14. Building the Atomic Bomb: the Manhattan Project Fdr4freedoms 2
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
{PDF EPUB} the Manhattan Projects Vol. 5 the Cold War by Jonathan Hickman the Irreverence of the MANHATTAN PROJECTS
Read Ebook {PDF EPUB} The Manhattan Projects Vol. 5 The Cold War by Jonathan Hickman The Irreverence of THE MANHATTAN PROJECTS. Jonathan Hickman’s and Nick Pitarra’s THE MANHATTAN PROJECTS (2012-2015) depicts national heroes American, German, and Russian alike as violent and self-absorbed madmen. It elevates to superhuman levels the genius attributed to some of them, and deepens to subhuman levels the depravity we naturally suspect prodigious men of flirting with. Whenever we ask the question, “How can Franklin Delano Roosevelt, or Joseph Robert Oppenheimer, or SS Major Wernher Magnus Maximilian, Herr Baron von Braun, PhD., have accomplished so much in a single lifetime?” one of the answers we unconsciously consider is that they were unhinged, power-mad, driven by forces most of us never feel. If they slept less, thought more, worked longer hours, and pushed their ideas through opposition with more commitment than the rest of us, then did their private passions and their consciences also behave differently from those of your everyday mere mortal? THE MANHATTAN PROJECTS’ cast includes four Presidents of the United States—FDR, Harry S. Truman, JFK, and LBJ—two US Army generals— Leslie Groves and William Westmoreland —four famous scientists from one-time facist European states—Albert Einstein, Enrico Fermi, Wernher von Braun, and Helmutt Gröttrup — three famous American physicists—J. Robert Oppenheimer, Richard Feynman, and Harry Daghlian —one Defense Minister of the USSR and one of its eventual Premiers— Dmitriy Ustinov and Leonid Brezhnev—and two of the earliest cosmonauts—Yuri Gagarin and Laika , a dog. But it is not history. -
The Making of an Atomic Bomb
(Image: Courtesy of United States Government, public domain.) INTRODUCTORY ESSAY "DESTROYER OF WORLDS": THE MAKING OF AN ATOMIC BOMB At 5:29 a.m. (MST), the world’s first atomic bomb detonated in the New Mexican desert, releasing a level of destructive power unknown in the existence of humanity. Emitting as much energy as 21,000 tons of TNT and creating a fireball that measured roughly 2,000 feet in diameter, the first successful test of an atomic bomb, known as the Trinity Test, forever changed the history of the world. The road to Trinity may have begun before the start of World War II, but the war brought the creation of atomic weaponry to fruition. The harnessing of atomic energy may have come as a result of World War II, but it also helped bring the conflict to an end. How did humanity come to construct and wield such a devastating weapon? 1 | THE MANHATTAN PROJECT Models of Fat Man and Little Boy on display at the Bradbury Science Museum. (Image: Courtesy of Los Alamos National Laboratory.) WE WAITED UNTIL THE BLAST HAD PASSED, WALKED OUT OF THE SHELTER AND THEN IT WAS ENTIRELY SOLEMN. WE KNEW THE WORLD WOULD NOT BE THE SAME. A FEW PEOPLE LAUGHED, A FEW PEOPLE CRIED. MOST PEOPLE WERE SILENT. J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER EARLY NUCLEAR RESEARCH GERMAN DISCOVERY OF FISSION Achieving the monumental goal of splitting the nucleus The 1930s saw further development in the field. Hungarian- of an atom, known as nuclear fission, came through the German physicist Leo Szilard conceived the possibility of self- development of scientific discoveries that stretched over several sustaining nuclear fission reactions, or a nuclear chain reaction, centuries. -
Chapter 4. CLASSIFICATION UNDER the ATOMIC ENERGY
Chapter 4 CLASSIFICATION UNDER THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT INTRODUCTION The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 was the first and, other than its successor, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, to date the only U.S. statute to establish a program to restrict the dissemination of information. This Act transferred control of all aspects of atomic (nuclear) energy from the Army, which had managed the government’s World War II Manhattan Project to produce atomic bombs, to a five-member civilian Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). These new types of bombs, of awesome power, had been developed under stringent secrecy and security conditions. Congress, in enacting the 1946 Atomic Energy Act, continued the Manhattan Project’s comprehensive, rigid controls on U.S. information about atomic bombs and other aspects of atomic energy. That Atomic Energy Act designated the atomic energy information to be protected as “Restricted Data” and defined that data. Two types of atomic energy information were defined by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Restricted Data (RD) and a type that was subsequently termed Formerly Restricted Data (FRD). Before discussing further the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 and its unique requirements for controlling atomic energy information, some of the special information-control activities that accompanied the research, development, and production efforts that led to the first atomic bomb will be mentioned. Realization that an atomic bomb was possible had a profound impact on the scientists who first became aware of that possibility. The implications of such a weapon were so tremendous that the U.S. scientists conducting the initial, basic research related to nuclear fission voluntarily restricted the publication of their scientific work in this area. -
The Manhattan Project and Its Legacy
Transforming the Relationship between Science and Society: The Manhattan Project and Its Legacy Report on the workshop funded by the National Science Foundation held on February 14 and 15, 2013 in Washington, DC Table of Contents Executive Summary iii Introduction 1 The Workshop 2 Two Motifs 4 Core Session Discussions 6 Scientific Responsibility 6 The Culture of Secrecy and the National Security State 9 The Decision to Drop the Bomb 13 Aftermath 15 Next Steps 18 Conclusion 21 Appendix: Participant List and Biographies 22 Copyright © 2013 by the Atomic Heritage Foundation. All rights reserved. No part of this book, either text or illustration, may be reproduced or transmit- ted in any form by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, reporting, or by any information storage or retrieval system without written persmission from the publisher. Report prepared by Carla Borden. Design and layout by Alexandra Levy. Executive Summary The story of the Manhattan Project—the effort to develop and build the first atomic bomb—is epic, and it continues to unfold. The decision by the United States to use the bomb against Japan in August 1945 to end World War II is still being mythologized, argued, dissected, and researched. The moral responsibility of scientists, then and now, also has remained a live issue. Secrecy and security practices deemed necessary for the Manhattan Project have spread through the govern- ment, sometimes conflicting with notions of democracy. From the Manhattan Project, the scientific enterprise has grown enormously, to include research into the human genome, for example, and what became the Internet. Nuclear power plants provide needed electricity yet are controversial for many people. -
Potsdam Declaration from Lisa Bastien
TEACHING AMERICAN HISTORY PROJECT Lesson Title - Potsdam Declaration From Lisa Bastien Grade: 9-12 Length of class period: 86 minute block period Inquiry: (What essential question are students answering, what problem are they solving, or what decision are they making?) Why would the terms of the Potsdam Declaration deter the Japanese from giving an unconditional surrender? Objectives: (What content and skills do you expect students to learn from this lesson?) Students will be able to: • explain the events leading up to the dropping of the atomic bombs • provide examples as to why Japan refused to except the unconditional surrender presented to them prior to the use of the atomic bombs Students will: • analyze a primary source to use as support in response to a given question Materials: (What primary sources or local resources are the basis for this lesson?) Potsdam Declaration (see attached) Activities: (What will you and your students do during the lesson to promote learning?) • Start class by doing a class lecture/discussion on the war in the Pacific (WWII) including specifics on: the Philippines, the battle of Midway, Island Hopping, Guadalcanal, Kamikazes, Iwo Jima, Okinawa and ultimately the Manhattan Project. • Ask the class "what are some ways the US could have warned the Japanese of the nuclear bomb and/or it’s affects without dropping it on a city?" (students may make many suggestions including staging a demonstration so that Japan could understand what the bomb was capable of doing.) • Discuss with the students that staging a demonstration was a consideration that was made. Have them analyze through discussion why it was decided against. -
A New Effort to Achieve World
Marshall and the Atomic Bomb Marshall and the Atomic Bomb By Frank Settle General George C. Marshall and the Atomic Bomb (Praeger, 2016) provides the first full narrative describing General Marshall’s crucial role in the first decade of nuclear weapons that included the Manhattan Project, the use of the atomic bomb on Japan, and their management during the early years of the Cold War. Marshall is best known today as the architect of the plan for Europe’s recovery in the aftermath of World War II—the Marshall Plan. He also earned acclaim as the master strategist of the Allied victory in World War II. Marshall mobilized and equipped the Army and Air Force under a single command, serving as the primary conduit for information between the Army and the Air Force, as well as the president and secretary of war. As Army Chief of Staff during World War II, he developed a close working relationship with Admiral Earnest King, Chief of Naval Operations; worked with Congress and leaders of industry on funding and producing resources for the war; and developed and implemented the successful strategy the Allies pursued in fighting the war. Last but not least of his responsibilities was the production of the atomic bomb. The Beginnings An early morning phone call to General Marshall and a letter to President Franklin Roosevelt led to Marshall’s little known, nonetheless critical, role in the development and use of the atomic bomb. The call, received at 3:00 a.m. on September 1, 1939, informed Marshall that German dive bombers had attacked Warsaw. -
The Development of Military Nuclear Strategy And
The Development of Military Nuclear Strategy and Anglo-American Relations, 1939 – 1958 Submitted by: Geoffrey Charles Mallett Skinner to the University of Exeter as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History, July 2018 This thesis is available for Library use on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgement. I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been identified and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for the award of a degree by this or any other University. (Signature) ……………………………………………………………………………… 1 Abstract There was no special governmental partnership between Britain and America during the Second World War in atomic affairs. A recalibration is required that updates and amends the existing historiography in this respect. The wartime atomic relations of those countries were cooperative at the level of science and resources, but rarely that of the state. As soon as it became apparent that fission weaponry would be the main basis of future military power, America decided to gain exclusive control over the weapon. Britain could not replicate American resources and no assistance was offered to it by its conventional ally. America then created its own, closed, nuclear system and well before the 1946 Atomic Energy Act, the event which is typically seen by historians as the explanation of the fracturing of wartime atomic relations. Immediately after 1945 there was insufficient systemic force to create change in the consistent American policy of atomic monopoly. As fusion bombs introduced a new magnitude of risk, and as the nuclear world expanded and deepened, the systemic pressures grew. -
Manchuria Documents to Examine
Source 1 Source Information: The Legacy of the Soviet Union Offensives of August 1945 https://amti.csis.org/the-legacy-of-the-soviet-offensives-of-august-1945/ ____________________________________________________________________________ THE LEGACY OF THE SOVIET OFFENSIVES OF AUGUST 1945 BY JEFF MANKOFF | AUGUST 13, 2015 JAPAN, RUSSIA, UNITED STATES The Second World War was an unparalleled calamity for the Soviet Union. As many as 27 million Soviet soldiers and civilians died as a result of the conflict that started with the German invasion of Poland in September 1939 and ended with the Japanese surrender in August 1945. Consumed by this existential struggle along its western border, the Soviet Union was a comparatively minor factor in the Pacific War until the very end. Yet Moscow’s timely intervention in the war against Japan allowed it to expand its influence along the Pacific Rim. With the breakdown of Allied unity soon heralding the onset of the Cold War, Soviet gains in Asia also left a legacy of division and confrontation, some of which endure into the present. By the 1930s, Stalin’s Soviet Union and Imperial Japan both viewed themselves as rising powers with ambitions to extend their territorial holdings. In addition to a strategic rivalry dating back to the 19th century, they now nursed an ideological enmity born of the Bolshevik Revolution and the ultraconservative military’s growing hold on Japanese politics. In 1935, Japan signed the AntiComintern Pact with Hitler’s Germany, laying the foundation for the creation of the Axis (Fascist Italy would join the following year). The two militaries engaged in a series of skirmishes along the frontier between Soviet Siberia and Japanese-occupied Manchuria (Manchukuo) during the late 1930s. -
Primary Source Document with Questions (Dbqs) the POTSDAM DECLARATION (JULY 26, 1945) Introduction the Dropping of the Atomic Bo
Primary Source Document with Questions (DBQs) THE POTSDAM DECLARATION (JULY 26, 1945) Introduction The dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki remains among the most controversial events in modern history. Historians have actively debated whether the bombings were necessary, what effect they had on bringing the war in the Pacific to an expeditious end, and what other options were available to the United States. These very same questions were also contentious at the time, as American policymakers struggled with how to use a phenomenally powerful new technology and what the long-term impact of atomic weaponry might be, not just on the Japanese, but on domestic politics, America’s international relations, and the budding Cold War with the Soviet Union. In retrospect, it is clear that the reasons for dropping the atomic bombs on Japan, just like the later impact of nuclear technology on world politics, were complex and intertwined with a variety of issues that went far beyond the simple goal of bringing World War II to a rapid close. The Potsdam Declaration was issued on July 26, 1945 by U.S. President Harry Truman, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and President Chiang Kai-shek of the Republic of China, who were meeting in Potsdam, Germany to consider war strategy and post-war policy. Soviet leader Joseph Stalin also attended the Potsdam Conference but did not sign the Declaration, since the Soviet Union did not enter the war against Japan until August 8, 1945. Document Excerpts with Questions From Japan’s Decision to Surrender, by Robert J.C. -
The Atomic Bombs and the Soviet Invasion: What Drove Japan's Decision to Surrender?
Volume 5 | Issue 8 | Article ID 2501 | Aug 01, 2007 The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus The Atomic Bombs and the Soviet Invasion: What Drove Japan's Decision to Surrender? Tsuyoshi Hasegawa The Atomic Bombs and the SovietFrank, have recently confronted this issue Invasion: What Drove Japan’s Decision to head-on, arguing that the atomic bombing of Surrender? Hiroshima had a more decisive effect on Japan’s decision to surrender than did Soviet Tsuyoshi HASEGAWA entry into the war.[4] This essay challenges that view. It argues that (1) the atomic Almost immediately following the end of World bombing of Nagasaki did not have much effect War II, Americans began to question the use of on Japan’s decision; (2) of the two factors—the the atomic bomb and the circumstances atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Soviet entry surrounding the end of the Pacific War. More into the war—the Soviet invasion had a more than half a century later, books and articles on important effect on Japan’s decision to the atomic bomb still provoke storms of debate surrender; (3) nevertheless, neither the atomic among readers and the use of atomic weapons bombs nor Soviet entry into the war served as remains a sharply contested subject.[1] As the “a knock-out punch” that had a direct, decisive, 1995 controversy over the Enola Gay exhibit at and immediate effect on Japan’s decision to the Smithsonian’s National Air and Space surrender; (4) the most important, immediate Museum revealed, the issues connected with cause behind Japan’s decision to surrender the dropping of the bombs on Hiroshima and were the emperor’s “sacred decision” to do so, Nagasaki continue to touch a sensitive nerve in engineered by a small group of the Japanese Americans. -
Nuclear Weapons Technology 101 for Policy Wonks Bruce T
NUCLEAR WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY FOR POLICY WONKS NUCLEAR WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY 101 FOR POLICY WONKS BRUCE T. GOODWIN BRUCE T. GOODWIN BRUCE T. Center for Global Security Research Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory August 2021 NUCLEAR WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY 101 FOR POLICY WONKS BRUCE T. GOODWIN Center for Global Security Research Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory August 2021 NUCLEAR WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY 101 FOR POLICY WONKS | 1 This work was performed under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in part under Contract W-7405-Eng-48 and in part under Contract DE-AC52-07NA27344. The views and opinions of the author expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States government or Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC. ISBN-978-1-952565-11-3 LCCN-2021907474 LLNL-MI-823628 TID-61681 2 | BRUCE T. GOODWIN Table of Contents About the Author. 2 Introduction . .3 The Revolution in Physics That Led to the Bomb . 4 The Nuclear Arms Race Begins. 6 Fission and Fusion are "Natural" Processes . 7 The Basics of the Operation of Nuclear Explosives. 8 The Atom . .9 Isotopes . .9 Half-life . 10 Fission . 10 Chain Reaction . 11 Critical Mass . 11 Fusion . 14 Types of Nuclear Weapons . 16 Finally, How Nuclear Weapons Work . 19 Fission Explosives . 19 Fusion Explosives . 22 Staged Thermonuclear Explosives: the H-bomb . 23 The Modern, Miniature Hydrogen Bomb . 25 Intrinsically Safe Nuclear Weapons . 32 Underground Testing . 35 The End of Nuclear Testing and the Advent of Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship . 39 Stockpile Stewardship Today . 41 Appendix 1: The Nuclear Weapons Complex . -
Historic Barriers to Anglo-American Nuclear Cooperation
3 HISTORIC BARRIERS TO ANGLO- AMERICAN NUCLEAR COOPERATION ANDREW BROWN Despite being the closest of allies, with shared values and language, at- tempts by the United Kingdom and the United States to reach accords on nuclear matters generated distrust and resentment but no durable arrangements until the Mutual Defense Agreement of 1958. There were times when the perceived national interests of the two countries were unsynchronized or at odds; periods when political leaders did not see eye to eye or made secret agreements that remained just that; and when espionage, propaganda, and public opinion caused addi- tional tensions. STATUS IMBALANCE The Magna Carta of the nuclear age is the two-part Frisch-Peierls mem- orandum. It was produced by two European émigrés, Otto Frisch and Rudolf Peierls, at Birmingham University in the spring of 1940. Un- like Einstein’s famous letter to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, with its vague warning that a powerful new bomb might be constructed from uranium, the Frisch-Peierls memorandum set out detailed technical arguments leading to the conclusion that “a moderate amount of U-235 [highly enriched uranium] would indeed constitute an extremely effi- cient explosive.” Like Einstein, Frisch and Peierls were worried that the Germans might already be working toward an atomic bomb against which there would be no defense. By suggesting “a counter-threat with a similar bomb,” they first enunciated the concept of mutual deterrence and recommended “start[ing] production as soon as possible, even if 36 Historic Barriers to Anglo-American Nuclear Cooperation 37 it is not intended to use the bomb as a means of attack.”1 Professor Mark Oliphant from Birmingham convinced the UK authorities that “the whole thing must be taken rather seriously,”2 and a small group of senior scientists came together as the Maud Committee.