Ben-Gurion University of the Negev The Jacob Blaustein Institutes for Desert Research The Albert Katz International School for Desert Studies
The Environmental Movement in Israel Strategic Analyses
Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of "Master of Science"
By: Shira Leon Zchout
12 November, 2013
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev The Jacob Blaustein Institutes for Desert Research The Albert Katz International School for Desert Studies
The Environmental Movement in Israel Strategic Analyses
Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of "Master of Science"
By: Shira Leon Zchout
Under the Supervision of Professor Alon Tal Department of Desert Ecology / Environmental Studies
Author's Signature Date November 11, 2013
Approved by the Supervisor Date: November 11, 2013.
Approved by the Director of the School …………… Date ………….…
The Environmental Movement in Israel Strategic Analyses Shira Leon Zchout This thesis is in partial fulfillment for the degree of Master of Science
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
The Jacob Blaustein Institutes for Desert Research
The Albert Katz International School for Desert Studies
2013 Abstract: In the face of environmental challenges, the Israeli environmental movement works to bring awareness to the public agenda, remove hazards and prevent future risks. This research examines the strategies applied by the Israeli ENGOs based on two theoretical models. First, it aims to characterize the relationship between resources and strategy, based upon the Resource Mobilization Theory . Second, the research examines the relationship between the state and Israel's environmental movement. Based on theories of Political Opportunities, the study assesses the most effective ways that civil society influence Israel's environmental policies.
A survey was conducted among the organizations belonging to Israel's environmental movement in which a total of 85 ENGOs participated. Interviews were conducted with more than 30 relevant observers: ENGO leaders, academic experts, and former Director Generals of the Ministry of Environmental Protection.
To examine the relationship between resources and strategy ENGOs were divided between two strategic characteristics: inclusive to the state and exclusive to the state. In other words organizations that work within the system to achieve results and those who attempt to influence by being critical outsiders. A systematic index was developed as a tool for the division, based on survey questions. Results revealed 57 inclusive ENGOs and 28 exclusive ENGOs. Strategic groups were compared upon several measurements of resources and a profile was built on each group.
Results show exclusive ENGOs operate with a more grassroots orientation and inclusive ENGOs are more professionalized in their style. Exclusive ENGOs operate primarily in the local arena; they are mainly neighborhood based or work with communities at risks. Inclusive ENGOs appear more stable, they tend to be larger in annual budget and paid staff but smaller in registered members and active affiliates.
Exclusive ENGOs are more dependent on volunteers for activity, while inclusive
ENGOS more specifically utilize volunteers for professional work and advice. Inclusive ENGOs appear to have a wider variety of income sources; higher rates receiving funding from the government, from foreign country and private donations, and have developed self- reliant income sources. Exclusive ENGOs have a smaller variety of income sources and depend more on membership fees. Still, both groups are highly dependent on foundation grants. These findings imply that higher resources encourage inclusive activity and lower resources encourage exclusive activity.
To characterize the relationship between the state and the ENGOs, the research examined the inclusiveness of the states towards Israel's ENGOs and the ENGO strategies in response. Results of interviews with eight former Director Generals of the
Ministry of Environmental Protection suggest that the state's general attitude towards
ENGOs can be characterized as "passive inclusive". According to the former director generals, the optimal strategies for civil society in the environmental sphere are a dual approach of aggressive intervention to assist in promoting legislation accompanied by discourse with efforts to coordinate when possible with the Ministry. The fact that the
Ministry is open towards ENGOs, and in some cases welcomes pressure from outside actors suggests that environmental issues are still marginalized and perceived as oppositional in Israel. Hence, the inclusiveness of the movement by the state is only partial. Survey results regarding the most effective modes of action reveal more than half of the ENGOs already use such dual strategies. At the same time, a hierarchical structure of the movement was recognized, that encourages collaborations. Consistently high levels of networking were reported, revealing prevalent collaborations for dual strategy in reaction to the state.
Acknowledgments
This work was partially supported through a scholarship made available by the JMG foundation.
I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Alon Tal, for making things happen. For providing me with the research opportunity, providing me with tools to proceed in each and every stage and for the chance to learn about the environmental movement through his inspiring viewpoint. I also thank him for his creative inputs, for setting limits and putting me back on track every time it was needed.
I would like to thank Naor Yerushalmi, Director Life and Environment; all of the participants in the research, and the members of the environmental movement for providing inspiration by their dedication and hard work to make the world a better place.
I would like to thank my research colleagues for completing the first phase of the research as a team. Especially, I thank Liat Osheri Frenkel, for the days and nights of work, together in starting and advancing the research; and Itai Greenspan for his systematic approach and advice. Also like to thank Dorit Levin, Assistant to the Director of AKIS.
I wish to give a great thanks to Tzipora Parnassa, Ben Gurion University, for her great help with statistical analyses. After seeing her passion for "playing with the numbers" I managed to find joy in statistics as well.
I would also like to thank my family and friends who accompanied me throughout the project, assisting with the children, providing advice and being our community.
Especially I wish to thank my husband Joe for taking this journey with me. My accomplishment is also his. I am grateful for who he is in my life. And lastly, for my twin sons Vito and D'ror, who were born in the process and brought me new perspectives on life and joy beyond what I ever imagined.
I dedicate this research to my husband Joe and my two sons, Vito and D'ror.
Table of Contents 1. Introduction ...... 1 1.1. Theoretical Background ...... 1 1.11. Strategic Orientation of Environmental Organizations ...... 1 1.12. Political Opportunities and State Structure ...... 6 1.13. Resource Mobilization Theory ...... 9 1.14. Impact of Discourse Frames and Identity ...... 11 2. Examples of Environmental movements from Abroad ...... 13 2.1. History of the Israeli environmental movement ...... 30 2.2. Research Objectives ...... 37 3. Research Method ...... 38 3.1 Israeli ENGO Survey ...... 38 3.11 Preparation of an ENGO list ...... 38 3.12 Questionnaire Design ...... 42 3.2 Development of an Index as a Division Tool ...... 47 3.3 Complementary Qualitative Research ...... 50 4. Findings Objective 1: Analyses of strategic orientation………...... 52 4.1. General results ...... 52 4.2. Result of the division between inclusive and exclusive strategies ...... 53 4.3. Results of the survey and comparison between strategic groups in several factors ...... 53 4.31. Trends of a Growing Movement ...... 53 4.32. Analyses of Size of Organizations in Four measures ...... 56 4.33. Strategic Orientation Analyses according to different Measures of Size ...... 66 4.34. Volunteer Dependency ...... 72 4.35. Income Sources ...... 75 4.36. Geographic Contexts ...... 80 4.37. Definitions of the active affiliates of the ENGOs ...... 91 4.38. Additional analyses- Worldview and Ideology ...... 92 4.4. Defining ENGOs ...... 100 5. Findings Objective 2: Assessing ENGO Tactics ...... 102 5.1. Perspective of the former Director Generals ...... 102 5.11. Introduction ...... 102
5.12. Level of inclusion by the Ministry ...... 103 5.13. Reasons for Inclusion by the State ...... 105 5.14. Preference for "Inclusive" strategic ENGO orientation ...... 107 5.15. The Role of Court Intervention ...... 110 5.16. Concerns about Growing Populism, Negative Confrontations, Radical Groups and the Attempts to Replace the Ministry ...... 114 5.17. Summary of Official Perceptions ...... 117 5.2. Strategies and Networking- Findings from the survey and Interviews ...... 119 5.21. Networking- coalitions and ad hoc collaboration ...... 122 5.22. Incentives for collaboration ...... 128 5.23. Difficulties and barriers in forming collaboration ...... 130 5.24. The social protest- a comparative perspective of strategic orientation ...... 132 6. Conclusions regarding ENGO Resources and Orientation ...... 137 6.1. Summary of the profile of Strategic Orientation Groups ...... 137 6.2. Implications regarding ENGO Resources and Orientation ...... 144 6.3. Additional Discussion Based on the Findings of resources and strategy ...... 145 7.Conclusions: Assessing the State's View towards ENGOs and the ENGO Tactics ...... 147 7.1. Assessment of the type of movement: Structure and Function ...... 147 7.2 The environmental movement and the political structure of the state ...... 148 8. References……………………………………………...... 154 9. Appendix ...... 166 Appendix 1: Advisory Panel Members ...... 166 Appendix 2: ENGOs that were known to be active prior to the research but had no longer been active by summer 2010: ...... 166 Appendix 3: Survey Respondents: National and Local Organizations ...... 166 Appendix 4: Interviewed During the Study ...... 168 Appendix 5: Questions from the survey used in the Index for division ...... 169 Appendix 6: The Survey Tool- Questioner sent to the ENGOs ...... 171
1
1. Introduction
1.1. Theoretical Background
1.11. Strategic Orientation of Environmental Organizations
Environmental nongovernmental organizations (ENGOs) worldwide were formed in response to environmental degradation and human detachment of nature.
They are domestic political players and take part in the internal politics. Some of them take part in international politics as well (Dalton et al. 2003; Wapner 1995). ENGOs aim to change public policy, industry and social behavior regarding environmental and health related issues (Schreurs 2002).
ENGOs tend to work in a variety of tactics and can be defined according to their strategies. Rucht (1996) divided movements into three categories of structure and strategy: the grassroots model, interest group model and political party oriented movement model. The grassroots model is a decentralized and informal movement and tends tend to engage in radical protests, and mobilize the public to act. The interest groups tend to engage in lobbying and conventional activities. And the third type movements form political parties aiming to be elected. Dalton and his colleagues (2003) in results of a broad international survey of ENGOs recognized four types of activity: conventional, networking, mobilizing, and protest. In their distinction, conventional activities are aimed at policy and legislation change, through lobbying activities; networking activities are at building networks and making connections with other groups and allies. Mobilizing activities are aimed at recruiting people for collective action; and unconventional actions are protests and disruptions. Koopmans (1993) characterized social movements into four action types between: demonstrative actions, confrontational, light violence and heavy violence. Demonstrational actions are mobilization of the mass in peaceful and legal activities such as legal nonviolent 2
demonstrations and petitioning, confrontational actions are disruptive, that aim to interfere with the daily order, light violence includes actions such as civil disobedience, light violence uses actions such as vandalism and throwing stones at policemen during demonstration. And heavy violence is illegal violence against people or property, such as arson or bombing, kidnapping etc. Tarrow (1994) defined three types of collective action: violent, disruptive and conventional.
Many theorists divide movements into two recurrent categories which serve as the salient distinction for the present study. Michaelson (1994) divided social movements between conflict and consensus groups. Winston (2003) made the same distinction, between radical and moderate groups. Similarly, Dryzek et al. (2003) divided movement activities in response to the level of state openness between inclusive and exclusive policies. And this study bases its division on the same relationship. In this approach inclusive ENGOs aim to be included in the politics; they work within conventional channels and accept the political structure and the contemporary power holders. While exclusive ENGOs serve as opposition and not interested in blending in the consensus. They challenge and confront the state and decision makers, and aim to influence from the outside (Dryzek et al. 2003).
The distinction between Inclusive and exclusive ENGOs would mainly be expressed by their modes of action, the differences can also be found in the self- definition of the group and opinions held by its members and representatives. Exclusive
ENGOs characterize themselves as activist groups, or radical and challenging groups, while inclusive groups define themselves cooperative, and acknowledge legitimacy of the establishment. Further, exclusive more than inclusive ENGOs, have a more radical worldview. It could be expressed in their opinions on the types of activity they should attempt, and whether they approve of a radical behavior. In terms of modes of action, 3
inclusive ENGOs are characterized mostly by conventional modes of action, while exclusive ENGOs are characterized mostly by confrontational, unconventional or radical modes of action.
Conventional modes of action are all forms of action that support and are accepted within the political system and are aimed at convincing. They include lobbying, and raising awareness (Handy 2001), testifying before government commissions and participating in government panels (Dalton et al. 2003); campaigns for public participation, also litigation, petitioning (Kitschelt 1986), and drafting the wording of new legislation (Kim et al. 2010). Additional conventional activities are creating forums for dialogue with industry and governmental representatives. For example, dialogue aimed to reach an agreement for the use of safer and cleaner production methods. Also educational activities and information distribution in all kinds of forms to the public, in order to influence environmental awareness, and behavior are considered conventional activities (Handy 2001). Also conventional activities that help build political pressure are public ranking of companies on environmental behavior, and involvement in elections to influence voters to choose candidates according to activity and worldview on specific subjects (Handy 2001;
Kitschelt 1986).
Exclusive ENGOs tend to use confrontational unconventional strategies. Unlike conventional activities unconventional modes are aimed at forcing or pressuring decision makers. These include court files (Vanhala 2012), public events that range from street theatre to bearing witness, civil disobedience, to demonstrations and disruption (Tarrow 1994; Kitschelt 1986). Some of those forms of action may carry potential and a degree of uncertainty whether the conflict will spread to other groups or individual. And this strengthens the pressure and influence of the event (Tarrow 1994). 4
For example sit-ins as a form of non- violent disruption used to stop construction, or disrupt normal activity by blocking public space. But they are also aimed to encourage the police to get involved in clearing the public gathering. By occupying the police the activists attract the media attention and receive more exposure.
The anti-nuclear movement in Whyl, West Germany during the 1970s organized a 28,000 people sit-in at a proposed site for a nuclear power plant. This mass activity managed to stop the construction of the power plant. The German campaign inspired additional activities to take place in the United States; such as the Seabrook sit in of
2,400 activists on a proposed nuclear power plant in New Hampshire (Gottlieb 1993).
Some unconventional modes of action include monkey wrenching, which is a form of sabotage and destruction of property for the sake of environmental preservation.
Examples of such methods in the past includes setting fire to a restaurant and ski patrol building in protest against a large expansion of a ski resort to untouched natural lands
(Gottschalk 1999). It also includes a form of public disruption, such as tree spiking, blocking roads or blocking the work of bulldozers in a construction site or of tree logging (Bron 1991).
Direct action is also a form of unconventional action. It entails direct contact between the activist and the source of the problem, for example an oil company, or the polluting factory, such as the above example in the Whyl. Direct action is a statement for not accepting the legitimacy of the actions it fights against. It includes disruption and ways to prevent or stop the cause of the problem (Armon 2005). Examples of direct action in Israel were carried out by Green Action in the campaign to stop the construction of the Trans Israel Highway. Green Action used sit-ins as a common form of action that managed to disrupt the work of the construction by blocking the bulldozers (Meizlish 2005; Rabinowitz & Vardi 2010). 5
Direct actions are also aimed at the media to raise public discourse (Armon
2005). To emphasize this type of action , activists of Greenpeace use non- violent direct activism and follow a principle to bear witness (Bakir 2006; Furst 2012; Gottlieb 1993).
They capture videos of abusive environmental behavior such as unnecessary whale killing and present them in the media. As result a public debate is then opened and creates pressure on policy makers and economic bodies to restrict harmful behaviors on the environment (Gottlieb 1993; Wapner 1995). Another principle of direct action is the risk. The more a campaign contains risk it increases the value of the target to the public.
It emphasizes to the public that these issues are important and activists are willing to take their safety and freedom at risk as part of their commitment (Wapner 1995).
Tarrow claims that movements are flexible and can “combine a variety of forms
(of action), either alone or in combination. ” (Tarrow 1994, p.115). Dalton et al. (2003) found that most environmental groups use a variety of tactics involving both conventional and unconventional modes of action. Each organization develops a repertoire of tactics, in which the extent of use of each type of action determines the behavioral character of the ENGO.
Further, both Tarrow (1994) and McAdam (1983) claim that movement strategies are not static. Even innovative confrontational modes of action become conventional after repetition. And eventually can be adopted by the elites or the counter movements (Tarrow 1994; McAdam 1983). And on the other side movements can escalade from disruption into violent forms of action as well (Tarrow 1994).
Dalton et al. (2003) argue that there is an unresolved conflict of theorists on whether ENGOs should work within conventional channels or to challenge the state from the outside. The use of both oppositional and peaceful modes of action are describes by Dryzek et al. (2003) as dual strategy. According to them a combination is 6
the favorable strategy. For example additional petitioning in a demonstration adds power to an action that confronts politicians on the one hand and lobbies them -- contacting and urging them to make decisions, on the other (Tarrow 1994). Dalton et al.
(2003) describe it difficult in some cases as the same actor cannot both engage in both since it can reduce the credibility gained for discourse with the government and attendance in round tables.
Researchers 1 have studied internal and external factors that inspire collective action and influence movements to emerge and engage in specific strategies. According to
Herman: " The internal environment includes variables such as the protest movement’s program (mainly sets of values and goals), its structure (e.g., level of hierarchy and degree of centralization), orientation (e.g., ideological, pragmatic), resources (both human and material), and mobilization strategy (inclusive vs. exclusive). The external environment includes variables such as the type of political system (democratic vs. non- democratic), features of the mainstream sociopolitical ethos (e.g., pluralist vs. uniformist), range of legitimate modes of political activity, etc. "(1996, p. 144)
1.12. Political Opportunities and State Structure
Some theorists claim that the dynamics of state structure determines the nature of social movements. Tarrow (1994) claims movements act in response to the opening of opportunities in the political structure. According to him political opportunity structure can also promote or suppress movement activity. According to Tarrow (1994) the political structure is the permanent structure of the politics of the state. It includes the stability of the governing system, the number of political parties; level of freedom of action and speech of a civil society and the open channels for interest groups to contact and influence decision makers.
1 For example see Brulle 1996; Curtis & Gronberg 2007; Dalton et al., 2003; Kim et al. 2010; Meyer 2004; Vanhala 2012; Winston 2003. 7
According to Tarrow (1994), when a change in the political structure occurs opportunity is opened for movements to establish, to sound out and influence decision makers. Examples for opportunities that open with the structural change of the state: dispute between elites, opening of access to power, available allies in the political system, change in staffing of key positions, and existence of other social movement actors (Tarrow 1994). Movements can also create and expand opportunity to allow other groups to emerge; this can be seen by pioneer oppositional activists gaining solidarity, protest groups developing new forms of collective action, and movements expanding their message to represent a broader audience (Tarrow 1994). Dryzek et al. (2003) explain that when choosing modes of action, organizations should consider the effect of their choice on the rest of the movement as well. They claim that cooperative modes can weaken civil society, while oppositional modes of action, aside from their success or failure strengthen the power and legitimacy of civil society. The additional outcomes of an ENGO engaging in oppositional modes of action can be seen in increased public discourse, greater base of supporters, political pressure, and public receptiveness to other ideas of the same type.
Dryzek et al. (2003) emphasize that movements react to the political structure of the government. They argue that the difference in the characteristics and competence of civil society between different counties is related to the state structure and level of democracy (Dryzek et al. 2003). They claim: “the form taken by a country’s environmental movement and its relationship to the state- is framed (though not completely determined) by the structural characteristics of the state.” (p. 21).
Following the same rationale, Dalton et al. (2005) found that in developed countries there are more protest activities. Koopmans (1993) argues that elites can choose to respond to protest either in "confrontation or integration" . Dalton et al. 8
(2005) argued that industrialized democracies allow existence of radical and confrontational movements, while less democratic states lack the institutional basis, such as freedom of information and the right to protest, to allow oppositional social movement activity. Michaelson (1994) strengthens Dalton's argument, and pressed that in countries where the level of democracy is very low, oppositional movements are most likely oppressed.
Within democratic states, the structure of the democracy also varies and must be examined to understand its influence on civil society. Democratic states can have open or weak structures that allow access of interest groups to policy makers. But some democracies are centralized and have a closed state structure, where decision makers exclude all interest groups (De Tocqueville in Tarrow 1994; De Tocqueville in Oser
2009). Dryzek et al. (2003) added a dimension of strength and came up with a model of four levels of openness that characterized four types of countries: active inclusion, passive inclusion, active exclusion and passive exclusion. A state that possesses or uses civil society as a governmental branch is characterized as active inclusive, a pluralistic state that includes public interest groups in decision making is passive inclusive. A state that excludes civil society from participation but allows its existence is defined passive exclusive and a state that attacks civil society and denies freedom of action is defined active exclusive (Dryzek et al. 2003).
Tilly (1981) claims that governments have an interest to influence the modes of action of organizations in civil society. They aim to interfere with “some forms of collective action, tolerating others and eliminating still others from the scene. To some extent, as a result, the different forms of collective action reshape subsequent action.
Where the likely benefit from a repressed and a tolerated action are roughly equal, 9
generally speaking, groups tend to press and to innovate within or just adjacent to the tolerated area.” (pp. 21-22).
Accordingly it is assumed (Dryzek et al. 2003) that inclusive states would encourage ENGOs to engage in inclusive tactics since conventional modes of action can be effective and influence decision makers. Kitschelt (1986) argues that the open democratic states encourage inclusive strategies of the ENGOs as there are many channels of access to the state. Downes (2000) claims movements face a dilemma when states have inclusive structure, whether they should engage in confrontational or consensus actions. Dryzek et al. (2003) claim inclusive strategies bring higher potential for success and influence, conditioned to when state imperatives fit the ENGO’s goals.
Kitschelt (1986) expects that ENGOs in open states engage in "assimilative strategies " meaning inclusive strategies. Exclusive states that deny access of any interest group implicitly encourage social movements to use oppositional modes of action to confront and challenge the state to influence policy change (Dryzek et al. 2003).
ENGOs most likely care about how they are perceived from the outside. It would be logical that some organizations wish to present themselves as peaceful actors to enable future cooperation with the state. Dalton et al. (2003) elaborated on the conflict that ENGOs face in choosing a strategy: " the choice of protest and confrontation as a tactic can strengthen the anti-institutional identity of a movement and thereby limit its repertoire of possible activities ." (p. 5) Choosing confrontational forms of action might eliminate any future contacts with the government and therefore
ENGOs might prefer to avoid it and engage in conventional strategies.
1.13. Resource Mobilization Theory
10
Resource Mobilization (RM) theory maintains movement choices of action are based on rational more than ideology (Ben- Eliezer 1999). It assumes that organizations examine and choose strategy to bring the optimal results (Michaelson 1994). McCarthy and Zald (1977) who developed this theory link between the organizational characteristics and strategy. They claim the movement activity and its success is determined by the movement potential to attract resources in the form of funding, general public supporters, political connections, and ability to recruit public figures for support (Ben- Eliezer 1999; Dalton et al. 2003; Oser 2009).
According to McCarthy and Zald (1977) other resources included public adherents, allies, and other external influences such as relationship with the state. In this view, the relationship of the state is also described as an influencing resource.
Therefore the resource mobilization theory resembles the political opportunity structure, and seems to actually be an expansion of it.
In their hypotheses, McCarthy and Zald (1977) predict well-funded organizations would choose conventional modes of action. In these organizations, some resources are allocated to maintain the organizational structure. And organizational actions tend to be cautious to protect the existing platform and maintain government and foundation support. Dalton et al. (2003) supported this theory, and found that high budgeted ENGOs engage in more conventional and moderate activities that entail " low risk ". They also claimed that higher budgets lead to higher rates of activity.
Furthermore, Dalton et al. (2003) argue, when resources are limited, choices of action will be made according to the costs and benefits. Example, lobby vs. demonstrations and public awareness campaigns are chosen based on their costs.
According to Dryzek et al. (2003) inclusive behavior usually demands fewer resources.
Therefore as long as the ENGO goals fit in the imperatives of the state and find 11
channels for influence, it would be expected that low resourced ENGOs engage in inclusive forms. Curtis and Gronberg (2007) found a correlation between size of ENGO and collective action. Also, Handy talks about the relationship between resources and collective action.
Also, Piven and Cloward (1977, cited by Dalton et al. 2003) " claimed that poorly funded movements often rely on the time and energy of volunteer activists, thereby leading to spontaneous, protest-based tactics. Thus ENGOs with small budgets and staffs may be more likely to perform more confrontational activities, as they need to get noticed and cannot appeal to a broad-based membership. " (p. 14)
In addition to the resources mentioned, membership base is an additional resource of leverage (Oser 2009). Dalton et al. (2003) found a correlation between age and conventional activities. They attributed it to the political connections and legitimacy that can be gained over time by movements. This in turn gives an advantage for working within conventional channels. They reason that older ENGOs, are more established and obtain more connections gaining status, therefore they will not attempt to risk it in radical actions. Also, Contentious organizations tend to become moderate over time, or they turn to unsustainable violent paths (Koopmans 1993; Tarrow 1994). It is hard to keep radical opposition of thoughts and action in power (Dryzek et al. 2003).
1.14. Impact of Discourse Frames and Identity
Other research has examined the influence of internal factors on the choice of strategic orientation such as discourse and identity. Discourse frames are the languages used by movement members. They are a shared way of understanding the reality, and express the belief system and philosophy of a group (Brulle 1996; Tarrow 1994). Using discourse terms allows simplicity in language, as in mentioning one phrase can mean a 12
lot within a group (Dryzek 1997). Discourse frames connect groups together as they strengthen their shared culture in a common language (Brulle 1996).
For example, the human rights movement introduced a discourse about equal rights. This phrase contains all of the demands that the movement had for minority groups to be recognized as equal. From the civil/human rights movement the discussion of equal rights enters into many other movements (Walker 2009). Demands for equal right entered the environmental struggles, as citizens demanded environmental justice, rights for clean and healthy environment (Brulle 1996; Walker 2009). It also entered the discourse of the women's rights movement, and later also to the LGBT movements.
Tarrow (1994) explains that discourse frames encompass the “ shared meanings that inspire people to collective action ” (p22). He argues that social movements use frames that justify and promote collective action (1994). Brulle (1996) argues that forms of social injustice are not enough to mobilize activists. Collective action emerges after discourse is developed. It builds a group identity that leads to collective action. Walker,
(2009) argues that construction of frames is essential to organize collective action.
Brulle, (1996) explains that discourse frames that are used in a movement constitute the organization’s collective identity. Pellow and Brulle (2005) argue movements actively construct frames to mobilize activists. Doherty (2002) argues that movements need identity, a clear distinction between the members that form the group and its counters and before they engage in collective action.
Further examination of the example presented of the emergence of the discourse about rights can better clarify how it is used for engaging the public in collective action.
The scope of collective action of the environmental justice movement in the United
States changed with its discourse. The movement started with a frame of environmental racism , which relates to minority groups in their struggle for safety and health. But then 13
the movement adopted a broader, more moderate frame, the demand for environmental justice . The second frame could relate to and engage a larger audience, including the mainstream environmental movement. And in its more moderate form, the movement was expanded (Walker 2009).
The study of movements from abroad can also show a distinction between inclusive and exclusive oriented organizations, and their relation to the government. The upcoming section will examine briefly other environmental movements around the world and present how the distinction between inclusive and exclusive ENGOs tend to be universally relevant. And how state structure has influence on movement strategy.
2. Examples of Environmental movements from Abroad
Observers argue that according to the political opportunity structure a centralized state usually has an oppositional environmental movement, while a pluralistic open state usually has a cooperative environmental movement (Dryzek et al.
2003; Tarrow 1996). In order to better understand the meaning of an open and a closed state and the distinction between inclusive and exclusive strategic orientations, it is necessary to examine environmental movements operating in other counties. This will offer a perspective about the context of political structure and the level of democracy, in which the ENGOs engage and highlight different strategic orientations. The history of three different environmental movements will be considered briefly in this context: the environmental movements of the USA, Germany and the UK.
The first seeds of the environmental movements in the United States started with the establishment of the American Forestry Association in 1875. This association held a conservation approach that emphasized the need for humanity to control its over- exploitation of woodlands and harvest resources responsibly (Brulle 1996). Soon after, 14
two more environmental groups were formed, the Appalachian Mountain Trail in1876 and the Sierra Club in 1892 as response to the massive development and overexploitation in Westerns United States (Gottlieb 1993). These two ENGOs took one step beyond the American Forestry Association to initiate a discourse about preservation. They believed that nature and wilderness were the main concerns, rather than the human environment and well- being. The organizations aimed to preserve wilderness, wildlife, and scenic areas, including the protection of plants (Brulle 1996;
Gottlieb 1993).
Over the years more environmental groups joined force with the nascent movement advocating nature conservation and preservation. Groups such as the
Audubon Society officially incorporated in 1905 (Audubon Society Website), the
Wilderness Society that was formed in 1935 (Gottlieb 1993) and the National Wildlife
Federation (NWF) that was formed in 1938 as result of government support and initiatives for protection of the wildlife, specifically migratory birds (NWF website).
These pioneering conservation and preservation ENGOs worked according to inclusive strategies, such as lobbying for the promotion of environmental policy and integrating with the state in efforts to influence decision making within mainstream, conventional channels (Dryzek et al. 2003). And the state embraced them, attended their conferences and implemented some of their proposed policies (Gottlieb 1993).
Many writers during the 1960s and early 1970s had warned about the environmental consequences of human activity. In 1962 Rachel Carson's " Silent Spring " warned about the influence of toxic chemicals on human health and wildlife; Barry
Commoner warned above ground nuclear testing in 1971; Paul Ehrlich described "The
Population Bomb" about the dangers of population growth in 1968, "The Club of 15
Rome", a group of businessmen and scientists reported in 1972 about degrading natural resources (Ditt & Rafferty 1996; Schreurs 2002).
Influenced by these publications, a new generation of ENGOs joined and extended American environmental concerns. ENGOs with greater urban concerns, such as pollution control, and prevention of urban industrial hazards, and concern for resource depletion joined America's growing environmental agendas (Brulle 1996;
Gottlieb 1993; Schreurs 2002). These ENGOS also used inclusive strategies, especially lobbying, but were more science-based (Brulle 1996). Examples of some are the
Environmental Defense Fund that was established in 1967, Friends of the Earth established in 1969 and the Natural Resources Defense Council in 1970.
During this time, with the growing environmental awareness, older groups such as Sierra Club , the Audubon Society , and the Wilderness Society became more established and expanded in membership and activity (Glazer & Glazer 1998; Gottlieb
1993; Schreurs 2002). For instance the Sierra club in 1960 had approximately 15,000 members, and in 1972 had around 136,000 (Schreurs 2002). These groups also used the growing environmental awareness to leverage their activity. One example of a successful campaign brought to the legislation of the Wilderness Act in 1964 that allowed the preservation of 90 million acres of land and thousands of miles of rivers.
This was achieved due to lobbying of the Sierra Club accompanied by a public letter writing campaign to the Congress to pose public pressure on politicians (Handy 2001).
In parallel to the environmental movement in the United States, other social movements emerged during the 1960’s, as part of the New Left and the Counterculture movements. The New Left included the antinuclear and the civil rights movements and it confronted the modern industrial society that idealizes labor and profit; the 16
Counterculture movement believed in liberation and transformation of oneself and society. The Counterculture and the New Left connected on many levels: they both criticized consumer culture and aimed to bring society back to simpler, more natural ways of life. In its search for an alternative lifestyle, the counterculture movement established alternative frameworks that varied, from communes that offered alternative living conditions and organized coops, to free universities for the public and alternative publishing houses. Both movements used nonviolence and civil disobedience and attracted attention due to their progressive ideas. The specific environmental targets the
New Left aimed at were largely linked to the environmental implications of the cold war such as the nuclear emissions, nuclear weapon testing and redesigning society toward a less consumer culture (Gottlieb 1993).
Both of these movements faded out by the end of the 1970s giving room for new alternative movements to emerge. These movements introduced new approaches towards environmentalism and radical behavior. They integrated ideas such as ecofeminism, social ecology, and animal liberation to the public discourse. These movements posed an alternative perspective for American society and challenged the culture, but remained outside the politics and participated in a general discourse about societal and individual liberation. They were strategically exclusive movements that did not aim to challenge the politics (Dryzek et al. 2003; Gottlieb 1993).
Earth Day was celebrated for the first time on April 22, 1970. It was marked historically for its mass participation of approximately 10 million people across the
United States. It catapulted the environmental debate into mainstream American culture.
From that moment the media started to embrace environmental issues and bring them to the front pages for the first time. Concern for the environment became a national issue
(Gottlieb 1993). 17
The momentum created by the first Earth Day led the Nixon administration embraced the environmental movement and declared the 1970's to be "the decade of the environment". Dryzek et al. (2003) explain that this choice was a political opportunity for the Nixon Administration to gain back legitimacy. Indeed the legitimacy of the state was threatened as the counter culture movement confronted the state on political issues; the feminist movement on gender issues' the civil rights movement on racism; and the
Peace movement on the Vietnam War. Nixon essentially chose to embrace the most moderate elements of the U.S. environmental movement, that was gaining momentum across society, and the polls showed it was a concern of the public; Nixon reckoned he could regain the public's trust this way rather than give in to the more extremist demands of the counter culture movement.
As a result of the embrace by the state, the mainstream environmental groups grew closer to the state and lobbied for improvements in environmental policy. The inclusion of the environmental organizations by the state led to the enacting of a large number of environmental policies and statutes, and enforcement agencies were established. Some of the achievements of the time were the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) and the Clean Air Act both in 1970; and the Clean Water Act in
1972. Institutionally, the EPA was established as a regulatory agency in 1970, and many more environmental regulations were legislated (Dryzek et al. 2003; Gottlieb
1993; Schreurs 2002).
During the Nixon administration in the 1970s the mainstream groups became more established and staffed with scientific and professional experts (Gottlieb 1993). In the beginning of the 1980s some of the large, well-supported ENGOs formed a coalition to confront the Reagan anti- environmental administration, and basically institutionalized mainstream environmentalism (Gottlieb 1993). The Reagan 18
administration was unabashedly hostile towards environmentalists when it first came to power. But when Reagan tried to exclude the mainstream environmental movements, they gained more funding and membership, and fought back thorough the democratic tools of the court system and Congress. Eventually the Reagan administration was forced to include them in decision making (Dryzek et al. 2003). It seems that these mainstream ENGOs were able to integrate with the system and that they knew how to struggle to regain their position inside the state.
But during the 1970's and 1980's also radical strategic exclusive ENGOs emerged. Greenpeace was established in 1971 in Canada by a group of students that invaded a nuclear testing base on an island in the Pacific Ocean, and soon became a multi-national organization. From the start Greenpeace was strategically an exclusive group that engaged in radical activities aimed to challenge the state, such as demonstrations; sit-ins and a variety of direct actions, focused on global environmental issues engaging in direct action and bearing witness (Gottlieb 1993).
Some- time after Greenpeace , another strategically exclusive group was established in 1979, it was called Earth First! (Gottlieb 1993). Earth First was a radical
ENGO ideologically based on a spiritual connection with the earth. Its members held radical beliefs about the role of human beings in the ecosystem, and insisted humanity should adapt to natural and tribal life style of indigenous people. Members of Earth
First! engaged in civil disobedience and monkey wrenching, tree spiking, and blocking bulldozers to prevent logging among their confrontational activities (Bron 1991).
Further, during the 1980's a different, exclusive movement rose. It became known as the environmental justice movement. It emerged both from the anti-toxic and the anti-racist movements (DeLuca 2007). It was a decentralized movement made of 19
several local communities, and confronted and challenged the government (Pellow &
Brulle 2005; Gottlieb 1993). The anti-toxic movement rose around the battle of Love
Canal residents (Gottlieb 1993). Soon thereafter, a movement to confront environmental racism started, largely associated with the activist Robert Doyle Bullard, who exposed the relative proximity of minority communities to environmental hazards (Bullard 1990;
Gottlieb 1993). The environmental justice movement called for a just distribution of the environmental risks such as air and water pollution, solid waste and toxic chemicals. By the 1990's the movement became a national force and in retrospect, the 1990s were declared as the years of environmental justice (Dryzek et al. 2003). This movement also influenced the mainstream wilderness movements to broaden its agenda and include human well-being, diverting its goals solely from protection of the wilderness (DeLuca
2007).
The environmental justice movement criticized the mainstream ENGOs for coopting and blending in the government. The critique was largely suspicious of mainstream ENGOs' inclusive strategies of joining governmental round tables, their willingness to compromise their goals and the lack of transparency within the organization (Glazer & Glazer 1998).
Pellow and Brulle (2005) argue that the most apparent success of the environmental justice movement was on the local level, where most of the campaigns took place. Struggling communities succeeded in preventing or reducing pollution from different sources, and relocating or economically compensating residents of polluted regions. On the legal level, the environmental justice movement has not had much success, as the court system in the United States has refused to charge polluters on the behalf of title VI of the Civil Rights Act that prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, and national origin. But, in 1994 the environmental Justice movement also 20
had an effect on the national level, as environmental justice reached the highest level of governmental attention. President Clinton signed an executive order for Governmental
Agencies to consider environmental justice in their activities, and the Congressional
Black Caucus was strengthened with environmental voters (Pellow & Brulle 2005).
Looking at the history of the environmental movement in the United States, it shows a long heritage of inclusive activity of lobbying, and involvement in decision making and very little radical activist environmental groups. Dryzek et al. (2003) argue that the inclusive strategy used by the ENGOs in the United States was a result of the open state structure. Channels for civil society to contact and influence decision makers are available. Moreover, they claim the Administrative Procedures Act passed in 1946 induced a more open and democratic process for decision making, and provides guidelines for public participation, opposing proposed rules and government actions.
Also the United States court system is a highly open structure and allows interest groups to participate in or challenge legislation. Examples include the liberal "standing" rules allowing public interest groups to petition the court as public party as well and the ability of any individual to sue a government agency when not carrying out its mandate as defined by legislation, which was granted during the 1960s (Dryzek et al 2003;
Schreurs 2002) and non-governmental nonprofit organizations are easily granted legal standing as a public foundation with a tax- exempt status 2 These lead to the open state structure that allows the ENGOs to approach and influence policy without much radical confrontation.
The strategic decision to pursue exclusive activity adopted during the 1970s by the alternative movement occurred for several other reasons. These were related to the
2 Under section 501 (c)(3) and 501(c)(4) in the tax code that provides legal writes for the organization and provides supportive conditions such as mailing discounts. And since 1976 another privilege was added to the environmental organizations, permitting them to spend up to 20% of their income on lobbying (Schreurs 2002). 21
goals of the broader social ideology with which it was associated. Greenpeace and
Earth First! were formed due to an urge to protest. They were designed to be confrontational movements that challenge the state to restructure society. The organizations were defined by their modes of action rather than their specific goals per se (Gottlieb 1993).
The Environmental Justice movement in the United States, by definition, was an excluded and oppositional movement. It rose through exposing governmental failures due to racism and the lack of effective enforcement of industries that led to serious environmental risks to many minority communities around the United States (Glazer &
Glazer 1998; Gottlieb 1993; Pellow & Brulle 2005).
The dynamics of the environmental movement in Europe evolved in somewhat similar patterns, yet mainly in response to state structure and policy (Schreurs 2002). In
Germany a mainstream strategically inclusive environmental movement had been active decades before any radical wave of environmental activity (Dryzek et al. 2003). Prior to
World War II the government adopted nature conservation as a national concern, but during and after the war it had neglected environmental concerns. The new policy aimed at development to regain the economic stability after the war marginalized the environmental protection discourse in the government (Ditt & Rafferty 1996; Schreurs
2002).
Post-war West Germany focused most of its collective energies on rebuilding the economy. Germany showed a successful economic development with a high growth rate of 7.6 percent increase in the GNP between the years 1952 and 1958. The country soon became touted as an economic miracle. But this growth brought also environmental problems: heavy pollution of water, air and noise grew severe in industrial regions. Also, development threatened the country's open spaces (Bodemann 22
1985/6; Schreurs 2002). In response to massive development of polluting industry and construction that threatened the protection of the natural areas a group of nature conservation organizations was formed during the 1950s. One conservation organizations established was the Association for the Protection of German Forests , formed in 1947 specifically in response to massive deforestation that was happening across Germany. Also The German League for Nature and Environment (DNR) was established in 1950 3. Later, in 1961 the World Wildlife Fund set up a branch in
Germany. This group of conservation organizations did not intervene in politics and did not make meaningful efforts to promote environmental policy (Schreurs 2002).
The new social movement in West Germany started in the late 1960's with student activism. The year 1968 marked a turning point in German postwar history as a counter culture movement arose. Along with the student activism, joined the antinuclear and peace movements, woman's groups, third world solidarity, gay movements and others (Bodemann 1985/6; Koopmans 1993). This radical counter- culture movement rose against hierarchy in the universities, challenging "fascism" and
"extra- establishment" (Bodemann 1985/6, p.141). It changed the discourse about power in Germany. It also revealed a generation gap of values and political discourse between the students and the older generation, as the younger generation exhibited a growing lack of trust in the governmental systems (Bodemann 1985/6; Chandler &
Siaroff 1986). The anti-nuclear confrontational movement gained momentum and drew massive participation. Yet, all attempts to reach the government failed. Conventional lobbying was also attempted but revealed no fruit, as no party was willing to adopt an anti-nuclear position. It has been argued by Dryzek et al (2003) that this is when the environment became political. In retrospect, they argue, political exclusion by the state
3 The DNR is an umbrella organization of German nature conservation and environmental protection organizations. http://www.business-biodiversity.eu/default.asp?Menue=86&Organisation=683 23
helped strengthen the oppositional counter- culture movement. The New Social
Movement of West Germany was parallel to the New Left movement in the United
States (Dryzek et al. 2003).
The student activism of the late 1960's accompanied by other social movements led to the emergence of many local grassroots in the early 1970s. These groups were formed for local environmental and social issues such as transportation, energy conservation, deforestation (Bodemann 1985/6; Dryzek et al. 2003). The local groups in the 1970's grew larger and by 1980 a green movement was established with 5 million people. The German environmental movement reflected a very diverse and active collection of people, in a variety of organizations: from local single-issue groups to national advocacy organizations; from recreational groups to ecological research institutions (Dryzek et al. 2003).
The German Green Party was formed from the grassroots environmental movement in 1980 and elected to parliament in 1983 (Dryzek et al 2003) 4. The structural development of the movement over time resembles the structural models described by Rucht. Emerging as local grassroots, forming into national organizations aimed at policy change and finally entered into the politics as an elected party (1996).
Throughout the 1980's the Green Party's effect on the environmental movement was the subject of serious debate. Some thought it would encourage hierarchy and undermine the experience and participatory approach of the civil society groups. Some activists argued that it was best to challenge the system from within while some activists claimed that it was better to challenge from the outside (Bodemann 1985/6;
Dryzek et al. 2003). As the disagreement was not resolved, two green parties were
4 This was the first time in German history since the election system was changed that a new party entered the German parliament- the Bundestag (Chandler and Siaroff, 1986, p303;). 24
formed. The argument continued until the moderate camp won, by receiving more votes and emerged as the more popular approach (Dryzek et al. 2003). This argument, in fact can be seen as a tactical disagreement between two inclusive approaches. Despite the fact that both parties aimed to provide an alternative and challenged the state, they were both political parties aiming for the public support.
The German environmental movement did not have many channels to influence decision making as in the US. It had less ability to challenge the government in court since there was no clear standing for ENGOs, no law for class action suits, and no established freedom of information law. The German environmental movement had to deal with governmental atmosphere hostile to its requests for information. By 1994 the environmental Information Act was passed, but it did not change the non-cooperative culture of governmental agencies regarding transparency and supplying information
(Dryzek et al. 2003).
Politicians excluded all non- profit activist, and this, according to Dryzek et al.
(2003) created the best conditions for a more exclusive social movement to emerge. As movements were excluded they had no choice but expand their opposition and grow in numbers and power. Lack of response of the government forced the anti- nuclear movement to engage in direct action in parallel to legal action.
In the United Kingdoms, the environmental movement started with the formation of the Rambler Association and The Commons Preservations Society both in
1865. The Commons Preservation Society was a uniquely aggressive confrontational
ENGO that was established to preserve common urban open spaces and campaigned against fencing to block common rural paths (Cowell 2002; Ditt & Rafferty 1996). A few years later some more groups that focused on conservation of nature, wildlife and rural development were established. Most of these groups preferred cooperation with 25
the state rather than opposition to it. But their actions did not translate into legislation
(Ditt & Rafferty 1996). According to Dryzek et al. (2003) the environmental movement of the UK that was established prior to the 1970's wave of social movement activism of
Europe had only a small influence on decision makers. These ENGOs included the
Royal Society for the Protection of Birds founded in 1889 (Dryzek et al. 2003), the
Society to promote Nature Reserves founded in 1912 (Ditt & Rafferty 1996) and the
Royal Society for Nature Conservation founded in 1916. Since the 1920s, perhaps with the influence of the ENGOs, the government started to implement some environmental legislation. It subjected road building to planning commission, ordered petrol station regulations and posed limits on advertising (Ditt & Rafferty, 1996).
The Council for the Protection of Rural England was founded in 1926 (Ditt &
Rafferty 1996; Dryzek et al. 2003) as an umbrella organization for local groups. It led exclusive strategies such as protests for preservation of the countryside and promoted the creation of national parks. It campaigned for the establishment of national parks and the government gave in to the public pressure and looked into some options. But due to political and economic distractions, until World War II there were no tangible accomplishments (Ditt & Rafferty 1996).
Only sporadic forms of direct action were used by ENGOs during the 1970's, mainly against highway construction and a site occupation of a nuclear power construction site. The government responded to these actions carefully, with moderate police response and public hearings. But in general the environmental movement did not succeed in mobilizing people for action as was so successfully done by the peace movement. During the 1970's Britain did not have a radical environmental movement parallel to the New Social Movements that emerged in other European countries
(Dryzek et al. 2003). The limited unconventional activities were initiated primarily by 26
informal groups, while the moderate conventional activities were held by the more established, formal organizations (Dryzek et al. 2003). A radical civil society in the UK refused to rise.
Friends of the Earth UK was formed in 1971, and Greenpeace UK in 1977
(Dryzek et al. 2003) and by the 1980s both had expanded considerably (Rootes 2009).
But their activities in Britain were modest compared to activities in other countries. And by the 1980’s Greenpeace's work was based on hierarchical decision making and not as a participatory democratic as in other countries. It also preferred governance based on generating donations rather than an active membership even though it started as a New
Social Movement, grassroots and decentralized decision making (Dryzek et al. 2003).
During the Thatcher administration, between the years 1979-1990, the government and decision makers were largely inaccessible by the public. Further, governmental information was restricted from the public as well. But there were some channels still open. Official advisory committees still had public representation and some ENGOs sent its representatives to those committees. Still, the Thatcher administration weakened some of the governmental institutions related to the environment (Dryzek et al. 2003) and weakened decisions based on environmental concerns, as it promoted reforms that enabled land releases to be decision of the developers rather than planning systems. The Thatcher administration started a based on market concerns rather than other notions of the public interest (Blowers 1987). In addition, it passed acts to restrict protest and "scare" movements from organizing demonstrations. One of the new acts placed criminal responsibilities upon demonstration organizers for all activities held by demonstration participants (Dryzek et al. 2003). Civil society was suffering from decline under the conditions imposed by the
Thatcher administration. 27
But after the year 1988 when Thatcher acknowledged that environmental global pollution should be more energetically addressed by Britain, suddenly moderate groups were included and enjoyed access to the government. Environmental committees were created and funding was diverted to environmental issues. Some ENGO leaders were even hired by the ministry of environment. This led to a better information supply from the government to the ENGOs (Dryzek et al. 2003). During this time both Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth shifted toward more conventional forms of action, lobbying for environmental policy, rather than mobilizing the public (Rootes 2009).
Still, with all the political access the ENGOs enjoyed in the 1990’s, the British government largely maintained its exclusive approach to public interest groups. The UK legal system also did not favor the interest groups. The Criminal Justice and Public
Order Act passed in 1994 outlawed most forms of protest. The criminal act banned protest- which previously had been legal- making protestors into criminals. Even potential protesters were arrested if traveling within 5 miles from a protest. And police increased its power. For fear of losing their income, large organizations retreated from protest activity. Friends of the Earth , after joining a campaign against road construction in 1992 withdrew its participation from a protest against construction of a highway;
Greenpeace cancelled its protest against a nuclear site during this period (Dryzek et al.
2003; Rootes 2009).
Ironically, the extreme tactics used by the government to dismantle the protest movements actually served to encourage more participation and inspired a movement to act against it. Suddenly in the mid 1990’s there was an awakening of awareness and the environmental movement's power grew and had many successful protests. The period showed the limits of governmental exclusion as the "people will rise up. This exclusion stimulated activity and new alternative groups to be formed (Dryzek et al 2003). 28
The campaign against construction of a motorway in Twyford Down in the beginning of the 1990s attracted thousands of participants and turned from a local interest campaign to a national concern and ignited a series of anti-road campaigns. This campaign had used direct action such as site occupation, tree housing. It was followed by others, such as a radical confrontational campaign against widening of the M1 motorway inside of London (Rootes 2009) as a number of confrontational ENGOs were formed around these struggles. ALARM-UK, Critical Mass, Reclaim the Streets, Earth
First! : All used direct action including tunneling construction sites and street charactering images, accompanied by media attention. And some groups joined the broader direct action movements Anti Capitalism & Globalization , Anti Criminal Act
(Dryzek et al. 2003).
The 1997 Blair Labor Government was more open to the environment movement. Environmental issues were not the main topic on its agenda, but a transparency policy was integrated into the governmental system, and several governmental panels were established on environmental issues (Dryzek et al. 2003).
And it seems that the environmental movement responded. In recent years, it became a highly institutionalized movement that used lobbying for policy change rather than community mobilization (Rootes 2009). And in the late 1990s, environmental justice also entered the discourse of Britain's environmental movement. Unlike the United
States, where the environmental justice movement was a confrontational movement, it entered via the mainstream environmental organizations, who brought these concerns to policy makers (Agyman & Evans 2004).
The environmental movement in the UK began and for a long time remained an inclusive movement. Even after political channels were closed and democratic conditions worsened, it took the environmental movement some time to respond and 29
engage in confrontational activity. Finally, in the 1990's, after inclusive strategies were restricted, the environmental movement awoke, and started engaging more frequently in radical modes of action to counter the attack on civil society by the governments. This trend is also seen in the income and membership distribution of the ENGOs. UK
ENGOs that engage in modest activities such as lobbying and the national advocacy and focused on nature conservation and nature-reserve management were the ones to gain the larger incomes and membership over the years, and in contrast, ENGOs, such as
Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth , which stimulate and organize public pressure campaigns, have a much smaller budget and membership than the conservationist- inclusive ENGOs (Rootes 2009, monitored until 2006).
The above examples of environmental movements from the United States,
Germany and the UK show a clear distinction between inclusive and exclusive movements. Most of them reflect the level of democracy and centralization of their particular country (Dryzek et al. 2003; Gottlieb 1993; Tarrow 1994). There were some cases, where the political structure in the state cannot explain the evolution of national environmental movements. These are probably cases where other factors took place.
Such was the case of Greenpeace and Earth First! in the United States. These movements rose in times of political opportunity. It seems they did not need to engage in confrontational modes of action to convince the government to change policy and yet they have. In these two cases Gottlieb (1993) assumes both of these ENGOs were formed with the goal of providing answers to the confrontational demands that grew in those years, after the new left protest movement. In fact their decision to engage in exclusive modes of action can be explained by the identity and goals of those ENGOs.
30
2.1. History of the Israeli environmental movement
The Society for the Protection of Nature in Israel (SPNI) was the first ENGO to be active in Israel. Its primary focus was nature conservation and it was established in
1954 after its leaders failed in a campaign to prevent the draining of the Hula wetland
(Tal 2006). Orenstein and Silverman (2013) link the SPNI's goals for nature conservation to the conservation movement of the United States that started in the late
19 th century. From the perspective of its goals, the SPNI was aligned with the National-
Zionist state imperative (Yishai 1998).
From a strategic perspective, soon after it was established, the SPNI became very inclusive, as it integrated with the state and functioned as an interest group, even taking on quasi-governmental functions. Its leadership was centralized, it received funding from governmental ministries, and it functioned as the state's extension in matters that concerned nature protection and nature education. Its ideology was aligned with the state Zionist imperative for connection with nature and its protection
(Orenstein & Silverman 2013). Moreover, SPNI nature guides also functioned as nature inspectors (Tal 2006).
The SPNI started to distance itself from the government following two events.
One was the establishment of the Nature Reserve Authority in 1964. This event removed the law enforcement for nature protection from the hands of the SPNI. The second was a demonstration to promote preservation of the Carmel mountain forest in
1963. The demonstration attracted a mass of activists and emerged as a formative and inspiring event. Activists became aware of their power and a sense of solidarity strengthened them. Following this, the SPNI turned to more exclusive strategies; it led 31
many campaigns and changed direction, becoming a more aggressive watchdog of the government on environmental protection issues (Tal 2006).
In the context of a steadily decreasing participation level by Israelis in party politics, during the 1960's civil society became a much more common framework for public activity (Oser 2009). This phenomenon was soon manifested in the environmental field as a handful of environmental organizations were formed and broadened environmental activities of the SPNI. Malraz was established as an exclusive advocacy ENGO that used legal actions against the state and against polluting bodies. It was known as a "trouble maker" for its preference of public media rather than dialogue with the government (Malraz website; Tal 2006). Malraz was also the only ENGO that for many years held a scientific based approach regarding concerns about environmental hazards (Malraz website). Another significant ENGO established during the 1970s, the
Council for a Beautiful Israel remains an inclusive educational ENGO that promotes landscape care by organizations and authorities. Its goals also conformed with the national Zionist imperative, aiming at beautifying the country's environment (Yishai
1998). Both of these organizations have survived until the present study and continue with a broad base of activity.
Another exclusive ENGO that was formed at the time was Econet (Tal, 2006).
Its founders were concerned about the establishment of nuclear power in Israel. This organization is currently not active (Sadeh 2010). By the 1980's when many environmental campaigns arose in Israel (Sadeh 2010) and many new organizations appeared at the beginning of the 1990s (Bar-David & Tal 1996; Karassin 2001; Tal
2006). It was also during the 1990s that movement spread to the periphery. And
ENGOs were formed in cities such as Eilat, Ashdod, Bnei-Brak, Dimona, and Hadera.
This, while in the 1980's they were primarily centered in large cities, with the exception 32
of the SPNI that has prior to this opened chapters all across the country (Binyamini &
Pizmonai- Levi 2003).
In the same time, between the 1960's and the 1970's two other movements emerged: Israel's feminist movement and the Black Panthers . While the press offered both a reasonable level of coverage, ultimately both movements were not embraced by
Israel's political established and were largely excluded from the state's accepted
"mainstream". The feminist movement threatened the family structure and the Black
Panthers threatened the social order. The latter destroyed the myth of a diversified and united country and exposed racial pervasive societal discrimination (Yihsai 1998).
Opportunity structures for Israeli civil society opened in many levels at the end of the 1980's and early 1990's; Economic growth came as result of the transition to a neo-liberal economy and privatization of the market (Ben- Eliezer 1999) and more funding became available for NGOs from the government (Binyamini & Pizmonai-
Levi 2003). At the same time according to Ben- Eliezer (1999), the country witnessed a weakening of the legitimacy of the political party system as result of intrigues between political parties. Moreover, the outbreak of the intifada of 1987 opened a discourse about peace and the Palestinian rights that resulted in the weakening of the legitimacy of the IDF and the state for its occupation of the Palestinian territories. Change was also happening in global politics, with the fall of the Soviet Empire and growing pressure on
Israel from the US to enter into a peace process (Ben- Eliezer 1999).
Along with these processes that opened political opportunities, environmental opportunities also opened. The United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro, 1992 (Handl 2012) raised environmental awareness worldwide, and international Jewish philanthropy began to take an interest in 33
Israel’s environment (Tal et al. 2011). These developments enabled many new organizations to get established.
Zelinger (2005) associates the trends of the growing environmental activity in the 1990s with the general rise in the formation of advocacy nonprofit organizations, not only environmental. Gidron and Katz (2004, in Oser 2009) also found that advocacy groups, although they constitute only a small portion of civil society during the 1990's have been rising in numbers. From constituting 3% of the registered organizations in the beginning if the 1990's growing to be 9% by the end of the century.
Moreover, Zelinger (2005) relates the rise in activity at the time to political events. The
Oslo Accords in 1993, created an atmosphere where many new non-profit organizations were set up to take advantage of the perceived opportunities created by the peace process, strengthening the trend of expansion among ENGOs. This was slowed down after the Prime Minister Rabin Assassination in 1996 and also after the second Intifada.
The rise of environmental activity was accompanied by shift in goals and the environmental discourse, beyond the traditional concern for nature preservation with a growing emphasis on quality of the environment public health based on scientific methods (Orenstein & Silverman 2013; Schwartz 2009). Binyamini (2003) describes this shift from a one dimensional approach to a multi-dimensional approach that integrated many ideas of human rights, social justice and freedom, and facilitated connections between the ENGOs to other types of movements. According to Orenstein and Silverman (2013) the same shift was presented by the environmental movements of
Western world countries during the 1960s. The late feedback of this worldwide shift is seen in the change in the SPNI towards social and demographic issues and its new interest in urban environmental issues (Binyamini 2003). 34
A trend of a growing movement was seen in some environmental movement mapping research. Bar-David and Tal (1996) gave an estimation of 80 active ENGOs in the country in a 1996 survey (commissioned by the CRB foundation). A study conducted by the environmental umbrella organization , Life and Environment estimated
100 active ENGOs in the year 2000 (Karassin 2001) while around 70 were members of
Life and Environment ). And by 2002 Binyamini and Pizmonai- Levi found 129 environmental legally registered ENGOs, of these 89 were active (Binyamini &
Pizmonai- Levi 2003). The research of Karassin and Binyamini and Pizmonai- Levi did not include unregistered grassroots, while the research of Bar-David and Tal did. Due to the inconsistency in research methods these final numbers cannot be compared systematically, yet they provide a general picture of a growing movement.
Bar-David and Tal (1996) revealed an active but inclusive movement. The most common activities found to be practiced were advocacy such as meetings with public officials, working with the media, letter writing, talking with decision makers, creating public awareness and forming coalitions.
Although systematically incomparable with the Bar-David and Tal research,
Karassin (2001) revealed a more dynamic movement that often used a dual strategy. It found that ENGOs both engaged in inclusive tactics along with exclusive strategies.
Most of the ENGOs were active in initiating educational activities for youth and adults and had utilized the media in their activities. Half of the ENGOs used petitions as a tool to promote their objectives and more than a third joined or organized demonstrations.
Approximately one third had been involved in filing a law suit, although there were only two organizations, the Israel Union for Environmental Defense (IUED) and Hok
Ha'Teva that pursued legal means as their primary operational tool. Only four ENGOs were active in environmental professional consulting. 35
Binyamini and Pizmonai- Levi (2003) identified even more exclusive groups among the traditional inclusive ones. Along with the advocacy groups that worked through persuasion, and some in more exclusive strategies of legal actions, there were groups that engaged in direct action. Such were Greenpeace , Green Course and Green
Action . An assumed change in strategies can be attributed to the intensive environmental activity that took place in the campaign to combat the construction of the
Tran- Israel Highway. The campaign took place between the years 1993-2002. It involved extensive activity that required high level cooperation intensifying around the year 2000. Each ENGO engages in a variety of strategies: the reputable professionalized
ENGOs engages in professional activities, planning, lobbying to public pressure, legal actions, and the activist and radical groups engaged mainly in demonstrations and direct action (Mayzlish 2005; Rabinowitz & Vardi 2010, pp.165-188).
During this campaign the ENGOs attacked inter alia the lack of transparency in the government, and later the personal interests that the politicians pursued was revealed. And perhaps because the campaign had little or no influence, many organizations and individuals experimented with exclusive strategies. Direct action was introduced in a late stage of the campaign and opened more opportunities for activity as it attracted large numbers of participants, received attention from the media and allowed the controversy to enter public debate (Binyamini 2003; Mayzlish 2005; Rabinowitz &
Vardi 2010; Tal 2006). From a narrow perspective, judging by the physical results alone, it would seem that the campaign was lost. But it can also be argued that it left a much stronger aggressive and sober environmental movement.
One of the trends recognized since the beginning of the 21 st century, is the increasingly widespread grassroots activities (Binyamini 2003). These were thought to use more unconventional and radical modes of action. Yet, when examined in depth, 36
many examples revealed that the collective impact of grass-roots activism was moderate and traditional. Grassroots members overall tended to use conventional tactics in accepted institutional frameworks, with a focus on low-risk campaigns at the local level, eventually acting safely rather than seeking fundamental social transformation (Gotler
2005). Although the grassroots activities were found to be conservative, the spread of local grassroots around the country indicates that environmental activism and awareness were growing. Ultimately it showed a growth in the environmental movement and an expansion to other social issues (Binyamini 2003).
Still, some unconventional activities such as direct action and public demonstrations were performed by Greenpeace (Furst 2012) Green Course . Other exclusive strategies were adopted by other ENGOs. Israel Union for Environmental
Defense presented oppositional legal activity through administrative petitions to the high court of justice, which is by its very nature in direct conflict to government positions. SPNI continues to engage in both strategies: On the one hand, it participates in governmental planning committees, but it also functioned as an oppositional body and does not hesitate to organize demonstrations.
Opposition to government policies helped motivate cooperation between groups and the forming of broad coalitions for specific goals. For example, the Coalitions for
Protection of the Judean Mountains aimed to stop the plans for development of a neighborhood in West Jerusalem. The Forum for Responsible Planning was formed to lobby against the government reform for privatization of the lands (The Lobby for
Responsible Planning website).
Historically, this short review reveals that the Israeli ENGO community has seen a shift in its strategies and its capacity. These shifts not only come due to a strategic choice by the ENGOs. They were also the result of opportunities that opened, and in the 37
change of conditions. For example, the political atmosphere in campaigns of the 1960s and 1970's allowed for successful persuasion strategies that could take advantage of the nationalistic concerns of decision makers (Tal 2006). But slowly these naïve strategies were replaced by advocacy groups that challenged the interests and values behind development (Rabinowitz & Vardi 2010; Tal 2006) 5.
2.2. Research Objectives
The goals of this research are to:
1. To characterize the relationship between the strategies applied by Israeli
ENGOs and their resources. This will be achieved by dividing between
the strategic orientation of groups and a comparison among the groups
with contrasting strategic orientations to provide a more accurate profile.
2. To characterize the relationship of the state and the Israeli ENGOs.
Specifically it will assess the level of openness of the state towards the
environmental movement and the strategies applied in response.
5 See the Israel Union for Environmental Defense against Yitzhak Tshuva in the campaign against the Carmel Towers on the Haifa shorelines in Tal 2006, pp. 544-550; the campaign against the Trance Israel Highway campaigns (Rabinowitz & Vardi 2010, pp. 163-187).
38
3. Research Method
The major tool used in this study was a survey distributed to the Israeli ENGO community. In addition, semi-structured interviews were made with ENGO leaders, academic experts, some former director generals of the Ministry of Environmental
Protection and representatives from the industry. The ENGO survey and most of the interviews were conducted as part of a broader research aimed to identify the trends and potential of the environmental movement. Results of that research were submitted to
The JMG Foundation as a comprehensive report (Tal et al. 2011) and uploaded in a website (Israel's Environmental Organizations 2011 website), followed by the publication of an article based on the report (Tal et al. 2013). Results of the survey and the interviews were used for the current research, aimed to answer more focused research questions about the Israeli environmental movement's strategies.
3.1 Israeli ENGO Survey
Preparation of the survey involved several initial steps. Creation of the Israeli
ENGO list was needed to set the groundwork for the survey; then a questionnaire was drafted and completed; and last, contact was made with the NGOs to fill in the questionnaire and ongoing reminders to fill the questioner. The research team consulted an advisory panel during the preparation of the survey and also in later stages. The advisory panel consisted of ENGO leaders, academic experts, and representatives from the philanthropic community. For the list of personnel composing the advisory panel, see Appendix 1.
3.11 Preparation of an ENGO list
39
The research aimed at exploring the Israeli environmental movement, it intended to conduct research about social movement groups that belong to the environmental movement. Preparation of a list of organizations that belong to the environmental movement required some definitions to be agreed upon. Two levels of definition were required: definitions for the environmental activity targeted by the ENGOs and the type of NGO legal registration that will be included in the research were both needed.
Karassin (2001) included all non-governmental, not for profit groups active in promoting environmental quality in Israel. She chose a broad definition to avoid exclusion of groups that seemed part of the environmental movement from her list. Bar
David and Tal (1996) included not only Grassroots initiatives, but also organizations that had only marginal environmental goals as part of their broader agenda.
Regarding the legal registration limit of inclusion, Dalton et al. (2003) included only registered environmental organizations that have a wide interest that aim at political change and excluded singe issue and local groups as well. Considering that the
Israeli environmental community is very small, due to considerable relatively small population, even small unregistered groups that have only local targets are part and contribute to the country's national environmental movement.
In the present research, all non-governmental and not-for-profit active groups were included. Small and unregistered groups (in the national registrar) were included in the research along with registered active groups as long as they were still legally active and functioning. Also, single issue and local groups were included.
Governmental or for-profit groups were excluded from the research. Professional association were included only if they held goals to influence and change society in related issues. For example, the IFLA - Israeli Association of Landscape Architects was included in the research, since it aims and engages in activities to protest the landscape. 40
The research team, in consultation with the advisory panel agreed upon a definition of the “nuclear” Israeli ENGO community. The research team in consultation with the advisory panel also decided to include all groups in the research that conformed to the previous legal definitions that pursued one or more of the following goals:
• Aim to improve quality of the environment, improve public health and reduce
hazardous pollutants,
• Aim to preserve nature / protect the open spaces,
• Research and protect the wildlife,
• Encourage sustainable development, and oppose unsustainable planning and
development
• Improve urban life and environment,
• Increase awareness on environmental issues for policy makers and the public,
• Encourage or educate for sustainable public behavior,
• Aim to enhance recognition of the right for healthy and clean environment
• Aim to improve environmental justice, and equal allocation of the resources,
• Empower communities around environment related issues,
• Increase Investment and development of public transportation, and
• Encourage or lobby for sustainable use of the common resources.
The research started in summer 2010 with the formation of a list of the active
ENGOs in Israel. To complete the ENGO list, information was taken from many sources. Among the sources used was the data specifically ordered from the National
Registrar of Associations. Information was ordered and delivered pursuant to the freedom of information law of 1998 (The Knesset website). Approximately 30,000 non- profit organizations were listed in the National Registrar by 2010 and the total list that 41
was delivered to the research team. In this database, useful information was difficult to find. At the same time the research team was referred to and permitted to use an online search engine of the National Registrar that was prepared to be released to the public a few months later. The search engine made information about NGOs more easily accessible (Guidestar website).
Information for the ENGO list was also provided by a previous mapping of joint
Palestinian and Israeli ENGOs (Adwan et al. 2004), and in addition information was provided by many experts, including members of the advisory panel Naor Yerushalmi, director Life and Environment , Ran Levi, environmental officer for the Yad- Hanadiv foundation, and several environmental activists across the country.
More information on ENGOs was collected from a database on grassroots activities that were supported by the Sheli Fund , under the Green Environmental Fund
(GEF) between the years 2007-2010. The Sheli Fund is a fund specifically meant to provide small grants to support voluntary environmental grassroots activities. This database was provided by the director of the GEF, Sigal Yaniv, and a complementary source later was found in the GEF website (Sheli Fund website). Several ENGO websites helped complete the list, including the Life and Environment umbrella organization website that lists its 100 member organizations (Life & Environment website).
While the final list of survey organizing involved approximately 120 groups recognized with correct contact and background information, the original list included many more. The list was narrowed down by the exclusion of irrelevant groups according to the definitions agreed upon. For example animal rights protection groups were excluded. Other exclusions on the list were technical, as some of the organizations 42
found in the different data sources were no longer active (Appendix 2). There were approximately 30 groups with no updated contact information; these groups were taken off the list as well after several contact attempts and no answer. 8 groups that were located engage in tangent issues but not purely environmental, or have changed their legal status from non- profit to for- profit groups. Moreover, 26 social groups in the past years had engaged in environmental issues but had stopped.
To emphasize the modular characteristic of the preparation of the list, when the questioner was sent to the ENGOs, approximately 30 email addresses were found to be wrong. This, accompanied by several phone call attempts, led to the information that some to the ENGOs had stopped being active. But on the other hand, because the word was spread that a major survey had begun, around 20 more ENGOs were added to the list and were included in the survey.
Some ENGOs had changed their legal status to avoid the difficulties of bureaucracy accompanied with aims of becoming a self-sustained organization. This was the case with Adamama an educational and experimental sustainable center and
City Tree (Etz Bair) , a center for environmental education sustainable communities in
Tel Aviv. Adamama, was established as a nonprofit association in 2003, but from difficulty of management and bureaucracy, the center was legally diverted to a private owned for - profit organization (Gur Rotem 2010). City Tree is a different type of groups. It was established as a social business out of the principles of sustainability 6.
3.12 Questionnaire Design
6 In retrospect, City Tree might have been an accurate group to be included in the research, its goals are coherent with the environmental movement groups and in its bottom line it is not aimed for profit. Further, it serves as a model of sustainability in its funding structure, where the income is received fully from membership fees and fees for goods and services.
43
A questionnaire was developed to characterize the environmental movement and learn the capacities, priorities, activities opinions and goals of the ENGOs. The questionnaire included both open and closed ended questions (Monette et al. 2007).
Great care was put on the exact wording to prevent bias or misunderstandings 7 . Some of the questions from previous mappings of the Israeli environmental movement (Bar
David & Tal 1996; Karassin 2001) were integrated into the questionnaire to help identify trends and processes over time.
A final draft was approved by the research team and advisory panel. The draft included 15 sub-categories with a total of 68 questions. A pretest survey was conducted for problem corrections similar to the guidelines of Kumar et al. (1995). Between three to five questionnaires were completed by random ENGO representatives who later recommended some corrections.
Thereafter the questionnaire was converted into an online version and sent to the list of ENGOs along with a cover letter at the end of Sept. 2010. As the response rate was initially low, many follow-up phone calls were required in order to improve participation and ensure a comprehensive and reliable view of the environmental movement and to complete the survey. A small number of ENGO representatives found the online questionnaire tool to be confusing and difficult. But the main difficulty was the length of the questionnaire which was very time-consuming and required additional information check-up about the ENGO that was not always included in the general knowledge of the person that filled in the questionnaire. Two or three personal phone call reminders and encouragement were enough in most cases, but some ENGO
7 For example see guidelines in Kumar et al, 1995, pp. 290-320).
44
representatives needed help in filling in the questionnaire. Therefore, in some cases telephone interviews were conducted instead.
By January 2011 some 75 ENGOs had filled the questionnaire and an interim report was distributed among the ENGO community for review. The interim report was distributed to the ENGOs, the philanthropic community and academic experts.
Following the distribution of the interim report, four hearings were conducted in four different regions in the country between January and Febuary 2011. Hearings were conducted in Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Beer Sheva and Shfaram (Galilee). Thirty-five representatives of environmental organizations and the foundations participated in those hearing and gave their input and understanding on the results.
The hearing in the center and in the north had the most participants, 10 ENGO representatives in the north and 14 ENGO representatives in the center. Most of the participants In Jerusalem hearing were foundation representatives, with total of 8 participants both ENGO and philanthropic representatives; and in the south only three
ENGO representative participated. It is important to mention and appreciate the ENGO representative from Tzel Hatamar of the Arava Valley (most southern region) that participated in the Jerusalem hearing.
The survey was complete By June 2011 with a response rate of 81%, and a total of 97 ENGOs that were included in the survey. Seven ENGOs only filled basic details in the questionnaire, approximately 15 filled parts, and the majority had completed the whole questionnaire. The final results of the survey included most of the large ENGOs as well as many local and regional groups. Cross sections were then conducted on the data that were generated from the questionnaires. 45
A report of the results including trends and potential was written and published in June 2011 (Tal et al. 2011). Still, due to the continual efforts of the research team, some organizations completed the questionnaire after the final report was published.
Also, since the goal of the present research is somewhat different than the original survey, some ENGO were removed from the original list and were not included in the present research. Most of the groups that were removed from the original survey were removed because they only partially completed the questionnaire, lacking the data for the statistical analyses. Also, some groups were removed from the list because the definition of the research unit was narrowed. Unlike the original survey that aimed to assess of the functions and potential of environmental activity, the present research was aimed to assess the ENGOs as a social movement community. Therefore as the original research included ENGOs with only marginal environmental goals and related activities, the present research excluded them from the list.
One example of an ENGO that was included in the original survey but was removed for the present research is the JNF. Many of its activities are defined with environment goals, such as forestry and land reclamation but it was removed because of its additional identity of a development organization as a land owner, and its integration with the government. Another group that was removed was Tevel Betzedek . This organization has demonstrated environmental activity, but in a second examination, its environmental goals are only marginal to its social justice and educational goals.
Therefore Tevel Betzedek was removed from the final list of ENGOs and removed from the research. For the total list of ENGOs that participated in the present research see
Appendix 3. As a result of these changes, in the present thesis submission, there is some minor incoherence with the results of the report of 2010.
46
Strategic Orientation of ENGOs, Between Inclusive and Exclusive Strategies
A definition of the ENGOs included in the present research was made with a determination of their strategic orientation. The critical question was whether organizations can be categorized as “inclusive ENGOs” that engage in appeasing modes of action, or whether they can be defined as “exclusive ENGOs” that engage in confrontational modes of action. It is important to mention that the division was made cognizant that a dichotomous division limits the observation and eliminates the variety of differences between the groups. But, considering the small number of the ENGOs included as the research units, it is assumed that a dichotomous division can bring the best results of statistical analyses.
The strategic orientation of each the ENGOs was characterized according to a combination of the survey results that together formed an index. The index was designed to comprehend many characteristics of the ENGOs that can imply of their strategy. In addition some control measures were put to examine the results of the Index and change them in cases where it was found needed. First, consultation was made with two representatives of the umbrella organization Life and Environment , the current director Naor Yerushalmi and the former chairman Alon Tal. Both of them expressed their opinions about the strategic orientation of each and every ENGO. Second, Only in cases where the definition of the strategic orientation of an ENGO was not clear or disagreed upon, division by the index and of the opinions of the umbrella group representatives were examined by the researcher on the basis of personal acquaintance and information from the ENGO websites and news web articles. And in some cases phone interview was conducted with the ENGO representatives. Phone interviews aimed to track information such as the strategies in current campaigns, general 47
strategies, reasons for their specific actions, relationship with the local authorities and with the Ministry of Environmental Protection or other Governmental Ministries.
The index was calibrated according to six chosen ENGOs that were preliminary defined as prototypes of the two categories. ENGOs that were recognized to be inclusive prototypes are Israel Green Building Council (ILGBC), Israel Energy Forum and Transport Today and Tomorrow . All of them were defined by the index inclusive.
ENGOs that were recognized exclusive were Zalul, Citizens for the Environment and
Green Course . All of the three ENGOs were pointed by the index as exclusive.
3.2 Development of an Index as a Division Tool
Three different characteristics of the ENGOS were chosen from the survey results to form the Index, modes of action, self-identification of the ENGO and opinions about relevant issues. See questions inserted to the index in appendix 6, and example calculation of the index in table 1. The opinion characteristic was a sub-index of itself which combined three statement questions.
Each one of the three characteristics determined upon every ENGO whether it is inclusive and exclusive ENGO it its category. An Index grade was given for each characteristic according to the result in the survey in each category. Grade 1 was given for results as an exclusive strategic orientation and 0 for inclusive strategic orientation.
An average grade score for the three characteristics revealed the strategic orientation of the ENGO. The average score for each ENGO was then presented as a percentage.
Definition of an inclusive ENGO was equal to 50% or less (inclusive=<50%) and the definition of an exclusive group was equivalent to a score over 50% (exclusive>50%).
For example, Citizens for the Environment scored 67% in the index, and confirmed the coherence of the index and its consistencywith the preliminary evaluation's definition 48
for "exclusive". And Israel Energy Forum scored 0% on the index, also showing coherence with the preliminary evaluation and its classification as an inclusive ENGO.
The first characteristic included in the Index was based on the ENGOs' modes of action. In this question ENGOs were requested to choose from a given list, and fill out the modes of action in percentages, accumulating up to 100% of their resources. For example an ENGO could fill 55% lobbying, 40% education and 5% scientific monitoring. Together they accumulate up to 100%. This question revealed that both modes of action activism and/or legal actions accumulate to at least 20%, the ENGO was scored 1 (exclusive strategic orientation) 8. And if the combined percentage of both activism and legal action reported by the ENGO was lower than 20%, it was scored 0
(inclusive strategic orientation) for this characteristic (default score =inclusive).
Characterizing the ENGOs according to these numbers of up to 20% accumulation was the result of the calibration, where the six prototype ENGOs were preliminary examined. During the calibration it was seen that even the ENGOs most known for their exclusive approach were found to engage in with relatively low percentages of activism and legal means while utilizing other kinds of activities. For example, one of the prototypes for an exclusive ENGO was Green Course . It filled 40% activism and the rest was divided between lobbying, community activities, and leadership training. Moreover, other than the two definitions from exclusive strategies, most of the activities could be used both by inclusive and exclusive ENGOs. For example media coverage and education can also be engaged by both inclusive and exclusive ENGOs.
8 Dalton et al. 2003 used similar modes of action, protest and court actions, to characterize protest activities. 49
The second characteristic included in the Index was of the self- definition of the
ENGOs. In this question the ENGOs were required to choose definitions from a list with no limit to how many choices they filled. If the ENGO marked activist group , among other definitions, or marked it singularly, it was scored 1 (exclusive strategy).
And if it chose any other definition, default was scored 0 (inclusive strategy).
Characterizing the ENGOs through self- definition points at how an ENGO locates itself in relation to the state, whether it aims mainly at cooperation or confrontation with the authorities.
The third criterion included in the Index was a combination of the level of identification with three statements, measuring the ENGO opinions. Each of the questions was analyzed independently, as some had positive answers and some had negative answers. A statement that supports or identified with exclusive strategies was considered a positive statement and was scored 1 for positive answer and 0 for negative answer. And a statement that supported inclusive strategies was scored 0 for positive answer and 1 for negative answer. The average percent of all results gave the index for the subgroup result. Equal and less than 50% inclusive, and over 50% was exclusive.
For example if the average of all six questions gave 30%, the definition for this criterion was inclusive.
Table 1: Example for the index calculations. The index is based upon three categories: Modes of Action, Self- Definition and statements upon strategies. category Modes of Self- Average Final Score** Definition Action Definition Result of of three Strategic Statements* Orientation
Measures Activism, activism=1, positive Average of all legal all other towards results: actions=1; exclusive 50
all other results=0 strategies=1, Inclusive<=50% results=0 negative or indifferent=0 Exclusive>50%
Example 1 1 1 1 100 Exclusive
Example 2 1 0 1 33 Inclusive
*The average result of the three statements is not presented in percentage, since the determination was made upon the average. Otherwise the opinions would have more weight on the index result than the other questions. **final score is the average result of the three categories. Based upon the final score the strategic orientation was determined.
Finally, after the division was made for each of the ENGOs, statistical analyses were made to compare between the strategic groups and to build a profile for each type of strategic oriented group. The specific tests applied include Mann Whitney non- parametric test, Pearson Chi square test for goodness-of-fit, two tailed T-test to string data, Pearson correlation, Spearmen non- parametric correlations.
3.3 Complementary Qualitative Research
Aside from the survey and the associated statistical analysis additional qualitative methods were applied to assess the relationship between the ENGOs and the state. Interviews were held with numerous activists and experts regarding the levels of inclusion of the state and the reasons for organizations' strategic orientation and effectiveness and influence of the ENGOs on the Ministry of Environmental Protection.
In-depth interviews were conducted with 32 individuals with particularly rich experience and familiarity with Israel’s ENGO community.
The interviews were conducted during two different time periods. In the course of the year 2011 interviewees were conducted with key ENGO leaders in the environmental movement, grassroots activists, journalists, academics that study and engage in environmental activity, representatives from the industrial sector. And in 51
2013 interviews were conducted with seven former Director Generals of the Ministry of
Environmental Protection (for the list of interviewees see Appendix 4). These interviews were designed to elucidate how the ENGOs interacted with the office and understand what strategies were most successful and influential in retrospect that pushed the office to greater action and led to more effective environmental protection.
The Interviews were semi-structured. They were taped and were later transcribed. 52
4. Findings Objective 1: Analyses of strategic orientation
This section presents the results of analyses conducted on the survey results.
Results of the strategic definition of each group as to which strategic group it belongs serve as the base for the analyses. Each resource examined will be first presented in independently in order to gain perspective from the total structure of the movement.
Then analyses and comparison is conducted contrasting the two strategic groups.
Resources that were examined are year of establishment that looks at the relationship between age and strategic orientation. Four measure of organization size were examined: annual budget, paid staff, number of members and number of active affiliates. In addition, and not fully in the frame of the strategic question, a correlation was examined between age and the measures of size, to find whether a connection between size and age exists. Income sources were compared between the two strategic groups and last of the resources, geographic focus and region were examined, with the aim to find whether there is a relationship between geographic focus, location in the country or a division along the axis of center and periphery, between the strategies applied. Additional examinations were made to find the similarities and differences between the strategic groups in their worldview and values, statements and paradigms.
4.1. General results
From the final assessment of 120 ENGOs that were participated in the survey, approximately 8 were excluded as result of the redefinition of the present research, leaving approximately 112 currently active ENGOs. A total of 85 participating ENGOs were included in the present research, an assessed response rate of 76%. Out of the final 85 ENGOs included in the research, 69 are legally registered associations that are 53
registered in the national registrar and 16 are not registered. In order to make or simplicity of the writing, non-registered groups are also referred to as ENGOs.
4.2. Result of the division between inclusive and exclusive strategies
Results of the characterization of the ENGO strategic orientation revealed 57 inclusive and 28 exclusive ENGOs. In percent they constitute 67.1% inclusive and
32.9% exclusive out of the total 85 ENGOs included in the research 9. It is important to mention that the division between the two types of ENGOs surfaces during the assessment and the "individuality" of the ENGOs emerges, and appears to be clear cut.
At the same time, most ENGOs are dynamic in time and many evolve as circumstances change. Also, it was found that there are no radical anti-establishment environmental groups that belong to the environmental community in Israel today; therefore ENGOs that were defined as exclusive are not recognized as anti- establishment.
4.3. Results of the survey and comparison between strategic groups in several factors
In this chapter results of characteristics of the Israeli ENGOs will be presented to obtain perspective and an understanding of the context in which the ENGOs are active. After each piece of information is analyzed generally in a wider context, analyses will be presented on of the comparison between the strategic orientation groups. Finally, a profile of the characteristics of the two strategic groups will be put together to identify similarities and differences.
4.31. Trends of a Growing Movement
9 The rate of ENGOs characterized as exclusive is considerably high. Dalton et al (2003), found a lower percent of exclusive ENGOs in a global survey; only 19% of the ENGOs use modes of action such as demonstrations, protest and direct action. And only 15% use legal actions.) 54
A description of the year of formation of the ENGOs in Figure 1 shows that half of the ENGOs were established since 2000, and more than a third during the 1990's.
Only 14% of active ENGOs were established before the 1990's. This result verifies previous studies conducted about Israel's environmental movement and confirms a significant rise in environmental activity occurred during the 1990s (Bar David & Tal
1996; Karassin 2001; Tal 2006). Moreover, it identifies the trend of a growing movement as 50% of the ENGOs are new (up to 10 years of age by the time of data collection). Yet, the life cycle of the ENGOs should be taken in account, considering that some ENGOs that were active during previous studies are not active anymore. For example between the data collection and the final submission of this research, two organizations that participated in the survey have changes their status. The Public
Health Coalition (PHC) due to difficulties in funding has reduced activity, and converted itself to a volunteer association between May and August 2013 (PHC website). And The Israel Green Building Association has merged into the Israel Green
Building Council due to overlapping goals and activities (Naor Yerushalmi, July 2013).
Therefore identification of the growing trend can only be done considering the point in time, and short life cycle of some ENGOs.
60% 48% 50%
40% 35%
30%
20%
10% 7% 4% 1% 2% 2% 0% 1950- 1960- 1970- 1980- 1990- 2000- 2010 1959 1969 1979 1989 1999 2009
55
Figure 1: Distribution of ENGOs according to the year of establishment (N=85)
Analyses of independent sample T test for the age distribution of the two strategic groups revealed there is no significant difference. Both age averages of strategic oriented groups of ENGOs range between 12 and 13 years, with standard deviation of 11.41 years. Figure 2 presents the distribution of both strategic orientation groups according to year of establishment. The age distributions of the two strategic groups seem very similar, with a slight difference. It seems that more exclusive than inclusive ENGOs were established in the 1990's, and higher rates of inclusive ENGOs were established after 2000. It might be that the 1990's had a combative spirit, whereas the last decade is a more moderate time. But these are unfounded assumptions, since it may have been that ENGOs have changed their repertoire of actions, and started off as more radical or moderate than they are presently. Other than this slight difference,
ENGOs established during the decades of 1960's and 1970s are all characterized as inclusive ENGOs and the 1950's marked the establishment of one exclusive ENGO, the
SPNI. But this information is misleading, since MALRAZ which was established in
1961 had shifted from exclusive ENGO to inclusive ENGO during the 1990's. Also the
SPNI started as an inclusive ENGO and over time separated from the government and started practicing exclusive strategies.
Since ENGOs have proven to change characteristics over time, this analysis of year of establishment can help us examine not the characteristics of the ENGOs when they were established, but the current age as a link to their strategic orientation. Gil
Yaakov, former Director, Green course (November 2010) gave an input on this issue.
He saw a change in the modes of action Green Course engaged in over time. He explained that Green course was formed during the campaign against the construction of the Trans Israel Highway, and initiated many direct action activities designed at 56
stopping the bulldozers. Only after the campaign ended did Green course start engaging in other tactics, such as lobbying, networking and contacting media. And again in recent years since 2008 a new approach led the ENGO to recruit more radical students as cell coordinators and as result more radical activities are returning.
Also associate directors at Citizens for the Environment (CFE), Liora Amitai and Jamila Hardel Wakim (October 2013) realized their modes of action have changed over time. They see it as one of the symptoms as an aging organization. In the past they held some aggressive campaigns against the Ministry of Environmental Protection to close polluting factories. Amitai explained the ENGO can no longer invest all of it resources in public struggles against one source as it entails too many personal and organizational sacrifices.
60% 53% Inclusive 50% Exclusive 46% 39% 40% 30% 30%
20%
10% 7%7% 4% 5% 4% 4% 0% 0% 0% 2% 0% 1950- 1960- 1970- 1980- 1990- 2000- 2010 1959 1969 1979 1989 1999 2009
Figure 2: distribution of both strategic orientation groups according to their year of establishment (N=85, N inclusive=57, N exclusive=28)
4.32. Analyses of Size of Organizations in Four measures
Size of the ENGOs was measured in the survey in various ways. Initially, it was measured by the number of registered members and then by the number of active affiliates, by annual budget and by number of full time equivalent (FTE) paid staff. In 57
order to determine the best and most accurate size measurement, analyses of the similarities and differences of the size measurements will be presented prior to the size comparison between the strategic orientation groups.
Budget and full time equivalent (FTE) paid staff
Annual budget is presented in Figure 3. It is apparent that almost a third of the
ENGOs (28%) have no formal budget and 15% have a small annual budget of up to
100,000 NIS. Combining the three columns together there are 43% of ENGOs with either a small or no budget. This high rate of low budgeted ENGO implies the movement is a grassroots based movement. A quarter of the ENGOs (27%) have a medium annual budget between 100,001-500,000 NIS that could be enough for office rent and at least a salary for a part time employee (Tal et al. 2011). Almost a third of the ENGOs reported an annual income of more than 500,000 NIS, 20% between
500,000 to 3,000000 and 11% have an annual budget that exceeds the 3 million NIS.
ENGOs that form the highest budget figure are: Bimkom , The Heschel Center for
Environmental Thinking and Leadership , the Society for the Protection of Nature in
Israel , The Council for Beautiful Israel , The Arava Institute for Environmental Studies ,
Friends of the Earth Middle East , The Galilee Society Health Research and Service ,
Malraz , Council for the Prevention of Noise and Air Pollution , and The Sayarut
Association (“Green Horizons”). 58
30% 28% 27% 25% 20% 20% 15% 11% 9% 10% 6% 5% 0%
Figure 3: Distribution of ENGOs in percent according to annual Budget levels (N=82)
Figure 4 presents the cross sections of FTE paid staff. It was assumed that an association between annual budget and number of FTE paid staff exists. Larger budgets are expected to result in more FTE paid staff. Analyses of the two results show a similar trend. But it seems that FTE paid staff lags behind the budget rates. While 28% of the
ENGOs have no formal budget, 39% of the ENGOs have no paid staff. This leaves 11% of the ENGOs with some budget but with no paid staff. As 15% of the ENGOs have a small annual budget of up to 100,000 NIS, 15% have a paid staff member equivalent up to one full time position. A quarter of the ENGOs have between 1-5 employees (27%), and a medium annual budget of between 100,000-500,000 NIS (27%). While 31% of the ENGOs have an annual budget higher than 500,000 NIS, only 18% of the ENGOs have more than 5 FTE paid staff. 59
40% 38% 35% 30% 27% 25% 20% 15% 15% 9% 10% 5% 5% 4% 0% No Paid 0> FTE Paid 1> FTE Paid 5> FTE Paid 10> FTE Paid Over 20 FTE Staff Staff >=1 Staff >=5 Staff >=10 Staff >=20 Paid Staff
Figure 4: Distribution of ENGOs in percent according to number of Full time equivalent (FTE) Paid Staff (N=82)
Between the annual budget and the FTE paid staff, both results reflect on the
ENGOs capacity. A paid employee can better initiate fundraising activities and organize the ENGO work, while a volunteer-based ENGO is less capable of conducting ongoing, time consuming activities. In a given annual budget ENGOs have a choice where they will utilize their available resources. Many different options are available for investments by an ENGO. Funds can be spent to hire an employee, invest in outsourcing of activities such as filing lawsuits, receiving expert advice, scientific monitoring, or engage in pure volunteer activity where only the materials cost money.
Therefore, it can be argued that measurement of ENGO size is more precise by simply assessing the annual budget. It also seems more than the number of active affiliates for the same reasons of prioritization. Annual budget will be used as a size measurement to compare the different parameters of ENGOs.
Spearmen's Rank Order Correlation Test was made to determine the relationship between budget and FTE paid staff. For this statistical test the data of FTE paid staff 60
were recoded according to a categorical scale (categories 1=0, 2= 0.1-1, 3=1.1-5,
4=over 5). The variable of budget was originally taken as ordinal data in the survey; therefore no transformation was conducted pursuant to it. Results show a significant positive high correlation between budget and FTE paid staff, Spearman’s correlation coefficient equals 0.850 and P<0.05 (P=0.000). This finding is consistent with the
Hypothesis of McCarthy and Zald (1977) that predicted higher budgets are also more likely to be more staffed.
Number of registered members and active affiliates
Figure 5 presents the distribution of ENGOs according to number of registered members and the number of active affiliates. As to registered members, almost half of the ENGOs have between 21-50 registered members. And in a different observation, over three quarters of the ENGOs (13%+48%+14%=75%) have up to 100 members.
14% of the ENGOs have between 101-500 members and only 10% of the ENGOs have more than 500 members. Results of active affiliates show a similar distribution, with some exceptions. Approximately a third of the ENGOs have up to 20 active affiliates
(35%). Some 68% of the ENGOs have up to 100 active affiliates, combined in total of more than a third. 13% have between 101-500, and a larger sum of 18% have more than
500 active affiliates, out of these, more than a third have more than 5000 active affiliates. The differences are small, but it is apparent that the distribution of active affiliates seems more diffused than registered members, with more ENGOs that have a small number of active affiliates and more ENGOs that have very high numbers of active affiliates. 61
60% Members 50% 48% Activists
40% 35%
30%
19% 20% 13% 14%14% 14%13% 7% 10% 5% 6% 2% 4% 4% 0% Under 20 21-50 51-100 101-500 501-1000 1001- Over 5000 5000
Figure 5: Distribution of ENGOs in percent according to number of registered members and number of active affiliates (N=83)
A statistical analysis was conducted to compare between distribution of ENGOs according to number of members and number of active affiliates. Both data sets were each combined into two categories prior to the analyses. The first category included results up to the median, in both cases up to 50 members/ active affiliates, and the second category included results above the median, all results of over 50 members/ active affiliates. Fisher's Exact Test reveals a significant difference between the number of members and number of active affiliates P<0.05 (P=0.001). 68.8% of the results between number of registered members and active affiliates are inconsistent. And only a third of the ENGOs (31.2%) that have a low number of members also have a low number of active affiliates. Figure 6 presents the results of both registered members and active affiliates after the combination of categories. 46% of the ENGOs have over 50 active affiliates, while only 39% of the ENGOs have the same numbers. Namely more
ENGOs have over 50 numbers active affiliates, than over 50 registered members. And
61% of the ENGO have up to 50 registered members while 54% of the ENGOs have up 62
to 50 active affiliates. Drawing from this figure, it seems that ENGOs have higher numbers of active affiliates than registered members.
70% 61% 60% 54% 46% 50% 39% 40%
30%
20%
10% Members Activists 0% Up to 50 Over 50
Figure 6: combined categories of number of registered members ENGOs and number of active affiliates (N=83)
Results of both the number of registered members and active affiliates reveal that the median result of both groups comes to roughly 50 members. This result, consistent with the idea established from the results of budget, reveals the grassroots nature of Israel's environmental movement. In this movement, activity is managed by a small group of people. And still, results show a significant difference between the two parameters of size.
The differences between the number of registered members and active affiliates in the small and the large ENGOs can be explained by the fact that small ENGOs have more incentives to gain a significant membership base while large ENGOs do not. A remark by Ran Levy, a member of the advisory committee, during the stage of designing the survey questions, might explain this difference. He hypothesized that the large ENGOs reach a saturation point in which they do not specifically seek to register additional people that are active or in relations with the ENGO, but small ENGOs do 63
not reach that limit. Therefore, paradoxically, the smaller ENGOs have more registered members than active affiliates (Comment of Ran Levy, Advisory Committee September
2010). It can be assumed that small ENGOs have an incentive to gain a larger base of supporters. A logical assumption for the small ENGOs states that the more people that the ENGO represents, the greater its legitimacy and potential to empower the ENGO for present and future actions. Larger groups presumably already enjoy that legitimacy; therefore they do not seek to register members. This remark was a response to a comment of another member that incorrectly assumed that receiving a newsletter from
Adam Teva V'din meant membership in that ENGO.
An additional explanation for the gap between membership and active affiliates among the large ENGOs can be explained by the type of activity and the audience invited to join those activities. Many environmental activities organized by the ENGOs, such as demonstrations, community building happenings, teaching events, physical projects such as gardening and mud building projects; are designed to facilitate public attendance in general, and are not specifically limited to registered members. And even more, when success of an event is measured also by the number of people that attended.
In such cases, larger numbers of people take part in the ENGO events than are actually registered as members. It is assumed that the survey results reflect this audience as active affiliates.
In addition to the political incentive, a legal incentive for membership recruitment was examined. It was based on the assumption that registered members are needed for the National Registrar requirements. After an examination this assumption was rejected. It was found that in order for legal registration of an NGO in Israel, a minimum of six people are required for legal registration. A minimum of two people should be registered as the founders; two people sit in board of directors and two people 64
in the audit committee. There are no governmental fees required for filing annual reports or registering the NGO (National registrar information website and phone call for information, September 2010). Therefor there is no formal bureaucratic incentive for
ENGOs to strive to have more members than they have actual participants.
Membership fees
Another incentive for recruiting membership might be potential for income increase, as long as the ENGO charges membership fees. Results show that only a third of the ENGOs (32.9%, N=85) collect fees for membership. Figure 7 presents the distribution of ENGOs that collect membership fees according to the number of registered members. It shows that a higher percentage of larger ENGOs (in terms of membership) charge membership fees than the smaller ENGOs. None of the small
ENGOs, of up to 20 members, charge membership fees. Of the small ENGOs that have between 20-50 ENGOs only 10% charge membership fees and 37% do not. In the group of ENGOs between 51 to 500 similar numbers of ENGOs charge and do not charge membership fees. And in ENGOs with more than 1000 members, more ENGOs charge fees for memberships (6%) than those who do not (1%).
40% 37% Charge Membership Fees 35% Not Charge Membership Fees 30%
25%
20%
15% 13% 10% 10% 10% 9% 6% 5% 4% 5% 2% 1%1% 1% 0% 0% 0% Under 20 21-50 51-100 101-500 501-1000 1001- Over 5000 5000
65
Figure 7: Percent of ENGOs that charge Membership Fees according to Number of Registered Members (N=81 N charge=27 N not charge=55).
Mann-Whitney Non- Parametric Tests was made to determine whether there is a correlation between the number of members and the tendency to charge membership fees. For this analysis data regarding the number of members were combined into two categories up to the median and over the median (category 1 up to 50 members, and category 2 over 50 members). The variable of membership fees is also dichotomous, charge membership fees and not charges membership fees. Results of Mann-Whitney
Non- Parametric Tests confirm the trend found in figure 7. Results show significant difference in the tendency to charge membership fees. Small ENGOs with up to 50 members are less likely to charge membership fees than large ENGOs with over 50 members Mann Whitney U= 446.500, P<0.05 (P=0.000).
ENGOs with small numbers of members are less likely to charge membership fees, perhaps to avoid burdening their members. In many cases the members of small groups already have considerable volunteer work and might have already unofficially economically supported activities by paying small expenses, hosting activities, buying equipment for activities, etc. Moreover, a small membership platform is not a meaningful income source; in most cases it cannot provide the kind of funding that an
ENGO needs for effective and broad activity.
Finally, to answer the hypothesis raised about the income increase incentive, only with higher levels of membership does an economic incentive exist to recruit and register members. From the earlier comparison between memberships to the data on the active affiliates, it seems that ENGOs typically do not make an effort to register members from the larger pool of individuals that take part in its activity. 66
The analyses of the two measures of size registered members and active affiliates were made in order to characterize the different size measures and determine the most accurate measure of ENGO size. Considering the hypothesized funding and legitimacy incentives for registering members, and the stability that members provide, while no bureaucratic incentive exists. And considering the assumption that the answers in the survey on number of registered members are taken from a list somewhere and active affiliates were based estimations of overall participants in activities with perhaps even rough or exaggerated estimations, question of accuracy of results of number of active affiliates arises. Therefore, registered members seem to be a better size measure of ENGOs rather than active affiliates.
In the above study of the four measures of size -- the measures of budget was chosen for further analyses of size of ENGOs. After the analyses of size measures, the strategic orientation groups were compared and analyzed according to these four scales of size. Number of registered members and number of active affiliates, budget and full time equivalent paid staff.
4.33. Strategic Orientation Analyses according to different Measures of Size
Budget
Mann-Whitney Non-Parametric Test was made to determine differences in budget distribution between the strategic groups. Results show a significant difference between the two strategy groups in budget distribution as P<0.05 (P=0.039). Figure 8 visually presents these findings. The cross section shows that inclusive ENGOs have a larger percentage than exclusive ENGOs with all categories of high annual budget of over 100,000 NIS. In the category between 100,001-500,000 31% of inclusive ENGOs could be found with only 18% of exclusive ENGOs; in the category of annul budget 67
between 500,001-3,000,000 NIS there are 22% inclusive ENGOs and only 14% exclusive ENGOs; and in the category of annual budget that exceeds 3 million, there are
13% inclusive ENGOs and 7% exclusive ENGOs.
The figure also shows a higher percent of exclusive ENGOs with low annual budgets than inclusive ENGOs in the lower budget categories up to 100,000 NIS. In the category of no formal budget 39% on exclusive ENGOs and only 22% of inclusive ones, in budget under 25,000 11% of exclusive ENGOs and only 4% of inclusive, and between 25,001-100,000 there are 11% of exclusive ENGOs while only 7% of inclusive. Therefore, it can be concluded that exclusive ENGOs tend to have a lower budget and inclusive ENGOs tend have a larger budget.
45% 39% 40% Inclusive 31% 35% Exclusive 30% 22% 22% 25% 20% 18% 14% 13% 15% 11% 11% 10% 7% 7% 4% 5% 0%
Figure 8: Strategic orientation groups in percentage divided according to budget distribution (N=82, N inclusive=54 N exclusive=28)
Paid Staff
Statistical analyses were made to determine whether the distributions of FTE paid staff are different between the two strategic oriented groups. Even though the data of FTE paid staff is string data, T-Test was not the compatible test in this case, since the 68
strategic oriented groups showed two different variances for paid staff as Leven's test for Equality of Variances shows significant difference in variance, F=4.183, P<0.05
(P=0.044). STDV of inclusive ENGOs was 8.333 FTE paid staff and STDV of exclusive ENGOs was significantly larger and equals 11.308 FTE paid staff. In the case where variances are unequal, T- Test would not be accurate, since some of the data would be lost in the average. Therefore the variable of FTE paid staff was recoded into four categories according to ranges (1=0, 2= 0.1-1, 3=1.1-5, 4=over 5) Mann- Whitney
Non- Parametric Test was performed on the recoded variable. This test too shows insignificant difference between the two strategies in the amount of FTE paid staff,
Mann- Whitney U=656.500, P>0.05,(P=0.383, N= 82).
Although no significant statistical difference emerged between inclusive and exclusive ENGOs in distribution of FTE paid staff, figure 9 shows some differences in the distributions, as pointed out by Leven's test for equality of variances. This figure presents inclusive and exclusive strategies divided by 6 categories according to a rising scale of FTE paid staff. A larger rate of exclusive ENGOs have no paid staff than the inclusive groups, as 50% of exclusive ENGOs have no paid staff, only 32% of inclusive
ENGOs have no paid staff. And in the other extreme, a higher percent of exclusive
ENGOs than inclusive ENGOs with over 20 FTE paid staff was detected. Conversely, a larger percent of the inclusive ENGOs have a medium number of paid staff members.
30% of inclusive ENGOs have between 1-5 FTE paid staff employees while only 21% of exclusive ENGOs do. And in the higher amounts of FTE paid staff, it is hard to detect any trend. These results are consistent with the findings from the analysis of budget distribution, where inclusive ENGOs are concentrated more in the middle sized budget with this orientation less likely among lower budget organizations. 69
60%
50% Inclusive 50% Exclusive
40% 32% 30% 30% 21% 20% 16%14% 9% 11% 10% 5% 5% 4% 0% 0% No Paid Staff 0> FTE Paid 1> FTE Paid 5> FTE Paid 10> FTE Paid Over 20 FTE Staff >=1 Staff >=5 Staff >=10 Staff >=20 Paid Staff
Figure 9: Strategic orientation groups in percentages distributed according to number of FTE Paid Staff (N=82, N inclusive=55 N exclusive=27)
Registered members
Statistical Analyses was conducted to determine the difference between the strategic orientation groups in distribution of registered members and of active affiliates. Results of Chi Square Test on the combined categories (previously recoded into two categories: up to 50, and over 50 registered members) show significant difference between inclusive and exclusive strategic groups in size of registered membership X2(1) = 4.022, P<0.05 (P=0.045). Figure 10 shows that 71% of inclusive
ENGOs have up to 50 members and only 29% of inclusive ENGOs have over 50 members. While the distribution of exclusive ENGOs is more uniform, with 43% have up to 50 members and 57% of exclusive ENGOs have more than 50 members. This result is surprising, considering the previous results of budget distribution of strategic orientation groups where inclusive ENGOs tend to be larger in budget than exclusive
ENGOs. Here the opposite is presented, as exclusive ENGOs tend to have less budget and paid staff. They also have more members than inclusive ENGOs. This new finding shows that exclusive ENGOs are better resourced in both manpower and members, and 70
inclusive ENGOs are better resourced in funding. This result might imply that more people are drawn to an activity characterized as exclusive to the state which presumably offers them great stimulation and a sense of combative purpose.
80% 71% Inclusive 70% Exclusive 60% 57%
50% 43% 40% 29% 30% 20% 10% 0% Up to 50 Over 50
Figure 10: Strategic orientation ENGO groups in percentages divided according to number of registered members (N=83 N inclusive=55, N exclusive=28)
A comparison between the strategic groups in terms of the number of active affiliates is found in Figure 11. It shows similar trend of both inclusive and exclusive
ENGOs. There are high percentages of both inclusive and exclusive ENGOs with a small number of activists (fewer than 20 activists). The percent of ENGOs decreases as the numbers of activists increase. A slight difference in some size measures reveals that inclusive ENGOs are slightly more varied in terms of numbers of activists. There are
9% more inclusive ENGOs than exclusive ENGOs with les then 20 activists. Then from
21 up to 1,000 activists, there are slightly higher percentages of exclusive ENGOs than inclusive ENGOs. In the subset with1001-5000 activists, there is an equal percent of both inclusive and exclusive ENGOs, and at the highest numbers of activists 5%, more inclusive ENGOs than exclusive ENGOs. Pearson Chi Square Test was not possible to conduct due to small repetitions (less than 5) in 7 categories. Therefore categories were combined into two categories around the median, the first category up to 50 activists 71
and the second category over 50 activists. No significant difference was found between the two strategic orientation groups, X2(1) =1.033 P>0.05 (P=0.310) (N=83).
45% 38% 40% inclusive 35% exclusive 29% 30% 25% 21% 20% 18% 18% 14% 15% 13% 13% 10% 7%7% 7% 7% 4% 4% 5% 0% Under 20 21-50 51-100 101-500 501-1000 1001- Over 5000 5000
Figure 11: the distribution of strategic orientation groups according to number of active affiliates (N=83, N inclusive=55, N exclusive =28)
Analyses of size and age:
An additional analysis sought to characterize the relationship between age and size of the ENGOs. Results of statistic correlations are presented in table 2. Spearman
Rank Order Correlation test was run to determine whether there is a correlation between age and budget distribution of the ENGOs. A significant correlation was found between the budget and year of establishment. Pearson Correlation was run to determine the relationship between the age of ENGOs and FTE paid staff reveal a significant positive correlation. Correlation between age and number of active affiliates showed significant medium correlation with age. In contrast, the age and the number of registered members revealed significant low correlation. Results suggest that there is a basis for the assumption that older ENGOs are more likely to have a larger budget and larger in manpower inclusive active affiliates, registered members and employees. 72
Table 2: Results of Correlation Coefficient of Spearmen's Rank Order Correlation Test and Pearson Coefficient between Age and the different measurements of Size of ENGOs
Size category Coefficient
Annual budget (N=82) 0.475**
FTE Paid staff (N=82) 0.477***
Number Registered Members (N=83) 0.363**
Number Active Affiliates (N=83) 0.256*
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *** Linear regression- Pearson coefficient for string variables. Was found significant, P=0.00.
4.34. Volunteer Dependency
It was found that most of the ENGOs depend on volunteers; results presented in table 3 reveal the ENGO relationship with volunteers. 95% of the ENGOs have volunteers (N=77), and from those that have volunteers 59% of the ENGOs volunteers work includes all activities (N=71). Chi Square Test was made to determine whether there is a difference between the strategic oriented groups in the existence of volunteers.
Results show no significant difference, X2(1) = 0.145, P>0.05 (P=0.703). An examination of the level of dependency on volunteers shows that approximately half of the ENGOs (52%) are dependent on volunteers in all of their activities, 18% are dependent in most of their activities, and 30% are less or not dependent on volunteers for activity.
Table 3: Volunteer Dependency and Level of Dependency.
Volunteer Yes No Details Dependency
Have volunteers 95% 5% ENGOs with no volunteers: Eco Ocean, (N=77) Deshe Institute, Eco and Sustainable 73
Tourism Israel, Green Forum – SPNI.
Volunteer work includes all activities in the ENGO (N=71) 59% 41%
Level of dependency All activities Most activities Some or none of on volunteers (N=71) dependent dependent activity dependent
Percent of ENGOs 52 18 30
Figure 12 presents the distribution of the strategic orientation group according to volunteer dependency. It seems that the two strategic orientation groups have similar distributions of volunteer dependency, although some differences are identified. Nearly
20% more exclusive ENGOs are dependent on volunteers in all activities, 64% of exclusive ENGOs are while only 46% of inclusive ENGOs are dependent on volunteers in all activities.
Interestingly the ratio reverses as the level of dependency decreases. Larger percentages of inclusive ENGOs stand in the range of partially dependence on volunteers. 22% of inclusive ENGOs have most activities dependent on volunteers while only 12% of exclusive. 11% of inclusive versus 8% of exclusive ENGOs have some activities dependent of volunteers, and 13% of inclusive versus only 4% exclusive
ENGOs that are slightly dependent on volunteers. And again at the other extreme, there are 3% more of exclusive ENGOs than inclusive ENGOs that do not depend on volunteers at all, while 12% are exclusive versus 9% inclusive.
Statistical analyses were conducted to determine whether there is significant difference between the two strategic groups in volunteer dependency. Chi Square Test shows no significant difference in the volunteer dependency between strategic groups
X2(4)=3.544 P>0.05 (P=0.471). 74
70% 64% incluisve 60% exclusive 46% 50% 40% 30% 22% 20% 12% 13% 11% 12% 9% 8% 10% 4% 0% Not dependant Slightly Some activities Most activities All activities dependent dependant dependant dependant
Figure 12: Strategic orientation ENGO groups divided according to level of volunteer dependency (N=71, N inclusive 46, N exclusive 25)
Professional volunteer activities
Since inclusive ENGOs typically enjoy greater resources it would seem intuitive that they do not need as much professional volunteers work as exclusive ENGOs. But results presented in Figure 13 show otherwise. Results show that a higher percent of inclusive ENGOs use volunteers for professional work, 37% of inclusive groups in comparison to 20% of exclusive ENGOs use volunteers for professional work.
Respectively, 39% of inclusive ENGOs and only 24% of exclusive ENGOs use volunteers for professional advice. Other professional activities of volunteers showed a smaller difference between the strategic groups. 67% of inclusive and 64% of exclusive
ENGOs use volunteer work for scientific studies, 54% of inclusive ENGOs and 48% of exclusive ENGOs use volunteers for fundraising. The only result that shows higher utilization of volunteers by exclusive ENGOs is in management. This requires responsibilities, but does not require professional background per se. 52% of exclusive
ENGOs and only 39%of inclusive ENGOs use volunteers for management of the
ENGO. In total, inclusive ENGOs seem to utilize volunteers more for professional 75
work and advice, as exclusive ENGOs tend to utilize the work of volunteer for management of the ENGO.
80% Incluisve 67% 70% 64% Exclusive 60% 54% 52% 48% 50% 39% 39% 40% 37%
30% 24% 20% 20%
10%
0% Professional Professional Scientific Fund raising Management work advice studies
Figure 13: Percent of ENGOs that use volunteers for professional activities (N=71, N inclusive =46, N exclusive =25)
Attempts were made to analyze and compare professionals on staff between strategic groups. A detailed question on the subject was designed into the survey. But only 29
ENGOs filled the question of specific profession of staff, while 51 ENGOs reported they have at least part time paid staff. Due to the low response rate, analyses of professional staff were discontinued for fear of bias.
4.35. Income Sources
To understand the strength, stability and freedom of action of the Israeli ENGOs it is important to look at their sources of income. In the survey, ENGOs were requested to fill the percent of income received for each source mentioned. Figure 14 presents results of the income sources of the ENGOs. To better present the sources of income, they were compiled into groups according to type. It was found that the major source of income is donations, supporting 73% of the ENGOs. After that 49% of the ENGOs have 76
self-reliant incomes, 25% of the ENGOs receive funding from local and national governments and a high percentage was unrevealed by the ENGOs as 36% of the
ENGOs marked other, as part of their income sources.
80% 73% 70% 60% 49% 50% 40% 36% 25% 30% 20% 10% 0% Donations National and local Sefl reliant Other governments
Figure 14: Percent of ENGOs that receive funding from the sources of income (N=75)
Cross section of the strategic orientation groups with the sources of income reveals two very similar groups. Results presented in figure 15. Both strategic groups show similar percentages receiving funding from the various sources. But in further break downs of the specific sources of income, different trends appear between the strategic orientaiton groups. 77
90% Inclusive 80% 77% 71% Exclusive 70%
60% 53% 46% 50% 42% 40% 31% 27% 30% 23% 20% 10% 0% Donations National and local Sefl reliant Other governments
Figure 15: percent of strategic orientation groups that receive funding from the income sources (N=75, N inclusive=49 N exclusive =26)
Figure 16 presents the distribution of strategic orientation groups between different sources of income under the different definition of donations. Large differences are found between the groups with regards to donations from individuals from abroad. While 29% of inclusive ENGOs receive donations from that source, only
8% of exclusive ENGOs do. Also, even more striking is the extent of international government or embassy grants. While 12% of inclusive ENGOs utilize this source, none of exclusive ENGOs do. Also corporate donations seem to be used more by inclusive
ENGOs than by exclusive ENGOs: 16% of inclusive and only 8% of exclusive ENGOs receive funding from corporations. And in terms of vulnerability, it seems that both inclusive and exclusive ENGOs are heavily dependent on foundations. 58% of exclusive ENGOs and 53% of inclusive ENGOS depend of project foundations. 37% inclusive ENGOs and 31% exclusive ENGOs depend on general foundation grants.
Such high rates, specifically from project-based donations highlight the organizations' vulnerability. This finding was emphasized in the report by Tal et al. (2011). 78
70%
60% 58% Inclusive 53% Exclusive 50%
40% 37% 29% 31% 30%
20% 16% 12% 10% 8% 8% 0% 0% Individuals Foundation Foundation International Corporate from abroad grants project grants gov. or donations embassy grants
Figure 16: Donations: percent of strategic orientation groups that receive funding from different sources in the form of donations list (N=75, N inclusive=49 N exclusive =26)
A breakdown of the governmental sources of income between local and national also reveal a large difference between the two strategic groups. Results presented in figure 17 show that while 16% of inclusive ENGOs receive funding from local governments, none of the exclusive ENGOs utilize this source. And in funding from national governments, 16% of inclusive ENGOs and 12% of exclusive ENGOS receive government grants. One possibility for low or no funding from government for exclusive ENGOs is a restriction (explicit or implicit) posed on the ENGO while receiving the funding to refrain from criticizing the government. This is a partial reason why for example both Israel Union for Environmental Defense and Zalul refuse to receive government funding (Maya Jacobs, Zalul, October 2013; Tzipi Iser Itzik,
November 2011). 79
18% 16% 16% 16% Inclusive Exclusive 14% 12% 12% 10% 8% 6% 4% 2% 0% 0% Israeli national gov. grants Israeli local gov. grants
Figure 17: Government grants- Percent of strategic orientation groups that receive from local and national government grants (N=75, N inclusive=49 N exclusive =26)
The breakdown of the self-reliant income sources in figure 18 presents two different focuses of self-reliant sources. While inclusive ENGOs invest in developing several self-reliant sources, exclusive ENGOs show high rates of ENGOs that receive funding from membership fees, but very little development of other self-reliant sources.
About 35% of exclusive ENGOs receive funding from membership fees while only
24% of inclusive ENGOs do. The opposite is presented among other self-reliant sources, as 22% receive funding through business entrepreneurship, only 12% of exclusive ENGOs have developed a profitable business as an income source. And the gap grows higher between the groups in fees for services. As 27% of inclusive ENGOs charge fees for services, only 4% of exclusive ENGOs do. 80
40% Incluisve 35% 35% Exclusive 30% 27% 24% 25% 22%
20%
15% 12% 10% 4% 5%
0% Fees for services Business Membership fees entrepreneurship
Figure 18: Self Reliant income- percent of strategic orientation groups that receive income from self-reliant sources (N=75, N inclusive=49 N exclusive =26)
4.36. Geographic Contexts
The arena in which Israeli ENGOs are mostly active was assessed. Results in
Figure 19 show a considerably high activity level (5 on a Likert scale of 5) in national and regional levels (53% and 54%) and very high activity at the local level (73%).
Analyses of the ENGOs that reported interest on the national level, reveals that many local oriented grassroots also reported high levels of operation on the national level.
Only 8% of the ENGOs are involved in issues of the Middle East and 13% of the
ENGOs operate on international issues. Most organizations who reported in the Middle
East also replied that they worked internationally. 81
80% 73% 70%
60% 53% 54% 50% 40% 30% 20% 13% 8% 10% 0% International Middle East National Regional Local (within Israel)
Figure 19: Geographic Focus of Operation (5 of a Likert scale of 5, N=78)
Further in-depth analyses of the results points out that 59 % of the ENGOs that focus on the national level also focus on both local and regional levels as well. 61% out of the national focused ENGOs also focus on the local level and 68% on the regional level as well. Tal et al (2013) regarded this question of local ENGOs reporting high levels of activity in the national level. They offered an explanation based on the fact that the Israeli country has limited natural spaces due to its small size. They posit that environmental issues in each and every region tend to become national concerns and it can be assumed that even in local campaigns ENGOs seek to reach the national level of concern. There are many examples that show how seemingly local campaigns succeeded after they received national-level attention and benefited from the intervention of other national ENGOs or central government decision makers.
An example of such a campaign was the efforts of the Committee to Save
Palmahim Beach . Opposition to a proposed plan to build a hotel resort on the
Palmahim Beach began as a local grassroots campaign initiated by a few high school students, and reached national level activity with cooperation of national ENGOs such as Israel Union for Environmental Defense and the SPNI. This initially local campaign ultimately became a national concern, aimed against the construction of a tourist resort 82
on the seashore. Unlike most of the targeted ENGOs, this local initiative was never established as a registered organization and still functions as an action committee (Rinat
2010; Save Palmahim Beach campaign website).
Another reason why local groups report national level activity may be because the local grassroots ENGOs wish to appear to have a national environmental orientation and a national interest and wish to avoid being identified as a NIMBY organization 10 .
Identifying as national in addition to regional or local ENGO might also help attain financial support from foundations that hold a national agenda.
A similar dynamic occurred when the Association to Save the Sasgon Valley launched a grassroots campaign that fought against a proposed plan for construction of a
Hotel Resort in an untouched natural valley in the heart of Timna Park of the Arava
Region. This small, geographically peripheral group of activists realized that there was not enough potential in the local campaign to influence the local planning committee and targeted their efforts at a broader public discourse and at national decision makers
(Golan 2010). After a few years leading a loud and influential campaign and due to the
High Court petition of Adam Teva V'din against the contractor, the plan was delayed
(Adam Teva V'din website).
Geographic focus of operation according to Size in Budget
Figure 20 presents the distribution of three sized groups according to their geographic focus of operation. It shows that the majority of the small ENGOs with annual budgets of up to 25,000 NIS remain in a grassroots mode, with 93%. focused on the local level. Small ENGOs also focus on regional level with 56%, but less than a third of them, 30% worked at the national level. Only a small portion of the small
10 For further discussions labeling of local campaigns as NIMBY campaigns see Doherty (2002). 83
ENGOs, 7% are focused on the international levels and none are focused speficially in the Middle East. The medium size ENGOs with annual budget between 25,001 and
500,000 are also focused primarily on the local level, (69% of the ENGOs). But these groups do not neglect the national and regional levels either: 46% of the medium budgeted ENGOs are focused on the regional level and 54% on the national level. Only
19% of the large ENGO focus on the Middle Eastern and international levels. The large
ENGOs, with annual budgets that excceed 500,000 NIS, invest mainly on national level issues, with 86% of these ENGOs reporting national activities. They also focus on the regional and local levels, with 67% and 62% of the groups from this subset reporting such activities accordingly. Therefore the picture that appears when assessing the geographic focus of operation as a function is an opposite trend from that of the smaller versus larger ENGOs at the domestic levels. The smaller ENGOS are focused more at the local level and the larger focus more at the national.
100% 93% Small up to 25,000 90% 86% 80% Medium between 25,000-500,000 69% Large over 500,000 67% 70% 62% 56% 60% 54% 50% 46% 40% 30% 30% 19% 19% 20% 15% 7% 8% 10% 0% 0% International Middle East National Regional Local (within Israel)
Figure 20: Percentage Annual Budget groups distributed according to their Geographic Focus of Operation (5 of a Likert scale of 5, N=74, N small=27, N medium=26, N large=21)
84
Strategic orientation groups distributed according to Geographic focus
After the examination of the different budget groups and their geographic focus of operation that provide a size context for the geographic focus, analyses was made to compare between the geographic focus of strategic orientation groups. Figure 21 presents the distribution of strategic orientation groups according to their geographic focus of operation. In this survey question ENGOs were permitted to fill in more than one option. The figure shows specifically that the majority of exclusive ENGOs focus on the local level while less than two thirds of inclusive ENGOs invest at the local level.
This might show a connection to the findings that exclusive ENGOs are smaller than inclusive ENGOs. Also, at the regional levels, the ratio of exclusive to inclusive
ENGOs is larger: 62% of exclusive ENGOs and 48% inclusive ENGOs focus on the regional level. In the national focus of activity, both inclusive and exclusive have similar numbers, with 50% of exclusive and 52% of inclusive ENGs focusing on the national level. In the Middle- Eastern and international levels, the ratio of inclusive
ENGOs is larger: 9% of inclusive and only 4% of exclusive ENGOs focus on the
Middle East, and 17% inclusive and only 4% exclusive ENGOs focus on the international level. Generally, it seems that exclusive ENGOs dominate and focus mainly on the local and regional levels and inclusive ENGOs dominate the focus of international levels.
The fact that the majority of exclusive ENGOs engage at the local level does not necessarily mean all of them are local ENGOs. For example, 62% of the high-budgeted
ENGOs focus on the local level as well. Examples of such ENGOs are SPNI and the
Council for Beautiful Israel , both of whom reported focusing on all the three geographical categories: national, regional and local. 85
120% 96% 100% Inclusive Exclusive 80% 62% 52% 59% 60% 50% 48% 40% 17% 20% 9% 4% 4% 0% International Middle East National Regional Local (within Israel)
Figure 21: Strategic orientation ENGO groups according to Geographic focus of Operation (N=80, N inclusive=54 N exclusive=26)
After the analyses were made about the level of geographic focus, a question arises where and how the ENGOs are distributed around the country. Table 4 presents the main regional focus, or geographic location of the ENGOs. “South” includes the largest geographic region, south of the Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, an area that comprises more than 60% of the land of Israel. “Center” includes the Tel Aviv metropolitan area, with the largest population concentration in Israel, Jerusalem, the Jerusalem region
(including the Israeli population of the west bank) , “Haifa Region” includes the Carmel mountain region and the regional coastland, “North” includes the Galilee and the Golan regions, “All of Israel” are national groups that invest without limiting themselves to a particular region .
In relation to the local population, the southern region has shown greater activity than expected, as the population consists of only 16% and a full 25% of the Israeli
ENGOs participating in the survey were active in the region. Table 4 presents the distribution of Israel's general population, which theoretically should be reflected in the number of active environmental organizations. 86
Table 4: The main geographic location of the ENGOs Geographical regional focus of ENGOs (N=72)
Region Population %, % of ENGOs by by Region Region 2010* South 16 25 Center 25 15 Jerusalem 19 7 Haifa Region 14 8 North 25 13 All of Israel 100 32
*information was retrieved from The Central Bureau of Statistics.
The percentage of ENGOs operating in the center and the north of Israel appear to be comparable to their percentage of the population. The Tel Aviv metropolitan area is typically considered be the most socially aware and active region in Israel.
Considering the relatively wealthy population living there and their easy access to decision makers, planning institutions and the media, it would appear that the 15% of
ENGOs active there is a relatively small number. One explanation for this result might be that ENGOs that are situated in the center tend to be involved and invested in issues at the national level rather than the given local or regional sphere and checked the answer "All of Israel" accordingly. Analyses of the ENGOs that checked the "All of
Israel Column" (32%) reveal that more than two third of them, 70% are located in the
Tel Aviv metropolitan, while only 30% are located in other regions. This implies that
ENGOs located in the center tend to be nationally focused rather than regionally locally.
The Jerusalem region seems to show a relatively low rate of ENGO activities as well.
This might be due to the considerable high numbers of poor and neglected communities, 87
as well as significant Arab and Ultra- Orthodox Communities who tend to be less involved in Israel's environmental movement.
Analyses was made of ENGOs' budgets, according to geographic distribution to better percieve the efforts invested in the rigions. Figure 22 presents the Annual Budget groups compared in Geographic Region of Operation. A large portion (70%) of the large ENGOs report their activity as not being limited to a specific region. But some large ENGOs are focused on specific regions as well. 15% are focused in the south,
10% are focused in the center and only 5% of large groups are based in the north. There are no large ENGOs that are specifically focused in Haifa and Jerusalem regions.
According to the logic of peripheral regions, which anticipated their being neglected by large ENGOs, the south and the north both stand out as exceptions. Perhaps the high activity of the south can be attributed to the activity around the pollution of Ramat-
Hovav industrial zone, or the considerably large rural communities active at protecting their nearby nature. Small and medium sized ENGOs are distributed more evenly, though they also show less activity in the peripheral regions taking out the anomaly of the south. 32% of the medium sized ENGOs focus on the south, 12% are in the center,
8% in Jerusalem, 8% in Haifa, 20% in the north and 20% focus on all of Israel. The distribution of the small ENGOs is very similar: 27% in the south, 23% in the center,
12% in the Jerusalem region, 15% in the Haifa region, 8% in the north, and 15% focus on all of Israel. 88
80% small up to 25,000 70% 70% Medium between 25,000-500,000 60% Large over 500,000 50%
40% 32% 27% 30% 23% 20% 20% 20% 15% 15% 15% 12% 12% 10% 8% 8% 8% 10% 5% 0% 0% 0% South Center Jerusalem Haifa region North All of Israel (Galilee and Golan) Figure 22: Annual budget in three categories according to geographic region of operation (N=71, N small =26, N medium= 25, N large=20)
After the examination of distribution of size groups according to region, comparisons were made of strategic groups according to region of focus, presented in
Figure 23. A third of inclusive ENGOS, 33% are not confined to a region, 23% are focused in the south, some 19% are focused in the center, 10% in the Northern regions of Galilee and Golan, and only 4% of inclusive ENGOS are focused in Jerusalem region. As to exclusive ENGOS 29% are unconfined to any specific region, and the same percentages are focused in the south. The remaining approximate third of exclusive EGNOs are focused 17% in the north, 13% in Jerusalem region, only 8% in the center, and 4% in Haifa. A statistical analysis was made to determine whether the differences between the distributions of geographic region are significant. Mann-
Whitney Non Parametric Test shows no significant difference. Mann-Whitney
U=511.500, P>0.05 (P0.518).
Still, although the total distributions of inclusive and exclusive ENGOs are not significantly different, some trends can be seen. For example both peripheral regions of the south and north, including Galilee and Golan, show larger percentages of exclusive 89
ENGOs than inclusive ENGOs. This is coherent with the assumption that exclusive
ENGOS are dispersed in the periphery while inclusive ENGOs are located in the center.
The periphery is characterized by a weaker ability to access decision makers and diminished ability to enter political controversies. Therefore, peripheral ENGOs are more likely to be exclusive. In comparison to the distribution of budget, it can be seen that some large ENGOs are also active in the periphery.
Figure 23 shows opposite ratios between inclusive and exclusive ENGOs in
Jerusalem and in Haifa. A larger percent of exclusive ENGOs are focused in Jerusalem and a larger percent of inclusive ENGOs are focused in Haifa. To note, these two locations have resulted in only small and medium size ENGOs in figure 22. This difference between the two city regions can be attributable to the type of struggles.
Haifa region has suffered from heavy air pollution for decades, and might have had to develop professionalism to succeed in its goals to reduce the pollution and control the industry. Also, because of the known pollution of the region, environmental issues are considered especially germane local concerns. In contrast, the Jerusalem environmental issues are characterized as sporadic and temporary, requiring grassroots characteristics such as organizing public pressure on short notices, maintaining opposition to proposed development plans and organizing neighborhood protests.
Another possible explanation for the difference between the prevalent strategies practices between the regions of Haifa and Jerusalem is linked to the types of community of both regions. Haifa is a considerably secular city that was established by working class people, around the local industry. This industry still provides many work places. Haifa infrastructure was added with a highly developed high tech industry in south of Haifa. And although there are different communities of Jews Muslims and
Christians, it is a considerable peaceful city. It is not hard to engage the community of 90
Haifa in environmental concerns and ENGOs can create discourse around environmental issues. This allows the ENGOs to practice inclusive strategies.
Jerusalem is a heterogeneous city, made with a variety of communities; many of them are poor communities. Relative to the rest of the country it tends to have religious communities characteristics and is posed in the center of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
Moreover, there is a constant competition over the public space and issues of democracy between the secular and the religions communities. Some environmental issues are perceived as anti-religious, or have secular characteristics, such as the promotion of public transportation on the weekends, issues of population growth, and campaigns against housing development plans that might also affect the fast growing religious community. Therefore environmental issues seem rather difficult to promote in
Jerusalem, and ENGOs are forced to act in constant opposition to prevailing political interests.
35% 33% 29% 29% 30% Inclusive Exclusive 25% 23% 20% 19% 17%
15% 13% 10% 10% 10% 8% 4% 4% 5%
0% South Center Jerusalem Haifa North All of Israel
Figure 23: strategic orientation groups according to Geographic region of operation (N=72) N inclusive 48, N exclusive 24)
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4.37. Definitions of the active affiliates of the ENGOs
Worldview of the ENGO representatives
Results of the definitions of the members presented in figure 24 reveal a number of interesting facts. As less than half of inclusive ENGOs, 45% reported their active affiliates are neighborhood activists, a much larger percent, 77% of exclusive ENGOs reported the same. A higher difference was found in the definitions of the active affiliates as a community that is threatened by or that suffers from environmental hazards. Only 15% of inclusive ENGOs positively responded to this definition, while more than half (54%) of exclusive ENGOs have. Other definitions also seem to show a big difference between inclusive and exclusive strategic groups. In terms of staff backgrounds, 72% of inclusive ENGOs marked professionals, while only 54% of exclusive groups have, At the same time,64% of inclusive ENGOs marked academics, while only 42% of exclusive ENGOs have this better trained group working there. A smaller difference was found in the definitions of students and in the definition of a particular ethnic group. 43% of inclusive ENGOs marked students, and 35% of exclusive; 9% of inclusive ENGOs and 4% of exclusive marked a particular ethnic group as identity of active affiliates.
These results of identification of the active affiliates add another layer to understanding the difference between the two groups, as divided according to their strategic orientations. These data reveal that exclusive ENGOs are not only more peripheral and locally oriented; they tend to define themselves as neighborhood activists and are comprised of members of communities suffering from environmental hazards.
This can strengthens the hypothesis about the reasons for choosing exclusive strategies for defending their homes. Also, on the other side, higher percentages of inclusive
ENGOs reported professionals and academics as their active affiliates. First, they might 92
prefer to regard themselves as more professional oriented and second, professionals and academics might be more attracted to inclusive ENGOs or might be willing to consider inclusive strategies to maintain their reputation.
90% 77% 80% Inclusive 72% exclusive 70% 64% 60% 54% 54% 50% 45% 42% 43% 40% 35% 30% 20% 15% 9% 10% 4% 0%
Figure 24: definitions of the active affiliates of the ENGOs, as reported by the ENGOs (N=79, N inclusive=53, N exclusive =26)
4.38. Additional analyses- Worldview and Ideology
This section presents the analyses that were made to investigate the ideology and worldview of the Israeli ENGOs. It presents an analysis of opinions of the ENGO representatives. It then presents the values that ENGOs relate to and closes with an examination of the issues targeted by the ENGOs.
Table 5 presents the level of identification of the Israeli ENGOs with different statements and results of the statistical analyses. Percentages given in the table represent only ENGOs that responded that they identify highly (5 on a Likert scale of 5) with the questionnaire statements. Results show that only inclusive ENGOs agree with the
Ministry of Environmental Protection in its policy, 8% of inclusive and none of the exclusive ENGOs agree that the Ministry adopts good policies. Moreover, only inclusive ENGOs approve of the enforcement taken up by the Ministry, and this 93
involves only 4% of respondents. No significant statistical analyses were apparent for both of these results. These two statements were tested for use for the index that determines the strategic orientation of the ENGOs. It was initially assumed that inclusive ENGOs agree with the Ministry while exclusive ENGOs disagree. But after some thoughts and consultation with experts it was agreed that both exclusive and inclusive ENGOs can criticize the actions and conduct of the Government in a developed democratic state.
Both strategic orientation groups see the economic need of investing in economic enterprises for future income. 41% of inclusive and 36% of exclusive
ENGOs expressed a view that they strongly agree. As to the necessity of long term versus short term investment, there is no clear cut difference between the position of inclusive and exclusive EGNOs. In both statements a larger percentage of inclusive
ENGOs responded they highly agree. A much larger percentage of exclusive than inclusive ENGOs agree there is a problem of environmental justice in Israel. 68% of exclusive and only 31% of inclusive ENGOs highly agree that this is a problem.
A higher rate of inclusive ENGOs with 8% than exclusive ENGOs with 4% agree that ENGOs should invest more in local issues than global issues. It might be pointed out that inclusive groups have a more rational/ practical approach, and understand that addressing the global issues might leave them with no progress and demonstrable returns for their many efforts, whereas exclusive ENGO are more idealistic and address the local issues as symptoms of the national and global issues.
Both strategic orientation groups similarly agree that the main problem of the movement is that it lacks representation in the Knesset. 29% of inclusive ENGOs highly agree and 32% of exclusive ENGOS agree with this problem. A very low percentage of 94
both inclusive and exclusive ENGOs expressed a view that sees Israel's environment is improving. Only 4% of each group responded they highly agree with this statement. As to how effectively they target the government, the more inclusive than exclusive
ENGOs responded that the environmental movement does not effectively engage all governmental Ministries. 20% of inclusive and only 12% of exclusive ENGOs responded that they highly agree with the statement. Both inclusive and exclusive
ENGOs similarly believe that the environmental problems are only symptoms of the social problems. 24% of inclusive ENGOS and 22% of exclusive ENGOs expressed a position that highly agrees with this statement.
To sum up this part of the survey, the main differences found in the opinions between inclusive and exclusive ENGOs is in their approaches towards environmental justice. A smaller percentage of exclusive ENGOs see it as important to invest in local rather than global issues. And in terms of environmental injustice, no statistical significant difference was found, but a large difference of 37% resulted between inclusive and exclusive ENGOs that expressed high identification with the problem of injustice.
Table 5: Identification of the ENGOs with statements on different topics. Results of responses on statements on a Likert scale of 5. 1= strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree.
Statement % of % of Inclusive Exclusive ENGOs ENGOs* * The Ministry of Environmental Protection usually adopts 8 0 good environmental positions (n=73)
The Ministry of Environmental Protection usually utilizes 4 0 regulations and environmental law appropriately. (n=73)
In order to progress, organizations need to invest more in 41 36 95
economic enterprises and long term projects (n=73)
In order to attain results, environmental organizations need to 8 0 invest more in short term projects so that results can be clearly seen. (n=72)
The problem of environmental justice in Israel is very severe. 31 68 Disenfranchised populations suffer from environmental hazards more than established populations do (n=73)
Environmental organizations need to focus more on local 8 4 issues and put less time and effort in global issues, such as climate change (n=73)
One of the main problems in environmental policy is the lack 29 32 of representatives in the Knesset (n=73)
Environmental quality in Israel is improving over the years. 4 4 (n=72) The environmental movement today does not act effectively 20 12 engage all government ministries. (n=71)
The environmental crisis is a symptom of a social crisis; the 22 24 environmental movement today does not focus enough on the social aspects of the environmental crisis (n=73) *percent of the strategic groups that reported 5 of a 5 scale Likert scale.
Values
Analyses of the values that ENGOs relate to, presented in figure 25 reveal the most common and controversial approaches. The term “sustainable development” is the most popular orientation among ENGOs three quarters: 74% of the ENGOs highly agree with the concept. After sustainable development, the concept of “ensuring individual rights to a good environment” is a commonly shared principal, with 68%
ENGO expressing support for this aspiration. And nature conservation enjoys considerable support with a 67% level of identification. These issues mentioned seem to constitute a consensus among the environmental movement.
Some 54% of the surveyed organizations see "love of the homeland" as a value with which they identify. Environmental justice and fair share for all have an 96
identification of 55% of environmental groups. Additionally, protecting public health, with 53% is widely supported with just over half of the ENGOs expressing identification. Less popular were orientations involving “integrating economic tools into environmental policy” – with only 42% support, “environmental technology development and implementation” had but 36% support among responding organizations, and “anti- globalization” only 12% support. It seems that the discourse about globalization and its social and environmental effects has not quite gained wide backing among the Israeli environmental community. (Gotler 2005) These results also may reflect an inclination among Israeli ENGOs who are skeptical about technological solutions as a panacea for environmental problems. They might not see the benefits of environmental technologies, while at the same time they fear green washing.
80% 74% 68% 70% 67% 60% 55% 54% 53% 50% 42% 40% 36% 30%
20% 12% 10% 0%
Figure 25: Number of ENGOs who Expressed Identification with Environmental paradigms (5 of a Likert scale of 5) Ideological Orientation in relation to strategic orientation (n=78)
Analysis of the substantive paradigms selected by respondents and the strategic orientation of groups presented in figure 26 suggests that both groups exhibit similar identification with most different values (respondents reported 5 on a Likert scale of 5). 97
Yet, there were a few areas where a different ideological approach was noticeable between the strategic groups. Figure 25 presents the percent of ENGOs that highly identify with different positions.
Out of these values, there was higher identification among exclusive ENGOS for some while others were more embraced by inclusive ENGOs. Exclusive ENGOs appear to have a greater recognition of "individual rights for a clean environment”, where 81% of exclusive and 62% of inclusive ENGOs identify with the concept respectively. Both
"conservation" and "environmental justice" show a 15% difference between the two strategic groups: 77% of exclusive groups and 62% of inclusive identify with
"conservation" and 65% of exclusive versus 50% of inclusive agree with the concept of
"environmental justice". "Public health" has a difference of 14% between inclusive and exclusive ENGOs: 62% of exclusive ENGOs and 48% of inclusive ENGOs identify with the concept. "Sustainable development" holds a difference of 10% between inclusive and exclusive strategies, with 81% and 71% identifying with the concept.
Values that enjoyed higher support of inclusive ENGOs and less support of exclusive ENGOs were more controversial among the ENGOs in total. In this group of values, "integrating economic tools" had the highest difference between the groups.
46% of inclusive and 35% of exclusive ENGOs identified with it. "Integrating environmental technology" had a 7% difference: 38% inclusive and 31% of exclusive groups support this concept. "Love of the homeland" is a seemingly neutral value, with
56% inclusive support and 50% exclusive support. And the least popular concept among both groups is "anti-globalization" with only 13% of inclusive ENGOs expressing identification and even less (8%) of exclusive ENGOs that identify with it. 98
The value of "individual rights for the environment" serves as a connection between civil rights and environment. This was one of the concepts that lead to the activity of Adam Teva V'din for example. It also serves the connection that drew human rights activist Ronit Piso into the environmental movement (Piso, December 2011).
The issue of environmental justice is one of the major issues raised by environmental groups active among Israel's Arab minority. The Galilee Society claims environmental and social justice, are their main issues. An interview with Basel Gatas, the former director of the Galilee Society and presently a member of Israel's Knesset reveals that the organization's top priority is social and environmental justice. Gatas claims that the Galilee Society is first and foremost a development ENGO, even before it has environmental goals. It aims to address the injustice that the Arab minority sector suffers. Gatas claims that the Arab community suffers from discrimination and neglect that lead to many environmental problems. He claims that the Arab community suffers many times more from environmental hazards, such as quarries and mines than Jewish community 11 . The organization is less involved in sanitation issues. The Galilee
Society aims to develop the Arab community and ensure that environmental and health conditions are comparable to the non-Arab communities.
An interview with Hussain Tarabia, director of Naga (December 2010) also revealed the serious problem of environmental injustice. This is in spite the fact that the group's offices are nested within the Municipal Environmental Association (Igud Arim).
Tarabia argues that Israeli Arab villages suffer from lack of infrastructure, lack of solutions for solid and construction waste, lack of sanitary solutions such as sewage problems. Also lack of lands appointed for industries, force the industry onto the
11 Research reporting on the relative proximity to mines to nearby Arab communities was published as part of the Galilee Society position paper.
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community. The result is a mix of industrial and domestic activities in the same neighborhoods, that can be seen in the garages, cowsheds, goat and sheep pens under the houses. These problems still occupy the Israeli Arab community; he argues while for the most part they are already addressed and taken care of for the Jewish majority.
Public health is an issue that began to gain attention during the 1990s. Adam
Teva V'din started addressing issues of human rights for a clean environment. A decade later, The Public Health Coalition was established in 2001 by 17 organizations with the specific aim of addressing issues of public health. Also many local groups are concerned about public health. For example Green and Blue ENGO led a campaign against the pollution of Carmel Chemicals in the industrial zone of Atlit/ Sustainable
Negev in the south also seeks to reduce the pollution from the Israel's southern factories.
90% 81% 81% 77% 80% 71% inclusive 65% 70% 62% 62% 62% exclusive 60% 56% 50% 48% 50% 50% 46% 38% 40% 35% 31% 30% 20% 13% 8% 10% 0%
Figure 26: percent of ENGOs that highly identify with the values presented (N=78, N inclusive=52, N exclusive=26) 100
4.4. Defining ENGOs
Results of self-definition by the organizations participating in the survey offer data which is separate from the measures used for assigning the organizations based on the index calculations. They reveal a movement that is mostly oriented at policy change.
Table 6 presents self-definitions reported by the ENGOs. 59% of the ENGOs define themselves as national advocacy groups . 45% describe themselves as local organizations . 36% call themselves professional groups and only a third, 33% are educational groups . 14% of the ENGOs reported themselves as think tanks , as they see themselves as leaders of new approaches toward society and the environment. Some sport a decidedly philosophical or religious orientation; such are Hebrew Nature and
Haredim for the Environment . Some focus on the connection of society to nature and the role of humans in conservation, like The Heschel Center for Environmental
Thinking and Leadership , and The Israeli Forum for Ecological Art . Other groups serve as advocacy centers for specific topics, such as Bustan , that work for recognition of the
Bedouin settlements in the Negev, and The Association for Sustainable Economy.
Table 6: ENGO reports of self- definitions, respondents were permitted to mark more than one option.
ENGO definition N=85 Percent of organizations
National advocacy group 59
Local organization 45
Professional organization 36
Educational organization 33
Thank tank 14
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An in depth analyses reveals that 30% of the national advocacy groups defined themselves as local organizations. These data strengthen the assumption presented earlier that local groups bring local concerns to the national level. Either they see no other choice, or they decide to take a step forward to target larger causes. In either case, there is a strong relationship between local concerns and national policy.
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5. Findings Objective 2: Assessing ENGO Tactics
5.1. Perspective of the former Director Generals
5.11. Introduction
Interviews were held with eight former Director Generals of Israel's Ministry of
Environmental Protection to evaluate the relationship between the government and the environmental movement. With survey results of 37% of the ENGOs prioritizing their actions to influence governmental ministries (5 of a 5 scale Likert scale), many Israeli
ENGOs focus on influencing the Ministry of Environmental Protection while only relatively modest attempts are made to influence other governmental Ministries (Liora
Amitai Associate Director, CFE, in Northern Research Hearing, February 2011). It was also pointed that the natural ally for Israel's ENGOs is the Ministry of Environmental
Protection (Maya Jacobs, Director Zalul , October 2013; Shlazinger October 2013).
Other ministries were mentioned to have some cooperation with Israel's environmental movement, but most ENGO representatives confirmed high correspondence and communications with the Ministry of Environmental Protection. Therefore Director
Generals of the Ministry were considered to be an appropriate group for providing a relatively objective assessment of Israel's environmental organizations' interaction with the government.
Table 7 provides the names of the former Director Generals interviewed and the years of their tenure as Director Generals in the Ministry of Environmental Quality and, as it is more recent renamed -- Environmental Protection.
Table 7: Former Director Generals of the Ministry of Environmental Protection interviewed
Name of Years as Director Under the Minister of the Date and location Director General Environmental Protection of Interview 103
General Uri Marinov 1973-1992 Roni Milo, Yigal Bibi April 2013, Herzliya Aharon Vardi 1996 Yossi Sarid March 2013, Herzliya Roni Kumar 1999 Dalia Itzik March 2013, Tel- Aviv Yitzhak Goren 1999-2002 Dalia Itzik ,Tzachi March 2013, Hanegbi Herzliya Shmuel 2002-2003 Tzachi Hanegbi March 2013, Hiafa Hershkovitz Miki Haran 2003-2006 The late Yehudit Naot, March 2013, Tel- Ilan Shlagi, Shalom Aviv Simhon, The late Gideon Ezra, Yossi Inbar 2009-2011 Gilad Erdan March 2013, Zichron Yaakov Alona Shefer 2011-2013 Gilad Erdan, Amir Peretz November 2010, Karo Tel- Aviv
5.12. Level of inclusion by the Ministry
The relationship of the Director Generals with the ENGO community varies greatly. Some of the former Director Generals were initially affiliated with the ENGO community. Uri Marinov was an executive committee member of the SPNI while serving as Director General, and Alona Shefer was a leader in the ENGO community before taking a government post. Shefer came to the Ministry of Environmental
Protection from a position as Director of the umbrella organization Life and
Environment and previous to that she worked in Adam Teva V'din, as an environmental advocate. On the opposite side, some former Director Generals were political appointments by the minister, without acquiring specific environmental background. 104
Yet, for the most part, the Ministry's Director Generals were professionally trained or promoted after successful performance in the Ministry for many years 12 .
During their tour of duty, the Director Generals in the Ministry of
Environmental Protection typically maintained a constant contact with the ENGO representatives. On the whole, they maintained an inclusive rather than exclusive policy towards the ENGOs. Out of all the eight former Director Generals that were interviewed, only two met with ENGO on only a quarterly basis. All the others met with the ENGO representatives at a far higher frequency, usually around once a month.
The fact that a Governmental ministry was willing to regularly meet with
ENGOs reveals that it had a tendency to adopt an inclusive approach towards the
ENGOs. And yet, the level of inclusion also depended on the results of the meetings held between the ENGOs and the government. It is well to ascertain whether these meetings were merely a formality or did the Ministry include the ENGOs in decision- making? Did it take the advice of the ENGOs? Did it make an effort to update the
ENGOs on progress in specific topics etc.
Shmuel Hershkovitz claimed he made active effort towards inclusion of the
ENGOs. He organized a forum for official dialogue between the Minister of
Environmental Protection and the ENGOs. He held periodic meetings -- once every six weeks, in which ENGO representatives, the ministry representatives and the Minister all participated together. Specific results of this direct channel were not recalled, aside from one that he mentioned. During one meeting, Hershkovits and the Minister were
12 Roni Kumar, Yossi Inbar, Yitzhak Goren and Miki Haran were promoted to their position this way. Vardi came from the Home Front Command as commander of Civil Defense. He initially was an outsider appointed as a deputy Director General by Yossi Sarid and only became Director General after successfully managing a national plan to respond to toxic chemical disasters.].
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convinced to change the ministry's stance and to end the conflict over the fish cages located in the Gulf of Eilat.
5.13. Reasons for Inclusion by the State
Most of the Director General's expressed motivation serving for meeting with the ENGOs appears to be positive, albeit self-serving. Goren, Marinov and Shefer all mentioned that while they worked in the Ministry of Environmental Protection, they looked at the ENGOs as partners that have a potential for making a contribution to better ministry policies. Vardi met with the ENGS because he wished to learn from them, as he believed that decisions are made better with more people contributing.
Another motivation involved democratic principles of maintaining a democratic process of decision making. Haran mentioned that she met with ENGOs because she believes in the importance of governmental transparency. She took significant time to hear and study the positions of the ENGOs for two reasons: to see how she could help them in attaining their goals and to locate herself, as Director General of the Ministry, in the middle between two extremes. The ENGOs presumably were on one extreme and Israeli industry was on the other. When the Ministry was posed in the middle between the two extremes she felt it was a sign that she had made a good decision. The same principle for decision making, as a middle vector between two extremes, was said to also have been used by Vardi.
Additional democratic ideological incentives were sounded by Shefer and Goren for maintaining ENGOs as a force to monitor the actions of the Ministry. They expressed they believe the ENGOs fill an important role of being watchdogs of the government on environmental issues. Also, Goren, Inbar and Kumar were aware of the need for outsider groups to push the Ministry forward. They admitted that just like all governmental bureaucracies, there are cases where the Ministry “falls asleep” or is 106
slowed down by the bureaucratic culture and normative procedures. Accordingly, the
Ministry of Environmental Protection needed these outside, non-governmental forces to keep them working at a reasonable pace and maintain a sense of urgency. Kumar also mentioned that the role of the ENGOs is to take the Ministry out of the comfort zone into which it often sinks.
A counter argument was mentioned by Inbar. He explained why in some cases the Ministry avoids inclusion of the ENGOs. Inbar claimed that in some cases the
Ministry of Environmental Protection fills the role of an outsider green group for the government. Therefore, the Ministry does not always need the presence of the ENGOs, as they are already preforming this outsider role by themselves. This claim matches some of the positions taken historically by this particular governmental ministry. The
Ministry of Environmental Protection is frequently seen as an outside player in the government since it was established in 1988. Its positions often leaves it in conflict with other governmental ministries in most of its activities, as it opposes plans and poses pressure to delay projects until they are planned properly and considers environmental implications. The position of the Minister of Environmental Protection was unpopular in most of Israel's governments. Out of many Minsters who have held the position over the years, only one actively sought out this Ministry over another (Tal 2006).
Although Inbar was the only former Director General to voice without regret his periodically ignoring ENGOS, other former Directors interviewed explained in an apologetic manner that they could not meet with all of the ENGOs or have the ability to change ministry priorities to better help those ENGOs. This implies that there were cases where the Ministry excluded the ENGOs from discussion or simply did not listen to their requests. Though realistically it is obvious that not all ENGO claims are reasonable and that a governmental ministry cannot completely change its agenda after 107
every meeting with ENGOs. Nonetheless, this dominant view suggests that ENGO demands were always taken seriously.
5.14. Preference for "Inclusive" strategic ENGO orientation
Between the two strategic orientations discussed earlier, some of the former
Director Generals expressed a clear preference that ENGOs engage in inclusive modes of action, such as discussions with officials and participating in planning committees, along with a general willingness to compromise on some of their goals for the sake of achieving others. Miki Haran and Goren remarked that the best environmental outcomes were the result of cooperation with the ENGOs. As an example Haran mentioned the positive results of such cooperation with the SPNI on issues of planning. Also in this category was the campaign to remove the fish cages from the Gulf of Eilat and the establishment of the Ariel Sharon Park on the Hirya waste site. In both cases she relied on support from the SPNI in the National Planning Council.
The case of the fish cages in Eilat involved a ten year campaign of the environmental movement. This campaign ended in a victory for the ENGOs who fought to take out the fish farming cages out of the Red Sea onto a land-based location, to prevent their contribution to the declining coral reefs in the Gulf of Aqaba. The Ariel
Sharon Park involved a plan, which after several years was approved, to turn the land surrounding and including the Hirya waste site into a green park. This was an ambitious idea since it is planned to be the largest park in the entire Tel Aviv metropolitan, and located on expensive, strategic real estate lands (Orenstien & Silverman 2013).
Shefer also preferred inclusive oriented strategies by the ENGOs. She expressed her belief that when the ENGOs and the Ministry of Environmental Protection work in coordination, there is synergy, and the result is far more powerful. A combined force 108
can make a much larger influence on environmental policy than two separate efforts.
She mentioned a positive case of support that the ENGOs provided to the Ministry, by sending letters to all Governmental Ministers in response to her request. This was during one of the last rounds of the campaign to promote construction of a power plant in Ashkelon that runs on both Natural Gas and coal instead of a strictly coal-fired plant.
These letters, she believed, were helpful by creating the pressure needed to promote the policy advocated by the Minister of Environmental Protection. It is worth mentioning that the ENGO campaign against construction of a coal power plant also continued over ten years. When Shefer drafted the ENGOs, they had already had opportunity to participate in governmental meetings to change the policy of the Minister of
Infrastructure. Nonetheless, support was needed by the ENGOs to empower the
Minister of the Environmental Protection to confront the governmental ministries that were in opposition to the more environmentally friendly plan. The new natural gas
(potential) electricity station was finally approved in July 2011.
Interestingly, when Shefer worked in her previous position as director of Life and Environment, she followed the same principals. She aimed to initiate simple and clear environmental campaigns in order to recruit a wide audience from a variety of sectors, and enhance cooperation amongst them. Following this frame of thought, she launched the Israeli Earth Hour , (when cities turn off their lights in solidarity with global efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions) which is considered to be a large success since its inauguration in 2007.
Other former Director Generals also expressed a preference for cooperation and an inclusive strategic orientation regarding the ENGOs. Inbar mentioned a successful example of joint work to promote a proposed Packaging Law in the Knesset. He 109
approved of the cooperation with the ENGOs that, he believed led to the legislation of the law.
Goren claimed he always urged cooperation with the ENGOs. An example of the type of cooperation he initiated is the planning process for the construction of an incinerator in Ramat- Hovav. As the director general of the ministry he organized a joint team of representatives. Some representatives joined from the Ministry and some from two ENGOs in the role of outsider of interest groups, Adam Teva V'din and
Sustainable Negev 13 . Goren remarked that the meetings produced considerable arguing and yelling but eventually the ENGOs understood that the incinerator was going to be constructed anyway. The result of the inclusive process was an incinerator with the most progressive operational requirements possible. Ultimately, he felt that it t was
"funny" to consider this project as a good environmental result. Today, he laughed, the facility would never have been passed at all. Still, considering the knowledge that was available at the time about filters and pollution prevention technologies, or other forms of garbage disposal, cooperation with the ENGOs led to better environmental results than would have occurred without this dialogue. And the process of decision making included the environmental concerns expressed by the ENGOs.
Vardi mentioned that at certain times, some organizations tried to confront and break the cooperation between the Ministry and the ENGOs apart. But as Director
General he did not allow this to happen. He made an effort to bring the ENGOs back into a dialogue. He restored the relationship by listening and reasoning with them, even to their radical opinions, which, he remarked were later softened.
13 This structure of decision making resembles "consensus based decision making" discussed in Pellow (1999), public participation in decision making discussed by Churchman and Sadan (2003). A higher level of citizen participation is presented by Ronen Gofer, Citizen-Based Consensus Conference as a method for citizen participation. 110
Although cooperation was expressed to be preferable by the former Director
Generals, several former directors concluded that some level of confrontation by the
ENGOs helped influence the Ministry. Miki Haran, for example, claimed that ENGOs that confronted the Ministry, but that also knew when to restrain themselves, received the most attention. Adam Teva V'din was specifically mentioned by her for its close relationship as a confrontational ENGO. She believes it empowered the ministry though confrontation to promote environmental activity.
Furthermore, in some cases, the former Director Generals admitted that confrontation with the ENGOs served as a catalyst for activity by the governmental ministry. Kumar argued that according to his perspective, confrontational activities brought the most results. Haran assumed that during her years in the position, the high profile work of small confrontational ENGOs in the north were part of the "trigger" that led to resolution of a serious asbestos contamination problem in the Galilee.
The case of high profile confrontational ENGOs in the north such as CFE, The
Association for Quality of Environment and Life In Nahariya , The Health Coalition indicates that confrontation strategies often are more influential, since without being so aggressive, these ENGOs would not have been heard and their positions would never been seriously considered.
5.15. The Role of Court Intervention
Legal actions are characterized as exclusive strategic tools that ENGOs use. It is a form of an outside attack on the government (Vanhala 2012). Legal actions force the involvement and interference of an outside body, the court system in governmental work. This might delay projects or disrupt the ongoing work of the government. ENGOs might demand preconditions or the cancelation of a project or any reform promoted by 111
the government. And one outcome can be the delay of a project until the court has finished its deliberations. There have been many cases, where although the court ruled in favor of the ENGOs, in fact they did not manage to delay the project, due to lack of financial guarantees. Tal (2006, pp. 547-549) described in length the partial success of
Adam Teva V'Din in stopping the construction of the Carmel Beach Towers on the shorelines.
Most of the former Director Generals agreed that court actions filed by the
ENGOs constitute a useful tool for the Ministry in promoting its own environmental agenda. This might be explained by the oppositional role of the ministry with regards to other governmental agencies or by the relative weakness of the Ministry in comparison to other governmental ministries. Miki Haran explained it is so: The political power of the Ministry is ultimately dependent on the environmental Minister, yet it was often the case that the Minister of Environmental Protection was in a weak position to forward legislation or attain a given decision. In such cases, pressure from the court system can serve to empower the minister and strengthen their opposition to other governmental ministries.
Some of the former Director Generals mentioned cases where court actions of the ENGOs assisted their work. Further, some of them even confessed that they requested ENGOs to file legal actions against them or to include the ministry in a legal action that was already filed. Kumar recalled a problem of conflicting interests in the ministry that affected or stopped legislation where he requested that ENGOs file a court case. At the time, the Minister of Environmental Quality was also the Agricultural
Minister and had difficulty promoting positions that might harm agriculture. Kumar solved this dynamic by requesting legal action against the ministry by the ENGOs in order to force it to pass legislation. 112
Roni Kumar also mentioned that there were some cases when he used the legal actions of ENGOs to promote environmental issues that could not have been promoted otherwise. One example he recalled was the suit filed by Adam Teva V'din against Haifa
Chemical Ltd in relation to the Kishon River. The campaign run by Adam Teva V'din eventually pushed the Ministry to take action. After Adam Teva V'din won the trial, the company turned to the Ministry with requests for permits to discharge its effluent overflow to the sea. But the Ministry used the momentum from the court case to pressure the company. It added to the defendants, heightened inspection of all additional factories that discharged into the stream and pressured them to reduce outputs even further. Kumar remarked that without the prior legal campaign of Adam Teva V'din , the ministry would not have initiated this step to protect the river.
Yitzhak Goren replied there were in fact cases when he personally requested the
ENGOs add the Ministry of Environmental Protection to their court petitions as respondents, so that he would be “forced” to promote actions that were delayed.
According to Goren, in cases of legal action against the government, he refused to submit his response as the Director General of the Ministry together with the state.
Submitting the response together meant the state and the Ministry of Environmental
Protection were positioned on the same side. But in these cases where he refused, he actually posed the Ministry of Environmental Protection against the government. For a while he was criticized for this by the state attorney's office, until his right of refusal was acknowledged.
Another example of the use of court cases filed by ENGOs in coordination with the Ministry was recalled by Marinov from the very early years of its activities. The
ENGOs ran a high profile campaign against the construction of the Voice of America
Radio Station, to be operated in the central Arava region. The court filing required him 113
as the Director General to submit an affidavit. There Marinov used his witness status to blame the contractors for not completing an environmental impact assessment. That provided the final evidence needed to delay the construction.
Aharon Vardi said he used ENGO initiated court cases many times to promote the Ministry's agenda. These actions helped cancel the construction of many roads, including the northern road. He recalled that the two main ENGOs that used legal actions were Adam Teva V'din and the SPNI.
But there was also a negative opinion about confrontation through legal actions.
Yossi Inbar was the only former Director General that directly opposed the use of the courts as a supporting "tool" by the ENGOs. He mentioned that the court actions often interfered with the work of the Ministry and explained that a court action submitted by
Adam Teva V'din delayed the approval of a major military training school in the south near the Ramat Hovav industrial zone. The case, in his opinion, also brought many unnecessary tests and monitoring of soils as part of the environmental impact assessment. Inbar complained that the monitoring was largely unnecessary and that the project wasted government money excessively. In contrast, Yossi Ziv, former head of
Ramat Hovav Local Industrial Council (December 2010) saw this lawsuit as a necessary deterrent procedure that helped reduce development that would have otherwise disregarded the required environmental assessments.
Nevertheless, even though he objected to the use of legal actions, Inbar also found them useful at times. He recalled a court case that helped sort out an issue.
Previous to the submission of the petition, there was a dispute between the Ministry of
Environmental Protection and The Water Authority about areas of responsibility which 114
delayed some regulations. The intervention of ENGOs by filing a legal action forced a solution to the dispute and the regulations were amended properly.
In contrast to his remark about dialogue with the ENGOs, Shmuel Hershkovitz presented his approach that characterizes as an exclusive policy towards the ENGO community by the Ministry of Environmental Protection. He explained that as Director
General of the Ministry, he did not see the ENGOs as potential contributors that could help solve disputes, nor did he see them as potential force to strengthen the activities of the ministries. He neither opposed nor praised the ENGO legal strategy as a means for helping or interfering with the work of the office. He claimed that during his years as
Director General, the ministry was strong enough to promote what it aimed for and did not need the support of the ENGOs.
5.16. Concerns about Growing Populism, Negative Confrontations, Radical Groups and the Attempts to Replace the Ministry
Some criticism was also sounded by the former Director Generals. Some of them expressed concern that the ENGOs search for popularity and public support rather than scientific integrity interfered with meaningful discussions. Such populist behavior produced confrontations that led to mistrust between the different interest groups, the
Ministry and the general public. These tactics eventually can lead to the loss of the political power gained by the ENGOs.
Some of the former Director Generals tried to explain the reasons for such radical, irresponsible behavior. Marinov explained that the need for funding drives the
ENGOs to seek publicity and this in most ways leads to more radical positions (and activities) to attain headlines. Vardi understood the periodic confrontations of the
ENGOs as a method to attract public attention. Yossi Inbar claimed that the ENGOs aim to stimulate public debate. But in some cases they mislead the public by providing 115
false data to attain headlines. He claims that damage is done because it is hard to argue against newspaper titles, even when they are false. And people do not remember the follow-up article apologizing for the misleading information.
Haran also identified a trend that ENGOs divert from professional based claims to arguments aimed to attract the public attention but are based on unfound claims. She explained that this is a recent problem. Years ago there was not enough media coverage for environmental issues, but recently the ENGOs have too much coverage that can be superficial or false. Haran expressed concern also that the ENGOs depend too much on the court cases as a tool to promote their agenda. Recently, she said, there were eight court decisions that ruled against the ENGO side. If the court rules against them too many times, there is risk of them becoming irrelevant. Therefore, she says, the ENGOs should draw appropriate conclusions. Vanhala (2012) expressed the same type of problem facing the British environmental movement.
According to Inbar some of the attacks by confrontational ENGOs against the
Ministry and the Ministers were too personal. This led to closing the door by the ministers, rather than opening dialogue. Also, the ENGOs tended to bringing extreme approaches that wasted time and energy of the ministry. Shefer and Marinov also witnessed some personal attacks, which in their eyes were unnecessary.
Aside from the damaging behavior of publicity and unfound claims, a few of the former Director Generals complained about some ENGOs, for their headstrong character and unwillingness to compromise. They claimed that the progress in some important environmental issues was frozen because of unnecessary confrontations with the ENGOs. For example, Inbar argued that the Law for Cleaning Polluted Lands is currently stuck because of several confrontations around it. Goren also complained 116
about specific actions by ENGOs where he felt extremism was counter-productive. So was the extreme position of the SPNI, in his view, during the campaign to close the
Eilat fish cages. Because of its stubbornness and unrealistic demands that the fish cages be closed immediately rather than gradually phased out, the conflict was not resolved, until approximately ten years later.
Some of the Director Generals claimed that some stubborn ENGOs (extreme cases of exclusive groups) were not even willing to meet with the office. These groups presumably proved to be the most difficult with which to deal. Roni Kumar claimed he had encounters with ENGOs that were not willing to compromise nor acknowledge the constraints of the Ministry. And some also were not willing to even talk with the ministry. He defined these ENGOs as sectorial and confrontational ENGOs, and confessed he had the most difficult time working with them. Shefer expressed difficulties with dealing with radical ENGOs. She claimed there were cases where their extremism almost ruined meaningful achievements of the ministry.
Maintaining their inclusive appearances, even when ENGOs confronted the
Ministry, most former Director Generals claimed that they did not stop contact or support for those ENGOs. Inbar gave the example of the ENGO, Tzalul. Even though
Tzalul aggressively confronts the Ministry and often attacks the Director General personally, its representatives continued to sit on the committee for sea discharge permits. And the ministry made no effort to exclude them. Goren recalled that the ministry continued to fund confrontational organizations even as they attacked the ministry. For some time the Ministry even funded animal liberation confrontational organizations. And when private individual advocates came into confrontation with the
Ministry he continued to listen to them. 117
Another problem associated with an exclusive ENGO strategy raised by the former Director Generals was when ENGOs ignore and try to replace the Ministry by promoting private legislation. For instance, Haran claims that Israel's Clean Air Law, which was a private law and drafted by Adam Teva V'din was a mistake. She reasoned it was because Adam Teva V'din was not aware of other considerations and priorities.
Goren felt that the ENGOs should not try to replace the government in its work but rather should set limits as to what it might do. Kumar made it clear that the distinction for him is not between radical and reform, but between activists that are willing to communicate properly with the ministry, and those who do not.
In general, the former Director Generals expressed they were pleased with the work of the ENGOs. Kumar was satisfied that over all, the ENGOs were supportive of the Ministry's work. He saw meeting with the ENGOs as a form of networking. For him they were potential assistants, and he aimed at recruiting them in cases where the ministry planned wide scale campaigns. Goren too expressed satisfaction of the functioning of the ENGOs. He assessed that they do manage to promote activity in issues that they care about. He explained that there often is activity regarding those issues in which ENGOs are involved. This observation suggests that the ENGOs have a central role in setting the national agenda. It also indicates that the ENGO community serves a very valuable function and that the Ministry of Environmental Protection cannot be left alone to address all environmental problems.
5.17. Summary of Official Perceptions
Results of the interviews suggest that the Ministry of Environmental Protection typically maintains a passive-inclusive policy towards the ENGOs. The level of communication between the Ministry and the ENGOs, the way it utilizes the ENGOs, and the fact that it sees the importance of the work of the ENGOs, all indicate an 118
inclusive policy. Questions remain about the level of information flow between the two sides, and the level of inclusion of the ENGOs in round tables and in decision making.
Although the former Director Generals preferred that ENGOs engage in inclusive strategies, they seemed to remember more about the ENGOs that confronted them. Exclusive strategies seem to be more memorable and successful in attracting attention and producing results, specifically via court actions.
The former Director Generals made it clear that there is danger in granting publicity to unfounded claims. Untruthful or exaggerated newspaper titles might be effective as an ephemeral victory in a momentary campaign. But in the long run it affects the status of the ENGO and the ENGO community as a whole. Though the
Ministry might still perceive the specific ENGO as responsible, the public that does not distinguish between one ENGO and another might come to find all ENGOs as radical or irrational.
The former Director Generals approved of and responded to dialogue and proper communication and they all described themselves as open for dialogue. Therefore, a trustworthy dialogue is surely desirable in establishing synergy where ENGOs and the
Ministry of Environmental Protection empower one another. Aside from dialogue, the former Director Generals seemed to be influenced strongly by some level of confrontation more than appeasing appeals. Therefore, it can be argued that the optimal
ENGO strategy is to gain inclusion at the ministry while occasionally attracting attention with confrontational tools that do not prevent continuing with an open, willingness to compromise and maintain a dialogue. 119
5.2. Strategies and Networking- Findings from the survey and Interviews
Based on the results of the survey and interviews with ENGO leaders this section reviews the strategies applied by the ENGOs. It briefly reviews the types of modes of action applied by the ENGOs, and enumerates the various aspects of incentives and difficulties regarding networking as an optimal strategy.
Results of the modes of action were divided between four characteristics of strategies: confrontational strategies, a professional orientation, social and educational activities, and media utilization. Names the modes of action included in each strategic characteristic are described in Table 8. In relation to the dichotomous division used in the previous section, confrontational strategies are parallel to exclusive strategies, and both professional and social activities are parallel to inclusive strategies. Media utilization in this case is neutral, because the type and goal of its use determines its strategic character.
Results, presented in table 8 show 67% of the ENGOs engage in confrontational strategies (35% of the ENGOs engage in legal actions, 45% engage in activism). And
78% of the ENGOs use professional means. Media is utilized by 64% of the ENGOs.
Table 8: the percentages of ENGOs that engage in the different sets of modes of action (N=78)
Strategy type Percent of Modes of action included in each definition ENGOs* Confrontational 67 Activism and legal actions
Social and 99 Lobbying, physical projects, environmental educational education for youth, public awareness, leadership 120
training, and community activities
Professional 78 Environmental economic assessments, planning, information collection to affect policy change, scientific research, scientific monitoring and conducting Environmental Impact Surveys and risk assessments, demonstration of energy saving/ sustainable technologies,
Media 64 All forms of media * In the survey question ENGOs chose their modes of action they engage in from a list, therefor the percentages do not add up to 100%. Analyses of the combinations of strategies used reveals 65% of the ENGOs use both confrontational strategies with either professional or social activity, meaning more than half of the ENGOs combine inclusive and exclusive modes of action. The combination of both inclusive and exclusive strategies is defined as dual strategy by
Dryzek et al (2003)
According to Hardel Wakim (October 2013), almost no campaign can achieve its goal without a combination of strategies. For example, the SPNI combines both strategies in its actions. This combination of activities between professional and activism might seem jarring. Nir Papai, head of the environmental protection department in the SPNI (November 2010) added that when the SPNI had officially entered the planning committees it held meetings to discuss the conflict, whether it could continue serving as an aggressive ENGO while continuing to be included in the planning committees. The final decision made was not to compromise. SPNI should be present in the committees and yet keep from integrating and becoming part of the establishment. Namely, SPNI chose to act as outsiders and criticize decision making when goals are not met. 121
Yoav Sagie, director, Deshe institute , an ENGO spinoff think tank of the SPNI, confirmed that engaging in dual strategy is the most efficient strategy (November 2010).
He insisted that participation in planning committees had brought many successes. And yet, if decision makers act in ways that are not in favor of the environment, the SPNI will not hesitate to confront them. Therefore, as much as the SPNI has gained official status it still uses exclusive confrontational strategies when needed. For example Sagie gave a campaign to save the Nitsanim sand dunes. In this campaign, the SPNI engaged in education activities, and in addition organized demonstrations to pressure the planning authorities. This was before the SPNI was granted a seat in the planning committees.
More results of the combinations reveal that 47% of the ENGOs surveyed use both confrontational strategies and the media. It is important to note that this result does not specifically mean that ENGOs combine them in the same campaign, but it shows that in the total actions approximately half of the ENGOs both invest in media coverage and in confrontational activities. The media can be used as a tool for posing public pressure. An example of the use of the media was provided by Maya Jacobs, director of the marine protection NGO, Zalul (October 2013). She revealed that when acting to raise an issue to decision makers, aiming to address specific figures, Zalul publishes an article and adds the target's name in the text. This way, they trust, it will definitely reach the decision maker targeted, as the PR of the politician tracks all publications concerning them. Also Liora Amitai, associate director CFE explained that she has used the media as a platform to draw attention, when efforts for civil discourse were not enough.
Aviv Lavi, environmental reporter (November 2010) acknowledged that most environmental campaigns cannot be successful without media coverage. According to 122
him the politicians address issues that are covered in the media. Most environmental issues have not yet reached the threshold of media coverage, therefore they are not seen by the politicians as important issues to address. According to Zafrir Rinat, also an environmental reporter from the Haaretz newspaper (January 2011) some ENGOs have found the right formula to reach the media. The Environmental Threats Reports produced annually by the SPNI was provided as a good example. He said it has the right name; information is organized clearly and easy for a news reporter to understand.
5.21. Networking- coalitions and ad hoc collaboration
Results of the survey reveal a considerably large number of organizations (74%) who reported membership in coalitions (N=85). Some of the coalitions take the form of established organizations and some are ad hoc alliances around specific campaigns.
Examples of well-established coalitions include the umbrella organization Life and
Environment , as 34 ENGOs reported participation, The Public Health Coalition with 7
ENGOs reporting participation and Sustainable Jerusalem which had 5 ENGOs that reported participation. This coalition started as an ad hoc campaign to oppose the plans for development of the Judean hills lying to the west of Jerusalem. The development plan was rejected due to the loud opposition and the coalition continued with other goals, such as to strengthen the city center and to enhance community life.
Life and Environment serves as the umbrella organization of the Israeli ENGOs.
Naor Yerushalmi has served as its director since 2009. He believes that it aims to empower the environmental organizations and provide them with tools. The umbrella group seeksto unite the ENGOs and show that they are part of a large movement of common goals, and to increase visibility of the environmental movement in the eyes of the public and decision makers (August 2013). 123
Examples of ad hoc coalitions reported are The Lobby for Responsible Planning
(AKA the campaign against privatization of public lands or the coalition against the reform in the planning system), with 8 EGNOs that reported participation. This ad hoc coalition rose as a campaign against a reform promoted by the Prime Minister to change the procedures of the Israeli National Council for Planning and Building. The plan was meant to shorten the process of plan approvals, allowing less public hearings and civil opposition to the plans proposed. Another ad hoc coalition is the Water Coalition of the
ENGOs. In this network ENGOs gathered together to propose sustainable solutions to the water management in Israel. Here too, 6 ENGOs reported activity. Sustainability
Coalition had 7 reports of ENGO participation.
Some coalitions that were mentioned by the ENGOs are not specifically designed for environmental causes. For example, the Galilee Coalition for Planning for
Equal Rights in the Galilee , This coalition was aimed more at development. According to Basel Ghattas (December2010) one of its achievements was the establishment of an
Industrial Zone near Sheikh Danun. Other coalitions were Auga - the Arab NGO
Umbrella Organization, The Youth Movement Council , The Israel Movement for Reform
& Progressive Judaism (IMPJ) and many others. Also international networks and coalitions were mentioned, such as the Anna Lindh Foundation that brings leaders together from across the Mediterranean (Anna Lindh Foundation website).
The extent of cooperation between Israeli ENGOs is remarkable. The survey results show that 92% of the ENGOs participate in ad- hoc cooperative activities with other organizations (N=84). Some five ENGOs were found to be central ENGOs, that engage other organizations or who support them, as reflected in the large number of ad hoc collaborations reported by the cooperating ENGOs. These ENGOs are: the Society for Protection of Nature (SPNI) with 34 ad hoc collaborations, Adam Teva V'Din with 124
22 ad hoc collaborations, Life and Environment with 13 ENGOs reported cooperation;
Green Course with 11 ad hoc collaborations, Heschel Center with 10 organizations reporting ad hoc cooperation. Other ENGOs received lower numbers of reports of cooperation, such as The Health Coalition reported by 5 other ENGOs, 3 ENGOs reported cooperation with the Green Network (Reshet Yeruka).
It is assumed that in reality there are more ENGOs members in coalitions and in cooperation. First, not all ENGOs joined the survey, and second, the examination of membership in the umbrella organization reveals much higher participation than was reported. Life and Environment has over 100 ENGO members. Some ENGOs marked their connection with the umbrella group as participation in a coalition (34) while others perceive their relationship as ad hoc, cooperation with Life and Environment ENOGO
(13). Still others that formally are considered as members of the umbrella organization did not mention their affiliation at all in the survey. This indicates that there might be even more cooperation than was reported in the survey, as ENGOs may not have recalled or chose not to mention when they filled the survey questionnaire.
Ad hoc cooperation was also reported with other social change groups such as
The Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI) by Friends of the Earth Middle East .
They reported cooperation on issues of water rights. Dror Yisrael youth movement was mentioned by Hebrew Nature . The cooperation took place in writing joint position papers and High Court Petition against the privatization of public lands. The national union of Israeli Students was reported as a partner by Life and Environment .
Cooperation with this non-environmental group was made in the effort to oppose the canceling of the Commission for Future Generations. 125
Cooperation of ENGOs was also mentioned with some governmental institutions. The Ministry of Environmental Protection had 3 reports on ad hoc cooperation; the Open Landscape Institute reported cooperation on several goals by providing information, joint activities and strategic planning. Cooperation was reported
Eco- Ocean for the development of educational programs, and with Kayak4all Zebulun , in educational activities.
Local authorities and local green units were reported by 5 ENGOs to have cooperation. For example the Society for the Conservation of The Red Sea Environment reported cooperation with the Eilat municipality by providing educational activities for youth for protecting the coral reefs. Amakim Vemerhavim , a local ENGO located in the
Jezreel Valley reported cooperation with the regional councils of the Jezreel Valley and
Megiddo, for joining a coalition to oppose the plans for construction of an airport in the valley. Environmental Forum Midreshet Ben Gurion reported cooperation with the environmental unit of the regional council Ramat Negev by providing information and volunteers. Malraz reported that it maintains cooperation with many environmental units of local authorities, in many issues including youth movements.
The Nature and Parks Authority was reported as a partner by 7 ENGOs. Such
ENGOs as the Israel Society for Ecology and Environmental Quality Sciences reported cooperation by providing information for a scientific journal and conferences. The
Keshet Association located in Mitzpe Ramon reported cooperation with the Nature and
Parks Authority around the development of plans for Mitzpe Ramon. The Israeli
Forum for Ecological Art reported ongoing cooperation on various subjects.
The Jewish National Fund was reported by 6 ENGOs as a partner with whom they enjoyed cooperation. For example JNF providing funding support for Ecocinema ; 126
the International Birding and Research Center in Eilat reported cooperation in tree planting, water managements and professional advice. Also Shatil , an organizations founded by the New Israel Fund to support and empower the Israeli civil society, was reported by 8 ENGOs as a partner for cooperation. Most of the cooperation was held by providing the ENGOs with support, professional advice, training and empowerment.
These results involving a wide range of social coalitions and much ad hoc cooperation within the environmental movement reflect its nature as a social network.
Results of interactions with groups from outside the movement also demonstrate the position of the environmental movement as a social movement within civil society and its interconnectedness with other social movements in Israel.
Ronit Piso, former director, Health Coalition (December 2010) strengthens the findings of a number of central ENGOs. She emphasized that as head of the coalition, on local issues that relate directly to the local ENGOs it is easy to engage most groups.
But when it comes to campaigns aimed at the national level, even though in every case she contacted all ENGO members of her coalition, most likely that only the national
ENGOs would actually be engaged. According to her this is true with one exception that proves the rule: Citizens for the Environment a medium sized national ENGO located in the Galilee that also joins in national campaigns.
From the five central ENGOs identified by reports of ENGOs on ad hoc cooperation, each works in a slightly different niche, regarding its modes of actions and goals. But they also overlap. A general distribution of niches maintains that Adam Teva
V'Din have ad hoc cooperation with local groups, mainly in advocacy for policy change and legal actions, Life and Environment provide a basis of support, professional advice 127
and lobbying services and the Heschel Center provides training and workshops for the
ENGOs.
The SPNI is too big and unique an organization to generalize about its activities.
It is the largest and oldest ENGO in Israel. It encourages local active environmental communities by spreading chapters and field schools around the country, reaching a total of 30 branches. Some of its activities are currently independent registered groups or groups that are nested under their auspices. So are the Deshe institute , the Green
Forum in Tel Aviv , the Sustainable Jerusalem Coalition , Adulam committee against the
Oil Shale , the Neveim Committee , Lanua- transportation users , and Green Course were formed in auspices of the SPNI during the campaign against the trance Israel Highway
(survey findings; Binyamini 2013; Rabinowitz and Vardi 2010).
Dan Rabinowitz (January 2011) traces back through Israeli environmental history and claims that almost in every decade the environmental movement had a leading campaign, which served to formulate a new identity and that resulted in increased activity. The educational campaign to protect the wildflowers was the defining campaign of the 1960s; the more aggressive campaign against mining in the
Carmel Mountain was the dominant campaign of the 1970s. The campaign against the
Trans Israel Highway in the late 1990s showed that the movement had matured and opened their eyes about the powerful interests they fight against. And the coal power plant in Ashkelon in the recent decade. In this case, sustained protest succeeded in changing a governmental decision about the construction of a coal running power plant to a bi- fuel (Gas and coal). The last two campaigns he mentioned involved large scale and complex coordination between several groups and activities.
The campaign against the construction of a coal power plant in Ashkelon is an example of collaboration between many ENGOs that led to a significant achievement. 128
In this specific collaboration, each ENGO operated on its own, but also in coordination with the other groups. This way the active groups were not held up by the cooperation and were free to react spontaneously and quickly. Nili Grossman, former energy campaigner of Greenpeace (Nili Grossman October 2013) explained the division of labor. Greenpeace and Green Course both led demonstrations, direct activism and street theater. Also, the local community was engaged and joined the demonstrations, as well as many politicians. SPNI representatives sat in the national infrastructure planning committee that discussed the matter where they lobbied and voted in opposition. And
Life and Environmental was also engaged. Later on in the campaign, the Israel Energy
Forum published position papers on the matter and presented some of them in front of the national infrastructure planning committee (Hann 2003; Hasviva June 16 th 2008;
Israel Energy Forum website Oct 2013; nrg July 12 th 2011).
According to Nili Grossman the Electric Company, which was the "developer" against whom the efforts were directed, was not aware of the collaboration between the
ENGOs and the local council. This gave the environmental groups an advantage. In this way the municipality was exposed to information that was useful for the campaign and forwarded it to the ENGOs.
5.22. Incentives for collaboration
Similar to Alona Shefer, many environmental leaders believe collaboration amongst ENGOs lead to synergy. Some activists agree that the campaigns of the present days face confrontations with better funded groups with powerful economic interests
(Azaria Alon December 2010; Dan Rabinowitz January 2011; Gil Yaakov, November
2010). Therefore pooling forces is needed for success. According to Dov Hanin, a former chair of Life and Environment, the forms of cooperation are part of the culture of the Israeli ENGOs. He emphasized that there are even organizations that are built to 129
support collaboration. Almost all of the achievements of the environmental movement can be attributed to more than one ENGO. In fact he could not recall one major victory that was has not involved at least two groups (November 2010). Also, he claimed that there are advantages in cooperation with local groups. Hanin argued that the small groups are lively and serve as catalyst to engage in issues that the national ENGOs sometimes miss. Orly Ronen director, the Heschel Center, expressed the view that the engagement of the local groups is needed in order to catch politicians' attention
(November 2010).
Keren Halpern, Adam Teva V'Din (November 2010) explains that in order for some of the local campaigns to succeed it is crucial to engage the local community since they provide the legitimacy for the campaign. Therefore Adam Teva V'Din works to maintain their connections with local initiatives. Also, in terms of human resources it makes more sense to keep local volunteers active. For examples she cited cases where there is a need to gather information from the local council.
Green Rahat is an example of a local group that maintains ad hoc collaborations and receives support from other groups. According to Ahmed Amrani, director
(December 2010), the ENGO maintains collaboration with a few organizations, both environmental and other civil society groups according to the project and goals.
Cooperation with human rights organizations was held in combating the installation of cellular antennas. Green Rahat collected information and together they wrote position papers. The Jewish National Fund supports it by providing trees for planting; Shatil provides support in organizational management. Adam Teva V'Din helped in clearing illegal gas stations in the city and Life and Environment sent a city planner to help in the preparation of a position paper. Amrani explained that he knows who to contact for 130
specific needs, but as a small volunteer groups he admits that he only contacts the large groups when he needs support.
These results, showing the type of cooperation between ENGOs, suggest that the environmental movement is highly organized and hierarchical. The umbrella group unites the movement and serves as a bridge to policy makers. At the same time, a small group of highly professionalized and well-staffed groups fill special niches. Behind them on the lower scales of influence, are most of the groups, ranging between established medium sized budgeted groups to local grassroots, unregistered and unbudgeted groups.
5.23. Difficulties and barriers in forming collaboration
Although there are many incentives for the different forms of collaboration within Israel's environmental movement, there are also many difficulties. Some of the difficulties were expressed by experts and ENGO leaders. The first and most basic barrier mandates that collaboration will not exist if the ENGOs disagree on the goals or on the strategies. Moreover, every ENGO bases its activity on different considerations.
Local groups often have local perspectives that can sometimes be personal with emotional involvement. Their perspective is very different than the considerations of the national ENGOs that are more dispassionate and can better see national interests.
Gideon Betzalel, former head of Green and Blue , a local ENGO in the north, gave an example of a campaign that showed the different considerations held by the local and national ENGOs. Green and Blue strived to open the beach nearby Atlit to the public, and tried to recruit the SPNI. The national ENGO refused to take part in for reasons of compromise for the sake of the protection of the Dor HaBonim Beach nature reserve. Green and Blue ENGO did not give up and without the support of SPNI 131
succeeded in clearing the beach of Neve Yam of water park and a ballroom garden on the water's edge (December 2010).
Rabinowitz, an anthropologist and environmental activist found a different difficulty in ad hoc collaborations. According to him, the main problem is conflict over
"credit". He explained that taking credit for actions affects allocation of resources and affects media attention, public support, and even funding. If ENGOs know that they will not be appreciated/ credited for their work and support, they might hesitate to join a coalition or a campaign (January 2011)
Similar difficulties were described by Maya Jacobs, Zalul (October 2013). She explained that credit is important for ensuring donations. For example, Zalul fills an activity or a goal accomplished in grants applications the foundations might be skeptical, since another ENGO filed an application describing the same campaign but did not mention Zalul as a partner. Jacobs also emphasized the risk of losing control or delivering the wrong message to the media and the public, if the partners are too loud or is predominant over other partners.
Based on the difficulty about sharing credit, Rabinowitz also believes that the duration of the campaign has an effect on choices and quality of cooperation. He found that it is easier to receive cooperation for a one time activity, where every detail is agreed upon in advance. For example how much funding each ENGO provides, credits on the brochures, agreement of the speakers and upon the message. But in a long term campaign, these issues become more complicated, and therefore cooperation has less chance of persisting. For example, the coalition for sustainable planning started with a very large collaboration of groups, not only environmental but also groups from the industry, and a variety of civil rights groups (Marlene – Grunpeter 2010; The Lobby for 132
Responsible Planning website 2013). But the campaign took much longer than was first expected, which made it very difficult to keep it together for the duration of the campaign.
Nili Grossman, Greenpeace (October 2013) maintains that the problem in long term cooperation is the tendency of ENGOs to form ad hoc coalitions for the campaign.
The formation of ad hoc coalitions, according to her, wastes time and energy. The coalition structure demands that every action of the coalition be agree upon and signed off by all participants. This bureaucratization slows the reaction time and weakens the forces, rather than ad hoc collaboration that simply utilizes the advantages of each group. In some cases during a campaign, she claimed, a response is needed within only a few hours' notice for preparations of a press release. This for example, is very difficult to deliver in an ad hoc coalition.
5.24. The social protest- a comparative perspective of strategic orientation
The protest of summer 2011 was a movement that attracted thousands of people to the streets to protest against the government's economic policies. It was a large occurrence of social activity movement that awoke during the present thesis writing.
The strategy of the social protest in the context of its influence will be presented briefly as a comparative perspective for the strategies applied by the Israeli environmental movement.
The protest was based upon a tent setting as a symbol of the shortage of housing, which led to people having to live in the streets. During summer 2011, it engaged massive numbers of activists over the course of almost two whole months on a daily basis, living in tents. The protest was spread all around the country and took place in many locations central and peripheral. The beginning of the protests was characterized 133
by growth and expansion. For example two weeks after the first tent was put up, 1000 tents were set up in different centers all around the country. Two weeks after that, more than double that amount were in place (Marom 2013). The movement conducted massive demonstrations weekly (Marom 2013), and in its peak, almost three weeks into the protest, almost half a million people joined the demonstrations held across the country, participating in the " largest demonstration in Israeli history " (Gamson 2011).
The imaginations of the media and the mainstream public were captured by the protest
(Marom 2013).
The social protest was aimed mainly against the neo- liberal economic policy of the state (Marom 2013; Zeira 2013). It started with demands for affordable housing and slowly incorporated more and more goals of social reform. It expanded to include concerns about the rising costs of living, and soon transformed to general demands for social justice. The social protest succeeded in including many communities and cultures in the protest. The leaders of the protest were young middle class people, but lower class citizens, immigrants, Palestinian workers and settlers from the West Bank joined together under the unified roof of the protest (Wallach 2013).
The movement constituted an extreme example of an exclusive, confrontational protest. It challenged the government and posed a threat to its legitimacy. It engaged in direct action by "occupying" public space, by putting up the tents and declaring rights for the city and public space (Marom 2013). Some demonstrations escalated into violent clashes with the police, ending up with many of many protesters in detention. And the attempts of city councils to evacuate the tents of the city parks were often marked by confrontation. The media gave a lot of attention and the protesters hoped to pose enough pressure to threaten the legitimacy of the government, forcing it to listen to protesters' demands. 134
The government's approach to the protesters was mainly denial. At first, it ignored it; it then it tried to negotiate with different sectors of the movement, wishing to separate the student union from the other groups. When this did not break the movement, it then formed a committee that was authorized to recommend reforms that could provide solutions to the protesters' claims. Though an expert committee was formed, in practice it did not have the power to change public policy. Many people felt that by forming the committee the government actually ignored the demands of the protest while creating the impression that it was honoring them. (Zeira 2013). The government reaction weakened the protest as some of the groups in the protest believed in the true intention of the government and others did not, engaging in more radical activities to have their demands met.
The protest was set loose in the fall of 2011 and was revived in the coming summer, of 2012 with many more protests. Yet, the subsequent events drew far smaller audiences. In addition, a branch of the protest leaders turned to an inclusive strategy.
Two leaders of the protest, Stav Shafir and Itzik Smuli entered politics, joining the
Israeli Labor Party in 2012 and were elected as members of Knesset in the national elections of January 2013. Answering the question of why she chose to enter the politics, Shafir explained that from the beginning of her participation in the protest she knew that a protest can only be temporary. She believed that the protest is political, and the change needs to be made from inside politics (Esterkin 2012).
In the summer of 2013 the protest was revived but narrowed and divided between the new insider actors, and the more radicalized movement and demonstrations often escalated into violent clashes. It seems that 2013 was the last summer of the social protest, and it will only fade away, just as the cycles of protest defined by Tarrow
(1994). 135
Examination of the short term and direct impact of the social protest shows that its direct demands were not met. The same Prime Minister was elected again, with the same economic policy. As one commentator summarized: " the erosion of public services, the rise of inequality, the stagnation of wages, the lack of true public discussion of economic issues - all these have not yet changed." (Zeira 2013). But marginal changes were made by the government to meet the protest demands. Some of them are subsidies for education from age of three; allocation of budgets to encourage youth movement activity; enhanced enforcement on employee rights violations; and some steps taken towards lowering costs of housing (website formed by The Public
Knowledge Workshop). The limited implementation of the committee's recommendations offers proof of the government's actual intentions.
When judged from the perspective of the public discourse, the movement was a breakthrough. It changed the prevailing culture and the discourse in society, about the role of the government and civility. It completely changed the public discourse about decision making, the governmental economic policy, working rights and the legitimacy of corporate profits from exploitation of public, natural resources. It also served to change the balance of power and power relations between civil society and the government. Among other outcomes of the protest of summer 2011, opportunities were opened for many new initiatives and social groups to form. Workers associations were initiated for the first time in new sectors, such as the communications sector .
In summary, the radical approach and direct actions of the social protest drew large audiences and the public as well as the media were both supportive. But the challenging nature of the protest prevented it from creating change at the political level. 136
Ultimately, the protest had to break apart as radical protest is hard to keep active
(Dryzek et al 2003). It can be argued that after this breakthrough was made, and momentum and adherents gained, it became savvy and legitimate to send representatives into the inner circles of decision making.
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6. Conclusions regarding ENGO Resources and Orientation
6.1. Summary of the profile of Strategic Orientation Groups
The general findings of the relationship between resources and strategy, described in depth in the first chapter reveal a large movement which continues to grow.
Half of the ENGOs surveyed were established after 2000. But the movement was also found to be very fragile, where most of the ENGOs operate with no budget or very little funding. Also, ENGOs tend to have more active affiliates rather than registered members. Most of the ENGOs are largely dependent on volunteers for activity. The large ENGOs tend to charge membership fees more than the small ENGOs. Assessment of the stability and strengths of the movement accompanied with recommendations were discussed in length in the research report of Tal et al, released to the public in
2013, followed by an article based on the report (Tal et al 2013).
The characterization of the of each ENGOs between inclusive and exclusive strategies was based upon the hypotheses that the strategic orientation is expressed in the modes of action, the self-definition of the ENGO and opinions about the legitimacy and urgency for engagement in a few types of modes of action. Results of the characterization of the ENGOs between inclusive and exclusive strategies reveal that two thirds (67.1%) engage mainly in inclusive strategies, and a third (32.9%), base their campaigns on exclusive strategies. The main findings that characterize the relationship between strategies and ENGO resources are discussed in this section.
Relationship between age ENGO size and strategic orientation
Significant statistical correlation was found between age and size of ENGO. The older ENGOs are significantly better financed, with larger staffs, and have more 138
registered members and more active affiliates. After this finding, there was reason to expect the same results between strategic orientation and age. As described in theoretical background, Dalton et al (2003) found that older ENGOs engage in inclusive strategies more than young ENGOs. It was expected that the same trend be found in the present study. The explanations proposed by Dalton et al. to these findings are that over time ENGOs accumulate more connections and reputation, and thus have more power to enter politics and join in decision making.
Although correlations between age and four measures of size were found significant, correlation between age and strategic orientation was not found in the present research. Moreover, in contrast to the expected results, exclusive ENGOs in
Israel seem to be older than inclusive ones. As a higher percentage of excusive ENGOS were established during the 1990's while more inclusive ENGOs established since 2000.
Analyses of budget revealed a significant difference between the strategic orientation groups. Inclusive ENGOs have a higher annual budget than exclusive
ENGOs. Additionally, results show slightly higher numbers of paid staff in in inclusive
ENGOs. Half of all exclusive ENGOs have no paid staff while only a third of all inclusive ENGOs have no paid staff.
Results of analyses of registered members revealed a statistical significant difference between the two strategic oriented groups. A larger percent of inclusive
ENGOs have relatively small numbers of registered members, while the distribution of exclusive ENGOs is similarly distributed between low and high numbers of registered members. In the analyses of active affiliates, both strategic oriented groups showed a negative trend of decrease in ENGOs as the number of activists increase but not much difference was found between the groups. 139
In term of volunteer dependency both inclusive and exclusive ENGOs were found to be highly dependent on non-paid workers. Levels of volunteer dependency showed a similar negative trend between inclusive and exclusive strategies, but with a slight higher dependency of exclusive ENGOs on volunteers. Higher percentages of exclusive ENGOs are dependent on volunteers in all activities: approximately two thirds of exclusive ENGOs versus almost half of inclusive ENGOs.
In general the higher budgeted ENGOs turn to moderate strategies and lower budgeted are dependent on volunteers and engage in exclusive strategies. This finding shows that unlike the modest grassroots groups identified by Gotler (2005), the grassroots groups today have a higher tendency to engage in more radical forms of activities than well- funded ENGOs.
The findings of budget and human resources and their relationship to strategic orientation are consistent with the findings of both Dalton et al (2003) and Piven and
Cloward (1977 in Dalton et al 2003), as presented in the theoretical background. They showed that lower budgets tend to be associated with exclusive strategies while higher budgets lead to more moderate and conventional actions. The argument of Dalton et al
(2003) that higher budgets lead to extended activity of ENGOs was not measured in the present research.
Result of the analysis of professionals on staff was not conducted due to a low response rate, but analyses of activities of volunteers reveal that a higher percentage of inclusive ENGOs utilize volunteers for professional activities and professional advice.
This result points to the relative efficiency of resource utilization by inclusive ENGOs.
If ENGOs use volunteers for professional advice and professional activities they save their resources for other expenses on less available resources. 140
Differences in income sources:
Both inclusive and exclusive ENGOs are highly dependent on foundation grants.
This in times might lead to instability and vulnerability of the ENGOs to fluctuations of the economy McCarth and Zald (1977) emphasized the instability of ENGOs that are funded by distant supporters. They maintained that: " The more a SMO is dependent upon isolated constituents the less stable will be the flow of resources to the SMO. "
(p1228). This instability can also be linked to the foundation support, reflecting the vulnerability of the Israeli ENGOs to fluctuations of the economy.
But other than the common dependency on foundation support, some differences were identified. Exclusive ENGOs are dependent on fewer sources of income, which makes them more vulnerable to changes and fluctuations of the economy. Inclusive
ENGOs receive funding from abroad, governmental and private donations, while almost none of exclusive ENGOs do. A larger percent of inclusive ENGOs have developed creative ways for funding, while exclusive ENGOs are still highly dependent on the traditional grants and membership fees. These results of income sources imply that inclusive ENGOs are slightly more stable economically than exclusive ENGOs.
Center and periphery and strategic orientation
A slight difference was found between inclusive and exclusive groups in their main geographic focus of operation. While approximately two thirds of inclusive
ENGOs focus on the local level, the great majority of exclusive ENGOs do. In the examination of the distribution of the groups according to the geographic region of focus a slight trend pointing at a relationship where center and periphery is identified.
Slightly higher rates of inclusive ENGOs focus on the center, while higher rates of exclusive ENGOs are more prevalent in peripheral regions. A question remains about 141
the peripheral characteristics of ENGOs in Jerusalem, as it has a small number of
ENGOs relative to the population, even though it serves as the capital of the state.
Worldviews informing the two strategies
The two strategic groups exhibited some differences in their ideological orientation about various issues. The largest difference was found in the approach towards the problem of environmental justice. Exclusive ENGOs seem to have a stronger feeling that it constitutes a serious problem. In their work involving the
Ministry of environmental Protection, inclusive ENGOs tended to express appreciation for its policy and actions, while only a few or none of the exclusive ENGOs did. A slight difference was detected between the groups in their approach towards investing in short term goals. Inclusive ENGOs seem a little more rational, as a higher percentage of inclusive ENGOs support the approach, and exclusive ENGOs seem more idealistic in their less supportive approach to invest at the local scale. This result seems inconsistent with the results regarding the level of focus. It is logical that groups that have a local focus also invest in short term results, especially groups that are active in defending their regions from existing threats. These finding tell us that this assumption might not be the case or may be only part of the whole story.
A higher percentage of inclusive ENGOs believe that the environmental movement does not effectively approach all governmental ministries. This is expected from the inclusive ENGOs, as they are characterized as groups that aim at engaging with the establishment. Exclusive ENGOs might see this as unnecessary, or they might not educate themselves about the potential of informally engaging the different government sectors, aside from the Ministry of Environmental Protection. 142
Analyses of the values with which the ENGOs identify reveal that consensus values that received high support from both groups, specifically received higher support from exclusive ENGOs. And in the less consensus issues, such as anti-globalization, and integrating economic tools and environmental technology in environmental policy, higher identification was found among inclusive ENGOS.
The result of difference in economic tools between groups is consistent with the description of Dryzek et al. (2003) of the differences between inclusive and exclusive
ENGOs. They claimed that the differences between inclusive and exclusive can also be identified in the paradigms they use to influence the state. They claimed inclusive
ENGOs use the economic paradigm, while exclusive ENGOs use the question of legitimacy of the state for its actions.
Examination of the difference in technological approach might imply that exclusive ENGOs are not as open for practical solutions as inclusive ENGOs are. They are more suspicious of practical solutions that take the issue of the ideology and bring them down to earth. They might fear giving in to technological optimism, or of losing the game if the decision is based on cost-benefit analyses, while inclusive ENGOs are slightly more open to these concepts.
How ENGOs identify their activists was examined as well. Results point out that exclusive ENGOs identify their members more than inclusive ENGOs as neighborhood activists, and communities at risk from environmental hazards. This is opposed to the reports of inclusive ENGOs that identify their activists as professionals and academics.
This result is consistent with the findings that Exclusive ENGOs are more peripheral and local. 143
In summary, the strategic orientation of ENGOs was analyzed based on factors regarding resources and potential. In the overall analyses, some similarities and differences were found between two strategic groups. The research findings point at two groups with both similarities and differences in characteristics.
Exclusive ENGOs tend to be smaller in terms of annual budget and paid staff but larger in registered members and active affiliates. In general, they depend on their membership fees for partial income to a greater extent than inclusive ENGOs do. Also, their income is dependent on fewer sources. Only small numbers of exclusive ENGOs have developed self-reliant sources of income, less than inclusive ENGOs (not including membership fees), which makes them more vulnerable to changes. They are also more dependent on volunteers for activity and can be associated with the ability to attract large audiences in the form of active affiliates, which is where their strength lays.
They tend to be focused mainly locally; most of them are neighborhood based. To a small extent they tend to be more focused and situated in the periphery than inclusive
ENGOs.
Inclusive ENGOs tend to be larger in their annual budgets and paid staff, but smaller in registered members and active affiliates. More often than exclusive ENGOs, they use volunteers specifically for professional work and consultancy. They have professionals and academics as members more often than do exclusive ENGOs. Their opinions are typically more positive towards the Ministry of Environmental Protection and they tend to criticize the current lack of a comprehensive government environmental policy. Inclusive ENGOs also tend to attribute greater value to investment in integrating economic tools and environmental technology in environmental policy than inclusive ENGOs do. Both groups maintain networks and cooperate with other groups. And they also cooperate under various coalitions. 144
6.2. Implications regarding ENGO Resources and Orientation
It is assumed that the relationship between the strategies and the difference in their relative resources suggest that resources are influential factors in the choice of organizational strategy. Drawing from the results, it would seem that well-resourced
ENGOs choose moderate actions since they enjoy channels to reach decision making.
These inclusive groups tend to prefer actions that are aimed at influencing via conventional channels, such as participation in meetings, publishing a position paper or monitoring and research. In some cases, these actions require high amounts of funding.
ENGOs with more modest budgets cannot afford to hire professional staff. In some cases the most staff they can hire is a part time manager to coordinate their activities and manage the paper work. Inclusive strategies of the sort mentioned, require a better trained professional staff, draw fewer audiences and have less ways to utilize activists, unless they are volunteer professionals or academics. This can explain the lower numbers of members and active affiliates.
But the opposite assumption must not be ruled out, that moderate actions lead to better funding, and are not a result of using these resources. Also it is important to be reminded that the profile illustrated in the present research can only point at trends and tendencies of the two specific sectioned groups. The findings cannot offer final conclusions about the characteristics of the two strategic groups, nor explain fully the relationship between strategy and resources. Other ways of dividing the ENGOs could result in different findings. Moreover a comprehensive evaluation of organizational characteristics and behaviors is too complex to be generalized in a single study. Future in-depth analyses should be done before reaching conclusions about the factors that drive the choice of action of the Israeli ENGOs. 145
Other factors were not examined for their influence about choice of strategy. For example, Gil Yaakov, former director Green Course, found a difference in the characteristics of activists that were drawn to the activities according to the nature of the campaign. Campaigns that were characterized by taking positions against an authority attracted more "radical" people, while proactive campaigns for more mainstream activities attracted a wider more mainstream audience. But due to lack of time, no further examination was made of this finding.
6.3. Additional Discussion Based on the Findings of resources and strategy
There are many exceptions to the above trends and generalizations. Although most exclusive ENGOs have grassroots characteristics (smaller budgets and locally oriented), a minority of them are large national groups. They have relatively significant budgets and considerably larger numbers of paid staff. These greats are often engaged in the political arena in various ways. Some were granted seats on various governmental and planning committees – such as SPNI, Israel Union for Environmental Defense,
Green Course, Tzalul, the Galilee Society . Israel Union for Environmental Defense and
SPNI were characterized as exclusive, even though they have built strong connections with the Ministry of Environmental Protection, employ lobbyists and have many allies in the government and Israeli parliament.
It is likely that these groups engage in exclusive strategies for reasons other than lack of resources. Also, this minority of groups might have caused a modest bias in the results since they have different characteristics that other ENGOs characterized as exclusive. Therefore it is likely to assume that including them might have prevented representative statistical results in some of the parameters. 146
To better understand the reasons why high- budget ENGOs use confrontational, aggressive modes of action it is important to look at the total requirements for a successful campaign. There often are advantages to using exclusive strategies.
Exclusive approaches bring excitement to the activists, especially if radical actions are involved. Exclusive strategies such as demonstrations, direct actions, disruption and confrontations attract the attention of the media and the public. They also can provide a sense of strength and raise motivation of the activists. In some campaigns, even the well-connected ENGOs might choose to use these actions to increase public pressure on the topic.
The existence of allies such as political actors, parallel movements, private individuals and the general public was not examined in comparing the two strategic orientation groups. Further research is recommended to examine the relationship between strategy and the existence of allies. It is logical to expect that allies are an important resource for influence and that inclusive ENGOs will disproportionately seek to find them.
The next final conclusions will provide an assessment of the Israeli environmental movement strategies in relation to the political structure of the state.
Specifically it will examine the relationship of the movement with the state, and determine the level of openness and he receptiveness of the state towards the environmental movement. A review of institutional opportunities to engage the state will be made. The results of interviews with former director generals will be presented as a basis for characterizing the relationship from the side of the Ministry of
Environmental Protection. Through examples of the strategies selected, the seizing of opportunities by the ENGOs will be assessed. 147
7. Conclusions: Assessing the State's View towards ENGOs and the ENGO Tactics
7.1. Assessment of the type of movement: Structure and Function
Rucht (1996) argued that the characteristics of a movement can shed light on the level of opened of the government. Attempts to position the Israeli environmental movement according to the typology of Rucht, between party politics, interest groups and grassroots characteristics reveal an interesting conclusion. The environmental movement is found to have a clear centralized and hierarchical, structure. In terms of total structure, results of the survey point to an interest group model, since it is centralized and hierarchical. This is despite the fact that most of the ENGOs were founded with a grassroots structure: in terms of budget, volunteer dependency, and their local scale of operations, most of them are small, local and groups with an "exclusive" orientation.
In terms of function, the major impact of the movement is carried out by or in cooperation with the larger, better funded and well-connected ENGOs, as they are involved in the majority of campaigns. These groups are to some extent included by the government and have channels to access decision makers. Therefore it was assumed that the movement could be characterized as an interest group. But although the well- connected groups can be inclusive, most of them are also aggressive in nature. They engage in discourse with the government, but do not hesitate to use exclusive strategies to exert pressure and attack governmental decisions.
Another part of the movement has shown an orientation to organize in the formal political system and many activists have been elected to serve in local governments. The emergence of environmental political parties is a new phenomenon, rising from the understanding that the change should be made in the politics and not 148
only in the public sphere and the culture (Eran Binyamini, August 2013; Karassin
2012). But since green parties have not yet been elected in the national elections, they have little influence on the function of the movement at the national level.
The Israeli environmental movement, both in its structure and function can be located between the grassroots and the interest group model. It can be argued that it conforms to a grassroots model for its function, and to the interest group model for its structure, organized as a centralized hierarchical movement.
7.2 The environmental movement and the political structure of the state
The findings point to a somewhat close relationship between the environmental movement and the state. Interviews with the former director generals revealed that they largely see the environmental movement as partners. The Ministry of Environmental
Protection typically regards the ENGOs as partners: it includes them in round tables as interest groups. It also utilizes the ENGOs to promote their own policies, through requesting legal filing administrative petitions to the Supreme Court against the government or by exerting public pressure to empower the Ministry against the competing governmental ministries.
Interviews with ENGO leaders and academics confirm that the ENGOs have many channels to the government, through allies, through legislation of ENGO representation in governmental and planning committees 14 Most of the legislative environmental achievements in Israel were the results of the environmental movement efforts and initiatives as well as the result of the growing reputation of the ENGOs as professional groups to be listened to.
14 Some researchers have reviewed and assessed the opportunities for ENGOs to influence environmental legislation. See Golan 2007; Karassin 2012; Marom - Albeck and Tal, 2000; Tal 2006, pp541-553).
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The environmental movement seems to takes advantage of the political opportunities, and maintains close relationships with the Ministry of Environmental
Protection and other institutional bodies. It takes an active part in the governmental planning committees, actively creates and locates political allies and initiates and promotes legislation.
On one hand, the political structure of the state provides many opportunities for the environmental movement to get its message across. And on the other, the state does not own the movement or actually restricts it as characterizes active inclusive states.
Therefore, according to the state structure definitions by Dryzek et al. (2003), the policy of the state towards the environmental movement should be defined as passive inclusive.
So it seems that the policy of the Ministry of Environmental Protection is also passive inclusive towards the ENGOs. Still, the research did not assess all levels of interaction between the Ministry of Environmental Protection and the Israeli ENGOs.
Therefore the relationship presented in the results should not be excessively generalized.
Moreover, some ENGOs experienced difficulties in receiving information as well as difficulties in reaching the decision makers. And some suffer counter attacks from the
Ministry when trying to contact them.
From the perspective of ideology, the opinions of the Israeli environmental movement appear to be moderate. It does not consist of anti-establishment organizations
(Naor Yesushalmi 2013). Also anti-corporatism has not yet reached the Israeli consciousness (Lucy Michaels, 2011). Accordingly, in the survey results, only a small proportion of the ENGOs expressed alignment with anti-globalization values. And yet, many ENGOs have shown aggressive behavior and a considerably high percentage of 150
exclusive strategies (compared to the results of Dalton et al 2003). This conflict can be explained by the most interesting finding that the Ministry requests public pressure and legal actions to promote political decisions.
This can explain why aggressive modes of action are so often applied in many cases as a tool to influence the Ministry of Environmental Protection. And they are also the result of cooperation or discourse between the Ministry and the ENGOs. This shows that both the Ministry for Environmental Protection and the ENGOs are aware of their common goals, but they are also aware that their objectives are far from identical. And it also explains the conflict presented earlier, of the large national included ENGOs that engage largely in exclusive strategies and were defined exclusive in the dichotomous division.
The oppositional role, both of the environmental movement and the Ministry of
Environmental Protection, reveal that environmental issues in Israel are still marginalized. The demand for environmental consideration is often perceived by the government as an obstacle to progress. Compared to the growing global recognition of the severity environmental threats to society and the general enthusiasm for sustainability, it would seem that the Israeli governments' environmental consciousness is less developed than other countries. Hence, the inclusiveness of the movement is only partial.
The oppositional nature of the environmental concerns in the political system makes the aggressive behavior of the ENGOs ever so relevant. Aggressive and radical campaigns in Israel are found to be necessary to raise the level of public discourse and exert pressure on politicians to include environmental considerations in decision. And 151
since the government has not yet prioritized environmental protection, efforts to pressure and raise awareness are of high significance.
In terms of raising awareness and initiating cultural change, the environmental movement can learn a lot from the summer 2011 social protest. But at the same time, in influencing and policy change, it seems that the environmental movement has had better experience and greater success than the protesters. Even with a consortium of social groups that connected around the protest.
On one level, the summer 2011 social protest was a success story as it lifted the oppositional discourse in Israel's public debate. The social protest bravely criticized the economic policy of the government that has been a mainstream policy consensus since the 1980s. It demanded that the governmental reassume responsibility for the welfare of its citizens. Such demands prior to the protests, were marginalized, only raised by marginal or minority lower class groups, and therefore were labeled lower class issues.
To make the breakthrough in the public discourse, radical protest was needed. And ironically, it was led by young middle class individuals who claimed that these problems were not solely affecting the lower class anymore, but constituted a national problem that affected everyone. Perhaps the environmental movement can learn from the protesters that to succeed in bringing the environmental discourse to the mainstream, radical protest is needed.
When measuring the direct results of the social protest in terms of public policy reform, however, it would seem that very little has changed. By way of contrast, the environmental movement has succeeded greatly. In recent years Israel witnessed the passage of major environmental legislation, the most important of which is probably the clean air law. Many successful campaigns have protected threatened resources and 152
reduced pollution. Therefore, it might be that a slow and steady revolution in policy is more efficient than an ephemeral radical protest.
This analysis of the strategies used by Israel's environmental movement show the benefits of relatively high aggressive strategies, confrontations, demonstrations and legal actions. But most of these actions came after attempts for dialogue, or were accompanied by discourse with the government. ENGO leaders confessed that many times they tried at first to engage in discourse, contact decision makers. But either they were not listened to or they were discreetly requested by the government officials to exert pressure and engage in more radical aggressive strategies.
As the case of Israel's social protest shows, if exclusive strategies are not accompanied by discourse with the government, the power of the actions and energy of the activists may be wasted. Therefore the optimal choice of action appears to be a dual strategy. Such a bifurcated approach is even requested by the government in some cases. Some ENGOs are able to engage in dual strategies on their own, most notably the
SPNI as described in interviews by both their past director/chair Yoav Saggie and present director of environmental activism, Nir Papai. But not all ENGOs have the resources necessary to be successful with such contrasting strategies. Also, ENGOs that aim to participate in round tables need to create trust and credibility in the eyes of the governmental contacts, officials and ministers. And in some cases where the radical activism is too harsh, ENGOs might find it impossible gaining the trust of decision makers after engaging in radical activism.
The findings imply that the ENGOs are aware of the advantages of collaboration and of its role to complete and apply dual strategies. High rates of networking and collaboration were reported among the groups and examples were provided of 153
collaboration for dual strategy. Collaboration for a dual strategy in turn increases the public pressure ENGOs can exert due to the legitimacy created by the collaboration on the one hand, and allows them to be trusted to join round tables on the other.
154
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166
9. Appendix
Appendix 1: Advisory Panel Members
• Naor Yerushalmi, Director, Life and Environment • Liora Amitai, Director, Citizens for the Environment • Ran Levy, Yad Hanadiv Foundation • Sigal Yaniv, Director, the Green Environment Foundation • Keren Halperin-Museri, Staff Attorney, Adam Teva V’din • Dr. Arie Rotem, Principal, TRI Rotem Research, the Interdisciplinary College • Itay Greenspan, Candidate Ph.D. University of Pennsylvania • Dr. Eilon Schwartz, Director, Heschel Center (former chair, Life and Environment
Appendix 2: ENGOs that were known to be active prior to the research but had no longer been active by summer 2010:
• Econet Israel • The Israeli Association of Environmental Architects Association • The Green Wheel • The Committee to Preserve and Develop Petah Tikva • The Committee for Public Transportation • The Committee for Ein Ganim/ Kiryat Motzkin Neighborhood • Free Zichron for Environmental Quality • Havatzelet for Environmental Quality • Living Waters for the Galilee • The Association for Environmental Education in Tivon • The Association for Hebron Gardens in Petah Tikva • The Greens Association • Green in the Galilee Association
Appendix 3: Survey Respondents: National and Local Organizations
1. Life and Environment 2. The Society for the Protection of Nature in Israel 3. Galilee Society for Health Research and Service 4. Adam Teva V’din - the Israel Union for Environmental Defense 5. Green Course 6. Citizens for the Environment in the Galilee 7. The Heschel Center for Environmental Thinking and Leadership 8. ACHLA - Environment for Sharon Residents 9. Association for Quality of Environment and Life in Petach Tikva 10. Eco-ocean 167
11. Ecoweek 12. Ecocinema 13. The Israeli Permaculture Organization Eretz Carmel 14. A Land without Cigarette Butts 15. Green Beer Sheva 16. Bustan 17. Bimkom- Planners for Planning rights 18. Save Adullam 19. IFLA - Israeli Association of Landscape Architects 20. Israel Society for Ecology and Environmental Quality Sciences 21. The Committee to Save Palmahim Beach 22. Citizens for Haneviim St. 23. The Green Movement of Haifa 24. ILGBC - Israel Green Building Council 25. Malraz, Council for the Prevention of Noise and Air Pollution 26. The Council for a Beautiful Israel 27. Council for Sustainable Development Kfar Saba 28. International Birding and Research Center in Eilat 29. The Neighborhood Sustainability Center 30. The Green Triangle 31. The Israel Green Building Association 32. The Association to Save the Sasgon Valley 33. The Association for Sustainable Economy 34. AQLEN - The Association for Quality of Environment and Life In Nahariya 35. The Association for Preserving the Wonders of Nature and Landscape in Kiryat Shmona 36. Green Forum – SPNI 37. Israeli Forum for Ecological Art 38. Israel Energy Forum 39. Environmental Forum Midreshet Ben Gurion 40. The Ashdod Committee for the Conservation of the Environment 41. The Cellular Antenna Forum 42. Hapardes - The Association for Development of the South Tel Aviv Community 43. The Coalition for Public Health 44. Green Cell – Acre 45. Adam-Yam (Human - Sea) 46. Ein-Shemer Ecological Greenhouse 47. Haredim for the Environment 48. Teva Naki (Clean Nature) 49. Jewish Nature 50. EcoPeace /Friends of the Earth Middle East 51. Green Now 52. Israel for Bikes - the Association for Cycling Transportation 53. Green and Blue 54. Link to the Environment 55. Samson Riders Bike Club 56. IMMRAC 57. Open Landscape Institute (Deshe) 168
58. Arava Institute for Environmental Studies 59. Movement for Israeli Urbanism (MIU) 60. Israel Palestine Center for Research and Information (IPCRI) 61. Sustainable Negev 62. Naga - The Association for Environmental Protection of Sakhnin 63. The Center for a Healthy Environment in the Arava 64. Sviva Israel 65. Society for the Conservation of The Red Sea Environment 66. The Green Movement Association 67. Alamal Hatikva 68. Association The Sayarut Association (“Green Horizons”) 69. The Keshet Association 70. Amakim Vemerhavim 71. Kurkar Hills Forum 72. Carmel Public Forum 73. Tzel Hatamar (The Date’s Shade) 74. Zalul 75. Arad-Judean Desert Group 76. Sustainable Jerusalem Coalition 77. Kayak4all Zebulun 78. Green Rahat 79. Ramot Favors Environment 80. Israel Healthy Cities Network 81. Shomera for A Better Environment 82. Shomrei Hagan 83. Arad Against Phosphate Mine in Sdeh Barir 84. Transport Today and Tomorrow 85. Eco and Sustainable Tourism Israel
Appendix 4: Interviewed During the Study
ENGO leaders, academic experts, representatives from the Industry: • Azaria Alon, Founder, Society for Protection of Nature in Israel (SPNI) • Ahmed Amrani, Rahat Mayor’s Office, Founder of “Green Rahat • Gideon Betzalel, Chair, “Blue and Green” • Professor Tamar Dayan, Tel Aviv University, Outgoing Chair, SPNI • Shmuel Gelbhart, Chair, The Greens of Haifa • Dr. Basel Ghattas, Tevel Program, Past Director, Galilee Society • Bilha Givon, Director, Sustainable Negev • Keren Halperin-Museri, Esq. Staff Attorney, Adam Teva V’din, Israel Union for Environmental Defense • Tzipi Itzik, Esq. Past director, Adam Teva V’din • Dr. Dov Khenin, Chairman Knesset Sub-Committee on Environment and Health • Aviv Lavi, Environmental Journalist, Ma’ariv, Channel 2, Galei Tzahal • Ronit Piso, Director, the Coalition for Public Health • Nir Papay, Director of the Environment and Nature Preservation Branch, SPNI 169
• Orli Ronen, Deputy Director, the Heschel Center • Yoav Sagi, Head of the Open Landscape Institute (Deshe), and past director and chair, SPNI • Yossi Sarid, Past Minister of Environment, Past Minister of Education • Dr. Eilon Schwartz, Director, Heschel Center for Environmental Thinking and Leadership • Gil Yaacov, Director, Green Course. • Naor Yerushalmi, Director, Life and Environment, NGO Umbrella Group • Yossi Ziv, former Director, Ramat Hovav Regional Council • Dr. Hussein Tarabeih, former Director, The Galilee Society • Tsafrir Rinat, Environmental Correspondent, Haaretz • Prof. Dan Rabinowitz, Tel Aviv University, Greenpeace International Board • Liora Amiai, Associate Director Citizens for the Environment • Jamila Hardel- Wakim, Associate Director Citizens for the Environment • Maya Jacobs, Director, Zalul • Yihiam Shlazinger, Biologist, past head of the Environmental Unit, Eilat Municipality • Yael Cohen Paran, Director, Israel Energy Forum • Eran Ben- Yemini, Chairman, The Green Movement • Nili Grossman, Past head of the Energy Campaign, Greenpeace • Abed Namarne, Al Amal, Forum Coordinator • Gur Rotem, Adamama
Former Director Generals, the Ministry of Environmental Protection: • Alona Shefer Caro, Esq. 2011-2013. • Dr. Miki Haran 2003-2006. • Roni Kumar 1999. • Aharon Vardi 1996-1999. • Yizhak Goren 2002-2003. • Shmuel Herskovitz 2002-2003. • Uri Marinov 1973-1992. • Yossi Inbar 2009-2011.
Appendix 5: Questions from the survey used in the Index for division 1. Modes of action: For each relevant mode of action please mark the percentage of the total strategies taken by your organization: Advocacy & lobbying Environmental economic assessments / cost- benefit analyses Planning Information collection to affect policy change, Scientific research Scientific monitoring Legal actions Environmental Impact Survey, Risk assessment Demonstration of energy saving/ sustainable technologies 170
Physical projects (example: community garden, playground mud building) Environmental activism Media coverage Environmental education for youth Public awareness, seminars, teachings Leadership training Community activities (happenings, films) Total= 100%
2. Self-Definition of the ENGO Which one of the definitions defines the organization most accurately? (more than one option can be marked). • National advocacy • Local organization / Community-based organization • Local action committee • Coalition (the members are other organizations) • Activist group • Faith-based organization • Research institute • Think-tank • Educational institute • Educational organization • Professional organization • Volunteer group • Community garden • Other, please specify______
3. Opinions of the ENGOs Please respond to statements involving environmental work in Israel. To what extent do you agree with the following statements? (Response in Likert scale of 5: 1= Strongly Disagree, 2= Disagree, 3= Moderately Agree, 4= Agree, 5= Strongly Agree). a. When an important environmental value is in danger, it is legitimate to move to radical activism and civil resistance. b. Environmental organizations tend to take extreme positions that in the long run prove to be less effective. c. Environmental organizations need to talk more in economic terms and generate better economic data to support what their position 171
Appendix 6: The Survey Tool- Questioner sent to the ENGOs
Cover letter:
October 31, 2010 Greetings, Before you is a questionnaire about the state of the environmental movement in Israel, whose goal is to offer a comprehensive picture of environmental organizations working in Israel today. The questionnaire is being conducted as part of a research initiative at Ben Gurion University that has been commissioned by the Goldsmith Fund for its use and that of other environmental foundations. The drafting of the questionnaire was done in consultation with an advisory committee that included leaders of Israeli environmental organizations, academic experts and representatives of central environmental foundations in Israel. Almost a decade has transpired since the last comprehensive survey was conducted about environmental organizations in Israel and the present questionnaire has the potential to reveal new trends and directions in Israel’s environmental movement along with identifying new needs among environmental organizations. As part of the project’s general policy of transparency, the information collected through the questionnaire about environmental organizations will be fully analyzed and included in a data base that will be posted on an internet site in conjunction with Life and Environment , the umbrella organization for environmental groups in Israel. Prior to any publication, the results of the survey will be disseminated to the organizations participating in the research with an opportunity for commenting and responding. If your organization does not want specific answers it gives posted on the web-site, it can inform the research staff in advance and we will see that it is not disseminated. Completing the questionnaire requires time, but we believe that it is important in order to influence the results of the study and to fully map the environmental organizations active in Israel today. The questionnaire is offered interactively as part of a web-site which will allow for easy calculation of the answers, something that will eliminate errors and expedite the process of data analysis. Please mark the correct answers or write in the appropriate space accordingly. In the event that a question is not clear, or in order to receive any additional information, you can write to our email address: [email protected]. You can also always contact the research team between the hours of 10:00 and 18:00 077-4503044. We thank you in advance for your time in seriously filling out the questionnaire.
Sincerely, Prof. Alon Tal, Shira Leon Zchout, Liat Oshri The Desert Research Institutes, Ben Gurion University Entering the questioner requires filling an email address which will be used as a code for entering and will allow re- entering any time independently.
Part 1 This part is for contact and general information 1. First Name: Surname: Phone No. 2. Organization info Name in Hebrew: In English: Address: Phone: 172
Email: Website: 3. Name of Organization’s Director and Educational background: ______4. Head of Board of Directors : Profession: Active since year: 5. List of all Board members: ______6. Is the Organization registered as a Public Organization (Ahmutah) in the Registrar of Associations a. Yes b. No 7. Public Organization Number ______( מלכ"ר) ?Is the Organization known as a Non-profit Organization .8 a. Yes b. No 9. Is the Organization a tax deductible organization according to section 46 of the Income Tax Ordinance? a. Yes b. No
Part 2
This part refers to the establishment of the Organization
1. Year that activities began ______2. Was the reason for the organization’s establishment a. Reactive (response to an environmental problem/hazard) b. Proactive (promotion of an idea or action) 3. What was the mode of establishment (more than one answer can be marked). a. Initiative of an individual person or a group b. Opportunity for funding c. Split-off from another organization d. Other, please specify______
Part 3
This part refers to the vision and goals of the organization The upcoming questions are open questions; please keep answer short -- no more than three rows for each question. 1. Vision of the organization: ______2. Goals of the organization ______173
3. What are the three highest priority objectives of organization at the moment? a. ______b. ______c. ______4. Please rate the following concepts as to how the organization identifies with them.
5. In what arena is the organization mostly active? Please assess the amount of activity invested in each area below.
5 4 3 2 1 Greatly Identifies Moderately Slightly In no way identifies identifies identifies identifies with the approach Sustainable development Conservation Environmental justice- fair share for all Integrating economic tools in environmental policy Environmental Technology development and implementation Public health Ensuring individual rights to a good environment. Anti -globalization, global justice Love of the homeland
If you answered "Regional (within Israel)” please answer the next Question:
5 4 3 2 1 Extremely Active Moderately Active Hardly Active Not Active in this Active area International level Middle eastern National level Regional (within Israel) Local 174
6. Please mention in what part of Israel is the organization mostly active? a. South b. Center (Tel Aviv metropolitan) c. Jerusalem d. Haifa region e. North (Galilee and Golan) f. All of Israel Part 4 This part refers to the definition of the organization 1. Which one of the definitions defines the organization most accurately? a. National advocacy b. Local organization / Community-based organization c. Local action committee d. Coalition (the members are other organizations) e. Activist group f. Faith-based organization g. Research institute h. Think-tank i. Educational institute j. Educational organization k. Professional organization l. Volunteer group m. Community garden n. Other, please specify______2. Is the organization based on chapters? a. Yes. Number of chapters______b. No 3. Is the organization a member in a formal coalition? a. Yes b. No skip to next question 4. Names of coalitions the organization is active in
a. ______b. ______c. ______d. ______
5. . Are there any cases where your organization is part of an ad hoc cooperation with other organizations? a. Yes b. No 175
6. please list names and types of cooperation involve. Name of organization type of Year of beginning of Year of ending of cooperation cooperation cooperation / Ending /Starting year year a.
b.
c.
d.
Part 5 Members of your organization and the board of directors 1. How many people take part/ are active in the organization? a. Up to 20 b. 21-50 c. 51-100 d. 101-500 e. 501-1000 f. 1001-5000 g. More than 5000 2. Please mention how many people took part in the organization: a. At the first year of activity______b. Ten years ago______c. Five years ago______3. How many registered members are in the organization? h. Up to 20 i. 21-50 j. 51-100 k. 101-500 l. 501-1000 m. 1001-5000 n. More than 5000 4. Please fill in the rate of involvement of the members in the next activities All More than Between a As much as none half of quarter and a quarter of members but half of members not all members Pay only membership fee Attend conferences and ongoing activities Volunteer periodically Volunteers regularly Other, please specify ______176
5. Which of the following definitions best fits the definition of your members? (More than one answer can be marked). a. Neighborhood activists/ regional residents b. A community suffering from environmental hazards / environmental threat c. Professionals d. Academics e. Students f. Alumni of a shared project/ studies g. A particular ethnic group h. Cannot be identified in any way i. Other ______6. Are the members of the organization mostly a. All citizens b. Jews c. Jews and Arabs d. Arabs e. Membership cannot not be generalized f. Other______7. What is the average age of the active people in your organization? a. Youth b. 20-30 c. 31-40 d. 41-60 e. Older than 60 f. Age cannot be generalized 8. How are the members of your board chosen? a. Elections at a general meeting b. No elections -- whoever is interested is a member of the committee c. The board appoints itself. d. Other, please specify______9. The board of directors meets: a. Less than once a year b. Once a year c. Quarterly d. Once a month or more
10. Please mention to what extent the members of the board take part in the activities below:
5 4 3 2 1 Always Usually Some Almost Never times Never 177
a. Determines organizational policy b. Active in budget management c. Active in choosing new projects d. Active in fund raising e. Active in staff recr uitment f. Active in chooses modes of action g. Initiation of new activities Part 6 This part refers to the extent of the organization’s actions 1. The total budget of the organization a. The organization works with no formal budget b. Up to 25,000 NIS c. 25,001-100,000 NIS d. 100,001-500,00 NIS e. 500,001-3,000,000 NIS f. Over 3 000,000 , NIS 2. Does the organization have projects that are not environmental related? a. Yes b. No- skip next question 3. Please specify the activities other than environmental______4. Where is most of your work carried out? a. independent office b. home office-- skip to next question c. shared office d. other, please specify______5. Is the office? a. Owned by the organization b. Rented c. Donated (ex. By city council, corporation, other)
178
Part 7 This part refers to the sources of funding of the organization (please refer to the Fiscal Year 2009) 1. Please fill in the total number jobs in your organizations. For example, A half time job counts as 0.5, and a total can add up to 2.75 jobs ______jobs.
2. Please fill in the total number of part time employees working in the positions below. more than half time more than one Less than one Full time and less than full quarter and less than quarter time half time a. Managers b. Project coordinators c. Book keepers d. Fundraisers e. Economists f. Lawyers g. Scientists h. Planners/ architects i. Community work coordinators j. Community workers k. Educators l. Media workers (spokesperson,
etc.) m. Computer support staff n. Office workers o. Intellectuals/ artists/ philosophers p. Other 3. Does your organization hire freelancers? a. Yes b. No- skip next question 1. In what subjects does the organization hire freelancers? ______Part 8 Sources of funding of your organization (please refer to the Fiscal Year 2009) 1. Does the organization charge membership fee?
a. Yes b. No
2. Please mark the percentage of income for each relevant source % of organizational income 179
a. Individual contributions from Israel b. Individual cont ributions from abroad c. Foundation grants – (not for specific projects) d. Foundation project grants e. Fees for services and goods (also governmental) f. Israeli national government grants g. International government or embassy grants h. Israeli local governmen t grants i. Investment income
j. Business entrepreneurship
k. Income from membership fees l. Corporate donations m. Legacies n. Other incomes ______Total= 100%
3. If one of your income sources is government grants, please mention from which body/ authority granted the money. a. ______b. ______c. ______Please mark the funds contributing to your organization a. The Green Environment Fund ( New Israel Fund, Dorot Foundation, Nathan Cummings Foundation,
and the Andrea and Charles Bronfman Philanthropies) b. The Sheli Fund c. The Goldman Fund d. The Beracha Foundation e. Yad HaNadiv (Rothschild Foundation)
f. The Abraham Fund Initiatives g. The Jewish Agency's Partnership 2000 program h. Keren Kayement LeIsra el - Jewish National Fund
(KKL- JNF) i. Gandyr Foundation j. Ford Foundation k. Pratt Foundation l. Porter Foundation m. The Heinrich Boell Foundation n. Ministry of Environmental Protection o. Government inheritance fund p. Other______4. Assets held by the organization c. The organization does not have any savings d. Up 10% of the annual budget e. 10%-25% of the annual budget f. 26%-100 % of the annual budget g. More than 100% of the annual budget 180
5. From the point of view of your organization’s budget, the year 2009 was: a. A normal year b. A weak year (downtrend) c. A good year (uptrend) 6. Compared to 2009, what is the budget trend for the year 2010 a. Budgets are the same b. Downtrend c. Uptrend Part 9 This part refers to the areas of activities Please rate to what extent your organization is active in any one of the environmental issues. 5 4 3 2 1 Extremely Quite Somewha Modestly Not at all Active Active t a. Water quality b. Desertification c. Energy d. Climate change e. Population growth f. Air quality g. Solid waste h. Toxics and hazardous substances i. Soil quality j. Sea and coastal protection/ education k. Soil erosion l. Conservation biology and Nature protection m. River restoration n. Transportation o. Local economy p. Environmental Economics q. Environmental planning r. Open spaces s. Green building t. Agriculture and food u. Changing consumption habits v. Sustainability w. Public health x. Environmental justice y. Sustainable cities/ New Urbanism z. Fare Trade & finance aa. Judaism and the Environmental bb. Coexistence and peace cc. Democracy and public participation in
decision making dd. Art & Culture ee. Other ______ff. Other ______181
Part 10 This part refers to your organization’s modes of action 1. For each relevant mode of action please mark the percentage of the total strategies taken by your organization:
Advocacy & lobbying
Environmental economic assessments / cost- benefit analyses Planning Information collection to affect policy change, Scientific research Scientific monitoring Legal actions Environmental Impact Survey, Risk assessment Demonstration of energy saving/ sustainable technologies Physical projects (example: community garden, playground mud
building) Environmental activism Media coverage Environmental education for youth Public awareness, seminars, teachings Leadership training Community activities (happenings, films) Total= 100% 2. To what extent did you attract media coverage? Please rate In every activity never 5 4 3 2 1 3. If you have attracted media coverage, what form did it take? a. National news b. Local news 4. What were the means of media you attracted? Yes No Television coverage National newspaper coverage Local newspaper coverage News on the web Blogs and/or websites of the organization Social network (such as facebook) Other ______5. Please define the nature of your activities with the help of the scale. Short term results long term results ______1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
6. Please rate the extent to which activity is intended to affect/ reach different sectors 5 4 3 2 1 Extremely Much Somewhat Minimally Not at all a. Private individuals b. Investment group (e.g., banks) 182
Corporations International bodies The Planning System The Knesset Government offices Local authorities Local community The general public
Part 11 This part refers to the challenges your organization holds
1. How challenging does the organization find the activities below? 5 4 3 2 1 Extremely Much Somewha Minimally Not at all t a. Fundraising b. Establishment an efficient
organizational operation c. Contacting public officials
personally/ Elected officials d. Receiving information e. Recruiting members for activities f. Receiving professional advice g. Contacting the authorities h. Promoting messages via the media i. Filing law suits j. Contacting members k. Pressuring politicians l. Other ______
2. Are there any other areas of activity that your organization is challenged in? a. Yes. Please specify______b. No 3. 4. If the organization had a larger budget, in what areas would it expand activities? 5 4 3 2 1 Extremely Much Somewhat Minimally Not at all a. Fundraising b. Establishment of an organization c. Contacting public officials d. Contacting authorities e. Pressuring politicians f. Filing law suits g. Promoting messages via the media h. Receiving information
i. Receiving professional advice/ knowledge/ training j. Recruiting members for activities k. Contacting members l. Expand professional staff 183
m. Raise salaries for employees n. publicity o. Spreading information
p. Technology (organizational set up, internet, social network) q. Other ______5. Are there any other activities, besides what was mentioned, you would expand? a. Yes. Please specify______b. No Part 12 This part refers to the effect of foundations on the environmental activities 1. Name 5 of the following foundations that you think have contributed most to promoting environmental issues in Israel?
a. The Green Environment Fund ( New Israel Fund, Dorot Foundation, Nathan Cummings Foundation, and the Andrea and Charles Bronfman Philanthropies) b. The Sheli Fund c. The Goldman Fund d. The Beracha Foundation e. Yad HaNadiv (Rothschild Foun dation) f. The Abraham Fund Initiatives g. The Jewish Agency's Partnership 2000 program h. Keren Kayement LeIsrael - Jewish National Fund (KKL - JNF) i. Gandyr Foundation j. Ford Foundation k. Pratt Foundation l. Porter Foundation m. The Heinrich Boell Foundation n. Ministry of Environmental Protection o. Government inheritance fund
Part 13 In this part please respond to statements involving environmental work in Israel To what extent do you agree with the following statements?
5 4 3 2 1 Strongl Agre Moder Disagr Strongl y e ately ee y Agree Agree Disagr ee The environmental movement today does not act effectively engage all government ministries. The environmental movement does need to deal with the relationship between health and the environment The environmental crisis is a symptom of a social crisis; the
environmental movement today does not focus enough on the social aspects of the environmental crisis
Environmental organizations need to strengthen their volunteer cadre in order to be more effective. 184
Relative to their budgets, environmental organizations do not invest enough in learning and receiving professional training When an important environmental value is in danger, it is legitimate to move to radical activism and civil resistance. In order to progress, organizations need to invest more in economic enterprises and long term projects Environmental organizations should not stop working in conventional activism such as demonstrations, petitions, media In order to attain results, environmental organizations need to invest more in short term projects so that results can be clearly seen. The problem of environmental justice in Israel is very severe.
Disenfranchised populations suffer from environmental hazards more than established populations do. More collaboration should take place between the local and national environmental organizations Environmental organizations need to focus more on local issues and put less time and effort in global issues, such as climate change One of the main problems in environmental policy is the lack of representatives in the Knesset Environmental organizations do not succeed because they do not put enough emphasis on becoming professional Environmental awareness is not high enough, and should be a main focus of the environmental movement Compared to the energy invested in national policy advocacy, environmental organizations do not put enough effort in changing public behavior, green consumption etc. Environmental organizations need to put a greater emphasis on the issue of "over population" in confronting the public and decision makers. If environmental organizations would make a greater effort, it would be possible to receive larger donations for environmental activities from Israeli donors. The Ministry of Environmental Protection usually adopts good environmental positions. The Ministry of Environmental Protection usually utilizes regulations and environmental law appropriately. Environmental organizations tend to take extreme position, that in the long run prove to be less effective.
Environmental quality in Israel is improving over the years. The environmental movement suffers from a lack of professional knowledge and lacks tools to properly combat environmental threats, leading to many lost battles. The main obstacle facing the environmental movement is lack of funding. . Environmental organizations need to talk more in economic terms and generate better economic data to support what their position The environmental movement needs to develop more income generating activities The environmental movement needs to establish more local funding sources and be less dependent on international funding.
Part 14 185
This part refers to the volunteers your organization Are there volunteers in the organization? a. Yes b. No skip to next chapter 1. To what extent is the organization dependant on the volunteer work? All the activities 5 4 3 2 1 not dependant 2. Does volunteer work include all the activities conducted by your organization, (including office work) a. Yes b. No 3. What activities do the volunteers carry out? (More than one answer can be checked) c. Professional work (example law suits, economic analyses) d. Professional advice for the organization e. Scientific studies f. Environmental activism g. Public education activities h. Coordination, logistics i. Physical projects (such as mud building etc.) j. Fund raising k. management l. Other, please specify______4. What does the organization do in order to strengthen its connections with volunteers? (More than one answer can be checked) m. The organization does nothing to strengthen the connections with the volunteers n. Social gatherings o. A newsletter p. Take up only short term projects q. Hold workshops and teachings r. Offer discounts and special sales for volunteers s. Activity expense reimbursements t. other______Part 15 Improving the environmental movement 1. What needs to be changed in the tactics of Israel’s environmental organizations in order to promote more effective environmental policies? ______186
2. What can be learned from other countries and implemented in Israel to improve the performance of local environmental organizations? ______3. What challenges and advantages does Israel’s environmental movement have today that it didn't have 10 years ago? ______
Thank you for your cooperation