Volume 5 | Issue 8 | Article ID 2501 | Aug 01, 2007 The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus The Atomic Bombs and the Soviet Invasion: What Drove Japan's Decision to Surrender? Tsuyoshi Hasegawa The Atomic Bombs and the SovietFrank, have recently confronted this issue Invasion: What Drove Japan’s Decision to head-on, arguing that the atomic bombing of Surrender? Hiroshima had a more decisive effect on Japan’s decision to surrender than did Soviet Tsuyoshi HASEGAWA entry into the war.[4] This essay challenges that view. It argues that (1) the atomic Almost immediately following the end of World bombing of Nagasaki did not have much effect War II, Americans began to question the use of on Japan’s decision; (2) of the two factors—the the atomic bomb and the circumstances atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Soviet entry surrounding the end of the Pacific War. More into the war—the Soviet invasion had a more than half a century later, books and articles on important effect on Japan’s decision to the atomic bomb still provoke storms of debate surrender; (3) nevertheless, neither the atomic among readers and the use of atomic weapons bombs nor Soviet entry into the war served as remains a sharply contested subject.[1] As the “a knock-out punch” that had a direct, decisive, 1995 controversy over the Enola Gay exhibit at and immediate effect on Japan’s decision to the Smithsonian’s National Air and Space surrender; (4) the most important, immediate Museum revealed, the issues connected with cause behind Japan’s decision to surrender the dropping of the bombs on Hiroshima and were the emperor’s “sacred decision” to do so, Nagasaki continue to touch a sensitive nerve in engineered by a small group of the Japanese Americans. Among scholars, disagreement ruling elite; and (5) that in the calculations of remains no less heated. But, on the whole, this this group, Soviet entry into the war provided a debate has been strangely parochial, centering more powerful motivation than the atomic almost exclusively on how the U.S. leadership bombs to seek the termination of the war by made the decision to drop the bombs. accepting the terms specified in the Potsdam Proclamation. Further, by posing There are two distinct gaps in thiscounterfactual hypotheses, I argue that Soviet historiography. First, with regard to the atomic entry into the war against Japan alone, without bombs, as Asada Sadao in Japan correctly the atomic bombs, might have led to Japan’s observes, American historians havesurrender before November 1, but that the concentrated on the “motives” behind the use atomic bombs alone, without Soviet entry into of atomic bombs, but “they have slighted the the war, would not have accomplished this. effects of the bomb.”[2] Second, although Finally, I argue that had U.S. President Harry historians have been aware of the decisive Truman sought Stalin’s signature on the influence of both the atomic bombs and the Potsdam Proclamation, and had Truman Soviet entry into the war, they have largely included the promise of a constitutional sidestepped the Soviet factor, relegating it to monarchy in the Potsdam Proclamation, as sideshow status.[3] Secretary of War Henry Stimson had originally suggested, the war might have ended sooner, Two historians, Asada Sadao and Richard possibly without the atomic bombs being 1 5 | 8 | 0 APJ | JF dropped on Japan. “Togo extracted from the American statements about the ‘new and revolutionary increase in 1: The Influence of the Hiroshima Bomb on destruct[ive]’ power of the atomic bomb a Japan’s Decision to Surrender reason to accept the Potsdam Proclamation.”[6] In order to discuss the influence of the atomic If these arguments are correct, there was bombs on Japan’s decision to surrender, we indeed a fundamental change of policy, at least must examine three separate issues: (1) the on the part of Togo, if not the entire cabinet, effect of the Hiroshima bomb; (2) the effect of and the Hiroshima bomb had a decisive effect the Nagasaki bomb; and (3) the effect of the on Togo’s thinking, since until then he had two bombs combined. been advocating suing for peace through Let us first examine the effect of the Hiroshima Moscow’s mediation before considering the bomb. In order to prove that the Hiroshima acceptance of the Potsdam Proclamation. In his bomb had a decisive effect on Japan’s decision, memoirs, however, Togo does not portray this Asada and Frank use the following evidence: cabinet meeting as a decisive turning point. (1) the August 7 cabinet meeting; (2) the The following is all he says about the cabinet testimony of Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Kido meeting: “On the afternoon of the 7th, there Koichi concerning the emperor’s statement on was a cabinet meeting. The army minister and August 7; and (3) the emperor’s statement to the home minister read their reports. The army Foreign Minister Togo Shigenori on August 8. appeared to minimize the effect of the bomb, without admitting that it was the atomic bomb, insisting that further investigation was necessary.”[7] The only source that makes a reference to Togo’s insistence on the acceptance of the Potsdam Proclamation was the testimony given by Cabinet Minister Sakomizu Hisatsune under postwar interrogation. Citing Sakomizu’s testimony, Oi Atsushi, who interviewed Togo in preparation for the Tokyo trial, asked him about his alleged proposal to accept the Potsdam terms. Togo replied: “I reported that The atomic bombing of Hiroshima the United States was broadcasting that the atomic bomb would impart a revolutionary The Cabinet Meeting on August 7 change in warfare, and that unless Japan accepted peace it would drop the bombs on According to Asada and Frank, the cabinet other places. The Army… attempted to meeting on August 7 was a crucial turning minimize its effect, saying that they were not point. Asada argues that, judging that “the sure if it was the atomic bomb, and that since it introduction of a new weapon, which had [had] dispatched a delegation, it had to wait for drastically altered the whole military situation, its report.”[8] The picture that emerges from offered the military ample grounds for ending this testimony is that Togo merely reported the the war,” Foreign Minister Togo Shigenori U.S. message. Perhaps he merely conveyed his proposed that “surrender be considered at once preference to consider the Potsdam on the basis of terms presented in the Potsdam Proclamation by reporting Truman’s message. Declaration [Proclamation].”[5] Frank writes: But when met with stiff opposition from Army 2 5 | 8 | 0 APJ | JF Minister Anami Korechika, who dismissed the Hirohito had told him: “Now that things have American atomic bomb message as mere come to this impasse, we must bow to the propaganda, Togo, without a fight, accepted inevitable. No matter what happens to my Anami’s proposal to wait until the delegation safety, we should lose no time in ending the submitted its official findings. According to war so as not to have another tragedy like Sakomizu’s memoirs, Togo first proposed, and this.”[11] Citing Kido’s account as the decisive the cabinet agreed, that Japan should register a evidence, Asada concludes: “The Emperor strong protest through the International Red was… from this time forward Japan’s foremost Cross and the Swiss legation about thepeace advocate, increasingly articulate and American use of the atomic bomb as a serious urgent in expressing his wish for peace.”[12] violation of international law prohibiting Frank, however, does not share Asada’s poisonous gas. Sakomizu further wrote: “There description of the emperor as the “foremost was an argument advocating the quickpeace advocate,” viewing him as wavering at termination of war by accepting the Potsdam times over whether or not Japan should attach Proclamation,” but in view of the Army’s more than one condition to its acceptance of opposition, the cabinet merely decided to send the Potsdam Proclamation.[13] the investigation team to Hiroshima.[9] In other words, neither the cabinet nor Togo himself believed that any change of policy was necessary on the afternoon of August 7, one day after the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, although the majority of the cabinet members had already known that the bomb was most likely an atomic bomb, and furthermore that unless Japan surrendered, many atomic bombs might be dropped on other cities in Japan. In fact, far from entertaining the possibility of accepting the Potsdam terms, the cabinet was blatantly more combative against the United States, deciding to lodge a formal protest against the use of the atomic bomb. What Did the Emperor Say on August 7? The news of the dropping of an atomic bomb on Hiroshima had already been brought to the emperor early in the morning on August 7, but Kido learned of it only at noon. Kido had an unusually long audience with the emperor that lasted from 1:30 to 2:05 in the Imperial Library. Kido’s diary notes: “The emperor Kido Koichi expressed his august view on how to deal with the current situation and asked variousKido’s description of the emperor’s reaction to questions.”[10] But Kido’s diary says nothing the Hiroshima bomb must be taken with a grain about what the emperor’s view was and what of salt. As Hirohito’s closest adviser, Kido questions he asked. Later, Kido recalled that worked assiduously to create the myth that the 3 5 | 8 | 0 APJ | JF emperor had played a decisive role in ending [with the Allied powers, Asada the war.