through a Dynamic System of Metaphors.” Brussels 1991. Available at
435
ARCHIVES
DENMARK NAC National Archives, Copenhagen FM 1946–72 Foreign Ministry 1946–72 FM 1973–88 Foreign Ministry 1973–88 EW Embassy Washington PM Permanent Mission to the United Nations ES Embassy Stockholm EO Embassy Oslo LMAC Labour Movement Archives, Copenhagen ECA Ernst Christiansen’s Archive
FINLAND FMAH Foreign Ministry Archives, Helsinki REC Ralph Enckell’s Collection SCAH Swedish Central Archives, Helsinki SPP Swedish People’s Party (of Finland) NAH National Archives, Helsinki GGC Georg A. Gripenberg’s Collection BPCAH Brage Press Cutting Archive, Helsinki
NORWAY NAO National Archives, Oslo FM 1940–49 Foreign Ministry 1940–49 FM 1950–59 Foreign Ministry 1950–59 PMO Prime Minister’s Office FMAO Foreign Ministry Archives, Oslo 1960–69 1960–69 1970–79 1970–79 HLA Halvard Lange’s Archive LMAO Labour Movement Archives, Oslo LPA Labour Party Archives KNA Konrad Nordahl’s Archive
437 ARCHIVES
SWEDEN FMAS Foreign Ministry Archives, Stockholm NAS National Archives, Stockholm FM, FS 1920 Foreign Ministry, Filing system of 1920 ULA Ulla Lindstr m’s Archive LPG Liberal Party Group BOA Bertil Ohlin’s Archive FM, FS 1902 Foreign Ministry, Filing system of 1902 NLS National Library, Stockholm MS Manuscripts’ Section (Kerstin Hesselgren, Östen Undén) LMAS Labour Movement Archives, Stockholm SDPG Social Democratic Party Group FTU Federation of Trade Unions (Landsorganisationen) AGMA Alva and Gunnar Myrdal’s Archive ULG University Library, Gothenburg WHC Women’s History Collections KHC Kerstin Hesselgren’s Collection
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475
INDEX
Aaen, Frank 30n, 371n, 429n Bengtsson, Ingemund 285, 287, Aasland, Aaslaug 378 288n Agerberg, Nils 271 Berg, Hans C. 206 Albertsson, Kristján 305 Berg, Helge 410 Ålgård, Ole 236, 241n, 242n Berglund, Sten 46 Alholm, Bj rn 320 Bergvall, John 65n, 254, 256, 257 Åman, Valter 286n Berner, Örjan 294 Amby, Kristen 157, 158, 166 Biaka-Boda, Victor 291 Ammundsen, Esther 354 Bierring, Ole 195 Andersen, Alsing 20, 21, 166, 352 Bin Laden, Osama 18 Andersen, Hans Christian 109 Bjereld, Ulf 46, 270, 271 Andersen, Hans G. 304 Bjerregaard, Ritt 354, 365, 366 Andersen, Knud B rge (K. B.) 192, Bj l, Erling 43, 92 193, 196, 363 Bj rling, Ewa 30n, 428n Andersen, Rolf 205 Blehr, Otto 97 Andersson, Sven 294, 296, 411 Blix, Hans 262n, 288 Andrén, Georg 65n Bobrikov, Nikolai Ivanovich 319 Andvord, Rolf 203, 218 Boheman, Erik 134n, 265, 282, 286, Annan, Kofi 1, 2, 70, 81 423n Ansteensen, Einar 230, 231 B hn, Norman 375 Apunen, Osmo 339n, 342n Bolin, Bertil 408 Arafat, Yasser 240, 241, 243 Bonnevie, Kristine 122, 123n Arnalds, Ragnar 306 Borberg, William 144, 146–148, Arnesen, Arne 231, 388, 389, 396 162–164, 346 Ås, Berit 237 Borten, Per 239 Ásgeirsson, Ásgeir 303 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros 6 Ásgrímsson, Halld r 308 Boyd, Andrew 35 Aspengren, Tor 390 Boye, Thore 232 Åstr m, Sverker 252, 263, 284, 285, Braadland, Erik 231 291–294, 412, 413, 434 Branting, Hjalmar 96 Baehr, Peter R. 38, 39, 82 Brauer, Kurt 189 Bagge, G sta 254, 255 Brooks, Angie 388 Begtrup, Bodil 99, 120n, 127, 136, Brunskog, U. A. J. 262n 159, 346–348, 351–354 Bryn, Dag 225 Belfrage, Leif 284 Buckley, William F. 73 Benediktsson, Bjarni 302 Bugge-Wicksell, Anna 123 Bengtson, Torsten 261, 287 Burke, Edmund 52
477 INDEX
Cappelen, Andreas 393 Eriksen, Knut E. 199 Cardoso, Fernando Henrique 2, 8, Eriksson, Herman 251, 254, 255 37, 70, Eriksson, Lars 411, 412 Carlsson, Thorbj rn 408, 409, Erlander, Tage 256, 265–267, 270–, Casparsson, Ragnar 407, 408 273, 275, 277, 279, 282, 283, 408, Cassel, Leif 289 Erlandsen, Christian 382, 383 Cassirer, Ernst 36 Eskelund, Karl I. 164, 165 Castberg, Frede 212, 214n, 216, 383 Ewerl f, Knut 269, 272, Castrén, Erik 328 Federspiel, Per 147, 149, 349 Cecil, Robert 114 Fjeldsted, Katrín 307n Charlesworth, Hilary 139 Fog, Mogens 147, 148 Chiang, Pei-heng 40 Forchhammer, Henni 99, 121, 345 Childs, Marquis 252 Frigland, Berit 394 Chinkin, Christine 139 Friis, Finn T. B. 158, 159, 188, 352– Christensen, Lars 374, 375 354 Christiansen, Ernst 164, 165 Frisch, Hartvig 142, 146, 147, 153, Cohn, Georg 109, 146, 155–157, 349 160, 161, 165, 166, 354, 356, 362 Frydenlund, Knut 233, 234, 239– Colban, Erik 206 241, 387, 388, 396, 397 Conlan, Inger N. 144 Galtung, Johan 232–234, 236, 237 Dahl, Birgitta 2n Geijer, Arne 408 Dahl, Finn 378, 381 George, Zelma Watson 63 Dahlén, Olle 286, 413–416 Gerhardsen, Einar 226, 378 Dahlman, Sven 409, 410 Gestrin, Kristian 325, 326 Dalen, Frieda 378–381 Gildersleeve, Virginia 126, 127 Dickson, James I. A. 253 Gjellerup, Pia 30n, 428n, 429n Drummond, James Eric 103, 108, Gj res, Axel 251, 254, 255 122 Glesinger, Egon 14n Duerst-Lahti, Georgia 118 Glistrup, Mogens 190, 191, 369 D lffer, Jost 34 Gloerfelt-Tarp, Kirsten 347 Edberg, Rolf 262, 263 Goldberg, Arthur 64 Ehrnrooth, Georg C. 324 Goldmann, Kjell 46 Einstein, Albert 5 Gottschalck-Hansen, Nils 274 Ekwall, Åsa 300 Grafstr m, Sven 134n, 256, 261, 291 Ellemann-Jensen, Uffe 194, 196, 369 Granskog, Ernest 334, 335 Enckell, Ralph 17, 313, 314, 316, Grazia, Alfred de 53 320, 321, 323, 324, 327 Gripenberg, Georg 314 Engen, Hans 227 Guldberg, Ove 189 Engh, Sunniva 44 Guldvik, Anders J. 391 Enzensberger, Hans Magnus 200 G nther, Christian 251
478 INDEX
Gustafsson, Bengt 412, 415 Holmbäck, Åke 261, 264, 266, 267 Gustav V 407 H nningstad, Arne B. 80 Habermas, J rgen 8, 9, 82, 430, 431, Horne, Solveig 30n, 429n 433 Huldt, Bo 45 Hækkerup, Per 165, 171–174, 176, Hultberg, Helge 195, 196 178–181, 183, 185, 188, 362 Humphrey, John P. 134 Häggl f, Gunnar 253–255, 261 Husfeldt, Erik 142, 143, 145, 146, Halvorsen, Kristin 400 cover illustration Hambro, Carl J. 91, 97, 98, 109, 111, Hussein, Saddam 18 201–207, 211, 217, 218, 225–227, Hvass, Frants 144, 146, 147, 149, 375 158, 346, 353 Hambro, Edvard 49, 97, 98 Ingvarsson, Ingvi S. 420 Hammarskj ld, Dag 11, 16, 17, 65, Jakobsen, Frode 165, 174, 177, 179– 260, 268, 275 181, 185 Hammershaimb, Venzel Ulrik 168 Jakobson, Max 15, 311, 321–323, Hansen, Hans Christian 152, 153n, 327–330 161, 167 Jamali, Sarah Powell 128 Hartling, Poul 184, 189, 357, 359 Jarring, Gunnar 260, 261 Håstad, Elis 277–279 Jaspers, Karl 36 Haugen, Ingvald 374, 375 Jebb, Gladwyn 349 Heckscher, Gunnar 283 Jensen, Aage Hessellund 164, 172 Hedlund, Gunnar 280, 287 Jensen, Eiler 350–352, 355 Hedtoft, Hans 149 Jensen, Henry L. W. 166, 167, 172, Heland, Erik von 65 173, 179 Heljas, Lennart 315, 316 Jensen, Kirsten 360n Helveg Petersen, Niels 367, 368 Jerneck, Magnus 46 Hernelius, Allan 287 Jernstr m, Frank 324, 325, 338 Herz, Ulrich 413 J hannesson, Ólafur 302 Hesse, Hermann 15 Johansen, Johan Strand 206, 209, Hesselgren, Kerstin 110, 134, 135, 212, 213, 217, 219, 220 403 J nasson, Hermann 303 Hichens-Bergstr m, Richard 255, Jones, S. Shepard 102 258 Jong Il, Kim 18 Hjalmarson, Jarl 46, 263, 267–283, J nsson, Finnur 302, 303 319, 431 Jonsson, Magnus 103n Hjorth-Nielsen, Henning 193 Judge, Anthony 40, 434 Hjeltnes, Guri 44 Just, Annette 369 H jdahl, Odd 387 Kakitsubo, Nasyoshi 64 H jer, Signe 403, 404 Kalela, Jaakko 329n Holbrooke, Richard C. 77 Kallehauge, Holger 365–367
479 INDEX
Kant, Immanuel 8 Langeland, Hallgeir 30n, 248, 429n Karjalainen, Ahti 308, 325, 328, 329 Langhelle, Nils 217 Karlsson, Arne 288 Lannung, Hermod 147, 150n, 152, Karlsson, Sonia 30n, 429n 153n, 159, 166, 167, 176, 179, 182, Karvikko, Irma 314 185–187, 188n, 368 Kauffmann, Henrik 142, 143, 145, Larsen, Aksel 148, 180 146, 153, 163, cover illustration Leira, Halvard 372 Kekkonen, Matti 323 Leivo-Larsson, Tyyne 315, 325, 326 Kekkonen, Urho 316, 319, 320, 322, Leskinen, Väin 319 324, 326, 329, 426 Lidegaard, Bo 42 Kelly, Rita Mae 118 Lidén, Anders 140n, 429 Kelsen, Hans 58 Lie, Håkon 375 Keohane, Robert 10 Lie, Trygve 11, 44, 65, 200, 202– Kettunen, Pauli 401 208, 211, 220, 228, 255, 374–376, Kiljunen, Kimmo 6 378, 381 Kilsmo, Karl 268 Lind, Per 284 Kjartansson, Hannes 303, 305 Lindberg, Staffan I. 46, 47 Kjelsberg, Betzy 122 Linde, Hans 30n, 429n Knudsen, Olav F. 199 Lindh, Anna 416 Kock, Karin 134, 261, 404 Lindhagen, Carl 88 Koht, Halvdan 128, 199 Lindstr m, Ulla 65, 128, 133n, 254– 256, 258–260, 263, 269, 270, 273, Koiranen, Vilho 418, 419 275, 285, 288, 404, 405, 407, 408 Komensk , Jan Amos 4 Lionæs, Aase 135, 136, 220–222, Koren, Peter 224 226n, 243, 379–381, 384 Korhonen, Keijo 308, 317, 334n Lipponen, Paavo 329n, 342 Korsbäck, Verner 319n Ljungdahl, Vilmar 254 Kraft, Ole Bj rn 147, 149, 150, 154, Ljunggren, Anna 30n 155, 172 Locke, John 53, 68 Krag, Jens Otto 137, 164, 168, 170, Luard, Evan 35 171, 180, 181, 183–187, 195, 354 Lund, Arne 363, 364 Kristensen, Knud 149, 350 Lundberg, John 265, 276, 277 Kristiansen, Georg 229 Lundborg, Hans 298, 300 Khrushchev, Nikita 269–273, 278, 279 Lundborg, Östen 251 Kvanmo, Hanna 243 Lutz, Bertha 126, 127 La Fontaine, Henri 99 Lyng, John 230, 231, 385 Lange, Christian L. 88, 97, 208 Madison, James 51, 52 Lange, Halvard 208, 211–214, 216– Matthiasen, Niels 181, 185, 186 218, 223, 225, 226, 229, 230, 246, Mayo, Charles 61 379, 380, 382 Meinander, Niels 311, 312
480 INDEX
Meinander, Ragnar 319, 417 Norvik, Erling 224n Melchior, Arne 363 Nygaardsvold, Johan 374, 376 Mentsen, Parelius 384–386 Nylander, Lennart 251 Michelet, Christian F. 101 O’Brien, Conor Cruise 14–17, 35, Mickwitz, G sta 316–318, 417 36, 54 Midtgaard, Kristine 42, 47 Oddsson, Daví 307 Mill, John Stuart 14 Oftedal, Tor 234, 235, 239 Miller, Carol 120, 121, 133, 138n Ohlin, Bertil 263–268, 275, 282, 290 Miribel, Elisabeth de 126n Oldenburg, Troels 172, 190 Moe, Finn 206, 215 Olesen, Lotte R. Bennedsgaard 47 M ller, Birger 294 Olesen, Thorsten B. 149 M ller, John Christmas 144, 147 Olovsson, Fredrik 30n, 428n M ller, Per Stig 370 Ording, Arne 208, 212, 213, 217 M ller, Poul 177–179, 182 Örn, Torsten 410 M ller, Yngve 267, 270, 276n, 286n, Ould Daddah, Turkia 388 287, 288 Paasikivi, Juho K. 319 Moltke, Kai 178, 180 Paasio, Rafael 333, 334 Mongella, Gertrude 116 Palme, Olof 275, 278, 285, 294, 414 Morgenstierne, Wilhelm Munthe Pastinen, Ilkka 336 143, 202, 203, 216–218 Pedersen, Richard F. 67 M rth, Ulrika 46 Pehrson, Johan 30n, 429n Moss, Alice 119 Petrén, Sture 261 Moynihan, Daniel Patrick 68 Pharo, Helge 199 Munch, Peter 90, 92, 93, 102, 104, Pietikäinen, Sirpa 420 106, 107 Pietilä, Hilkka 118, 334n, 419 Mykletun, Jostein 44, 223n, 246, 395 Pitkin, Hanna 53, 54, 432 Myrdal, Alva 133, 284, 285, 388 Pohjala, Kyllikki 320, 321 Myrdal, Gunnar 250 Ponsonby, Arthur 84 Nansen, Fridtjof 88, 97 Prebensen, Per 205 Neumann, Iver B. 201, 372 Procopé, Victor 324 Nicolson, Harold 7, 112, 432 Putnam, Robert D. 26, 56 Nielsen, Ejnar 351 Qvam, Fredrikke 121, 122 Nielsen, Peter 177 Ræder, Johan Georg 229 Nielsen, Sivert A. 228 Ranke, Leopold von 24 Nilsson Hedstr m, Lotta 295n Rasmussen, Gustav 147–149, 153, Nilsson, Torsten 284–288, 292, 294 155–157, 162, 347, 349–351, 354 Nordahl, Konrad 220–222, 373, 374, Ravne, Per 229–231 378, 381–386, 408 Refslund Thomsen, Gudrun 353n, N rlund, Ib 148, 349 354 N rthen, Ruth 197 Reutz, Johanne 99, 135, 374n, 380
481 INDEX
Reventlow, Eduard 145–148 Sipilä, Helvi 328 Richert, Arvid 251 Sjaastad, Anders C. 200 Riggs, Robert E. 39 Sj stedt, Gunnar 46 Rikvold, Jon 385, 386 Skard, Åse Gruda 126, 128, 375– Rimmerfors, Einar 268 377, 380 Riste, Olav 44, 198 Skoglund, Martin 249 Rittberger, Volker 8 Sk ld, Per Edvin 251, 279 Robins, Dorothy B. 40 Skottsberg-Åhman, Brita 261, 289, Rokkan, Stein 372, 373 293n Roosevelt, Eleanor 127, 128 Skylstad, Rasmus B. 224, 225 Roosevelt, Franklin D. 4, 74, 143 S der, Karin 114, 115 Ross, Else-Merete 353n S derhjelm, Johan Otto 324, 325 R ssel, Agda 63, 133, 261, 263, 284, Sohlman, Rolf 254, 261, 285 285, 405 Soikkanen, Timo 43 Rothholz, Walter 371 Solheim, Erik 400 Russell, Ruth B. 58 S lvh j, Hans 184 Rydbeck, Olof 252, 285, 289, 293 Spaak, Paul-Henri 207 Rydh, Hanna 254, 404 Sporon-Fiedler, Axel 143 Sá, Hernane Tavares de 35, 78 Sporon-Fiedler, Frans 144 Saarinen, Helvi 420 Ståhl, Manne 264, 268 Saillant, Louis 348, 349, 381 Steffek, Jens 430 Sandberg, Gunnar 251, 254 Stenelo, Lars-G ran 46 Sandler, Rickard 110, 175n, 254– Stettinius, Edward 12 258, 261, 265, 288, 407 Stinus, Arne 188, 189, 191, 192, 368 Scavenius, Erik 163 Stoltenberg, Jens 400 Schlesinger, Stephen C. 34 Stoltenberg, Thorvald 237 Schl ter, Poul 177, 179 Storberget, Knut 400 Schmitter, Philippe 37n Stray, Svenn Thorkild 389, 390 Schorlemer, Sabine von 38 Street, Jessie 126 Seidenfaden, Erik 168 Sundbom, Annie Marie 416n Seidenfaden, Gunnar 185, 186 Sunde, Arne 216, 375 Selassie, Haile 135 Sundelius, Bengt 46 Selvig, Kaare N. 391 Sundsb , Svein 392, 393 Semmingsen, Ingrid 380 Svärd, Gunnar 269, 272 Serup, Axel 144–146 Svenbalrud, Hallvard Kvale 44 Seweriin, Rakel 381n Svenningsen, Nils 167, 168 Sievert, Rolf 262n Svento, Reinhold 319, 320, 322 Sieyès, Abbé 51, 52 Sverdrup, Jakob 212 Sinnemäki, Anni 340 Tabor, Hans 173, 174, 178, 179, 183, 184, 188, 189
482 INDEX
Tennyson, Alfred 4 Virgin, Ivar 292, 293 Tetri, Kaarlo 334n Virolainen, Johannes 314, 316 Thommessen, Olemic 30n Voegelin, Eric 52 Thommessen, Øystein 206 Voionmaa, Väin 107 Þ rarinsson, Þ rarinn 304 Vougt, Allan 251 Thors, Ólafur 303, 304 Wahlund, Sten 260, 261, 287, 288n Thors, Thor 302–305 Wallin, Risto 36 Thorsing, Oscar 261 Walters, Francis Paul 34 Thorsteinsson, Pétur J. Waltz, Kenneth N. 25 Thunborg, Anders 114 Weber, Max 53 Thyness, Paul 235 Wedén, Sven 264–267, 275, 276, Tingsten, Herbert 249 319 Tocqueville, Alexis de 7, 68, 69 Wendt, Alexander 50 Topolski, Feliks 35 Westergaard, Anna 120n Torm, Uffe 358, 359 Westling, Otto 408 T rngren, Ralf 311, 312 Wickman, Albin 321 T rnudd, Klaus 43, 336 Wickman, Johannes 278 Towns, Ann 140 Wickman, Krister 294, 296 Treholt, Arne 233, 234, 392, 393 Wigforss, Ernst 270, 271 Truman, Harry S. 4, 12 Wiig, Birgit 394 Undén, Östen 64, 65n, 111, 248, Wikborg, Erling 219 249, 251, 253–258, 260–272, 274– Willetts, Peter 40 279, 282, 284–286, 298, 402–405, Wilson, Woodrow 58, 75, 85, 88, 89, 407 94, 104 Unger, Gunnar 277, 278n Winther, Christian 169, 175, 176, Vahlberg, Gustav 254, 258, 407 192 Valdimarsson, Finnbogi R tur 305 Wold, Terje 206, 210, 211, 213–216, Vandenberg, Arthur H. 77 383 Vårvik, Dagfinn 238 Worm-M ller, Jacob 203, 204, 206, Västberg, Disa 405 217 Veistrup, Peter 368 Wright, Nonny 352 Vennemoe, Per 224, 225 Yi-fang, Wu 126 Vesa, Unto 43 Zeuthen, Else 368 Vilhjálmsson, Þ r 305 Zilliacus, Jutta 114, 337–339 Villanueva, César 37, 46 Zimmern, Alfred 111 Villaume, Paul 42
483