Project Camel Was a Subsidiary Project of the Manhattan Engineer
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u o o o a y 7 0 / This document cona^f^of _pase 3 Copy So. vJ?__o^|?frS erie 5; __ _______ REDACTED COPY BOOK VIII, VOLUI2E 5 CHAPTER 2 r_t^ * IF.10AT,0N CAKCeUrEO MABB&TTA1 DISTRICT HISTORY f ~ f o PROJECT G&iEI, .............. °A T r.r/jjj3 r /REST iT'A iTfils document Restricted Data as defined In the Energy Act of 1954. Its dlssem disclosure to a n y vn&uthorlzed ,prolilbltod. I0M BUS A c t 1948 Spe«^io R^irietad Dut.o ^Tarehce Pequxved iU c n i i AL <£or3oze?iQf£f Project Camel was a subsidiary project of the Manhattan Engineer District, It was financed through an GSRD contract with the California Institute of Technology* The California Institute m m already engaged in similar tsar emergency development work in cooperation with the ifavy. This Chapter presents a general description of the scope of Project Camel* The work, carried out under great pressure, was subject to general coordination between Dr* Oppenhelaer of Los Labora tories and Dr. Lauritson of GST# This close personal relation assured security, unity of research effort and integration with the Los Alamos objective, A great deal of the effort expended under froject Caasi m s insurance against accident, Jfer failure, of similar work highly central ized at Los Alamos, la addition# hosever, there neve assigned to Fro* jeet Camel several research, development and testing problems in sup* part of the "satin line* work at Los Alaaos* Hot the least contribution of the Caesl Project m s in procure- aent# where the engineering ability of its staff, t«@ether with contacts in the industrial production field in the southern California area, sere of tremendous importance to the success of tbs final product* This chapter covers the history of Project Camel from its inception to the termination and transfer of its activities after the cessation of hostilities, as described in Section S* FI TABLS OF CONTENTS fer« 93 * , Page 80 * yonswD-ap pi SSCTIQg 1 - IH?RODUCTIOH 1*1# General 2*1 1-2* Purpose of the History- 2*1 1-5* Evanta Leading to tho Organization of Projeet Camel 2.2 SBCTIOB a - OROASIZATIOH OF gag PgQJSCt 2-1* General 8*5 2-2* Initiation of the Work 2*9 2-5* Soope of the Work 2,9 2-4* CIS Organization 2*10 2-5* Statement of the Problem 2*15 SSCTIQB 5 * PEmOPMESt OF BJEPLQSm QQMPQMBT3 5-1* General 2*17 5-2* Detonator# 2*17 5*3* &>We 2*20 5-i»* Contact Fuse* 2*22 SECl?108 it - PB7BI/)PMSHT OF I&TAL CQMPQKBffT3 4*1* General 2*24 i*-2* Pumpkin a 2*24 Par* Ho# Page Ho* lt-3- Tail* 2*25 k*h* Spheres 2.26 hm5* Pits 2*27 i^“6« Kilip«old3 £*2s U*7<* Electronic Fuses 2*20 li-S* Firing Systea* 2.29 k~9* Handling Equipment 2*32' SECTION 5 - FLIGHT A ® STATIC TESTS 5*2.* General 2*35 5*2- Types of Testa 2*55 5*5* A Typical Test ' 2*36 5*4» Deli vary 2*57 5-5* Construction of Test Facilities 2*3? 5-6* Scab Assembly Buildings 2.3a 5-7. Change in Organisation 2*39 5-8* Telemetering 2*39 5-9* Photography 2*39 SECTION 6 * PRODUCTION AND PHQCUREJEHT SaCTIOW 7 - DSVELQPfiiaiT OF HIGH EXPLOSIVE PROOPCTICW m m M m . - s m .ima.. m m 7-1. , General 2.44 7-2. Site 2.44 7-3* Typo of Construction 2.45 7-4» Construction Schedule 2.46 ,.<7-5* Responsibility and Organization 2.46 7-6. Priorities 2.49 7*7* Chang© to Lena Castings <* Increeent 3 2.59 7*8. Jnerecent 2 2.51 7-9* lncre»ent 4 2.52 7-10. Trial Operation 2*53 7-11* Pressing Hon-Lens Blocks 2,53 SECTICK a - YgBMHMyiCW ASP...TOMBaEajg JMKfc..AaEgXEBB 8-1* General 2.54 3-2* Decision to Terminate 2.55 3-3. Transfer of Peraoawol 2*56 8-4. Coapletion of Construction 2*56 8-5. Transfer of Techniques 2.56 8-6* Disposition of Records and Materials 2.57 General 2 . 5 9 JfoEsJbu IszslMs . 9-2* Housing 2.59 9-3. Contracts 2.39 9-4* Cost 2.60 9-5* Constraction at Pasadena 2.60 ssctxgn io - s m m m 10-1. General 2.62 10-2, Joint Responsibility of MED, the Navy and Gif 2,62 10-3. CoopartBentalisafcian 2.62 10-4* Personnel Investigations 2.62 10-5. Pasadena Branch Gfflee 2.63 10-6* Agents at HC3ES, Inyokern 2,63 20-7. Assignment of Personnel 2,64. 3 J 0 - S ...... Limitation of Naval Responsibility 2.64 10-9. Concealment of Infonmticm 2.64 APPEIffilCES A. Photographs and Drawing B* Documents i located in the to# Angeles*&fea was on# of the most discoure.ging factor# in keeping abreast of the difficult schedule# and v»a resulting in lo#« of irreplaoable time# c. In order not to place too much information in the hand# of any on# individual or firm, a practice had been instituted of distributing order# for the simplest possible component# among a# many manufacturer# a# were able to produce the item# in the time required* the manufacture1 e problem was on# then of adapting hi# personnel and equipment to the comparatively mall seal# production# to very exacting specifications, of 1tarns requiring unusual technique# and material#. Solution# of the problem# which naturally ares# were difficult to obtain in a short tim#, since they were relayed from the Lo# Angeles procure* ment office to Site Y, and back again* Further, * small change from the drawing or specification which wa# not apparent or appeared unimportant to the manufacturer could not b# discovered until the order "*# received and tested at to# Alamo## X# discover errors, advise the manufacturer of necessary changes and agree on method# by which corrections might be effeoted were time consuming operations which were eliminating all possibility of adherence to schedules* d. Xt also wa# apparent that there were other phase# of the work on which the La* Alamo# laboratory would need assistance* These fact# were recognised by the University of California and were var made known to fir # Vann cover Bush, Chairman, OSRD. e. Previous to this time, the California Institute of Technology under Contract OJBMsr 1+16 with the OSRD had independently carried the develojasent of rookets to a point where the Savy had taken an active Interest in their use* Pending the construction of large production facilities by the Navy, OIT had been induced to undertake the experimental production of rockets as a part of its contract* For this purpose, the Havy had transferred large amounts of money to the OSED, as a result of whioh CIS had developed extensive facilities for the procure ment, production and inspection of metal and explosive rocket components* Since the peak of Clf*e program had been reached by the fall of lyUkt end the Kavy’s facilities were being put into operation, It was apparent that the Cl* rocket organization and facilities could be cf tremendous assistance to the Quiver si ty of California in the development and pro* cureaent of specialised equipment and fabricated parts required for the atomic bomb* It was also apparent that this organisation, because of its experience with explosives end related fields In rocket development, was la a position to provide a great deal of “know haw" in the solution of problems with whioh the &os Alamos laboratory was faced* SSCTIGH 2 * ORGAHlZATIOH 0? "PROJECT CAMED" 2-1• general* a. At the suggestion of Dr* Bash, Or* a* 0* Lauritsen, Director of Research for Contract OEHsr 2*18, was invited to visit !*>• Alamos In November l$t& to discuss the problems with whloh Site If was confronted* As a result of this visit* Dr* Qppeaheimer outlined ia a letter to Dr* Bush, on Sovember 21, 19M m the extent and manner in whioh the collaboration of Clt could be utilised and requested that necessary arrangements be effected toward that end (Appendix JML)* b* To Admiral W* S* Parsons# USS, on special assignment by the Havy to the MBD# and In charge of the Ordnance Division at Los Alamos, fell the task of obtaining the agreement of the parties concern ed* the feraation* by OSRD* of a special committee under &DEG composed of Br* J* B* Coaaat# Chairaan, Dr* t* b* Sbyae and Mr* ifrrtley Hows*; had resulted ia the transfer of 11,000,000 to contract QEMsr i<18 for initia tion of work on a "special War Department project1* (Appendix B-2), there was an immediate reaction* however# by the Bureau of Ordnance of the Bfevy Department, upon receipt of Inform tlonfrom CIT that it pro posed to undertake work on another project of considerable magnitude* the tfavy was greatly concerned over the potential effect of the special project on its program for rocket development and production* i*hereas the . DSHD and CIT had been committed to a reduction la the program of rocket production as Kavy facilities became available, there remained problame connected with the improvement of rocket performance, and develo|aaeat of new types# which the lavy felt required the continued aotiva partici pation of top CIS personnel* The matter m s resolved in a series of discussions by Admiral Parsons with Admiral Hussey, Chief of tha Bureau of Ordnance, and other* In the Navy Department, and, at a con ference on 30 December 19^ 4. in Pasadena, California, reported la a letter from Dr* F» L* Efcvde, Chief of EH.vision 3, I?I®C,to Dr.