Political Transformations and Political Entrepreneurs
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Political Transformations and Political Entrepreneurs 9780230618671ts01.indd i 9/16/2009 2:56:25 PM This page intentionally left blank Political Transformations and Political Entrepreneurs Israel in Comparative Perspective Assaf Meydani POLITICAL TRANSFORMATIONS AND POLITICAL ENTREPRENEURS Copyright © Assaf Meydani, 2009. All rights reserved. First published in 2009 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN® in the United States—a division of St. Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world, this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN: 978–0–230–61867–1 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Meydani, Assaf. Political transformations and political entrepreneurs : Israel in comparative perspective / Assaf Meydani. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 978–0–230–61867–1 (alk. paper) 1. Elections—Israel. 2. Election law—Israel. 3. Prime ministers— Israel—Election. 4. Prime ministers—Election. 5. Pressure groups— Israel. 6. Pressure groups. 7. Political stability—Israel. 8. Political culture—Israel. 9. Israel—Politics and government. 10. Comparative government—Case studies. I. Title. JQ1830.A95M49 2009 324.9—dc22 2009010767 A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library. Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India. First edition: December 2009 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America. 9780230618671ts01.indd iv 9/16/2009 2:56:26 PM To my wife Marit and my daughters Romy and Alma with love and appreciation To my mother Lea, my father Ben-Zion, and my sisters Inbal and Reut, thank you for always being there. This page intentionally left blank CONTENTS List of Figures and Tables xi Acknowledgments xiii One Introduction 1 Two Institutional Change as an Interaction between Political and Social Players—The Role of Political Entrepreneurs 11 2.1 Institutional Theory 12 2.2 A Procedural Model for Formal Institutional Change Analysis 16 2.3 The Book’s Contributions to the Field 36 Three Political Entrepreneurs and Institutional Change: The Case of Basic Law: The Government (1992) 41 3.1 Introduction 41 3.1.1 Case Description 44 3.2 Public Awareness of Political Rule Change as a Necessary Condition for Initiation of Institutional Design Change 46 3.3 Political Entrepreneurs 54 3.4 The Players’ Dependence on Structural and Cultural Limitations 60 3.5 Level 1: Entrepreneurs—Group—Public 61 9780230618671ts01.indd vii 9/16/2009 2:56:26 PM viii Contents 3.6 Level 2: Entrepreneurs—Interest Groups—Politicians 78 3.7 Level 3: Political Entrepreneurs and Legislative Bodies 89 3.8 Summary 101 Four Political Entrepreneurs and Institutional Change: Cancellation of the Direct Election of the Prime Minister 105 4.1 Introduction 105 4.1.1 Case Study 106 4.2 The Public’s Sense of the Need to Change Political Rules as a Necessary Condition for Initiating Institutional Change 108 4.3 The Political Entrepreneurs 113 4.4 The Players’ Activity with Regard to Structural and Cultural Constraints 122 4.5 Level 1: Entrepreneurs—Group—Public 123 4.6 Level 2: Entrepreneurs—Interest Groups—Politicians 132 4.7 Level 3: Political Entrepreneurs and Legislative Bodies 136 4.8 Summary 142 Five Comparative Aspects of Institutional Changes: the Cases of Argentina, Italy and New Zealand 145 5.1 Introduction 145 5.2 The Feeling among the Public of a Need for a Political Rule Change 148 5.2.1 Argentina: The Judicial Reforms from 1994 and 1997 148 5.2.2 Italy: The 1993 Electoral Reform 153 9780230618671ts01.indd viii 9/16/2009 2:56:26 PM Contents ix 5.2.3 New Zealand: The 1993 Electoral Reform 155 5.3 Political Entrepreneurs 157 5.3.1 Argentina—Political Entrepreneurship 158 5.3.2 Italy—Political Entrepreneurship 160 5.3.3 New Zealand—Political Entrepreneurship 161 5.4 Determination of the Character and Design of a Basic Formal Institutional Change: Players’ Activity as Determined via Structural and Cultural Constraints 163 5.4.1 Argentina—Institutional Change Design 163 5.4.2 Italy—Institutional Change Design 166 5.4.3 New Zealand—Institutional Change Design 169 5.5 Summary 171 Six Summary and Conclusions 173 6.1 Preface 173 6.2 Institutional Changes in Israel 173 6.3 Institutional Changes—A Comparative Perspective 176 Notes 183 Bibliography 199 Index 213 9780230618671ts01.indd ix 9/16/2009 2:56:27 PM This page intentionally left blank FIGURES AND TABLES Figures 2.1 Institutional Change Stability 17 2.2 Institutional Change of Formal Political Rules—Process 21 2.3 Why Has Institutional Change Taken Place? 23 2.4 The Entrepreneur and Initial Resource Recruitment 27 2.5 The Political Entrepreneur and Public Support Recruitment Strategies 31 4.1 Number Employed and Rate of Unemployment (Israel, 1995–2001) 112 Tables 3.1 Rae’s Split Measure 1949–1999 50 3.2 Effective Party Number and Centralization Measures, 1949–1999 52 3.3 Poverty Incidence among Families, Prior to National Security and Tax Payments, 1979–1998 (in Percentages) 53 6.1 Institutional Changes—A Comparative Perspective 177 6.2 The Extent of Democratic Norms Internalization—A Comparative Aspect 178 6.3 The Extent of the Political Economic Stability—Comparative Aspects 178 9780230618671ts01.indd xi 9/16/2009 2:56:27 PM This page intentionally left blank ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This book is based on my Ph.D. dissertation (2004): Political Entrepreneurs and Dynamics of Institutional Change: Conceptual Framework and Analysis of Case Studies in Israel (Hebrew), Ben Gurion University, Israel, later on developed and expanded. I would like to thank Gideon Doron, Shlomo Mizrahi and David A. Frenkel for their help in this research. I’m grateful to Gad Barzilai, Arye Naor, David Nachmias, Gideon Rahat, Shimon Shetreet, Itai Sened, Pablo T. Spiller, Arye Carmon, Amnon Rubinstein and Uriel Reichmann for their advice and collaboration. I would also like to thank Naomi Chazan for her time and support. I would like to thank the Academic College of Tel-Aviv-Yaffo for their generous support and especially to Israel Zang, Nehemia Friedland and Dror Amir. The manuscript would never have reached final form but for the edi- torial skill and dedication of Nina Reshef. In addition, I would like to thank Farideh Koohi-Kamali, Colleen Lawrie, Robyn Curtis and Asa Johnson from Palgrave Macmillan for their useful advice and support. And finally my thanks to the anonymous readers for useful remarks and to B. Guy Peters for his guidance. 9780230618671ts01.indd xiii 9/16/2009 2:56:27 PM This page intentionally left blank CHAPTER ONE Introduction The past two decades have seen dramatic changes in Israeli society, captured in its nascent examination of the essence and relevance of the rules by which it is organized. Declarative announcements of reform have been all too frequent in the political arena. Politicians drape their platforms in the banner of reform so frequently that it seems as if “change, reform and more change” is proffered as the miracle cure to all the nation’s problems. But is it really? None of the several attempts at reform have left any significant marks. The direct election of the prime minister was enacted in 1992 and repealed in 2001; of the New Public Management reforms belatedly adopted, the few adopted failed in the implementation stage; legislative attempts to pass a constitution are still stalled, with basic laws being amended as if they were ordinary laws. In brief, policy change in many policy domains has been so frequent as to become a major social problem in itself.1 In approaching this situation from a theoretical and empirical per- spective, this book attempts to provide policy-makers with the tools they need to make policy decisions that are concurrently legitimate and feasible. In particular, the book examines the process by which formal political rules are changed, while emphasizing the involvement and role of political entrepreneurs (or change agents) in formulating and motivating such changes. Such changes are important because they redefine the framework of political debate together with the distribu- tion of power among the players.2 Sociopolitical change usually requires vast effort and resources. We therefore expect change to occur when the major players have clear inter- ests in making it happen. However, more often than not, fundamental institutional change entails the concession of political power by the major 9780230618671ts02.indd 1 10/5/2009 7:55:44 PM 2 Political Transformations & Entrepreneurs players in the game. This situation demands that we delve into why poli- ticians and legislators, individuals presumably interested in maximizing their own value and power, would promote and support institutional change that concludes in concession of their political power. Moreover, as fundamental political rules usually reflect the distri- bution of power, among social and political actors we would expect any proposed change in the rules to initiate a complex process of social and political bargaining. In order for such bargaining to result in stable institutional change, the players must rely on long-term considerations rather than on the achievement of immediate goals. Yet even here, we find cases in which the players involved in a fundamental institutional change are guided by short-term considerations motivated by the drive to maximize their immediate interests; alternatively, we can find other cases in which institutional change is promoted as a mechanism for the resolution of economic, political or social crises.