The Italian Communist Party and The

CEU eTD Collection

The Italian Communist Party Party Communist Italian The

and the Hungarian crisis of of crisis Hungarian the and Inpartial fulfillment of the requirementsfor the CENTRALEUROPEAN UNI DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY History one-year M. A. M. A. one-year History Second reader:Second Prof. Alfred Rieber Supervisor: Prof. Marsha Siefert Candidate: AnielloCandidate: Verde Budapest, Hungary Budapest,Hungary A. Y. 2011/2012 1956 1956 June 4 June th

, 2012 degreeof Masters of Arts VERSITY

CEU eTD Collection page must form a part of any such copies made. Fur made. copies such any of part a form must page lodged in the Central European Library. Details ma Details Library. European Central the in lodged t with accordance in only made be may part, or full the with rests thesis this of text the in Copyright such instructions may not be made without the writt bemade may without suchinstructions not Author. Copies by any process, either in either process, any by Copies Author. en permission of enthe Author. permission he instructions given by the Author and Author the by given instructions he y be obtained from the librarian. This This librarian. the from obtained be y ther copies made in accordance with with accordance in made copies ther CEU eTD Collection for their indispensible support, guidance and corre guidance and support, fortheir indispensible

I would like to express my frank gratitude to profe to gratitude my frank express to like I would Particularly, I would like to thank Anikó Molnar Anikó fo thank to IParticularly, like would s Imy thank to Additionally, like Department would Acknowledgements Acknowledgements III III ctions. ctions. ssors Marsha Siefert and Alfred Rieber Rieber Alfredand SiefertMarsha ssors r her continuous help and suggestions. suggestions. r her and help continuous taff. CEU eTD Collection atrs ht hpd h pltcl cin f h pa the of action political the shaped that patterns exce negative of sort a be to considered often been just a “passive” agent in the context of the Hungar the of context the in agent “passive” a just practices and the emerging “Eurocommunism”. “Eurocommunism”. andpracticesthe emerging Therefore, this research is going to demonstrate th demonstrate to going is research this Therefore, commu the how and PCI, the of interests” H “permanent from coming news the how reconstruct to necessary o In strategy? persisting and preexisting communist interp be uprising Hungarian the of Italy in impact

o eosrc te C’ dcso-aig ihn the within decision-making PCI’s the reconstruct to Instead socialism. European modern toward Communism th of choices controversial the Italy, in Communism otoes oe te miaet oe f omns i Communism of role ambivalent the over controversy T party-discipline. the of imposition authoritative confro a into resulted PCI the of reaction The one. Despite a vast research about the impact of the Hun the of impact the about research vast a Despite A BSTRACT I V V

his issue interjects the historiographical historiographical the interjects issue his rty: can the communist reaction to the the to reaction communist the can rty: at the Italian Communist Party was not not was Party Communist Italian the at ian crisis, but it operated as an “active” an as operated it but crisis, ian ption in the progressive path of Italian of path progressive the in ption ee a a oeet mlcto o the of implication coherent a as reted tto bten mrig isn and dissent emerging between ntation e Italian Communist Party (PCI) have have (PCI) Party Communist Italian e garian crisis of 1956 on the legacy of legacy the on 1956 of crisis garian dr o nwr hs usin i is it question, this answer to rder context of the enduring strategic strategic enduring the of context nist apparatus reacted to the crisis. crisis. the to reacted apparatus nist , the main idea of this research is is research this of idea main the , n Italy: between Stalinist-type Stalinist-type between Italy: n nay et n mrn o the on imprint an left ungary CEU eTD Collection Dissent and party discipline: any democracy in the in anydiscipline: and partydemocracy Dissent the “ the October October 24 Second Chapter 29 implications,

Party Communist Italian uprising the of strategies and Goals Chapter First Methodological note, 10 7 Introduction,

Fourth Chapter Chapter Fourth Italy,in 60 implications thecounter-offensive to The from PCIthe stalemate Chapter Third

eest ad hie te C’ rsos t te Hun the to response PCI’s the choice: and Necessity

Conclusion, 32 Conclusion, Freedom “to agree”: the paradoxical nature of the P thenatureparadoxical the of Freedom“to agree”: the in communi policies and opinion Publiccultural Togliatti’s struggle for communism in Italy:thein communism Togliatti’sfor struggle A problematic definition: the controversy the problematicthe Aover definition: Conclusion, 67 Conclusion, eiiin f h eey n jsiiain f h in the of justification and enemy the of Definition Uncertainty and radicalization in thePCI’s in positio Uncertainty radicalization and 50 Conclusion, It the in aftershock: Earthquakeand re-assessments The “mud-machine”: “mud-machine”: The Manifesto dei Centouno Manifesto , 12, th – October – 28 L’Unità th : and defense, shock ”, 71 and the defense of the andof the defense Table of Contents Table of Contents V

34 34 partito nuovo partito centralismo democratico centralismo , 53 53 , n, n, 54 PCI’s attitude to Hungaryto PCI’s 1956, 13 attitude alian Left,alian 44 CI’s cultural policies and theroad toward and policies cultural CI’s st st strategy,26 partito nuovo partito in response to the 1956 Hungarian Hungarian 1956 the to response in tervention: the “white terror” and its its and terror” “white the tervention: ain piig n is strategic its and uprising garian and its strategy, its and 21 , 36 , ? , 69 , 69 CEU eTD Collection Bibliography, 93 93 Bibliography, 89 Conclusion, 76

Conclusion, 87 Conclusion, f “opposition” Congress: the VIII needat Political The debate in the Cultural Commission: criticism of Commission: criticism The the debatein Cultural VI VI or De-Stalinization?, 80 or De-Stalinization?, the orthodoxy of the cultural policies, policies, the cultural the orthodoxy of CEU eTD Collection “1956”. “1956”.

Foundation (Rome); “Palmiro Togliatti” fond; serie serie fond; Togliatti” “Palmiro (Rome); Foundation Parliament. incre 0.1% a witnessed 1958 of election general the n had members thousand hundred two 1957 in although party the hand, other the On crisis. political and 4 3 2 1 Foundation (Rome); “Palmiro Togliatti” fond; serie serie fond; Togliatti” “Palmiro (Rome); Foundation http://www.storiadc.it/elezioni/politiche_1958.html “1956”. “1956”. harmful”. huma was party the of attitude “the that argued had over Hungary. position Sar the communist criticized letter to Botteghe Oscure Botteghe to letter 31 Pa ItalianCommunist the of head Togliatti, Palmiro controversial because of the ambivalence of its eff its theambivalence of of controversial because do not belong to our party; it is pure repetition o repetition pure is it party; our to belong not do Rome-based headquarters of the party was in party the of headquarters Rome-based questio This strategy? political PCI’s the of depth did Or communism? toward hostility growing the from crit and dissent of kind any toward intolerance the why wonder might One emerge. toward PCI of attitude h rsls f h 15 ad 98 lcin ae ava are elections 1958 and 1953 the of results The wellla as as hereby meant is Oscure” “Botteghe By Togliatti, Palmiro to Sarfatti Giacomo from Letter Sarfatti, Giacomo to Togliatti Palmiro from Letter st h Hnain eouin a boe ot n Budapest in out broken had Revolution Hungarian The “I think that it is useless to answer. The position The answer. to useless is it that think “I h crepnec rpre aoe s mrsie bec impressive is above reported correspondence The 15, n epne o icm Srat’ lte (O letter Sarfatti’s Giacomo to response in 1956, , 2

4 hrfr, h ipc o te ugra cii o t on crisis Hungarian the of impact the Therefore, 3 , and the Italian Communist Party was slowly sinkin slowly wasParty ItalianCommunist the and ,

via delle Botteghe Oscure Botteghe delle via I NTRODUCTION . . October 29 October no. 5: “ 5: no. no. 5: “ 5: no. ter on in the dissertation the PCI itself, because because itself, thePCI thedissertation in on ter October 31 October 7 7

was able to react efficiently to such a crisis: a such to efficiently react to able was Corrispondenza politica Corrispondenza Corrispondenza politica Corrispondenza f vulgarity and slanders of our enemies”. our of slanders and vulgarity f ects on the realm of Communism in Italy. in of Communism ectsthe realm on icism just a sort of psychological defense defense psychological of sort a just icism stated in the text, the language, the tone, tone, the language, the text, the in stated n might be rephrased in political terms: political in rephrased be might n rty (PCI), wrote these words on October on words these wrote (PCI), rty fatti, a “common” PCI votersince 1945, “common”PCI a fatti, th , 1956, Archive of the “Antonio Gramsci” Gramsci” “Antonio the of Archive 1956, , nly unacceptable and politically most most politically and unacceptable nly th

this intolerance find its roots in the in roots its find intolerance this s o te omns sas n the in seats communist the of ase , 1956, Archive of the “Antonio Gramsci” Gramsci” “Antonio the of Archive 1956, , ot renewed their party membership, membership, party their renewed ot Togliatti answered so rudely: was rudely: so answered Togliatti . . tbr 29 ctober ause it let questions about the the about questions let it ause ut i dy bfr Sarfatti’s before days six just he PCI was definitely definitely was PCI he ”; archival unit no. 13, box 13, no. unit archival ”; th ”; archival unit no. 13, box 13, no. unit archival ”; ween h latter the wherein ) ilable hereby: hereby: ilable g into a moral a into g the 1

CEU eTD Collection political contexts: where to set the boundary betwe boundary the set to where contexts: political atrs f h Iain omns at y mid-50’s by Party Communist Italian the of patterns evaluation of the position of the Italian comrades comrades Italian the of position the of evaluation w PCI’s political strategy? strategy? PCI’s political o events, the of evaluation erroneous an “mistake”, the evolution of its position between October 24 October between position its of evolution the f tla Cmuim dpce a a ainl n in and national a as depicted Communism, Italian of uprising on the PCI’s strategy. uprisingstrategy. the PCI’s on 5 t events the of Italy in implications strategic the prah f h PI t h vr bgnig f h up toward the attitude Soviet changeableand uncertain the of beginning very the at PCI the of approach examination under time-span The position. defensive th when crisis, the of phase initial the on focused “old-father”. “old-father”. interp distorted partly a on legacy their construct par small of number unstable and changeable a since for the of party the of transition contemporary the t be, might issue This policies. its of assumptions o investigation the involves problem the Therefore, Giorgio Napolitano, Napolitano, Giorgio as the attitude of the Italian Communist Party towa Party Communist Italian the of attitude the as Next, I will move on to the analysis of the debate the of analysis the to on move will I Next, h aatto o oe r h ohr iwon implie viewpoint other the or one of adaptation The For answering these main research questions, firstl questions, research main these answering For Then, I will move to the analysis of the turning-po the of analysis the to move will I Then, Dal PCI al socialismo europeo socialismo al PCI Dal

(Bari, Laterza, 2005), pp. 16-17. pp. 2005), Laterza, (Bari, 8

aking place in Hungary as well as in other in as well as Hungary in place aking th o some extent, still “politically-incorrect”: still extent, some o and October 28 October and retation of the history of their disowned disowned their of history the of retation en myth and reality in the historiography historiography the in reality and myth en mer Italian communists is still stranded, still is communists Italian mer crisis. crisis. in both the national and international international and national the both in ws t chrn ipiain f the of implication coherent a it was r ties succeeded the old-PCI and tried to to tried and old-PCI the succeeded ties int: October 30 October int: Iain omns Pry a o a on was Party Communist Italian e rd the Hungarian Revolution a sort of sort a Revolution Hungarian the rd n o te mato te Hungarian the of impact the on and is limited to a few days because the the because days few a to limited is within the party, and on the study of of study the on and party, the within y I will focus on the general strategic strategic general the on focus will I y oaie oc fo 14 onwards? 1945 from force novative n the PCI itself and on the basic basic the on and itself PCI the n rising was deeply shaped by the the by shaped deeply was rising s a certain moral and political political and moral certain a s th th . The second chapter is is chapter second The . – October 31 October – st , and of of and , 5

CEU eTD Collection ups t hglgt hte te C wre accordi worked PCI the whether highlight to purpose what the limits of internal democracy were. of internal democracy were. whatthe limits r the communist counter-attack. counter-attack. thecommunist positi offensive an to defensive a from shifted PCI o fre otge sue o ret poes f de of and of strategies. party’s values implication process a arrest Ital the of reaction to the Conversely, Eurocommunism. Oscure Botteghe force not in experienced the PCI radicalization strategy.The terms in interpreted be should crisis Hungarian the managed to impose a strict party-discipline. Theref party-discipline. strict a impose to managed circl intellectual the and union trade (the network p the both affected dissent why explain to going am egions (particularly, in Egypt, but also in the USS the in also but Egypt, in (particularly, egions The leading hypothesis of this work is that the rea the that is work this of hypothesis leading The Finally, I will focus on the controversial cases of cases controversial the on focus will I Finally, 9

on, by stressing features and objectives of objectives and features stressing by on, of strict continuity of the party’s political party’spolitical the continuityof strict of the context of the Hungarian uprising did did uprising Hungarian of the the context R). In this chapter, I will explain how the how explain will I chapter, Inthis R). s, n hw h oiia establishment political the how and es), ore, this part of the dissertation has the has dissertation the of part this ore, ction of the Italian Communist Party to to Party ItalianCommunist the of ction within-party dissent. In this chapter, I chapter, this In dissent. within-party ian Communist Party was a coherent coherent a was Party Communist ian g o eortc rtra t l, and all, at criteria democratic to ng arty apparatus and the communist communist the and apparatus arty ortzto twr an toward mocratization CEU eTD Collection atr oe a o t te eiins historiograph revisionist the to lot a owes pattern L’Unità histo online-based the and (Rome), Library National intent is to theoretically connect the impact of th of impact the connect theoretically to is intent d further a at attempt the on based is dissertation th Nevertheless, Zazzara). (G. politics and history cul Italian on PCI the of impact the and Frigerio), the of version false a constructing at attempts its Italian in role ambivalent its as well as USSR the Italian of history the revised which years) recent that have been already analyzed in former studies. studies. former have in analyzed already that been w as Party Communist Italian the of decision-making i which research, this of purpose very the in roots T sources. primary on relies widely chapter) fourth pa empirical the for chosen methodology the quoted,

framework (first chapter) of the thesis. of the thesis. framework(first chapter) art of state the out point to order in useful most analys the enlarge to order in bibliography, the in (Ro Foundation Gramsci” “Antonio the ofArchive the As far as the theoretical framework is concerned, t concerned, is framework theoretical the as far As In parallel to this, a relevant number of pieces of pieces of number relevant a this, to parallel In of p anumber on based mostly been Thehas research In addition to many books were cited, and others others and cited, were books many to addition In . . M ETHODOLOGICAL NOTE ETHODOLOGICAL 10 10

on this topic, and to support the theoretical theoretical the support to and topic, this on is with valuable contributions. These were were These contributions. valuable with is Communism stressing its subordination to subordination its stressing Communism democracy (V. Zaslavsky, E. Aga Rossi), Rossi), Aga E. Zaslavsky, (V. democracy e Hungarian crisis to persisting strategic strategic persisting to crisis Hungarian e s to give an original interpretation of the the of interpretation original an give to s evelopment of these studies. Indeed, the Indeed, studies. these of evelopment ugra ursn (. retei A. Argentieri, (F. uprising Hungarian ical stream (1990’s, 2000’s, and very very and 2000’s, (1990’s, stream ical secondary literature has been included included been has literature secondary e oiain o ti coc fns its finds choice this for motivation he rical archive of the PCI’s press organ, organ, press PCI’s the of archive rical ue A Boi ad nesadn of understanding and Brogi) (A. ture ell as a personal assessment of sources sources of assessment personal a as ell were consulted though not necessarily necessarily not though consulted were me), the newspapers’ collection at theat collection newspapers’ the me), t f h rsac (eod tid and third (second, research the of rt e interpretative framework of this this of framework interpretative e he starting-point of its interpretative interpretative its of starting-point he rimary sources, remarkably those of of those remarkably sources, rimary

CEU eTD Collection problems under examination has been mostly based on has beenunder mostly based problems examination documents in history A Revolution. ugra rvlto. 4 coe – November 4 – October 24 revolution. Hungarian position of PCI and PSI; official PSI; and PCI of position PCI’s cultural policies and Cultural Commission byCommission Cultural and policies PCI’s cultural b has chapter this for source essential an Finally, correspondence political Togliatti’s on Giolitti), speec relevant some of transcripts the on research, events the of Coletti) L. and Pirani (M. witnesses nepeaie atr o ti dsetto. Theref dissertation. this of pattern interpretative inte and considered been have sources primary these n when present is literature secondary to reference International History Project, 2004) and by Békés, Békés, by and 2004) Project, History International h Hnain rss olce ad rnltd y Gr by translated and collected crisis Hungarian the political Togliatti’s se concerning Oscure”, “Botteghe archival the particularly, – Foundation Gramsci” sou archival the union); trade PCI-driven (the CGIL in – articles newspapers’ particularly, considered: context. democratic 1956 in PCI the of attitude the between continuity inter this Therefore, Communism. Italian in factors h fut catr s ae o rcn atce that articles recent on based is chapter fourth The n re t wr o te eod n tid chapters, third and second the on work to order In communiqués , CEU Press, 2006). Although in these two chapters chapters two these in Although 2006). Press, CEU , 11 11 released by these political parties and by the the by and parties political these by released een the study of the documents about the about documents the of study the een ecessary to support a given interpretation, given a support to ecessary – particularly, the letter to P. Spriano. Spriano. P. to letter the particularly, – , Woodrow Wilson Center – Cold War War Cold – Center Wilson Woodrow , re t hglgt h eouin f the of evolution the highlight to order and its ambiguous position in the Italian the in position ambiguous its and Rainer and Byrne ( Byrne and Rainer Albertina Vittoria. Vittoria. Albertina ore, the assessment of the historical historical the of assessment the ore, correspondence; the documents about about documents the correspondence; hes (G. Manacorda, I. Calvino and A. A. and Calvino I. Manacorda, (G. hes under examination in that part of the the of part that in examination under pretation stresses strong elements of of elements strong stresses pretation the analysis of the primary sources. sources. of the analysis the primary rces of the Archive at the “Antonio “Antonio the at Archive the of rces eotd h tsioy f w eye- two of testimony the reported nil ( anville pee i odr o osrc the construct to order in rpreted is Cre er-mds” and Ferri-Amadesi” “Carte ries ay rmr sucs were sources primary many oit ouet o the on documents Soviet The 1956 Hungarian 1956 The CEU eTD Collection parties that were forced to face the political cost political the face to forced were that parties political action of the Italian comrades, I will fi will I comrades, Italian the of action political to a “second storm” “second a to eros deep a caused De-Stalinization the But speech. reveale Khrushchev S. Nikita when 1956, February in 1 arena. a whole, a as movement communist the of history the a strategic calculation? calculation? astrategic Hungary on stance communist the was historiography: de to order in Therefore, strategy. political PCI’s October-e late in Hungary in place took that events crisis. crisis. had PCI the interests persisting the on focus will deter that factors the and strengths, its stressing I will define the crucial role of the PCI’s Cultura PCI’s the of role crucial the define will I historica the in importance strategic its stressing Lucio Magri, Magri, Lucio et I il oe o h aayi o te key-points the of analysis the to move will I Next,

The communist establishment of Botteghe Oscure prob Oscure Botteghe of establishment communist The This chapter is an attempt to explain how the Itali the how explain to attempt an is chapter This hn I il nlz te etrs n plce o t of policies and features the analyze will I Then,

G OALS AND STRATEGIES OF THE THE OF STRATEGIES AND OALS The tailor of Ulm: Communism in the twentieth centu twentieth the in Communism Ulm: of tailor The 1 : the Hungarian Revolution. Therefore, 1956 was an was 1956 Therefore, Revolution. Hungarian the :

H I TALIAN TALIAN UNGARIAN UPRISING UNGARIAN First chapter First C OMMUNIST OMMUNIST 1 rstly focus on the controversy existing in the in existing controversy the on focus rstly 2 2 mined its inherent rigidity. In this context, I context, this In rigidity. inherent its mined l context under examination. In this section, section, this In examination. under context l l Commission in the communist attempts to attempts communist the in Commission l to preserve from the harmful impact of the of impact harmful the from preserve to of their contradictions on the democratic the on contradictions their of fine the strategic patterns that drove the the drove that patterns strategic the fine ion of the communist legacy which lead lead which legacy communist the of ion arly November 1956 was rooted in the in rooted was 1956 November arly nd particularly for Western communist communist Western for particularly nd an Communist Party’s response to the the to response Party’s Communist an a “mistake”, or was it the outcome ofoutcome the it was or “mistake”, a he communist cultural network, by by network, cultural communist he of the PCI’s political strategy by by strategy political PCI’s the of P ry

Sai’ cie i hs “secret” his in crimes Stalin’s d ARTY IN RESPONSE TO THE THE TO RESPONSE IN ARTY (New York, Verso, 2011), p. 128. 128. p. 2011), Verso, (New York, ably thought to have had enough enough had have to thought ably annus horribilis annus 1956 in

CEU eTD Collection position over Hungary had been to establish a confu a establish to been had Hungary over position facecrisis. Hungarian the s will I section, this in Therefore, establishment. strategic the on particular, in and, strategy PCI’s question almost automatically communi legacy almost question of the of correctness the questioning by crisis: Hungarian vie given a from derive might that implications the topic This Revolution. Hungarian the of context the strategies. strategies. withi definition the frame to and opinion”, “public a also give to try will I opinion. public influence Argentieri, argued that one of the most significant most the of one that argued Argentieri, Vásárhelyi, Miklós Hungary? in place took whatever a and national internatio legacyas both of the PCI is there thirdly, uprising; the of days the during is strategic the secondly, crisis; Hungarian the to over dispute a is there Firstly, issues. following A problematic definition: the controversy the over definition: A problematic Historians are still debating about the political a political the about debating still are Historians of consequences actual the on focus will I Finally, hrfr, h cnrvry n h hsoigah im historiography the in controversy the Therefore, The “ideological problem” can be summarized in a so a in summarized be can problem” “ideological The 1 3

how how the PCI employed its strategy to to strategy its employed PCI the how how the ideology concerning the PCI’s attitude PCI’s the concerning ideology the nal political agent. nal political sue concerns the role of the Italian party party Italian the of role the concerns sue and enduring consequences of the PCI’s PCI’s the of consequences enduring and h polm f h ipiain fr the for implications the of problem the definition of what is meant hereby by by hereby meant is what of definition is considered to be quite relevant due to due relevant quite be to considered is n the interpretative pattern of the PCI’s the of pattern interpretative the n wpoint on the PCI’s attitude toward the toward attitude PCI’s the on wpoint ction of the Italian Communist Party in in Party Communist Italian the of ction the position of the party, one would would one party, the of position the calculation of the Botteghe Oscure Oscure Botteghe the of calculation sm in Italy. in sm PCI’s attitude to Hungary to 1956 PCI’sattitude sion: supporters and slanderers of the the of slanderers and supporters sion: h Hnain eouin o the for Revolution Hungarian the uig n neve wt Federigo with interview an during rt of lexical dispute: how to name to how dispute: lexical of rt le svrl ipts vr the over disputes several plies CEU eTD Collection political significance: “revolution” or “counter-re or “revolution” significance: political H got basically confused and, even the decades later, and, confusedgot basically 3 2 the left, pretended to achieve a kind of “neutral” “neutral” of kind a achieve to pretended left, the co this In “accuracy”. definitional justified which acceptan implicit even the revolution: Hungarian the the of understanding to led often prudence lexical acknowled The words. the of meaning the in embodied di “lexical” the of importance Indeed,the streams. “politica as journalism) seldom (and historiography “uprising”, trends: dominant the between dichotomy neet osrit o te tla Cmuit Party Communist Italian the of constraints inherent u better a for relevant actually is it but Hungary, Federigo Argentieri pointed out, remained dominant remained out, dominant pointed FederigoArgentieri id the reflected they since events the of aftermath 105. 105. d’Ungheria word “ word in instance, (for language common In significance. name, for instance a shameful crime. crime. name,a for shameful instance xrsin Hnain vns, h wr “vn” ( “event” word the events”, “Hungarian expression Argentieri, Federigo Ibidem ungarian uprising appeared so self-confident in the in self-confident so appeared uprising ungarian

Historiography seldom employed different lexical me lexical different employed seldom Historiography Indeed, a quite fierce controversy divides the hist the divides controversy fierce quite a Indeed, u te rcie rvd o e ut dvre fo t from divorced quite be to proved practice the But

. fatto ” (“Hungarian events / happenings”). happenings”). events / ”(“Hungarian ” might be used for identifying a given happening t happening given a identifying for used be might ” Ungheria 1956. La rivoluzione calunniata rivoluzione La 1956. Ungheria

14 14 nderstanding of the ambiguous features and and features ambiguous the of nderstanding eological perspective of the authors and, as as and, authors the of perspective eological volution” became quite popular in the very the in popular quite became volution” significance by using the expression “ expression the using by significance mist is still apparent. still is mist spute relies on its ideological implications implications ideological its on relies spute ntext, many intellectuals, particularly of of particularly intellectuals, many ntext, in the 60’s. in oriography and it does not involve just involve not does it and oriography ir pronouncements that public opinion public that pronouncements ir s perd tl srone b mist, by surrounded still appeared ts l-orc atraie” o h main the to alternatives” lly-correct breaking-news), even nowadays, the the nowadays, even breaking-news), . This issue is not free of a heavy heavy a of free not is issue This . fatto “upheaval”, “tragedy” were used in in used were “tragedy” “upheaval”, (Venice, Marsilio Editore, 2006), pp. 104- pp. 2006), Editore, Marsilio (Venice, ans for avoiding to highlight a clear clear a highlight to avoiding for ans eet f h ne fr sr of sort a for need the of gement ce of an inherently distorted distorted inherently an of ce ) seemed to have a pejorative pejorative a have to seemed ) e hoy we oe sd the used one when theory: he 3

hat one does not “dare” to “dare” not does one hat 2

fatti fatti CEU eTD Collection be understood as a juxtaposition of two notions: na notions: two of juxtaposition a as understood be peaceful demonstration intended to innovate the soc the innovate to intended demonstration peaceful fe al te vns ee o cer nuh n tha and restoration”. enough clear not were events the all, after eas “much was it Therefore, 1956. to up granted for intellectual communist the forced have might Vásárhe Miklós As know. to position a in was nobody eouin B uig h epeso “ expression the using By revolution? interv his in about talked Vásárhelyi confusion the auto and debate the into entered events” “Hungarian h hsoia eet. eod h vlnay distort voluntary the Beyond events. historical the as a sounds surrogate “counter-revol wholeof still ulti as restoration at attempt and invasion, the to (Bari, Edizioni Dedalo, 2007), p. 81. p. 2007), Dedalo, Edizioni (Bari, 6 5 4 words, Pistillo replaced the term “counter-revoluti term the replaced Pistillo words, to justified reactions that soon turned into an att an into turned soon that reactions justified to consequence a as [“emerged – attempts nationalistic u the that out pointed author the Pistillo: Michele rec the in found be can this of example interesting “confusion the writers, ideology-oriented nostalgic This problem will be discussed later, particularly later, discussed willbe problem This Pistillo, Michele Ibidem In

Indeed, the main point is that the “lexical confusi “lexical the that is point main the Indeed,

lhuh oaas h uae em “counter-revolutio term usage the nowadays Although

the specific context of the Italian debate on the H the on debate Italian the of context specific the . 4

olat e i itro Dses e ovrez sui convergenze e Dissensi Vittorio. Di e Togliatti

at d’Ungheria fatti in the second section of the third chapter. chapter. third the of section second the in 1 élite 5

empt to restore the old regime”. old the restore to empt ution”. ution”. mate aim. Therefore, the expression as a as expression the Therefore, aim. mate iew: were really the “Hungarian events” a events” “Hungarian the really wereiew: on” with a long expression which could could which expression long a with on” to change its mind on everything taken taken everything on mind its change to ier to feel comfortable with the fact that, that, fact the with comfortable feel to ier tionalistic attempt as a justified reaction justified a as attempt tionalistic ialist State, but he also remarks that “the that remarksalsohe but State, ialist rsn ws culy h otoe f a of outcome the actually was prising Vsrey dsrbd tl eit. An exists. still described Vásárhelyi ” matically conditioned it, by introducing introducing by it, conditioned matically of the first Soviet intervention”] – led – intervention”] Soviet first the of on” derives from the mist surrounding surrounding mist the from derives on” onstruction of the events given by by given events the of onstruction lyi pointed out, the Hungarian crisis crisis Hungarian the out, pointed lyi ungarian Revolution, the expression expression the Revolution, ungarian , n acps h floig point: following the accepts one ”, os f h hsoia facts historical the of ions t there was a danger of [fascist] [fascist] of danger a was there t n” is limited to a minority of of minority a to limited is n” at d’Ungheria fatti , “Critica Marxista” Marxista” “Critica , 5 In other other In 6 the , CEU eTD Collection eetees ti “iudrtnig hd n impact an had “misunderstanding” this Nevertheless, between the PCI and the PCUS will be discussed in t in discussed be will PCUS the and PCI the between elUgei Contemporanea 2012). 30th, http://www.sissco.it/index.php?id=1293&tx_wfqbe_pi1 dell’Ungheria uaet fr ntne te etr junlss re journalists, Western the instance, for Budapest: mis partly was events the of sequence chronological revolution, witnessed the abolition of the one-part the of abolition the witnessed revolution, nepeain s tl wdsra dsie e arch new despite widespread still is interpretation The correspondence between Botteghe Oscure and the and Oscure Botteghe between correspondence The make just PCI the did or events actual the of aware different of foundation theoretical a as essential the decision-making taking place in Moscow, in Buda Moscow, in in place taking thedecision-making th clarifying of importance the stressed Argentieri in this presented still Biagini Antonello instance, 10 9 8 7 remind that the correspondence consists of two tele two of consists correspondence the that remind etaiy Nvme 1 (November neutrality October30 again. again. collection of primary sources: C. Békés, J. Rainer, J. Békés, C. sources: primary of collection 33. p. 1995), Spring C., D. Washington no Bulletin, Project History International War Cold 30 documents Andropov was not able to justify troop movements fr movements troop justify to able not was Andropov Nag opposite: the almost was sequence chronological w they sequence.However, this in facts the related h hsoigahcl ipt cn e on i Arge in found be can dispute historiographical The Gr C. J. by contribution abovementioned the Beyond trans. Granville, C. Johanna eeec t tee ouet i Agnir, p 13 pp. Argentieri, in documents these to Reference th

The mist around the events directly concerns Botteg concerns directly events the around mist The . The latter is very important because Togliatti im Togliatti because important very is latter The . (Budapest and New York, CEU Press, 2002). 2002). Press, CEU New and York, (Budapest th alone gives a sense that the PCI constantly kept i kept aconstantly gives sense the PCI alonethat st Soviet documents on the Hungarian Revolution, 24 Oc 24 Revolution, Hungarian the on documents Soviet ad h Sve ivso o Bdps (oebr 4 (November Budapest of invasion Soviet the and )

grams, the first sent on October 23 October on sent first the grams, M. Byrne, Byrne, M. WorwWlo Cne o nentoa Schola International for Center Wilson (Woodrow 5 . he third chapter of this dissertation. It is now us now is It dissertation. this of chapter third he plicitly suggested that the Kremlin to invade Hunga invade to Kremlin the that suggested plicitly 1 %5Bidrecensione%5D=2803 (lasted visited on May May on visited (lasted %5Bidrecensione%5D=2803 5-136. The problem of the exchange of information information of exchange the of problem The 5-136. 6

anville, another essential source is the following following the is source essential another anville, y system (October 30 (October system y e issue of neutrality in order to understand to order in neutrality of issue e ntieri’s response to Antonello Biagini’s Biagini’s Antonello to response ntieri’s ere not in position to know that the actual actual the knowthat to position in not ere a “mistake” about this position in 1956? in position this about “mistake” a historiographical streams: was the PCI PCI the was streams: historiographical iet o the of sidents epeain n 06 wie Federigo while 2006, in terpretation The 1956 Hungarian Revolution. A history in in history A Revolution. Hungarian 1956 The pest, asRome. aswell in pest, vl tde ta dsisd it. dismissed that studies ival om the provinces toward Budapest. toward provinces the om dcae te etaiy s on as soon as neutrality the declared y edn fr h frin bevs in observes foreign the for leading (2006): (2006): he Oscure as well. One question is question One well. as Oscure he Kremlin between October 23 October between Kremlin on the historiography and this this and historiography the on n touch with theKremlin. with touch n Duna hotel hotel Duna tober – 4 November 1956 November 4 – tober th rd , the second on October October on second the , ), the declaration of declaration the ), 9

th ), and they they and ), during the the during rd 8 eful to eful Storia Storia 10 For and

rs, rs, ry ry 7 ,

CEU eTD Collection oiin ti las o cran ere f forgive of degree certain a to leads this position: sinistra italiana sinistra Togliatti’s telegram of 30 October Togliatti’stelegram writ authors important most the of one Agosti, Aldo exchanges Togliatti’s on researches from resulting Italian leader – therefore, no conclusion can be re be can conclusion no therefore, – Italianleader “m are there that wrote Guerra Adriano conclusions: 13 12 11 comunismo democratico democratico comunismo the side of the “victims” ofthe confusing “Hungari of theside the “victims” this to according Paradoxically, crisis. Hungarian of outcome the than serious” “more nothing be would Therefore strategy. given a follow actually not did pointless simply be would uprising Hungarian the of strat the on debate the views, these of implication whi in conditions situational the of reconstruction decision-making. n did Togliatti that stressed instead, Pons, Silvio it seems impossible to conduct such an analysis wit analysis an such conduct to impossible seems it t response in strategies PCI’s the of context wider c appear words Togliatti’s that remark to necessary eeec t ti psto o Sli Pn i Argen in Pons Silvio of position this to Reference Guerra, Adriano 136. p. Argentieri, N

te shlr atal mnind h dcmn, but document, the mentioned actually scholars Other hs itrrttos ml te oin f “mistake” of notion the imply interpretations These n re t age gis bt tee iw (ht of (that views these both against argue to order In

e v e r hls, itrorpy hwd cran reticence certain a showed historiography theless, (Milan, Mondadori, 2004), pp. 202-203. 202-203. pp. 2004), Mondadori, (Milan, 13 Comunismi e comunisti. Dalle “svolte” di Togliatti Togliatti di “svolte” Dalle comunisti. e Comunismi

(Bari, Edizioni Dedalo, 2005), p. 190.p. 2005), Dedalo, Edizioni (Bari,

th . 11

tieri, p. 136, and in V. Zaslavsky, Zaslavsky, V. in and 136, p. tieri, 17 17 ached through the study of such a source. such of the study through ached o the Hungarian revolution. Nevertheless, Nevertheless, revolution. Hungarian the o egy of the party’s response in the context the in response party’s the of egy t ae n iprat oe n h Soviet the in role important any have ot an events”. anevents”. lear especially if they are analyzed in the in analyzed are they if especially lear with Moscow. For instance, the historian the instance, For Moscow. with line of reasoning, Togliatti might be on be might Togliatti reasoning, of line hout considering the behavior of the PCI the of behavior the considering hout , the “mistaken” response of the PCI PCI the of response “mistaken” the , es n h bss f controversial a of basis the on ness ing on the PCI, did not mention at all at mention not did PCI, the on ing , since the PCI had just “mistaken”, it it “mistaken”, just had PCI the since , ysterious aspects” in the words of the of words the in aspects” ysterious ch the PCI took its stances. As an an As stances. its took PCI the ch in the understanding of the PCI’s PCI’s the of understanding the in the complex circumstances of the the of circumstances complex the gsi n ta o Pn) i is it Pons), of that and Agosti still reached controversial controversial reached still in “accepting” the findings findings the “accepting” in Sai dl 94 l rlo del crollo al 1944 del Stalin e o tlnso la e stalinismo Lo 12

CEU eTD Collection beginning of the new phase and end of the former on former the of end and phase new the of beginning of communism in Italy as a political phenomenon. Italy phenomenon. a in political as ofcommunism beca vivid that is revolution Hungarian the and PCI of the about position – successful evennot though an show surely words his but decisions, Soviet the whe know to position a in probably is nobody Party: and concerns the on source a as but itself, making i of source a as not important be of to seems ideatelegram the rejects which notion a “strategy”, a as 16 15 14 association “Ars”, Naples, 2002. 2002. Naples, “Ars”, association 1975). Press, University Princeton T S. Blackmer, M. L. D. is stream historiographical dvriy: h epeso o Bake “nt i d in approach. historiographical “unity Blackmer of expression the “diversity”: with “continuity” of elements of mixture a as Party understanding of its role in Italian and in po role society understanding of its strategic patterns but, but, patterns strategic intervention. which revisionism forward push the exaggerated have histori of guise the in politicians some as well as Giorgio Napolitano, Napolitano, Giorgio Höbel, Alexander book Blackmer’s from comes expression The Nevertheless, the main interpretative problem is wh is problem interpretative main the Nevertheless, neetnl eog, h dbt o te reconstruct the on debate the enough, Interestingly th described historians some onwards, 70’s the From t s n neibe at ht b lt 7’, h PC the 70’s, late by that, fact undeniable an is It In this view, the position of the PCI would be seen be would ofthe PCI position view, the Inthis

16

Dal PCI al socialismo europeo socialismo al PCI Dal infct e iii e cmrmso storico compromesso del limiti e Significato n nuce in 14

te at aprts iety noprtd h wil the incorporated silently apparatus party the ,

Unity in diversity in Unity arrow (edts.), (edts.), arrow (Bari, Laterza, 2005), pp. 16-17. pp. 2005), Laterza, (Bari, 1 8 litical arena. arena. litical

ans (G. Napolitano, M. Pistillo) seemed to seemed Pistillo) M. Napolitano, (G. ans the Italian the party. intent, which is historically informative – – informative historically is which intent, its ideological tradition and elements of elements and tradition ideological its use it interjects the debate on the legacy legacy the on debate the interjects it use observations of the Italian Communist Communist Italian the of observations e. In this sense, historians (A. Höbel) (A. historians sense, this In e. in terms of continuity with the general general the with continuity of terms in nformation about the Soviet decision- Soviet the about nformation ther Togliatti’s telegram had a role in in role a had telegram Togliatti’s ther I had reshaped its strategies and the the and strategies its reshaped had I came from the trauma of the Soviet Soviet the of trauma the from came msae. n diin Togliatti’s addition, In “mistake”. Communism in Italy and France and Italy in Communism (M.T.I. Press, 1968), another source of this this of source another 1968), Press, (M.T.I. ion of single events concerning the the concerning events single of ion ere to set the boundary between the between boundary the set to ere e history of the Italian Communist Italian the of history e vriy bs smaie this summarized best iversity” , conference paper about Berlinguer, Berlinguer, about paper conference , t break to l (Princeton, (Princeton, 15

CEU eTD Collection communism in Italy, chose to quote one of Ashleigh of one quote to chose Italy, in communism w from the Postwar onwards. Eric Hobsbawm, in his boo his in Hobsbawm, Eric onwards. Postwar the from th of history whole the reinterpret to attempts the understanding This and practices. of set values its Col the of constraints the into “trapped” be to PCI a Indeed, 1956. in PCI the of involvement strategic the neglect to means a be to seems “discontinuity” the and PCI, the of radicalization strong a to led find stan the about communists Italian of consciousness” interpretation this for patterns argumentative 18 17 Italy. th in actor innovative an actually was PCI the that ques his constructed Napolitano, Giorgio President, come to terms with the controversial past. controversial the with terms to come mo the eliminate to and post-1989, the in coherence att intellectuals politically-committed of movement com Italian “inventing” by collapsed, transition had the communism of trauma the over paint white some artificial an be to seems interpretation Hobsbawm’s terms. relative in forces conservative progressive “necessarily” necessarily were communist the oppose F. Argentieri, p. 74. 74. p. Argentieri, F. Hobsbawm, E. to Reference t te msoie taiin n t mv twr “E toward move to and tradition “muscovite” the ith

From the Marxist viewpoint, indeed, this simply is is simply this indeed, viewpoint, Marxist the From Intervista sul PCI sul Intervista

(Bari, Laterza, 1975) in Argentieri, p. 106. 106. p. inArgentieri, 1975) Laterza, (Bari, 18 Alberto Chilosi, in his work on the evolution of evolution the on work his in Chilosi, Alberto 1 9

idea of setting back the starting-time of the of starting-time the back setting of idea of the problem provides a logical basis for a basis logical provides ofthe problem e PCI as a progressive democratic force democratic progressive a as PCI e d War, but also as a progressive force in in force progressive a as also but War, d need for the controversial analysis of the the of analysis controversial the for need e conservative socio-political context of context socio-political conservative e ce taken in 1956. But the crises of 1956 1956 of crises the But 1956. in taken ce ly constructed history intended to wipe to intended history constructed ly mtd o etr a itoa historical fictional a restore to empted ral dilemma caused by the reticence to reticence the by caused dilemma ral tions in order to corroborate the view view the corroborate to order in tions part of historiography considered the the considered historiography of part s eeio retei ons out, points Argentieri Federigo As Brilliant’s aphorisms which can best best can which aphorisms Brilliant’s hi ros n es o “guilty of sense in roots their k-interview not an issue: since the forces who who forces the since issue: an not o otcmuim a so as soon as post-communism: to munism as a moderate leftist leftist moderate a as munism ns te omnss were communists the ones, urocommunism”. The main main The urocommunism”. 17 with the current Italian current the with CEU eTD Collection studies would possibly affect politics even possiblydecades would affect politics studies contempo of topics many on investigation historical o predominance intellectual the out, points Zazzara “de the over revisionism the accepted fully not has identity crisis which affected the Italianfro the left identitywhich crisis affected c a intellectuals, and politicians communist former implies clearly it but alone, Revolution Hungarian stil is open becausethe issue still is andHungary changed, but not the fact that I that amright”. changed,the fact not but historiographi this of sense innermost the describe the book by Paolo Mieli, “Il Corriere della Sera”, Sera”, della 9b75910f192b.shtml Corriere “Il Mieli, http://www.corriere.it/cultura/libri/11_giugno_28/z Paolo by book the discipline and as marginalization of dissent. and as marginalization discipline ideology-centered an as appears PCI the sense, this gu as a model the Soviet faith in unconditional its b inspired actually was Party ItalianCommunist the A Zazzara, G. Argentieri, F. Bosetti, G. Rossi, Aga 20 19 assessment http://www.dse.ec.unipi.it/persone/docenti/Chilosi/ G. Zazzara, Zazzara, G. Chilosi, Alberto

h rcpin f hs coal sra ws edm c seldom was stream scholarly this of reception The

Therefore, in the current context of Italian histor Italian of context current the in Therefore, n epne o hs hsoigahcl tem, par streams, historiographical these to response In Ps, aut o Pltcl cecs n Departmen and Sciences Political of Faculty (Pisa, La storia a sinistra. Ricerca e impegno politico do politico impegno e Ricerca sinistra. a storia La h ln mrh f tla cmuit fo revolutio from communists Italian of march long The

19 , p. 1. 1. p. , azzara-la-storia-a-sinistra_bc3d555a-a196-11e0-ae6a

20 20 m 1989 onwards. onwards. 1989 m ul ettv dl C d cnrlae a storia la controllare di PCI del tentativo Quel l politically relevant: it does not involve the involve not does it relevant: politically l ide for the world communist movement. In movement. communist world idefor the later. entral issue in the recent post-communist post-communist recent the in issue entral y an inherently conservative soul and by by and soul conservative inherently any mocratic” look of the PCI yet: as Gilda Gilda as yet: PCI the of look mocratic” . Frigerio) highlighted that the action of action the that highlighted Frigerio) . organization, based on a strict internal strict a on based organization, iography, the controversy over the PCI PCI the over controversy the iography, rary history with the excuse that such that excuse the with history rary gvn vlain f h rl o the of role the of evaluation given a cal stream: “My opinions may have have may opinions “My stream: cal po il fascismo il po te C ws o ep o influence to deep so was PCI the f o te cdma V Zsasy E. Zaslavsky, (V. academia the of t 20 t of Economics – University of Pisa): Pisa): of University – Economics of t ontroversial, because the academy academy the because ontroversial,

n to neoliberalism: a retrospective retrospective a neoliberalism: to n (Bari, Laterza, 2011), review of review of 2011), Laterza, (Bari, - : CEU eTD Collection Stanford, Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Stanford Uni Stanford Press, Center Wilson Woodrow Stanford, hotspot of the Cold War in the Italianin War c of the the Cold democratic hotspot PCI the did how context: democratic the in PCI the 22 21 the national political context achieved in 1943, as 1943, in achieved context political national the omnss xlie fo te ie hy ond the joined they time the from exploited communists cells-based small the from divorced party-model new It in communism rebuild to began Togliatti onwards, Party). Party). and forces anti-fascist other the sustain to Italy it. Togliatti’ inspiring in role prominent a had Stalin V (particularly historiography recent hand, one the c by organization abandontheir insurgency-oriented the same time, it has relevant ideological-politica has relevant it thesame time, Italy: in is it forCommunism Togliatti’sstrategy mark a difference with the past, Togliatti named hi Togliatti past, markthe a with difference V. Zaslavsky, E. Aga Rossi, Rossi, Aga E. Zaslavsky, V. his Italian Salerno” of “swing By 44. p. Magri, L. 22 s al a 14, rm h s-ald “ so-called the from 1944, as early As The disagreement in the historiography is actually actually is historiography the in disagreement The Togliatti’s struggleCommunism for Italy:in the Togliatti’s

This important innovation was not applied all at on at all applied not was innovation important This rm h ognztoa vepit the viewpoint, organizational the From Therefore, On the other hand, a “left-winged” faction of form of faction “left-winged” a hand, other the On partito nuovo partito Stalin and Togliatti. Italy and the origins of the of origins the and Italy Togliatti. and Stalin might be the expression which summarizes the quinte the summarizes which expression the be might

to support the government headed by Ferruccio Parri Ferruccio by headed government the support to soon as Palmiro Togliatti left Moscow and came bac came and Moscow left Togliatti Palmiro as soon toriography means the break of the communist isolat communist the of break the means toriography vla i Salerno di svolta att nuovo partito versity Press, 2001), pp. 80-88. 80-88. pp. 2001), Press, versity 21 21 l implications. implications. l an organizational-structural concept and, at concept anorganizational-structural s projects ontext? s organizational action and in supporting in and action organizational s . Zaslavsky and E. Aga Rossi) shows that shows Rossi) Aga E. and Zaslavsky . partito nuovo partito onstructing a branched mass-party. mass-party. a branchedonstructing actually cope with the emergence of a of emergence the with cope actually based on different views on the role of of role the on views different on based aly with a clear objective: to create a create to objective: clear a with aly ce, with a sort of “magic wand”. On On wand”. “magic of sort a with ce, Resistenza organizational structure which the the which structure organizational er partisans, like Giulio Seniga and Seniga Giulio like partisans, er oe lt h Iain comrades Italian the let model partito nuovo partito (te wn o Salerno”) of swing (“the ” and its political strategy strategy political its and (1943-1945). In order to to order In (1943-1945). Cold War Cold (“new party”). (“new party”). (Washington and and (Washington ssence of of ssence (Action (Action ion in in ion k to to k 21

CEU eTD Collection y olat ad y oe rmnn mmes Lii L (Luigi members prominent some by and Togliatti by n Sve leadership. Soviet and un two on based militants PCI the of identification hom this of construction the Therefore, Togliatti). recent studies, particularly G. Mastrangelo, Mastrangelo, G. particularly studies, recent returned never who partisans former by composed was und was structure insurgency the onwards, 1948 from leadership communist the II, War World of aftermath network. reluctantly and reforms the opposed Secchia, Pietro alive thanks to concrete aids from the USSR. The in The USSR. the from aids concrete to thanks alive overwhelming charismatic legitimization of “ of legitimization charismatic overwhelming wh Terracini) Umberto Grieco, Ruggiero Scoccimarro, mdl-ls bcgon (seily h mn h j Sereni). Emilio and Reale Eugenio Amendola, who men the (especially background middle-class a Gir and Macaluso Emanuele of exception onlypartial It Northern from all came PCI the of high-ranks the 26 25 24 23 pny rtczd tlns ot otoesa decis controversial most Stalin’s criticized openly m structurally became party The 193-195. pp. 1971), for Italian communism: the PCI was the PCI Italiancommunism: for of sort heresy. asof considereda a sign “whiggism” within the apparatus: the PCI became a s a became PCI the apparatus: the within “whiggism” operations and the internal conflict with Secchia b withSecchia conflict theinternal and operations c the into fell – Milan particularly – cities major offensive perspective as a “stay-behind” organizati “stay-behind” a as perspective offensive fascism) and of World War II (the Soviet-German pac Soviet-German (the II War World of and fascism) young man attempted on Togliatti’s life, the insurg the life, Togliatti’s on attempted man young s a to led Secchia and Togliatti of views different sprin 2, no. 3, vol. Studies”, War Cold of “Journal inoffensive for the Italian State (see S. Pons, Pons, S. (see State received Italian the Togliatti for as inoffensive only, purposes defensive had D. L. M. Blackmer, S. Tarrow (edts.), p. 55. 55. p. (edts.), Tarrow S. Blackmer, L.M. D. exc partial one just was There 209. p. Einaudi, M. Garosci, A. – Domenach M. J. – Einaudi M. Galli, Giorgio

The gradual edification of the of edification gradual The The

partito nuovo partito 23

tra e Prio ouit Italiano Comunista Partito del Storia reshaped the leadership – cadres dynamics by gradu by dynamics cadres – leadership the reshaped 25 hrfr, rtcs o te SR n o te leader the of and USSR the of criticism Therefore,

partito nuovo partito Il complotto comunista complotto Il de facto de tln Tgiti n te rgn o te od a i War Cold the of origins the and Togliatti Stalin, ecame irreconcilable. irreconcilable. ecame haos. After some dramatic days, Togliatti asked to to asked Togliatti days, dramatic some After haos. ituation of potential civil war: in the very first first very the in war: civil potential of ituation g 2001, p. 20 and p. 21 – footnote no. 75). In July In 75). no. footnote – 21 p. and 20 p. 2001, g omns i Wsen Europe Western in Communism on. Silvio Pons, instead, argued that the military military the that argued instead, Pons, Silvio on. ency apparatus automatically began its operations a operations its began automatically apparatus ency o drn te er o te pns Cvl a (soci War Civil Spanish the of years the during ion eption to this general pattern: Umberto Terracini w Terracini Umberto pattern: general this to eption surgency apparatus was maintained in both defensive both in maintained was apparatus surgency aly (an overwhelming majority from Piedmont), with Piedmont), from majority overwhelming (an aly ore homogeneous also from the sociological viewpoin sociological the from also homogeneous ore olamo Li Causi (from Sicily). The establishment had establishment The Sicily). (from Causi Li olamo forced to “accept” the democratic system democratic the “accept” forcedto t of 1939-1941) – see M. Einaudi, p. 195. 195. p. Einaudi, M. see – 1939-1941) of t chose to keep its clandestine military organizatio military clandestine its keep to chose er the control of Pietro Secchia. The communist mil communist The Secchia. Pietro of control the er Il Migliore Il directions from Kostylev about keeping the “army” “army” the keeping about Kostylev from directions 22 22 ie i te ota, ie inal Pjta Giorg Pajetta, Giancarlo like Postwar, the in oined their weapons to the authorities, and – according according – and authorities, the to weapons their had a very significant political consequence consequence political significant very a had Mln I Frihee 17) p. 4-4. n the In 248-249. pp. 1976), Formichiere, Il (Milan, accepted to dismantle the insurrectional the dismantle to accepted ogeneous apparatus implied a common common a implied apparatus ogeneous ocal mts cmuit ideology communist myths: touchable olid party structure olid (Naples, Controcorrente, 2002) – was kept kept was – 2002) Controcorrente, (Naples, , nwy dd o ejy h same the enjoy not did anyway, o, ” (“The Best”, nick-name given to to given nick-name Best”, (“The ” ongo, Edoardo D’Onofrio, Mauro Mauro D’Onofrio, Edoardo ongo, (Hamden, Archon Books, Books, Archon (Hamden, 24 , vertically , headed ally marginalizing marginalizing ally hours after a a after hours hp was ship Europe n 1948, the 1948, network network stop the stop 26 ho had ho nd the the nd n and, n and also also and and itia itia the the t al- 24 to to io : , ,

CEU eTD Collection permanently located the Christian-democrats (DC – – (DC Christian-democrats the located permanently oiia cam i odr o pa t a ie audie wider a to speak to order in claims political president of the DC and he was Prime Minister of re of Minister Prime was he and DC the of president publications ltd., 2004), p. 126. 126. p. 2004), ltd., publications 10%: the PCI obtained 22.6% and 20.6%, 20.6%, and 22.6% obtained thePCI 10%: t 1953, In assembly. constituent the of members the whi 18% the to compared if particularly outstanding ( Chamber upper the for vote the minority position. minority position. l a in PRI) – republicans and – PLI – liberals with f h Iain cnro o wih h cmuit we communists the which on scenario, Italian the of yearsof the final Worl in theantifasciststruggle legitim of basis wider a seek to had necessarily it Fanfani i threat, red the face to order In forces. centrist Plasser, Plasser, 29 28 27 elections of 1953, he was replaced by Amintore Fanf Amintore by replaced was he 1953, of elections Austrian-Italian the of settlement the to and 1947 low the for vote the in seats) (126 31% impressive occasions from mid-50’s to late 80’s: January-Febru 80’s: late to mid-50’s from occasions December 1982-August 1983; April 1987-July 1987. 1987. 1987-July April 1983; 1982-August December transformed into a mass-party, tried to become a so a become to tried mass-party, a into transformed to had Togliatti Therefore, procedures. democratic and forces, centrist the for support political the civil rights (such as abortion and divorce) coming coming divorce) and abortion as (such rights civil of the 1948 Constitution with regard to the workers the to regard with Constitution 1948 the of bett for claims workers’ the voice to tried indeed, PCI became the main center of the political opposit political the of center main the became PCI Luciano Bardi, Bardi, Luciano Affa Foreign the of Minister was Gasperi De Alcide resul following the witnessed 1948 of election The Indeed, since 1948, the PCI had had to adjust its p its adjust to had had PCI the 1948, since Indeed, The only one way to challenge the challenge to way one only The

28 oiia pris n eetrl hne pry respo party change: electoral and parties Political rcie te ocle “ so-called the practiced epne t eetrl eainet n Italy in de-alignment electoral to Responses Senato della Repubblica della Senato

ovni a excludendum ad conventio conventio ad excludendum ad conventio controversy over Südtirol. From 1948 to 1953, he be he 1953, to 1948 From Südtirol. over controversy he share of power of the communists decreased by al by decreased communists the of power of share he publican Italy. After his death, occurred before th before occurred death, his After Italy. publican ary 1954; July 1958-February 1959; July 1960-June 1 1960-June July 1959; 1958-February July 1954; ary ch the party had obtained in 1946, in the vote for for vote the in 1946, in obtained had party the ch Chamber ( Chamber irs during the negotiations that led to the Paris T Paris the to led that negotiations the during irs ani was held the position of Prime Minister in seve in Minister Prime of position the held was ani 23 23 d War II alone was no longer enough. IIenough. War d longer no alone was this objective had to be achieved within the within achieved be to had objective this s te oua Fot PI n PI otie an obtained PSI) and (PCI Front Popular the ts: .Teersls(lot1 mlino vts were votes) of million 15 (almost results These ). ndeed, Alcide De Gasperi and Amintore Amintore and Gasperi De Alcide ndeed, er labor laws (namely for the application the for (namely laws labor er ization because the contribution given to given contribution the because ization from anti-Church from eading position and the communists in a in communists the and position eading ’ ion to the DC. Botteghe Oscure tried to to tried Oscure Botteghe DC. the to ion rt of catch-all party. catch-all of rt Camera dei Deputati dei Camera olitical strategy to the specific features features specific the to strategy olitical status eorza Cristiana Democrazia , in Peter Mair, Wolfgang C. Müller, Fritz Fritz Müller, C. Wolfgang Mair, Peter in , e strong re ss o lcoa market electoral to nses ehp te rdtoa communist traditional the reshape c o ptnil oes te PCI, the voters: potential of nce ) and the claims for a number of number a for claims the and ) : h caiingm which coalition-game the ”: 27 was the gradual erosion of of erosion gradual the was bt o a srn a the as strong as not but , élites ) and 30.8% (68 seats) in in seats) (68 30.8% and ) 29 . In this sense, the sense, this In . The communists, communists, The , usually allied allied usually , (London, Sage Sage (London, e general general e electing electing reaty of of reaty came came most 963; 963; ral CEU eTD Collection Italiano political weight, even if such weight was not impor not was weight such if even weight, political nepeig ivni ursh’ ltrr metaphor literary Guareschi’s Giovanni interpreting Italian religion-based the of “backwardness” the in a reputation a party the for construct artificially weaknesses. weaknesses. 1955 and for the appointment of the judges of the C the of thejudges of theappointment for and 1955 Giovanni for fact, in determinant, were communists 32 31 30 the small city of Brescello. The two figures embodi figures two The Brescello. of city small the epnd h ngtain wt Per Nnis Socia Nenni’s Pietro with negotiations the reopened virtu the terms, political In dimension. social and opponents of the centrists what the Church itself w what theChurch itself of opponents the centrists sometimes given to Joseph Stalin. Stalin. Joseph to given sometimes ad excludendum ad strateg Togliatti’s Therefore, laws. the of content ha to opportunity the lose not did it but decisions approved 74% of the whole legislative approvedthe whole 74% of participated PCI the that show Vassallo) Salvatore Furt 1948. of election the in performance excellent omns ntok n motn shrs f oit a society of spheres important in network communist Togliatti Therefore, primacy. political a obtaining Salvatore Vassallo, Vassallo, Salvatore 3. p. Chilosi, Alberto of figures literary the to Reference

The positive outcomes of the communist strategy cou strategy communist the of outcomes positive The hs taey f otnos xaso o te influe the of expansion continuous of strategy This h ipiain f hs mrsie aa s ht the that is data impressive this of implication The oee, h srcua faue o Iain society Italian of features structural the However,

itne t rbid h uie fot f h Itali the of front united the rebuild to intended ) . . l oen d prio n Italia in partito di governo Il Don Camillo Don

corpus and and onstitutional Court in the same year. year. same the in Court onstitutional ed the DC and the PCI. “ PCI. the and DC the ed Gronchi’s accession to the Presidency of the Republ the of Presidency the to accession Gronchi’s Blga I Mln, 94, . 5. h vts f t of votes The 151. p. 1994), Mulino, Il (Bologna, in the period1948-1968. in 24 24 Peppone s the main bulwark of social modernization social of bulwark main the s ve a say on it, and to influence partly the partly influence to and it, on say a ve as for the DC. asfor the al enlargement of the communist claims communist the of enlargement al context. As Alberto Chilosi points out, points Chilosi Alberto As context. okd n h epnin f h pro- the of expansion the on worked tant enough to “leapfrog” the “leapfrog” to enough tant gv te omnss n important an communists the gave y s hermore, recent studies (particularly, (particularly, studies recent hermore, , the fictional priest and communist leader of of leader communist and priest fictional the , 30 list Party (PSI – – (PSI Party list in the decision-making and finally finally and decision-making the in PCI verbally opposed the political political the opposed verbally PCI c hd nme o srnts and strengths of number a had nce te C tid o eoe o the for become to tried PCI the , ld be definitely seen in the political the in seen definitely be ld rvne te omnss from communists the prevented nd public life. Indeed, the PCI PCI the Indeed, life. public nd an Left, which had obtained an an obtained had which Left, an Peppone 31

32 ” was also the nick-name nick-name the also was ”

att Socialista Partito conventio ic in in ic he CEU eTD Collection rcie a la hegemony clear a practiced placed its men in unpaid positions, usually in the the in usually positions, unpaid in men its placed Giunti, 1995), p. 83. The author points out that ma that out points author The 83. p. 1995), Giunti, h pbi ceiiiy f h pry a srcl co strictly was party the of credibility public the Union, which deeply influenced the PCI political de political which thePCI Union, deeply influenced up cover to purpose the actually served credentials d the both of acceptance “official” their but force a as appear to wanted they because Rossi), Aga and 36 35 34 33 (Bologna, Il Mulino, 1997), p. 236. 236. p. 1997), Mulino, Il (Bologna, immediately communists the But union. trade unitary influential Italian influential union. trade Lavoro del Italiana Generale Confederazione C I 14, u t te rwn argne f h co the Work the of Confederation (Italian theCISL founded of arrogance growing the to due 1948, In DC. establishment isolated the operational body of the the of body operational the isolated establishment as its inherent contradictions. inherent contradictions. asits t are on focus to aspects main The weaknesses. some of the workers. workers. theof politica the for support provide to was purpose the to the leadership to revealed, 1956 of crisis the As hands. Togliatti’s ideology- an was PCI the party: the in command-line im crucial the of consisted limitation “subjective” communists played a sort of “double-game” of sort a played communists Argentieri, p. 21, quotation from Vittorio Foa. Foa. Vittorio from quotation 21, p. Argentieri, Rossi, Aga E. Zaslavsky, V. proclamatio official the After 208. p. Einaudi, M. Gundle, Stephen The “objective” limitation was actually the ideolog the actually was limitation “objective” The

On the other hand, the political strategy embodied embodied strategy political the hand, other the On The inherent rigidity of the strategy led to “subje to led strategy the of rigidity inherent The The rigidity of this political strategy can be expl be can strategy political this of rigidity The 36 cmnsi tlai r Hlyod Msa l sfid la Mosca: e Hollywood tra italiani comunisti I , a clear sign of Stalinism in the “aftermath” in of t signof a , Stalinism clear Togliatti and Stalin. Il PCI e la politica estera i estera politica la e PCI Il Stalin. and Togliatti 33 n h Iain eea Cneeain f Labor of Confederation General Italian the on

ny mobilizations of the CGIL had a clear political political clear a had CGIL the of mobilizations ny l position of the party, rather than to defend give defend to than rather party, the of position l n of the labor unity in 1944, the DC and the PCI fo PCI the and DC the 1944, unityin labor the of n trade union from the leadership officially shared w shared officially leadership the from union trade ers’ Trade Unions). Unions). ers’Trade 35 started started (“ mnss te C hs t bek h lbr nt and unity labor the break to chose DC the mmunists, 25 25 low-ranks. Thanks to this move, the communist communist the move, this to Thanks low-ranks. doppiezza ), still nowadays the largest and most most and largest the nowadays still ), party-membership implied full obedience obedience full implied party-membership portance of discipline and of the vertical the of and discipline of portance nnected to the credibility of the Soviet Soviet the of credibility the to nnected cisions. cisions. de facto de ained by a structural contradiction: the contradiction: structural a by ained ctive” and “objective” limitations. The limitations. “objective” and ctive” he rigidity of the strategy itself as well well as itself strategy the of rigidity he based party organization centralized in in centralized organization party based hi srn lnae ih h Soviet the with linkage strong their ical paradox of Western Communism: Western of paradox ical mcai mtos n te national the and methods emocratic by the the by eunl ntoa ad progressive and national genuinely ” inthe original text by Zaslavsky by text original inthe ” a conquest of all the positions: the PCI PCI the positions: the all of conquest a dla utr d massa di cultura della a partito nuovo partito he “secret” speech. speech. he“secret” taliana negli archivi di Mosca di archivi negli taliana model had also also had model 34 CI – (CGIL (Florence, (Florence, n interests interests n character: character: rmed an rmed ith the the ith

CEU eTD Collection juxtaposed. juxtaposed. party, but also a source of ambiguities. ambiguities. a also of party,source but rgesv at. ovrey y 96 i ws stil was it 1956, by Conversely, party. progressive postwar the notions of modernity and morality (a ne (a morality and modernity of notions the postwar attempt to enlarge the party’s influence: “as soon soon “as influence: party’s the enlarge to attempt moral significance. moral Italian intellectuals (scholars, writers, (scholars, journalis Italianintellectuals “ By culture. Italian of world the included network international peace. peace. international a the as East socialist the tendencies; reactionary internati the as West the construction: ideological req PCI the of strategy political The itself. Union 37 main main the “leapfrog” Into order organization. social order” in its political program. Indeed, Ita Indeed, program. political its in order” social P the to regard With 207. p. 1998), Collins, Harper hs dooycnee sse i wih oiia an political which in system ideology-centered this poli of provider a as Union Soviet the with linkage injustice of the existing order) in the understandi inthe order) theexisting of injustice Donald Sassoon, Sassoon, Donald Public opinion and cultural policies in the communi in policies cultural and opinion Public

In analytical terms, the most important aspect of t of aspect important most the terms, analytical In Beyond their connections in the trade unions, an es an unions, trade the in connections their Beyond characte was discourse communist the sense, this In

u t tee otaitos oe ol hrl argue hardly could one contradictions, these to Due nees permanenti interessi One hundred years of socialism. The West European l European West The socialism. of years hundred One 37 Therefore, the linkage with the USSR was a source a was USSR the with linkage the Therefore, “emnn itrss) popcie line with alliance prospective interests”): (“permanent

conventio ad excludendum ad conventio ng of itself. itself. ngof lian communists juxtaposed in their ideology in the in ideology their in juxtaposed communists lian CI, the author mentions the idea of “an entirely di entirely “an of idea the mentions author the CI, w social order to be achieved by overcoming the soc the overcoming by achieved be to order social w 26 26 ts, artists, and some famous architects). architects). and famous some artists, ts, tical legitimization; public credibility of of credibility public legitimization; tical culture” is meant hereby the number of number the hereby meant is culture” l quite a conservative and “muscovite” “muscovite” and conservative a quite l s t a cnoiae is oiin s a as position its consolidated had it as et f el eorc, rges and progress democracy, real of gent nl gn o “akades ad of and “backwardness” of agent onal he PCI’s cultural network is Togliatti’s Togliatti’s is network cultural PCI’s he uired a continuous defense of a fake fake a of defense continuous a uired mrl lmns f esain were persuasion of elements moral d sential part of the communist-friendly communist-friendly the of part sential st strategy strategy st ie b a itr o pltc and politics of mixture a by rized ht h PI a a oen and modern a was PCI the that eft in the twentieth century twentieth the in eft , the PCI had to defend itsdefend to had PCI the , of prestige for the for prestige of h PSI; the (London, second second fferent fferent ial ial CEU eTD Collection att nuovo partito point of reference because it appeared as the cente the as appeared it because reference of point Bologna) the communists daily statemen voiced their communists Bologna)the ue ubr f oa ise ( issues local of number huge figurative dialogue between intellectuals and socie and intellectuals between dialogue figurative society”. cultural its widening by tried, PCI the mass-party, moved toward communism for both political beliefs a beliefs political both for communism toward moved rul the break and society “innovating” at aimed who 40 39 38 the PCI’s imprint on cultural realm: realm: cultural on imprint PCI’s the a bten h Uie Sae ad h cmuit in communists the and States United the between War society. society. o sort a of grantor the be to themselves considered cultural network provided the party with this “mean this the partywith culturalnetwork provided trends (DC’s major review was the conservative conservative the was review major (DC’s trends foll not did communists) the of opponent major (the oth the on intellectuals, The politics. and society reputation a PCI the for construct artificially to comm and intellectuals kept which support mutual of communists, and he recalls Gramsci’s theory of the the of theory Gramsci’s Italy. in communism of development recalls he and communists, th writes author The 157. p. 2011), Press, Carolina 205-206. pp. Einaudi, M. fo be can conclusion similar A 129. p. Grundle, S. Ibidem

Furthermore, another crucial aspect of the communis the of aspect crucial another Furthermore, h mi ojcie f h clua ntok f h p the of network cultural the of objective main The . 38 The impressive network of newspapers and intellect and newspapers of network impressive The rjc, olat nee t fn a en t influ to means a find to needed Togliatti project, Paese-sera

L’Unità at the cultural confrontation was “a core challenge core “a was confrontation cultural the at of Rome, Rome, of und in Alessandro Brogi, Brogi, Alessandro in und , , Rinascita 27 27 tl ad France and Italy er hand, considered the PCI to be a political political a be to PCI the considered hand, er Famiglia Cristiana Famiglia clua hgmn” s pecniin o the for pre-condition a as hegemony” “cultural s h ol “rgesv” oc i Italian in force “progressive” only the as r of vivid intellectual life. Indeed, the DC the Indeed, life. intellectual vivid of r ty. In other words, in order to pursue the pursue to order in words, other In ty. s”. s”. ts to almost one million Italians. one million almost to ts influence, to enlarge its presence in in presence its enlarge to influence, unist party together: Togliatti intended intended Togliatti together: party unist msin f oenzto o Italian of modernization of mission f Milano-sera nd will to follow the fashion. the follow to will nd es of “traditionalism” spontaneously spontaneously “traditionalism” of es ow modern cultural and intellectual intellectual and cultural modern ow , , t cultural network is the relationship relationship the is network cultural t Nuovi Argomenti Nuovi ry a t tk avnae f the of advantage take to was arty (Chapel Hill, University of North North of University Hill, (Chapel ual reviews gives a sense of sense a gives reviews ual Confronting America. The Cold Cold The America. Confronting ne ulc pno: the opinion: public ence in Milan, Milan, in ), and those intellectuals intellectuals those and ), , , Vie Nuove Vie Progresso 40 39 ” for the for ” and a and They

in in CEU eTD Collection potential voters – whose ideological beliefs were, were, beliefs ideological whose – voters potential mea opinion” “public followers, its and PCI between osbe teeoe i ws seta t “exploit” to essential was it therefore, possible; oetal t al tla vtr, n t al those all to and voters, Italian all to potentially ideas. In this sphere, the PCI was in competition j InPCIsphere, ideas.was competition this thein attemp communist the to regard with Firstly, sense. eaae fo a ie pltcl gna ad rm a Italiancommunism. the legacy sustained of from and agenda, political given a from separated 42 41 had an “aristocraticview” hadan bugos fre: n hs ae te omnss in communists the political case, this and in forces: cultural “bourgeois” the of analysis the to comes [of their work] in a political sense. political a in work] their [of th of intellectuals the of work cultural the direct an organizational an became communication “Cultural wi connections their of and policies cultural PCI’s influence. into ideas the transform to “channel” a th of Commission Cultural the out: carried actually necess is it opinion), public (the“object” the and of thethe PC competitor sphere, Therefore,this in Gramsci” Foundation publication, no. 1, 31 1, no. publication, Foundation Gramsci” S. Grundle, p. 160. 160. p. Grundle, S. Vittoria, Albertina

As far as the political agenda is concerned, Toglia concerned, is agenda political the as far As However, the notion of “public opinion” can be unde be can opinion” “public of notion the However,

Secondly, the notion of “public opinion” can be und be can opinion” “public of notion the Secondly, After having identified the “means” of the communis the of “means” the identified having After La commissione culturale del PCI dal 1948 al 1956 al 1948 dal PCI del culturale commissione La 42 of culture, but he also needed to speak to anaudi to speak to needed also he culture, but of

41 st Therefore, the cultural policies cannot be theoret be cannot policies cultural the Therefore, year, January-March 1990, pp. 135-170), p. 154. p. 154. 135-170), pp. 1990, year,January-March 28 28 e party, and [intended to] use the outcomes outcomes the use to] [intended and party, e ary to clarify how the cultural policies were policies cultural the how clarify ary to ust with the PSI. with ust I was the DC itself. Iwasitself. the DC Vittoria provides a good definition of the the of definition good a provides Vittoria iies olwn te oiia debate. political the following citizens e PCI provided the cultural network with with network cultural the provided PCI e t to consolidate the ideological affiliation ideologicalaffiliation the consolidate to t to a given extent, already close to leftist leftist to close already extent, given a to h cnetos ih nelcul i a in intellectuals with connections the h h ata wr o te intellectuals: the of work actual the th tended to speak to a wider audience, audience, wider a to speak to tended ns the number of voters – as well as well as – voters of number the ns tti, as well as other high-party ranks, ranks, high-party other as well as tti, d coordination instrument intended to intended instrument coordination d erstood in a “wider” sense, when it it when sense, “wider” a in erstood t cultural network (the intellectuals) intellectuals) (the network cultural t ipts h PI nae with engaged PCI the disputes tog oa cnoain which connotation moral strong rstood in a “narrow” and a “wide” “wide” a and “narrow” a in rstood , “Studi Storici” (Rome, “Antonio “Antonio (Rome, Storici” “Studi , ence as wide as asencewide ically CEU eTD Collection ulc rdblt ws n seta pr o te com the of part essential an was credibility public political sense. political at-salsmn. s a gig o ru ltr i later argue to going am I As party-establishment. embody a moral alternative” moral a embody pretende Oscure Botteghe so, do to attempt to order main strategic achievement of the shift from the “o the from shift the of achievement strategic main voters, leftist with “followership” its consolidate controversial with equilibrium this deeplyaffected implications 46 45 44 43 Baldini&Castoldi, 1994), p. 70. 70. p. 1994), Baldini&Castoldi, strategy. As explained above, the strategic assumpt the strategic above, explained strategy.As dedication of the intellectuals to the communist ca communist the to intellectuals the of dedication 1982, pp. 598-615), p. 601. p. 598-615), pp. 1982, n h postwar”. the in applythe to tried PCI “the Rosa, Asor to according h itletas “utr a isrmn t suppor to instrument as “culture intellectuals: the attem to purpose the had 1955 January in Commission and the Hungarian uprising led to a crisis of crisis confi anduprising thea Hungarian led to for essential was it Therefore, society. capitalist alrea as – modernization a as well (as moralization Letizia Paolozzi, Alberto Leiss, Leiss, Alberto Paolozzi, Letizia Rosa, Asor Alberto 160. p. A. Vittoria, Ibidem eest ad hie te C’ rsos t te Hun the to response PCI’s the choice: and Necessity Moreover, as far as the moral connotation is concer is connotation moral the as far as Moreover,

h Hnain eouin a udrtnal a cruci a understandably was Revolution Hungarian The

. 43 Indeed, the replacement of Salinari with Alicata a Alicata with Salinari of replacement the Indeed, 45 Lo Stato democratico e i partiti politici partiti i e democratico Stato Lo hs tep ipid dlct eulbim betwee equilibrium delicate a implied attempt This 46 to the other political forces: the PCI as the only the as PCI the forces: political other the to

oi a qoiin: ’nt d Iga a Veltroni a Ingrao da L’Unità quotidiano: dal Voci 29 29 the PCI to keep this reputation unchanged, reputation this keep to PCI the dence in the moral mission of the party. of the party. mission dencethe moral in but also to catch new voters – this is the is this – voters new catch to also but consequences. consequences. use and authoritative subordination to the to subordination authoritative and use ions were based on a delicate equilibrium equilibrium delicate a were ions on based most ambitious project of cultural policy policy cultural projectof ambitious most ld” party-model to the to party-model ld” d to have assumed for itself “the task to task “the itself for assumed have to d te taey f h party”. the of strategy the t , “Letteratura Italiana” (Turin, Einaudi, vol. I, I, vol. Einaudi, (Turin, Italiana” “Letteratura , n this thesis, the Hungarian uprising uprising Hungarian the thesis, this n munist strategy: the PCI wanted to to wanted PCI the strategy: munist y icse) f h bugos and bourgeois the of discussed) dy pt at a further instrumentalization of instrumentalization further a at pt ned, the attempt to construct a wide a construct to attempt the ned, al “stress-factor” for the PCI’s PCI’s the for “stress-factor” al ain rss n is strategic its and crisis garian s leader of the Cultural the of leader s partito nuovo partito spontaneous n chance for a for chance 44 Indeed, (Milan, (Milan, . In . CEU eTD Collection oss dfne n cutratc. h oeal res overall The counter-attack. and defense boosts: b “strongholds” on a battleground, the defense of the of defense the battleground, a on “strongholds” harmfu the from possible, as many as or them of all f h pltcl taey the strategy political the of the Congress of December 1956. 1956. theCongressof December mixture of enforcement of the “strongholds” followe of enforcement mixture of theoretical discussion over the interpretation of t of interpretation the over discussion theoretical party-di the of application fierce the of consisted individual moral choice. moralchoice. individual party-disc the of acceptance the toward that other, pain a through road the side, one the on crossroad: Budapest unveiled the contradictions of the PCI. of the PCI. the contradictions Budapestunveiled or an “active” actor in facing the impact of the Hu the impact actorfacing orin an “active” historiographica abovementioned the to regards with from deviation a extent, any to it, was or strategy wi coped coherent a party response its was the strategically-speaking: how understanding for crucial is the internal dynamics of the party. party. ofthe internal dynamics the ideologi stronga and rules) democratic “bourgeois” e tween a number of of number a tween By “strongholds” hereby is meant the struggle for s for struggle the meant is hereby “strongholds” By The response of the Italian Communist Party was a c a was Party Communist Italian the of response The deci the of reconstruction the terms, analytical In h cmuit upres s el s h PI establi PCI the as well as supporters communist The s on s h Hnain piig rk ot te sh the out, broke uprising Hungarian the as soon As

realpolitik att nuovo partito atr (uh s h isrmna acpac o th of acceptance instrumental the as (such factors a itne t pru. hs enforcement This pursue. to intended was 30

he “ he that strategy? This question also is crucial is also question This strategy? that ngarian Revolution? ngarianRevolution? ipline and, the consequent removal of the of removal consequent the and, ipline

cal affiliation which founded and shaped and founded which affiliation cal implication of the communist political communist the of implication interessi permanenti interessi d up by a fierce ideological offensive. offensive. ideological a by up d fierce ponse might be defined as a balanced balanced a as defined be might ponse sion-making of the Italian communists communists Italian the of sion-making l controversy: was the PCI a “passive” “passive” a PCI the was controversy: l u eaiain f osine o the on conscience; of examination ful fatti d’Ungheria fatti cpie t sc a etn ta the that extent an such to scipline, ipc o te eouin js like just Revolution: the of impact l aving the aving omplex juxtaposition of ambivalent ambivalent of juxtaposition omplex shment found themselves at a a at themselves found shment cig mgs noig from incoming images ocking h h Hnain Revolution Hungarian the th interessi permanenti interessi ”

was a major issue at issue major a was was the foundation foundation the was , either , e CEU eTD Collection ötráá tér Köztarsáság Italian Socialist Party: Pietro Nenni deplored the deplored Nenni Pietro Party: ItalianSocialist which disseminated in the streets of the Hungarian Hungarian the streets of in whichthe disseminated fascist restoration. fascistrestoration. anti-co between equivalence fictional the stressing therefore, and, understand easily could communists PC the way this In Church). the of role threatening h lnae ih h Sve Uin n te rca i factors important two of apparatuswere preserved, crucial the and Union Soviet the with linkage the at basic least two shield to caughtthe opportunity to legitimization political provide to choosing By was the main weapon of the party: party: the of weapon main the was con any without deliberately, Oscure Botteghe which Moscow as a supreme guide and decision-maker in the and guide in decision-maker Moscowas a supreme demonstr to purpose the served also it addition, In apparatu party the of foundation ideological strong disciplin internal the of imposition the Therefore, USS the denying by “necessity”: of out taken stance its its calculatio strategic of terms in efficient most the utemr, h cmuit rs tid o nf two unify to tried press communist the Furthermore, Conversely, the PCI had to “tolerate” a loss just w just loss a “tolerate” to had PCI the Conversely, H

h epneo h C otie loa “active” an also contained PCI the of response The However, what was the strategic cost of these two m two these of cost strategic the was what However, interessi permanenti interessi o w e v e r,

hs nta dfnie prah per, o oe ex some to appears, approach defensive initial this eape f acs tro) n te itr o Min of picture the and terror) fascist of (example , in spite of the expected negative impact of the H the of impact negative expected the of spite in , L’Unità L’Unità tried to depict the uprising as a pro-fascist coup coup pro-fascist a as uprising the depict to tried 3 1 1 conduct of Togliatti’s party and interrupted interrupted and partyTogliatti’s of conduct n. The purpose of the PCI was to maintain maintain to was PCI the of purpose The n. interests from the devastation of the crisis: of thecrisis: from interests the devastation e had the purpose to keep untouched the untouched keep to purpose the had e capital the “white terror”. capitalthe “white terror”. political legitimization. legitimization. political the second Soviet intervention, the PCI PCI the intervention, Soviet second the s and to remove dissent from the ranks. the from dissent remove to and s mmunism as such and a vague idea of of idea vague a and such as mmunism ate the faith of the Italian comrades in in comrades Italian the of faith the ate I attempted to speak a language Italian language a speak to attempted I the attack was addressed to the DC by DC the to addressed was attack the R, the party would have denied itself. itself. denied have would party the R, ith regard to the connections with the with connections the to regard ith straint, chose to carry out. The press press The out. carry to chose straint, communist world. communist elgcl onain f h party the of foundation deological element: the ideological offensive, offensive, ideological the element: oves? This response was probably probably was response This oves? images: the bodies hanged in in hanged bodies the images: et a a unavoidable an as tent, dszenty (image of the the of (image dszenty ungarian events. events. ungarian CEU eTD Collection en, e aae t peev te dooia found ideological the preserve to managed he Nenni, program as a sign of realism, but he also stresses stresses also he but realism, of sign a as program shaped the political actions of the the of actions political the shaped enhance the ideology-centered party discipline. partydiscipline. enhancethe ideology-centered thethepopular party. baseof of importance the to due all, at option an not was onw 1945 from Party Communist Italian reshaped that lead have would this because simply USSR, the with l was crisis Hungarian the of context the in making popularones. forc bourgeois-conservative the of primacy the from t democracy, real toward move Italy’s drive to able on claims; constitutional and social given advocate effi more be to pretended Oscure Botteghe hand, one i DC the with comparison in choice better a was PCI pers to was purpose The credibility. public solid a the negotiations for the reunification of the Left. of for the the reunification thenegotiations 47 Labor Party, but it does not work that well with re with well that work not does it but Party, Labor sui be might understanding This society. capitalist Donald Sassoon, pp. 197-198. The author describes describes author The 197-198. pp. Sassoon, Donald The PCI reacted to the Hungarian Revolution by defe by Revolution Hungarian the to reacted PCI The Conclusion Indeed, in order to expand the influence of his new his of influence the expand to order in Indeed, The analysis of the strategic dilemma of the PCI su PCI the of dilemma strategic the of analysis The

47

partito nuovo partito the persisting role of the left as defender of the of defender as left the of role persisting the gard to the PCI. Indeed, Italian communists did not did communists Italian Indeed, PCI. the to gard table to define the political role and program of t of program and role political the define to table the attitude of the European left to innovate its po its innovate to left European the of attitude the 3 2 2 . Although Togliatti tolerated the break with with break the tolerated Togliatti Although .

uade as many Italians as possible that the that possible as Italians many as uade the other hand, the party pretended to be be to pretended party the hand, other the ogical: Botteghe Oscure could not break break not could Oscure Botteghe ogical: ideology for both the establishment and establishment the both for ideology o be achieved through the political shift shift political the through achieved be o n both political and moral terms: on the on terms: moral and political both n to a general criticism of the guidelines guidelines the of criticism general a to -party model, Togliatti had to build up build to had Togliatti model, -party cient than the Christian-democrats to to Christian-democrats the than cient ards. However, such a political break political a such However, ards. s o h dmnne f h social- the of dominance the to es ggests that the communist decision- communist the that ggests tos f the of ations nding the nding interessi permanenti interessi att nuovo partito values of pre- of values he British British he and to to and consider consider litical litical that that CEU eTD Collection in the context of a Catholic society with strong ca withstrong society Catholic a of inthecontext 49 48 PC the Conversely, one. modern a as society Italian salsmn (ih ut fw f eeat exceptio relevant “slanderous” of few a just (with establishment wh exactly side, Soviet the on was morality choice: accepting the enormity of the events”. enormityacceptingof the Argent as tradition: political their of implication revolution”. revolution”. F. Argentieri, p. 57. 57. p. Argentieri, F. Argentieri’s in concept main the actually is This

The

r e e w s o xmnto o cncec bcue hr ws n was there because conscience of examination no as 48 version on the Hungarian uprising because it appea it because uprising Hungarian the on version 49

pitalist foundations – particularly in the North. North. the in particularly – foundations pitalist

I considered itself to be a political agent of mode of agent political a be to itself considered I book: book: 33

a iouin calunniata rivoluzione la ieri puts it, “the lie was necessary for for necessary was lie “the it, puts ieri ere it had always been. The party party The been. always had it ere s ad t vtr acpe the accepted voters its and ns) red as the most natural most the as red o doubt on the moral moral the on doubt o means “the slandered slandered “the means rnization rnization

CEU eTD Collection p. 1. The two pieces stressed the following notions following the stressed pieces two The 1. p. the democratization process” and “path toward the e the toward “path and process” thedemocratization 23 had encircled Warsaw during the previous days. hadWarsawencircled the previous during still was Kremlin the before, hours few just that, Franco Fabiani, Fabiani, Franco

3 2 1 uprising against the regime. On the first page of t of page first the On regime. the against uprising solution of the Polish crisis on October 23 October on crisis Polish the of solution oin: h eiiain f oils truh refor Hungar ain reactionary toward attempt degeneration through socialism of edification the notions: counterrevolution dangerous a of risk the stressed eae aot hs n fuh fr this”. for fought and this about debated social of construction the prospective: a and issue lega the for issues problematic of number a implied circum the changeable to respond andto efficiently party the leadership, the of guidance the to thanks Adriana Castellani, Castellani, Adriana HenryKissinger, Ingrao, Pietro rd eetees te oiin ae b te rs organ press the by taken position the Nevertheless, Nevertheless, Botteghe Oscure had no time for a sig a for time no Oscurehad Botteghe Nevertheless, “It is worth reminding the Italian bourgeois press press bourgeois Italian the reminding worth is “It otge sue eevd h nw fo Bdps wit Budapest from news the received Oscure Botteghe , the demonstration of solidarity with Poland takin Poland with solidarity of the demonstration , Gli avvenimenti polacchi avvenimenti Gli Oggi Cyriankiewicz e Gomulka parlaranno al popolo p popolo al parlaranno Gomulka e Cyriankiewicz Oggi Diplomacy O Stressfactors on the PCI and the first countermea the first and the PCI on Stressfactors cnr nle i d Bdps pooai a rpi a gruppi da provocati Budapest di vie nelle Scontri CTOBER CTOBER (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 554556. p. 1994), Schuster, and Simon (NewYork, 24

TH

– , “L’Unità”, October 23 “L’Unità”, , October

O CTOBER CTOBER Second chapter Secondchapter 1 dification of socialism” respectively. respectively. socialism” of dification rd respectively: “counterrevolutionary attempt at di at attempt “counterrevolutionary respectively: hs way This . The Italian communist press did not mention not did press communist Italian The . 34 34

28 2

TH he October 24 October he ism, its methods and time. Polish workers Polish time. and methods its ism, wondering whether to use the tanks that that tanks the use to whether wondering stances of the crisis. stancesof the crisis. : was able to rapidly “digest” the shock, shock, the “digest” rapidly to able was in the socialist bloc by contrasting two two contrasting by bloc socialist the in cy of communism in Italy. The outbreak outbreak The Italy. in communism of cy SHOCK AND DEFENSE AND SHOCK y. rd g place in Budapest had turned into an an into hadturned Budapest in g place 3 , 1956, p. 1.p. 1956, , that the Polish events have a central central a have events Polish the that h of relief: by the evening of October October of evening the by relief: of h s n oad ad h rs o a of risk the and Poland, in ms

L’Unità f h Iain omns Party Communist Italian the of olacco h an initial astonishment but, but, astonishment initial an h mt d controrivoluzionari di rmati th ecmd h diplomatic the welcomed issue, the communist press communist the issue, , “L’Unità”, October 23 October “L’Unità”, , sures

rd storting storting , 1956, , , and and , CEU eTD Collection beneficial” (p. 9). 9). (p. beneficial” 1950 (edts.), Merli Stefano and Masini Carlo Pier negotiati in involved were Labor) of Union (Italian trying to construct for the PCI forand the CGIL. tryingthe construct to alli political of system the endanger might Hungary over “s the socalled domination facethe Soviet of o foundations ideological the in leak a opened also news the of impact the Furthermore, establishment. followe communist between faultline dangerous a of by and, opinion public the of eyes the in apparent contradiction the since attack under be to happened te ocle “ socalled (the il ou o te su o te ulc rdblt o credibility public the of issue the on focus will the changed partlyto appeared Hungariandue crisis epne codnl. n diin fo Otbr 29 October from addition, In accordingly. response astonishme of state initial an by characterized was the strategy described. adjust to previously mul of emergence the to led crisis Hungarian the of 4

described before. described before. th in interpreted be to need management” “crisis of Th uprising. the of phase first the in implications While the PCI was negotiating an alliance with the with alliance an negotiating was PCI the While In order to explain the PCI’s decisionmaking proce decisionmaking PCI’s the explain to order In The purpose of this chapter is to explain the strat the explain to is chapter this of purpose The eody te omns apaeet oad h Sovi the toward appeasement communist the Secondly, The timespan under examination in this chapter is is chapter this in examination under timespan The Indeed, the Hungarian Revolution had an impact on a on impact an had Revolution Hungarian the Indeed, Mln Flrnli 19) p x. h atos arg authors The xx. p. 1990), Feltrinelli, (Milan, nees permanenti interessi

) Frty te ulc rdblt o the of credibility public the Firstly, ”). Il socialismo al bivio. L’archivio di Giuseppe Fara Giuseppe di L’archivio bivio. al socialismo Il ons for a potential reunification after the split o split the after reunification potential a for ons PSI, Di Vittorio’s CGIL and the socialist trade un trade socialist the and CGIL Vittorio’s Di PSI, 4 35 35

ue that the break of 1948 was “unavoidable and and “unavoidable was 1948 of break the that ue e definition of the initial attempts at a sort a at attempts initial the of definition e atellites”. atellites”. implication, might lead to the emergence the to lead might implication, e general frame of the political strategies political the of frame general e changeable position of the USSR itself. itself. of the USSR changeable position f the PCI’s legacy, by exposing the real real the exposing by legacy, PCI’s the f egic choices of the PCI, and its political its and PCI, the of choices egic tiple stressfactors that forced the party party the forced that stressfactors tiple nt which shaped the PCI’s very first first very PCI’s the shaped which nt the f October 24 October s of Togliatti’s party might become become might party Togliatti’s of s incoming from Hungary might have have might Hungary from incoming ne olat ad i itro were Vittorio Di and Togliatti ance ss in this phase of the crisis, firstly, I firstly, crisis, the of phase this in ss rs (the popular base) and the party party the and base) popular (the rs th ll the strategic interests of the party the of interests strategic the ll te C’ attd twr the toward attitude PCI’s the , att nuovo partito t iiay nevnin in intervention military et th – October 28 October – by stressing the the stressing by att nuovo partito th because it becauseit velli, 1945 velli, f 1948. See 1948. f ion UIL UIL ion

CEU eTD Collection atoe. et I il drs te su o the of issue the address will I Next, partymodel. L’Unità of which the newspaper was an important component” important an was newspaper the which of counterrevolutionary coup: “what really mattered w mattered really “what coup: counterrevolutionary important means to defend the defend to means important atfrom cr any protected attempt ideology be had to Therefore, society. bourgeois and Catholic Italian m both of force a as followers its by perceived was t In upheaval. Poznań the of trauma the and speech, P the of legacy the endanger would which communists credibility of the p the public crucialmaintain to stigmatizatio the criticism: expected from creature roa viable one just had PCI the Budapest, in crisis in political effective an with massparty a PCI the

(Italian PSDI Social PCI,and Nenni’sSaragat’s PSI the in transformations to attention particular with inte means a as reports press the of role important 5 n e boneve wt te omns lae Pie leader communist the with bookinterview her in 1994), p. 20. 20. p. 1994), L. Paolozzi and Alberto Leiss, Leiss, Alberto and Paolozzi L. As the news coming from Hungary reached Botteghe Os Botteghe reached Hungary from coming news the As hs nta apoc t te rss ie a defusi at aimed crisis the to approach initial This The The “mudmachine”: The partito nuovo partito . . was an essential component of Togliatti’s strategy Togliatti’s of component essential an was L’Unità Voci dal quotidiano. L’Unità da Ingrao a Veltroni a Ingrao da L’Unità quotidiano. dal Voci

partito nuovo partito and the defense of the the defense and of 36 36 by constructing the legacy of the theory of the of theory the of legacy the constructing by arty. arty. Italian Left, which included, beyond the beyond included, which Left, Italian n of the riot against a socialist power was was power socialist a against riot the of n iticism. iticism. d, in order to defend Togliatti’s political political Togliatti’s defend to order in d, nded to defend the legacy of Togliatti’s Togliatti’s of legacy the defend to nded he peculiar context of mid50’s, the PCI PCI the mid50’s, of context peculiar he political cost of the stance on Hungary Hungary on stance the of cost political Democratic Party). DemocraticParty). fluence. By the very beginning of the the of beginning very the By fluence. hs oa eeet n h communist the in element moral this as to protect the protect to as driain n mrlzto o the of moralization and odernization 5 r Iga, ak hn hedtr of chiefeditor then back Ingrao, tro , the historian Letizia Paolozzi wrote Paolozzi Letizia historian the , partito nuovo nuovo partito CI after the trauma of the “secret” “secret” the of trauma the after CI g h poaadtak n the on propagandaattack the ng cure, cure, L’Unità (Milan, Baldini&Castoldi, Baldini&Castoldi, (Milan, partito nuovo partito intended to make of of make to intended became the most most the became project CEU eTD Collection ponderously asponderouslyreluctantly accepted. oiia rnfrain f15 i oada wel as Poland (in 1956 of transformations political Peopl Hungarian the of spirit democratic blossoming Nevertheless, he never admitted the crimes of Stali of thecrimes admitted henever Nevertheless, plenum”. The author referred to the first meeting o meeting tothefirst referred author The plenum”. situational prudence: the exposure of the alleged r alleged of the exposure the prudence: situational fro incoming news confusing of mist the in crucial,

9 8 7 6 of the speech happened to be known in the West, Tog West, review the in known be to happened speech the of v “soft” of sort a release to tried Oscure Botteghe per oeet ih h ciae f h DeStaliniz the of climate the with coherent appear th of an interpretation construct to haveattempted bef day the demonstration the staged which movement enemy of both socialist Hungary and the USSR. USSR. Hungary enemysocialist and of the both reactionar a been have must it Logically, movement. coul uprising the basis, this On “democratic”. also Budapes in demonstrations syllogism: the distortive renewing itself by removing the “mistakes” of the r the of “mistakes” the removing by itself renewing de toward path the on improvement an as interpreted – – Togl Significantly, one. communist a was overthrown not could uprising the circumstances, political and con political the of view distorted and onesided a F. Fabiani, p. 1: “there is a sense of satisfactio of sense a is “there 1: p. Fabiani, F. given had PCI the 1956, July to 1956 February From 24 October. A. Castellani, Ibidem L’Unità Nevertheless, in the eyes of the Romebased communi Romebased the of eyes the in Nevertheless, In this sense, the popular movement was considered considered was movement popular the sense, this In This interpretative pattern, in which the PCI’s pos PCI’s the which in pattern, interpretative This uv Argomenti Nuovi . ttd nee t b dsoitd rm h “patrio the from dissociated be to needed stated) h itrrtd h sec a a in f eea of renewal of sign a as speech the interpreted he : th , 1956, p. 1. p. 1956, ,

8

n because the masses demonstrated for what is now n now is what for demonstrated masses the because n ersion of the criticism toward Stalin. As soon as t as soon As Stalin. toward criticism the of ersion f the new Plenum of the Polish communist party. party. communist Polish the Plenumof new fthe n. Indeed, communist press spoke about “mistakes” o “mistakes” about spoke press communist Indeed, n. 37 37 several interpretations of the “secret” speech. Fi speech. “secret” the of interpretations several liatti had to accept an interview with the communis the with interview an accept to had liatti e troubles in the socialist bloc which could could which bloc socialist the ein troubles eactionary coup (“planned long time ago” time long (“planned coup eactionary be justified, because the authority to be to authority the because justified, be text: regardless of the peculiar historical historical peculiar the of regardless text: ecent past. ecent t had to be “socialist” first, in order in be to first, behad “socialist” to t y coup, possibly inspired by an external external an by inspired ypossibly coup, l as in Hungary) had necessarily to be to necessarily had Hungary) in as l ition was rooted, seems to be based on based be to seems rooted, was ition d not originate from the democratic democratic the from originate not d ortc oils: h rgm was regime the socialism: mocratic Hnay t eecs a ot of sort a exercise to Hungary, m ore. On this basis, the party might might party the basis, this On ore. to be the genuine expression of the the of expression genuine the be to ’ Rpbi. y mlcto, the implication, By Republic. e’s at hmef rvdd hs very this provided himself iatti to Bteh Ocr hd as had Oscure Botteghe ation st establishment, it seemed to be to seemed it establishment, st 9 This interpretation implied a implied interpretation This i ad socialist” and tic the pure socialist spirit. spirit. socialist pure the he content content he ew in this this in ew 7 mass nly. nly. rstly, rstly, 6 t t

CEU eTD Collection the insurgents “preventing Nagy from making a “preventing from theinsurgents speec making Nagy counterrevo a as uprising the of view the endorsed organizational one. organizational pressorgantherefore its unprepared; establishment 24. 24. Ferri “Carte fond, Togliatti” “Palmiro Foundation, anyor later”. fromat the beginning time outcome the be to it consider to right the have we boundarie legal the beyond goes country, capitalist noncapitalist in all at admissible not is movement “th correspondence: political his interpretationin 12 11 10 KGB, and the general Mikhail S. Malinin, in order t order in Malinin, S. Mikhail general the and KGB, issued on on issued contribu other by replaced were pieces Castellani’s

Hungary. Although Hungary. opera few a only had newspapers, Italian other like aside the contributions of their established corres their established of asidethe contributions did why following: the is Italy, in decisionmaking help might which problem, interpretative The riot. Eu Central other in edited were reports the of most Anastas Mikoyan and Mikhail Suslov were sent to Bu to sent were Suslov Mikhail and Mikoyan Anastas 24 October A. Castellani, Oct Rome, Spriano, Paolo to Togliatti P. by Letter n at te is polmtc su, t h vr b very the at issue, problematic first the fact, In From the organizational viewpoint, as early as Octo as early as viewpoint, organizational the From oee, h sde otra o te rss n Budap in crisis the of outbreak sudden the However, nta, rm coe 25 October from Instead, n coe 24 October On L’Unità n coe 25 October on th L’Unità , , L’Unità th , 1956, p. 1. p. 1956, , had officially one contributor in Budapest, Adrian Budapest, in contributor one officially had th

eesd ln atce y din Cseln, who Castellani, Adriana by article long a released nad, h ognzto o te rs hd changed had press the of organization the onwards, th n the and 10

Amedesi” serie, subserie no. 4 “1956”, archival un archival “1956”, 4 no. subserie serie, Amedesi” o provide assistance to the Hungarian government in government Hungarian the to assistance provide o 38 38 communiqué dapest on October 24 October on dapest br 31 ober pondent in Hungary? in pondent e use of armed violence and of an insurgent and useviolence of armed e did not show a clear line of action. show a of not action. line clear did countries. [...] If massprotest, in a non a in massprotest, If [...] countries. s and becomes an insurrectional attempt, attempt, insurrectional an becomes and s ropean cities, far from the hotspot of the the of hotspot the from far cities, ropean tions. The analysis of the leadingarticle leadingarticle the of analysis The tions. of the contribution of the enemy, either either enemy, the of contribution the of lution: she pretended to have witnessed witnessed have to pretended she lution: h Rmae eios rfr o set to prefer editors Romebased the h” st to cast new light on the communist communist the on light new cast to , 1956, Archive of the “Antonio Gramsci” Gramsci” “Antonio the of Archive 1956, , ber 24 ber ting correspondents permanently in in permanently correspondents ting 11 gnig f h ursn, a the was uprising, the of eginning the night before. the night before. est actually found the communist communist the found actually est y ulv n Mikoyan and Suslov by th , the Italian communist press, communist Italian the , th th with Ivan A. Serov, head of the the of head Serov, A. withIvan a Castellani, Castellani, a 12 o the to , since since , fully it no. it the the CEU eTD Collection rcs ifrain n h vr frt or o the of hours first very the in information precise pr institutional an keep to tried PCI the position, emnn crepnet f h cmuit press. communist the of correspondent permanent position to becentra carefully to the “supervised” by position oiin ad epy nlecd h Sve decision Soviet the influenced deeply and position, oebr 1956 November “delegates” contributed to give Moscow, and the com the and Moscow, give to contributed “delegates” tegh, ioaulv eot Otbr 24 October report, st the MikoyanSuslov exaggerating strength”, are well, as comrades other the http://www.voglioscendere.go.ilcannocchiale.it.ilca press during the communist referencepointfor the and Mikoyan. of Suslov statements on stay to chose initially Italy in press communist i that similarities of extent an such shows Kremlin 14 13 dai send to used They power. the regain to attempts the riot was less dangerous than what they had expe had they what than dangerous less was riot the clearly appears on the issues of the newspaper. newspaper. theof theissues on appears clearly h eprec o te sce sec” f eray 1 February of speech” “secret the of experience the icpie priual i te icmtne o Oc of circumstances the in particularly discipline: applie Oscure Botteghe consequences). controversial the on done had PCI the (which release to not what individu an make to “attempt” not did establishment oils bo t Iay a Pau, hr te journ the where Prague, was Italy to bloc socialist fo center Another Vienna. was newssupply ofcenter ore o nw wr cniee te ny ns o be to ind ignore ones temporarily to tried newspaper communist only the considered were news of sources Foreign Affairs, Johanna Granville, trans. trans. Granville, Johanna Affairs, Foreign International Scholars, Washington D. C., Spring 19 Spring C., D. Washington Scholars, International h srcue f h pes raiain a b inf be can organization press the of structure The Travaglio, Marco Therefore, organizational issues concerning the pre the concerning issues organizational Therefore, lo osdrn ta te al omncto wt B with communication mail the that considering Also , Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Bulletin, Project History International War Cold , otnli n Ungheria in Montanelli oit ouet o te ugra Rvlto, 4 Oc 24 Revolution, Hungarian the on documents Soviet th 15, eerm rm uaet o h Sve Minist Soviet the to Budapest from telegram 1956, , nnocchiale.it/2007/10/04/montanelli_in_ungheria.htm 95), p. 29 . 29 p. 95), ly reports to Moscow that shaped the Kremlin’s offi Kremlin’s the shaped that Moscow to reports ly cted: “We have the impression that Gerő especially, Gerő that impression the have “We cted: 39 39 egh f h opnn ad neetmtn ter ow their underestimating and opponent the of rength re fo te rvnec o te otiuin whi contributions the of provenience the from erred munist parties all around the world, the impression the world, the around all parties munist mkn poes Te is rpr b te w Soviet two the by report first The process. making “l anchae, coe 7 October Cannocchiale”, “Il , ofile, especially due to the effective lack of lack effective the to due especially ofile, l editing l board. days of the crisis. daysthe crisis. of the safe side, and just “translated” the the “translated” just and side, safe the 14 piig I ti sne te communist the sense, this In uprising. oe 23 tober r the transmission of the news from the the from news the of transmission the r ividual contributors who were not in a a in not were who contributors ividual i n eagrto t sae ht the that state to exaggeration no is t ned Vneit bcm a stable a became Vangelista Indeed, ss can be interpreted as an outcome of outcome an as interpreted be can ss ls Ofo aglsa prtd s a as operated Vangelista Orfeo alist al assessment on what to release and and release to what on assessment al rbe o te sce” peh with speech “secret” the of problem 5: y ul acpig h Soviet the accepting fully by 956: te rnil o te socialist the of principle the d udapest was delayed, the main main the delayed, was udapest no. 5 (Woodrow Wilson Center for for Center Wilson (Woodrow 5 no. ul rlal. hrfr, the Therefore, reliable. fully rd Otbr 24 October – 13

th te Soviet the , th oe – 4 – tober 2007, , l. l. y of ry that that but but cial cial ch ch n n

CEU eTD Collection u te wr atal cniee t b a effectiv an be to considered actually were they but written on October 27 October on written wrote: “this is just another criminal attempt at ar at attempt criminal another just is “this wrote:

19 18 17 16 15

improvement. defeat ideological an as presented not were events People’sRepublic. t objective the fulfilled already had troops Soviet counterrevolutionar a prepared long had insurgents on the Hungarian events of Polish newspaper ofPolish eventsthe Hungarian on informing by particular in Warsaw, from events the poiin o h cie o Sai ad áoi s we 27 October Vangelistawrote on is Rákosi and Stalin of crimes the to opposition break and regime the safeguard to mission the with revolution alla round the world. This [attempt] act [attempt] This world. the round alla revolution removal of the mistakes of the Stalinist era. ofthe Stalinist removal of the mistakes accession Nagy’s considered Oscure Botteghe Indeed, omns Pry te iwon of viewpoint the Party: Communist su for weight political significant very a acquired virtuous correction of the mistakes taking in mistakes place of correction the virtuous the of degeneration dangerous the between distance democratization of regime, and of removal of the mi the of removal of and regime, of democratization O. Vangelista, Vangelista, O. Ingrao, P. 1 p. 1956, 25th, October “L’Unità”, Vangelista, O. 197. p. A. Brogi, Vangelista, Orfeo Nevertheless, Nevertheless, neetnl eog,te tla omns at s Party Communist Italian the enough, Interestingly iial, h orait Sri Sge n Fbo F Fabio and Segre Sergio journalists the Similarly, However, on October 25 October on However, Da una parte della barricata a difesa del socialism del difesa a barricata della parte una Da 18 Chi sono i membri del nuovo governo? nuovo del membri i sono Chi Therefore, Imre Nagy was initially depicted as a p a as depicted initially was Nagy Imre Therefore, Gli avvenimenti Gli L’Unità th 15 , but it was released just one day later. later. day one just released was it but ,

ecmd h apitet f me ay s rm Min Prime as Nagy Imre of appointment the welcomed th , the communist followers learnt from learnt followers communist the ,

, “L’Unità”, October 25 October “L’Unità”, , th . 19

rbn Ludu Trybuna resting with coercion and force the path toward the toward path the force and coercion with resting ually took place while Hungary was witnessing a pro a witnessing was Hungary while place took ually 17 stakes of the past”. thepast”. of stakes . 40 40

Trybuna Ludu Trybuna , “L’Unità”, October 28 October “L’Unità”, , Poland with the Soviet blessing. the Soviet with Poland th o repress the attempt at overthrowing the overthrowing at attempt the repress o , 1956, p. 1.p. 1956, , prig h itrrtto o te Italian the of interpretation the pporting of the socialist international movement, movement, international socialist the of reactionary attempts in Hungary and the and Hungary in attempts reactionary the Italian public about the viewpoints the about public Italian the served the purpose of stressing the the stressing of purpose the served o to be a step forward in the process ofprocess the in forward step a be to cu. u te nevnin f the of intervention the But coup. y , “L’Unità”, October 25 October “L’Unità”, , bai olwd h dvlpet of development the followed abiani till showed a certain optimism: the optimism: certain a showed till lkon l aon te country”, the around all llknown with the Stalinist past: “his brave brave “his past: Stalinist the with . The Polish perspective, The . Polish indeed, e opportunity for a further further a for opportunity e th L’Unità , 1956, p. 1. The article was article The 1. p. 1956, , ositive figure, the man man the figure, ositive th , 1956, p. 1. Ingrao Ingrao 1. p. 1956, , that a group of of group a that socialist socialist ister. cess of of cess 16

CEU eTD Collection provide good examples of this strategy, which the h the which strategy, this of examples good provide Within the CC there a sort of “contrast” between ha between “contrast” of sort a there CC the Within Presidium CC CPSU the within debate the of minutes 31 macchinadel fango

21 20 atmt t rsoain. h aayi o te iss the of analysis The restoration”. a at “attempt interpretat PCI’s the in other the to one connected members could not tolerate the abolition of theone of abolition the tolerate not could members York, CEU Press, 2002), pp. 262299, documents no. no. documents 262299, pp. 2002), Press, CEU York, million one and all at land no had peasants million possessio in were landowners of few a While Hitler. Hort “Here’s stated: he wherein restore?”), to want what limits. whatlimits. ac be could consolidation a at attempts the whether a to hnebe eoe coe 30 October before changeable too was interpretation, this to alternative no had PCI the o be al t d bfr te piig B October By uprising. the before do to able been not p to leaders two these of accession The leadership. the of consolidation a at attempting were Soviets unstable to foresee to unstable the events. situation political the on assessment final a give osldto o Ng’ laesi. y coe 31 October By leadership. Nagy’s of consolidation military stronger a for pushed hardliners the while see himself Khrushchev groups. these around divided Affairs) Foreign the of (Minister Shepilov faction, t task the of charge in marshal (the Voroshilov and A. Guerra, p. 192. p. A. Guerra, Byrne, M. Rainer, J. Békés, C. st OnOctober 25 n re t flil hs betv te rs hd to had press the objective this fulfill to order In This position might seem ambiguous, especially if c if especially ambiguous, might seem position This In this context, context, this In ). The reconstruction of the Soviet decisionmaking Soviet the of reconstruction The ). th L’Unità , Pietro Ingrao Pietro , wrote piece his ” (“the mudmachine”). mudmachine”). ”(“the had to consider the insurgents to be the enemy, an enemy, the be to insurgents the consider to had The 1956 Hungarian Revolution. A history in documen in history A Revolution. Hungarian 1956 The

20 Indeed, radical stances might be still risky back Indeed, back risky might bestill stances radical th intervention, the moderates preferred to wait for for wait to preferred moderates the intervention, party system decided by Nagy on October 30 October on Nagy by decided system party I te eid ne eaiain ide, the indeed, examination, under period the In . o help Rákosi in the period 19451947), and a “mode a and 19451947), period the in Rákosi help o rdliners, particularly Zhukov (the Minister of the the of Minister (the Zhukov particularly rdliners, n Mlno. l te te mmes f h C were CC the of members other the All Malenkov. and st 41 41 te oeae ls spot eas ms o te CC the of most because support lost moderates the , 40 (session of October 30 October of (session 40 med to be quite unsure about how to solve the crisi the solve to how about unsure quite be to med process is possible thanks to the “Malin’s notes”, “Malin’s the to thanks possible is process during the sessions concerning the Hungarian crisis Hungarian the concerning sessions the during Cosa vogliono restaurare vogliono Cosa because the position of the Kremlin itself Kremlin the of position the because as a whole. Indeed, the situation was too was situation the Indeed, whole. a as HWP’s power under Nagy’s and Kádár’s Kádár’s and Nagy’s under power HWP’s e of ues ower was a concession that Moscow had Moscow that concession a was ower and half did not have enough land. […] […] land. enough have not did half and istorian Alessandro Frigerio named “ named Frigerio Alessandro istorian o: h “ugra taey ad the and tragedy” “Hungarian the ion: tually carried out by Nagy, and with with and Nagy, by out carried tually n of the 43% of the whole land, two two land, whole the of 43% the of n onsidered in retrospect. Nevertheless, Nevertheless, retrospect. in onsidered hy’s Hungary, Hungary allied with with allied Hungary Hungary, hy’s 25 overstress two concept, logically logically concept, two overstress L’Unità th , the main point at stake was was stake at point main the , f coe 25 October of th ) and 49 (session of October October of (session 49 and ) ts ? (“What they do ? (Budapest and New New and (Budapest d it could not not could it d then. th . . th n 28 and a political political a Defense) Defense) 21

rate” rate” the la s: s: th . .

CEU eTD Collection ouain ee culy itm (infcnl, th (significantly, victims actually were population toward painful, road,socialism seeksthe least its i country the kept landowners fascist of regime The 24 23 22 28 Pajetta mentioned the Algerian case as anexample). the Algerian mentioned as Pajetta case reactionary with movement communist the encircling from a dangerous fascist outburst. outburst. froma fascist dangerous interventi its with Army, Red the Union: Soviet the the affects view this implication, By coup. fascist event Hungarian The view). communist the in agents, epnil fr h sfeig f ugr. Therefore Hungary. of suffering the for responsible tar enemies the were fighters the only the implication, enjoyed still – wrote Ingrao what to according do knock to attempting were They restore. to trying t of followers fascists, as insurgents the depicted revolution” was repeatedly compared to the military the to compared wasrepeatedly revolution” As world. the around all aggression theimperialist fron national the of forces the and troops colonial le also but the People’s Republi in maintainingthe legal order justified, morally just not was Hungary imperialis alleged against intervention the of cost to need not did communists implications: important In late October 1956, 1956, October late In Pajetta, G. Ingrao, P. th Further features of this interpretation appeared in appeared interpretation this of features Further This quotation is quite relevant for the purpose of purpose the for relevant quite is quotation This Therefore, the socialist movement was considered to considered was movement socialist the Therefore, ), a very influential partymember: the text the partymember: influential very a ), Cosa vogliono restaurare? vogliono Cosa La tragedia dell’Ungheria tragedia La L’Unità iey oee te ofit aig lc i Algeri in place taking conflict the covered widely

, “L’Unità”, October 25 October “L’Unità”, , , “L’Unità”, October 28 October “L’Unità”, , t. The PCI interpreted the Algerian crisis as a cle a as crisis Algerian the interpreted PCI The t. the uprising broke out in Budapest, the Hungarian Hungarian the Budapest, in out broke uprising the oppression of France in Algeria. Algeria. in France of oppression 42 42 23 ”. gives the reader a sense that an attempt at attempt an that sense a reader the gives he old, backward regime, which they were they which regime, backward old, he understanding of the international role of of role international the of understanding 22 c. ; h itreto o Sve top in troops Soviet of intervention the m; n ignorance. […] The Hungarian people people Hungarian The […] ignorance. n 24 on, was actually trying to save Hungary Hungary save to trying actually was on, the piece by Giancarlo Pajetta (October Pajetta Giancarlo by piece the

th th geted by by geted e fascist insurgents were imperialist imperialist were insurgents fascist e

, 1956, p. 1. p. 1956, , wn the People’s Democracy, which – – which Democracy, People’s the wn the analysis presented hereby: Ingrao Ingrao hereby: presented analysis the , 1956, p. 1. p. 1956, , te onr a sc ad t “civil” its and such as country the , bear the moral burden of the human human the of burden moral the bear forces was taking place (remarkably, (remarkably, place taking was forces be under attack. This view had two two had view This attack. under be support of Hungarian people. By By people. Hungarian of support s were a “tragedy” caused by the the by caused “tragedy” a were s al cret sne t ie at aimed it since correct, gally L’Unità bcue hy were they because , a between the French French the between a ar signal of of signal ar “counter CEU eTD Collection en eotd y ispe of, n Gacro Paje Giancarlo and Boffa, Giuseppe by reported been ewe oe edn atce f omn ad number a and comment of article leading one between oua avnuim s h rsl o a og subvers long a of result the is adventurism popular n coe 28 October on similarities between the statements of the Italian the of statements the between similarities

26 25 Kr contactthe with wasconstant Botteghein Oscure fle had HWP the of Secretary First former the since a group of insurgents!”. of group a dell’Ungheria Soviet viewpoint from Botteghe Oscure, but it also also organization. of coordination the press it but Oscure, Botteghe from viewpoint Soviet time. same very the at events the of interpretation So the of Committee Central Moscowbased the words, ae s h ise n coe 28 October on issue the is case pa and tragedy of sense give to was objective whose the “Hungarian led to at restoration which attempt on the on reforms, certain through socialism toward betw contrast clear a often very find could readers i the of pages first the drafting in rule certain a nedd o vrho te eortc re ad o r to and order democratic the overthrow to intended edi – events” Hungarian the on assessment “Pravda’s Flashnews: “ Flashnews: Boffa, G. As far as this article by Pajetta is concerned, onc concerned, is Pajetta by article this as far As n diin te is pgs ee iuly structur visually were pages first the addition, In In order to strengthen this interpretation with a s a with interpretation this strengthen to order In Un giudizio della Pravda sugli avvenimenti in Unghe in avvenimenti sugli Pravda della giudizio Un Ernő Gerő fucilato da un gruppo di insorti! di gruppo un da fucilato Gerő Ernő ) was accompanied by a flashnews edited in Vienna: in edited flashnews a by accompanied was ) th , , L’Unità 26 The news was clearly fake, and fake, clearly was news The eotd wt n snl ln o ciiim o dis nor criticism of line single no with reported,

th te bvmnind ril b Pjta ( Pajetta by article abovementioned the : 43 43 ”, “L’Unità”, October 28 October ”, “L’Unità”, se o te as ne eaiain the examination: under days the of ssues communists and those of of those and communists tragedy”, on the other hand. tragedy”,hand. the other on This shows a high consideration of the of consideration high a shows This ort of visual framework, visual of ort e more it is impossible not to notice the notice to not impossible is it more e emlin. emlin. e te oih oiie oe o path of model positive Polish the een nic. For instance, the most impressive impressive most the instance, For nic. ria ed on the basis of the juxtaposition juxtaposition the of basis the on ed soe h cptls one”. capitalist the estore v wr o te meils powers imperialist the of work ive d to Moscow two days before, and and before, days two Moscow to d e side, and the dangerous terrorist terrorist dangerous the and side, e e b Guep Bfa “hs anti “This Boffa: Giuseppe by ted t, ae i Rm, ae h same the gave Rome, in based tta, , “L’Unità”, October 25 October “L’Unità”, , f hr oe o breakingnews, on ones short of viet Party, whose statements had had statements whose Party, viet shows that there was a strong strong a was there that shows L’Unità was surely aware of that, of aware surely was “Ernő Gerő executed by by executed Gerő “Ernő th , p. 1. 1. p. , Pravda L’Unità th , 1956, p. 8.p. 1956, , La tragedia tragedia La 25 ac, the tance, n other In . Indeed, . applied CEU eTD Collection been against the people, because the communist part communist the because people, the against been nuovo

27 (Soveria Manelli, Rubbettino, 2002), p. 244. 244. p. 2002), Rubbettino, Manelli, (Soveria its alleged mission as the agent of progress in Ita agent in of alleged progress as the its mission provide which affiliation ideological the as strong tha afraid was partyestablishment The party. their the of because ideali the and PCI, the of legacy the characterized necessary was – it names Argentieri communist press tried to maintain the public credib public the maintain to tried press communist tews cnrdcoy nepeain f h genes the of interpretation contradictory otherwise compared to the ally the other leftist partiesothersoug allyleftist comparedthe the to Therefor well. as ally potential a be to considered S (Italian PSDI Saragat’s of influence the limiting g a achieved which front popular the reconstructing t Through PSI. the of socialists the and PCI the of valuesof party. Saragat’s possi be would coalition threeparty no (therefore, Francesco Malgeri, Malgeri, Francesco eetees te SI ol nt e osdrd o b to considered be not could PSDI the Nevertheless, Earthquake and aftershock: reassessments in the It the Earthquakeaftershock: and in reassessments I sm te mdmcie ws h iel ol o t for tool ideal the was “mudmachine” the sum, In

Togliatti’s rm n psil ciiim Te sadru” inte “slanderous” The criticism. possible any from partito nuovo partito a tgoe e cnrso pltc e oit nell’ società e politica centrismo: del stagione La implied a wider project of joining the forces of t of forces the joining of project wider a implied

44 44 ly. ly. ht. d the PCI with theoretical foundations for foundations theoretical with PCI the d zed view the communist followers had of of had followers communist the view zed 27 t a potential disillusionment might be as be might disillusionment potential a t ility of the party, by shielding the the shielding by party, the of ility reat performance in the vote of 1948 and and 1948 of vote the in performance reat is of the crisis: the uprising must have have must uprising the crisis: the of is e, in strategic terms, the PSI might be be might PSI the terms, strategic in e, ble) due to the strong anticommunist anticommunist strong the to due ble)

y was the people itself. This way, the way, This itself. people the was y ocialdemocratic Party), which Nenni Nenni which Party), ocialdemocratic his alliance, Togliatti aimed at both both at aimed Togliatti alliance, his alian Left Left alian e C, n re t spot an support to order in PCI, he e a potential ally for the PCI PCI the for ally potential a e peain f h ursn – as – uprising the of rpretation tog oa sain which suasion moral strong tla e scno dopoguerra secondo del Italia he communists communists he partito partito

CEU eTD Collection party, had some similarities with that of that with party,similarities some had wy rm h PI Cnesl, h iiil attitude initial the Conversely, PCI. the from away order in minim to neededresoluteness with react to d any consider Togliatti let not did strategyPCI’s particularly line Soviet the to submission its make alliance the for negotiations the PSDI: the toward imply an break irreversible The would second option towar move and PSDI, the with side to 1948); in (as

28 the revolt, at least as far asfarof the risk counter theatrevolt, least as fr distant too not was crisis the of interpretation students, the intellectuals, then the riot expanded riot the then intellectuals, the students, the but counterrevolutionaries, and fascists surely of understanding communist of the whichdeeply shaped “pop dichotomy the of version rigid the rejected it showed party socialist the sense, this In USSR. the cam socialist the of view idealized PCI’s the share of idea the approve not did Party Socialist Italian Tullio Vecchietti, Vecchietti, Tullio Nevertheless, as the revolution broke out in Budape in out broke revolution the as Nevertheless, Nevertheless, already on October 25 October on already Nevertheless, Nenni had two alternative options: to side with the with side to options: alternative Nennihad two is, n coe 25 October on First, On the other hand, Togliatti might have wanted to a to wanted have might Togliatti hand, other the On Avanti per priual itrsig n oiia term political in interesting particularly appears Il dramma di Budapest di dramma Il th Tli Vchet woe ht aog h rbl, t rebels, the “among that wrote Vecchietti Tullio ,

, “Avanti!”, October 25 October “Avanti!”, , th L’Unità , the PSI rejected the gist of the PCI’s position: position: PCI’s the of gist the rejected PSI the , 45 45 revolution was concerned. was concerned. revolution om that of the PCI by the very beginning of beginning very the by PCI the of that om . . to the factories”. the to egree of moderation as a serious option: he option: serious a as moderation egreeof the fascist coup as such because it did not did it because such as coup fascist the riot broke out because of the university university the of because out broke riot ize the negative effects of the crisis. ofthe crisis. the negative effects ize a more moderate spirit than the PCI did: did: PCI the than spirit moderate more a p, nor the fully positive consideration of consideration positive fully the nor p, apparent. But the stressfactors on the the on stressfactors the But apparent. lr ocs vru “orei forces”, “bourgeois versus forces” ular might continue unless the PCI did not not did PCI the unless continue might with the USSR, and with the PCI. and with the USSR, with of PCI, and rebuild the “ the rebuild and PCI, d a Britishlike model of labor party. party. labor of model Britishlike a d the political system. system. the political st, the PSI did not immediately move move immediately not did PSI the st, th void boosting the leaning of the PSI PSI the of leaning the boosting void , 1956, p. 1.p. , 1956, Avanti : n h oe ad te PSI’s the hand, one the on s: te esae o Nenni’s of newspaper the , 28 Therefore, the position the Therefore, Lista Garibaldi Lista here must be be must here the ” CEU eTD Collection by implication, to Saragat’s PSDI. On the one hand, one the On PSDI. Saragat’s to implication, by passed their decision of asking for the military in military the for asking of decision their passed W ad f h gvrmn. ned i te hoi s chaotic the in Indeed, government. the of and HWP “invited” were troops Soviets the Institute), 1956 intervention, and on Hungary generallyspeaking. generallyspeaking. and Hungary on intervention, wo PCI the unless closed soon be would it but open, nevnin i te omns ve, h ivso o invasion the view, communist the in intervention: of videodocuments screened in the film film the in screened videodocuments of socialism” “one the on “invite” Ingrao’s accept to willing not later turned into a popular uprising stu Gerő’s latera for popular turned into movement popular Hungarian the of characterization Nenn Therefore, invasion. illegal an through regime was it view, socialist the in socialism; defending

32 31 30 29 (College Station, Texas A&M University Press, 2004) Press, University A&M Texas Station, (College ugr ws are ot ad h Hnain governme Octobe on just legitimization Hungarian legal a with the invasion and out, carried was Hungary that nor government, the of authority the have not 06 Fr ute dtis n h pann ad conce and planning Granville, the C. Johanna on details further For 2006. part Togliatti’s the toward appeasement of attitude reacted by assaulting the building of n of building the by assaulting reacted fruitless in gratitude involved been of had sense who alleged demonstrators, the about spoke HWP the ugra atoiis a akd h Sves o inte to Soviets the asked had authorities Hungarian comradesemerging. was argued, in an interview realized years later, the c the later, years realized interview an in argued, F. Malgeri, p. 244. 244. p. Malgeri, F. Ingrao, P. G by done speech radio the to referred remark This f Institute Research the of study the to According On October 26 October On Therefore, the PSI wanted to communicate the PCI th PCI the communicate to wanted PSI the Therefore, The most important implication of this interpretati this of implication important most The However, the position of the PSI was partly ambival partly was PSI the of position the However, 31 Da una parte della barricata in difesa del socialis del difesa in barricata della parte Da una ; on the other hand, a certain intolerance toward t toward intolerance certain a hand, other the on ; th The First Domino: international decisionmaking dur decisionmaking international Domino: First The , indeed, the PSI sent some ambivalent signals to to signals ambivalent some sent PSI the indeed, , 32

Bródy Sándor utca Sándor Bródy a iot d Budapest di rivolta La ommittee was “heterogeneously” composed, therefore, composed, “heterogeneously” was ommittee tervention out of the legal procedures. As András H András As procedures. legal the of out tervention r 25 r or the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution (la Revolution Hungarian 1956 the of History the or y n noml omte cmoe b mmes f the of members by composed committee informal an by f h pry tef Nvrhls, h pa o inva of plan the Nevertheless, itself. party the of erő in the evening of October 23 October of evening the in erő 46 46 , p. 76. 76. p. , gtain wt te ed f h rdo Vlra Ben Valéria radio, the of head the with egotiations th . n aot Wv Oeain (is itreto) see intervention) (first Operation” “Wave about rns . The interview with Hegedűs is part of the collect the of part is Hegedűs with interview The . tain f coe 23 October of ituation ugra sol fe twr te oit ad the and, Soviets the toward feel should Hungarian t ind fra dcmn wih rvdd the provided which document formal a signed nt bborn attitude toward the demonstrators. toward theattitude bborn [leftist] side of the fence in defense of defense in fence the of side [leftist] mo the uld reconsider its position on the Soviet the on position its reconsider uld n tep a dfnig n unpopular an defending at attempt an y: the newspaper is very informative informative very is newspaper the y: on was the consideration of the Soviet Soviet the of consideration the was on rvene) , “L’Unità”, October 25 October “L’Unità”, , , “La Storia Siamo Noi”, RAI Educational, Educational, RAI Noi”, Siamo Storia “La , hc sae te eosrto and demonstration the staged which ent: on the one hand, the party was was party the hand, one the on ent: at the door for the alliance was still still was alliance the for door the at Hnay o Otbr 23 October (on Hungary f ’ pry tesd h democratic the stressed party i’s Avanti 29 a a eiiae tep at attempt legitimate a was he attitude of the communist the of attitude he issue of that day had a clear clear a had day that of issue ing the Hungarian crisis of 1956 of crisis Hungarian the ing rd , the Hungarian communists communists Hungarian the , Botteghe Oscure Botteghe rd . The First Secretary of of Secretary First The . th , 1956, p. 1. p. 1956, , rd in of sion egedűs egedűs ter on, on, ter and, and, the , it did it 30 ion ion ke,

CEU eTD Collection L’Unità idcn a oc gi veiet plch e ungher e polacchi avvenimenti gli Mosca a giudicano ups t e sr o “ann” rm h PI o i to PSI the from “warning” of sort a be to purpose this second version, might be to further destabiliz further to be might version, second this of the 1956 Institute (available on the website: ww website: the on (available Institute 1956 the of n have force of use incomprehensible an such to led v the government Kádár’s of report the to According until 1989. Nevertheless, in the peculiar situation peculiar the in Nevertheless, 1989. until n te fie o te W of HWP the of offices the and t was it since dynamics, withinparty PSI the about 36 35 34 33 withdrawn. morning of October 25 October of morning 1956, p. 1.p. 1956, defined the Soviet crisismanagement as “veryas stubb crisismanagement definedthe Soviet art abovementioned the characterized which attitude satisfaction for the fact that – according to what what to according – that fact the for satisfaction PCI’s theory of the “counterrevolutionary putsch” “counterrevolutionary the of theory PCI’s the new government. government. thenew Antal Apró, ordered some agents to fire in order to order in fire to agents some ordered Apró, Antal recons another to According climate. the radicalize of episodes many documented Dalos G. historian (the shoot on the people as soon as he was aware of the of wasaware he as soon as people the on shoot w negotiation the that understand to time Togliatti for time some taking was yet) person in out spoken rm h ws ulig up. building was he frame able been hardly have would Togliatti which fact of ht h PI xetd rm h PI te ic “Ital piece ( Budapest” the PCI: the from expected PSI the what Paladini, Leo name Historians Ibidem Budapest di avvenimenti agli italiani commenti I Another piece issued by the socialist newspaper is is newspaper socialist the by issued piece Another This last statement was not true, since the PCI wou PCI the since true, not was statement last This . ) to give no mention about the about mention no give to ) 36 I commenti italiani agli avvenimenti di Budapest di avvenimenti agli italiani commenti I

Come si giudicano a Mosca gli avvenimenti polacchi polacchi avvenimenti gli Mosca a giudicano si Come véres csütörtök véres th in Kossuth Lajos tér Lajos Kossuth kdma utca Akadémia 33 (“bloody Thursday”) the episode of masskilling wh masskilling of episode the Thursday”) (“bloody

n h ohr ad te ic b Lo aaii ( Paladini Leo by piece the hand, other the On : the Soviet tanks at the posts of garrison before before garrison of posts the at tanks Soviet the : véres csütörtök véres tre t sot t h cvlas ht ahrd in gathered that civilians the at shoot to started , October 26 October , e the internal situation and undermine the consolid the undermine and situation internal the e w.rev.hu), the head of the KGB, Serov, ordered the ordered Serov, KGB, the of head the w.rev.hu), episodes of mutual approaches between invaders and and invaders between mutualapproaches of episodes ot been fully clarified yet. According to the recon the to According yet. clarified fully been ot truction, the ÁVH, and the Hungarian hardliners suc hardliners Hungarian the and ÁVH, the truction, provoke the expectable Soviet reaction. The purpos The reaction. Soviet expectable the provoke ictims were about 300. The circumstances that sudde that circumstances The 300. about were ictims 47 47 this kind). In this view, Serov ordered to fire in fire to ordered Serov view, this In kind). this of October 26 October of ith the socialists would go on if the PCI the if on go would socialists the ith 35 Avanti he only one newspaper (naturally, with with (naturally, newspaper one only he orn”(“ th and, immediately after that, expressed that, after immediately and, , 1956, p. 1. p. 1956, , a final assessment. This way, he gave gave he way, This assessment. final a sptnil ly en (h hd not had (who Nenni ally: potential ts (October 25 (October ld not change its position on Hungary Hungary on position its change not ld to explain within the interpretative interpretative the within explain to a very good source to give sense of of sense give to source good very a icle by Giuseppe Boffa: Paladini Paladini Boffa: Giuseppe by icle esi ian comments on the events of of events the on comments ian rud ti psto hd been had position this – argued molto chiuso molto ) did not share the proSoviet proSoviet the share not did ) e ungheresi e ) started with a criticism of the of criticism a with started ) th , that statement served the the served statement that , th ), an unequivocal matter matter unequivocal an ), , “Avanti!”, October 26 October “Avanti!”, , ”). ich took place in the the in place took ich 34

the Parliament Parliament the the square. square. the oe si Come struction struction order to order ation of ation tanks to tanks locals locals e, in e, h as as h nly nly th , CEU eTD Collection be able to understand on time what the current situ current the what time on understand to able be socialism”. revolutio popular great a of actors from themselves communists. cooperationof the a well as requirement minimum of sort a as appeared ideologic and political its reduce to able be would 38 37 conferenze internazionali conferenze persecutio political the of victims the and Hungary its informative content, but also for the author. I author. the for also but content, informative its (in the article the (in democrats should address to all the communists all all communists the all to address should democrats w the that think “I ears: Togliatti’s to admonition eouin mlye] o ae eeg o te fighte the on revenge take to employ[ed] revolution cruel the against “protest[ed] PSI) the (including Vienna of Conference Socialist International the at referencepoin legitimate as “succession” socialist so with Union Soviet the to submission confused PCI Indeed Italy. in movement socialist the of referent dis a toward moving be to seemed Nenni importantly, since October 25 October since c the what – effort counterrevolutionary a implied suggesti be to seemed PSI the enough, Significantly the PSI establishment. establishment. thePSI Text of the resolution of the Socialist Internatio Socialist the of resolution the of Text Basso, Lelio This “warning” became explicit in the issue of Octo of issue the in explicit became “warning” This This quotation points out two interesting concepts concepts interesting two out points quotation This 37

Aver corraggio Aver Aver coraggio Aver th , the word “democrats” came alongside “socialists”; alongside came “democrats” word the , ; archival unit no. 19. 19. no. unit archival ; , “Avanti!”, October 27 October “Avanti!”, , – “To be brave”) expressed a wish, which might sou might which wish, a expressed brave”) be “To –

ndeed, Lelio Basso was one of the most important me important most the of one was Basso Lelio ndeed, nal Conference of Vienna (November 1957), p. 3, par 3, p. 1957), (November Vienna of Conference nal n”, “Filippo Turati” Foundation (Rome), serie 20; s 20; serie (Rome), Foundation Turati” “Filippo n”, 48 48 th , 1956, p. 1. The article is very significant, not not significant, very is article The 1. p. 1956, , t of the left clear appeared one year later, year one appeared clear left the of t al dependence on the Soviet Union. This This Union. Soviet the on dependence al ation taught us all, and they will not turn turn not will they and all, us taught ation , Basso seems to be suggesting that the that suggesting be to seems Basso , around the world is that the latter would latter the that is world the around (November 1957): the socialist parties socialist the 1957): (November ommunists pretended to be fighting – – fighting be to pretended ommunists err hc te omns counter communist the which terror s ta al h scait ad l the all and socialists the all that ish politicallyspeaking: for the first time first the for politicallyspeaking: s a proof of the genuine goodwill of goodwill genuine the of proof a s ber 27 ber g ht h PIs oiin actually position PCI’s the that ng t osals n h pt toward path the on obstacles to n cialism. This concept of a sort of of sort a of concept This cialism. vwl f h PI s reliable a as PCI the of avowal s o Hnays freedom”. Hungary’s for rs th . Indeed, Lelio Basso’s words words Basso’s Lelio Indeed, . secondly, and very very and secondly, nd as an an as nd n within n just for for just . 1 “On 1 . ub. 2: 2: ub. 38

CEU eTD Collection because of its repressive nature; by implication, t implication, by nature; repressive its of because Moscow on October 30 October on Moscow (“The pure stream and the dirty lather”), he first first he lather”), dirty the and stream pure (“The its right, precisely at the PSDI, as a potential al PSDI,asright, aat the potential its precisely own party by October 27 October by party own p his Furthermore, not. did Party Communist Italian th from away move to hours some still had Togliatti to Nenni Pietro from position official an announced chance toward the communist position. In his articl his In position. communist the toward chance whichBott asthe one appeared thePCIPSI alliance In strongholds”. the of “enforcement before called exclu was latter the Togliatti, with break to about oth In USSR. the of that with alongside radicalized th strategy PCI’s the for crucial so was revolution

40 39 the PCI had lost. thePCI had lost. a of working class and popular masses, as grantor of grantor as masses, popular and class working of ar exploitation capitalist from free is labor where “social that out pointed clearly he but revolution, closer to Nenni than Togliatti did. closer NenniTogliatti than to with broken not had who Vittorio, Di sense, this In clear events these of had Togliatti perception The communiqué Presa di posizione della CGIL sugli avvenimenti di di avvenimenti CGIL sugli della posizione di Presa In addition, the Inaddition, s rsl, hn h “liau” a eprd the expired, had “ultimatum” the when result, a As These factors proved to be important in order to b to order in important be to proved factors These oee, y coe 27 October by However, , wherein he maintained Togliatti’s interpretation interpretation Togliatti’s maintained he wherein , Avanti th , 1956. The text can be found in Argentieri, p. 136 p. Argentieri, in found be textcan 1956. The , issue of October 27 Octoberof issue th . 39 th Indeed, Giuseppe Di Vittorio, President of the CGI the of President Vittorio, Di Giuseppe Indeed,

te tep a a epsr o te lee rs of risk alleged the of exposure an at attempt the , Ungheria 49 49 th y mre fo te et f h tlga h sn to sent he telegram the of text the from emerges ly contained a sort of ultimatum: the newspaper the ultimatum: of sort a contained ly, by implication missing the PCI. PCI. the missing byly,implication he PSI pretended to have “inherited” a role role a “inherited” have to pretended PSI he e possible just with the active participation participation active the with just possible e progress and the edification of a society society a of edification the and progress e the number of the of number the eghe Oscure could sacrifice eventually. eghesacrifice Oscurecould eventually. osition seemed to have weakened in his in weakened have to seemed osition sively concerned about what has been been has what about concerned sively , “L’Unità”, October 28 October “L’Unità”, , freedom and national independence”. national and freedom e USSR. But the First Secretary of the the of Secretary First the But USSR. e er words, by the time Nenni was just just was Nenni time the by words, er oost the tendency of the PSI to look to to look to PSI the of tendency the oost olat yt see t mv much move to seemed yet, Togliatti La corrente pura e la sporca schiuma sporca la e pura corrente La t t psto hd o e necessarily be to had position its at oprd h Sve itreto in intervention Soviet the compared be taken one day later. Therefore, Therefore, later. day one taken be leader of the PSI took a critical critical a took PSI the of leader . of the uprising as a counter a as uprising the of interessi permanenti interessi th , 1956, p. 1. p. 1956, , L, released L, counter 40 ,

CEU eTD Collection en sopd osdrn te eoitos ih Tog with negotiations the considering stopped Nenni ilo nrot ad opsd y C e ol. t wa It only. po the move, that With threat. terrorist the facing men DC by composed and Andreotti Giulio the foreign intervention against Béla Kun’s socialist r Béla socialist Kun’s foreignagainst intervention eorc fo pltcl errs (n atclr o particular (in terrorism political from democracy C gv is oe f ofdne wtot particip a (without confidence of vote its gave PCI and USSR, the with broke partly PCI, the of leader 43 42 41 H [was] impossible”. [was] th on relied either revolution class working the of w [it but defended, be to need[ed] revolutions that

water. water. la “dirty the be to considered were allies, Italian s socialist of improvement the at aiming socialism, epn te C ioae o te ainl cnro f scenario national the compromesso storico on isolated PCI the keeping b to proved Hungary over position the Consequently, a as Nenni of eyes the in appeared PCI the 1956, of dista quite but side), left the (on PCI Togliatti’s Sara the between spectrum: political leftist the of By Nenni, Pietro u Ibidem Next, the socialist leader stated that “[according that stated leader socialist the Next, In sum, Nenni considered the Hungarian democratic m democratic Hungarian the considered Nenni sum, In

In this sense, the PSI provided further evidence th evidence further provided PSI the sense, Inthis gr t te tak f h mnrhc ocs Parisb forces monarchic the of attack the to ngary conventio ad excludendum ad conventio compromesso storico compromesso . La corrente pura e la sporca acqua sporca la e pura corrente La 42

. 43 (“historical compromise”), Italian historiography historiography Italian compromise”), (“historical

by the DC in return of a cooperation of the PCI in PCI the of cooperation a of return in DC the by

litical isolation of the PCI came to an end. anend. to came PCI the of isolation litical , “Avanti!”, October 28 October “Avanti!”, , opened to Eurocommunism in 1973; later on, in 1976, in on, later 1973; in Eurocommunism to opened f the extreme leftist leftist extreme the f to i te oenet t te oenet edd b headed government the to government) the in ation 50

ther”, which had to be washed away by pure pure by away washed be to had which ther”, nt from both of them. In the circumstances circumstances the In them. of both from nt atal a oenet omd n mrec for emergency in formed government a actually s epublic in 1920. epublicin as at stake] the principle that the defense the that principle the stake] at as e shields and hearts of the workers or it it or workers the of hearts and shields e ociety; the Soviet troops, as well as their as well as troops, Soviet the ociety; to] Italian socialists it [was] not at stake at not [was] it socialists Italian to] at its political culture was in the middle the in was culture political its at gat’s PSDI (on the right side) and and side) right the (on PSDI gat’s n unreliable counterpart. Therefore, Therefore, counterpart. unreliable n e the main reason which had been been had which reason main the e sd omn i 17, n t the to and 1871, in commune ased iti s sros oiia option. political serious a as liatti ovement as the “pure stream” of of stream” “pure the as ovement o 15 u t Berlinguer’s to up 1956 rom rgt Rosse Brigate th , 1956, p. 1.p. 1956, , named the gradual dismissal of dismissal gradual the named 41

the efforts to protect Italian Italian protect to efforts the ). Enrico Berlinguer, Berlinguer, Enrico ). the the y CEU eTD Collection atclry u t is im upr t te Soviet the to support firm its to due particularly party. “strongholds”, that is to protect its its protect to is that “strongholds”, control of Togliatti’s party: by October 28 October by party: Togliatti’s of control t by limited quite was had actually Oscure Botteghe allia of system USSR, the with linkage affiliation, ad ae PI s el mvd oad h centerlef the toward moved well) as PSI later (and o the after isolated politically be to happened PCI T alliance of system the affected negatively crisis destru been have might truth partial a of admission consid not were honesty intellectual to concessions sta its radicalize to PCI the forced contradictions evo political the of the uncertainty But coherence. pos PCI’s the provide would which events, Hungarian credibility of the of credibility

exposed the contradictions of the PCI’s position. of the PCI’s the contradictions position. exposed fro coming news the crisis; the facing for strategy n had itself USSR the of Committee Central the that of the popular base toward the political establishm the political oftoward the popular base At the same time, the constraints that influenced t influenced that constraints the time, same the At h cmuit esae atmtd t osrcig a constructing at attempted newspaper communist The Du Conclusion In this context, Togliatti needed to rely on on rely to needed Togliatti context, this In ring the first phase of the uprising, the PCI emplo PCI the uprising, the of phase first the ring partito nuovo partito , the ideological affiliation of followers, and the and followers, of affiliation ideological the , interessi permanenti interessi th , the situation in Hungary was still so unstable so still was Hungary in situation the , 5 1

L’Unità lution in Hungary and the graveness of the the graveness of the and Hungary in lution ent. ogliatti intended to construct. Indeed, the the Indeed, construct. to intended ogliatti line. As a result, while socialdemocrats socialdemocrats while result, a As line. eet aogie ih h Sve ones: Soviet the with alongside tements m Budapest was so impressive that they they that impressive so was Budapest m ot been able to define clearly a coherent coherent a clearlydefine to able been ot ered to be an option, because even the even because option, an be to ered c) Nvrhls, h st f options of set the Nevertheless, nce). utbreak of the Hungarian Revolution, Revolution, Hungarian the of utbreak tv fr h pbi ceiiiy f the of credibility public the for ctive he PCI’s strategy in this phase of the the of phase this in strategy PCI’s he t coalitions of government, the PCI PCI the government, of coalitions t wo factors that were not under the the under not were that factors wo yed a strategy intended to enforce its enforceits to intended yedstrategy a as a means to maintain the public public the maintain to means a as (public credibility and ideological ideological and credibility (public ition with a possible ideological ideological possible a with ition “riiil rt” bu the about truth” “artificial n confidence CEU eTD Collection be the only total opponent of the DC and its allies its and DC the of opponent total only the be and found the ideological endangerdiscipline party convenient more choice a as perceived was isolation Neverth positions. government the from far remained

52

ations of the PCI’s legacy. of the PCI’s ations legacy. was considered to be still better than to than better still be to considered was than the alternative: in other words, to to words, other in alternative: the than eless, strategicallyspeaking, this this strategicallyspeaking, eless, CEU eTD Collection

1 of features and objectives examine will I section, t of attack the after counteroffensive a out carry and prudenc radicalization toward boosts ambivalent withdrawal. the reconsider to Togliatti “promised” October 28 October i Hungary in place taking changes political complex communism in ItalyWar of the Cold in the context into communism exist debate the interjects problem this Therefore, decisi considered took it or crisis Hungarian whole rema Party Communist Italian the whether understand as actually is issue This management”. “crisis the from passage the out carried PCI the how and why is of the Hungarian Workers’ Party, and October 31 October and Party, Workers’ Hungarian the of insurgents to lay down the weapons. insurgentslaydown the to Nagy supporting officially still was it but Party, between October 29 October between O. Vangelista, Vangelista, O. Why and how the Italian Communist Party “reversed” Party Communist Whythe Italian how and Nevertheless, the scenario changed very fast, and t and fast, very changed scenario the Nevertheless, hs hpe i fcsd n h eouin f h PCI the of evolution the on focused is chapter This Secondly, I will focus on the factors (Hungarian as (Hungarian factors the on focus will I Secondly, In order to develop this issue, firstly, I will foc Iwill firstly, issue, this develop to Inorder th , Botteghe Oscure had stigmatized the uprising agai uprising the stigmatized had Oscure Botteghe , T Imre Nagy parla alla radio Budapest di radio alla parla Nagy Imre HE HE PCI th , when the USSR was still withdrawing troops in spi in troops withdrawing still was USSR the when , FROM THE STALEMATE TO THE COUNTER THE TO STALEMATE THE FROM

1

Third chapter Third 53 53 , “L’Unità”, October 29 October “L’Unità”, , and Kádár in their attempts to persuade the persuade to attempts their in Kádár and us on the ambiguities of the PCI’s position position PCI’s the of ambiguities the on us ing in the historiography on the features of of features the on historiography the ing in this offensive. I will explain why and how and why explain will I offensive. this st ons aiming at given political objectives. political given at aiming ons , when the Presidium of the CPSU CC CPSU the of Presidium the when , e in the position of the PCI. PCI. of the ethe position in and of emerging Eurocommunism. Eurocommunism. and of emerging In this first section, I will analyze the the analyze will I section, first this In he “bourgeois” forces. In the second second the In forces. “bourgeois” he he problem in the scope of this chapter this of scope the in problem he n very late October 1956. Indeed, by by Indeed, 1956. October late very n eeat s otoesa i odr to order in controversial as relevant well as international) that let the PCI PCI the let that international) as well a defensive to an offensive phase of phase offensive an to defensive a the impact of the Hungarian crisis crisis the Hungarian theof impact ined a “passive” agent during the the during agent “passive” a ined s taey n h cnet f the of context the in strategy ’s nst the Hungarian Workers’ Workers’ Hungarian the nst th - , 1956, p. 7. 7. p. 1956, , OFFENSIVE te of the collapse the of te

CEU eTD Collection perceived as being a loss for the other”. Therefore other”. the for loss a being as perceived Finnishtype or Austriantype move away from Moscow from away move Austriantype or Finnishtype Su Geneva 1955 the after competition” “geopolitical of the “white the victims create to empathy between Hungari the “convert” to and intervention, leg military moral and political provide to managed PCI the 2 minimize Soviet influence country. that on Soviet minimize Hunga “win” to either opportunity the with West the as interpret would powers Western which indecision, f withdrawal Soviet the considered Togliatti Party. all without a strong military presence of the Red A a the Red strong presencewithout of all military Sovie the that clear made control regain to attempt socia of “motherland” the of prestige international the and spirit, democratic real a by sustained was So the that years for pretending been had Togliatti the also affect would nor could admit. noradmit. could dominat Soviet the of face real the of exposure the Ind authority. down its struggledknock to order in v masses the why base popular its to explain hardly Uncertainty and radicalization in the PCI’s positio in Uncertaintyradicalization and Henry Kissinger, Kissinger, Henry October 29 October The Soviet tentative choices of October 28 October of choices tentative Soviet The In this sense, the ideological cost of the Soviet w Soviet the of cost ideological the sense, this In Such an admission would create an ideological leak leak ideological an create would admission an Such th was definitely a day of tension at the headquarter the at tension of day a definitely was Diplomacy nees permanenti interessi Nw ok Smn n Shse, 94, . 2. Kiss 522. p. 1994), Schuster, and Simon York, (New

, the Soviet strategic comedown in Hungary (due to to (due Hungary in comedown strategic Soviet the , 2

te dooia ad oa fudtos f the of foundations moral and ideological the : 54 54 mmit as follows: “a gain for one side was widely widely inEurope. thestalemate break would ) was side one for gain “a follows: as mmit th might have an impact on the PCI as well: well: as PCI the on impact an have might legacy of the PCI was strictly linked to the to linked strictly was PCI the of legacy eed, the only possible explanation implied explanation eed, possible the only rmy. rmy. t influence on Hungary would not exist at exist not would Hungary on influence t ion: a truth Botteghe Oscure did not want not did Oscure Botteghe truth a ion: viet influence in the socalled “satellites” “satellites” socalled the in influence viet n an crisis into an “Italian issue”, in order in issue”, “Italian an into crisis an terror” and Italian communists. terror” and rom Hungary to be an apparent sign of of sign apparent an be to Hungary rom oluntarily moved against the HWP, and HWP, the against moved oluntarily ithdrawal might be huge: the PCI could could PCI the huge: be might ithdrawal

a weakness. This might have provided provided have might This weakness. a ry to the Western camp or, at least, to least, at or, camp Western the to ry im Bt h fiue n h military the in failure the But lism. in the set of values of the PCI, and and PCI, the of values of set the in tmzto t te wie Soviet awaited the to itimization s of the Italian Communist Communist Italian the of s inger defined the the defined inger either a a either CEU eTD Collection party’s legacy and the linkage with the USSR. There USSR. the with linkage the and legacy party’s partito nuovo partito affe would it therefore, opinion, public leftist by

4 3 strategic comedown, after the relation with the PSI the relation after with strategiccomedown, h cags n oh h gvrmn ad W leadersh HWP on. go and to intervention government the both in changes the uprising and, even without mentioning the word “int word the mentioning without even and, uprising sho telegram The optimistic”. more are you or agree a along moving is government Hungarian the opinion ry a wtdaig rm uaet n – t es o least government. the Hungarian negotiations with at – and Budapest from withdrawing was Army h pry I ti cnet Hnay ol b sacrif be could Hungary context, this In party. the government itself that glorifie the uprising”. the glorifie that itself government g and [P]arty [Workers’] Hungarian the of that from count as a riot defined which we the in verymoment Togliat as communists: Italian the to embarrassment o sort a as witha Hungarianwhole. crisis USSR) the and PCI the both (of legacy to able be would which strategy communication new a Hu invade to Moscow persuade to attempt an firstly, P the Therefore, counterrevolution. against fight as USSR the nor minority a as insurgents the depict Soviets to stop the Hungarian reactionary tendencie reactionary theHungarian stop to Soviets is telegram the of text The 136. p. Argentieri, F. Ibidem Nevertheless, the events of October 28 October of events the Nevertheless, After the beginning of the Operation “Wave” (the fi (the “Wave” Operation the of beginning the After The new circumstances were a factor of confusion fo confusion of factor a were circumstances new The . . . 3 n at te oit Hnain eoitos cause negotiations Hungarian – Soviet the fact, In

th s. s. – 29 – ervention”, the Italian leader seemed to be suggest be to seemed leader Italian the ervention”, vial i Agnir’ bo. olat woe “ wrote: Togliatti book. Argentieri’s in available ws Togliatti’s concerns for the Soviet attitude tow attitude Soviet the for concerns Togliatti’s ws 55 55 4 This contradiction would be easily perceived easily be would contradiction This ecinr ra. wud ie o nw hte you whether know to like would I road. reactionary th ct very negatively the public credibility of credibility public the negatively very ct had changed the scenario again: the Red Red the again: scenario the changed had had already cooledoff. cooledoff. already had CI strategically moved in two directions: two in moved strategically CI the international power involved in the in involved power international the iced on the altar of the defense of the the of defense the of altar the on iced overnment, and it is now the Hungarian Hungarian the now is it and overnment, was different errevolution,our position ngary again; secondly, the definition of definition the secondly, again; ngary fore, the PCI risked suffering a further further a suffering risked PCI the fore, ti himself wrote to Moscow, “In the the “In Moscow, to wrote himself ti rst intervention of October 23 October of intervention rst combine defense of the communist the of defense combine r the PCI, since it could no longer longer no could it since PCI, the r “pndo” prah o the to approach “opendoor” f fcal – h US opened USSR the – fficially p Tgiti rfre the preferred Togliatti ip, a serious a d rd ard the the ard ing the ing ) and and ) in my my in CEU eTD Collection believe either that the insurgents were fascists or fascists were insurgents the that either believe rvd ob del famne ad n ed f ful a of need in and fragmented deeply be to proved p. 3. p. press (College Station, Texas A&M University Press, 2004) Press, University A&M Texas Station, (College believetogether. the two they but them, not could PCI of the the legacy in leak another mightlead to

9 8 7 6 5 have a final opinion of the situation”. See J. C. G C. J. See situation”. the of opinion final have a nonhostile a occupy troops Hungarian the as long As Hu into troops sending cease to defense of minister radicalization final decision. In the telegram of October 29 October of telegram the In decision. final n to will Soviet the that know now Historians Army. th and Suslov) and (Mikoyan “experts” of delegation the withdrawal due to the huge risk of a counterre huge of risk a thewithdrawal the due to in Hungary: by October 29 October by Hungary: in in person addressed a telegram to Khrushchev (Octob Khrushchev to telegram a addressed person in negotiat USSR the is, (that contradiction further a solution for persuading the insurgents to lay down for lay persuadingto the insurgents solution down Hungaria new the to appeared still system oneparty the Soviet fight against imperialism and fascism. and fascism. fight imperialism the Soviet against would “counterrevolution” the with bargain Soviet be to seemed leadership and the Soviet communists) y Sveugra stlmn” s en hrb t hereby meant is settlement” “SovietHungarian By Montanelli, Indro 67. p. Argentieri, F. 136. p. Argentieri, Granville, C. Johanna infcnl eog, otge sue xeine a experienced Oscure Botteghe enough, Significantly The PCI made its first move as soon as there was cl was there as soon as move first its made PCI The As Botteghe Oscure perceived the risk that the part the that risk the perceived Oscure Botteghe As n h cnet f nraigpesr o te C du PCI the on pressure increasing of context the In 8 , the impact of the HungarianSoviet tentative sett tentative HungarianSoviet the of impact the , 7 s on s h Hnain oenet fral stil (formally government Hungarian the as soon as Questa è la storia della battaglia di Budapest… di battaglia della storia la è Questa The first domino. International decision making dur making decision International domino. first The th , the State Security Authority had been abolished; abolished; been had Authority Security State the ,

th , Mikoyan suggested the Kremlin to “[give] instruct “[give] to Kremlin the suggested Mikoyan , ranville, CWIHP, p. 32. p. CWIHP, ranville, ngary, continuing to concentrate them on Soviet ter Soviet on them concentrate to continuing ngary, egotiate was a tactical move to take some more time more some take to move tactical a was egotiate e Hungarian government about the withdrawal of the the of withdrawal the about government Hungarian e position, these troops will be sufficient. […] We We […] sufficient. be will troops these position, 56 56 , pp. 7985. 7985. pp. , he tentative agreement reached between the Soviet Soviet the between reached agreement tentative he that the USSR would come to terms with with terms to come would USSR the that : what was true? Italian communists could Italian communists what was : true? ing with the counterrevolution), Togliatti counterrevolution), the with ing volution in Hungary. in volution theweapons. closer to find an agreement. Indeed,the anagreement. find to closer be hardly compatible with the myth of myth the with compatible hardly be er 30 er y might have fallen in the deadlock of of deadlock the in fallen have mighty l reconstruction; the abolition of the the of abolition the reconstruction; l ear perception of the radical changes changes radical the of perception ear n government as the only possible possible only the as government n lement e the celebrations of the bourgeois bourgeois the of celebrations the e , “Il Corriere della Sera”, July 23rd, 2001, 2001, 23rd, July Sera”, della Corriere “Il , th ) asking for a reconsideration of reconsideration a for asking ) 9 5 on the leftist public opinion public leftist the on

ing the Hungarian crisis of 1956 of crisis Hungarian the ing process of ideological ideological of process i te ad o the of hands the in l 6

the HWP had HWP the ions to the the to ions do not not do ritory. ritory. for a for Red Red

CEU eTD Collection partly differs from the previous ones because of it of because ones previous the from differs partly en ed t mk sm cnesos n eun o k for return in concessions some make to ready been p. 1. p. having sent the telegram, the PCI had to be in a wa a in be to had PCI the telegram, the sent having counterrevolutionaries”, p. 1). 1). p. counterrevolutionaries”,

12 11 10 of counterrevolutionaries!”, p. 1) and the second second the and 1) p. counterrevolutionaries!”, of 29 inst For uprising. the of narration the in “horror” thiscontradiction. Botteghe Oscure. BottegheOscure. so would po the over position Kremlin radical official an Therefore, the how foresee to able was nobody with rightist forces. In this sense, by October 29 October by sense, this In forces. rightist with r that prove to needed partyItalian the influence, indeed, itself: PCUS the than radical more actually more interestingly, Gerő had died twice: the first first the twice: died had Gerő interestingly, more to prevent Italian communists from doing. Italiancommunists preventto preci was USSR the that fact the about nervous very opposite impulses toward radicalization and need fo and toward need radicalization impulses opposite th during press communist the of content ambivalent interp This strategy. communication new a for quest fo radicalization: of elements clear presents also political the on than events the of reconstruction released by by released In his reports from Prague, Vangelista often relat often Vangelista Prague, from reports his In Vangelista, O. quotat the (particularly, telegram the of text The th Nevertheless, the position of the PCI was limited b limited was PCI the of position the Nevertheless, Therefore, it is paradoxical just at first sight to sight first at just paradoxical is it Therefore, In this context, the PCI did the second move of thi of move second the did PCI the context, this In These ambivalent features were present already in t in already werepresent features ambivalent These issue of the newspaper, “Farkas, both father and s and father both “Farkas, newspaper, the of issue L’Unità Nuovo passo del governo Nagy per accordarsi con gli con accordarsi per Nagy governo del passo Nuovo n coe 29 October on

th . 11 n atclr te otn o te ic o writing of piece the of content the particular, In on the issue of October 25 October of issue the on ance, according to the reports by Vangelista, on th on Vangelista, by reports the to according ance, 10 ion reported) actually shows Togliatti’s disappoint Togliatti’s shows actually reported) ion n h ise f oebr 4 November of issue the on

ed facts that never happened, but to increase the s the increase to but happened, never that facts ed 57 57 on, had been executed in jail” (p. 7). Similarly, b Similarly, 7). (p. jail” in executed been had on, eal communists would never come to terms terms to come never would communists eal th r instance, Vangelista used the expression the used Vangelista instance, r assessment. On the other hand, the article the hand, other the On assessment. litical changes would be a risky move for move risky a be would changes litical – October 30 October – state that, by October 30 October by that, state s focus, much more on the (pretended) the on more much focus, s r moderation. rmoderation. ese days: there is a sense of mixture of mixture of sense a is there days: ese sely doing what he was actually trying trying actually was he what doing sely hl te atr ol hv possibly have would latter the while retation seems to be coherent with the with coherent be to seems retation itingposition: by October 29 October by itingposition: s controversial phase of the crisis: the the crisis: the of phase controversial s he leading article by Orfeo Vangelista Orfeo by leadingarticle he y a further constraint because, after after because, constraint further a y eeping Hungary under Moscow’s Moscow’s under Hungary eeping insorti lve the Hungarian problem. problem. Hungarian the lve th (“Ernő Gerő executed by a group group a by executed Gerő (“Ernő th , “L’Unità”, October 29 October “L’Unità”, , , Togliatti must have been been have must Togliatti , th “rő eő ild y the by killed Gerő (“Ernő th , the PCI was was PCI the , th th e October October e th – 30 – ment in in ment ut even even ut cale of of cale , 1956, 1956, , th 12 ,

CEU eTD Collection Roma empasse rss Ide, n coe 30 October on Indeed, crisis. events, to influence ( influence to events, warned Togliatti antiSo text, antisocialist, anticommunist, “reactionary, the of beginning very the At coup of 1922, which started with a march from Naple from march a with started which 1922, of coup th in recall to purpose the had Budapest” on “march time, Togliatti recognized also that “non counterr that also recognized Togliatti time, “ 18 17 16 15 14 13 “official” administration with a new one, and they they the and one, new of a with days administration “official” the During movement. revolutionary the S uprising, the of outbreak the After Győr. of city

through his article ( througharticle his definitely an antiSoviet uprising. uprising. antiSoviet an definitely no had revolt the Therefore, communists. admittedly omte hae b te omr oa HPlae Att HWPleader local former the by headed committee members of the working class, in particular those o those particular in class, working the of members c national localbased the of strength real the and Although capital. the of that to power alternative PCI review at the National Library (Rome), pp. 492 pp. (Rome), Library National the review at PCI socialism” W the in retraced be to was suffering Hungarian the According to the “bourgeois” press (in particular, particular, (in press “bourgeois” the to According Sándor Rácz headed the Central Workers’ Council of of Council Workers’ Central the headed Rácz Sándor b councils: revolutionary the headed HWPmen former m P. Togliatti, p. 493. 493. p. Togliatti, P. 492. p. Togliatti, P. Togliatti, Palmiro HW the of leader localbased a was Szigethy Attila 29 October “L’Unità”, Vangelista, O. Ibidem arcia su Budapest su arcia Togliatti tried to defend the legacy of the party a party the of legacy the defend to tried Togliatti u te an ore f h abvln attd o t of attitude ambivalent the of source main the But ”. ”. . is definitely Togliatti’s indepth analysis of the of analysis indepth Togliatti’s definitely is 17 , which inflamed the riot against the legitimate po legitimate the against riot the inflamed which , Sui fatti di Ungheria di fatti Sui Sui fatti di Ungheria di fatti Sui ” trascinare 13 for describing the attitude toward Nagy of the Győ the of Nagy toward attitude the describing for

th ) public opinion”. public ) te ertr o te tla Cmuit at spok Party Communist Italian the of Secretary the , th , p. 1.p. , , “Rinascita”, issue of November 1956, collection o collection 1956, November of issue “Rinascita”, , ) 15 this interpretation exaggerated the organizational organizational the exaggerated interpretation this zigethy tookover the local national committee, and and committee, national local the tookover zigethy in the communist review the communist in f “Il Corriere della Sera”), Győr might become become might Győr Sera”), della Corriere “Il mite i i itrsig o oie ht i many in that, notice to interesting is it ommittee, 493. 493. drove the transition from the “old” to the “new” sy “new” the to “old” the from transition the drove Csepel t an anticommunist characterization as such, but i but such, as characterization anticommunist an t 58 58 Budapest, several groups of fighters were composed composed were fighters of groups several Budapest, P operating in the NorthWestern Duna Region, in th in Region, Duna NorthWestern the in operating P eyond Szighety, Földvári had a similar role in Misk in role similar a had Földvári Szighety, eyond piig Sieh’ mn ee be o elc the replace to able were men Szigethy’s uprising, 16 and and evolutionary workers joined the riot”. joined workers evolutionary viet wave trying, in the confusion of the the of confusion the in trying, wave viet Indeed, he pointed out that the origin of origin the that out pointed he Indeed, e minds of the leftist readers the fascist the readers leftist the of minds e nd the reputation of the USSR in Italy. in USSR the of reputation the nd Corvin köz Corvin estern promises of a “liberation from “liberation a of promises estern s to Rome, the socalled “ socalled the Rome, to s PCI’s position over the Hungarian Hungarian the over position PCI’s he PCI in this phase of “forced” “forced” of phase this in PCI he tla cmuit aot the about communists Italian l Szigethy. ila ; the fighters of fighters the ; wer. For the first (and last) (and first the For wer. Rinascita 14 h expression The rbased national national rbased Tűzoltó utca Tűzoltó f the issues of the of issues the f . . marcia su marcia de facto de capacities capacities headed headed cities, cities, e out out e were 18 t was t stem. stem. olc; olc;

an by e e CEU eTD Collection withdrawal. But the ambiguous Soviet attitude durin attitude Soviet ambiguous the But withdrawal. Ita events the of interpretation the of implication radicaliza toward move the process: decisionmaking same day. sameday. para in considered if particularly informative very the PCI for a stronger Soviet position over Hungary over position Soviet stronger a for PCI the defined “grotesque” defined con the on and Europe, CentralEastern in socialism doubt cast who forces) bourgeois the (particularly, PCI to seek a new strategy. a PCInew seek to strategy.

21 20 19 country. Indeed,31 October country.on most the to due government Hungarian the overthrow fascism, and the Soviet Union to an imperialist cou an imperialist to Union fascism,and the Soviet

will reconcile ourselves with the turn of the turn events with to reconcile will ourselves s not are we being time the For forces. reactionary increasingly is and position twofaced a occupying governmen you with agreement in are we Hungarian direction, reactionary the of and Hungary in situation Mosco from reply a received establishment communist J. C. Granville, CWIHP, p. 33. 33. p. CWIHP, Granville, C. J. Ibidem Ibidem Indeed, both these sources help to highlight constr highlight to help sources these both Indeed, These words gave Togliatti the understandable expec understandable the Togliatti gave words These y coe 31 October By The most relevant point emerging from the analysis analysis fromthe emerging point relevant Themost n h ohr ad te ril cnan a tog ad strong a contains article the hand, other the On . . st te ie f h “ocd rdne hd oe o an to come had prudence” “forced the of time the , 19 the idea that “the popular and socialist regimes c regimes socialist and popular “the that idea the

st , the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Sov the Central Committee of the Presidium , 59 59 wardreactionarydebauch”. a ntry”. peaking out openly against Nagy, but we we but Nagy, against openly out peaking lian communists gave before the Soviet Soviet the before gave communists lian ll ih h tlga sn o ta very that on sent telegram the with llel . According to our information, Nagy is is Nagy information, our to According . duct of the role of the USSR: Togliatti USSR: the of role the of duct g the “days of the the of “days the g . Therefore, the article on on article the Therefore, . o te eortc onain of foundations democratic the on s aints and aims that shaped the PCI’s PCI’s the shaped that aims and aints of this source concerns theanxiety of concerns source ofthis aln udr h ifune f the of influence the under falling in perd s h ms natural most the as appeared tion 20 tation that the USSR would try to to try would USSR the that tation

oiin drse t al those all to addressed monition : I yu eauto o the of evaluation your “In w: eet oiia cags n the in changes political recent t’s tendencies to move in a a in move to tendencies t’s empasse an be compared to compared be an n. h Italian The end. 21

” forced the the forced ” R inascita inascita iet partyiet is is CEU eTD Collection oiia cnet Ide, h Iain omnss w communists Italian the Indeed, context. political at’ dcsoaig rcs: h tm o the of time the process: decisionmaking party’s and its implications in Italyin implications its and Otbr 24 (October events taking place in Hungary as well as on abroad as eventswell taking Hungary in place of opinion public Italian on impact the exploiting (October 30 (October 22 h sd of side the war. Hu into troops move to decided and again, gathered power. and “deviationist” illegitimate nolonger was government Hungarian the since only): massacre of massacre “o perspective,adoptedan situational the PCI this so very become would power) HWP’s the consolidating (includin such as Hungary that knew Party Communist opportunity for its propaganda: on October 31 October on propaganda: its for opportunity C. Békés, J. Rainer, M. Byrne, document no. 53, Oc 53, no. document Byrne, M. Rainer, J. Békés, C. A turn in the PCI’s strategy took pace due to a num a to due pace took strategyPCI’s the in turn A isl, h eouin f h Hnain rss prov crisis Hungarian the of evolution the Firstly, Definition of the enemy and justification of the in the of justification and enemy the of Definition The PCI had serious clues of this prospective decis prospective this of clues serious had PCI The 22

th th L’Unità Köztarsáság tér Köztarsáság ) “allowed” Western communists to target Hungary as Hungary target to communists Western “allowed” ) Otbr 29 October – and L’Humanité (October 30 (October th

t a ofnie oiin fo Otbr 31 October (from position offensive an to ) I adto, h aoiin f h oepry syste oneparty the of abolition the addition, In . th ) appeared as an important piece of evidence on on evidence of piece important an as appeared ) 6 tober 31 tober st

, the news incoming to the West about the about West the to incoming news the , ffensive” strategy. ffensive”strategy. a number of impressive and unforeseeable unforeseeable and impressive of number a October 30 st tervention: inventing the “white terror” “white the inventing tervention: , 1956, pp. 307310. 307310. pp. 1956, , ngary without a formal declaration of of declaration formal a without ngary ber of factors that changed the overall overall the changed that factors of ber em ere able to pass from a defensive defensive a from pass to able ere g all those communists that failed in failed that communists those all g ion, and this expectation shaped the shaped expectation this and ion, ided Botteghe Oscure with a great great a with Oscure Botteghe ided on an enemy of the Red Army. In Army. Red the of enemy an on passe communist, it had become a a become had it communist, a oe, n te Italian the and over, was th and 31 October such (not the insurgents insurgents the (not such st onwards) by by onwards) st . . m m CEU eTD Collection relations positio Beijing’s considered already had leadership 25 24 23

Nvme 1 (November

second Soviet intervention. intervention. secondSoviet poli a for ground the prepare to order in influence on the prospective condemnation of Nagy’s governmen Nagy’s of condemnation prospective the on relative “prudence” of the previous phase. previous the of “prudence” relative violence “verbal such used press communist the all, the human cost. cost. thehuman th and counterrevolution, a was uprising Hungarian East the both in leaders, socialist all Therefore, idn n h wrs f h Sve tlga o Octob of telegram Soviet the of words the in hidden hand other the on tragedy; Hungarian the in victims been had communists that evidence apparent the with bourgeoi counterattack to needed PCI the scenario, PCI the of counteroffensive the Therefore, Italy. a worldwide aggression, against fightengageda in implicatio By lifeblood. with imperialism” “Western provid Israel of support in Egypt on attack British Soviet delegation explaining the terms of the meeti the of terms the explaining delegation Soviet F. Argentieri, p. 74. 74. p. Argentieri, F. no footnote and 9597, pp. CWIHP, Granville, C. J. 94. p. CWIHP, Granville, C. J. S The moves of this offensive strategy were mainly ch mainly were strategy offensive this of moves The hr, h prleim ewe te oit withdrawa Soviet the between parallelism the Third, The main concern of the communist offensive was to offensive to was communist the Theconcern of main e condly, the USSR found quite a widespread consensus widespread a quite found USSR the condly, 23 ad t a gig o ban oh ios (November Tito’s both obtain to going was it and , st “o meiet t rpes h nwbr Hungarian newborn the repress to impediment” “no )

ng of November 2 November of ng 25 6 . 42, p. 217 (minute of the meeting between Tito an Tito between meeting the of (minute 217 p. 42, . This was a crucial element of the communist the of element crucial a was This 1

n te et are o oe on: the point: one on agreed West, the and possibly from Suez to Budapest. Budapest. to possiblyfromSuez a w anojcie:o h Italian the on objectives: main two had e repression was justified regardless of regardless justified was repression e ed the communist propaganda against against propaganda communist the ed ia ad oa lgtmzto o the of legitimization moral and tical fre b poiig ulc opinion public providing by forces s ” that it definitely differed from the the from differed definitely it that ” n, the USSR appeared as the power power the as appeared USSR the n, t. Indeed, by October 30 October Indeed, by t. Tgiti orcl ra te clues the read correctly Togliatti , aracterized by two features. First of First features. two by aracterized n on the Moscow – “satellites” “satellites” – Moscow the on n restore the legacy of communism in communism of legacy restorethe o be te eptaos u the but perpetrators the been not r 31 er nd fo Hnay n te French the and Hungary from l ). ). among the socialist countries socialist the among st , and he used his political political his used he and , 2 nd ad Gomułka’s and ) democracy. th , the Sovietthe , d the the d 24

CEU eTD Collection bodies hanged before the MDP House of House MDP the before hanged bodies the bourgeoisinterpretat question potentiallyinto Budapest PCI followers, the “white terror” sounded as the mo the as sounded terror” “white the followers, PCI 26 of side the USSR). (a communists Hungarian and Italian between empathy second this of purpose The Italy. in confrontation wi Hungary in enemy the categorize to preferred and feelings antiSoviet the of nature complicated the c terror”, “white the was objective this fulfill to interpretation communist the in credibilitygap the viole a Oscure, Botteghe to according shocktactic: categorize the evolution of the Hungarian crisis: i crisis: Hungarian the of evolution the categorize Therefore, a distortive notion of the enemy was to to was enemy the of notion distortive a Therefore, connect theoretically be to had Hungary in struggle could communists Italian language a speak to needed were distortions these both Nevertheless, uprising. that as well as exaggerated hugely was Mindszenty, of and Church the of role the particular, In Italy. confr political the of features the opinion leftist tha changes political Hungarian the of aspects some O. Vangelista, Vangelista, O. The second feature of the communist propaganda was propaganda communist the of feature second The ” 26 Vengelista had mentioned on October 29 October on mentioned Vengelista had Nuovo passo del governo Nagy per accordarsi con gli con accordarsi per Nagy governo del passo Nuovo

Kö 62 z tarsáság tér tarsáság

ontation between leftist and rightist forces in in forces rightist and leftist between ontation ontinuously illustrated with the image of the the of image the with illustrated ontinuously ion. The major categorization used in order order used in categorization The major ion. of a wide number of Hungarian comrades, comrades, Hungarian of number wide a of the primate of Hungary, Cardinal József József Cardinal Hungary, of primate the n its newsreports, its n be applied: applied: be nt propaganda might have partly bridged bridged partly have might propaganda nt f h cii o, t es, t ol call would it least, at or, crisis the of st natural implication of the “ the of implication natural st t might recall in the eyes of the Italian the of eyes the in recall might t feature of the offensive was to create create to was offensive the of feature dt h omns tugei Italy. in struggle communist the to ed th eesr bcue h propaganda the because necessary . h yia eeet o te political the of elements typical th nesad ey el communist well: very understand t least, those who were still on the on still were who those least, t f nicmuit elns n the in feelings anticommunist of the usage of “Italian categories” to to categories” “Italian of usage the . Indeed, in the perspective of the the of perspective the in Indeed, . insorti L’Unità , “L’Unità”, October 29 October “L’Unità”, , L’Unità did not try to explain to try not did overstressed marcia su su marcia th , p. ,1.p. CEU eTD Collection justification of the Soviet military intervention. military intervention. of the Soviet justification oebr 1 November abitava l’anima del mondo del l’anima abitava work of Italian journalists in Budapest during the the during Budapest in journalists Italian of work du PCI withthe broke gradually Perucchi Sergio and even radicalized Castellani, Adriana and Jacoviello sh so was PCI the of interpretation the and reality controvers to led move this However, eyewitnesses. communist press because it would provide the Romeb the provide would it because press communist Sergio Perucchi of of Perucchi Sergio uaet aogie ih din Cseln, h in the Castellani, accom that reviews Adriana communist other of correspondent with alongside Budapest, international newspapers, had sent additional corre additional sent had newspapers, international intended to “exploit” the Suez crisis: “The PCI cal PCI “The crisis: Suez the “exploit” to intended ge the of context the in surprising not is this and f war”. of the weakens Union, Soviet the against action every “ that evidence clear provided events Hungarian the 31 30 29 28 27 the Italian journalists in Budapest was also dramat also was Budapest in journalists Italian the c propaganda, on changes these of impact the on and muoiono all’alba muoiono terror”. concre give to order in employed was “enemy” the of undergone relevant changes from the previous phase. previous the from changes relevant undergone released by “L’Unità” on November 1 November on “L’Unità” by released action of imperialist forces. This is the gist of t of gist the is This forces. imperialist of action p international Oscure, Botteghe to According said. government

of November 1 November of its to support political provided having for guilty Italian government was composed by a coalition of bycoalition a wascomposed government Italian 1 November “L’Unità”, 5960. pp. Argentieri, F. distortive This 1920. pp. Leiss, A. Paolozzi, L. Communiqué The “campaign for peace” was intended to criticize criticize to intended was peace” for “campaign The Indeed, the illustrative signs of the communist off communist the of signs illustrative the Indeed, The analysis of the issues of issues the of analysis The 28 30

infcnl eog, n hs wrs hr ws alr was there words these in enough, Significantly st lo u t te at ht b te ey at as o days last very the by that, fact the to due also 31 signed by the General Directive Board of the Itali the of Board Directive General the by signed : according to the communists, even thanks to a sil a to thanks even communists, the to according : (1961), realized as a movie by Mario Craveri and E and Craveri Mario movieby a as realized (1961), st issue of issue i Nuove Vie st , 1956, p. 1. 1. p. 1956, , . Some information about the changes in the press o press the in changes the about information Some . L’Unità . On the one hand, this organizational improvement improvement organizational this hand, one the On .

st L’Unità , p. 1. p. , . The main concern of the communist press was “peac was press communist the of concern main The . 27 helps to highlight how the distorted categorizatio distorted the how highlight to helps spondents into Hungary. The communist press organ s organ press communist The Hungary. into spondents ized by Indro Montanelli who wrote the play script script play the wrote who Montanelli Indro by ized arp that some journalists, in particular the faithf the particular in journalists, some that arp more their positions; on the other hand, Giorgio B Giorgio hand, other the on positions; their more piigi h oi fSri eucis memoirs, Perucchi’s Sergio of topic the is uprising an be found in F. Argentieri, pp. 6162. The experi The 6162. pp. Argentieri, F. in found be an ring the remaining days of the Hungarian crisis. Th crisis. Hungarian the of days remaining the ring ial outcomes: on the other hand, the contrast betwe contrast the hand, other the on outcomes: ial DCPSDIPLI, headed by Antonio Segni. Segni. Antonio by headed DCPSDIPLI, 6 Indeed, Indeed, 3 3 ased editors with reports about the “white terror” terror” “white the about reports with editors ased panied panied strategy was successfully applied by the PCI from from PCI the by applied successfully was strategy he leta junls Abro aoilo ad the and Jacoviello, Alberto journalist fluential “imperialist” allies. Indeed, Pietro Ingrao Pietro Indeed, allies. “imperialist” ls to fight for peace” for fight to ls neral patterns of the communist strategy communist the of patterns neral communiqué forces of peace, [and] increases the risk the increases [and] peace, of forces eace was endangered by the worldwide worldwide the by endangered was eace L’Unità every move back of the socialist camp, socialist the of back move every L’Unità ensive clearly showed on the first page page first the on showed clearly ensive f October, the organization of the press had had press the of organization the October, f teness to the false myth of the “white “white the of myth false the to teness an Communist Party on October 31 October on Party Communist an nrico Gras. Gras. nrico , just like all the other main Italian and and Italian main other the all like just , , Giorgio Bontempi of Bontempi Giorgio , lo h Iain DCheaded Italian the also ay sne f preventive of sense a eady released on November 1 November on released ent acceptance, Rome was Rome acceptance, ent rganization after October 30 October after rganization 29 , the main headline main the , was essential for the the for essential was PaeseSera ul Alberto ul ontempi ence of ence I sogni sogni I e daily daily e

en the the en ent to ent st Dove Dove from from and and and and e”, e”, st th n : , CEU eTD Collection political cost of the international crises: more pr more crises: international the of cost political ee e partito del sede Nevertheless, the PCI employed a huge extent of ver of extent huge a employed PCI the Nevertheless, oiia aea a te itra Gög Dls ( Dalos György historian the as – arena political Nevertheless, Western press introduced the idea tha idea the introduced press Western Nevertheless, the reports by Vangelista, on the October 29 October the on Vangelista, by reports the still but chapter, this of footnote a in introduced executed in jail” (p. 7). Similarly, but even more even but Similarly, 7). (p. jail” in executed Varsavia Hungary. The issues of of issues The Hungary. about giving birth to a new Catholic party. Catholic a givingto new about birth the of spirit the enflaming in Mindszenty Cardinal 35 34 33 32 fie was a matter of fact, but just a small group of ÁVH of group small a just but fact, matterof a was intervention in Egypt. Egypt. in intervention theore (just its for cost equivalent an with DC the intervention Soviet of cost political the from PCI Ingr aggression Suez, on of the sufficient coverage focused stayed which (RAI), Broadcasting Television can be found on November 1 November on found be can rge rpre 10 omnss hanged communists 130 reported Prague) (telegra sources Hungarian Vangelista, to according of November 4 November of eotd hm s raignw o svrl sus H issues. several on breakingnews as them reported Soviet withdrawal” – “Mindszenty back to thecapita to back “Mindszenty – withdrawal” Soviet tl fl o mn f h od eie sec o Nove of (speech regime old the of men of full still C The Nagy. toward attitude negative particularly a

communist press carried out: mobviolence against t against mobviolence out: carried press communist October 25 October (“ in order to “convert” the Hungarian crisis into an an into crisis Hungarian the “convert” to order in a Better Future Better a O. Vangelista, Vangelista, O. Vangelista, O. tha news, false hereby meant is “falsification” By Ingrao, P. G cl atce, n oebr 2 November on attacked, rcely In brief, the main purpose of the “campaign for pea for “campaign the of purpose main the brief, In n diin te omns pes sd cer falsi clear a used press communist the addition, In i voai dell’aggressione avvocati li , “L’Unità”, November 2 November “L’Unità”, , th (“Ernő Gerő executed by a group of counterrevolut of group a by executed Gerő (“Ernő Gli avvocati dell’aggressione avvocati Gli th , in “New York Times”, November 1 November Times”, York “New in , “’nt” Nvme 1 November “L’Unità”, , (“Ernő Gerő killed by the counterrevolutionaries” the by killed Gerő (“Ernő I controrivoluzionari impiccano centotrenta comunis centotrenta impiccano controrivoluzionari I l adnl Mnset vo fnae n att. Im partito. un fondare vuol Mindszenty cardinale Il st L’Unità issue of issue nd

, 1956, p. 8. This provides an example of deliberat of example an provides This 8. p. 1956, , ”), in particular the newborn Italian State Radio Radio State Italian newborn the particular in ”), f oebr 1 November of L’Unità nd st , “L’Unità”, November 2 November “L’Unità”, , 15, . .Ti i as a eape f h kn o kind the of example an also is This 1. p. 1956, , wo h nmd te doae o te aggression” the of advocates “the named he whom , th issue of the newspaper, “Farkas, both father and s and father both “Farkas, newspaper, the of issue repeated for a further clarification): For instanc For clarification): further a for repeated . Three concepts are actually associated: “completi associated: actually are concepts Three . 35 interestingly, Gerő had died twice: the first on th on first the twice: died had Gerő interestingly, agents was actually hanged by the crowd. crowd. the by hanged actually was agents t Mindszenty could run a Catholic party ( party Catholic a run could Mindszenty t ardinal just remarked that the Hungarian government Hungarian the that remarked just ardinal he defenders of the House of the Party of of Party the of House the of defenders he bal violence against Mindszenty. The best example o example best The Mindszenty. against violence bal l” – “Trash of the old regime come back” (p. 8). 8). (p. back” come regime old the of “Trash – l”

st Iain su” Mnset nvr rpsd o enter to proposed never Mindszenty issue”: “Italian 34 6 , 1956), but Mindszenty never said this, nor did he did nor this, said never Mindszenty but 1956), , nhra 1956 Ungheria n coe 30 October on t is facts that never happened. Nevertheless, Nevertheless, happened. never that facts is t 4 r i te it f oe lutaie xmls (alre examples illustrative some of list the is ere

br 3 mber ecisely, on the one hand, to discharge the the discharge to hand, one the on ecisely, ao argued. st in Hungary; on the other hand, to charge to hand, other the on Hungary; in n 2 and phed to Belgrade and, from Belgrade, to to Belgrade, from and, Belgrade to phed tical) support to the French and British and French the to support tical) oneeouin ih i speeches his with counterrevolution rd ionaries!”, p. 1) and the second on the issue issue the on second the and 1) p. ionaries!”, fication – sources on the website www.rev.hu). www.rev.hu). website the on sources – nd , p. 1). 1). p. , ce” was to attempt to “reverse” the the “reverse” to attempt to was ce” on the Hungarian case without a a without case Hungarian the on , 1956, p. 8. 8. p. 1956, , nd , Rome, Donzelli, p. 116) remarked. remarked. 116) p. Donzelli, Rome, , ti che avevano difeso fino all’ultimo la all’ultimo fino difeso avevano che ti are still illustrative examples: examples: illustrative still are e ay a eucao l at di Patto il denunciato ha Nagy re th 33 ad poiet oe of role prominent a and , f h nw cmn from coming news the of e attack on Mindszenty Mindszenty on attack e Mindszenty Sees Sees Mindszenty Köztarsáság tér Köztarsáság e, according to to according e, f falsifications falsifications f on, had been been had on, e issue of of issue e on of the the of on L’Unità show show f this this f was and the ady 32

CEU eTD Collection oebr 4 November rvd te wie Sve itreto wt a mora a with intervention Soviet awaited the provide moral obligation to “stop chaos and terror”. white “stop moralobligation to acc morally was cost, human its as well as Hungary, legitimization of the Soviet intervention of Novemb of intervention Soviet the of legitimization 25. 25. 39 38 37 36 well. well. pla taking crisis a just not was counterrevolution shift of sort a obtained Oscure Botteghe approach, ce and Church the is that communism”, of “enemy the “fasci by out carried mobviolence by characterized this interpretation, this “L’Unità”, November 5 November “L’Unità”, communist cause. communist

of the “deviationist” government. Therefore, the fa the Therefore, government. “deviationist” the of could Hungary of forces popular the that followers from the windows of the the of windows the from Weste the to appeared it as events, the of sequence already been had units Soviet of march the Hungary positio a in not were observers foreign the Indeed, Giulio Nascimbeni, Nascimbeni, Giulio 69. p. Argentieri, F. Vangelista, O. Ibidem By transforming the Hungarian crisis into an “Itali an into crisis Hungarian the transforming By n atclr te rbe o te ugra neutral Hungarian the of problem the particular, In oee, olat ad nro copne te moral the accompanied Ingrao and Togliatti However, hrfr, omns junlss tity connected strictly journalists communist Therefore, . th curd s cneune f h Hnain neutral Hungarian the of consequence a as occurred Le truppe sovietiche intervengono in Ungheria per per Ungheria in intervengono sovietiche truppe Le 38 Montanelli “I sogni rinascono all’alba” rinascono sogni “I Montanelli L’Unità

th , 1956, p. 1.p. 1956, , Duna hotel Duna depicted the choices of Nagy’s government as a bet a as government Nagy’s of choices the depicted

, seemed to be suggesting that the Soviet invasion invasion Soviet the that suggesting be to seemed , 6 5 5 37

rn journalists who lived the crisis mostly crisis the lived who journalists rn n to know that in the villages of Eastern Eastern of villages the in that know to n e n uaet bt t novd tl as Italy involved it but Budapest, in ce lse myth of the “white terror” helped to to helped terror” “white the of myth lse er 4 er st” insurgents, with the Italian notion of notion Italian the with insurgents, st” not be on the side of the insurgents and insurgents the of side the on be not , “Il Corriere della Sera”, August 25 August Sera”, della Corriere “Il , in the political debate: the Hungarian Hungarian the debate: political the in an issue”, the PCI tried to persuade its its persuade to tried PCI the issue”, an paet o tre as I fc, the fact, In days. three for apparent ntrist political forces. Thanks to this to Thanks forces. political ntrist th pal bcue h US hd the had USSR the because eptable ity was crucial: the chronological chronological the crucial: was ity . In order to prepare the ground for ground the prepare to order In . justification l h nto o “ht terror”, “white of notion the porre fine al caos e al terrore bianco terrore al e caos al fine porre utfcto wt a political a with justification t (oebr 1 (November ity 36 te nain of invasion the : rayal of the the of rayal th , 1994, p. 1994, , st ). of 39 ,

CEU eTD Collection eetees i te tla cnet te opposite the context, Italian the in Nevertheless, just recently. Therefore, historians now know that that know now historians Therefore, recently. just process of reactionary degeneration which made the made which degeneration reactionary of process http://www.sissco.it/index.php?id=1293&tx_wfqbe_pi1 (November 1 (November Hunga the considered Ingrao by headed newspaper the nrpv ide, ose te rnns o Ng’ g Nagy’s of proneness 1 (November the boosted indeed, Andropov, p and, 307311 pp. neutrality), declaring Nagy from attack) is still very solid, in spite of its incons of its spite in very solid, attack)still is 43 42 41 40 nesadbe ht h US wud nae ugr a Hungary of neutrality. declaration invade would USSR governmen the new that the in understandable and uprising the of spirit the that the Hungarian declaration of neutrality had a a had neutrality of declaration Hungarian thatthe 31 October became get fro support to neutrality political the hope in Budapest attack to intent Soviet the as soon the of justification any sufficient provide not did neutrality proclaim to decided government Hungarian local reports witnessed the troops movements from Z from movements thetroops witnessed reports local ril dsrbs fcinl iuto: mt stre empty situation: fictional a describes article elUgei contemporanea dell’Ungheria

was actually the consequence of the Soviet interven Soviet the of consequence the actually was governme Hungarian the of decisionmaking the about background their of regardless historians, Indeed, endorsed by by endorsed Hungarian government; ongoing Soviet withdrawal; em withdrawal; Soviet ongoing government; Hungarian gn; asklig o cmuit. h Hnain n Hungarian The communists. of masskillings agent; This point is crucial in Federigo Argentieri, p. 5 p. Argentieri, Federigo in crucial is point This (Wo 53 no. document Byrne, M. Rainer, J. Békés, C. Vangelista, O. Nov Andropov, by Y. report CWIHP, Granville, C. J. Nevertheless, the chronological “misunderstanding” “misunderstanding” chronological the Nevertheless, This “misunderstanding” affected historiography as as historiography affected “misunderstanding” This st ); no. 65 (Report by Yurii Andropov to the CPSU CC CPSU the to Andropov Yurii by (Report 65 no. ); st . infcnl, uaet ok h cac t issue to chance the took Budapest Significantly, ). st L’Unità ) as the natural implication of the counterrevolutthe of implication natural the as ) Imre Nagy ha denunciato il Patto di Varsavia di Patto il denunciato ha Nagy Imre n at perd s h ms lgcl reconstructio logical most the as appeared fact in 41

Mln Bmin, 06 Agnir’ rve o Bi of review Argentieri’s – 2006 Bompiani, Milan, ,

role in the Soviet decision for the second interven second the for decision Soviet the in role 0. Nevertheless, the historian Antonello Biagini st Biagini Antonello historian the Nevertheless, 0. ets because of the fear of the terrorists; anarchy anarchy terrorists; the of fear the of because ets intervention unavoidable. unavoidable. intervention áhony toward Budapest. Budapest. toward áhony 66 . 33.Te miuu attd o te ambassado the of attitude ambiguous The 330334. p. istencyinvestigation. asourcegrounded in urlt ws osdrd o e h fnl ucm of outcome final the be to considered was eutrality ember 1 ember %5Bidrecensione%5D=2803. %5Bidrecensione%5D=2803.

ergence of a strong role of the Church as a politic a as Church the of role strong a of ergence m the international community. the international m troop movements in Hungarian territory: as territory: Hungarian in movements troop rking notes of the CPSU CC Presidium meeting, meeting, Presidium CC CPSU the of notes rking overnment toward the declaration of neutrality neutrality of declaration the toward overnment and beliefs, did not have full information information full have not did beliefs, and nepeain nurlt a cue f the of cause as (neutrality interpretation the Hungarian declaration of neutrality neutrality of declaration Hungarian the st tion, and not the cause of the attack. the of cause the not and tion, , 1956, p. 33. p. 1956, , after a meeting with Andropov, who Andropov, with meeting a after , “L’Unità”, November 2 November “L’Unità”, , nt, because relevant sources emerged emerged sources relevant because nt, Presidium, November 1 November Presidium, such a declaration just as soon as several several as soon as just declaration a such had a strong impact on journalism: journalism: on impact strong a had rian break with the Warsaw Pact Pact Warsaw the with break rian la, h gvrmn declared government the clear, well, because the interpretation interpretation the because well, . hrfr, t emd o be to seemed it Therefore, t. fter Budapest had issued a a issued had Budapest fter ionary tendencies existing in existing tendencies ionary st o te events. the of n ); no. 66 (Telegram 66 no. ); nd , 1956, p. 8. The The 8. p. 1956, , 40 agini’s book: book: agini’s

tion ( tion ill argues argues ill n the in Storia Storia 43

a a 42 al al r r

CEU eTD Collection phase. phase. iri Npltn: http://www.repubblica.it/2006/0 Napolitano: ungheria/napolitanoungheria.html. Giorgio save international peace aswell”. save peace international and military the defend to just not extent decisive counter the of chaos the into falling from Hungary [ Therefore, East. Middle in aggression imperialist of point flash a of creation the avoided Hungary in Dec in Napolitano Giorgio of speech a in summarized 45 44

olwn i a atce sud y L Rpblc” o Repubblica” “La r by issued been article have an is speech following the of fragments Just hp?id=732. http://www.storialibera.it/epoca_contemporanea/comu 108110. Argentieri, pp. – 1996) o journalist the and Argentieri Hungarian between the controversy of ranks recogn the to within from well revisionism as neglected they Therefore, system. e the to intended was revolution Hungarian the that and journalists noncommunist particular, In well.

Italian communists gave up the situational “prudenc situational the up gave communists Italian expect the Oscure Botteghe gave Kremlin the as soon stale the of break the to thanks position offensive events. through press communist Italian the in constructed impe the “demonstrate” to tried it and East, Middle h cmlt saeet f h cret rsdn of President current the of statement complete The ta events the related press noncommunist However, L’Unità In h Iain omns Pry a al t raie the realize to able was Party Communist Italian The Conclusion u, h mrl n pltcl eiiiain f the of legitimization political and moral the sum, 44 All the elements of the PCI’s final position on th on position final PCI’s the of elements the All rmd h cmuit fesv i te internationa the in offensive communist the framed

45

stablishment of a neutral or possibly Westernlike Westernlike possibly or neutral a of stablishment writers endorsed a sort of “liberal” interpretation “liberal” of sort a endorsed writers te Crir dla ea Guep Rso (Novembe Russo Giuseppe Sera” della “Corriere the f 6 Otbr 29 October n nismo_nel_mondo/est_europa/ungheria_1956/articolo.p 7 king place in Hungary with a number of distortions distortions of number a with Hungary in place king ize the importance of the workers’ councils and of of and councils workers’ the of importance the ize Workers’ Party. A good example of this can be the the be can this of example good A Party. Workers’ pre b te an esaes Fr ntne the instance, For newspapers. main the by eported

taei itrss f h US,bt to but USSR, the of interests strategic ae n h Sve dcsoaig as decisionmaking: Soviet the in mate the Italian Republic can be found here: here: found be can Republic Italian the revolution, and it also contributed to a to contributed also it and revolution, e” which had characterized the former former the characterized had which e” ation of new measures to be taken, the taken, be to measures new of ation h itreto] otiue t save to contributed intervention] the several distortions of the Hungarian Hungarian the of distortions several ember 1956: “the Soviet intervention Soviet “the 1956: ember eot ad e te SR tp the stop USSR the let and revolt, ils sii ad betvs f the of objectives and spirit rialist th 20, e mnh atr h eeto of election the after months few 2006, , eod oit nevnin were intervention Soviet second passage from a defensive to an an to defensive a from passage 6/sezioni/politica/presidente/napolitano e Hungarian uprising were later were uprising Hungarian e l context of the crisis in in crisis the of context l , arguing arguing , political political as as r r CEU eTD Collection post1945 democratic order. democratic post1945 order. by late 1956, therefore, such a view is in contrast in is view a such therefore, 1956, late by We followers, the image of the USSR as the only intern only the as USSR the of image the followers, necessary in order to protect one of the of one protect to order in necessary o the On intervention. Soviet the of legitimization on Hungary. In this sense, the PCI intended to defe to intended PCI the sense, this In Hungary. on o outcome the as intervention the of cost human the moral the hand, other the On Italy. in prestige its was an essential component. component. wasan essential p the of foundations ideological the criticism from “secret”speech. t at or, (1944) Salerno of swing the from communism spir reformist and democratic of sort a of idea the w PCI the of attitude the that shows interpretation severa among line given a chose and process, making th since “mistake”: the of stream historiographical hist some challenges interpretation this Therefore, t during role “active” an actually had PCI the that The analysis of the communist counteroffensive is is counteroffensive communist the of analysis The Through its final position the Italian Communist Pa Communist Italian the position final its Through tr pwr. hs nepeain a itne t r to intended was interpretation This powers. stern

interessi permanenti interessi 68

justification was crucial in order to make make to order in crucial was justification with the historiography which endorsed endorsed which historiography the with arty’s legacy, among which the morality the which among legacy, arty’s as very conservative and quite dogmatic dogmatic quite and conservative very as ational agent of peace and grantor of the of grantor and peace of agent ational PI okpr i te oit decision Soviet the in part took PCI e nd its its nd f the rightist coup, not of the Soviet war Soviet the of not coup, rightist the f e ad a oiia lgtmzto was legitimization political a hand, ne oriographical streams. First of all, the the all, of First streams. oriographical t ieped n h rns f Italian of ranks the in widespread it he latest, in the very aftermath of the of aftermath very the in latest, he e as f h Hnain uprising. Hungarian the of days he rty constructed a political and moral and political a constructed rty also interesting because it highlights highlights it because interesting also l available options. In addition, this this addition, In options. available l soe i te ys f h leftist the of eyes the in estore, interesse permanente interesse : the linkage with the USSR and USSR the with linkage the : in shielding shielding in CEU eTD Collection political apparatus (the party-organization itself) party-organization (the apparatus political ofthe PCI. the ranks within practice individual freedom became seldom intolerable in the intolerable in seldom freedom became individual Therefore, crisis. Hungarian the about truth PCI’s to leadership the “forced” audience, Italian the on nature dramatic the party: the of ranks the within e gradual the of because particularly consequences, official the However, followers. its of affiliation

1 students’ as well as CGIL the as such institutions cultural n partyand its theconnection the between leak definitive a opened 1956 of storm” “second the show to needed Party Communist Italian the opinion, crisis on the notion of notion the on crisis A. Guerra, p. 279. p. A. Guerra, n at i odr o per s rlal political reliable a as appear to order in fact, In The communist offensive had helped the Italian Comm Italian the helped had offensive communist The h proe f hs hpe i t aaye h impac the analyze to is chapter this of purpose The Botte of position controversial the words, other In D The problem of freedom in the ranks of the Italian the Italian the ranks of freedom problemof The in ISSENT AND PARTY AND ISSENT centralismo democratico centralismo -

DISCIPLINE connections with its network its connectionswith DEMOCRATICO F o urth Chapter Chapter urth : ANY DEMOCRACY IN THE THE IN DEMOCRACY ANY 69 69

(“democratic centralism”) and on its actual its on and centralism”) (“democratic and on its network (including a number of number a (including network its on and stigmatize dissent in order to establish the establish to order in dissent stigmatize etwork was based. etworkwas based. of the Hungarian events, and their impact impact their and events, Hungarian the of position of the PCI had controversial controversial had PCI the of position aftermath of the crisis. aftermath gn i te ys f h lfit public leftist the of eyes the in agent ? ? in the ideological affiliation on which on affiliation ideological the in a homogenous position. Nevertheless, position. homogenous a mergence of a problem of freedom freedom of problem a of mergence h cnrs bten uhrt and authority between contrast the ghe Oscure led to an internal party party internal an to led Oscure ghe t on the Hungarian events, on the the on events, Hungarian the on t councils and intellectuals). More More intellectuals). and councils unist Party to keep the ideological the keep to Partyunist Communist Party and in the in and Party Communist CENTRALISMO CENTRALISMO 1

CEU eTD Collection oebr 15 November pr persistence of Stalinist-type features in the appar the in features Stalinist-type of persistence

hardliners within the party. the party. hardlinerswithin events the conversely, or, paradigm “Eurocommunist” Pa Communist Italian the whether assess to order in the toward establishment political the of attitude over the PCI’s Hunga in position idealsand realism such as Calvino, Battaglia, Manacorda. Manacorda. Battaglia, suchas Calvino, M Commission, the of president the of line official document of dissent in 1956, the “ 1956, in of document dissent genesis the well as illustrate will I section, this c the in policies cultural PCI’s the of outcome and democratico communist-friendly Italian communist-friendly Party. Party. the in deficit democratic the of issue the address Gio and Vittorio Di and side, one the on Togliatti, att particular with 1956, December of Congress VIII ecise Therefore, I will analyze the emergence of dissent dissent of emergence the analyze will I Therefore, Secondly, I will move to the analysis of the meetin the of theanalysis to move Iwill Secondly, the stress will I analysis this conduct to order In Thirdly, I will focus on the political crises that that crises political the on focus will I Thirdly,

l y, I intend to focus on the contradictions between between contradictions the on focus to intend I y, became apparent by late 1956: firstly, the connect the firstly, 1956: late by apparent became th n 16 and th wt priua rfrne o h itra contras internal the to reference particular with , intellighenzia Manifesto dei Centouno dei Manifesto , with particular attention to the paradoxical natu paradoxical the to attention particular with , 70

atus and practices of the Italian Communist Italian the of practices and atus “dissidents”. This point is actually crucial crucial actually is point This “dissidents”. n eouin f h ms significant most the of evolution and ry. ry. litti, on the other. In this section, I will will I section, this In other. the on litti, el o te C, n I il tes the stress will I and PCI, the of realm areas where a crisis of the of crisis a where areas ontext of the Hungarian Revolution. In Revolution. Hungarian the of ontext ario Alicata, and several “revisionists”, “revisionists”, several and Alicata, ario affected the PCI before and during the during and before PCI the affected ention to the political ruptures between between ruptures political the to ention rty was really moving toward a sort of sort a toward moving really was rty g of the PCI’s Cultural Commission of Commission Cultural PCI’s gthe of of 1956 contributed to strengthen the the strengthen to contributed 1956 of within the ranks of the party and the the and party the of ranks the within ”. individual freedom, proclaimed proclaimed freedom, individual ion between the PCI and the and PCI the between ion bten the between t centralismo centralismo re re CEU eTD Collection but dissent was not tolerated as soon as the decisi the as soon as tolerated not was dissent but princi In network. cultural its and PCI the between y n cntan: y i-0s ms o te Italian the of most mid-50’s, by constraint: any by f h itleta i spot f h PIs positio PCI’s the of support in intellectual the of were actually “free” unless they “agreed” with the with they “agreed” wereunless actually“free” Togliatti, intended to apply the theory of of theory the apply to intended Togliatti, cult new a out carry to purpose the with Commission 6 5 4 3 2

intellighenzia decision. As soon as the entitled institution passe institution theentitled Asas soon decision. ie sbet r rcdr. nta, dmcai ce “democratic Instead, procedure. or subject time, old-re the of forces the to opponent only the is it soviet the since decision-making ananti-democratic “organ of notion Marxist original the “democratize” follows: the intellectuals were very welcome in the in welcome very were intellectuals the follows: toward the “ toward “101”

manifesto-dei-101/ manifesto-dei-101/ http://temi.repubblica.it/micromega-online/i-fatti- ietos n principle. in directions th country, the of agent political progressive only stances in the eyes of the Italianopinion. stancesthe public the eyes in of A. Vittoria, p. 161. 161. p. A. Vittoria, 160 p. A. Vittoria, 190. p. A. Brogi, Carnevali, Emilio proce decision-making a is centralism” “Democratic F By implication, the political outcome of Alicata’s Alicata’s of outcome political the implication, By n aur 15, h PI pone Mro lct as Alicata Mario appointed PCI the 1955, January In Significantly enough, this idyll between the party the party idyll between this Significantlyenough, reedom “to agree”: the paradoxical nature of the PC the of nature paradoxical the agree”: “to reedom i “irMg” Rm, ’srso gup editori gruppo – L’Espresso (Rome, “MicroMega” in , M ee osdrd o e n pia rsuc t “vali to resource optimal an be to considered were anifestodei Centouno fti ’nhra i dses dgi intellettual degli dissenso il e d’Ungheria fatti I 6 n diin te wr sotnosy iln t gi to willing spontaneously were they addition, In

” ” d a decision, nobody could dispute it. it. dispute could nobody decision, a d dungheria-e-il-dissenso-allinterno-del-pci-storia-d gime. Therefore, the mandate of the soviet has no l no has soviet the of mandate the Therefore, gime. is considered to be entitled to pass all decisions all pass to entitled to be isconsidered ic centralism”. The latter (organic centralism) con centralism) (organic latter The centralism”. ic taim tertcly los re icsin befo discussion free allows theoretically ntralism” 7 etaim democratico centralismo 1 s nrdcd n h cmuit otie n re to order in doctrine communist the in introduced ss

5

political stances taken from above. above. stances taken political from on had been taken. been had on ple, Alicata’s line can be summarized as summarized be can line Alicata’s ple, phase of elaboration of the party line, line, party the of elaboration of phase intellectuals perceived the PCI as the the as PCI the perceived intellectuals and leftist intellectuals was not affected affected not was intellectuals andleftist ural policy: Alicata, in agreement with with agreement in Alicata, policy: ural line was the attempt at a mobilization mobilization a at attempt the was line erefore, they welcomed its political political its welcomed they erefore, ns 4 ifunil ebr o Italian of members influential : ale, no. 9, 2006), available online: online: available 2006), 9, no. ale, I’s cultural policies and the road road the and policies cultural I’s d snsr. tra e mnfso dei manifesto del Storia sinistra. di i president of the Cultural Cultural the of president 3 ae te communist the date” In other words, they they words, other In 2 o h connection the to e positive a ve el- because of of because imits in in imits sists of of sists re the the re

CEU eTD Collection particular to the Marxists of the Students’ Council Students’ the of Marxists the to particular problem of principle: the right to individual free rightindividual to ofthe problem principle: demonstrating in Budapest came to the minds of the of minds the to came Budapest in demonstrating for the improvement of socialism. Indeed, that lett Indeed, that socialism. of improvement the for the support of the “Italian progressive students” progressive “Italian the of support the y an uprising turned into had not thedemonstration 9 8 7 beintegrated to the lif for claim in the opposite: cont now established journalists and writers belonging t writersbelonging and journalists nowestablished Centouno “spe analysis The the party. communist of the and intellectuals attrition of process of process gradual intellighenzia and D’Amelio were sitting. were D’Amelio and of mechanism isn ad a te ae ie te nelcul be discipline. intellectuals the time, same the at and, dissent since of changed cooperation, the terms Revolution part the between tuning the affected deeply events, Interestin 2006. 9, no. “MicroMega”, Carnevali, E. Ibidem Ibidem Nevertheless, the break did not take place all at o at all place take not did break the Nevertheless, h ie t peae dcmn o sldrt i fav in solidarity of document a prepare to idea The But the explosion of the Hungarian crisis, and part and crisis, Hungarian the of explosion the But In other words, the party and many intellectuals we intellectuals many and party the words, other In r ibution to its political choices: “we do not claim not do “we choices: political its to ibution . . i vr ifraie n re t udrtn hw th how understand to order in informative very is ” . etaim democratico centralismo 8 They sent a letter to the Hungarian Embassy in Rom in Embassy Hungarian the to letter a sent They

o the leftist area. area. theleftist o culy okd n h cnet f leftist of context the in worked actually gly enough, those students, in particular Asor Rosa Asor particular in students, those enough, gly 72

e of the party”, as Lucio Coletti put it. put LucioasofColetti the party”,e 9 choice. choice. to the Hungarian colleagues demonstrating demonstrating colleagues Hungarian the to er had been written on October 23 October on written been had er et. et. y and its cultural network: the Hungarian Hungarian the network: cultural its and y , where men such as Asor Rosa, Tronti Rosa, Asor as such men where , the party became more intolerant toward toward intolerant more the party became f h gnss f h “ the of genesis the of icularly the evolution of the historical historical the of evolution the icularly ae oe noeat oad party- toward intolerant more came Roman students of “La Sapienza”, in in Sapienza”, “La of students Roman nce. Indeed, it was the outcome of a a of outcome the was it Indeed, nce. for independence from the party. We party. the from independence for re approaching a breaking-point on a a on breaking-point a approaching re il cneto bten leftist between connection cial” or of the Hungarian students students Hungarian the of or clua plce ad the and policies cultural e Manifesto dei dei Manifesto e granting granting e rd 7 , when ,

, are are , CEU eTD Collection lc…ee o yu wr ta Etna Ltuna an Lithuania Estonia, that aware you not blocs…were occupation?”. students and workers fighting in Budapest. and fightingBudapest. workers students in t PCI the urge to intellectuals of network informal Caracciolo. In that occasion Pajetta sarcastically sarcastically Pajetta occasion that In Caracciolo. genesis of the “ the of genesis 14 13 12 11 10

network. network. emer dissent the by disappointed very was Togliatti

al Muscetta Carlo crisis as a whole. According to the testimony of an of testimony the to According whole. a as crisis letter to Carlo Muscetta. Carlo letterto damage further to situation: critical a to lead may initia your but organization, the within doubts his the and right the has comrade “each interpretation: homogen not was PCI the that impression the opinion crisis. In the night between October 28 October between night the In crisis. deb official an open to chose intellectuals leftist influential leftist intellectuals leftist influential 2006. 9, no. “MicroMega”, Carnevali, E. writers influential most the of one Pirani, Mario Spr Paolo from came complaint mostsignificant The Stefano, Di Paolo Ibidem ae o, y coe 27 October by on, Later fe te ubek f h uhaa, h chief-edito the upheaval, the of outbreak the After In particular, Togliatti as well as Pajetta were co were Pajetta as well as Togliatti particular, In Since Botteghe Oscure did provide any satisfying re satisfying any provide did Oscure Botteghe Since Giancarlo Pajetta and Giorgio Amendola had an argum an AmendolaGiorgiohad and GiancarloPajetta . Manifesto 14

10 Confidenze critiche di Carlo Muscetta Carlo di critiche Confidenze wloe te ntaie f h suet ad a t had and students the of initiative the welcomed , ”. ”. 13

11 th

Bteh Ocr hd eevd eea cmlit f complaints several received had Oscure Botteghe , who had invited the party to reconsider its positi its reconsider to party the invited had who th and 29 and of of 73 iano, who addressed a letter to Togliatti. to Togliatti. letter a addressed who iano, L’Unità

th , “Corriere della Sera”, July9 Sera”, della “Corriere , , a group of intellectuals (Cafagna, Coletti, Coletti, (Cafagna, intellectuals of group a , tive has a different connotation, because it it because connotation, different a has tive t wti te at aot h Hungarian the about party the within ate commented: “the world is divided in two two in divided is world “the commented: [the party]”, Togliatti wrote in a private private a in wrote Togliatti party]”, [the duty of giving his opinion, his concerns, his opinion, his giving of duty o give political support to the Hungarian the to support political give o ncerned about the risk to give the public public the give to risk the about ncerned important eye-witness, Mario Pirani Mario eye-witness, important ging within the party-friendly cultural party-friendly the within ging related to Carnevali his memories about the the about memories his Carnevali to related eously in agreement with the official the with agreement in eously r of the communist review review communist the of r ply to the complaints, a number of of number a complaints, the to ply ent with Lucio Coletti and Alberto LucioColetti with ent d Latvia are under Russian Russian under are Latvia d e da o rae an create to idea he th , 2009, p. 41. p. 2009, , on on the on on Società rom rom 12 , , , CEU eTD Collection proposed, discussed, and finally approved. finallyproposed,discussed, approved. and rcdr of procedure rvd o e fiinl apid t h bgnig o beginning the at applied efficiently be to proved L’Unità version of the “secret” speech. speech. “secret” the of version review 17 16 15 Br

democratic order was actually effective and working and effective actually was order democratic ofcomplaint. oad h PI i i itrsig o eid ht Al that remind to interesting is it PCI, the toward centralismo democratico centralismo n coe 30 October On topic of discussion between the subscribers (by Oct (by subscribers the between discussion of topic and the party apparatus, in particular the Cultural the particular in apparatus, party the and with their political organization: they wrote a “le a wrote they organization: political their with cultura the “operation”, this of beginning very the concer is procedure the as far As interesting. very speak out in order to provide the party with new the partyorderwith id speakin provide out to niae b te X oges f h PU) ad for and PCUS), the of Congress XX the by indicated n the to reference (with system democratic internal ask had subscribers the context: particular that in

Ibidem Ibidem Ibidem etoni, T etoni, Nevertheless, the content of the “ the of content the Nevertheless, u te ugra Rvlto hd teghnd h “ the strengthened had Revolution Hungarian the But The content as well as the “procedure” followed in in followed “procedure” the as well as content The Nuovi Argomenti Nuovi . . . Js i odr o ie sne f h iprac o importance the of sense a give to order in Just . 17 y sun te hl dcmn, h pry ol dem would party the document, whole the issuing By r ombatore, Muscetta, Caracciolo) gathered in Rome, a Rome, in gathered Caracciolo) Muscetta, ombatore, 15 etaim democratico centralismo

th te ihrns f h PI n of and PCI the of high-ranks the , , which Togliatti had choosen in March 1956 to give to 1956 March in choosen had Togliatti which , and, by implication, reduced the tolerance toward toward tolerance the reduced implication, by and,

lettera dei Centouno dei lettera n h rlto bten C ad utrl network cultural and PCI between relation the in et Crcil ws h cifeio o te commun the of chief-editor the was Caracciolo berto 74

l network did not have any intent to break to intent any have not did network l tter” supposed to remain confidential remain to supposed tter” eas for a different political line. line. easa political different for Commission. In this sense, the informal the sense, this In Commission. ned, it is quite relevant to remark that, at that, remark to relevant quite is it ned, d o a epr mlmnain f the of implementation deeper a for ed f the crisis of confidence of these intellectuals intellectuals these of confidence of crisis the f f the crisis: the intellectuals wanted to to wanted intellectuals the crisis: the f eed for a further move in the direction the in move further a for eed ober 28 ober : a new political had been elaborated, elaborated, been had political new a : the elaboration of this document are document this of elaboration the L’Unità ” was not acceptable for the party party the for acceptable not was ” h pbiain f h lte on letter the of publication the th centralist” component of the the of component centralist” , they were one hundred-one), one were they , e i te fie o the of offices the in met nd wrote an official letter letter official an wrote nd his partial and party distorted distorted party and partial his ntae ht h internal the that onstrate internal debate. debate. internal 16 , a , ist ist CEU eTD Collection paradoxical situation On the one hand, they did not did they hand, one the On situation paradoxical position and our line because they do not understan not do they because line our and position 21 20 19 18 “ being from PCI: the toward protest of significance the of characterization the changed network its and news done in favor of lines different from the official different the official favor lines donein from of qui made and publication the opposed intellectuals, coe 31 October hi lte; olat ad aet, iil disapp visibly Pajetta, and Togliatti letter; their intellectual the of request the accepting of option ( assessment of the facts: on October on assessmentof the facts: 31 party-disci to obedience between choose to had they improve the to contribution a give to wanted really commu the of foundations ideological the protect to of the PCI’s democraticin understanding spirit referred to the trouble-makers who prepared the let the prepared who trouble-makers the to referred experienceclass struggle” in Agenzia Nazionale Stampa Associata Stampa Nazionale Agenzia Manifesto 2006. 9, no. “MicroMega”, Carnevali, E. Un the of Secretary National was the he then, Back Ibidem Ibidem hrfr, ’mlo ruh te et o h Italian the to text the brought D’Amelio Therefore, s cneune te tbon tiue f h PCI the of attitude stubborn the consequence, a As This stance appeared quite clear also to Paolo Spri Paolo to also clear quite appeared stance This Furthermore, the imposition of party-discipline was party-discipline of imposition the Furthermore, p aper based in in based aper . . ” with a programmatic revisionist intent, that is t is that intent, revisionist programmatic a with ” st a etr ul f omts: Ufruaey there “Unfortunately, dogmatism: of full letter a , i I Novembre IV via 20

. . st ). , they chose the second option. the second chose option. they , Iga ad ivni Berlinguer Giovanni and Ingrao . 21 The dissemination outside the realm of the party the of realm the outside dissemination The ion of the Students, part of the PCI’s network. network. thePCI’s of part Students, the of ion 75 centralismo democratico centralismo

one. one. itd o te lc o realism” of “lack the for ointed ter of protest) who do not understand our understand not do who protest) of ter , t es cnenn te ulcto of publication the concerning least at s, want to break with their party, and they they and party, their with break to want document, since it acquired a specific a acquired it since document, d that our line is dictated by doubtless doubtless by dictated is line our that d et f h at. n h ohr hand, other the On party. the of ment e la ta n cneso wud be would concession no that clear te nist legacy in Italy. Therefore, at the the at Therefore, Italy. in legacy nist ano who received from Togliatti, on on Togliatti, from received who ano a confidential “letter”, it became a a became it “letter”, confidential a considered to be necessary in order order in necessary be to considered ln ad hi on reo of freedom own their and pline General Press Agency, ANSA ANSA Agency, Press General tapd te usrbr it a into subscribers the “trapped” he introduction of an effective effective an of introduction he are comrades (Togliatti (Togliatti comrades are . . 18 osdrd the considered 19 f the of CEU eTD Collection paradoxical as its genesis, because the attitude of attitude the because genesis, its as paradoxical public law in Europe. Europe. law in public policies policies n Oina hsoy Spgo s jrs woe sch whose jurist a is Sapegno history. Oriental and on studies his for known particularly sociologist, f h pry is oua bs, ece i a a di way intellectuals”. a in reacted base, popular its party, the of “forg to tendency a was there that lamented Spriano with authority. authority. with Italia of attem the without all line at exist not would opposition official the to opposition of stream 24. 24. Ferri- “Carte fond, Togliatti” “Palmiro Foundation, 25 24 23 22 correspondence of Botteghe Oscure does not leave an leave not does Oscure Botteghe of correspondence of the “sacrifi spite in 1956, enforcedDecember by same could be said about other leftist intellectual leftist other about said be could same Centouno invi the accept to neglected and counter-revolution ap assembly the 1956) December (Rome, Congress VIII d a opened Commission Cultural the context, Inthis Piero Melograni and Antonio Sapegno are two very w very two are Sapegno Antonio and Melograni Piero Oct Rome, Spriano, Paolo to Togliatti P. by Letter 2006. 9, no. “MicroMega”, Carnevali, E. 199. p. A. Brogi, eetees te oe f h cmuit establishme communist the of move the Nevertheless, The distance between Spriano and Togliatti had appe had Togliatti and Spriano between distance The of criticism Commission: Cultural the in debate The hrfr, h otoe f h bek ewe PI and PCI between break the of outcome the Therefore, sent back their membership cards to Botteghe Oscur Botteghe cards membership backsent to their 23 The position of the establishment and of the leade the of and establishment the of position The

the discourse of modernity and backwardness in Euro in backwardness and modernity of discourse the Amedesi” serie, sub-serie no. 4 “1956”, archival un archival “1956”, 4 no. sub-serie serie, Amedesi” lry otiuin oue o te oprtv stud comparative the on focused contribution olarly 7 6 6 br 31 ober ell-known Italian scholars. The first is a historia a is first The scholars. Italian ell-known s, such as Melograni, Sapegno, Muscetta. Sapegno, Melograni, as such s, the party contributed to create a cultural cultural a create to contributed party the pt of the PCI at a replacement of freedom freedom of replacement a at PCI the of pt ce” of part of the cultural network. network. cultural ce” partof the of tation to debate about it. As a result, the result, a As it. about debate to tation ebate over a potential reconsideration of reconsideration potential a over ebate et that unforgettable year, and the base the and year, unforgettable that et st , 1956, Archive of the “Antonio Gramsci” Gramsci” “Antonio the of Archive 1956, , n communism. Significantly, such such Significantly, communism. n mtial opsd o ht f the of that to opposed ametrically y room for doubts about this. about doubts for room y ared clear and irreversible, and the and irreversible, and clear ared t a srtgcly fetv: as effective: strategically was nt the orthodoxy of the cultural cultural the of orthodoxy the rvd h “otie o the of “doctrine” the proved its cultural network was as as was network cultural its e. 22

r himself resulted to be to resulted himself r 24 The n and and n it no. it pean pean y of of y 25

CEU eTD Collection Negarville, L. Pergola, R. Zangheri, P. Fortunati, Fortunati, P. Zangheri, R. Pergola, L. Negarville, before the VIII Congress: E. Basevi, M. Cavagnaro, Cavagnaro, M. Basevi, E. Congress: VIII the before possibly sacrificing on the altar of free choice ev freechoice altar possiblyof the on sacrificing Levi, A. Accornero, G. Berti, M. Bartolotti, P. Buf P. Bartolotti, M. Berti, G. Accornero, A. Levi, Lizzani, L. Lombardo Radice, C. Marchesi, O. Nannuz O. Marchesi, C. Radice, Lombardo L. Lizzani, F Brambilla, G. Boldrini, A. Aloisi, M. attend: not M. Spinella, G. Sotgiu. L'elenco proseguiva con i n i con proseguiva L'elenco Sotgiu. G. Spinella, M. ap. tes hwd p t h meig ihu form without meeting Guercio. Del Vitello, Ferretti, Garritano, the at up showed Others Zappa. Gruppi, L. Filippelli, S. Cantimori, D. Cosenza, L. Berland F. Alatri, P. Adamoli, G. Spano, V. Sereni, mrgo F Msli G Dl o R Bnho R Bat Corsini, R. G. Colletti, L. Fasano, Neri, Bonchio, G. Alinovi, R. Bo, Del G. Maselli, F. Ambrogio, rcci E Rgoir, atoi Cvnoi Felis Cavandoli, Mattioli, Ragionieri, E. Procacci, E. Salinari, C. Manacorda, G. Tutino, S. Zancanaro, Diemoz, I. Calvino, F. Jacchia, V. Gerratana, Zanni Gerratana, V. Jacchia, F. Calvino, I. Diemoz, Melogran C. Modica, E. Trevisani, G. Santarelli, E. Giolitti, F. Ferri, D. Durbé, F. Feltrinelli, S. Lo S. Feltrinelli, F. Durbé, D. Ferri, F. Giolitti, and 16th, 1956, took place with a different composi different a with place took 1956, 16th, and the discussion the importantly, more even and Secondly, pursue to intended policy, cultural Alicata-driven Manacorda, A. Del Guercio, G. Berlinguer, A. Donini A. T Berlinguer, G. Guercio, A. Del A. Manacorda, Muscetta, C. Lizzani, C. Spinella, M. Guttuso, full-compos in gathered Commission the year a Twice 26 f they Therefore, PCI. the of establishment leading bu party-members, simple not were Commission the of 95 te utrl omsin prtd n ml gro small in operated Commission Cultural the 1955, A the problem of balance between freedom and party-di of thefreedom problem between balance issues these over debate The December. of Congress relationship with the intellectuals alive. alive. the intellectuals with relationship democ of injection real a needed actually party the much different from that of the intellectuals of th of intellectuals the of that from different much A. Vittoria, p. 163, footnote no. 109. Normally, a Normally, 109. no. footnote 163, p. Vittoria, A. l icata’s approach toward the inte the toward approach icata’s The Cultural Commission met on November 15 November on met Commission Cultural The uh dut mle topltcl hlegs Firs challenges. political two implied doubt a Such The prospective of those who took part in the meeti the in part took who those of prospective The pa tt nuovo rtito te oin of notion the :

etaim democratico centralismo ll ectuals: the organ of the PCI started wondering whet wondering started PCI the of organ the ectuals: zza, A. Natta, S. Scuderi, G. Pellegrini, N. Sanson N. Pellegrini, G. Scuderi, S. Natta, A. zza, Baldassi, R. Bianchi Bandinelli, D. Bertoni Jovine, Bertoni D. Bandinelli, Bianchi R. Baldassi, G. Brega, L. Ferrante). Some members, even if invit if even members, Some Ferrante). L. Brega, G. , G. Berlinguer, G. Della Volpe, G. Vianello, A.Pe Vianello, G. Volpe, Della G. Berlinguer, G. , F. Onofri, C. Polidoro, Sprovieri, D. Lajolo, A. Z A. Lajolo, D. Sprovieri, Polidoro, C. Onofri, F. a, R. Bilenchi, G. Bollati, L. Barca, S. Bertelli, Bertelli, S. Barca, L. Bollati, G. Bilenchi, R. a, ccording to the modification of the internal rules rules internal the of modification the to ccording alini, A. Cossutta, A. Donini, M. Fabiani, C. Lupor C. Fabiani, M. Donini, A. Cossutta, A. alini, ti P Srao G Fmgli A Pziao Sever Pizzinato, A. Fumagalli, G. Spriano, P. atti, omi degli invitati che non poterono partecipare (G. partecipare poterono non che invitati degli omi . Busetto, L. Fibbi, S. Garavini, P. Ingrao, R. Led R. Ingrao, P. Garavini, S. Fibbi, L. Busetto, . tion, enlarged because of the importance of the mee the of importance the of because enlarged tion, i, M. F. Alicata, M. Penelope, L. Foa, R. Rossanda, R. Foa, L. Penelope, M. Alicata, F. M. i, 77 iz, . rmaoi G D Sni, . ucta G Muscetta, C. Santis, De G. Trombadori, A. Nizza, , E. Modica. However, the meetings of November 15th November of meetings the However, Modica. E. , obdr, . atgi, . atrli C Salinari C. Santarelli, E. Battaglia, R. rombadori, p (he o fu mmes n ah sub-commission). each in members four or (three ups . af, . uts, . rcai R D Gaa A. Grada, De R. Treccani, E. Guttuso, R. Banfi, A. to. n 95 te opnns ee M Aiaa R. Alicata, M. were: components the 1955, In ition. ala M A Mncra A Lmrd, ail, A. Daniele, Lampredi, A. Manacorda, A. M. taglia,

zi, A. Natoli, G. Noberasco, E. Pancini, S. Pessi, Pessi, S. Pancini, E. Noberasco, G. Natoli, A. zi, l nie M Mfi Mzi Cuoi Pgi, Ciofi, Peggio, Ciufoli, Muzii, Mafai, M. invite: al en the will of the leader. of the leader. the will en e “ e a political exploitation of the intellectuals. intellectuals. the of exploitation political a ratic practices in order to keep its special its keep to order in practices ratic ocused on the “problem of freedom”, but but freedom”, of “problem the on ocused th Manifesto in order to prepare the ground for the for ground the prepare to order in scipline dominated the meeting. the dominated scipline concerned the founding principles of of principles founding the concerned could not stay out of the discussion: discussion: the of out stay not could tly, it questioned the correctness of of correctness the questioned it tly, ngs of November 15 November of ngs t they were also components of the the of components also were they t should be really implemented, implemented, really be should ”. First of all, all the members members the all all, of First ”. th and 16 and e, M. Ferrara, Ferrara, M. e, U. Cerroni, U. M. Rago, Rago, M. passed in in passed 26 senti, T. T. senti, adro, F. F. adro, th ed, did did ed,

Arian ini, C. ini, da, C. da, ini, I. I. ini, was G. , ting ting her her A. E. E. . .

CEU eTD Collection rcs, h “isdns o te utrl Commissio Cultural the of “dissidents” the process, direction, and with what limits”. what direction,and with ideological and cultural battle for Marxism-Leninis for battle cultural and ideological intellectuals of the of intellectuals stressing by dissent of suppression the stigmatized the political apparatus as a “starting-point” a as apparatus political the and spontaneity” and 32 31 30 29 28 27 thei usrbr o te “ the of subscribers result into a political break among break a thepolitical party-membe into result wa disagreement the that hereby meant is “moderate” c not did criticism Calvino’s enough, Significantly (Rome, “Antonio Gramsci” Foundation publication, 40 publication, Foundation Gramsci” “Antonio (Rome, application of the principle of of application the principle direction”. activit cultural and ideological the provide should issue main “the meeting: the during said Manacorda the questioned they but crisis, Hungarian the over o exception partial the (with merit the dispute not A. Vittoria, p. 168. 168. p. A. Vittoria, Ivi. Ibidem Ibidem Ivi. nevni la inoe el Cmisoe Cultural Commissione della riunione alla Interventi In other words, despite Manacorda accepted “the rig “the accepted Manacorda despite words, other In In this context, the leadership had to face the eme the face to had leadership the context, this In h ifunil rtr tl Clio eonzd the recognized Calvino Italo writer influential The In other words, the members of the Commission in di in Commission the of members the words, other In r unde , p. 1027. p. , 1026. p. , . . r 27 tnig f h dsue a dfeet rm ht of that from different was dispute the of standing

30 . Therefore, the main point of dispute was “how the “how was dispute of point main the Therefore, . Petőfi Manifesto circle: “the movement recalls the great tradition tradition great the recalls movement “the circle:

centralismo democratico centralismo cnetd h cretes f h PIs decision-m PCI’s the of correctness the contested ” 31

29 only: it was basically a way to avoid “anarchy avoid to way a basically was it only: 7 th year, no. 3-4, pp. 1026-1038), p. 1026. 1026. p. 1026-1038), pp. 3-4, no. year,

dl C (51 nvmr 1956) novembre (1516 PCI del e f Gustavo Manacorda only) of the decision decision the of only) Manacorda Gustavo f legitimacy of the procedure. As Gustavo As procedure. the of legitimacy rs). rs). m” ome “from the right”. Conversely, his his Conversely, right”. the “from ome rgence of a “moderate” opposition (by opposition “moderate” a of rgence at stake is whether and how the party party the how and whether is stake at s finally accommodated and it did not not did it and accommodated finally s h pstv rl o te Hungarian the of role positive the n stressed the need for an effective effective an for need the stressed n o te ords ih certain a with comrades the of y in the decision-making process. process. the decision-making in ht and the duty of the party to run its its run to party the of duty the and ht 28 need for a political direction, but but direction, political a for need , he considered this prerogative of prerogative this considered he , sagreement with the leadership did did leadership the with sagreement h itletas wie the while intellectuals: the party should give a give should party of the soviets”. the of , “Studi Storici” Storici” “Studi , aking aking 32

CEU eTD Collection presence of reactionary forces that could have prev have could that forces reactionary of presence Congress of the PCUS and the Hungarian crisis. and crisis. the Hungarian Congressthe PCUS of 38 37 36 35 34 33 otoo attitude” “orthodox dissent, and invited the Commission to open a to debat the Commission and invited dissent, Hungarian crisis and said that the line of thinking of line the that said and crisis Hungarian factorie Hungarian the of workers those whether you follow the stressed He facts. the of interpretation reality, the account into take not did party the of Indeed, the speaker mentioned persisting “reticence persisting mentioned speaker the Indeed, incorpo to “efforts” the in PCI the of achievements the interpr PCI’s questioned the Manacorda openly reject to one only the was s providedthat a demonstration Hungariansocialism Bosetti, Giancarlo to (according parties communist so of democratization the considered he mid-1950’s, to and orthodoxy party-centered on up give to wish p a expressed Calvino party: their to id intellectuals strong the in rooted deeply be to seemed remarks “orthodoxy”: the attitude to think that “the that party-think to “orthodoxy”:the attitude 1030. p. 2003), 3-4, (no. Storici” “Studi 159. p. A. Vittoria, 20. p. Argentieri, F. to foreword Bosetti, G. Ivi. Ibidem Ibidem neetnl eog, e one ot o ti attit this how out pointed he enough, Interestingly oee, h ms itrsig peh a ta o Ma of that was speech interesting most the However, Alongside with Calvino, Roberto Battaglia stigmatiz Battaglia Roberto Calvino, with Alongside , p. 1033. p. , . . 36 of the party cadres. He gave also a definition of of definition a also gave He cadres. party the of

etaim democratico centralismo 7 9 9 élite is the depository truth”. is of the élite of the party was “schematic”: was party the of sto o rvsoim fo te et, a left”, the “from revisionism of osition n cnrdcin “h cn elc the neglect can “who contradiction: ing in facing internal disputes” facinginternal in democratize socialism. Naturally, by the the by Naturally, socialism. democratize e over the “tragictruths” the eover u i js acpe fo a bv an above a from accepted just it but uch an option did not exist). not did uchan option s, still on general strike in spite of cold, cold, of spite in strike general on still s, ailed? But I would like to ask each of each ask to like would I But ailed? rate the spirit of the XX Congress. Congress. XX the of spirit the rate itself as well as the effective effective the as well as itself ils t b a ibe pin for option viable a be to cialism d wre i te otx o the of context the in worked ude ed the attitude of the party toward toward party the of attitude the ed ooia aflain f h leftist the of affiliation eological h cnrvril xeine of experiences controversial the tto o te ugra crisis. Hungarian the of etation nacorda, and not just because he he because just not and nacorda, 34 ht e called he what about the XXthe about 35 33 due the thethe due 38

the base the 37

CEU eTD Collection party(“ gathered the party was experiencing a process of radical mar radical of process a experiencing was party the the to contribution positive a give to intended and speak the Calvino: of that to similar theoretically http://www.storiain.net/arret/num123/artic1.asp. http://www.storiain.net/arret/num123/artic1.asp. 42 41 40 39 hun 1956, issue of “L’Unità”, p. 1. p. “L’Unità”, issue of 1956,

shift from the old organization to the to organization from the old shift Commission, Cultural the and union trade communist spher several in dissent of point common a of sense impossibility to defend socialism from the workers workers the from socialism defend to impossibility recall remark This workers. Hungarian the on attack th at later weeks three officially approve to going repressio the that stressed Manacorda all, of First many intellectuals who opposed the authority of Bot of the authority who opposed manyintellectuals o radicalization the purposes, positive to intended reaction?”. Alessandro Frigerio, Frigerio, Alessandro 2006. 9, no. “MicroMega”, Carnevali, E. The Ibidem oee, hr i as aohr neetn element. interesting another also is there However, From the analytical viewpoint, there are two r two are there viewpoint, analytical the From

In spite of the fact that the criticism came ideolo came criticism the that fact the of Inspite g e communiqué r, lo, a b ral cniee t b, osby wi possibly be, to considered really be can blood, . 39

of the CGIL has been discussed in the second chapt second the in discussed been has CGIL the of arroccamento ’rie e PI dngae a iouin d’Ungher rivoluzione la denigrare PCI: del L’ordine

”)Togliatti” around pa rtito nuovo rtito 8

er criticized Alicata’s line “from the left”, left”, the “from line Alicata’s criticized er 41 . . improvement of the party. Nevertheless, Nevertheless, party. the of improvement gically from the left and it was definitely definitely was it and left the from gically n of the uprising – which the PCI was was PCI the which – uprising the of n elevant elements in the quotation above. quotation the in elements elevant te C ipid h dmnzto of demonization the implied PCI the f tegheOscure. – as Paolo Spriano put it. it. put Spriano as – Paolo ginalization of dissent: “the base of the of base “the dissent: of ginalization e VIII Congress – was an illegitimate illegitimate an was – Congress VIII e Otbr 27 (October one of the institutions that marked the marked that institutions the of one s Di Vittorio’s statement about the the about statement Vittorio’s Di s es of the party: in both the main main the both in party: the of es er. The text can be on the October 27 October the on be can text The er. aaod’ ciiim was criticism Manacorda’s th no intent, servants of the the of servants intent, no th th 42 ).

40 hrfr, t ie a gives it Therefore, ia , “Storia In Net”, Net”, In “Storia , th , CEU eTD Collection particularly at the VIII Congress. VIIIparticularlyat the Congress. han one the on socialism: of models and men between 25 mobilize the ideological energies party. mobilize of the marginalization the considered leadership the since so a employed Party Communist Italian the apparent: fe i a oiial-retd a. hrfr, mos Therefore, way. “constructions”. politically-oriented a in often “facts the by motivated is uncertainty The unclear. 43

in this section actually differs from both these st these both from differs actually section in this the in reformism of traits the overstressed given) historia other Conversely, historiography. oriented a as Vittorio Di and Togliatti between dispute the “storm” of last 1956. leadership Togliatti’s that imply might examination and PCI the betweenand PCI the within fault-lines Togliatti (and the PCI’s establishment generally-sp establishment PCI’s the (and Togliatti party-cente less a toward move to willing Giolitti, PC relation the and top-hierarchy the both affected b and party the within methods democratic effective This section provides some examples of this: Miche this: of examples some provides section This th Political “opposition” at f the VIII “opposition” need Congress: Political n he wesbten h X oges f C’ loca PCI’s of Congress X the between weeks three In h eet o 15 hd ae h cnrs bten th between contrast the made had 1956 of events The Te itrcl at ta caatrzd h abovem the characterized that facts historical The Therefore, it is crucial to understand what the ava the what understand to crucial is it Therefore, -27 th 15) n te II oges f oe (8 Rome of Congress VIII the and 1956) , 43

reams. reams. political position of Di Vittorio. The interpretati The Vittorio. Di of position political ns and writers (hereby the example of Bruno Trentin Bruno of example the (hereby writers and ns minor episode, pretty much exaggerated by a politic a by exaggerated much pretty episode, minor 8 le Pistillo (cited later on) tried to interpret the interpret to tried on) later (cited Pistillo le 1

eaking), trying to impose party-discipline party-discipline impose to trying eaking), the CGIL, and whether the clashes underclashes the whether CGIL,and the had been actually questioned due to the to due questioned actually been had ” used so many times by historians and historians by times many so used ” of dissent to be a legitimate means to means legitimate a be to dissent of etween the party itself and its network network its and itself party the etween or DeStalinization? red socialism; on the other, Palmiro Palmiro other, the on socialism; red I-CGIL. It was also a confrontation confrontation a also was It I-CGIL. ilable sources say about the political the about say sources ilable rt of Soviet-style of party-discipline, party-discipline, of Soviet-style of rt d, Giuseppe Di Vittorio and Antonio and Vittorio Di Giuseppe d, th entioned political clashes are partly partly are clashes political entioned -13 uis f aiaaa (November Capitanata of units l th e PCI’s claims and the reality reality the and claims PCI’s e rcntutos per as appear reconstructions t December) the debate about about debate the December) on introduced introduced on history of of history will be be will ally- CEU eTD Collection political cause of socialism: the defense wo cause of the political of socialism: Pistillo, did. Pistillo, It –in “Eurocommunism” of precursors be to Giolitti interpr post-1989 the accepting necessarily without October 27 October can be distinguished in the in distinguished be can su ms hv a eti iprac, t es impo Kremlin. the “conversation”with least at importance, certain a have must issue “ to opposition novembre 1956) novembre (Bari, Edizioni Dedalo, 2007), p. 80. p. 2007), Dedalo, Edizioni (Bari, 47 46 45 44

He was definitely worried about the risk that the P the that risk the about worried definitely was He and consideration, Soviet the about Togliatti than There workers. the against soldiers the with siding [Hungarian] uprising with [political] support”. [political] with uprising [Hungarian] meth Stalinist of abandonment the for concerned one par the in that wrote He dangerous. potentially was em the about worried actually was communism Italian ht i itro boe ih h lnns practices leninist the socialism. of understanding with “broke Vittorio Di that http://www.brunotrentin.it/index.php?option=com_con t s o psil t nget a Mcee Pistillo Michele as – neglect to possible not is it

at dUgei, oe Otbr 12 October Rome, d’Ungheria, fatti Mario Pio Patruno, Patruno, Pio Mario Trentin, Bruno Pistillo, Michele Argent in F. found be can thetelegram textof The Nevertheless, it is still possible to wonder what t what wonder to possible still is it Nevertheless, h te The As far as the leader of the CGIL is concerned, a pa a concerned, CGILis the of leader the asfar As x o Tgitis eerm o ocw f coe 30 October of Moscow to telegram Togliatti’s of t th 46 : as already mentioned, Di Vittorio warned the PCI PCI the warned Vittorio Di mentioned, already as : , “Sud-Est” (no. 3, January, 2005), p. 100. p. 2005), January, 3, “Sud-Est”(no. ,

Il Migliore Il Quel dissenso tra Togliatti e Di Vittorio Di e Togliatti tra dissenso Quel olat e i itro Dses e ovrez sui convergenze e Dissensi Vittorio. Di e Togliatti ispe i itro i X oges poicae d provinciale Congresso X il e Vittorio Di Giuseppe ” at all: Togliatti mentioned the issue to the Sovi the to issue the mentioned Togliatti all: at ” communiqué

of the Italian trade union released on on released union trade Italian the of ieri, p. 136. 136. p. ieri, ” and moved toward a more democratic and modern modern and democratic more a toward moved and ” 8 tent&task=view&id=58&Itemid=21. Trentin mentioned mentioned Trentin tent&task=view&id=58&Itemid=21. 2 44

Since Togliatti himself wrote these words, these wrote himself Togliatti Since , text of the speech at the conference Di Vittorio Vittorio Di conference the at speech the of text , rking class. rking fore, the CGIL leader was less concerned concerned less was leader CGIL the fore, about the party itself generally-speaking. itself party the about CI could lose the innermost sense of the of sense innermost the lose could CI ty there were two opposite streams: “the “the streams: opposite two were there ty etation which described Di Vittorio and Vittorio Di described which etation he real features of this opposition were, opposition this of features real he aly – as Bruno Trentin, in dispute with with dispute in Trentin, Bruno as – aly rtial sign of the distance from Togliatti Togliatti from distance the of sign rtial pretends ods; the second willing to provide the provide to willing second the ods; ergence of an internal opposition that opposition internal an of ergence tn eog t big t p n a in up it bring to enough rtant at d’Ungheria fatti 47

45 th ta tee a nt an not was there that – shows that the leader of of leader the that shows about the inherent risk of risk inherent the about l C d Cptnt (2527 Capitanata di PCI el ets, therefore, that that therefore, ets, th , “Critica Marxista” Marxista” “Critica , , 2007: 2007: , L’Unità on on e i e CEU eTD Collection osbe nepeain f i itros statement. Vittorio’s Di of interpretation possible communiqué o Secretary General the particular, In appeasement. saying that “the replacement of Togliatti with Di V Di with Togliatti of replacement “the that saying

whose interest should prevail over the party’s party’s the over prevail should interest whose 53 52 51 50 49 48 witness (Coletti) was discussing with Pajetta and I and Pajetta with discussing was (Coletti) witness

uprising into an antisocialist and counterrevolutio and antisocialist an into uprising took forces rightist “extreme that wrote he wherein remarks the need for a better defense of the workers. of the workers. defense theneed a better for coher appears interpretation this Furthermore, PCI. C the of strategy the since wavelength, same the on thi In PCI. the and CGIL the between connection the u of project the crisis the of impact the from save of Ingrao’s office. The Secretary of the CGIL had a had CGIL the of Secretary The office. Ingrao’s of ht te ieped uos ae o onain t a at foundation no have rumors widespread “the that Furthermore, this this Furthermore, version cannot be verified. verified. be cannot version Ingrao and Pajetta later; months few died Vittorio Coletti Nevertheless, Togliatti. replace to intent extent”. such but Togliatti, to opposition my assumes rumor him (methaforically speaking), and asked him to iss to him asked and speaking), (methaforically him M. Pistillo, p. 80. p. Pistillo, M. 100.p. Patruno, Pio Mario Fertilio, D. 80. p. Pistillo, M. Ibidem Ibidem N This position taken by Di Vittorio can be interpret be can Vittorio Di by taken position This Unsurprisingly, Di Vittorio did not give up on his his on up give not did Vittorio Di Unsurprisingly, evertheless, after that controversial stance, Di Vi Di stance, controversial that after evertheless, . . 50 52

. Indeed, on on Indeed, . La rivolta dei 101 dei rivolta La n coe 29 October on communiqué L’Unità , “Corriere della Sera”, September 22 September Sera”, della “Corriere , th

i rsos t a raignw luce b AS a ANSA by launched breaking-news a to response in : gives an additional and important piece of informa of piece important and additional an gives f oebr 8 November of is the only one who left a testimony about this hap this about testimony a left who one only the is would have no interest in relating this story), the story), this relating in interest no have would ngrao in the office of office the in ngrao codn t te etmn o Lco oet, while Coletti, Lucio of testimony the to According phone conversation with Pajetta and the latter “sl latter the and Pajetta with conversation phone ue immediately a a immediately ue 8 3

nary [coup]” nary realpolitik th nification of the Italian trade unions and unions trade Italian the of nification control of the movement and turned the the turned and movement the of control ittorio was probable” was ittorio ( ent with Di Vittorio’s statements about statements Vittorio’s Di with ent f the CGIL disseminated an additional additional an disseminated CGIL the f GIL moved alongside with that of the of that with alongside moved GIL s sense, Di Vittorio and Togliatti were Togliatti and Vittorio Di sense, s ttorio sent Togliatti several signals of of signals several Togliatti sent ttorio nenmni e fti d’Ungheria fatti dei Insegnamenti ed defense of the Hungarian workers, workers, Hungarian the of defense 51 poiin os o eit o any to exist not does opposition as a demonstration of his will to will his of demonstration a as communiqué communiqué nd – according to what Patruno Patruno what to according – l n te ae senseless”. are they and ll L’Unità , 2006, p. 53. There is also another another also is There 53. p. 2006, , 53 , supports the interpretation the supports , , Di Vittorio called the phone the called Vittorio Di , to clarify that he had no no had he that clarify to 48 , the latter argued latter the , tion: “this tion: refore, this refore, pening (Di (Di pening apped” apped” the the nd nd 49 ),

CEU eTD Collection Foggia del novembre 1956 novembre del Foggia stressedas well. conside the on PCI the within debate the opening to against the workers. the workers. against d a such whetherand them, defend to how questioned the gist of his speech at the VIII Congress of the of Congress VIII the at speech his of gist the th cause to aggressive so be cure the can metaphor: 58 57 56 55 54 Togliat with break to mean not did Vittorio Di that

of finding a [correct] direction” [correct] a finding of bu excessive of processes that out pointed CGIL the achievements of socialism need bedefended”. to of socialism achievements in Soviet the with agreed “We argument: Togliatti’s f aiaaa (25 Capitanata of democracy on the altar of the of principle authorit of democracythe altar on “syst a proposed he decision-making: actual to came criticiz Vittorio Di this, to parallel In West. the workers. Indeed, he partly disagreed with the speec the with disagreed partly he Indeed, workers. g to able not was he hand, other the on leadership; contradictions of his position: on the one hand, he hand, one the on position: his of contradictions Galante, Michele thelocal-base of Secretary the was Gentile Savino Ibidem Ibidem Ibidem n te wrs D Vtoi tid o tes parad a stress to tried Vittorio Di words, other In u D Vtoi dd o qeto te ih t defen to right the question not did Vittorio Di But hrfr, t em ta D Vtoi ws personally was Vittorio Di that seems it Therefore, . . .

54 Giuseppe Di Vittorio, i fatti di Ungheria e la via via la e Ungheria di fatti i Vittorio, Di Giuseppe

th oebr 15) Te oa Gnrl ertr o th of Secretary General local The 1956). November, , “Sud-Est” (November 2006), p. 91. 91. p. 2006), “Sud-Est”(November ,

57 in the communist parties of the East as well as in as well as East the of parties communist the in d unit of the PCI, M. P. Paturno, p. 101. p. Paturno, P. M. PCI, the of unit d 8 4

ed the PCI for its democratic deficit when it when deficit democratic its for PCI the ed 56 PCI, on December 8 December on PCI, y”,out. points as Galante “needed” to accept the the accept to “needed”

ti, but he definitely intended to contribute to intended definitelyhe but ti, ration the workers – an issue Manacorda issue an – workers the ration h of Savino Gentile Savino of h reaucratization caused “serious problem problem “serious caused reaucratization e death of the patient? This is actually is This patient? the of death e ive up the struggle for the wellfare of of wellfare the for struggle the up ive efense could be carried out by fighting fighting by out carried be could efense tervention because we know that the the that know we because tervention ox, which can be expressed with a a with expressed be can which ox, em which would not give up on on up give not would which em d socialist achievements, he just just he achievements, socialist d italiana al socialismo in un discorso a discorso un in socialismo al italiana troubled because he felt the the felt he because troubled th , 1956. The leader of of leader The 1956. , 55 at the X Congress X the at diktat 58 e PCI repeated repeated PCI e

of the PCI’s PCI’s the of those of those CEU eTD Collection bureaucratization of the PCI leading to a compressi a to leading PCI the of bureaucratization about opinions andideas” opinions about Manacorda of proposals the with alongside criticism Indeed Congress. same the at speech his in Giolitti the of within freedom the partythe problem outside importan most the maybe – voices important most the o c Vittorio demonstration Di but communism, Italian of hierarchies clear his gave CGIL the of head the atta an imply not did criticism This Congress. VIII ae the make 61 60 59

of party-discipline prevailed on the basis of the basis on autho of prevailed party-discipline concern Vittorio’s Di shared Giolitti that inferred needed”. loyal and debate Open necessary. is debate through impo be cannot pronouncement a assessment, given “A editoriale, no. 9, 2006): http://temi.repubblica.it 2006): 9, no. editoriale, n does who occasions, many In one. Hungarian the to ha would Poland dissent, of position his maintained del-pci-nel-1956/ del-pci-nel-1956/ Ibidem Ibidem L’intervento di Antonio Giolitti al Congresso del P del Congresso al Giolitti Antonio di L’intervento ute ipiain o te oiin ae b D Vi Di by taken position the of implications Further The n iltis iw tee a dfntl ne fr a for need definitely was there view, Giolitti’s In oee, ilti de a osby oe motn r important more possibly a added Giolitti However, r efore, there is a sense of criticism from “the left “the from criticism of sense a is there efore, . . 61

etaim democratico centralismo 59 as a “basic condition for a real democracy”.real a for condition “basic a as

fetv. hrfr, rm hs rtcs, t can it criticism, this from Therefore, effective. /micromega-online/lintervento-di-antonio-giolitti-a CI nel 1956 nel CI 8 5

rity. rity. on of within-party freedom: the principle principle the freedom: within-party of on ck over the leadership of Togliatti, since since Togliatti, of leadership the over ck ranks of Botteghe Oscure. Oscure. Bottegheranks of an be definitely considered to be one of of one be to considered definitely be an ve experienced a crisis possibly similar similar possibly crisis a experienced ve and Di Vittorio: need for a “debate “debate a for need Vittorio: Di and ot speak out helps the enemy. All the All enemy. the helps out speak ot t – in the PCI to speak out, and bring bring and out, speak to PCI the in – t , “MicroMega” (Rome, L’Espresso – gruppo gruppo – L’Espresso (Rome, “MicroMega” , s about the risk of an excess in in excess an of risk the about s n inclusive procedure which would would which procedure inclusive n oprsn f ifrn oiin is opinions different of comparison ” in the words Di Vittorio said at the at said Vittorio Di words the in ” , the communist leader added his his added leader communist the , ttorio were developed by Antonio Antonio by developed were ttorio sed through discipline: persuasion discipline: through sed f accepting and respecting the the respecting and accepting f mr: I Gmła a not had Gomułka “If emark: 60 He also remarked: also He l-congresso- be CEU eTD Collection eae vn oe neetn wt rgr t te int the to regard with interesting more even became by labeling the “dissidents” as traitors. as “dissidents” traitors. bythe labeling (“as marginalized often was dissent and party-line, practices: “effective freedom of debate in the fram the in debate of freedom “effective practices: liquidating (more precisely, Giolitti said: “ said: Giolitti precisely, (more liquidating onc witnessed we events, Hungarian the regard “with “ the of practice the in democracy h oiin f h cmae wo xrse a dissent a expressed who comrades the of opinion the codn t hm tee a a rcie f demonizat of practice a was there him, to according 65 64 63 62 wi democracy internal and freedom of principles the Stalinist still was party the that stressed leader atth the members approved of overwhelmingmajority call to possible definitely is it that similarities leaders, two the of position the Inaddition, said. expression, the CGIL”. expression, suppressed, were they instead validated, be should criticis his of concepts main the connected himself criticism”. his foraccused is of treason party our in democracy a realize to intentions good

Ibidem Ibidem Ibidem Ibidem When it comes to the considerations concerning the the concerning considerations the to comes it When In this sense, Giolitti stressed the permanence of of permanence the stressed Giolitti sense, this In ned Goit ad i itropitd u a demo a out pointed Vittorio Di and Giolitti Indeed, i itros n Goit’ ciiim fetd the affected criticism Giolitti’s and Vittorio’s Di . . . . 64

etaim democratic centralismo 62

sradicare 8 6 6 this an opposition to the party-line, which an an which party-line, the to opposition an this in its innermost core, and the replacement of replacement the and core, innermost its in though a minority, shared such an extent of extent an such shared minority, a though m to that of Di Vittorio: “[those opinions] “[those Vittorio: Di ofthat to m it occurred in the last period” – he said) said) he – period” last the in occurred it have been jeopardized when a comrade a when jeopardized been have e of democratic centralism” democratic of e ” – rooting out / to uproot) with no pity no with uproot) to / out rooting – ” a sort of Stalinist practices in the PCI: PCI: the in practices Stalinist of sort a PCI much deeper than that: the two two the that: than deeper much PCI e VIII Congress. eVIII Congress. o o toe h dsged ih the with disagreed who those of ion h h atoiaie moiin f an of imposition authoritative the th rrttv polm f h lmt of limits the of problem erpretative Hungarian uprising, Giolitti’s words Giolitti’s uprising, Hungarian even that of their most important important most their of that even cratic deficit in the PCI’s effective effective PCI’s the in deficit cratic ”. e more [the party] fighting and and fighting party] [the more e 63 o”. The communist leader said: said: leader communist The o”. neetnl eog, Giolitti enough, Interestingly 65 – Giolitti – CEU eTD Collection Manacorda, Di Vittorio, Giolitti) did not emerge be emerge not did Giolitti) Vittorio, Di Manacorda, intellect the of (that “opposition” the that recall In limits. what with was, it if And, “democratic”. marginally. Indeed, the communist offensive, from O from offensive, communist the Indeed, marginally. Conclusion of its the partywith asthe connection aswell in osdrd hmevs o e cie gns n h th the democratico in agents active be to themselves considered “ were still willing to accept the leader’s will. the leader’s will. accept willing wereto still not and 1956, of end the by apparent more much was betw contradictions the of perception the Secondly, ab disillusionment additional an in resulted crisis communist-driven trade union CGIL). union trade communist-driven ne its and party the between connections the in and leg own its in confidence of crisis a of impact the Congress, VIII the of conclusion the to Revolution in the party. in com Italian of affiliation ideological the maintain institutional truth” was wide was truth” institutional From October to December 1956, in the time-span fro time-span the in 1956, December to October From hrfr, h mi itrrttv pit s whether is point interpretative main the Therefore, Significantly enough, this crisis affected the popu the affected crisis this enough, Significantly ihn h rns f h PI hns okd different worked things PCI the of ranks the Within , u te ed o ipsn prydsiln i th in party-discipline imposing for need the but ”, l y accepted as an established practice in the realm the in practice established an as accepted y 8 7

network. network. order to clarify this issue, it is important toimportant is it issue, this clarify to order out the within-party democratic practices. practices. democratic within-party the out munist as well as their overall confidence confidence overall their as well as munist acy in the ranks of the political apparatus political the of ranks the in acy the Italian Communist Party experienced experienced Party Communist Italian the twork (the leftist cultural circles, and the the and circles, cultural leftist (the twork een Togliatti’s statements and the reality the and statements Togliatti’s een cause of the ideological disillusionment ideological the of cause as ad ht f oiiin sc as such politicians of that and uals, ctober 30 ctober all the faithful communists of the PCI the of communists faithful the all lar base of support for the party just just party the for support of base lar oeia nto o “ of notion eoretical m the outbreak of the Hungarian Hungarian the of outbreak the m ly. Firstly, the party-members party-members the Firstly, ly. cnrls” a actually was “centralism” th onwards, was successful in in successful was onwards, cnet f h Hungarian the of context e centralismo centralismo of the party party the of CEU eTD Collection ra bten nelcul ad h PI a wl as well (as PCI the and intellectuals between break because the free-practice of the dissent might be d be might dissent the of free-practice the because of the centralist attitude and practi authoritative attitude ofthe centralist Hungaria the of result the direct was Vittorio) not 66 on ih h US; dooia aflain n pbi c public and dissent. no tolerate to establishment affiliation ideological USSR; the with leader. and party-discipline of application straight the to leader. leader. memb influential some for tolerable longer no ranks phenomeno this crisis: Hungarian the of context the h pry ws hr ay eorc i te “ the in democracy any there was party: the dissent felt even more. felt even dissent more. m opinion public Italian on crisis Hungarian the of the “sacrificed” having after defend, to tried PCI Oscu Botteghe of center”, the high-ranks “political part and intellectuals for constraint no agree”: to V. Zaslavsky, E. Aga Rossi, p. 326. 326. p. Rossi, Aga E. Zaslavsky, V. l oee, hs on i qie eeat n interpreta in relevant quite is point this However, Furthermore, it is interesting to point out that t that out point to interesting is it Furthermore, On the other hand, this attitude was the most natur most the was attitude this hand, other the On unchanged maintaining for need the hand, one the On The actual practice of the “ the of practice actual The y. The cause of the opposition to Togliatti was the Togliatti to opposition the of y. cause The

centralismo democratico centralismo 88 ces of Botteghe Oscure. of Botteghe ces

etaim democratico centralismo n crisis itself, but it was the direct outcome outcome direct was the it but itself, crisis n alliance with the PSI. The potential impact impact potential The PSI. the with alliance he PCI did not have any viable alternative alternative viable any have not did PCI he angerous for both the strategic interest the interest strategic the both for angerous radicalization around the position of the of position the around radicalization re. re. -ars uls te are wt the with agreed they unless y-cadres, ade the need for suppressing voices of voices suppressing for need the ade ers, who actually spoke out against the against out spoke actually who ers, n made the practices of the high-party high-party the of practices the made n result of the excess in radicalization in radicalization in excess the of result the dispute between Togliatti and Di Di and Togliatti between dispute the al implication of the basic practices of of practices basic the of implication al ie em, eas i sos ht the that shows it because terms, tive ” PCI-style was limited to “freedom to limited was PCI-style ” the the redibility), “forced” the party party the “forced” redibility), interessi permanenti interessi 66

”? Probably not, not, Probably ”? (linkage (linkage CEU eTD Collection permanenti press” and, to provide the leftist public opinion w opinion public leftist the provide to and, press” modify its strategy according to changes in the int in changes strategymodify to according its possi as many as alternatively, or, interests these

1 about the tolerance they used with the Hungarian “c Hungarian the with used they tolerance the about Indeed, as explained in the thesis, the Hungarian R Hungarian the thesis, the in explained as Indeed, its on focusing by crisis Hungarian the to reaction affiliation popular base-establishment as as well popularaffiliation base-establishment

socialist government. socialist “counter-revolution the prevent to order in Hungary beat to were purposes the position: defensive a on a communist but de facto enlarged to non-communist enlarged de facto but non-communist to acommunist of choices recent the of evaluation negative clear Budapest; in place taking events the of assessment Itali hand, one the on strategy: the in uncertainty Hungar in engagement military further a for request the of Rome in reception the to intervention first Togliatti’s telegram, Argentieri, p. 136. p. Argentieri, telegram, Togliatti’s Nevertheless, from October 29 October from Nevertheless, Between October 23 October Between However, the position of the PCI in the context of context the in PCI the of position the However, However, October 30 October However, The main findings of these research help to grasp t grasp to help research these of findings main The te ytm f line; h lnae ih h USS the with linkage the alliances; of system the : rd th and October 28 October and was a turning-point: Togliatti urged Soviets to ch to Soviets urged Togliatti turning-point: a was

th to October 31 October to C th ONCLUSION , Botteghe Oscure happened to be “forced” to stay stay to “forced” be to Oscurehappened Botteghe , 89 89

the public credibility of the credibility the public of the Hungarian government, still headed by headed still government, Hungarian the ernational context. ernationalcontext. an communists maintained their negative their maintained communists an Kremlin’s telegram responding Togliatti’s Togliatti’s responding telegram Kremlin’s st ith the “evidence” that the USSR invaded USSR the that “evidence” the ith evolution clearly affected all the the all affected clearly evolution – that is, between the suspension of the of suspension the between is, that – ble. In order to do so, the PCI had to to had PCI the so, do to order In ble. on the other hand, they could not give a a give not could they hand, other the on

ounter-revolutionary road”. ounter-revolutionary y – the PCI experienced a moment of of moment a experienced PCI the – y persisting interests-centered strategy. strategy. interests-centered persisting he features and objectives of the PCI’s PCI’s the of objectives and features he politicians. ak h ciiim f h “bourgeois the of criticism the back fo oetrwn te legitimate the overthrowing from ” the crisis was intended to defend all all defend to intended was crisis the , n te ideological the and R, ange their mind mind their ange partito nuovo partito 1 Therefore, interessi interessi . . CEU eTD Collection political linkage with the USSR. linkage the political with propensity to overcome the uncertainty of the forme uncertainty of propensitythe overcome to oiia lgtmzto ad oa jsiiain t justification: moral and legitimization political oe oiiin, n a ubr f at-ebr. Bu party-members. of number a and politicians, some t in resulted party-discipline and dissent internal in parallel to this, the choice to “slander” the Hu the “slander” to choice the this, to parallel in bet affiliation ideological the enhanced revolution 31 (October aboli Oscure Botteghe to communicated the about concerned particularly Soviets, the intervention. intervention. ground the prepare to order in “counter-offensive” over the on comrades Italian the of perspective the this Therefore, out. carried soon be would measures Part Communist Italian the gave telegram Soviet the among socialist countries (including China, Poland Poland China, (including countries socialist among “white of myth false the construct to context ideal t about Budapest from incoming news the peace”; for the provided and West, the of prestige the affected liberate the country from “white terror”. “whiteterror”. from liberatethe country th on intervention military the provide to onwards) its its eetees Bteh Ocr hd o sfe” str a “suffer” to had Oscure Botteghe Nevertheless, te itrainl atr cagd h seai as scenario the changed factors international Other Interestingly enough, this “offensive” let the Ital the let “offensive” this enough, Interestingly n hs otx, h PI ol sat poaad “ propaganda a start could PCI the context, this In nees permanenti interessi te ebl ilne f h cmag aant h H the against campaign the of violence verbal the : 90 90 st ) that they shared Togliatti’s view. Indeed, view. Togliatti’s shared they that ) ngarian revolution let the PCI maintain its its maintain PCI the let revolution ngarian ween political apparatus and popular base; popular and apparatus political ween terror”; the consensus on the intervention intervention the on consensus the terror”; he break with a number of intellectuals, intellectuals, of number a with break he he USSR invaded Hungary in order to to order in Hungary invaded USSR he PCI with a chance to begin a “campaign “campaign a begin to chance a with PCI r days. rdays. all problem: they needed to carry out a out carry to needed they problem: all ian Communist Party strengthen two of of two strengthen Party Communist ian e new-born Hungarian democracy with with democracy Hungarian new-born e communication contributed to change to contributed communication he killings in in killings he y the expectation that new repressive new that expectation the y and Yugoslavia) boosted the PCI’s PCI’s the boosted Yugoslavia) and o a eiiiain f h Soviet the of legitimization a for shment of the one-party system, system, one-party the of shment t, despite this strategic “loss”, the the “loss”, strategic this despite t, el te uz rss negatively crisis Suez the well: ategic loss: the tension between between tension the loss: ategic fesv” fo Nvme 1 November (from offensive” Köztarsáság tér Köztarsáság ungarian were an were st

CEU eTD Collection very far from being realized. realized. veryfrom far being party democratic a into PCI the transformed not had oncin ewe te C’ ad h Sve decisio Soviet the and PCI’s the between connection r to neglected that stream historiographical the of patt interpretative the Similarly, practices. PCI’s that Pistillo) Michele particularly thesis, the in words other In model. Stalinist-type a to according attitude conservative strong a by characterized was Party,de Communist Italian the policies: PCI’s the in given a implies hereby introduced conclusion The Hungar the about forgeries the believe to difficult c USSR-West the of understanding dogmatic a of full imagi ideology-centered the all, After USSR. the of for Nenni, with negotiations the sacrificed communists mattered really that interests those defend to to seemed PCI the on pressure external of situation related to its centralized and ideology-based appar and ideology-based centralized relatedits to coher were choices strategic PCI’s the crisis), the fighting against the Soviet tanks. tanks. fightingthe Soviet against since well, as truth the of distortion a was latter Ital between empathy creating in role crucial a had Therefore, this conclusion opposes the historiograp the opposes conclusion this Therefore, This consideration interjects the historical proble historical the interjects consideration This V (the 1956 December and October between Therefore, 91 91 underestimates the authoritarian traits of the the of traits authoritarian the underestimates ern introduced hereby highlights the limits the highlights hereby introduced ern ian crisis. In this sense especially, especially, sense this In crisis. ian atus. atus. many communist workers were actually actually were workers communist many ecognize two important points: the strict the points: important two ecognize spite its progressive and democratic look, look, democratic progressiveand its spite have “forced” the party to choose a way a choose to party the “forced” have ian and Hungarian communists – but the but – communists Hungarian and ian ent with persisting interests structurally structurally interests persisting with ent , the transition toward the toward transition the , nary of communists by mid-50’s was so so was mid-50’s by communists of nary , and its political establishment worked establishment political its and , m of the legacy of communism in Italy. in communism of legacy the of m and radicalized their position in support in position their radicalized and terpretation of the core values inspiring values core the of terpretation , the “Eurocommunist” model was still still was model “Eurocommunist” the , hical stream (among the authors cited authors the (among stream hical h pltcl salsmn: Italian establishment: political the n-making due to the conservative conservative the to due n-making onfrontation that it was not too too not was it that onfrontation III Congress was the final act of of act final the was Congress III partito nuovo partito L’Unità

CEU eTD Collection cope with the democratic context of the West. of the West. context copethe democratic with o up give to unwillingness the between contrast the democrati the and apparatus party ideology-centered co two of result a as but uniqueness, its of result

commitment to admit their guilty conscience even fitheir evenadmit to guilty conscience commitment showed really they and slanders”, the “constructing gr a did communists Italian remarked, interestingly Gi 1956, in that, Republic the of President Italian Rev the of anniversary 50° the for Hungary in visit of reburial the at part took Occhetto Achille when of an endu implication was the coherent it but all, tow the attitude that the fact valuesof the party; 2 Argentieri, p. 19. 19. p. Argentieri, infcnl, h PI anand t psto abou position its maintained PCI the Significantly, In sum, the main intent of this thesis is to descri to is thesis this of intent main the sum, In

92 92 ard the Hungarian crisis was not a mistake at a at mistake not was crisis the Hungarian ard ring political strategy. ringstrategy. political ntradictions: the contrast between a strong strong a between contrast the ntradictions:

n Stalinist-type practices and the need to need the and practices Stalinist-type n olitti was right. As Federigo Argentieri Argentieri Federigo As right. was olitti fty yearsftylater. olution, Giorgio Napolitano declared as as declared Napolitano Giorgio olution, c face to show to Italian public opinion; opinion; public Italian to show to face c Imre Nagy. In 2006, during an official official an during 2006, In Nagy. Imre be the peculiarity of the PCI not as a a as not PCI the of peculiarity the be eat job and spent many energies in in energies many spent and job eat an impoverishment of will and of of and will of impoverishment an t the Hungarian crisis up to 1989, 1989, to up crisis Hungarian the t 2

CEU eTD Collection Nenni, Pietro, Nenni,Pietro, rivoluzionari “Palmiro Togliatti” fond, serie Togliatti”3. fond, “Palmiro Palmiro Togliatti, Sui fatti di Ungheria, di fatti 3 October Sui Togliatti, Palmiro Basso, Lelio,Basso, Vecchietti, Tullio, Tullio, Vecchietti, Ingrao, Pietro, Pietro, Ingrao, 24 Paladini, Leo, Paladini, ain, Franco, Fabiani, Castellani, Adriana, Adriana, Castellani, 1956; “Partito Socialista Italiano” fond, serie 20. 20. serie fond, Italiano” Conf Socialista Socialist International “Partito 1957 the of Resolution 26 23 Boffa, Giuseppe, Giuseppe, Boffa, Socialista dell’Internazionale a difesa del socialismo del difesa a “Palmiro Togliatti” fond, serie Togliatti”5. fond, “Palmiro

Gli avvocati Gli dell’aggressione rd th National Library of Rome, newspapers library sectio Librarynewspapers library Rome, National of

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, 1956; 1956; , , October , 29 Published collections of collections primarysources Published Le truppe sovietiche intervengono in Ungheria per per Ungheria in intervengono sovietiche truppe Le (Budapest and New York, CEU Press, 2002); 2002); andPress, NewCEU (Budapest York, , November 5 November , , November 1 November , Ungheria 1956 Ungheria , , Cold War International History Project Bulletin Project History International War Cold , November 2 November , th La tragedia dell’Ungheria tragedia La Confronting America. The Cold War between the Unite the between War Cold The America. Confronting , 1956 , h sn i ebi e noo governo? nuovo del membri i sono Chi Ungheria 1956. La rivoluzione calunniata rivoluzione La 1956. Ungheria oit ouet o te ugra Rvlto, 4 Oc 24 Revolution, Hungarian the on documents Soviet th “td Soii, Rm, Atno rmc” Foundat Gramsci” “Antonio (Rome, Storici”, “Studi , st , 1956; , , 1956; 1956; ,

( nd Rome, Donzelli, 2006); 2006); Donzelli, Rome, , 1956; 1956; , Cae Hl, h Uiest o Nrh aoia Pre Carolina North of University The Hill, (Chapel Nuovo passo del governo Nagy per accordarsi con gli con accordarsi per Nagy governo del passo Nuovo Secondary sources Secondary sources Il cardinale Mindszenty vuol fondare un partito. Im partito. un fondare vuol Mindszenty cardinale Il , November 2 November , Imre Nagy parla alla radio di Budapest di radio alla parla Nagy Imre , October 28 October , 94 94

The 1956 Hungarian Revolution. A history history A Revolution. Hungarian 1956 The -del-pci-nel-1956/ -del-pci-nel-1956/ che avevano difeso fino all’ultimo la all’ultimo fino difeso avevano che dlPI 1-6 oebe 1956) novembre (15-16 PCI del e nd I e 1956 nel CI &fuseaction=topics.publications&gr do, do, omns i Iay n France and Italy in Communism , 1956; 1956; , th , 1956; , Communism in Western Europe Western in Communism //temi.repubblica.it/micromega- Imre Nagy ha denunciato il denunciato ha Nagy Imre (Venice, Marsilio Editori, Editori, Marsilio (Venice, Otbr 28 October , [CWIHP], no. 22-23, 29- 22-23, no. [CWIHP], , “MicroMega” (Rome, (Rome, “MicroMega” , porre fine al caos e al al e caos al fine porre d States and the and States d th , 1956; 1956; , tober – 4 4 – tober , October , , in in , ion ss, ss, re I

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(Washington D.C. and Stanford, Woodrow Wilson Univ Wilson Woodrow Stanford, and D.C. (Washington Reviewsand newspapers Dedalo): Edizioni (Bari, “CriticaMarxista” (Soveria Manelli, Rubbettino, 2002); Rubbettino, (Soveria Manelli, The Tailor of Ulm. Communism in the Twentieth Centu Twentieth the in Communism Ulm. of Tailor The Storia del Partito Comunista ItalianoComunista Partito del Storia a tra snsr. iec e men pltc do politico impegno e Ricerca sinistra. a storia La I comunisti italiani tra Hollywood e Mosca: la sfid la Mosca: e Hollywood tra italiani comunisti I Togliatti e Di Vittorio. Dissensi e convergenze sui convergenze e Dissensi Vittorio. Di e Togliatti Diplomacy (Hammersmith and London, Fontana Press, 1996); London,Press,and 1996); Fontana (Hammersmith Lo stalinismo e la sinistra italiana e sinistra la stalinismo Lo n Hnrd er o Scaim Te et uoen L European West The Socialism. of Years Hundred One a tgoe e cnrso pltc e oit nell’ società e politica centrismo: del stagione La Il governo di partito in Italia in partito di Il governo Dal PCI al socialismo europeo socialismo al PCI Dal (Milan, Feltrinelli, 1990); 1990); Feltrinelli, (Milan, Il complotto comunista complotto Il (College Station, Texas A&MPress, 2004 University (College Texas Station, h frt oio Itrainl eiin aig dur making decision International domino. first The (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1994); and Schuster, 1994); Simon (NewYork,

oi a qoiin. ’nt d Iga a Veltroni a Ingrao da L’Unità quotidiano. dal Voci Stalin and Togliatti. Italy and the origins of the of origins the and Italy Togliatti. and Stalin (Naples, Controcorrente, 2002); Controcorrente, (Naples, 2002); Il socialismo al bivio. L’archivio di Giuseppe di L’archivio bivio. al socialismo Il

95 95 (Bologna, Il (Bologna,1994); Mulino, (Bari, Laterza, 2005); Laterza,2005); (Bari, (Milan, Il 1976); Formichiere, (Milan, (Milan, Mondadori, 2004); 2004); Mondadori, (Milan, ersity Press and Stanford Stanford and Press ersity a della cultura di massa di cultura della a fatti d’Ungheria fatti o l fascismo il po ry (London and New New and (London tla e secondo del Italia ); eft in the the in eft n the ing (May- (Bari,

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aiet di “101” dei manifesto Pons, Silvio, Silvio, Pons, Carnevali, Emilio, Emilio, Carnevali, AlbertoAsor Rosa, spring3-27) pp. 2001, August25 Galante, Michele, Galante, dungheria-e-il-dissenso-allinterno-del-pci-storia-d Vittoria, Albertina, Vittoria, 111-128); pp. 1979, Patruno, Mario Pio, Pio, Mario Patruno, 1956 novembre del Foggia http://www.sudest.info/DIVITTORIO/GDV_Sudest_18b.ht a discorso un 1956) novembre http://www.sudest.info/DIVITTORIO/GDV_Sudest_3.htm (25-27 Capitanata Guerra, Adriano, Adriano, Guerra,

rd , 2001; 2001; , th “Il Corriere della Sera” (Milan): “Il(Milan): della Sera” Corriere “Journal of Cold War Studies” War of (Cambridge, MITCold Press “Journal “MicroMega” (Rome, L’Espresso publisher): L’Espresso publisher): “MicroMega” (Rome, “Letteratura Italiana” (Turin, Einaudi): Einaudi): (Turin, Italiana”“Letteratura “Sud-Est” (Manfredonia, Edizioni Sudest): Edizioni “Sud-Est”(Manfredonia, “Studi Storici” (Rome, “Antonio Gramsci” Foundation Gramsci” “Antonio (Rome, Storici” “Studi , 1994 1994 , tln Tgiti n te rgn o te od a i War Cold the of origins the and Togliatti Stalin, La rivolta dei 101 rivolta La Qualche riflessione sul ’56 ungherese ’56 sul riflessione Qualche Giuseppe Di Vittorio, i fatti di Ungheria e la via la e Ungheria di fatti i Vittorio, Di Giuseppe Questa è la storia della battaglia di Budapest… di battaglia della storia la è Questa I fatti d’Ungheria e il dissenso degli intellettual degli dissenso il e d’Ungheria fatti I Confidenze critiche di Carlo Muscetta Carlo di critiche Confidenze Lo Stato democratico e i partiti politici democratico e partiti Stato i Lo La commissione culturale del PCI dal 1948 al 1956 al 1948 dal PCI del culturale commissione La otnli I on rnsoo all’alba” rinascono sogni “I Montanelli (o 9 20) http://temi.repubblica.it/micromeg 2006): 9, (no. , ispe i itro i X oges poicae d provinciale Congresso X il e Vittorio Di Giuseppe no. 1, 1990, pp. 130-175) pp. 1990, 1, no. , “Corriere della Sera”,22 “Corriere , September della , “Sud-Est” (no. 3, January, 2005): 2005): January, 3, (no. “Sud-Est” , 96 96 , “Sud-Est” (no. 18, November 2006): 2006): November 18, (no. “Sud-Est” , el-manifesto-dei-101/ el-manifesto-dei-101/ , in in , (vol. I, 598-615) (vol. pp. 1982, “oree el Sr” Jl 9 July Sera”, della “Corriere , m; Il presente come storia come presente Il , “Il Corriere della Sera”, Sera”, della Corriere “Il , ): ): publication): publication): , “Il Corriere della Sera”, Sera”, della Corriere “Il , Europe n italiana al socialismo in socialismo al italiana i di sinistra. Storia del Storia sinistra. di i nd , 2006; , , in , vl 3 n. 2, no. 3, (vol. a-online/i-fatti- Contributi alla Contributi l C di PCI el (no. 1, 1, (no. th , CEU eTD Collection ae, Soi I Nt, http://www.storiain.net/arr Net”, In “Storia paper, rgro Alessandro, Frigerio, March in 2012); visited http://www.dse. Pisa): of University – Economics of fti d’Ungheria fatti i Berlinguer presented at the “Ars” in Naples, 2002: 2002: Naples, in “Ars” the at Bruno, Trentin, presented May in (lasted visited storico/ 2012); http://prcvomeroarenella.wordpress.com/2009/06/11/s Berlinguer öe, Alexander, Höbel, 2012); retrospectiveassessment Alberto, Chilosi, May visited 2012); http://www.sissco.it/index.php?id=1293&tx_wfqbe_pi1 contemporanea Revol Hungarian the Revoluti the Hungarian of History Institutefor the of phases the of Reconstruction May visited (last 2012); http://www.brunotrentin.it/index.php?option=com_con retei Fdrg, ok eiw Atnlo Biagi Antonello – review book Federigo, Argentieri,

Mln Bnep, 2006): Bontempi, (Milan, Quel dissenso tra Togliatti e Di Vittorio Di e Togliatti tra dissenso Quel The long march of Italian communists from revolutio from communists Italian of march long The infct e iii e cmrmso storico compromesso del limiti e Significato ’rie e PI dngae a iouin d’Unghe rivoluzione la denigrare PCI: del L’ordine , research paper (Pisa, Faculty of Political Scienc Political of Faculty (Pisa, paper research , Rm, coe 12 October Rome, , Online sources sources Online 97 97 on of 1956: www.rev.hu of on 1956: tnm2/ri1ap ls vstd May visited (last et/num123/artic1.asp ec.unipi.it/persone/docenti/Chilosi/ (last ec.unipi.it/persone/docenti/Chilosi/ ignificato-e-limiti-del-compromesso- tent&task=view&id=58&Itemid=21 tent&task=view&id=58&Itemid=21 5ircnin%D20 (lasted %5Bidrecensione%5D=2803 , conference transcript, transcript, conference , to aalbe n h wbie of website the on available ution ni, ni, cneec ppr about paper conference , tra dell’Ungheria Storia n to neoliberalism: a a neoliberalism: to n es and Department and Department es th 2007: , ria Di Vittorio e Vittorio Di , research research ,