Beyond Strong and Weak: Rethinking Postdictatorship Civil Societies Author(S): Dylan Riley and Juan J
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Beyond Strong and Weak: Rethinking Postdictatorship Civil Societies Author(s): Dylan Riley and Juan J. Fernández Source: American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 120, No. 2 (September 2014), pp. 432-503 Published by: The University of Chicago Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/678272 . Accessed: 17/02/2015 08:45 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. The University of Chicago Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to American Journal of Sociology. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 169.229.32.36 on Tue, 17 Feb 2015 08:45:38 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Beyond Strong and Weak: Rethinking Postdictatorship Civil Societies1 Dylan Riley University of California, Berkeley Juan J. Fernández University Carlos III de Madrid What is the impact of dictatorships on postdictatorial civil societies? Bottom-up theories suggest that totalitarian dictatorships destroy civil society while authoritarian ones allow for its development. Top-down theories of civil society suggest that totalitarianism can create civil societies while authoritarianism is unlikely to. This article argues that both these perspectives suffer from a one-dimensional understanding of civil society that conflates strength and autonomy. Accordingly we distinguish these two dimensions and argue that totalitarian dicta- torships tend to create organizationally strong but heteronomous civil societies, while authoritarian ones tend to create relatively autono- mous but organizationally weak civil societies. We then test this con- ceptualization by closely examining the historical connection between dictatorship and civil society development in Italy ða posttotalitarian caseÞ and Spain ða postauthoritarian oneÞ. Our article concludes by reflecting on the implications of our argument for democratic theory, civil society theory, and theories of regime variation. INTRODUCTION Much contemporary democratic theory rests on the claim that functioning democracies require a “civil society”—a network of nongovernmental or- ganizations that allows men and women to both discuss their common in- 1 We would like to thank Julia Adams, Irene Bloemraad, Victoria Bonnell, Michael Burawoy, Rebecca Jean Emigh, Neil Fligstein, Marion Fourcade, Philip Gorski, Michael © 2015 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0002-9602/2015/12002-0004$10.00 432 AJS Volume 120 Number 2 (September 2014): 432–503 This content downloaded from 169.229.32.36 on Tue, 17 Feb 2015 08:45:38 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Postdictatorship Civil Societies terests and form organizations that can pressure the state on the basis of those interests ðTocqueville ½1835 1988, p. 515; Lederer 1940, p. 72; Korn- hauser 1959, p. 23; Jowitt 1992, p. 287; Hall 1994; Booth and Richard 1998, p. 793; Putnam 2000, pp. 31–47; Howard 2003, pp. 47, 122–29; Alexander 2006, pp. 31, 37; Villa 2006, p. 225Þ. A lively debate has now developed around this thesis ðBerman 1997; Armony 2004; Riley 2010Þ. Yet recent work does not well explain where civil societies come from. According to some scholars they are both a cause and a consequence of liberal democracy ðPaxton 2002Þ. Others suggest that civil societies develop out of long-term cultural or economic factors ðPutnam 1993Þ. But surprisingly the political determinants of civil society development have been relatively neglected ðfor an exception, see Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas ½2001Þ. Specifi- cally there has been little comparative work on the impact of different sorts of dictatorial regime on the configuration of postdictatorship civil societies. That connection is the focus of this study. A word is necessary on terminology. This study follows Juan Linz’s ca- nonical distinction between “totalitarian” and “authoritarian” regimes. To- talitarian regimes have a strong state party with an official ideology, while authoritarian regimes lack strong state parties and more generally lack “ex- tensive political mobilization” ðLinz 1970, p. 255Þ. While we nuance Linz’s distinction below, this is the starting point for our analysis. To render our terminology consistent we will speak of “dictatorships” to refer to all non- liberal democratic regimes, but we will distinguish types of dictatorship according to whether they are totalitarian or authoritarian. In the analy- sis that follows Italy ð1922–43Þ will be our key empirical example of to- talitarianism, and Spain ð1939–75Þ will be our key empirical example of authoritarianism. There are of course some strongly held ideas about the impact of dicta- torship on civil societies. The prevailing view holds that totalitarian dic- tatorships tend to flatten civil societies, thus leaving a legacy of associational weakness after the emergence of democracy ðLinz, Stepan, and Gunther 1995, p. 82Þ. In contrast, authoritarian regimes leave more space for vol- untary associations. Therefore, societies that experience these regimes tend Hout, Andrew Janos, Michael Mann, Victor Pérez-Díaz, Sandra Susan Smith, Iván Szelényi, and Emanuela Tallo for their helpful comments. We also owe a large debt to the AJS reviewers, who were both rigorous and generous in their comments on a large and complex manuscript. We would also like to acknowledge institutional support from the Institute for Research on Labor and Employment and the Committee on Research, both at Berkeley. We are grateful as well to the participants of the Ideology and Religion Sem- inar at Berkeley, the Center for Comparative Research at Yale, and the Politics and Societies Colloquium at the University of Washington for extremely helpful feedback. Direct corre- spondence to Dylan Riley, Department of Sociology, University of California, 410 Barrows Hall, Berkeley, California 94720. E-mail: [email protected] 433 This content downloaded from 169.229.32.36 on Tue, 17 Feb 2015 08:45:38 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions American Journal of Sociology to have stronger civil societies in their democratic periods than do societies that experienced totalitarian regimes. Theoretically this argument is rooted in a “bottom-up” theory of civil society that views its growth in cultural or economic rather than political terms. This argument contrasts strikingly with what might be called the “top- down” view, a position that was once widely held but is now relatively neglected. Bolshevik theorists, particularly Lenin in the State and Revo- lution, emphasized that one of the central projects of socialist transforma- tion should be to “smash the state” and replace it with self-administering communes ðLenin 1975, p. 338Þ. To achieve this level of self-administration required a major effort to organize secondary associations from the central state down. Samuel Huntington, in his classic Political Order and Changing Societies, developed and generalized this point. He suggested that totali- tarian regimes, and particularly Leninist regimes, were centrally concerned with building “civic polities” ðHuntington 1968, pp. 339–40Þ. Indeed Hun- tington ð1968, p. 340Þ argued that communists were “the most energetic and intense students of Tocqueville’s ‘art of associating together.’”The top-down view reverses the bottom-up account. From this perspective it is precisely totalitarian regimes ðcommunist and fascist onesÞ that are likely to produce the most well-articulated intermediate structures. These two arguments have opposite implications about the connection between dictatorship and civil society. If the bottom-up view is correct, to- talitarian regimes should produce relatively weak civil societies, while au- thoritarian regimes should produce relatively stronger ones. If, in contrast, the top-down argument is right, totalitarian regimes should produce rela- tively strong civil societies, while authoritarian regimes should produce rel- atively weak ones. This study develops a critique of both these arguments and presents some evidence for thinking about the connection between dictatorship ðin both its totalitarian and authoritarian formsÞ and civil society in a new way. We suggest that both bottom-up and top-down theories suffer from a one-dimensional concept of civil society as either weak or strong. Our ar- ticle proposes to replace the strong/weak dichotomy with a reconstructed Gramscian concept. Gramsci, unlike both the bottom-up and top-down the- ories, thought of civil society as varying in two relatively autonomous di- mensions: organizational ðstrong or weakÞ and relational ðautonomous or heteronomousÞ. While in some instances organizational strength might com- bine with autonomy, Gramsci ð1971, pp. 159–60; see also Althusser 1971, p. 144Þ saw this as an empirical matter, not an intrinsic feature of all forms of civil society. Our article shows the fruitfulness of this approach by in- vestigating two strategically selected cases of postdictatorship civil society development: Italy and Spain. We show that postfascist Italy ðour example of a posttotalitarian regimeÞ possessed an organizationally strong civil so- 434 This content downloaded from 169.229.32.36