Interests, Preferences, and Center-Left Party Politics in Corporate Governance Reform John W. Cioffi* and Martin Höpner** (Published in: Politics & Society 34, 4, 463-502. Page numbers of the orginal text are marked with (here starts p. xxx)) John W. Cioffi (
[email protected]), J.D., Ph.D., is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Riverside. His research explores the relationships between law and political economy and focuses on the politics of corporate governance reform in Europe and the United States from the 1980s to the present. His publications include: “Revenge of the Law?: Securities Litigation Reform and Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Regulation of Corporate Governance,” in Martin Levin, Martin Shapiro, and Mark Landy (eds.), Creating Competitive Markets: The Politics and Economics of Regulatory Reform (Brookings Institution Press, 2006); “Building Finance Capitalism: The Regulatory Politics of Corporate Governance Reform in the United States and Germany,” in Jonah D. Levy (ed.), The State After Statism: New State Activities in the Age of Globalization and Liberalization (Harvard University Press, 2006); “Corporate Governance Reform, Regulatory Politics, and the Foundations of Finance Capitalism in the United States and Germany,” German Law Journal (2006); “The State of the Corporation: State Power, Politics, Policymaking and Corporate Governance in the United States, Germany, and France,” in Martin Shapiro and Martin Levin (eds.), Transatlantic Policymaking in an Age of Austerity (Georgetown University Press, 2004); “Restructuring ‘Germany, Inc.’: The Corporate Governance Debate and the Politics of Company Law Reform,” Law & Policy, (2002). Martin Höpner (
[email protected]), Ph.D., is a political scientists and researcher at the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies in Cologne, Germany.