Air-Raid Protection and Allied Subjects in Kyoto Japan .Pdf

Home , Bombing of Fukuoka, Central Army (Japan), Maizuru

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THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

Field Report

Covering Air-Raid Protection and Allied Subjects in Kyoto, Japan

Civilian Defense Division

February 1947

—

THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

Field Report

Covering Air-Raid Protection

and Allied Subjects in Kyoto, Japan

Civilian Defense Division

Dates of Survey:

4 November 1945 — 9 November 1945

Date of Publication:

February 1947

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0. S. SUPERINTENDENT Of D0UUM£«T8

APR 8 1947

This report was written primarily for the use of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey in the preparation of further reports of a more comprehensive nature. Any conclusions or opinions expressed in this report must be considered as limited to the specific material covered and as subject to further interpretation in the light of further studies conducted by the Survey.

II :

FOREWORD

The United States Strategic Bombing Survey military segment of the organization was drawn was established by the Secretary of War on from the Army to the extent of 60 percent, and 3 November 1944, pursuant to a directive from from the Navy to the extent of 40 percent. Both the late President Roosevelt. Its mission was the Army and the Navy gave the Survey all to conduct an impartial and expert study of the possible assistance in furnishing men, supplies, effects of our aerial attack on Germany to be transport, and information. The Survey oper- used in connection with air attacks on Japan ated from headquarters established in Tokyo and to establish a basis for evaluating the im- early in September 1945, with subheadquarters portance and potentialities of air power as an in Nagoya, Osaka, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki, instrument of military strategy for planning the and with mobile teams operating in other parts future development of the United States armed of Japan, the islands of the Pacific, and the forces and for determining future economic Asiatic mainland. policies with respect to the national defense. A It was possible to reconstruct much of war- summary report and some 200 supporting re- time Japanese military planning and execution, ports containing the findings of the Survey in engagement by engagement, and campaign by Germany have been published. campaign, and to secure reasonably accurate On 15 August 1945, President Truman re- statistics on Japan's economy and war produc- quested that the Survey conduct a similar study tion, plant by plant, and industry by industry. of the effects of all types of air attack in the In addition, studies were conducted on Japan's war against Japan, submitting reports in dupli- over-all strategic plans and the background of cate to the Secretary of War and to the Secre- her entry into the war, the internal discussions tary of the Navy. The officers of the Survey and negotiations leading to her acceptance of during its Japanese phase were unconditional surrender, the course of health and morale among the civilian population, the Franklin D'Olier, Chairman. effectiveness of the Japanese civilian defense Paul H. Nitze, Henry C. Alexander, Vice organization, and the effects of the atomic Chairmen. bombs. Separate reports will be issued cover- Harry L. Bowman, ing each phase of the study. J. Kenneth Galbraith, The Survey interrogated more than 700 Japa- Rensis Likert, nese military, government, and industrial offi- Frank A. McNamee, Jr., cials. It also recovered and translated many Fred Searls, Jr., documents which not only have been useful to Monroe E. Spaght, the Survey, but also will furnish data valuable Dr. Lewis R. Thompson, for other studies. Arrangements have been Theodore P. Wright, Directors. made to turn over the Survey's files to the Cen- Walter Wilds, Secretary. tral Intelligence Group, through which they The Survey's complement provided for 300 will be available for further examination and civilians, 350 officers, and 500 enlisted men. The distribution.

Ill

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Section

Summaries * ^"'"'

I. Introduction 1

II. Special Civilian-Defense Agencies 3

III. Organization and Operation of Japanese Civilian Defense 6

IV. Protection of Factories, Utilities, Installations, and Buildings

Devoted to Public Use... , 36

V. Passive Defense Installations and Precautions 41

VI. Evacuation and Welfare ." 50

VII. Training 58

VIII. Reference Notes 60

IX. Exhibits..... 62

A. List of air-raid attacks in Kyoto prefecture, excluding Mai- zuru, a naval base city north of Kyoto 62

B. Illustration of large municipal siren on tower of Kyoto city hall 63

C. Illustration of Control panels from which the sirens in Kyoto were operated 64

D. Illustration of the improved panel board intended for installation in the siren control room 65

E. Diagram of Kyoto prefectural control center 66

F. List of officials of Kyoto city fire and water departments 67

G. Translation of first-aid regulations, air defense, Kyoto prefecture, 7 July 1945, together with chart showing channels for medical instruction and training 68

H. Chart of guard rescue unit 71

I. Report on air-raid protection inspection of Mitsubishi Air- craft Engine Plant, plus Annexes I-l and 1-2 72

J. Report of air-raid protection inspection of Kyoto Imperial University 78

K. Report on air-raid protection inspection of the Miyako Hotel, Ltd 81

* See paragraphs headed "Comments" at the end of each titled subsection.

V Exhibit Page L. Report on air-raid protection inspection of the Daiken office building 83

M. Report on air-raid protection inspection of the St. Agnes' Epis- copal Church and girls school 85

N. Translation of table of contents and summary of air-raid defense book: Training Orders, Training Notices, and Pre-

fectural Orders Concerning Air Defense ; Kyoto Prefecture Police Department. (Reference Item No. 21) 87

O. Pictures of: (1) Conical-shape black-out street lighting unit; and (2) dome-shaped street lighting reflector unit 89

P. Translation of bill proposed for effecting evacuation of persons, published by Kyoto Prefecture, August, 1945. (Ref- erence Item No. 25).. 91

Q. Translation of section 3, Prefectural Regulations for Wartime Damage Rescue Work, 18 March 1945, abstracted from Kyoto Prefectural publication dated April 1945, Compen- dium of Matters Pertaining to Wartime Damage Protection Law No. 71, Promulgated February 24, 1942. (Reference Item No. 26) 93

R. Translation of questionnaire designed to determine destination of persons seeking other locations. (Reference Item No. 27) 96

S. Translation of compendium of regulations relating to school children group evacuation. Issued by educational section of Kyoto Prefecture, May 1945. (Reference Item No. 28).... 97

T. Translation of : (1) Ration card for sufferers ; and (2) sufferer's certificate. (Reference Item No. 29) 100

U. Guide to wartime damage insurance (original Japanese text and translation) 101

V. Translation of wartime disaster protection law 105

VI :

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Relative importance of Kyoto.—a Kyoto is the cultural center and one of the oldest of the cities of Japan. It was for centuries the capital, the primary metropolitan area, and the seat of the imperial court.

b. History has left a deep imprint on the city; the old imperial palace and grounds still occupy its central area ; extensive and well established temples, libraries, museums, universi- ties, and schools are to be found in larger numbers in Kyoto than in any metropolitan area of comparable size. It is thus the classical city and the recognized cultural center, a position which has been strengthened by the absence of heavy air raids, since it is the only important city in Japan that was not devastated.

c. Kyoto prefecture extends some 74 miles in a northwesterly direction from the city to the Sea of Japan. It is largely mountainous and includes no other cities of importance with the possible exception of Maizuru (population 29,908), a naval base town located on the small coastal plain bordering the Sea of Japan. 2. Area and Population.—The city of Kyoto is 112 square miles in area, in that respect being second only to Tokyo. In population, however, it ranked fourth prior to the air raids, being exceeded by Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya. The population figures for the city and the prefecture from January 1, 1940 to September 1, 1945 are given below

Date 1 factory building completely demol- mass raids on Osaka, Nagoya, and Kobe made ished. heavy demands upon Kyoto in terms of food, 5 factory buildings partially demol- shelter, clothing and transportation for the vic- ished. tims. They also convinced Kyoto officials that air-defense measures which were moderately 5 structures completely demolished effective against small, short raids, would be (military). entirely ineffective against prolonged mass in- 13 structures partially demolished (mili- cendiary raids, since Kyoto was fully as vul-

tary) . nerable to such raids.

b. As compared with any other major Japa- c. As mass air raids on other cities increased, nese city, raids on Kyoto were small and cas- Kyoto officials abandoned many of the air-de- ualties, as well as property damage, were ex- fense measures designed to save property, and tremely light. Kyoto is less than 30 miles concentrated on measures looking toward the from Osaka, however, and is only about 60 saving of lives and providing emergency relief miles from Nagoya and Kobe. Next to Tokyo, to victims. In view of the vulnerability of they were the three largest cities and were Kyoto and the nature of the equipment then among the most completely devastated. The available, that was a logical policy. ;

II. SPECIAL CIVILIAN DEFENSE AGENCIES

Auxiliary Police and Fire Units (Keibodan) fire, guard, and first aid. Early organization

plans provided for a headquarters arm but it 1. Introduction.—Since the organization, op- was later discontinued, and its duties were erations, and equipment of the auxiliary police assumed by the guard arm. and fire units of Kyoto were, for the most part, similar to what was found in Osaka and Kobe, d. The Guard arm (Keibibii).—The guard this report will deal chiefly with the variations arm of the Kyoto auxiliary police and fire units on the Osaka and Kobe units. There were in consisted of approximately 20 members, di- Kyoto 140 auxiliary police and fire units with vided into 2 or 3 squads according to the per- a total membership of 9,700. Because of the sonal preference of the unit leader. The leader small amount of actual damage in Kyoto, the of the guard arm was appointed directly by the equipment and personnel of these units were leader of the unit and he, in turn, chose his leaders. still intact and prepared for any natural calam- squad The members of all 3 squads ity such as fire, flood, or earthquake. One in- were charged with identical duties rather than teresting point developed was that there were each squad being responsible for a specific duty in the rural areas of Kyoto prefecture auxiliary as was the case in Osaka. The duties of the

police and fire units which functioned much the guard arm were as follows : traffic control same as those in the city. These rural units dissemination of air-raid signals; liaison with

police ; were formed from the rural volunteer fire de- and fire stations enforcement of light control guiding of citizens, partments (shobo gumi) which dated back to ; chiefly the aged, antiquity. infirm, and children to shelters ; assisting the police in cordoning ofl^ areas rendered danger- 2. Organizatio7i. a. Membership.—As com- ous by unexploded bombs ; rumor control ; ob- pared with the set membership of 197 in each of servation of enemy aircraft and fires occurring the Osaka auxiliary police and fire units, and

in their area ; and debris clearance. The equip- with the 250 to 300 in the Kobe units, the mini- ment of this arm consisted of tools, such as mum figure of 50 for Kyoto seemed at first shovels, mauls, rope, and picks, which were glance insufficient, but as will be seen in the necessary in the execution of the above-men- table of organization, the Kyoto units operated tioned functions. as a smaller, more closely knit organization. e. Fire arm. (Shobobu). The fire arm con- As in other cities, membership was on a purely — sisted of approximately 20 members, and was honorary basis, officers and members receiving usually divided into squads according to the no salary. A compensation act, however, pro- number of motorized pumps available ; in most vided for members who were injured in the cases, 2. The leader was chosen in the performance of duty. same manner as the leader of the guard arm, and he, b. Area. in Osaka, —As the area of an auxil- in turn, chose his own squad leaders. The iary police and fire unit was coterminous with duties of this arm were exclusively fire-fighting. that of a federated block association {rengo A full account of its training and equipment choked) It . had its headquarters in a grammar will be found in the report on "Fire Services." school, each grammar school district being con- f. The emergency first-aid arm (Kyogo- sidered the area of a single unit. bu).—This arm consisted of a squad of approxi- c. Table of organization.—Although there mately 10 men. The leader was chosen by the was no set table of organization for the Kyoto leader of the unit as was an assistant leader auxiliary police and fire units such as there was who would take over the leadership of a part in Osaka, the numbers of members varied from of the personnel in case it was found necessary 50 to 100, and consisted of a leader who was to split into two groups. Besides first aid, this selected by the local police chief and recom- arm was also held responsible for gas protec- mended to the governor of the prefecture for tion, and, although some gas masks and decon- appointment for a term of 2 years; 1 or 2 as- taminating powder were available, investiga- sistant leaders, recommended by the leader and tions showed that training and equipment were appointed in the same manner ; and three arms : extremely rudimentary. The first-aid arm 713045—47- usually set up a station at the headquarters ers of the damage infiicted upon the neighbor- of the auxiliary police and fire unit and either ing cities of Kobe and Osaka, but at that date brought in casualties or had casualties brought little could be done in the way of increasing in by lower echelons such as the neighborhood personnel or in obtaining additional equipment. group and block association. After giving ele- Neighborhood Group (Tonari Gumi), Block casualties, this mentary first aid to arm super- Association (Chokai), and Federated Block vised their transfer to higher echelons of medi- Association (Rengo Chokai) cal treatment. The equipment vi^as mostly Neighborhood Group (Tonari Gumi) medicine, bandages, tourniquets, and stretchers, complete. and was fairly 1. Orgayiization.—Before the heavy air raids 3. Overations. a. General operations.—At of 1945 the neighborhood groups were lacka- times when an incident got beyond the control daisical in their air-raid interest, but the heavy of the fire-fighting section of the block associa- raids on the Japanese mainland impressed them tion, a call was made on the auxiliary police and with the seriousness of their air-raid functions fire units for assistance. This assistance was and aroused greater interest and activity. dispatched on the order of the leader of the Their first efforts emphasized fire-fighting du- unit. At the same time, in most cases, assist- ties, but the dropping of high explosive bombs ance would be dispatched from the regular po- developed the need for planning and prepara- lice and fire services, and in that event the tion for rescue as well. In Kyoto the neighbor- equipment and personnel of the auxiliary police hood groups were generally smaller than those and fire unit was considered at the disposal of in Osaka and Kobe, there being 5 to 10 families the regular services. It should be remembered in the group, depending upon the convenience that raids on Kyoto were infrequent and com- of liaison among the families in the areas in- paratively light and at no time were the prefec- volved. Regular meetings were held once a tural police and and fire services ever short- month and special meetings were called by the handed. Consequently, there were few, if any, leader at such time as he deemed necessary. instances where the auxiliary police and fire No regular dues were paid by the members. units acted under their own command at an 2. Leader.—The leader generally was se- air-raid incident. lected by the vote of the group, as in Osaka and b. Reporting of incidents.—All block asso- Kobe, each household voting as one unit. In ciations were required to report any incident some instances, however, the leader was ap- occurring in their areas during an air raid to pointed by the leader of the block association the headquarters of the auxiliary police and fire and, in other cases, by the members of the block unit which held jurisdiction over their areas. association, who were themselves leaders of the This was accomplished by the fastest available neighborhood groups. In any event, the fami- means of communication, usually by telephone. lies in the neighborhood group determined in The unit thereupon reported such incident with- what manner their leader would be chosen. out delay to the regular police and fire stations The leader was elected for a term of 1 year and with which constant liaison was maintained received no salary. The specifically selected during a raid. air-raid defense leader of the neighborhood group did not lead the group in fire-fighting 4. Com.me7its.—Since Kyoto did not suffer air raid, those duties be- raids of saturation proportions, it was possible operations during an here to investigate and evaluate auxiliary po- ing the responsibility of the leader. The air- lice and fire units in a comparatively intact defense leader operated as a member of the status. These units functioned satisfactorily block association under the guidance of the air- in the raids, but it was evident again that defense leader (boku kakaricho) of that asso- neither their organization nor equipment was ciation, discussed below. designed for anything more than an auxiliary 3. Functions.—Inasmuch as the usual fire- service under light raid conditions. The limi- fighting duties and equipment of the neighbor- tation of the services of these units in raids of hood group were the responsibility of the block saturation proportions was brought home to association, the only air-raid duties of the group local officials upon receiving reports of observ- were the dissemination of air-raid signals and the guiding of members to shelter, especially Federated Block Association the children, the aged and infirm. Group lead- (Rengo Chokai—Here Called Chonai Rengokai) ers were assembled by the block association for air-raid instruction which was passed on to the 5. Organization and operation.—There members of the group. were 143 federated block associations in the city of Kyoto, 1 for each school district, com- Block Association (Chokai—Here Called posed of the leaders of 20 to 30 block associa- Chonaikai) tions. The leader of each, usually not a member, was elected by the members for a term of 4. Organization and operation.—Representa- 2 years. His duties were chiefly liaison be- tives, not necessarily the leaders, of 7 to 10 tween the city and prefectural governments neighborhood groups formed a block associa- and the block associations under his jurisdiction. chief variation, from the standpoint The tion, and general supervision of all functions of civilian-defense duties, between the block as- including air-raid activities. Organization of association was charged with air-raid defense this association included a defense section Osaka and Kobe wa^ the fact that here the (hogohu) which was responsible for supplying association was charged with air-raid-defense the two-man hand pumps and other air-raid duties under the leadership of an air-raid de- equipment to the block associations but no such fense leader (boku kakaricho) who was desig- equipment was maintained by this section for nated by the leader of the block association and emergency use. During the period of air raids who was trained in air-raid defense duties by it was charged with the dissemination of air- the air-raid defense leader of the federated raid signals and with the coordination and supervision of the air-raid activities of the block association (rengo chokai) . This leader association over it jurisdic- and his assistant were responsible for the super- block which had tion. The leader of this section was chosen by vision of all air-raid duties in the area of the all the members, with the concurrence of the association and with the actual operation of the leader, for a term of 2 years. hand pumps with which the association was 6. Comments.—The opportunity afforded at equipped by the prefectural government. In this target to study neighborhood groups un- view of the assignment of fire-fighting duties affected by major air raids, confirmed the re- to this association, it became the next higher sults of previous investigation to the effect echelon of air-raid defense above the individual that the type of aerial warfare waged by the the households, replacing neighborhood group United States against Japan was totally un- which held this position in the cities previously expected by the people, and, had Kyoto been investigated. The duties and functions of this hit by large-scale raids, the effectiveness of the association, other than air-raid defense, were neighborhood groups would have been essen- similar to those of like associations in Osaka tially the same. The groups were active and and Kobe, i.e., ceremonies, rations, collection of performed creditable duties in the light raids taxes, and savings. suffered by this city. III. ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF JAPANESE CIVILIAN DEFENSE

Air-Raid Warning b. The Maizuru Naval Base area.—This base operated its own warning central into 1. Intruduction.—Throughout investigations which channels of information of enemy air- conducted thus far, it has been stated that the craft were focused, and in which decision army was responsible for the detection of enemy the was made to sound warnings in its raiders and for the authorization of air-raid area. Here too, the information obtainable from warnings. Examination at this target revealed Army sources (see Osaka report) received, i. e., a departure from that general statement. In was from radio interception units, early the northern part of Kyoto prefecture in the warning radar stations on Chichi Jima Jima, City of Maizuru was located the important and Haha offshore craft. Army radar stations, civilian Maizuru naval base. Here the Navy assumed observation corps, and naval radar stations. It the job of operating its own warning control would appear that the operation of for the detection of enemy aircraft and the this warning central was a duplication of the operation dissemination of air-raid warnings throughout of that of the Central Maizuru City and the surrounding area. Ref- Army headquarters in Osaka and that it might well, therefore, have erence Item No. 1 is a map of Maizuru City been served from that headquarters. ap- and vicinity on which the area of responsibility An preciation, however, of the geographic vulnera- of the naval base is indicated. This map also bility of this base and of the possible delay in shows the several civilian air-defense observa- the transmission of air information from Mai- tion posts (indicated with red dots) and the zuru to Osaka and in the receipt of authoriza- headquarters (indicated by a dot within a cir- tion from Osaka to sound the warning signals cle) to which those posts reported information considered sufficient justification of enemy flights. Other than this departure was for the in authority to authorize air-raid signals, the establishment of this separate warning cen- organization of the air-raid warning system tral. Information sent from the air-defense in Kyoto followed closely the description of observation posts in the base area to the head- the procedure in Kobe. Inasmuch as the res- quarters of the posts was transmitted simul- ponsibility for detection of enemy aircraft taneously to the base and to the Army head- rested with the Army, no discussion of the quarters in- Osaka. The reports of enemy air several sources of detection is included in this activity picked up by the naval radar stations report. There is submitted, however, a map under the control of this base were sent to the showing the location of air-defense observation Maizuru warning central and from there com- corps posts and headquarters in Kyoto pre- municated to the Army headquarters in Osaka. fecture (Reference Item No. 3). This base operated four offshore picket boats which were not standard naval craft but were Air-Raid Signals independently owned fishing boats, requisi- 2. Authority to sound signals. a. most — tioned by the Navy and manned by Navy crews. of Kyoto prefecture was located in the area in These boats were not equipped with radar or which the Central Army Headquarters was re- listening devices and the information obtained sponsible for the dissemination of air-raid by visual means of detection was radioed to warnings. Direct telephone lines ran from the the shore base. In view of the fact that these Central Army warning headquarters in Osaka boats operated only to a distance of 60 miles to Kyoto prefecture and to the city of Kyoto. offshore, well within the range of coast-based The sirens in the city were sounded from the radar, informants doubted their value, at least office of the secretary of defense in the defense from the standpoint of early detection. This bureau, and the directions to sound raid warn- operation of the ings were disseminated throughout the prefec- headquarters also controlled City. Di- ture, with the exception of the area covered four municipal sirens in Maizuru by the warning control of the Maizuru naval rections for sounding warnings throughout the base, from the defense section of the police area outside the Maizuru City controlled by division of the prefectural government. this base were transmitted by telephone from this warning central to the rural police sta- little damage of equipment was suffered. The tions from which the sirens were activated. operation of its own warning central by the lag in Reference Item No. 4 is a chart of the air-de- Maizuru Naval Base avoided any time fense channels of communication available to transmission of signals there and insured warning to this important installation in the this base. Reference Item No. 5 is a diagram event of disruption of communications be- of the base air-defense-control center. tween this base and the Central Army head- 3. Types of sig7ials.—Announcement of air- quarters. At the time of investigation of this raid signals by sirens, flags, sleeves, bells, and target, a new main control panel for operation lights, having been promulgated from the of- of the municipal siren system was located in fice of the Ministry of Home Affairs, was the the siren room but had not been installed. same in Kyoto prefecture (including the area Officials expressed satisfaction with the opera- covered by the Maizuru naval base) as des- tion of the system as a whole but had planned cribed in the Osaka report on page 24. to install the new board as a more certain 4. Methods of announcing signals, a. Si- means of central control and a more rapid rens.—The sirens within the city of Kyoto were method of telephone communication to individ- sounded from a warning central installed in ual sirens in the event of the disruption of the tower of the municipal building. Refer- central control of any or all of the sirens. ence Item No. 2 is a map of the city of Kyoto Control Centers showing the locations of the 17 large sirens controlled from this central, which were the 1. Introduction.—The investigation of air- same type as those used in Kobe. In addition raid procedure in Kyoto revealed the existence to the large ones, 30 smaller sirens, averaging of two organized control centers from which about V2 horsepower, were individually op- varied air-raid services were dispatched, those erated throughout the city. Exhibit B is an of the auxiliary police and fire unit (keibodan) illustration of one of the large municipal si- and of the prefectural control center (here rens located on top of the municipal building, called sakusen shitsu). There was also a together with a close-up view of the same si- smaller control center, that of the block associa- ren. Exhibits C and D are views of the con- tion (chokai), from which only fire services trol panels by which the 17 sirens in Kyoto were dispatched. were operated. Although these sirens were 2. Operation, a. The Block Association rated to cover an area having a radius of 1% (Chokai).—In the section of this report, en- miles (2 kilometers), in order to compensate titled, "Block Associations," it will be seen that for adverse weather conditions they were in Kyoto, differing from the target cities al- spaced on a conservative calculation of cover- ready examined, the fire-fighting duties of the age of a radius of %o mile (IV2 kilometers). neighborhood group (tonari gumi) were as- On that basis, the adequacy of the coverage signed to the block association. The head- is evident (Reference Item No. 2). In the quarters of this association was alerted during event of disruption of the power lines running raids and was available to receive requests for from the warning central to the large municipal aid. From the viewpoint of the control center sirens, they could be sounded by an individual as generally conceived, this headquarters was switch located at each siren. not completely equipped (it had no operations b. Other methods.—Supplementary and map or equipment check boards), neither did auxiliary means of sounding signals, i. e., bells, it dispatch varied services (fire, police, first flags, sleeves, lights, and cards, were also used. aid). The headquarters housed the hand While the sirens were relied upon primarily, pumps with which these associations were visual means were essential for communicat- equipped, and served as an assembly point of ing the warnings to the deaf, to those persons the personnel during periods of air raid. Be- out of the range of siren coverage, and as an cause of the comparatively small area covered auxiliary means in the event of power failure. by this association, fire equipment was fre- 5. Comments.—Because of the relatively quently dispatched upon reports of its fire minor nature of the raids suffered by Kyoto, watchers even before requests for help were received from leaders of the neighborhood (e) Chief of the public works division.— groups. Supervised the defense and repair of public b. The auxiliary police and fire iDiit (Kei- utilities and roads. bodun).—When bombing incidents grew to pro- (f) Chief of the foodstuff's divisioji.—Di- portions beyond the effective control of the rected the procurement and distribution of householder and the assistance he received from food to air-raid sufferers and the distribution the block association, calls for help were made of food supply in the event of disruption. to the control center of auxiliary police and (g) Chief of the materiel division.—Di- fire unit. This was the first organized control rected the procurement and supply of materiel center in the sequence of air-raid operations other than food. from which varied services were dispatched. (h) Telephone maintenance clerk.—Charg- The supervising personnel of this headquar- ed with the maintenance of communications to ters included the leader, two assistant leaders, and from the control center. and the leaders of the services (fire and first (i) Message clerk.—Charged with the re- aid) which were dispatched from this control ceipt and transmission of information from the center. (A complete discussion of the organi- watch tower on the roof of the prefectural zation of this unit is contained in another sec- building. tion of this report entitled "Auxiliary Police (j) Information clerk.—Concerned with and Fire Units.") As reports of incidents the information received from civilian air-raid were received from lower echelons, they were observation corps headquarters. plotted on an operations map and forwarded (k) Information clerk.—Supervised the immediately to the police and fire stations. In gathering of information received from police addition to the services dispatched from this and fire stations within the prefecture and control center, reinforcements from neighbor- from neighboring prefectures. ing units might also be requested by the leader. (1) Tra)ismission clerk.—Transmitted the c Prefectiiral control center. Personnel.— commands of the air-defense headquarters- In Kyoto, as in the other target cities, the main commander to each police and fire station. control center was well organized and manned (m) Liaison clerk.—Supervised handling by all the officials who might have any emer- of messages to and from each police and fire gency duties during the period of a raid. There station. is attached hereto, as Exhibit E, a diagram (n) Recorder.—Recorded permanently the of the control center showing the personnel information displayed on the operations map present, the seating arrangement, and the or blackboard. equipment used (less communications). The (o) Plotting clerk.—Traced the route of following is a list of the personnel in the control approaching enemy planes. center. (The letters used correspond to the (p) Clerk.—Entered on the blackboard in- letters shown on the chart—Exhibit E.) formation pertaining to incidents. (a) Gover)ior of the prefecture.—The gov- (q) Operations map clerk.—Plotted the dis- ernor was titular head of the control center position of the fire services. and exercised general supervision of all air- (r) Operations map clerk.—Plotted inci- raid-defense activities in the prefecture. dents on operations map and indicated the dis- (b) Air-defense headquarters commander.— position of the guard services. Actual head of all air-defense activities in (s) Operations clerk.—Kept a running in- Kyoto prefecture. ventory of the dispatch and availability of (c) Chief of operations of the conti'ol cen- police and fire forces. There were tabs rep- ter.—Assisted the air-defense headquarters resenting each piece of fire equipment avail- commander and directed the actions of the con- able. As the equipment was dispatched for trol center. service, this man moved the appropriate tab (d) Chief of general affairs division.—In showing dispatch of the service. charge of emergency budgets, handling of air- (t) Message clerk.—Received and recorded raid casualties and homeless, and liaison be- reports of fires and casualties. As informa- tween the several sections. tion was received by this clerk it was written

8 : . on a form which was passed to the air-defense the Kyoto air-raid organization plan a central headquarters commander and to the governor pool of men for the sole purpose of repair to after which it was placed on a blackboard for public utilities. However, it appears that this the information of all in the room (after plot- squad was never actually organized. ting on the operations map). 3. Comments.—The control centers in Special staff members.—Head of the police Kyoto, faced with only small raids, functioned the secret affairs section {Keimuka) ; head of smoothly. Officials were proud of their physi- economic peace police (Tokntoka) ; head of the cal and personnel arrangement, but were doubt- preservation section {Keizai Hoanka) ; head of ful regarding their functioning had destruc- la- the criminal section (Keijika) ; head of the tion comparable to that of Osaka and Kobe oc- bor section {Roseika) ; head of the transporta- curred. Here, again, the location of the main tion section (Yusoka) ; head of the building prefectural control center was found in the section {Kenchikuka) ; head of the guard res- basement of one of the prefectural buildings cue unit (Keibitai) ; head of the information with little protection against bombing or fire, section (Johoka) and with no thought given to the location of an (2) Services available.—Services available alternate location. for dispatch solely by the control center were Incident Control as follows The guard rescue unit (Keibitai).—For a 1. Introduction.—Although the basic theory complete discussion of the organization and of control of bombing incidents was generally operation of this unit, see section of this report similar throughout the target cities investi- entitled "Rescue." gated, differences in the organization and oper- Fire arm.—In addition to the municipal lire ation of the several services engaged necessi- equipment available for service (see section tates the description of the methods employed. entitled "Fire Service") and that available For illustration, in Kyoto it was found that the from the auxiliary police and fire unit (keibo- air-defense leader of the neighborhood group dari) and block association (chokai), there was operated during periods of air-raid as a mem- also a central reserve of fire equipment at the ber of the block association under the imme- sole disposition of this headquarters. This diate leadership of the air-raid defense leader equipment consisted of motorized pumpers, of that association. That and other variations sent to Kyoto from Osaka after many of the require the review of incident control practice municipal fire stations in that city had been in this report. destroyed. 2. Operation.—The effect of bombing on a Damage evaluation squad.—This squad, com- household is first attacked by the members of posed of five or six men, was specially selected that home, using their air-raid equipment. by the police department for the purpose of These householders received prompt assistance dispatch to large incidents for prompt assess- from their neighbors. At the first public ment of bomb damage. warning of an impending enemy raid, the lead- Telephone repair squad.—This squad of 15 ers of each neighborhood group, trained in air- men was charged wnth the maintenance of defense duties, assembled at the headquarters police telephone lines and equipment. of the block association. This is the first evi- Truck pool.—Upon the sounding of the air- dence of such practice; in prior investigations his raid alert, there assembled near the control the neighborhood group leader stayed with center a pool of 20 specially designated trucks own group of families and directed operations for use in the transportation of emergency sup- of the householders and neighbors who came plies and personnel. to assist, as well as supervising the employ- which the group Army personnel.—Request for assistance ment of the hand pump with the hand from the armed forces for rescue and emer- was equipped. In Kyoto, however, block as- gency clearance of debris was made by the pumps were under the control of the groups. leader of the control center to the Kyoto Army sociation and not the neighborhood division. As the neighborhood group leader, operating Utility repair squad.—There was included in as a member of the block association, came to — the incident he assumed control. At or about referred to in the chain of incident control. that time, the hand pump of the block associa- 3. Conclusions.—In the discussion of inci- tion arrived at the incident. The neighbor- dent control, the question arises as to the wis- hood group leader continued as the incident dom of using a specially designated incident control officer and directed the employment of control officer, one supervising the action of the pumper. If the urgency of the situation the various services from the time of the drop- required reinforcement of other pumpers of ping of the bomb until the effect of the bombing the block association (and fire groups from has been handled—as in the British system neighboring block associations) the leader first as compared with the Japanese system—of on duty continued to command. If, at this shifting control upon the arrival of higher time, the air-raid defense leader of the block echelons—used by the Germans. In the Kyoto association appeared at the incident, he as- investigation, this question was posed to five sumed control of the operations. In the next different officials well versed in air-raid prac- higher echelon, the federated block association tice. Their unanimous opinion was that the

{rengo chokai) , there was also an air-raid use of a single incident control officer presented defense leader whose duties were generally certain advantages but that it was impractical, to direct the shifting of air-raid services of especially in a large raid, because of the un- the various block associations within his fed- availability of a sufficient number of trained erated block association. When the incident men, prefectural or civic, for service at every grew to such proportions that his personal di- incident. rection became necessary, he assumed control Unexploded Bombs of the incident. A call for assistance was made to the auxiliary police and fire unit (keibodan) Operations in bomb disposal procedure in if the incident grew out of control. As as- Kyoto were limited to the reporting of such sistance from this unit appeared, the control missiles and the precautionary measure of cor- authority continued on through a new sequence doning off a safe area prior to the arrival of the —first the leader of the squad sent to the bomb disposal squad from the Army in which scene, then the leader of the particular arm, lay the sole responsibility for actual disposition and finally the over-all leader of the unit. The of the bombs. While the size of the bomb and authority of these men continued in spite of its position (on top of the ground or imbedded) the arrival of reinforcements of equal echelons. determined the final size of the area considered By this time it was logical to assume that the to be safe, an arbitrary radius of 325 yards fire watcher atop the nearby fire station had (300 meters) around the bomb was roped off spotted the fire, reported to his chief in the prior to the arrival of the bomb disposal squads. fire station below, and that municipal fire Final determination of the proper area of equipment had been dispatched. Upon the safety, however, lay with the leader of the Army arrival of the municipal pumper, the leader bomb disposal squad. The usual channel of of that unit took over control, continued in reporting unexploded bombs was the same here control r.egardless of the arrival of like rein- as was described in the Kobe report, i. e., from forcements, but was superseded by his chief or the finder to the leader of the neighborhood any succeeding officers in the channel of muni- group, to the leader of the auxiliary police and cipal command who might have come to the fire unit, or municipal police station, whichever incident. This sequence was not disturbed was the closer. Reports received by the auxil- by the arrival of any reinforcements from out- iary units Avere sent by them to the police sta- side the city. It is to be noted that the general tion. From the police station these reports leader of the various organizations, because of were forwarded to the prefectural control cen-

his over-all authority, can supersede the leader- ter', and from there to the headquarters of the ship of the leaders of the services or the air- Kyoto Army division. Official records revealed raid leader because of the special training given the discovery and disposal of only three high- these arm and air-raid leaders. However, su- explosive bombs in Kyoto during the war. pervision of incidents was rarely, if ever, taken Early training in bomb identification was not over by the general leader of the organizations continued to include later types, and this weak-

10 3 . ness would have given rise to confusion in re- b. Maizuru fire department.—The only other porting if this area had suffered raids having full-time fire department in Kyoto prefecture a higher ratio of high-explosive bombs with a was located at Maizuru City (naval base), ap- resultant increase in the number of duds. proximately 70 miles northwest of Kyoto City. In this secondary naval base city of 88,061 Fire Services there were 10 pumpers and one battalion dis- Fire Protection trict. (Reference Item No. 7.) The fire de- 1. Introduction.—a. The information in partment in Maizuru City was also under the this report of Kyoto City was obtained by in- direction of the police protection department terviews with officials of the fire and water (now public welfare department) of the police departments ; by checking fire department rec- bureau. Thirty-seven villages throughout the ords ; by inspecting fire equipment and fire sta- prefecture had volunteer fire departments tions ; by observing fire drills ; and, in addition, which were not under the police bureau. The by inspecting several types of buildings. (For villages purchased their own gasoline pumping list of persons interrogated see Exhibit F.) equipment (350 to 500 g. p. m.^), fire hose and b. Size and population of Kyoto City.—Ky- appliances, and they operated very similarly to oto, one of Japan's historical cities, and the volunteer fire departments in the United former seat of the government, covered 115 States. Before the war the prefectural office square miles (299.44 square kilometers), much assisted these organizations once a year by de- of which was mountainous and thinly popu- tailing firemen from the Kyoto City department lated. In 1940 the population was 1,089,726, to conduct a week's fire-fighting training pro- but there was a gradual decline in number un- gram in each village. In April 1944, all motor- til in September, 1945, there were 832,364 per- ized fire pumps were borrowed from the vil- sons in the city. lages and assigned to Kyoto City fire stations c. Industrial area.—The industrial areas and important war plants in the prefecture. were located on the south and west sides of c. Fire department personnel.—In Decem- the city, where silk spinning mills, pottery man- ber, 1941, there were 700 regular firemen em- ufacturing, and dye making were the prewar ployed by Kyoto prefecture and assigned to industries. The manufacturing of airplane Kyoto City. In April 1944, the chief of the parts and submarine batteries was the princi- fire department asked that the personnel be pal war industry added to the city. increased to 1,211, but only 329 men were 2. Kyoto Prefecture fire department sec- added to the department. In November 1945, tion, a. Organization.—Kyoto firemen, dur- there were 821 firemen employed in all grades. ing the war, were under the police protection (Reference Item No. 7.) department of the prefectural police bureau. d. Fire department recruits.—Prior to the This department had in addition to the fire war, applicants for the fire service were re- section, auxiliary police and fire unit (kei- quired to be between 20 and 35 years of age. bodan) training, planning (plant fire brigade) After war was declared the minimum age for and personal affairs section. At the time of firemen was reduced to 17 years and the maxi- this survey, the fire section was under the pub- mum age increased to 40 years. The physical lic welfare department of the prefectural police and educational requirements were practically bureau. The public welfare department di- the same as in Osaka prefecture. rected, also, the business section, the peace e. Working conditions.—The two-platoon maintenance section and the personal affairs system (24 hours on duty and 24 hours off section. The fire department in Kyoto rated duty) was in effect for firemen. Their wages, only a subsection position of a principal de- advancement in rank, medical aid, and pension partment of the prefectural police bureau, benefits were about the same as for firemen in whereas, in Tokyo, Osaka, and Kobe they were Osaka and Hyogo prefectures, except that sal- on a departmental level, which raised their aries were slightly lower owing to cheaper fire-fighting organization from fire sections to living conditions in Kyoto. fire departments. 3. Auxiliary police and fire units (Keibodan)

^ Gallons per minute. a. Organization.—The police department exer- 713045—47— 11 )

cised over-all supervision of the auxiliary pumper ; all depending on the size of the plant police and fire units, and trained them for and the attitude of the management. These guard duty and in fire-fighting technique. In units, because of their inadequate training pro- actual operation the police and fire sections of gram, would not have been effective on large the police department could call upon these fires. The best private fire brigade observed units for reinforcing service. There were 140 was maintained by the Shinjo Gokurakuji Tem- units with 9,740 members. (For detailed or- ple, which has 54 buildings within its area. All ganization, see Auxiliary Police and Fire Unit priests, gardeners, janitors, in fact, all em- report. ployees, were members of the fire brigade. b. Duties.—The duties of the auxiliary units Special fire mains and hydrants had been in- of assisting the police and fire sections were stalled within the premises, with a 500 g.p.m. more or less uniform throughout the empire. electrically driven stationary pump, and a gasoline stand-by engine for use in the event of c. Training.—Kyoto started training its auxiliary police and firemen along the standard power failure (Reference Item No. 8). Fire lines, except that three or four firemen would hose was provided at all hydrants and an out- attend the meeting place of the auxiliary unit side water curtain was installed on the exposed once each month and train them in fire-fighting end of the main temple building. As there technique. Each training period lasted from were no incendiary raids or fires in this area 1 to 3 hours, and consisted of lectures, demon- the effectiveness of the temple fire brigade strations, and drills. After the heavy air raids could not be ascertained. The priest in charge on Osaka and Kobe, officials from Kyoto visited of the temple stated that the fire-protective those devastated areas and studied the effective- measures, including the fire brigade, the auto- ness of fire-fighting. When the results of their matic alarm system, the water system, water studies became known most training of auxil- storage, standpipes and extinguishers, were in- iary groups stopped. It was their opinion that stituted 8 years ago, after a building valued at a the type of fire-fighting training being given million dollars had burned. The fire-protective was of little value against American air raids. installations provided little more than prelim- The fire chief stated that after witnessing the inary fire-fighting equipment, as the fire mains devastating effect of air raids on neighboring were small, not properly looped or valved, and cities he had expected little, if any, assistance the fire hose used was ly^ inches in size.

from the auxiliary units. 4. Fire stations, a. Number prior to and d. Equipment.—Auxiliary police and fire during war.—In December 1941, there were 6 units had, in addition to their usual small hand battalion stations and 21 substations. Only pumps and fire-fighting equipment, 208 hand- 3 substations were added during the war, mak- drawn, 120 g. p. m. gasoline-driven pumps; ing a total of 24, and they were all still in opera- of 9 120 g. p. m. pumps on small Datson cars ; and tion. (See Reference Item No. 9, map 5 450 g. p. m. motorized trucks. Kyoto fire stations.) The city was divided district e. Affiliates.—Block associations (chokai) into six battalion districts, the Shimo were equipped with hand pumps and received being the highest valued and most important some training from the auxiliary firemen. from a fire-protection standpoint.

The neighborhood groups in Kyoto were neither 5. Fii'e equipment, a. Motorized appara- equipped nor trained to fight fire as they were tus.—In December 1941, there were 35 pump- in Osaka and Kobe. However, many families ers rated at 350 to 500 g.p.m. This number did provide themselves with small, concrete, had been increased by May 1945 to 80 pumpers, static water tanks, from 40 to 70 gallons in 54 of which were rated at 350 g.p.m. and 26 at size, for fire-fighting. 500 g.p.m. (See Reference Item No. 10, Make f. Private fire brigades.—Many manufac- and Number of Fire Pumpers.) The increase turing plants maintained fire-fighting units of 45 pumpers during the war consisted of 12 which received some training from the fire de- new 500 g.p.m. Nissans in addition to 33 fire partment. Their equipment consisted of hand trucks appropriated from villages in the prefec-

pumps ; a 120 g.p.m. gasoline-driven pump on a ture. The borrowed apparatus had been re- hand-drawn cart; a 450 g.p.m. motorized turned and the city had 47 pumpers, 17 of

12 which were rated at 500 g.p.m. and 30 at 350 en 2 months training in the police and fire train- g.p.m. (Reference Item No. 10.) One third ing school before being assigned to a fire sta- of the equipment in service was from 5 to 20 tion. They were given lectures on fire-fight- years old. ing; practical drills in hose evolutions; pump b. Types of fire apparatus.—A Japanese- operations; and military drill. During the built 85-foot aerial ladder, mounted on a war all training was reduced to 1 month and 1939 White truck, was the only ladder at the time of this report there was no train- equipment in the department, except the ing. The fire chief stated the wartime fire- usual 8- to 20-foot extension ladders car- men were poorly trained and he expected to ped with a 500 g.p.m. pump, but it had no reopen the school for the purpose of giving hose, rescue gear, forcible entry tools, electric these men a 3- to 4-week refresher course. wire cutters, rope, extra ladders, heavy jacks, b. Fire station drills.—Practical drills were salvage covers, life net, shovels, saws, axes, conducted in fire stations 5 times a month for or other small tools usually found on an aver- a period of 1 to 2 hours each. A series of drill age ladder truck in the United States. It was evolutions were observed at the Shimo battalion a bare truck carrying only the aerial ladder headquarters, the most important station in the and pump (See p. 26 for aerial truck demon- city. The raising and lowering of an 85-foot stration). A small nozzle, Yg-mch tip, was se- aerial ladder; pumping water to the secured cured to the top of the fly ladder and could be nozzle on the fly of the 85-foot aerial ; climbing used to throw a small stream into windows of ropes to a height of 25 feet ; sliding ropes and the taller buildings. The fire chief stated he empty hose lines from an elevation of 25 feet; had never had an occasion to use the aerial and finally, sliding through a 60-foot canvas ladder. The fire department was not ade- fire escape chute attached to a watch tower quately trained in the use of ladder equipment, were the series of drills performed (Pages 29 and could not be expected to get the most out and 30). Fire escape chutes were not carried of it. Pumpers were the only other type of on fire apparatus but were recommended by fire apparatus in the fire department and they the Ministry of Home Affairs as equipment were equipped the same as those in Osaka and for all limit-height buildings. The fire chief Kobe. stated that some department stores, office c. Maintenance of fire apparatus.—The fire buildings, and hospitals had fire escape chutes, apparatus observed in the Kyoto fire depart- but he did not know where they were kept nor ment was in much better mechanical condition who owned them. than was the equipment in Osaka and Kobe. 7. Fire alarm system, a. Electric Alarms. Electric starters were used on all motorized —In 1928, the city installed 70 fire alarm equipment. Motor repair and overhaul jobs boxes (Matsumoto MM type) at locations in the were done by public garages which were se- Shimo battalion district. These boxes were lected at the discretion of the battalion chiefs. connected to the nearest fire station and did Spare parts were scarce and delays in repair not record in a central office. The electric jobs were frequent. No stand-by apparatus alarm system had been out of service for more was available for temporary use while equip- than 5 years, and the fire chief stated it had ment was out of service. never been dependable. Most of the street d. Fire hose.—The Japanese standard fire boxes had had the electrical mechanism re- hose (21/2 inch unlined linen), equipped with moved. a snap-type coupling, was used in Kyoto prefec- b. Telephone alarms.—The telephone num- ture. A total of 1,400 sections (65.5 feet per ber 119 was used exclusively for reporting fires. section) of fire hose up to 10 years of age was The telephone exchanges in the several districts in service. Each pumper was supplied with a had one trunk line to their nearest battalion complete change of linen hose, in addition to headquarters station. The battalion station, 2y2-inch and 4-inch hard suctions (rubber) for in turn, called the nearest substation by direct hydrant connections and drafting. phone. There was no central fire alarm office 6. Training of firemen, a. Training school. for dispatching fire apparatus. Each battalion —Prior to the war, firemen recruits were giv- station functioned in its district independent

13 Above. Kyoto's aerial truck, located at Shimo battalion headquarters, equipped -with 5 00 g. p. m. pump, but had no hose or standard ladder equipment.

Right. Aerial truck extended 6 5 of its 8 5 feet 'with a 2/2-inch hose line playing a stream through a Js-inch nozzle tip made secure to the fly ladder. : of other districts. In 1943, the Shimo battalion 8. Water systems, a. Source of ivater.— district received a total of 56 fire alarms, which Ninety percent of Kyoto's water supply was se- were recorded as follows cured from two parallel canals, each 9 miles (1) Fire phone (119) 46 long, which brought water direct from Biwa (2) Ordinary phone (business phone in station) 2 Lake to Kyoto City purification plants, while 10 Police phone (relayed through police depart- (3) percent of the water was picked up from the ment) 1 Uji River within the city at the Momoyama (4) Watch towers 5 (5) Still alarms (man ran to fire station) 2 and Shin Momoyama purification plants. Fif- c. Watch towers. Located within the city teen pumps were used to lift water from the were 16 watch towers, 1 at each battalion head- intakes to the five purification plants. There quarters and 1 at each of 10 substations. One was an abundant supply of water flowing of the towers was 130 feet high, located on top through these plants to small distribution res- of a building near a fire station, but the other ervoirs. There were no large reservoirs in towers were steel frame, much like an oil der- the system and the largest purification plant rick. Thirteen of the steel towers were 40 (Keaoe) could be bypassed in an emergency feet in height and 1 was 60 feet. A 24-hour (Reference Item No. 6). fireman watch was maintained on these towers b. Water mains.—The mains from the 5 and the watch changed every hour. Fires were purification plants were 12- to 38-inch cast iron spotted and reported in the same manner as pipes which fed a grid distribution system. described in the Osaka and Kobe reports. The network of pipes was 4 to 16 inches in

Sliino Battalion Headquarters personnel lined up at reai of station for inspection before beginning a series of company drills. 15 Canvas fire escape chute, attached to Shimo station. Used for drill purposes only. It was not fire department gear, but was recommended by the Ministry of Home Affairs as equipment for limit height buildings, particularly department stores and office buildings.

16 diameter, well equipped with isolation valves, 9. Operations under air-raid conditions. and had few dead ends (Reference Items No. a. Prearranged plan.—The plan was for each 11 and No. 12). Water was supplied to this battalion district to protect the important areas network by gravity, with the exception of two in its district and forget others. Transporta- small areas in the northwest part of the city tion centers, public buildings, munitions facto- where the high ground required two pumping ries, storage warehouses, war plants and tem- plants, each with two electrically driven pumps ples were classed as important areas. No par- to maintain pressure. The city pressure ran ticular effort was made to increase the size or from 20 to 80 pounds on all mains. Only one to improve the fire department until the begin- fire main was broken in the air raids on Kyoto, ning of the Japanese calendar year, April 1, a 6-inch cast iron main receiving a direct high- 1944. At that time 37 pumpers (350 to 500 explosive hit, but it was repaired within 24 g.p.m.), and 118 hand-drawn 120 g. p. m. gaso- hours. line pumps were appropriated from villages in c. Hydrants.—There were 7,341 public and the prefecture and turned over to the Kyoto 1,744 private hydrants in the city. Fire hyd- fire department and industrial plants further rants in industrial plants were privately owned to strengthen their fire-fighting facilities. Be- (Reference Item No. 7). Both public and fore April 1944, the people had been led to private hydrants were on 4-inch risers and believe that that war was going well and air were located about 110 yards apart (Reference raids over the homeland were impossible. As Item No. 11). Approximately 9,065 of the B-29 bombers began flying over Kyoto on their hydrants were flush type, located below the way to Tokyo, more time and effort were de- sidewalk with a steel plate cover. They had voted to the training of fire fighters, both regu- single 2V.-inch outlets with snap-on connec- lar and auxiliary. Fire officials made trips to tions. The remaining 20 hydrants were post Tokyo and other cities after their disastrous type and also had one 2V2-inch snap-on hose raids, in an effort to learn how to cope with the connection. All hydrant hose connection in incendiary bomb. The fire chief stated that Japan were standardized. The fire department after the March 14, 1945 incendiary raid over was responsible for testing hydrants, but there Osaka, a city 30 miles away, he was firmly con- was no regular schedule for flushing them. vinced that there was no way to keep Kyoto d. Wells. There were 183 wells listed as a from suffering a similar experience, if bombers possible source of water for fire fighting (Ref- came over in an equal number and started erence Item No. 7). The wells were about thousands of simultaneous fires throughout the 6 feet in diameter with water approximately city. There was no doubt that Kyoto would 15 feet below the surface. Kyoto did not use have burned to the ground by one concentrated any wells to augment its city water supply (Ref- incendiary bombing. The building construc- erence Item No. 13). tion, crowded conditions, narrow streets from e. Other sources of water.—Kyoto had 979 12 to 20 feet wide in residential and small busi- open water tanks, one 77,000 gallon under- ness areas were ideal conditions for a conflagra- ground tank and 47 swimming pools which tion similar to Tokyo, Osaka and Kobe (see p. might be used for emergency fire fighting (p 36.) The fire department was inadequately 33). The fire department had made a survey trained to cope with a large fire under normal of the canals and three rivers that flowed conditions. In observing the drill of a typical through the city to determine where drafting fire company, it was noted that 5 minutes time of water could be done. At the suggestion of was taken in spotting the pumper, connecting fire department officials, sumps with covers the two 10-foot sections of suction hose, and were sunk in the bed of shallow canals to re- laying out one section of 21/2-ii^ch linen hose, ceive the suction (p. 34). Small 40- to 70-gal- and then the engineer became excited and could lon concrete tanks and 300-gallon barrel-type not lift water to his pump. With some help tanks were on the streets throughout the city from the inspection party he finally got water for use by neighborhood fire fighters. Kyoto's but not until after another 10 minutes. water supply was adequate for normal fire- b. Lone B-29 raid, January 16, 19 k5.—At fighting. 2320, on January 16, 1945, a lone B-29 flew

17 Emergency underground water tank (77,000 gallons) at Bukkoji Temple with three openings for drafting, two on street and third inside temple grounds as indicated above.

18 4

Sump in Kiyamachi district, covered with stone slab, one o£ several in shallo^v canals for fire-fighting use. over the city, headed in the general direction houses and partially destroyed 99 others. For- of Tokyo, and the city was not alerted. After ty people were killed, 19 seriously and 34 a few minutes it circled back over Kyoto and slightly wounded. These 2 raids were the most dropped several high-explosive bombs and a damaging of 11 small air raids on Kyoto pre- few incendiaries. Twenty-nine houses were fecture (Reference Item No. 7, pages 2 through completely destroyed; 112 half destroyed; 175 5). partially damaged; and 2 burned by incendi- Fire Prevention aries. Thirty-four persons were killed ; 23 seriously wounded ; 33 slightly wounded ; and 750 10. Operation.—No organized fire prevention were made homeless. A section of water main bureau existed in Kyoto prefecture. One fire- was destroyed police lines ; and public telephone man was detailed each day from each fire sta- in the area were put out of commission, but all tion for a period of one to two hours for the were restored the following day. (Reference purpose of inspecting his immediate area ; fire

Item No. 7, page 3). The fire department en- hydrants and other sources of water ; condition countered no serious difficulty in controlling of streets; and rubbish burning in hazardous the small fires which burned two houses. locations. No inspections were made of build- c. B-29 air raid, June 26, 19i5.—At 2141, ings, factories or homes. Once each month a on June 26, 1945, B-29's dropped high explos- pressure test by a static gauge was taken on ives in the Kyoto area, which destroyed 54 fire hydrants. The fire chiefs stated that the 713045—47— 19 Typical residential street in Kyoto. Looking east along Bukkoji Dori (street) in Yanagi Bunba district.

20 pressure in the mains ranged from 30 to 50 department, Kyoto had suffered only two large pounds, and during the early morning hours fires, one was 11 years previously when 36 when domestic water was not being used, the houses burned, and the second was 8 years ago pressure increased to 80 pounds in some dis- when a building at Shinjo Gokurokuji Temple tricts. He added that fire hydrants were used burned, causing a loss of more than a million more frequently than other sources of water dollars. The chief attributed the low fire loss in Kyoto City, in fire fighting, probably because of the fact as compared to other Japanese cities, to that Kyoto's water system was not damaged. more cleanliness ; better than average

Japanese buildings ; wider streets ; a 11. Fii'e regulations.—The fire regulations good water system ; and public interest in the in Kyoto prefecture were the same as in Osaka general welfare of the historic city. and Hyogo prefectures. They were sketchy 14. Mutual Aid.—Kyoto dispatched 10 pump- and were interspersed in the building regula- ers to Osaka on March 14, 1945, to assist in tions promulgated by the Ministry of Home Af- combating the conflagration caused by an air fairs. Firemen had no authority to enforce raid. The apparatus was late in arriving and fire regulations, but they might file an official required refueling before it could work on the complaint with the district police ofiice where fire. Two hours actual working time was cred- action would be taken, if the police so desired. ited to each pumper. No further attempt was Action fire regulation violations was, how- on made to dispatch fire equipment to subsequent ever, seldom taken by the police, and firemen fires. hesitated to file complaints. Fire extinguish- 15. Fire Barriers.—The removal of houses ers were not required in most buildings and for the purpose of building fire roads and cre- those observed were the soda-acid type, and in ating fire breaks around important buildings poor condition or empty (p. 38). and plants was first begun on July 17, 1944 12. Building construction.—The Ministry of when 677 houses were demolished. On Feb- Home Aifairs regulated building laws in all ruary 27, March 18, and July 21, 1945, addi- Japanese provinces. Some consideration had tional buildings were demolished. Of these, been given to zoning for business, industrial 6,068 were houses in sparsely settled areas, and and residential districts. Karasumaru Dori 19,308 were in built-up sections around important establishments, and Shijo Dori, 100 and 80 feet wide, respec- making a grand total of 25,376 buildings (Reference tively, were the principal streets of Kyoto and Items Nos. 17 and 18). The removal of these they had been zoned for only new construction buildings would not have saved Kyoto from fire destruction in of reinforced concrete (Reference Item No. 14). one large incendiary raid (p. 41, area from A total of 363 concrete buildings from three to which buildings were removed). eight stories in height were located on those two streets. The south and west sides of the Emergency Medical Services city were industrial known as areas and there 1. Introduction.—The same grouping of sub- were no specific building regulations for them. jects is followed in the Kyoto report as in those In the residential area dwellings were bunched of Osaka and Kobe. Briefly stated, the term together, separated by a solid wall with 1 inch Emergency Medical Services comprises three of plaster on each side. The roofs were tile subdivisions: (1) emergency medical service and slate (p. 39, dwellings and small stores in which includes first aid and hospital services; the central part of the city), and (Reference (2) Red Cross activities; and (3) mortuary Item No. 15, Building Regulations). services. The foregoing order will be pursued in 13. Annual fire loss.—The last published Ky- the discussion of these subjects. oto prefecture fire department year book Emergency Medical Service (1941) hsted a total of 367 fires, 251 of which were in Kyoto City (Reference Item No. 2. Organization.—The emergency medical 16, p. 27.) The causes and frequency of fires service of Kyoto was organized under a com- were given in detail in the yearbook. The fire bined municipal-prefecture plan. At the pre- chief stated that in his 18 years in the fire fectural level the service was under the author-

21 Soda-acid iire extinguishers in the modern, limit-height, Sumitomo building (Sixth Army headquarters). None of these portable extinguishers w^as in an operative condition.

22 Residential and business district, looking southwest.

Crowded residential district, looking northeast. Views taken from roof of Asahi Press Building on Kaharamachi Dori (street), Kyoto.

23 Firebreak, widest in city, approximately 195 feet, buili by removing houses. Looking west toward Teramachi Dori (street) from Kyoto City Hall.

One of many firebreaks created near important buildings. Looking north toward Daimaru department store, from Shijo Dori, Takakura district.

24 ity of the health section in conjunction with ral police who in turn instructed the transpor- the police department, while at the municipal tation unit to dispatch vehicles to the necessary level the service was under the health depart- location. There were only two or three ambu- ment, a subsidiary of the welfare section (p. lances in Kyoto and they played a negligible 43). In a document, dated July 7, 1945, from part in the transportation of the wounded. the prefectural governor to the mayors of all There were no arrangements made with the large cities and towns of Kyoto prefecture, an Army or Navy for use of their vehicles in trans- air-defense medical organization plan was es- porting air-raid casualties from first-aid sta- tablished. This document included the air- tions to hospitals. defense first-aid regulations, first-aid facilities, 6. First-aid stations.—There were 141 first- and functional classifications of medical per- aid stations, each located at a public elementary sonnel and their assistants. This plan repre- school building, but, in a few instances, in the sented an ideal and differed to some extent from school nurses' office or in the basement. There the plan that was in actual operation. Exhibit were no specially constructed first-aid stations G is a translation of the abovementioned docu- and none located within department stores or ment. railroad terminals. Each large factory had a 3. Personnel. In Kyoto there were 890 doc- — small first-aid station and dispensary for the tors, 216 dentists, 1,467 nurses, 484 midwives use of its own employees. It was believed by and 558 pharmacists. All of the above medical the municipal and prefectural health authori- personnel were organized into their several ties after their visit to Osaka immediately fol- associations and assigned by their professional lowing the March 14, 1945 raid, that the first- qualifications for specific duties in the air- aid stations as planned would have been insuf- defense medical set-up. These assignments ficient in the event of heavy air raids on Kyoto.

were classified into eight categories : first-aid Based upon that decision, the Japanese Red stations, first-aid hospitals, obstetrical first-aid Cross was directed to assemble 20 supplemen- stations, special first-aid hospitals, medical tary first-aid stations to be used when directed arms of the auxiliary police and fire units, gas- by the health department. These stations were defense squads and two reserve sections. to be located in tents in any part of the city Pharmacists were assigned to the gas-defense that might be in need of them. (See Red Cross squads, midwives to the obstetrical first-aid section.) stations and the old and physically weak physi- a. Equipment of first-aid stations.—The med- cians to the reserve sections. ical equipment in the first-aid stations was very 4. Evacuation of casualties. During the air- — meager and consisted mainly of cotton, gauze raid alert, all personnel reported to their pre- bandages, disinfectants, and small amounts of assigned locations for duty. Ambulatory air- opiates and stimulants. Surgical instruments raid casualties were to walk to the first-aid sta- were not furnished as standard equipment but tions and all others were to be carried to the were brought to the stations by the physicians stations by stretcher bearers from the guard assigned there for duty. There was no steri- units of the prefectural police, the auxiliary lizing equipment nor any facilities for adminis- police and fire units, and volunteer workers of tration of plasma, or for blood transfusions. the neighborhood groups. At the first-aid sta- The Army had taken over practically all anti- tions the patients were to be separated into tetanus serum and none was available for use categories of injuries and, either treated and in the first-aid stations. There were few avail- dismissed, or sent to the hospitals for further treatment. able beds, and severely wounded patients were to be placed on the floor while awaiting treat- 5. Transportation of casualties.—The trans- ment. portation unit of the municipal welfare section (Yosuka) maintained a pool of trucks and other b. Reserve personnel.—After heavy air raids, vehicles for the removal of air-raid wounded if the assigned personnel were insuflficient to from the first-aid stations to the hospitals. handle large numbers of casualties, supplenien- When transportation was needed, the chief of tary aid would be furnished by physicians in the public health section notified the prefectu- the reserve sections or by physicians assigned

25 Ul Q _J CO < Z CO to l« CO to yj n O i= :7> < Q ^ < O «/i Q 2 a- a. 1-9. < (— I— CO «J o£. ui

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m != z Qi Z u. 3 -) m 3 O Qi >_ lU _1 — LU I— Qi ^ < < IJ N =i o Q 3 O Z < < o to first-aid stations in an undamaged section of needed. There were two hindrances to pro- the city. posed additional shelter facilities : first, there 7. Hospitals.—Throughout the entire city of was no cement or wood obtainable for con-

Kyoto, there were approximately 100 hospitals struction purposes ; and, second, due to the including all large and small, public, and pri- close proximity of the hospital buildings, there vate institutions. Thirty-nine of the hospitals, was very little space for the building of shel- with a total bed capacity of approximately ters. 2,100, were designated by the prefectural health 8. Medical training.—As in Kobe and Osaka, authorities for use in treatment of air-raid cas- a delegation of doctors, appointed by the chief ualties. Thirty-seven of the hospitals, with a of the prefectural health section, was sent to total bed capacity of 600, were designated as the Tokyo Army medical school for a course in first-aid hospitals, while the other 2 hospitals, emergency treatment of air-raid casualties. with a normal total bed capacity of 1,500 and Upon their return from Tokyo, the members of emergency expansion capacity of 3,000, were this delegation gave a course of instruction to designated as special first-aid hospitals. The the leaders of the several professional medical latter two hospitals, the Imperial University and allied associations and they, in turn, gave Hospital and Prefectural University Hospital, a required course of instruction to all members were designated as such because they were the of their respective associations. Primarily, largest hospitals and were more adequately medical information and instruction reached equipped to handle major surgical problems. the people through the usual block association When hospitals could not accommodate all of channels. Doctors who were assigned for duty the casualties, schools, office buildings, large with the first-aid stations and with the auxil- houses and churches in the near vicinity were iary police and fire units were responsible for to be converted into reserve hospitals. dissemination of medical information and in- a. Treatment in hospitals.—Patients were structions to the people. Some elementary first taken from the first-aid stations to the first-aid aid was taught to the people by the Red Cross hospitals where definitive treatment was given. Association, but because of the acute shortage The most severely wounded patients, and those of paper, printed first-aid instructions were requiring some specialized form of treatment, not distributed to the public. The medical were sent to the special first-aid hospitals. training actually received by the people was essentially the same as that in Kobe and Osaka. b. Air-raid protection in hospitals.—When an air-raid alarm sounded, all ambulatory pa- 9. Medical supplies.—All medical supplies tients went directly to preassigned locations, for Kyoto were received on a pro rata basis either in the basement of the building or in from the Ministry of Welfare in Tokyo and dis- dugout shelters on the premises outside the tributed to the municipal welfare section and building. Bed patients were carried on stretch- to the professional associations of Kyoto pre- ers into the basement or to the center of the fecture. The health section obtained supplies lower floors of the building. Anticipating in- from the association and distributed them to cendiary bomb raids, the larger hospitals, as a the several first-aid installations. As in Kobe fire-prevention measure, razed all wooden and Osaka, medical supplies were very scanty buildings which were used as hospital wards, and it was known by the health authorities that and patients were then placed in concrete or they- were definitely insufficient to give adequate brick veneer buildings. These frame veneer treatment to all patients. The supplies were buildings were shabbily constructed and were unobtainable because the Army had taken over themselves a great fire hazard. Black-outs major portions of all drugs and equipment for were enforced during alarms, and strategic exclusive military use. points in the hospitals, such as operating and 10. Comments.—Plans were made to enlist X-ray rooms, were equipped with special black- all members of the medical and allied profes- out curtains. It was believed by the health sions in the case of war casualties. For cover- authorities that air-raid protection for hospital age of the city, 141 first-aid stations were placed patients, as provided, was insufficient and that in readiness, and the larger hospitals were more adequate shelter space was urgently designated to care for the severely wounded. 713045—47—5 27 Equipment and supplies were far below the tirely by the respective services. Also, when

level of the working ideal ; first-aid training was their duty with the military service had been carried out, but in a sketchy and perfunctory completed, they were discharged and returned manner. Plans for protection of patients in to civil life without any obligation on the part hospitals in the event of air raids would have of the Red Cross for their reemployment. It been reasonably successful in moderate raids, is interesting to note that the Red Cross em- but, in view of the experiences of similar emer- ployed only those nurses who had been trained gency medical services in heavily bombed cities, in the Red Cross hospitals.

there is no reason to suppose that the Kyoto 14. Functions, a. Training.— (1) Training services would have proved to be any more of nurses was one of the major functions of adequate than elsewhere. the Red Cross. Of the two Red Cross hospitals in Kyoto the larger, with a bed capacity of 300, Red Cross Activities conducted a training school which graduated 11. Introduction.—The source of informa- 100 nurses annually. These nurses were of tion relative to the Red Cross activities in Ky- two classifications, a and h. The a group con- oto was the director of Red Cross for Kyoto sisted of nurses who had been graduated from prefecture, who had an intimate knowledge of high school and their course of training cov- Red Cross procedure at the height of the air ered a period of 3 years. Candidates for the h attacks, since he had been in his position for group were accepted upon graduation from nearly 2 years. It would be expected that the primary schools, and their course of training framework would be uniform in each of the covered only 2 years. The a class nurses were prefectures, but in those surveyed so far, preferred, but, in order to meet the demands of Osaka, Hyogo, and Kyoto, minor differences the Army and Navy, more attention was given have been noted. These differences will be to the recruitment and training of b class brought out in the analytical study of organiza- nurses. tion and procedure. (2) Training of the public did not occupy a 12. Organization.—The principal departure position of prominence in the Red Cross pro- in the organization plan of Kyoto from that of gram. In girls' schools, a course of lectures Osaka and Hyogo was the fact that the director and demonstrations was offered to those who of the prefectural Red Cross branch was ap- wished to receive this instruction. The con- pointed by Red Cross headquarters in Tokyo, tent of the course comprised a study of simple whereas in the case of the two latter prefec- first-aid measures. The length of the course tures, he was appointed by the prefectural gov- was not clearly defined, but upon its completion ernor. In no instance has there been discov- students were given certificates of attendance, ered any evidence pointing to local branches or after which they were authorized to teach first chapters of the Red Cross in the separate mu- aid to the neighborhood groups. There is no nicipalities. record of how many persons were reached by 13. Personnel.—In the prefectural office the first-aid instruction given in this way. An- director had in addition to himself a clerical other method of carrying first-aid instruction staff of 15 employees. The technical employees to the public was by means of a team consisting connected with the hospital and clinics averaged of one doctor and two or three nurses sent out about 50 doctors and 100 nurses, all of whom from Red Cross prefectural headquarters, who Were full-time paid workers. During the war, held mass meetings in public places at no doctors and nurses were furnished to the Army specified intervals, and gave lectures and dem- upon demand from Tokyo headquarters of the onstrations. This was neither a formal nor Red Cross. There was no accurate record of systematized plan of instruction and no certifi- how many were thus furnished to the military cates were issued. Printed matter used in the and naval forces, but it is estimated that since instruction program was furnished not to the the "Manchurian incident" in 1931 the prefec- public but only to instructors. The fact that ture had sent 600 nurses into the armed forces. there was no charge for the instruction pam- ^Yhen doctors and nurses were taken into the phlet was in contrast with the policy pursued military services their pay was assumed en- in Osaka and Hyogo prefectures.

28 b. Operations.—The Red Cross maintained membership by the payment of more than 1,000 no first-aid stations except at the Red Cross yen. All of those classes of membership are hospitals and clinics but worked in coordina- included in the total membership of 238,118 as tion with the first-aid program of the health of September 1945. Membership was not en- department. Upon call from the latter it was tirely voluntary, as the Red Cross headquarters planned that doctors and nurses would be sent in Tokyo set quotas which each prefecture was to assist the first-aid personnel at stations des- required to raise. For 1944 the call was for ignated by the health department. There were, 14,917 new members. Every family was ex- however, Red Cross teams organized and held pected to have at least one member. Although in readiness to go to any point of need and set special donations were sometimes demanded, up temporary first-aid stations. For that pur- e.g., for the construction of a new hospital, pose, tents and other equipment were assembled there was no emphasis placed on drives for and held on a stand-by basis. support of the Red Cross current expenses. (1) In contrast with the information re- Ten percent of all funds collected for member- ceived in Kobe, the Red Cross of Kyoto had no ships was contributed to the national headquar- plans whatever for furnishing any kind of wel- ters. The annual budget for all operating ex- fare service, e.g., food, clothing, or shelters. penses of the Red Cross program in Kyoto

(2) The preponderance of Red Cross activity prefecture for 1944 was 2,336,000 yen. in Kyoto was in the operation of Red Cross hos- 16. Comtnent.—The Red Cross program dur- pitals and clinics. There were two hospitals in ing the war was not greatly different from its Kyoto City, one with a bed capacity of 100, and peacetime activities. The principal difference the other with a capacitj^ of 300. In addition lay in the extramural training in first aid that there were three clinics maintained by the Red was conducted for the benefit of the general Cross outside the city of Kyoto, but no patients public. During the war, also, priority was were hospitalized in these institutions. Refu- given to military and naval casualties. On the gees who flocked in to Kyoto prefecture did not whole, however, the Red Cross in Kyoto was add materially to the load carried by the Red not geared for disaster relief.

Cross hospitals : first, because they were cared Mortuary Service for principally in the clinics on an out-patient status; and second, because the Red Cross hos- 17. Introduction.—Since the mortuary serv- pitals were reserved primarily for Army and ice was not called into operation except on a Navy casualties. At all times, however, some very limited scale as a result of 2 raids by single civilians were accepted in these hospitals. B-29's, in which 34 were killed at one time and 15. Finmices.—Although the Red Cross re- 43 at another, the program, for all practical ceived no support from the government, it did purposes, did not develop beyond the planning receive compensation on a per diem basis for stage, but even the program as planned was the care of Army and Navy patients. Civilian somewhat immature. patients who were able to pay for hospital care 18. Organization. — The mortuary service were also required to do so. As will be seen differed from that found in the other two cities from the account of funds derived from mem- surveyed thus far. In normal times the dis- bership and special contributions, those sources posal of the dead was a function of the health were quite inadequate for the support of the department. In anticipation of the necessity annual budget, so that the major amount of for handling large numbers of dead bodies, as revenue came from fees paid by patients. Re- judged from the experiences of Osaka and garding membership fees, there were three Kobe, it was decided that the job would be too classifications: (1) the usual fee of 3 yen per much for the health department and it was, year for 10 years after which no further fees therefore, transferred to the police department, were charged or, as an alternative, a person first to the auxiliary police and fire units might secure a paid-up lifetime membership (keibodan) but eventually, to another section, by the payment of 25 yen at one time hon- the purpose of which appeared to be personnel ; (2)

orary lifetime membership by the payment of management and accounting (keimuka) , as in- 200 yen; and (3) a superhonorary paid-up dicated by its duties which included employment

29 and training of police and firemen, the manage- burial in a common pit would probably have ment of budgets and accounts, and planning for been necessary due to lack of coffin material, the guard section of the police department. It and wood or oil for burning. was under this last-named function that the 21. Personnel.—The personnel relied upon disposal of the dead was arbitrarily placed. for the disposal of the dead were undertakers The personnel and accounting section was 1 of and their employees. Military personnel who the 14 independent sections of the prefectural had had experience with the disposal of dead police department, on the same level as the bodies on the battlefields were counted upon as guard section which has figured frequently into members of the operative force. The groups the organizational charts. At the close of the designated for discharging these duties could war, when the need for special plans for the not be considered a systematized organization disposal of the dead had ceased to exist, this in the sense that they engaged in practice drills function was transferred back to the health de- or any other formal exercises. If trouble had partment. The principal diflference between descended upon them on a large scale, they the management of this problem by the auxil- would have had to "do the best they could" to iary police and fire units and the personnel and meet the situation. accounting section was that the former was a 22. Transportation facilities. — Ambulances voluntary organization whereas the latter was were virtually nonexistent. The plan was to official. depend principally upon litter bearers to pick 19. Duties.—Duties imposed upon the per- up the dead, and take them either to a home sonnel and accounting section with respect to or a collection center, but should the distance, disposal of the dead did not contemplate that and the numbers to be transported be too great, the work would actually be done by the section, trucks would be requisitioned through the trans- but only that instructions would be issued by it portation section of the police department. to the city of Kyoto specifying the place and 23. Comments.—After the great raids on manner of disposal. This section had no per- Osaka and Kobe, representatives were sent sonnel and no equipment for disposal of the from Kyoto to observe the effectiveness of the dead, so that whatever the emergency should defensive preparations. They saw at first hand require would have had to be done, not by the that many of the war emergency measures police department, but by the city of Kyoto. broke down completely in the presence of dire 20. Identification.—Identification of dead and devastating attacks. They observed, for bodies was a mandatory duty of the police in instance, that using basements of houses and peacetime as well as in war. When identified, buildings for air-raid shelters often resulted the body was sent to the victim's family or in suffocation from smoke and death from in- friends. Should casualties be few, the plan tense heat. The effect of these observations was to leave the body where it fell, as that demonstrated the futility of many relief and would have made identification much easier, protective efforts. Presumably this should but when bodies were removed from the site have stimulated more intensive preparations of death, a tag showing where the body came for disposal of the dead, because of the proba- from formed a part of the plan. In the event bility that, as a result of major air raids, the of comparatively small numbers, these proce- fatalities would be increased in proportion with dures would have been adequate, but the author- the relaxation of defensive measures. It is, ities realized that larger numbers of dead would therefore, strange, but apparently true, that require more advanced planning. The contem- plans for large scale operations in the disposal plated procedure was to collect the bodies in a of dead persons pursued the same tendency to public place such as a temple or park, where decline as did plans for certain other emergency they would be held for identification by friends projects. and relatives for a period of 24 hours in hot Rescue weather and 48 hours in cold weather, after which the bodies would be finally disposed of. 1. Introduction.—The purpose of this report Should crematories be unable to handle the is to present a study of the organization author- load, the plan was to burn them en masse, but ized and formed to carry out rescue services,

30 ;

the training procedues employed, and the meth- on rescue operations at an engineering school ods of rescue technique advocated in Kyoto. (koheitai) conducted in Kyoto by Army per- The same program of development of the res- sonnel. Upon the completion of the course of cue service occurred in Kyoto as in both Osaka instruction, these men returned to their unit and Kobe, with the date of the establishment and trained all other members of the units. of the guard rescue unit (keibitai) definitely Each company was on duty every other day established as May 1, 1944. and on the night of that duty day was billeted in a dormitory at the headquarters. Each duty Guard Rescue Unit day was devoted to continued training in res- 2. Organization.—The directive v^^hich au- cue operations, since this unit, after the initial thorized the formation of this unit afforded the 3 months' training period, was assigned to du- prefectural governments considerable latitude ties except those directly concerned with rescue in its organization. Since the city of Kyoto service. Some practical training was secured was the only large city in the prefecture, the by assisting in demolishing houses to build fire officials decided that one battalion would be breaks and in the construction of shelters. sufficient to provide rescue services. The bat- This complete training program was the re- talion had two companies, each company was sponsibility of the leader of the unit. divided into two platoons, with each platoon 6. Operational control and procedure.—As composed of three squads (exhibit H). The soon as an air-raid alert was sounded, the en- unit was operated entirely from the prefectural tire battalion assembled at the headquarters level and its headquarters was established in from where its movements were directed from the prefectural building. The only other city the control center. When an incident occurred in Kyoto prefecture was Maizuru, a naval base which required the guard rescue unit, it was on the northern coast, where all rescue services planned to relay the information to a police were performed by naval personnel. box, then to a police station, then to the control center where the decision as to dis- 3. Personnel.—The members of the unit were was made recruited mainly from applicants between the position of the guard rescue unit. All other ages of 18 to 20 years with a few applicants procedures and controls were carried out as accepted up to 25 years. The emphasis upon described in the Osaka and Kobe field reports. the low age was due to the military draft law 7. Mutual Aid.—On March 13-14, 1945, 60 which took the males from 20 years of age. men of the unit were dispatched to Osaka City In contrast with Osaka and Kobe, no educa- to aid in rescue operations. All requests for tional qualification was required of an appli- such mutual aid had to go through the police cant. chief in each prefecture. 4. Table organization. Each squad was of — Guard Arm (Keibibu) of the Auxiliary composed of 1 leader and 10 men, each platoon Police and Fire Unit (Keibodan) had 1 leader, 1 orderly, and 3 squads ; each company had 2 leaders, 2 orderlies, and 2 platoons 8. Organization.—Rescue service in this unit and the battalion had 2 leaders, 1 orderly, and was assigned to the guard arm. (For a de- 2 companies. An orderly performed liaison tailed description of the auxiliary police and and messenger service along with any other fire unit see that section of this report.) The duties assigned to him by his commanding of- lack of personnel precluded any specialization ficer. The entire organization had a total com- of the various responsibilities charged to mem- plement of 151 men (Exhibit H). bers of this arm. 9. Personnel. The of the guard 5. Training.—Each selected applicant was — members sent to school for 3 months where he received arm were arbitrarily selected and assigned by training in rescue technique and minor police the leader of the auxiliary police and fire unit. duties concerned with the operation of the po- 10. Table of organization.—The guard arm lice boxes scattered around the city. At the was composed of 1 leader and 19 men, and, end of that period, on the basis of their records, with 140 auxiliary police and fire units in 30 men were selected to attend for 10 days a Kyoto, there were 2,800 members available, if series of lectures and practical demonstrations needed, for rescue service.

31 .

11. Traming.—The leader of the guard arm units with approximately 2,800 men were in a usually received his training in schools con- good position to handle rescue operations as ducted at police stations, but in a few instances, far as manpower was concerned. However, he was trained by the leader of the auxiliary the lack of proper rescue equipment, transpor- police and fire unit. It was then his duty to tation, and specialized training in rescue tech- instruct the members of his arm. niques greatly oflfset any advantage which 12. Operational control and procedure.—The might have accrued from the large complement. method of maintaining operational control of Statements by Kyoto leaders in the rescue the auxiliary police and fire unit in Kyoto was service readily confirmed what has already been identical to the procedures described in the stated in the Osaka and Kobe field reports, Osaka field report. namely, that the rescue services would never have been able to perform satisfactorily, if Features Common to Both Organizations Kyoto had been hit by such devastating raids 13. Location of casualties.—The same meth- as Osaka and Kobe were compelled to undergo. ods and procedures for locating trapped vic- The demolition of heavily constructed buildings tims as depicted in the Osaka and Kobe field by high-explosive bombs would have created a reports were carried out in Kyoto. In addi- situation far beyond the capabilities of the tion, the statement was made that in the very rescue services. few instances in which the guard rescue unit Post-Raid Clearance performed actual services, the leader requested all persons in the immediate vicinity to be quiet 1. Introduction.—The general pattern of pre- so that the groans of trapped victims could be fectural and city planning for clearing streets heard in order to determine their locations. and highways, repairing roads and bridges, and 14. Rescue technique.—In Kyoto, as in Osaka for executing restoration measures in Kyoto and Kobe, the only method used for extricating followed the broad outline described for Osaka trapped victims was the debris clearance and Kobe. Minor differences in emphasis re- method. flecting the attitudes of Kyoto officials will be 15. Equipment.—The identical, simple and pointed out below, together with brief accounts crude equipment as described in the Osaka and of the clearance and repair plans made there Kobe field reports was standard rescue equip- in order that basic uniformity of preparations ment in Kyoto. In the early part of the war, in the three localities will be made evident. At the guard rescue unit had only two trucks, the end of the discussion, there will follow a each capable of transporting 16 persons, so to commentary on the estimated effectiveness of alleviate this deficiency an agreement was made the plans, had Kyoto been obliged to put them with the trucking association to provide trans- into full operation. portation, but the poor mechanical condition 2. Post-raid clearance, a. Preparation for and lack of replacement parts for the trucks mass air raids. (1) Administrative organiza- compelled the unit to depend principally upon tion.—In the prefecture, the entire public works bicycles and their own feet. organization was included in the table of or- Comments ganization for air defense, with no change except in the name of the public works department

16. The guard rescue unit and the auxiliary (dobokuka) ; under the air-defense set-up, it police and fire units did not perform rescue was called department of construction with the services in factories as this service was carried head of the department made a member of the out by factory fire and first-aid units (refer to air-defense staff. The sections thereunder, op- Factory Air-Raid Protection Section of this erations (kanrika), roads (doroka), rivers and report) port (kakoka), embankment (saboka), and city 17. Both units were completely lacking in planning (toshi keikakuka) remained the same heavy rescue equipment and motor transporta- in operations and personnel. In the city the tion which seriously affected rescue operations. public works office was placed on the city's air- 18. The guard rescue unit with a complement defense table of organization but it made no of 151 men, and the auxiliary police and fire changes of any kind. The city public works

32 bureau (shifietsu. kyoku) had the following sec- 5 to 10 men in a ward could have been called because "the shortage of food made it tions : general affairs (shomuka) , civil works upon hard." In (shisetsuka) , operations (gyomuka) , and city impossible for the men to work water (jogesnika). In the air-defense ar- addition, it was found that road laborers were rangement of prefectural offices, the public working 1 week out of 4 for the city, and the works operations were subject to control by rest of the time for factories through private the police when necessity demanded, and the city arrangements with the ward road boss. Such forces automatically became subject to the men were discharged when this fact was dis- same authority at the will of the prefecturally covered by the city authorities. controlled police. The prefecture anticipated (3) Equipment.—The prefecture owned 15 no need for emergency road clearance in the rollers in January 1943, of which 9 were un- 17 districts outside Kyoto City and Maizuru, usable because of lack of spare parts, and the and held those cities fully responsible for clear- 6 still in service were taken by the Army for ing their own streets as a result of air raids. airfield construction. The Army likewise bor- bowed the city's pneumatic drills, as well as its (2) The emergency public works construc- rollers. remaining equipment consisted tion group (Okyu Doboku Kosaku Dan).—The 6 The prefecture public works department required of hand tools, of which there was a sufficient supply, in fact than the equipment each of its 17 branch offices to organize the greater emergency public works construction group in requirements recommended by the Ministry of Affairs as the necessary for January 1944. It informed the local heads of Home minimum the group that they were to take orders from road clearance and repair. their respective local police authorities, and (4) Mutual aid.—That mutual aid was not transmitted the plan which provided for organ- considered important in mass air raids was in- ization of the workers into brigades, battalions dicated by the virtual disregard on the part of and companies. There was no follow-through the prefectural and city public works depart- by the prefecture, however, either on the or- ments of the training maneuvers suggested by ganization recommended or the training sug- the Ministry of Home Affairs. It was the feel- gested by the Ministry of Home Affairs. There ing of the city officials that each ward of the were no "maneuvers" held and no reports made city was fully capable of handling ,its own street beyond those of normal peacetime operations. clearance problems, and that, if, by any chance, The city held maneuvers once a year, but con- additional aid were needed in a given ward, help sidered them of little value, and regarded train- could be summoned from another ward with- ing a matter of going through motions to con- out making any more elaborate arrangements form with instructions from the Ministry of than those already in effect for peacetime op- Home Affairs. Neither the prefecture nor the eration. Likewise, in their planning for street city added any new personnel to the road clear- clearance, as in street repair, the city officials ance forces with the one exception of civil en- did not contemplate calling upon the prefecture gineering students from Ritsumeikan Univer- for help. sity, who organized to assist in clearance and (5) Role of the police.—The general rule repair emergencies. It was stated, however, regarding clearance throughout the city and that the motive for this student help was that the prefecture was that, if a job of clearance of providing laboratory experience for the stu- were a small one, the local police authorities dents rather than assistance to harrassed road would handle it with help immediately at hand,

crews. The city provided for 1 company of i. e., auxiliary police and fire units (keibodan) the emergency public works construction group, or neighborhood group (tonari gumi) person- 25 to 30 men, in each of the 7 yards. There nel. If the problem were serious, the emer- were no more than 20 actually listed for each gency public works construction group was to ward and of these some were only names of be called out through a call from the local police persons which had been kept on the rolls even station to the prefectural police headquarters after the individuals had been conscripted by which issued the necessary orders to the public the army. The city officials stated that in Au- works officials. gust 1945, had there been an emergency, hardly b. Operations.—In none of the minor bomb-

33 ing incidents was there and post-raid emer- next morning and the damage was repaired by gency clearance necessary beyond the routine noon." This was the only hit on the water activity of the local auxiliary police and fire system and there were no hits on streetcar in- units. stallations. No plans were made for the repair

3. Emergency repair of roads and bridges.— of buildings necessary to the public welfare. The prefectural and city repair set-up was the It was thought that in the absence of repair same as that for clearance in organization, per- materials, it would be best to plan for use of sonnel, training, equipment, and the authority the buildings that escaped damage. exercised by the police. Materials were gath- 5. Demolition.—Demolition was left to the ered by the prefecture for emergency purposes, auxiliary police and fire units and, under police but were not distributed to strategic points as supervision, to the emergency repair organiza- in the case of Kobe. The city made no effort tion. No training was provided for anticipated along this line whatsoever on the grounds that emergency demolition, but it was thought that there were no materials to be gathered and dis- the practice gained by the auxiliary police and patched. As in Osaka and Kobe, the police firemen who had helped in the demolishing of organized and were authorized to call out the houses for the fire-breaks operations would be emergency repair organization (kinkyii kosaku adequate. Since the structures in Kyoto were tai) for road or bridge repair. It was felt that mainly of wood, the planning contemplated lit- auxiliary police and fire units were quite capable tle need for demolition. No thought was given of making temporary repairs to roads since "no to the use of dynamite because it was unob- training is needed for temporary restoration." tainable. bridges hit, either in the city or out- No were 6. Salvage.—There was no city official side of it, no roads were damaged in the areas agency for the salvaging of materials from outside of the city, and the city streets receiving buildings destroyed or damaged by air attack, slight damage were repaired by the regular city but there was a section for collection of usable road crews without more than the ordinary materials (shigen kaishu) in the prefectural amount of delay. department of commerce, the responsibility of 4. Emergency repair of other installations.— which included post-raid salvage. There was The prefecture held itself responsible for re- no post raid salvage accomplished after the pairs to roads and bridges outside of the cities three small raids on Kyoto City, but the sec- of Kyoto and Maizuru ; the municipal water tion operated a program of scrap collection system and streetcar system were city responsi- prior thereto. In October 1942, a metals col- bilities. Each of these public utilities set up lecting control company (kinzoku kaishu tosei its own emergency public works construction kaisha) was set up under the authority of the group, organized along the same lines as that section, with about 200 laborers and 70 office for roads and bridges. No new personnel was workers. Up to March 1945, some 5,000 tons added, and no special training was given to the of metal had been collected (temple bells, regular maintenance men. The only incident statues, cooking utensils, stoves, bridge rail- requiring the emergency services of either of ings, radiators) and sent to war industries. these groups was that of a bomb hit on the The law respecting scrap remaining unclaimed Umamachi section of the city. The story as on burned property, quoted in the Kobe re- told by the chief of the city water works section port, would have been put in operation had follows : "When the firemen noticed a drop in there been heavy raids on Kyoto, but there their pressure as they were fighting a fire in was nothing salvageable from the light raids the area, it was thought that a water main on the city. might have been hit, but since it was at night, 7. Comments.—a. The attitude toward air- and there were no lights, it was difficult to see. raid precautions as observed in Kyoto 214 Someone was sent to investigate. There was months after the end of hostilities among offi- a river nearby and the sound of water flowing cials charged with the responsibility of re- from a broken pipe was mistaken for the sound storing roads and bridges as well as public of the river. The water from the ruptured utilities, gave the impression, at first glance, main flowed all night, but it was turned off the of indifference to the calamitous possibilities of

34 6 mass air attack that had become actuaUties in quarters of the Ministry of Home Affairs in cities hardly 10 minutes away by air. Part of Tokyo. The city officials went out of their this attitude may have been a postwar develop- way to make it plain that the city operated ment springing from the fact that Kyoto es- "independently" of advice from Tokyo, and caped serious bombing and may not have ac- took its injunctions as "suggestions and not curately reflected the feelings of the officials orders." The public works officials of the pre- while the war was still in progress. One city fecture said that the national government was official, when asked why no effort was made to of no help to them. They sent an observer to obtain extra personnel or equipment for street watch practice maneuvers of the emergency clearance and repair emergencies, stated that public works construction group in Osaka pre- "we had no need of them here." However, fecture, but did not think them sufficiently that manner of projecting present knowledge worthwhile to repeat the performance with the backward to explain previous inadequacies can- groups in Kyoto prefecture. The air-defense not be taken at its face value, and the lack authorities planned for auxiliary police and of preparation must be further explained. It fire units to take care of immediate post-raid is perfectly true that road building and bridge clearance and repairs, but even elementary in- repairing equipment was scarce, and that con- formation required to effect these, available scription made labor hard to find, but far more from the public works specialists, was never could have been done by way of training volun- transmitted. teer auxiliaries and perfecting plans for emer- c. On the 9th and 10th of October 1945, a gency service by personnel already at hand. It flood damaged several bridges in the vicinity of is probable that, after viewing the destruction Kyoto, and, in an effort to determine whether wrought in neighboring cities, officials felt that the prefectural repair crews had gained any- further preparations were useless, for a spirit thing from their wartime alert, the public- of resignation was observed in all of the officials works officials were questioned on this point. interviewed. Such an attitude may have been They said that there was no perceptible dif- furthered by the conviction, quite prevalent in ference in efficiency than as though the war had Kyoto, that the city would be spared. In that not occurred, and as though the emergency connection it was stated that persons who had public works construction group had not been formerly headed for shelters began to stand in organized at all. The net result of the war- the streets to watch the passing parade of time planning centering around this group in B-29's. But, on the other hand, the rule that the three cities studied seems to boil down to members of the emergency public works con- three results: (1) The giving of a new name struction groups, with the few trucks they had, to public words personnel; (2) the establish- should assemble at ward headquarters upon ing of possibilities for mutual aid (though the sounding of the air-raid warning was never only half-heartedly carried out in Kyoto plan-

relaxed, and it was stated that the members of ning) ; and (3) the extension of police autor- the groups always responded immediately to ity over the groups. There was nothing to in- the calls. dicate that either the city or prefecture had b. Both in the city and in the prefectural made preparations that would have rendered government, however, there was a marked de- the effect of a mass raid on Kyoto any less preciation of the air-raid precautionary meas- destructive than those inflicted upon Osaka or ures advocated by the air-defense general head- Kobe. 713045—47—

35 IV. PROTECTION OF FACTORIES, UTILITIES, INSTALLATIONS, AND BUILD- INGS DEVOTED TO PUBLIC USE

Factory Air-Raid Protection geographical lay-out and its temporary wooden and steel-frame type of construction. Divided 1. Introduction.—The purpose of a brief in- into four subunits under the direct control of dustrial study in the Kyoto area was to observe the general manager of the plant and two as- in a given case, such as the Mitsubishi Aircraft sistants, it contained one innovation that was Engine Plant, the plans for, and efficiency of, a departure from the commonly used plan, in an air-raid protection organization of a factory that the permanent guard department, a located in an area upon which no extensive air- strongly staffed and well equipped casualty raid strikes were made. The above-mentioned and first-aid group and the repair department plant was selected as an example study (exhibit were held together in a permanent subunit I) for the reason that it had been badly dam- rather than dispersed throughout the rank and aged and moved from the Nagoya area to its file of subordinate war emergency air-raid present site as a part of the new Japanese plan groups of the organization. of April 1945, for industrial dispersion. It was representative of the new wartime emer- a. Siibunit No. 1, covering a relatively small gency type of construction and lay-out and was but highly important group of buildings, was the sole assembly plant in Japan for a particu- divided into three administrative sections only lar style of aircraft engine. It was built and one of which, section No. 1, was organized and active. Sections owned by the Japanese government on its pres- No. 2 and No. 3 were planned ent site but operated as plant unit No. 8 of the and could be activated quickly if air-raid emer- powerful Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd., gencies so dictated. Section No. 1 of this sub- which owned the machine tools and equipment. unit was further divided into four groups, namely, the first aid, fire fighting, fire pumping, 2. Control and responsibility. While res- — and liaison groups, organization and duties of ponsibility for adequate plant protection meas- which are fully described in exhibit I. ures rested with the owner and operator, the b. Subunit No. 2 was organized similarly to Munitions Ministry, the Army and Navy and subunit No. 1 except that it contained only the prefectural government exercised control of two sections. No. 4 and No. 5, but with four plans and policy for air-raid protection, the groups in each section. It was charged with latter governmental body supervising the execu- the protection of a large group of factory as- tion of the plan. sembly buildings including several storage a. Following the disastrous experience of warehouses located in the central portion of Mitsubishi plant in early raids this the Nagoya the plant. and the bombing of a sister plant (No. 14) lo- c. Subunit No. 3, comprising four sections, cated 30 miles north of Kyoto, the management Nos. 6, 7, 8, and 9, was the largest unit in the took a serious attitude toward the perfecting plant protection organization and covered a and training of a sizable factory protection or- wide area at the northwest corner of the plant ganization in this plant. They did not share the property, comprising all of the assembly plants illusion that beautiful Kyoto with its temples where new employees were trained in the art and shrines would be spared, as did the pre- of part finishing and assembly, and also the fectural officials of Kyoto. The general man- dormitories which housed some 2,500 employees. ager of this important plant of 10,000 em- Each section of this subunit was subdivided ployees assumed personal charge of all protec- into the same groups as section 1 of subunit tion matters and was chief of the air-raid xNo. 1. protection organization. 4. Protective equipment.—This plant pos- 3. Organization.—This plant followed the sessed, both in type and quantity, the best fire- general plan and outline of a typical Japanese fighting equipment, casualty and first-aid sta- factory air-raid protection force, but introduced tion appliances and interior communication certain pertinent variations, adapting them to facilities that could be obtained in Japan for the peculiar needs of this type of industry, its a high priority war production plant. Motor-

36 .

covering each of ized fire pumpers of 500 g.p.m. capacity, and and went through evolutions air-raid pro- the portable hand-drawn 120 g. p. m. gasoline- their posts of duty. The entire driven pumpers, as well as the large supply of tection force of the factory practiced five times condi- Japanese fire-fighting tools of all kinds, while per month simulating actual air-raid good, were not sufficient to provide adequate tions. protection for the number of buildings included 6. Air-raid shelters.—This plant had erected in this plant, or to cope with the conflagration two shelters of reinforced concrete for the par- that would certainly result from fires in this ticular use of management and their immediate type of wood building construction. Proper staffs which might have been considered to be interval was practiced in the erection of these up-to-date in design, (paragraph 9, exhibit I) buildings, which would prove of great assist- The employees of the plant were afforded only ance in fire fighting and control of an average the small, shallow dugout type of shelter, ca- fire, but a saturation raid of incendiary type pable of holding not more than six to eight per- bombs would have caused a complete loss in this sons within the plant yard, but, in the case of plant area. The roof construction of the in- apprentice workers and female employees, they dustrial saw-tooth type, covered with quarter- could have taken to the nearby mountain foot- inch corrugated asbestos sheathing, would not hills for protection on the first alert. This in- have prevented perforation by incendiary dustry was just another example of Japanese bombs, but would have provided roof levels on disregard for adequate protection of human life which incendiary bombs could accumulate and against air raids even in a vital industrial plant make extinguishment by the fire-fighting forces where the safety of workers was tantamount to difficult. the continuity of production so badly needed to

a. Water' supply for fire-fighting purposes keep the war machine in motion. Such protec- was supplied through 6-inch mains from the tion as was provided could not accommodate city of Kyoto and delivered through the yard more than 2,000 persons at any one time of a grid system at not more than 15 pounds per total number of approximately 7,000 on a day square inch pressure. This was supplemented shift and 3,000 on the night. by the introduction of gasoline driven pumps 7. Air-raid warning system.—Due to the set in the plant lines which brought the pres- suburban location of this plant with respect to sure in the hydrants up to 45 pounds per square the nearest center of population, air-raid sirens inch. Even with the addition of some 27 static and fire bells were not deemed necessary by the water-supply pools ranging from 500 to 100,000 management for exterior use, the method em- gallons capacity, the water supply would have ployed for the alerting of employees being a di- been insufficient to cope with a major fire, espe- rect telephone call from the control center to cially in view of the remote location of some each subunit station which was relayed to all of the statis supply. section posts. The personnel of these units, b. Automatic sprinkler protection, generally when alerted, would then sound small bells dis- recognized in American factories as the first persed throughout the manufacturing areas of line of protection, was not installed or even the plant. Air-raid intelligence was received contemplated in the construction of this new over the public radio and by telephone from factory. the central police headquarters of Kyoto prefecture. Although this plant did not suffer 5. Training.—Under the guidance of the 30 period of its full-time paid firemen of the plant fire brigade, any air-raid strikes during the assisted by the firemen of the prefectural police, operation, it did receive as many as 11 air- air-raid defense all employees of the plant engaged in fire-fight- raid alerts, at which time the ing and fire-pumping groups were given exten- forces sprang into action and the employees sive training concerning their duties. Many took shelter, indicating the adequacy of the employees in addition to those comprising the warning system for this type of industry. first-aid groups of each section of the air-raid 8. Protective lighting and concealment.— protection force were taught the rudiments of This plant depended upon power supplied from first-aid practice. The fire-defense forces the outside and its transformer station con- drilled three times weekly with their equipment trolled all lighting and power from this central

37 point so that during night operations lighting- with the result that these structures were could be completely controlled, as well as power highly inflammable and vulnerable to incendi- to moving machines. Certain administrative of- ary raids. fices as well as one room in the office group Air-Raid Protection of Public Buildings housing the air-raid control center were protected by means of black-out curtains and light 1. Introduction.—The purpose of the survey baffles. Little attempt was made to conceal of public buildings in Kyoto was to determine the plant by a pattern of camouflage painting, the adequacy of their air-raid protection prep- as it was easily distinguishable from the air arations and organizations in an area which by the pattern of its saw-tooth roof construc- had not been heavily bombed and to make an tion, although the stacks from the furnaces estimate of the probable efficacy of such or- were painted a black and white color combina- ganizations in the event of serious air raids. tion. For those purposes, the Kyoto Imperial Uni- versity (Exhibit the Hotel (Exhibit 9. Dispersal plans.—This industry was one J), Miyako of those in the important system of war pro- K), the Daiken office building (Exhibit L), and duction plants selected by the Japanese Minis- St. Agnes Episcopal Church and Girls' School try of Munitions for dispersal to rural areas on (Exhibit M) were selected as representative April 4, 1945. On the following day, the move- examples of their particular fields. ment of certain machine tool operations was 2. Types of buildings selected.—Kyoto Im- started toward the surrounding foothills to be perial University was the largest institution reinstalled in schools, small shops, and private of learning in Japan, composed of some 227 warehouses. At the end of the war this plan buildings covering an area of 140 acres. The had been 80 percent completed, but production Daiken building was the largest and most mod- suffered seriously as a result of the interrup- ern of its kind in the city. It was a concrete tion. and steel structure, housing 90 offices dis- 10. Comments.—The attitude of complacency tributed over 8 floors, each floor having an so prevalent in Kyoto was not shared by factory area of 3,856 square feet. The Miyako Hotel executives, nor had they resigned themselves was of the ultra exclusive type, elaborate in de- to the futility of resistance as had some of their sign, and equipped with extensive gardens, com- neighbors who had traveled to bombed areas. fortable lounges, spacious dining and banquet Many Kyoto factories had been transferred rooms, and game and recreation halls. It had from stricken areas and plant personnel had 95 guest rooms, both Japanese and American a vivid picture of the potentialities of Ameri- styles. St. Agnes Church and Girls' School was can air attack. As was usual in other areas, an Episcopal missionary unit comprising 1 con- fire-fighting equipment was provided, but in in- concrete and steel, 4 wooden, and 3 brick struc- sufficient quantity to be effective against large- tures within an area of approximately one- scale incendiary raids. Although Kyoto had quarter of a city block. an excellent water supply, experience indicates 3. Control and responsibility.—The responsi- that had the city been the object of a full-scale bility for air-raid protection rested with the attack, the drain would have been so heavy on administrative head of each of the institutions the system that plants on the outskirts of the under discussion, over-all control being exer- city would have been left with only static sup- cised by the prefectural government, except in plies which were inadequate. The insufficiency the case of the university which received orders of the Japanese plan for adequate shelters for from both the prefecture and the Ministry of industrial personnel was nowhere better dem- Education. Varying degrees of interest were

onstrated than in Kyoto. Shelters afforded evidenced among the responsible leaders : The were of flimsy earth and wood or slit trenches, university approached the problem in an and were insufficient in number to protect even apathetic manner, while the hotel made a con- a small portion of plant personnel. Instruc- scientious effort to develop an effective protec- tions were generally to flee to the hills or rice tive plan. The office building and the church paddies. Shortage of building material forced fitted somewhere in between the two extremes. factories to rely on wood as a building material 4. Organization.—The university, having

38 over 900 instructors and a student body of 7,- maintenance departments where they existed, 000, had a fairly extensive organization with although they were called repair squads in the an air-raid protection unit (boeidan) for each air-raid protection table of organization. In of the 16 academic departments. Each unit the case of the university assistance was ob- was the responsibility of the head of one of the tained from students who were assigned to the departments, and consisted of fire, guard, emer- repair squads (maintenance department). gency madical, repair, gas defense, and liaison e. Liaison squad.—The duties of this squad squads. The other institutions had less com- consisted of carrying messages between air- prehensive organizations, the church, for rair protection services and control centers. example, having five squads, one each for fire- Only the university and the church provided for fighting, first aid, guiding, spotting, and liaison, such a squad in their organizations. only and the office building and hotel providing f. Gas-protection squad.—A gas-protection two squads, one for fire and the other for first squad was included in the university's set-up aid. but its equipment was meager and rudimentary a. Fire-fighting squads.—In general, fire- and the training of its personnel was sketchy. fighting squads were inadequately trained, and The other institutions ignored gas protection their equipment consisted largely of hand entirely. pumps, fire beaters, mats, buckets, and sand, 5. Protective equipment.—In addition to the scarcely the implements required to cope with ordinary fire-fighting hand implements and cer- even minor fires, to say nothing of conflagra- tain fixed installations already mentioned, there tions. The hotel and office building had interior was some mobile fire-fighting apparatus avail- standpipes equipped with linen hose on each able, although it was of questionable value in floor, which would have served to combat nor- most cases. There was a unit of the city fire mal fires only. The church was too late in at- department stationed on the university's cam- tempting to secure fire-fighting equipment on pus, which had a motorized pump, mounted on the competitive open market with the result a 1926 Chevrolet chassis, and two hand-drawn that its equipment was negligible. motorized pumps, but none of the pumps was b. Guard squads.—At the university the in operating condition at the time of this re- guard squads were charged with spotting and port and there was no hose visible. The church reporting enemy aircraft, with guarding dormi- had one hand pump of 20 g. p. m. capacity, tories and valuable equipment, with light con- which was certainly incapable of extinguishing trol and guiding. Although these squads were anything more than the smallest of incipient not provided in the other organizations under fires. discussion, some of their functions were dele- 6. Water supply.—The water supply in all gated to other air-raid protection squads, e. g., of the buildings was obtained from the munici- the guiding and spotting squads in the church's pal system which produced a pressure ranging set-up. from 40 to 70 pounds per square inch depending c. Emergeyicy -medical squads.—The univer- on location in city, which might have been con- sity's emergency medical service was adequate sidered adequate for ordinary fires. Static in view of the fact that it had at its command supplies were not plentiful, 33,000 gallons the staff, equipment, and other resources of (126,000 liters) being available at the hotel, the university hospital. Likewise the squad 2,000 gallons at the office building, and none of St. Agnes church was benefited by the fact at the university and the church. Even if that its girl students had been trained in first there had been adequate water, the equipment aid by the local Red Cross hospital, but the would not have been able to make use of it. emergency medical personnel at the hotel and 7. Training.—Training was conducted 3 office building had little or no training and only times a year at Kyoto University by 18 police crude equipment. and fire officials from the prefectural head- d. Repair squad.—In a sense, no repair squad quarters. Classes lasted 1 hour and 20 min- was formally established as such in any of the utes and consisted of a 20-minute lecture and subject air-raid protection organizations, re- a 1-hour drill and demonstration period. Sub- pair being effected by the normal building and jects taught were fire fighting, aircraft recog-

39 nition, and decontamination. Training ot the building; by telephones and shouting at the city fire department unit at the university was hotel ; and by messengers at the school. All infrequent and towards the end of 1944 was buildings used the radio to keep informed re- discontinued as a waste of time. In the case garding the progress of the raid after the air of the Daiken office building, the prefectural alert signal was given. Control centers were police visited it 3 times per year and conducted informal and lacked special equipment. They classes of 1 hour each covering basic fire-fight- were really only headquarters assembly points ing techniques. Drills were held twice a year used for administration purposes. Air-raid and were supervised by local fire department warning systems could be considered adequate, personnel. Both the Miyako hotel and St. and in all cases they included watchers and spot- Agnes' Church requested assistance from the ters who checked in at their control centers by prefecture on several occasions, and although telephone or by messengers. they were never refused, no aid was ever forth- 10. Camouflage arid black-out. Camouflage coming. was nonexistent at three of the institutions and 8. Shelters.—Shelters for the university ineffectual in the case of the Daiken office were without exception inadequate and in some building, the management of which had toned cases, dangerous. Material used for the few down the attractive light colored exterior of in existence was wood and earth and, at best, their building with a dull black paint, a pro- they were no better than vegetable storage cedure of dubious value. Black-out precau- cellars. The basements in a few of the build- tions were practiced and portions of all buildings were used for shelters, but they could ac- ings had adequate black-out curtains. commodate only 2,000 persons and the remain- 11. Local assistance.—Arrangements were der of the people were told to flee to the hills made with local auxiliary police and fire units in the event of a raid. Shelters in the St. (keibodan) and neighborhood groups (tonari Agnes Church compound were two in number, gumi) for assistance in the case of the office accommodated 10 persons each, and were con- building, but such arrangements were nonex- structed like the ones at the university. The istent as far as St. Agnes Church and the basement of the one concrete building in the Miyoko hotel were concerned. The university church accommodated about 200 persons and expected no assistance but offered to send stu- the remainder of the students were sent home dents to neighboring units, if needed. or to the imperial palace grounds. The Daiken 12. Comments.—The air-raid protection of office building used two basements as shelters public buildings in Kyoto was inadequate. and the hotel used specially prepared rooms Equipment was totally insufficient and training which were equipped with wood shutters. In was infrequent to nonexistent. Shelters that general, shelters were inadequate in number were sufficient in capacity were makeshift as and none was gas-proofed. far as construction was concerned and, in some 9. Air-raid warning.—Air-raid warning was cases, shelters were so few in number that it received by means of the city sirens. This became necessary to send personnel to the hills warning was supplemented in the case of the for safety. Apathy was the keynote of most university and the office building by calls from programs and futility was apparent in all or- the Central Army headquarters and the pre- ganizations. The heavy raids on Osaka, Kobe, fectural police. The interior alarms were and Nagoya had had a profound effect on the handled by local siren in the case of the uni- persons interviewed and the general feeling was versity; by an electric bell system in the office that resistance to the inevitable was foolish.

40 ;

V. PASSIVE DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS AND PRECAUTIONS

Protective Lighting ter they were released in 1938, only more rigid application and enforcement as time went on. 1. Introduction.—The Light Control (toka In Kyoto, the first application of these regula- ransei) regulations issued in Kyoto were found tions, other than the drills mentioned above, to be practically the same as the regulations is- was immediately after Pearl Harbor. On De- sued in Osaka and included in that report as cember 8, 1941, all neon signs, all advertising exhibit N. This is understandable as local signs and other lights for advertising purposes regulations were all patterned after or copied and all unnecessary park lights were to be ex- from the regulations put out by the Ministry tinguished. This regulation was not rigidly of Home Affairs, and any changes made were enforced and some advertising lights were burn- to cover variations due to local conditions. The ing up to as late as July 1944. The next im- principal differences found between the condi- portant change was not made until February tions in Kyoto and those of the other two cities 28, 1943 when orders were given, on the basis studied to date was in the time of the tightening of instructions received from the Ministry of of the regulations, and in the degree of public Home Affairs, to extinguish all gate lights (the support of and cooperation with the program. only street lighting in the residential district Black-out violations were reported to be fre- streets) ; and all lights between intersections; quent in Kyoto, even after the major raids on to reduce the brightness of all others by re- Tokyo, while such violations were quite rare placing 60-watt lamps with 20-watt lamps; or in the other cities. These differences may be by other means to achieve this degree of bright- attributed to the conviction of the average per- ness reduction ; and to extinguish all lights used son, as well as the officials, that Kyoto would in show windows. This ruling was followed by not be bombed. a further restriction in April 1943, to have all 2. Training of the public.—As in the other indoor lighting units shielded to prevent direct cities studied, Kyoto had cooperated in the light from striking the window and thereby to Army's air-defense drills as far back as 1928 lessen sky glow. and at various times during the 1930's. These 4. Street lighting.—There were three sys- drills consisted almost solely of turning out the tems of street lighting in Kyoto: (a) On those lights for a short period at some designated streets having streetcar lines, the lighting was time. Similar drills using only the light con- the responsibility of the street railways depart- trol regulations as put out by the Ministry of ment of the city government; (b) on other Home Affairs (Osaka field report, Exhibit N), main streets, the lighting was the responsibility were held two or three times a year during of the street lighting department of the city the period from 1939 to 1941 inclusive. These and (c) on residential streets the only illumina- drills gave the public a chance to practice light tion was from lights located at the gate or en- control, the details of which were given to them trance to each dwelling and maintained by through newspaper articles, posters and pam- the resident. The major streets in Kyoto were phlets (Reference Item No. 19), also by litera- illuminated with a white glass globe unit, 2 ture, regulations, and talks handled through the to a pole, about 10 feet high, spread approxi- prefectural police—neighborhood group chan- mately 120 feet apart on the curb line in a nels (for organization of these distribution staggered arrangement. Late in the war, these channels see section II of this report) . Sam- enclosing globe units were extinguished and a ples of the material distributed through these black-out unit confining the light within a 140° channels are submitted as Reference Item No. cone was installed as a replacement at certain and the 21, table of contents of this reference essential points, such as intersection. One of together with an abstract of that portion of the these units is shown in exhibit 0. Lesser im- material on light control is attached as Exhibit portant streets were illuminated with a metal N. reflector unit spaced in the same manner. An 3. Enforcement.—As in Osaka, there was no illustration of one of these units is also included basic change in the light control regulations af- in Exhibit 0. Table 1 below gives data on the

41 street lighting provided by the street railways department.

Table No. 1'—Street lights in city of Kyoto along streetcar lines 7 residential lighting fixtures shields as early structed by the city of Kyoto in 1941, very lit- as 1941 ; others got them at the time the drive tle construction was accomplished until late was put on in April 1943 ; and others did not 1943 and the beginning of 1944 when an effort get them until the time of the serious raids on was made to accelerate the construction of the Osaka and Kobe in the spring of 1945. covered trench and tunnel-type shelters. This tardiness in the construction program was due 8. Factories.—Black-out curtains were installed in most factories and used rather re- mainly to the general belief that Kyoto would ligiously. There were no industrial fires in not undergo any heavy air attack, and that the any of the industries around Kyoto so there need for a great number of shelters was there- was no worry over extinguishing that kind of fore negligible. guiding beacon. d. The financial plan for the construction of public shelters was for the city to construct 9. Comments.—The feeling permeating Ky- and pay for the shelters and then be reimbursed oto early in the war that they would be im- for two-thirds of the cost by the national gov- mune from bombing, coupled with later realiza- ernment, but up to November 1945, the na- tion of the futility of their preparations as any tional had not paid any part of the defense against prolonged mass and area raids, government cost of construction. produced a laxity in the application and en- 3. Types shelters, a. forcement of light control that made Kyoto of Home.—The same type of home shelters as described in the Osaka a relatively well-lighted city compared to al- field reports generally con- most totally blacked-out nearby Osaka and and Kobe was Kobe. Public morale was helped considerably, structed in Kyoto. Each family had a shelter built under the home or in a nearby open space. and it is doubtful that the small amount of light escaping even at periods of greatest lax- b. Semipublic Shelters.—Basements of the ity would have been of much assistance to any more heavily constructed buildings were used enemy planes. as shelters for employees and the general public during daytime raids. Officials stated that Shelters they were not used at night as too few people 1. Introduction.—The purpose of this report were away from their homes and sufficient shel- is to describe the shelter policy handed down ter space was available in public shelters. by the Ministry of Home Affairs, to explain c. Public. (1) Uncovered trench. — This the manner in which Kyoto followed the policy, type of shelter was about 12 feet long, 5 feet to emphasize any deviations from it, and to de- to 6 feet deep, and 3 to 4 feet wide. They were pict the several types of shelters constructed constructed along the pavements, in the areas for family and public use in Kyoto. The chan- which had been made into fire breaks, and in nel of directives and authority followed the any other available open spaces. Most of this same lines as in Osaka and Kobe. The gen- type were reinforced with wooden beams. The eral trend was from the uncovered trench type capacity was from 10 to 15 persons and there to the covered trench type and then to the tun- were approximately 11,000 in Kyoto. The nel type. shelter planning section had drawn up plans 2. Development.—a. The responsibility' for to place roof coverings on these shelters but planning the shelter program in Kyoto was construction was never carried out. vested in the planning section of the prefec- (2) Covered trench.—These were the same tural government, while the enforcement of the general type of construction and capacity as program was vested in the prefectural police described in the Osaka and Kobe field reports. department. The city had built 6,600 of these shelters. b. City officials concerned with the construc- (3) Stations of subway railroad.—The station of shelters claimed that shelter space was tions of the subway railroad were not permit- provided for every individual in Kyoto. That ted to be used as shelters because the depth of conclusion was based on a count of family, covering over the subway structure was not public, and factory or business concerns' shel- considered to afford ample protection, inas- ters. much as it was not heavily reinforced. c. With the exception of the six shelters con- (4) Underground reinforced co7icrete pipe. 713045—47— 43 —-This shelter was constructed of reinforced earth. The shelters had electric lights but concrete pipe, 4 inches thick, with a diameter were not provided with seating or sanitary of 5 feet. It was placed on a concrete base of facilities. Page 86 shows an entrance to this 4 inches and was buried so that the top of the type shelter. (See Reference Item No. 24, pipe was at least 5 feet below the surface entitled "Specifications of Tunnel Type Air of the ground. In addition, 2 feet of earth Raid Shelter 1.) were placed on top, making a total roof cover- (6) Special shelters.—The prefectural gov- age of 7 feet of earth. Four sections of pipe ernment constructed shelters on the grounds were joined to give the shelter an over-all occupied by its buildings to provide protection length of approximately 50 feet. A wooden only for prefectural officials, while the clerical floor was installed, and benches were placed workers were compelled to seek protection in along each side, which provided seating capac- nearby public shelters of the covered trench ity for 50 to 60 persons. Entrance was pro- type. The most common of these shelters was vided by a concrete stairway leading from the rectangular in shape, constructed of concrete surface of the ground, all of which was en- approximately 8 inches thick, placed below the closed by a concrete structure 8 inches thick. ground surface and covered with 3 to 4 feet At the bottom of the stairway was an arrange- of earth. The inside dimensions were 15 feet ment of double wooden doors, 6 inches thick long, 8 feet wide, and 6 feet high, with a capac- and heavily reinforced, which led into the pipe ity of about 35 persons. The shelter was section of the shelter. At the other end of equipped with electric lights and two small ven- shaft, 4 feet the shelter was a vertical escape tilating shafts. However, it had only one en- 4 feet, of 12-inch concrete walls, equipped by trance and no seating or sanitary facilities (p. with an escape ladder. This vertical escape 86). shaft also served as a means of ventilation. 4. Comments.—a. The indiiferent attitude The shelter was equipped with electric lights toward a shelter construction program was and sanitary facilities. The city of Kyoto mainly due to the over-optimistic opinions of financed and constructed six of these shelters the military regarding the air defense of the in 1941. They afforded excellent protection homeland and the belief among local officials against incendiary bombs (page 84 and Refer- that the United States would not bomb histori- ence Item No. 23, Plans and Specifications of cal and cultural cities. Indicative of the lack Reinforced Concrete Pipe Shelter). of responsibility and preparation was that ade- Tunnel. In late 1944 and early 1945, (5) — quate shelter space was available to only about two tunnel-type shelters were constructed by 6,000 persons. the prefecture for Kyoto City in two hills lo- b. Only the reinforced concrete pipe shelters cated within the boundaries of the city. These and the two tunnel shelters provided adequate tunnels were approximately 8 feet wide, 6V2 protection and the value of the latter type was feet high, with the length varying according to offset by the distance the public had to travel to the location. The main tunnels were exca- reach them. All other types of shelters and vated from one side of the hill to the other the above-mentioned types gave no protection with branch tunnels constructed at right an- against suffocation if located in areas swept gles and so extended as to provide entrances by conflagrations. on all sides of the hills. In addition, other c. branches were built ofi" the main and branch Had Kyoto been subjected to the same type tunnels to a distance of about 25 feet. Heavy of saturation raids as other Japanese cities, it timbers reinforced the structures the capacity would have found itself in the same predica- of each being about 2,000 persons. The roof ment due to the shortage of adequate shelters coverage of each was from 60 to 75 feet of for the total protection of the public.

44 Concrete pipe buried in open lot. Built for the public by Kyoto City.

45 Concrete box type shelter H"p i" «-he front yard of the prefectnrp KnJlHing. Built for officials of Kyoto City.

Tunnel-type public shelter dug in the side of a mountain. Built by Kyoto Prefecture. (Kyoto City)

46 Gas Protection Service some protective clothing but that it was used for demonstration only by members of first-aid 1. Introduction.—Preparations in Kyoto for squads within the auxiliary police and fire units. gas defense began in 1934, 3 years after the There were no gas detection kits and no de- beginning of the "Manchurian Incident." contamination equipment. It was stated that After several years of war with the Allied 60 percent of the population provided them- forces, when there was no indication that the selves at their own expense with gas masks. use of gas was intended, interest waned to such The gas-defense section, however, gave no in- an extent that even paper plans for defense structions to the public in the proper use of were not worked out in any comprehensive de- gas masks. Such instructions as were given tail. In fact, the impression was gained that came from the district police headquarters, al- no defensive measures of any kind were se- though the informant was not clear as to how riously considered up to the time the outer this was done. The result was that a large perimeter of Japanese defenses was cracked portion of those who owned gas masks did not at Saipan. At Kyoto even the devastating know how to use them. No gas masks were raids upon Osaka, Kobe and Tokyo did not available for children, so that in case of attack seem to stir the authorities to a broad scale they would have had to rely upon damp towels defensive program. Although these raids in- over the face. spired some interest in protection against incendiary bombs, the interest in protection ORGANIZATION against gas was overshadowed by the more GAS-DEFENSE FOR KYOTO PREFECTURE imminent menace.

2. Organization and personyiel.—Plans for GOVERNOR gas defense were vested in the sanitation section which was originally in the police depart- health ADMINISTRATION ment but was later transferred to the DEPARTMENT department (p. 88). It was the plan, however, for the leader of gas-defense activities to work PUBLIC HEALTH SECTION in close liaison with the police department. The entire gas-defense organization consisted of administrative director and two assist- GAS DEFENSE FIRST-AID the SQUAD SQUAD ants, all of whom were pharmacists. One assistant was in charge of a section on gas de- MAN IN CHARGE OF MAN IN CHARGE OF tection, and the other of a section on gas decon- DECONTAMINATION GAS DETECTION tamination. The organization had no branches below the prefectural level, and consequently no Camouflage personnel either actual or contemplated. In 1. hitroduction. Local regulations on cam- case of a gas attack, it appeared that any defin- — ouflage (giso) were first released on August itive measures would have been carried out by 19, 1941, which were reprints of the pertinent the auxiliary police and fire units (keibodan) sections of the national regulations released at in the district police offices. Much confusion the same time by the Ministry of Home Affairs. developed from the fact that the sanitation As in Osaka, these regulations were classified section was transferred from the police depart- "secret" and were distributed only to chiefs of ment to the health department but the police the local police, managers of factories, and still continued to exercise some measure of con- owners of principal buildings. A copy of these trol, either officially or unofficially, and the gas- regulations freely translated, are included in defense service consequently received orders the Osaka field report as Exhibit S. from both sources. 2. Local Situation.—Theoretically, the de- 3. Equipment and training.—Except for gas cision as to which buildings, factories, or locali- masks, the report on this subject is almost ties should be camouflaged was the responsi- wholly negative. It was said that there was bility of the prefectural governor. Actually,

47 his responsibility was delegated in Kyoto to the head of the valley, a few miles above the point auxiliary police and fire section (keiboka) and where the Uji, Kamo, and Katsura rivers unite the technical help on camouflage was obtained to form the Yodo river. It was only a few by borrowing engineers from the building and miles north of a small lake and a few miles west construction section (kenchikiika) of the pre- of the end of Biwa Lake. It was surrounded fectural government. These engineers actually on the northeast and west by hills covered with made the decision as to which factories, build- verdant growth and the valley floor below ings and other points were to be camouflaged Kyoto was patterned with typical rice paddies. and their decisions were based solely on the A large race track and fair grounds just above one pamphlet issued by the Ministry of Home the river junctions, the emperor's palace and Affairs and on their own engineering "good grounds occupying several blocks almost in the common sense." None of these "experts" had center of the city, the several shrines and the had any special training, none had any infor- Y shaped railroad yards were all distinctive mation on camouflage tactics or technique features marking Kyoto. No attempt was worked out in Europe or elsewhere, other than made to camouflage any of them except the race what he picked up from an occasional item or track where the grandstands were darkened picture appearing in the newspapers. None but, characteristically, nothing was done to had ever flown over the locality to study the change the appearance of the oval track. city and the surrounding terrain or had had 5. Factory camouflage.—Sixty out of approx- access to aerial photographs to make this study. imately two hundred factories were camou- The Ministry of Home Affairs had one camouflaged in varying degrees, mostly by painting in flage expert who did fly over Kyoto once to a pattern effect and with attempts made to hide study it from the air and on the basis of his the straight lines of the edges of the buildings flight suggested the darkening of one or two and building shadows by plantings of shrubs additional buildings. and trees. The plants located at some distance 3. Types of camouflage.—Only three types of outside the city in an area where rice paddies camouflage were found in Kyoto and vicinity: might be expected had the paint applied in (a) The use of paint to darken buildings and block patterns to imitate the geometric pat- blend them into the background; (b) the use terns of the rice paddies, while others within of nets to screen a possible target; and (c) the the city used the block pattern to imitate the use of trees and shrubs to form a natural cam- appearance of the surrounding slum area roof ouflage. Painting was the means most exten- tops. Many factories located on the outskirts sively used and there was a great variety of of the town used checkerboard and other types types of patterns used, ranging from huge solid of patterns, some vividly contrasting in a man- blocks of one or two colors to checkerboard and ner which the "experts" thought would be ef- spiral or striped patterns. There was only fective. one use of nets and that was too hide the char- 6. Other camouflage.—Outside of factories acteristic rectangular pattern of the filtration there was very little additional camouflage used ponds at the waterworks. Plantings of shrubs except on the waterworks, observatory and were used as far as practicable at factories to race track already mentioned. Only 2 of the help break up the straight lines of the edges 15 larger office buildings were camouflaged. of the buildings and their shadows. The Min- Block patterns of dark green, dark brown, and istry of Home Affairs' publication did not men- black to hide the whiteness of their ceramic tile tion possible use of artificial fogs or smoke to finish were used. No camouflaging was at- achieve a camouflage and such possibilities had tempted on the 3 hospitals, 55 schools, or 8 never occurred to local officials. They had con- major shrines within the city. ceived the idea of using a light pattern a few 7. General comments.—Camouflage as worked miles down the valley to attempt to fake the out by the Ministry of Home Affairs was de- location of the town, but it was never carried signed for the type of raids the Japanese ex- the to planning stage. pected, namely ,the, sporadic type, typified by 4. Local topography and features.—Kyoto the Doolittle attack. No attempt was made or was located on a flat valley floor, almost at the contemplated to hide the city or any of the very

48 ;

distinctive landmarks mentioned above or even 3. Traffic.—Traffic rules also were similar to to study the problem of camouflaging the city those reported in the Osaka field report except as a whole. They studied only the treatment that in Kyoto streetcars were permitted to run of parts of it, individually, hoping to prevent through the alert period and even through part those parts from being singled out for attack; of the raid period, being required to stop only for example, the roofs and v^^alls of the larger when the planes were actually overhead. factories on the edge of town were painted in Traffic generally increased shortly after the rectangular block patterns to imitate the roofs alert and raid signals were sounded due to of nearby residences and, consequently, to hide people starting to move to shelters or to their these buildings. This camouflage was effective homes, and civilian-defense workers to their as a defense against the type of raid for which posts, but it thinned out rather soon and ceased it was planned, but it was worthless as a defense by the time planes were overhead. against the mass raids which were inflicted on 4. Guiding the public to shelters.—Public the Japanese cities. shelters were all marked with signs prepared by the city government. These signs were flat Conduct of the Public During an Air Raid boards measuring around 6 inches by 14 inches 1. Introduction.—Since Kyoto was not bombed and were hand-lettered "Public Shelter Capac- in the sense that Tokyo, Osaka, Kobe and other ity—People," with black paint on the raw cities were bombed, little information on this wood. The only markers to guide people at subject was obtainable. Kyoto had but two night were the occasional use of several daubs raids causing relatively minor damage, but had of white paint on each side of the entrance at door-knob height. one guided strangers to innumerable alerts which were caused by planes No the shelters except watchmen of public build- headed for other destinations. ings open at night, who generally remained near 2. Local Regulations.—Local regulations as the entrance of the building to indicate the loca- to how the public should conduct itself were tion of the shelter. No one was required to patterned after the regulations issued by the seek shelter and few actually did except at Ministry of Home Affairs, and described rather times when there was a mass fear of raids. fully in the Osaka and Kobe field reports, that 5. General comments. The people of Kyoto is, upon the sounding of the alert normal activi- — were very lax in their air-defense discipline ties were to be continued as far as practicable compared to the other cities studied to date. only those unengaged, the smaller children, sick Alerts were frequent, particularly late in the and aged were to start to move towards shel- due to planes headed for other destina- ters; factories, offices, and stores were to con- war tions, and, when raids did not develop people tinue as usual. . Upon the sounding of the raid alarm people were to move to shelters, and became convinced that Kyoto, due to its cultu- schools, offices, and stores were to close, but ral reputation, would not be bombed. Viola- factories were to continue working until the tions of black-out were frequent, people did not last possible moment. It was not mandatory enter shelters, and traffic frequently continued that people enter the shelters at any time, even to move even though the raid alarm had when the planes were overhead. sounded.

49 :

VI. EVACUATION AND WELFARE

Evacuation for such an evacuation, and this they were re- luctant to do without specific instructions from 1. Introduction.—a. Prior to August 11, Tokyo. • The opinion was freely expressed also, 1945 the city of Kyoto had no plan for the that inasmuch as Kyoto was a Japanese relig- evacuation of civilians, but on that date a plan ious and cultural center they did not believe (Exhibit P and Reference Item No. 25) was that the United States would bomb it, and, agreed upon and the effective date was set at therefore, it would be unnecessary to make August 25, 1945. It was never used inasmuch elaborate plans for the dispersal of civilians. as the cessation of hostilities came on August b. Change of policy. As early as February 15, 1945 and all preparations stopped, even the — the time of the bombings on Tokyo printing of the instructions which were to have 1945, at civilians voluntarily left the city. In fact been used. Although evacuation of civilians many the numbers were sufficiently large to attract was not contemplated prior to this time, provis- the attention of the officials and they, in turn, ions (Exhibit Q and Reference Item No. 26) attempted to dissuade further dispersal, fearing had been made for emergency welfare treat- that, if the voluntary evacuation continued, ment of air-raid sufferers in accordance with there would not be sufficient persons left to the provisions of the national law for the "Re- fight fires in the event there was an incendiary lief of Wartime Sufferers" passed on February raid on their city. After the heavy raid on 24, 1942 and amended from time to time. An- Osaka in March 1945, there was considerable other precautionary measure taken was the talk again about leaving the city and once more group evacuation of school children in March efforts were made by the city officials to dis- 1945, following the heavy air raids on Osaka after the drop- and Kobe. courage such action. However, ping of the atomic bomb (August 6, 1945) on b. Definition terms. In discussing evac- of — Hiroshima the prefectural and municipal offi- uation welfare in this field report the term and cials conferred on August 11, 1945 and decided "evacuee" is that taken to mean person who to carry out a plan (Exhibit P and Reference as a precautionary measure left or moved from Item No. 25) for dispersal of the nonessential the city at his to other own convenience some persons as of August 25, 1945, which plan, how-

destination ; whereas refugee, or sufferer as ever, was never carried out. the Japanese use the term, was one who had 3. The proposed plan discussed August 11, become an air-raid victim or sufferer by reason 19i5.—a On the orders of the governor the of damage to his home by bombs or fire or de- municipal officials had made an inventory of struction of his home to create a fire break. the persons who would be evacuated, and of Evacuation of Civilians where they planned to go (Exhibit R and Ref- erence Item No. 27). Following the decision 2. Policy. a. large — Kyoto was not one of the on August 11, 1945 to inaugurate a plan for cities designated by the Ministry of Home Af- dispersal, the municipality started printing the fairs to carry out a plan for the dispersal of its plan and necessary certificates for changing nonessential citizens, and, lacking any such in- districts. It was planned that instruction pam- structions both the prefectural and municipal phlets were to be distributed to the ward offices, officials felt that this area was relatively safe and civilians were expected to come and get from air attack. As long as the national gov- them. The essentials of the plan for evacua- ernment had not ordered dispersal, they had tion of civilians which was proposed to be put

not made any plans for it. One other element, into effect were the municipal officials admitted, influenced them (1) Evacuation was to be voluntary but in their decision not to initiate a plan for the strongly recommended. dispersal of civilians and that was the question (2) Evacuation was to be made to relatives of expense. Unless such a move was ordered in the prefecture or nearby prefectures. by the government, the prefecture and munici- (3) If no relatives, the city was to make a pality would be obliged to bear the expenses plan to provide housing within the prefecture.

50 . :

(4) Priority was to be given to the nonessential people in the city (same groups as in Osaka and Kobe). (5) For those who were not needed in the city, removal to agricultural districts in groups was to be carried out as quickly as possible. (6) For those who were required to remain in the city, accommodation for group housing was to be set up by the city. (7) The designated evacuation areas were Kyoto City and Maizuru City (site of a naval base in the prefecture) (8) The city was to establish an evacuation headquarters which was to issue evacuation certificates, advise on policies and attend to all other business in connection with evacuation. (9) Removal evacuation certificates were to be distributed by the ward leaders. (10) Free transportation was to be given to persons and baggage. (11) Receiving center councils were to be set up, giving guidance on the matter of securing houses and rooms and urging a positive back- to-the-farm policy for those who had relatives on farms. (12) Expenses were to be met from the pre- lectural budget. 4. Refugees.—There were two small air raids during 1945 but no figures were available as to the number of sufferers who left the city, it being the belief of the municipal officials that all found places within the city. However, there was a plan carried out for demolishing houses to create fire breaks which made it necessary for those persons made homeless to seek other quarters. The number of certificates permitting removal and destinations selected were reported as follows

Destination raid on Osaka was March 13, the first raid of major consequence on Kobe was March 17, and the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, in order to appreciate the sig- nificance of the dates of school group dispersion. Prior to those dates, it was estimated by the school authorities of the prefecture that about 2,000 pupils, accompanied by their parents or relatives had left the city. All pupils so dispersed had returned home on October 11, 1945. 7. Reception areas.—Due to the fact that the plan for dispersal of Kyoto school children was not initiated until March 1945, approximately 6 months after the completion of similar plans for Osaka and Kobe in neighboring prefectures, all available areas outside of Kyoto prefecture had been filled. It became necessary therefore to confine the reception areas for Kyoto school children to Kyoto prefecture. Temples, hotels, public halls, and school buildings were used in 144 villages throughout the prefecture to house the pupils, all living a group life rather than dispersed to individual homes and integrated into the community as individuals. 8. Statistics.—The counties to which the third to sixth grade pupils in groups from Ky- oto City and Maizuru were sent and the number in each are shown on the following page (Also

see Reference Item No. 30) . No data are available separating the figures between Koto City

County : were re-evacuated. No reason was given for city of Kyoto which had the responsibility of this. operating the welfare stations, published, for 11. Comments.—a. Peculiarly enough, Ky-: the use of ward leaders and other department oto, one of the large cities which was not devas- heads having any responsibility for welfare tated, had never been designated as an evacua- work, a compendium (Exhibit Q and Reference tion area and, therefore, lacking any specific Item No. 26) of all matters pertaining to the instructions from higher authority, the prefec- wartime damage protection law No. 71, pro- tural and municipal authorities had not made mulgated February 24, 1942. These instruc- plans for evacuation of nonessential persons tions were disseminated through the newspa- prior to August 11, 1945. The reasons for this pers, and verbally through the block associa- were: tions to those who might become air-raid suf- (1) Expense-—Unless the move was ordered ferers. by the national government, the prefecture and 2. Classes of .sujferers.—The air-raid suffer- municipality would have to bear the cost of ers in these instructions were divided into the evacuation. following three classes (2) Belief that because Kyoto was a Japa- a. Persons with relatives to go to. nese religious and cultural center the United b. Persons without relatives to go to. States would not bomb it. c. Persons whose work compelled them to in city. b. After the dropping of the atomic bomb on remain the Hiroshima (August 6, 1945) and Nagasaki After a raid, sufferers who had taken refuge

(August 9, 1945) decision was made to inaugu- in the welfare stations which were set up in rate a plan as of August 25, 1945, and printing schools, temples, and other prominent public of instructions was under way at the time of places, were to be immediately screened and

cessation of hostilities (August 15, 1945). In ( 1 ) those with relatives were to be sent to them advance of this, approximately 46,000, or about as quickly as possible; (2) those without rela- four percent, of the population evacuated the tives were to be furnished housing after those city on their own initiative because of impend- who were to remain in the city because of es- ing danger of air raids. Any evacuation of sential work had been taken care of; (3) and sufferers which might have become necessary if those who were to remain in the city because Kyoto had been bombed would have resulted in of essential work were to go to relatives, if a panicky, disorganized flight, inasmuch as within easy travel distance, or, if they had no there had been no public announcement of the relatives, they were to be put into temporary contemplated plan. buildings.

c. Instructions were received, however, for 3. Welfare stations.—In all, 141 emergency the evacuation of school children in groups to welfare stations were established throughout places outside the city. This was started the city with most of them located in school March 26, 1945 (the big raids on Osaka and buildings. These were to be the places to Kobe occurred on March 13 and 17, respective- which air-raid sufferers were to be brought, ly) and the second stage completed on August processed, given emergency first-aid, food, and 8, 1945 (atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima shelter. However, each sufferer was expected August 6, 1945). In all, approximately 40,000 to present his sufferer's certificate and ration pupils, or about 57 percent of the school popu- card for suflFerers (Exhibit T and Reference lation, were evacuated either in groups or had Item No. 29), to secure food and temporary accompanied parents. This proved a worth- shelter. These certificates were distributed in while precaution. advance through the medium of the block associations and neighborhood groups in anticipa- Post-Raid Emergency Welfare tion of air raids. Air-raid sufferers could re- food and shelter for a short 1. Responsibility.—It was not until March ceive emergency and during 18, 1945 that the prefecture published its war- period ranging from 3 to 5 days time damage rescue regulations which included that period they were expected to complete sections relating to emergency housing, sub- more permanent arrangements for their own prefec- sistence and welfare of air-raid sufferers. The welfare. The food was supplied by the 53 : tural police from their stores of previously necessary to use only four of these stations prepared packages and consisted of dried bread during two small raids, and under these condi- and rice balls. Members of the women's pa- tions they functioned very well in caring for triotic societies and other women's associations, approximately 2,200 sufferers. These stations all volunteers, assisted in preparing and serv- were not subjected to the severe test of heavy ing food to sufferers from the kitchens set up and continued attacks. in the schools which were serving as welfare stations. After this temporary relief period War Damage Claims the sufferers who had no place to go were to 1. Introduction.—The legislation and decrees be assigned by the police to group housing establishing all national wartime compensation which the city was planning to build for the for Japanese nationals in connection with death, purpose. Funds not only for the construction injury, or loss of property due to war causes of these group dwellings but also for the supply were such that no variation from place to place of emergency food were to be provided by the throughout the homeland should be expected in national treasury to the prefecture. The po- any aspect of their operation, except for sta- lice maintained a 2-day emergency ration at all tistics on number of policies issued (in the case times and the agricultural section of the pre- of casualty and property insurance), number fecture had a 5-day supply. If more were of claims paid on war insurance policies and needed, the police and the agriculture section on straight liability compensations provided by had the authority to order extra supplies from imperial decree. The insurance companies of the storage depots maintained by the agricul- Kyoto handled the issuance of policies and pay- tural and forestry ministry. The city had no ment of claims in exactly the same way as in funds of its own for food or clothing, but, inas- Osaka and Kobe. The sole differences were to much as there was very close cooperation be- be found in the response of the Kyoto people to the prefectural office the municipal tween and the insurance and compensation opportunities office, they did not anticipate difficulty any in furnished by the national government. The securing these items when needed. current report will describe a compensation 4. Statistics.—Only four of the welfare sta- law not mentioned in the earlier reports, and tions were actually set up for operation. At an account of compensation to persons dispos- these 4 stations it was reported 729 sufferers sessed by the fire-break program. were taken care of following a raid on January 2. War damage claims, a. War casualty in- 16, 1945 and an additional 1,500 after a small surance (Senso Shibo Shogai Hoken) —There raid on June 1945. 26, were 34 companies issuing this insurance in 5. Comfort stations.—At the time of the Kyoto. The life insurance companies made a heavy raids on Osaka and Kobe in March 1945, determined effort to induce the people to take the number of persons leaving those commu- out war casualty policies, although the fire and nities and passing through Kyoto was so large marine companies, which also handled the war that the city of Kyoto set up at the railroad sta- casualty policies made little effort in that re- tions a guidance agency and comfort station to spect. As a publicity stunt the mayor "took provide advice, a place to rest, immediate first out" a policy for the entire city, although of aid if needed, and for other needs of travellers. course that was no more than a gesttire since There were 3 such places in Kyoto, manned by the insurance required an individual applica- a corps of 20 to 30 volunteers from the police, tion and payment of premium. There was con- city officials and women's associations. These siderably less interest in insurance for life and places were very temporary and disbanded injury than there was in property damage in- after each major movement. No food was surance. Increased interest in war casualty available at them. insurance as the war progressed followed "u^ 6. Comments.—Profiting by lessons learned same general course as that for war dam ;, from the heavy air raids on Osaka and Kobe in insurance and will be discussed in (b) bel '

' March 1945, local officials established welfare but the fear of death and personal injury : aid stations, each equipped with emergency not increase proportionately with apprehensic; supplies of food, bedding, and the like. It was over property as the news from other citit 54 ; arrived in Kyoto and incendiaries came to be contents, for many household effects were re- regarded as the weapon that would be used moved from the city after the great raid on against the city if it were attacked. That at- Osaka. In spite of the fate of its neighboring titude prevailed despite the fact that the only cities, the percentage of persons in Kyoto tak- raids made on Kyoto were with high explosive ing out war damage insurance was less than bombs. Regarding the enforcement of the that for either Osaka or Kobe. Two reasons national law restricting to 5,000 yen the amount were given by insurance officials for this fact: of war casualty insurance issuable to one per- The first was that Kyoto was not subject to the son, officials said that there were instances in strong winds typical of the two seaside cities other cities of a person's having taken out poli- and the second, that the people figured their cies with several companies for a total amount city "would not be bombed inasmuch as it was in excess of the 5,000 yen limit but there was not a military target." All claims from the no known case in Kyoto. Such practice, how- three small raids on the city had been paid as ever, was eliminated by a law of July 1, 1945 of the time of this report, with no cases requir- which directed that all national war insurance ing the referee services of the control associa- taken out by any individual should be issued tion, closest branch of which was in Osaka. by a single company. c. Air-defense service alloumnce (Boku Fu- b. War damage insurance (Senso Hoken Rin- jisha Fujorei).—Despite the fact that there ji Sochi).—Only the fire and marine companies were nearly 200 casualties from the 3 minor issued this insurance, and there were 16 such raids on Kyoto, the finance section in the pre- companies in Kyoto. From the time the war fectural office, responsible for paying claims damage insurance act took effect in January under the air-defense service allowance law 1942, until April 1944, there was negligible covering air watchmen and auxiliary police interest on the part of the public in spite of the and fire units, had paid only one claim as of fact that the public was informed about the November 6, 1945. This was in the case of a i!^-ovisions of the law by the wide distribution 35-year-old man in the air-defense observation corps (boku kanshitai) of a descriptive leaflet (Exhibit U). No ap- who died of heart fail- F/reciable increase in interest resulted from the ure while running to man his lookout post upon Doolittle raid on Tokyo in April 1942. There hearing the air-raid warning. His family was was a large increase in April and May of 1944, compensated in the amount of 1,000 yen. when the war damage law was revised to cover About 10 days elapsed between the date of filing the claim and the date of It earthquake in addition to war-caused fire dam- payment. was stated that age, and was reduced in cost. One reason for most of the casualties from the small the increase was the fact that the law required raids on Kyoto occurred among members of the neighborhood groups (tonari all new applicants for private fire insurance gumi). policies to take out war damage insurance also, d. Wartime disaster protection (Senji Saigai even though the private companies were pro- Hogo). (1) Purpose.—On February 24, 1942 tected from disastrous loss by provisions in there was enacted a national wartime protec- their policies specifically excluding fire from tion law providing relief and financial indem- air raids as a damage cause for which they nity to victims of wartime disasters. The law would make payments. The law was not bind- took eflfect on April 30, 1942. "Wartime disas- ing on holders of fire policies already in force, ters" were defined as disasters caused by enemy but applied to all renewals. Kyoto insurance action, as well as disasters resulting from such. officials felt that the April 1944, increase could (2) Provisions.—Three types of compensa- not be accounted for by the new linkage between tion were named in the law: Relief, pension, the private fire and national war damage in- and allowance. Insofar as the act provided surance policies, but that there was a growing lor relief by means of food, clothing, housing, feeling of a?oprehension over American ability medical attention, school supplies, and other to bomb Japan. The March 13, 1945 raid on services this report will not be concerned. But Osaka prciuced an avalanche of applications its provisions for money to pay medical and for wf r 'lamage insurance in Kyoto. The peo- funeral expenses, for homes destroyed, for ple tended to insure their houses, but not the death and injury, and for sickness and disability 55 ——— come within the scope of the war damage claims Kyoto was responsible for assessing the value study. The act indemnified and protected from of houses and other buildings condemned for undue financial suffering those persons whose demolition to make firebreaks. The municipal buildings were commandeered for relief pur- government assessed the land which was either poses or whose commodities were expropriated bought or leased by the city. The same scale by the government to distribute to air-raid vic- for evaluating buildings was used by Kyoto pre- tims. It also covered persons killed, injured, fecture for the 19,351 houses involved in the or hospitalized in connection with carrying out program as was used in Kobe. The last of the relief duties, as well as providing compensa- firebreak operations was but one-third complete tion to the dependents of persons victimized in when the war ended in August, 1945, so that of any lawful manner as a result of wartime dis- the 7,672 houses assessed only about 2,000 had aster. The sums of money allowed under the been torn down at that time. Since the pro- law appear below. Special interpretations on gram was integrated with postwar plans for the disbursement of these sums will be found the city, it was contemplated that it would be in exhibit V. eventually completed. The assessment of land followed a fixed rule of compensation on the Table 1. Compensation payments (refers to Art. 12, basis of 120 yen per 36 square feet (tsubo) re- Exhibit V) gardless of the location of the land, providing

Description of payment Amount of payment the city bought the land. But if the city only 1. Medical attention expenses Actual expenses rented the land, the annual rent paid was 5 2. Injury compensation: yen per 36 square feet. For the first two of a. Permanent disability Yl,500 b. Loss of means of sustenance 1,000 the four firebreak operations all claimants had

c. Serious bodily injuries and female facial been paid in full, and, as of 6 November 1945, 700 scars the prefecture and city were paying r, 'ot 3. Terminal lump sum 1,500 third. The same arrangement as to national 4. Beneficiary compensation 1,000 government, prefecture and city financial,^ re- 5. Funeral expenses 100 sponsibility for indemnity on buildnigs sJnd land obtained in Kyoto as reported for Kobt" >'"<,..- b. Loss of Business and Ty-ansportaciv./ Table 2. Compensation paymeyits (refers to Art. 22, pensation.—Although no different in its provi- Exhibit V) sions, additional details of the compensation study. In 1. Injury compensation: law were secured from the Kyoto a. Permanent disability Y700 the case of indemnity for loss of business, as b. Loss of means of sustenance 500 when an individual's store was demolished, two c. Serious bodily injuries and female facial bases for payment were found. The first cov- scars 350 ered entrepreneurs who did not expect to con- 2. Beneficiary compensation 500 tinue in business. For certain categories of that classification of business establishments, the national department of commerce and in- Table 3. Com,pensation payments (refers to Art. 6, dustry laid down the amounts which the pro- Sec. 1-5 and Art. 2U) prietor could collect, and furnished the funds included 1. Medical attention expenses Actual expenses to pay him. Those businesses not

2. Injury compensation: above could collect from the pvefectuie i he a. Permanent disability Y1,000 second provided a different scfcle for thoc-.^: ^'ho b. Loss of means of sustenance _ ^ 700 wished to continue in busines, and the com- c. Serious bodily injury and female facial pensation designed merely to carry them scars 500 was re-established in an- 3. Terminal lump sum 1,000 over until they could get 4. Beneficiary compensation 700 other location. There were three classific.-<- 5. Funeral expenses 70 tions for such businesses, based upon amounts 3. Com/Sensation under the Firebreak Pro- received: (1) A manufacturing conc-ern, public gram. bathhouse or other establishment havim; equip- amount a. Assessm,ent and Payment.—As in other ment difficult to move was allowed an I""!- 't-nlh: cities, the prefectural city planning section in equal to six times its net profit 1 56 (2) more easily transferable businesses such all previous government urging and other at- as barber shops, shoe repair shops, grocery tacks on Japan put together. Even then, less stores or home industries were allowed three than half of the population and dwellings was times their net profit for 1 month informal ; (3) covered by either war casualty insurance or businesses such as those of peddlers were al- war damage insurance. There was little lowed an amount equal to 1 month's profit. knowledge or interest on the part of the gen- Compensation for these dispossessed business eral population regarding the wartime disas- operators was made in the form of a flat sum, ter protection law, so that had a major raid paid once, and was the financial responsibility struck Kyoto a large number of persons would of the prefecture. Payment for transporta- not have applied for funds under its terms. tion expenses has been described in the Kobe Insurance men interviewed, while not officially report on war damage claims. concerned with it, were wholly ignorant of the 4. Comments.—The negligible bombing ef- law and its provisions. The persistent belief fort made against Kyoto produced equally in- that Kyoto would not be attacked characterized significant payments of insurance and compen- even the officials administering the war insur- sation indemnity in the city, but the insurance ance program, they attitudes of the people in the face of constant and admitted to having threat of mass attack that never materialized made virtually no effort to promote the appli- lead to conclusions of general interest. The cations for policies. Whereas harassed Tokyo expectation that the city would be attacked by had completed its compensation payments to high-explosive bombs, if at all, changed in owners of homes dispossessed by the firebreaks March 1945, to the anticipation of fire raids, program, the payments in unbombed Kyoto and the March 17 attack on Osaka did more to were only three-fourths complete by November encourage the taking out of war insurance than 1945.

57 VII. TRAINING

Civilian-Defense Personnel phasis on the last. In addition, a special course was provided to train leaders in 1. Introduction.—The purpose of this sec- methods of maintaining high morale tion is to describe the civilian-defense schools, among the selection of civilian-defense personnel and the members of their own organizations. the methods used to train them. All directives Of particular interest is the statement that on training emanated from the Ministry of no training in rescue services was given at Home Affairs and were distributed through the this school until after the middle of 1944 information the prefectures down to the several political sub- when reached Kyoto from cities been on divisions. The first directive on training was which had bombed Kyushu received from the Ministry of Home Affairs in Island. October 1938, but a regular training program b. Prefectural police and fire schools.— was not developed in Kyoto until late in 1942. Schools for the training of minor leaders of Kyoto officials stated that the slow progress in police, fire and other organizations were con- training was the result of the attitude of civil- ducted in the same manner as described in the ian-defense officials who believed that Kyoto Osaka and Kobe field reports. would not be bombed. c. Auxiliary schools.—The number and type 2. Training schools, a. Air-defense school of these schools did not reach the proportions (Boku Gakko).—This school was established in found in Osaka and Kobe and that fact was March of 1943, by a directive from the Min- principally due to the belief among the leaders istry of Home Affairs. Here, as in Kobe, the of the organizations responsible for these school was the main training center for Kyoto schools that Kyoto was in little or no danger of prefecture. The expenses of the school were being bombed. met by the Great Japan Air-Defense Associa- Training of the Public tion granting a subsidy to cover 50 percent of the prefecture paying the the expenses, with 1. Introduction.—The purpose of this section balance. In addition, the Great Japan Air-De- of the report is to portray the various methods fense Association furnished most of the printed used for disseminating civilian-defense infor- material on civilian defense, which was used as mation and the procedures for educating the the basis for the training program. general public in the several phases of air-raid- (1) Instructors.—The faculty was com- protection duties. posed of police, fire, and organizational 2. Methods of disseminating information.— leaders who had been sent to the air-de- All of the methods used in Osaka and Kobe for school in Tokyo to undergo a 10-day fense bringing before the public the general rules of period of training in civilian-defense civilian defense were used in Kyoto with the services. In addition, certain persons exception of the radio. Officials stated that with specialized training were added to the great emphasis was placed upon the use of the aid in the instruction of subjects staff to press and the distribution of civilian-defense such as first aid and emergency relief. At pamphlets. A pamphlet on general air-raid various times the army furnished instruc- protection duties entitled "Air-Raid Instruction undergone field experience in tors who had Manual," published by the Ministry of Home connection with large fires and different Afl'airs, was reprinted at the expense of the types of bombs. Kyoto prefectural government and distributed (2) Trainees.—The selection of person- to every family in Kyoto prefecture through the nel for attendance at this school followed neighborhood groups. Practice air-raid drills the same principles as explained in the were conducted once a month under prefectural Osaka and Kobe field reports. leadership until February 1945, when formal (3) Ciirricidum.—Courses of training discontinued. Investigation proved offered in this school covered the fields of drills were public demonstrated a lack of interest first aid, construction of shelters, emer- that the drills were gency relief for bombed-out victims, and and gave no cooperation whenever raids on fire extinguishment, with particular em- held until after the reports of the 58 Kyushu Islands, and even then the outlying dis- used by the U. S. Army Air Forces. tricts of the city showed a complete disregard 5. Civilian-defense officials of Kyoto visited for black-out regulations and other civilian-de- cities such as Osaka and Kobe, which had been fense responsibilities. heavily bombed, in order to make a study of conditions so that they could better prepare the General Comments air-raid protection organization of Kyoto, and 3. Evidence gathered by observation and in- the reports which they brought back from those vestigation proved that the people of Kyoto had cities caused most officials and people of Kyoto been advised by governmental officials that the to develop a feeling of utter uselessness, realiz- city vs^ould probably not undergo any heavy air ing that they were unprepared and untrained to attack, and, as a result, training never got be- cope with situations arising from saturation yond the planning stage until late in 1944, and raids. This attitude was largely responsible then very little interest and effort were for the cessation of training programs by displayed. higher echelons in the spring of 1945. 4. The training programs for both civilian- 6. Considering the lack of training and its defense personnel and the public placed the obvious resulting influence on the operations of greatest emphasis upon the methods for ex- civilian-defense organizations, the loss of life tinguishing incendiaries and 550-pound (250 and property would have been relatively greater kg.) high explosive bombs. The training pro- had Kyoto been subjected to a saturation raid gram was not revised when other types were or raids, such as suffered by Osaka and Kobe.

59 ;

VIII. REFERENCE NOTES

The reference material listed below is on file in the Item No. office of G-2, United States Strategic Bombing Survey. 14. Map of Kyoto indicating areas in which only concrete buildings were Item No. permitted to be constructed.

1. Map of northeastern Kyoto prefecture, 15. Original Japanese document (untrans- showing area in which Maizuru was lated). City building regulations en- responsible for the sounding of air- forcement act (Kyoto prefecture). raid alarms. Summary in English of table of con- Map of city of Kyoto showing locations tents. of sirens. 16. Japanese pamphlet : "Protective Police Map showing locations of civilian ob- Statistics—1942. Record of Fire Sec- servation posts in Kyoto prefecture. tions of Public Welfare Department, Symbols indicate headquarters and in- Police Bureau" (untranslated). Ta- dividual posts. ble of contents in English.

Blueprint map of general communica- 17. Map of Kyoto showing fire barriers tions channels for air-raid defense in made by demolishing buildings. the Maizuru naval port area. 18. Data on construction of fire barriers Blueprint diagram of control center from 17 July 1944 to 21 July 1945. for air-raid defense of Maizuru naval 19. Pamphlet (illustrated) issued by the base. Kyoto Electric Company, containing suggestions on how to achieve light 6. Map of Kyoto City water system. control. 7. Data on fire department section of 20. Original Japanese document and trans- Kyoto prefecture (1945). General lation concerning control of lights in outline personnel, equipment ; water ; street cars. supply; number of fires; fire brigade 21. Original Japanese document and trans- districts ; organization and operation

lated table : statistics on fires caused by air raids. of contents "Training orders, training notices, and prefectural Map of Shinjo Gokurakuji Temple, orders concerning air defense" ; Kyoto hydrants, pools, showing fire mains, prefectural police department. See pump house, water curtain, and build- Exhibit N. ings. 22. Original Japanese documents. Data street lighting 9. Map of Kyoto showing locations of fire on provided by street stations. railway department of Kyoto. Ex- tracted and shown on Table 1. Data 10. List of pumpers in Kyoto during the on street lighting in residential sec-

period : manufacturer pumping war ; tions. Extracted and shown as Table capacities. List containing similar in- 2. Data on wattage used for lighting formation as of October 1945. by minimum rate residential custom- 11. Map of Kyoto showing distribution ers. Extracted and shown as Table 3. grid system and locations of hydrants Data on wattage for lighting by me- with cutout valves. tered residential customers. Extracted and shown as Table 4. 12. Blueprint showing distribution mains 23. Plans and specifications of reinforced in Kyoto City. concrete pipe shelter. 13. Map showing tanks, wells, and swimming pools used as static water supply 24. Specifications of tunnel-type air-raid in Kyoto City. shelter.

60 Reference Reference Item No. Item No.

25. Japanese text. Bill proposed for ef- 28. Japanese text. Compendium of regu- fecting evacuation of persons, pub- lations relating to school children lished Kyoto prefecture, August 1945. group evacuation, issued by Ministry See Exhibit P. of Education. See Exhibit S. 26. Japanese text. Compendium of matters pertaining to Wartime Damage 29. Japanese form of Sufferer's Certificate Protection Law No. 71, promulgated and Ration Card for Sufferers. See 1942. Exhibit 24 February See Q. Exhibit T. 27. Japanese text of questionnaire form 30. Map showing counties of Kyoto prefec- designed to determine destination of persons seeking other locations. See ture and the number of children sent

Exhibit R. . to each.

61 EXHIBIT A

List of air-raid attacks in Kyoto prefecture, excluding Maizuru, a naval base city north of Kyoto

Jan. 16, 1945.—2310 hours, one B-29. Ap- 13 seriously injured, 63 slightly injured. proximately 60 high-explosive bombs and 1 Sixty-five structures completely demolished, incendiary. Thirty-four killed, 23 seriously 84 structures slightly damaged. injured, 23 slightly injured. Two struc- July 19, 1945.-0930. Thirteen P-51s strafing tures completely demolished, 29 structures attack. Two killed, 11 seriously injured, 6 completely burned, 22 structures partially slightly injured. burned. July 24, 1945.-0750. Approximately 15 P-51s dropped 4 high-explosive bombs. Seven Jan. 29, 1945.—2105 hours. One B-29. Five killed, 4 seriously injured, 11 slightly injured. high explosives. No casualties. No damage. Second ivave.—Approximately 15 P-51s Feb. 4, 1945.—0035 hours. One B-29. Ap- dropped 5 high-explosive bombs. Seven proximately 83 high-explosive bombs. No killed, 2 seriously injured, 12 slightly in- casualties. One structure completely demol- jured. One structure completely demolished, ished. One structure partially demolished. 2 structures partially damaged. Mar. 19, 1945. 0700. Approximately 19 Grum- — July 28, 1945.-1330. Six P-51s strafing at- mans dropped 11 high explosives. One tack. Three seriously injured. structure totally demolished. No casualties. July 30, 1945.—1213. Approximately 20 small Mar. 19, 1945.—0730. Approximately 14 Grum- type planes strafing attack. One slightly mans dropped 1 high explosive. One per- injured. son seriously injured, one structure com- Second wave.—Eight small type planes strafing pletely demolished. attack. Two killed, 1 seriously injured, 1 Apr. 16, 1945.-1200. One B-29 dropped 7 slightly injured. One structure partially high explosives. Two killed, 2 seriously in- burned. jured, 37 sHghtly injured. No damage. Third wave.—One small type plane strafing at- Apr. 22, 1945.-0950. One B-29 strafing attack. Three slightly injured. tack. Two seriously injured and 2 slightly Fourth wave.—Approximately 17 small type injured. planes strafing attack. Fourteen killed, 9 May 11, 1945.-0900. Unspecified number of slightly injured. Six structures completely B-29s strafing attack. Two slightly injured. burned, 26 structures slightly burned. June 5, 1945.-0800. One B-29, strafing at- Fifth wave.—Seventeen small type planes straf- tack. One killed, 1 seriously injured, 7 ing attack. Fifteen structures completely slightly injured. burned. Two seriously injured, 2 slightly

June 9, 1945.-0930. Approximately 110 B-29s injured. strafing attack. One killed. Sixth wave.—Five planes, 2 slightly injured. June 15, 1945.—Approximately 15 B-29s Seventh wave.—Seventy planes, 1 slightly in- dropped 1,097 incendiaries. Twenty-five jured. structures completely burned. One killed, 1 Eighth ivave.—Five planes, 1 slightly injured. slightly injured. Ninth wave.—One hundred forty-five planes, 2 June 26, 1945.-0940. One B-29 dropped 6 killed, 1 structure completely burned, 2 par- high-explosive bombs. Forty-three killed. tially burned, 1 completely demolished.

62 EXHIBIT B Illustration of Large Municipal Siren on Tower of Kyoto City Hall.

Right. One o£ the large municipal sirens in Kyoto City, installed on the tower of the Kyoto City Hall. The control room from which the sirens were operated wâs located in the room in the top part of the towêr from w^hich the balconies protrude. Note the two large sake tanks used for the storage of static wâter for fire-fighting purposes.

Below. Close-up view^ of the siren shown above. EXHIBIT C

Illustration of control panels from which the sirens in Kyoto were operated

View of the control panels from which the sirens in Kyoto were operated. Lines from each siren ran into the individual connections on the large panel-board to the right. The circular switch in the center of the left board was an automatic switch which could be set to sound the air-raid warning signal desired.

64 EXHIBIT D

Illustration of the improved panel board intended for installation in the siren control room

Vie-w of the improved, panel board intended for installation in the siren control room. This board had not been connected. Note the small holes under the individual dials. Telephone connections could be made there -with each individual siren operator in the event of power disruption to the siren from this control room.

65 EXHIBIT E

Diagram of Kyoto prefectural control center

KYOTO PREFECTURAL CONTROL :

EXHIBIT F

List of officials of Kyoto City fire and water departments

Officials of Kyoto City Fire and Water Depart- 4. Fukuoka, Denzaburo. Assistant en- ments gineer of Keage purification plant, 1. Yoshida, Senjiro. Local fire brigade Kyoto public water works. commander. Chief of Shimo fire bri- 5 Moriguchi, K. Civil engineer, civil

. . , , gade station. , i- u • • police „,,,., ,r 1 T-.- i engineering department, bu- 2. Yoshioka, Yosnio. Fire inspector, peace ,. 1- 1. reau. preservation, police bureau. 3. Kondo, Kazuo. Assistant fire inspector, 6. Sakurai, Y. Civil engineer, civil en- peace preservation, police bureau. gineering department, police bureau.

67 . .

EXHIBIT G Translation of first-aid regulations, air defense, Kyoto prefecture, 7 July 1945, together with chart showing channels for medical instruction and training

Classification : Very Secret, Home Affairs Min- No. 3 Personnel.—First-aid hospitals. istry Training Order No. 6 (Naikun). No. 4 Personnel.—Special first-aid hospitals.

From : Prefectural Governor. No. 5 Personnel.—Auxiliary police and fire

To : Mayors : Kyoto, Maizuru, Fukuchiyama units and home guard units (jieitai) and towns of Miyazu, Higashiuji. Presi- No. 6 Personnel.—Supplementary first-aid dents of Kyoto Prefectural Medical, Dental, squads (reserve) (oenkyugohan) and Pharmaceutical Associations. No. 7 Personnel.—Those attached to police districts detection. CONTENTS Page for gas defense and 1. Kyoto Prefecture Air-Defense First-Aid No. 8 Personnel.—Those persons who cannot Regulations 1 be easily placed in any of the above numbered 2. Air-Defense First-Aid Facilities - 5 groups (reserve). 3. Functional Classification for Medical Article 5. —The governor will decide the Personnel 7 functional classification for public health nurses 4. Functional Classification for Assistant (hokenfu), midwives, nurses, and orthopedic

Medical Personnel 9 surgeons ; however, classification for like medical technicians with hospitals or clinics will -^ ^ A T^ -r-. A Prefecture Air-Defense First-Aid Kyoto , , ^ -1,^.1 t x ^ ^v, „ be determined by the directors 01 those m- Regulations ... ,. stitutions. injured sick Article 1.—First aid for or article 6.—Those affected by functional cases, medical care for pregnant women, women classification, as determined in articles 4 and 5, confined to childbed and prevention of epidemics ^ju ^^ notified by the organizations concerned, during air raids will be carried out according to Article 7.—When air alert is received, the regulations. these designated mayors and village heads will set Article 2.—Establishment of first-aid sta- up the first-aid and maternity first-aid stations, tions (kyugosho) and maternity first-aid sta- according to the plans stated in article 2. The tions ijosankijugosho) at air alert will be No. 1 and No. 2 Personnel, as designated in planned by designated mayors and village heads article 4, will quickly take their posts and com- under the direction of the governor. Reserve mence work, facilities will be adequately prepared. Article 8.—The No. 5 and No. 7 Personnel Article 3.—The governor will determine the will go quickly to their posts and will work first-aid hospitals (kyugobyoin) and the special under their respective chiefs of police districts, first-aid hospitals {tokitbetsukyugobyoin) from Article 9.—Nos. 3, 4, 6 and 8 Personnel will the list of hospitals (byoin), maternity hos- await instructions at their homes and places of pitals (surmi), and others. He will organize a business. first-aid squad (kyugohan) directly responsible Article 10.—The governor may issue new or to him from the prefectural public health sec- change the regulations as stated in articles tion (eiseika) personnel. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 when deemed necessary. Article 4.—Division of the work at air alert Article 11.—The first-aid organs established for doctors, dentists, and pharmacists will be in articles 2 and 3 will maintain close liaison decided by the governor. The presidents of the with the chiefs of police districts, auxiliary prefectural medical, dental, and pharmaceuti- police and fire units, and the other related air- cal associations will determine such division for defense organs. their respective members; these heads will be Article 12.—The governor will be respon- directed by the governor. sible for the instructing and training of the No. 1 Personnel.—First-aid station doctors, medical personnel concerned in first-aid meas- dentists, and pharmacists. ures and specialized treatments, and training No. 2 Personnel.—Maternity first-aid sta- of the others as designated in these regulations tions. in whole or part. 68 Article 13.—The governor will have the 8. The owner or administrator of building presidents of the medical, dental, and pharma- planned to be used as first-aid station or mater- ceutical associations instruct and train the nity first-aid station will assist with the estab- members concerned, and the public health lishment of such station during air alert or nurses, midwives, and nurses in the hospitals when directed by the governor, and such owner and clinics administered by the members. or administrator will have ready at all times Article 14.—At times the governor will let materials to make possible the giving of first the designated mayors and village heads be re- aid and the assisting of birth. sponsible for the training of No. 1 and No. 2 9. The owner or administrator of a desig- Personnel. nated first-aid or maternity first-aid station Article 15.—These regulations cover first- will clearly indicate the building and its en- aid measures for emergencies. trance, and at night he will place a distinguish- Air-Defense First-Aid Facilities ing light. 10. The governor-designated first-aid station 1. First-aid stations will receive temporarily, will have the necessary facilities to treat gas examine, and apply first-aid measures to injured casualties (decontamination station). and sick cases. The maternity first-aid stations 11. Measures to clarify the duties of the per- will mainly assist in delivery cases involving sonnel in a first-aid station or a maternity women who have lost their homes ; regarding station, such as number and names of personnel serious illnesses and irregular births requiring and system of taking turns working, will be operation or lengthy care, patients will be prepared. quickly delivered to first-aid hospitals or special 12. When a first-aid station is damaged or is first-aid hospitals. not able to function, it can be foreseen that a 2. A doctor will direct a first-aid hospital large number of injured and sick cases need to and also a maternity first-aid hospital. be removed, and so, plans for a reserve first-aid 3. Generally for every 5,000 to 10,000 people, station iyobikyugosho) will be made, other than a first-aid station will be set up in an easily those utilized for first-aid hosi)itals. accessible site ; maternity first-aid hospital will 13. The designated mayors and village heads be set up in designated cities, towns, and vil- will appoint the first-aid station chief from lages (wards in Kyoto city). among the doctors ; however, in case of clinics 4. First-aid stations will be established in: and hospitals used as first-aid stations, the a. Clinics having surgical facilities (ex- directors of such institutions are to be the cluding those designated as first-aid hospitals). chiefs. b. Remaining clinics and hospitals (excluding those designated as first-aid hospitals). Functional Classification of Medical c. Schools, public halls, hotels, and other ap- Personnel propriate buildings. 1. The following deals with No. 1 personnel. d. Maternity first-aid hospitals will be lo- For each first-aid station there will be three or cated as far as possible in obstetrics hospitals more doctors, one or more dentists ; and one or {sankabyoin) and maternity hospitals. more pharmacists. 5. When space is not adequate in case of "a," a. Doctors who are directors for hospitals preparations will be made to use a building in or clinics selected as first-aid stations. the vicinity for receiving the injured and sick b. Doctors who are directors or owners of cases. surgical-clinic facilities and who maintain of- Plans will be made to utilize nearby surgical fices which have been designated as first-aid facilities in regard to "b" and "c." stations. 6. There will be a plan to receive the in- c. Doctors, dentists, and pharmacists who jured and sick cases by utilizing the houses work under like professional men designated along the roads in the neighborhood of the as No. 2 Personnel. first-aid stations. d. Doctors familiar with surgical methods or 7. Escape facilities and air-raid shelters will who have had experience in surgery, excluding be prepared near first-aid stations and mater- those in No. 3 and No. 4. nity first-aid stations. e. Dentists and pharmacists who live near

69 : the first-aid stations, excluding those in Nos. b. Students of nurses' schools other than 3, 4 and 7. those attached to first-aid hospitals and special 2. No. 2 Personnel are directors and doctors first-aid hospitals. in obstetrics hospitals and maternity hospitals 2. No. 2 Personnel. There will be five mem- designated as maternity first-aid stations. bers in each maternity station. 3. No. 3 Personnel are directors, doctors, a. Public health nurses, midwives, and nurses dentists, and pharmacists of hospitals desig- in hospitals and maternity hospitals directed nated as first-aid hospitals. by doctors in No. 2. 4. No. 4 Personnel are directors, doctors, b. Students in schools for midwives. dentists and pharmacists of hospitals desig- 3. No. 3 Personnel. nated as special first-aid hospitals. a. Public health nurses, midwives, and nurses 5. No. 5 Personnel. For each auxiliary police in hospitals and clinics directed by doctors in and fire unit there will be two doctors and one No. 3. or more dentists. b. Orthopedic surgeons. a. Doctors and dentists in auxiliary police 4. No. 6 Personnel. and fire units, police doctors, and doctors not on a. Nurses who are students at schools for the regular police staff. public health nurses. b. Male doctors and dentists robust in health b. Off-duty nurses. and able to do field first-aid work. c. Off-duty nurses in hospitals for communi- 6. Personnel in No. 6 will be divided into cable diseases sanitariums for tuberculosis those who are fitted to work for long hours or patients. in distant places and those who cannot. A 5. No. 8 Personnel. squad of 10 men will be organized and each will have a squad chief. a. Public health nurses and nurses working Doctors, dentists, and pharmacists who are for public sanitation, excluding those in No. 3. not classified in any of the numbered groups. b. Public health nurses, midwives, and nurses with or believed 7. The following constitute the No. 7 Person- homes babies and who are to be nel, and there will be 10 men attached to each ill-fitted for first-aid work. police district. DISSEMINATION OF MEDICAL TRAINING Male pharmacists whose health is robust and

fit for field duty and those who have knowledge of gas detection, excluding the pharmacists who PROFESSIONAL MEDICAL work in hospital clinics. ASSOCIATIONS 8. The No. 8 Personnel a. Government doctors, dentists, and phar- PHYSICIANS ASSIGNED PHYSICIANS ASSIGNED macists. TO FIRST-AID TO AUXILIARY POLICE AND FIRE UNITS b. Married female doctors, dentists, and STATIONS pharmacists, excluding the personnel in Nos.

1, 2, 3 and 4. c. Physically unfit doctors, dentists, and pharmacists.

Functional Classification for Assistant Medical Personnel

1. The following will constitute No. 1 Per- sonnel. There will be approximately 10 members in each first-aid station. a. Public health nurses, midwives, and nurses in clinics and hospitals directed by doctors in No. 1. EXHIBIT H

Chart of guard rescue unit

KEIBITAI

BATTALION

( ) Battalion I Chief (Police Superintendent)

( ) Assistant Chief I (Police Inspector) (I) Orderly (Policeman)

Two Companies: 148 Total: 151

COMPANY (2)

( ) Company Commander I (Police Inspector)

( ) Assistant Commander I (Assistant Police Inspector) (2) Orderlies (Policemen) Two Platoons: 70 Total: 74

PLATOON (2)

( ) Platoon Leader I (Assistant Police Inspector)

( ) Orderly I (Policeman) Three Squads: 33 Total: 35

SQUAD (3)

( I ) Squad Leader (Police Sergeant) (10) Members (Policemen)

Total Personnel: I I

71 EXHIBIT I

Report on air-raid protection inspection of Mitsubishi Aircraft Engine Plant, plus Annexes I-l and 1-2

1. General Information: month, but during its 8 months of operation, Ownership.—Built by Japanese Government the production never exceeded 130 per month. and operated by Mitsubishi Heavy Indus- c. Located as it was in the Kyoto area which tries, Ltd., Tokyo. did not suflfer any heavy air strikes, this in- Location.—No. 1 Kawashimi—Meiji—Cho, dustry did not suffer any damage, although its Ukyo-Ku, Kyoto. air-raid protection organization was called out Principal officials.—T. Rinoye, general man- for many alerts during the period of its operations in wartime. As the intensity of air raids ager ; S. S. Shimawaga, manager of administrative Department; K. Kato, manager of Techni- increased over the large cities of Japan, further cal Department. steps were taken by the management of this Number of employees.—10,000. plant, on advice of the Munitions Ministry, to Work shifts.—This plant operated two 12- further disperse some of its machine-tool oper- hour shifts with two-thirds of the employees ations to temporary locations in the foothills engaged on the daylight shift and one-third on of the nearby mountains, such as school houses, the night shift. small warehouse buildings, privately owned Area of the plant.—-1,698,150 square meters. sheds. The war ended before this plan was Number of buildings in plant.—289. fully consummated. General construction of buildings.—Build- 2. Organization of the plant air-raid protec- ings in the office and administration group were tion forces.—The air-raid protection organiza- of wood frame covered with wood sheathing tion consisted of 1,300 employees under the di- and corrugated asbestos sheet roofing. The rectorship of the general manager of the plant larger buildings in the manufacturing depart- and two assistants, which group had attached ments of the plant were of steel frame con- to it an advisory capacity, the Protection Re- struction with wood sheathing and corrugated search Group of 20 men. Under this leader- asbestos sheet roofing. ship, the protection force was divided into four Principal products.—This plant is reported units (Annex I-l) namely, Permanent Subunit, to have been the only one in Japan assembling and Subunits Nos. 1, 2 and 3. (For geographi- aero engines of 2,200 horsepower, double row, cal coverage of these units see Annex 1-2.)

radial type, for both Army and Navy require- a. The first unit we will deal with is the ments. Permanent Subunit. The directing staff of a. Being a newly built plant in a rural area, this unit consisted of a chief and two assistants proper fire prevention consideration was given and was subdivided into five departments, to the separation of buildings and the dispersal namely: The Provisioning Department, with a of those units housing hazardous processes. chief and 44 persons; the Repair Department b. This industry was destroyed during an with a chief and 60 persons; the Sanitary or incendiary raid on the Nagoya area and such First-Aid Department, with a chief and 28 per- chief machine tools and equipment as could be sal- sons ; the Guard Department with a and vaged were moved during the fall of the year 45 persons, and a General Affairs Department 1944 to the present location where operations with a chief and 18 persons.

were started on or about January 1, 1945. b. Duties. This plant did not do any manufacturing as (1) Provisioning department.—The du- such but was purely an assembly plant for ties of the Provisioning Department were parts manufactured in small machine tool shops to procure and store an ample supply of and foundries widely dispersed throughout the foodstuffs, at company expense, to care Kyoto area. However, it was equipped with for the employees and their families in the heat treating and annealing furnaces to finish event of any emergency to the plant prop- the castings and forgings supplied by subcon- erty or to the nearby villages where the tract units. The plant was erected to meet a majority of the employees lived. Inas- production capacity of 330 aircraft engines per much as no emergency arose during war

72 time to require the services of this unit, it need never having arisen for their mobiliza-

did not function as such, but was used as tion. Section No. 1, headed by a chief and one a utility group to assist permanent subunit assistant, was further subdivided into four organization. groups, namely, first aid, fire fighting, fire (2) Repair department. — The person- pump, and liaison group. nel of this department consisted of machine (1) First-aid group.—Each section of tool mechanics, electrical apparatus tech- each subunit maintained and operated one nicians, building repair employees and first-aid station in the plant area served several foremen who could direct emer- by the section, composed of 18 trained gency repair to the water supply system first-aid assistants, equipped with first-aid for fire-fighting purposes. kits, litters, splints, and supplies. It was (3) First-aid department.—Under the their duty to render initial treatment to leadership of the chief physician of the wounded and carry them to the plant cas- plant, 4 other medical officers, 18 nurses ualty station for final treatment and dis- and 3 druggists in the stockroom, the du- charge or evacuation to the general hos- ties of this department were to man the 2 pital. casualty stations located in the plant area (2) Fire-fighting group.—The total per- and to prepare, in the event of an emer- sonnel in this group consisted of 35 per- gency, more seriously wounded cases for sons handling the 15 hand-operated water transport to the nearest general hospital. pumps of the 120-gallon capacity type with This department was also equipped and which each section was equipped. Addi- provided with sufficient medical supplies to tional equipment consisted of hand-pump care for as many as 5,000 casualties at one extinguishers, 25-foot ladders, and small time. hand tools. (4) Guard department.—The duties of (3) The fire pump group.—It was the the personnel of this department were to duty of the 25 employees of this group to provide the police force protecting en- assist the regular paid fire brigade of the trances to the plant against saboteurs or plant in the handling of pumping equip- unlawful entry, to check the identification ment, laying hose, drafting from static of employees entering and leaving the water supply ponds, and acting under the plant; to act as directing guides for em- direction of the chief of the plant fire bri- ployees seeking the safety of air-raid shel- gade during incidents occurring in their ters during an emergency and to perform particular area of responsibility. other guard duties as might be required by (4) Liaison group.—In this group 12 management. employees were used as messengers be- (5) General affairs department.—The tween the plant control center and the va- General Affairs Department was in charge rious operating units of the plant to call of all communications throughout the plant for further assistance, carry additional as well as with the prefectural government fire-fighting tools, and act as a general police and fire organizations of Kyoto. utility reserve to the other three groups All incidents throughout the plant were of the section. reported to this department, as well as d. Sicbunit No. 2.—This subunit, which was normal occupational accidents. It was responsible for the plant protection in the area their further duty, acting on behalf of denoted on the map shown in annex 1-2, con- management, to settle such cases with em- sisted of two sections, Nos. 4 and 5 of the ployees. plant organization, which were fully organized c. Subunit No. 1.—This unit was composed and staffed exactly the same as described for of a chief, two assistant chiefs and two admin- Section 1, Subunit No. 1 above. istrative assistants, and subdivided into three e. Subunit No. 3.—This unit, which covered sections. Section No. 1 described herein was a larger area of the plant, including dormitories organized and staffed, whereas sections Nos. for workers and the assembly plant for trainees 2 and 3 were only contemplated on paper, the learning the aircraft engine trade, was com-

73 posed of four sections, Nos. 6, 7, 8 and 9, which freezing line in a grid system and connected to were organized, staffed and subdivided into fire hydrants of 2-inch size, 15 in number, prop- four groups, exactly the same as section 1, sub- erly located with respect to the manufacturing unit No. 1 previously described. buildings. Supplementing this supply, 27 static water-supply pools were created artifi- 3. Management interest.—Mitsubishi heavy industries took the matter of air-raid protec- cially within the area of the plant, the largest tion very seriously after the bitter experience of which was plotted on the map shown as an- with some of their plants during the early air nex 1-2. raids on Nagoya, and the management of this 6. Automatic sprinkler protection. — The particular unit, which was known as Mitsu- buildings of this plant, which were constructed bishi Heavy Industries Unit No. 8 (Mitsubishi of highly combustible material, were not pro- Aircraft Engine Plant), was very much con- tected by any type of automatic protection even cerned about the adequacy and efficiency of for the oil-treatment process of steel castings their air-raid protection organization. As pre- or other hazardous processes. The only equip- viously stated, this plant was not bombed dur- ment to combat fires in these areas consisted of ing the war, but after the heavy raid on the 300 CO2 hand extinguishers and 1,200 of the sister works of this plant located some 30 miles foam type. north of Kyoto and known as Works No. 14, 7. Air-raid warning system.—The manage- preparations in the plant were carried out with ment of this plant depended entirely upon pub- renewed vigor and every precaution at their lic radio or telephone from the central police command was installed. headquarters of the Kyoto prefecture for the 4. Organization of the fire department.—The receipt of air-raid alerts and warnings. There plant maintained a central fire brigade of 30 was no audible air-raid alert or alarm system well trained firemen at all times who were installed throughout the plant area, but tele- equipped with two motor pumpers. This bri- phones were used between the control center gade trained and drilled three times weekly, located in the main administration building assisted during each drill by the fire-fighting with each subunit station, which in turn was and fire-pump group of a subunit in the plant connected with each of the sections and group air-raid protection organization. Again, due units. A number of small bells manually op- to the fact that no serious emergency resulted erated were installed throughout the buildings at this plant during its 8 months of operation, housing moving machinery which were sounded the size and adequacy of its organization to by members of the air-raid protection groups to combat the effects of an air raid can not be alert individual employees of the imminent dan- measured or determined. This personnel also ger of air raid. In addition to this signal flags, conducted inspections daily throughout the the blue and white for the alert and the red plant and made recommendations to manage- and white for the alarm, were hoisted on the ment for the proper location of the simple fire- flag poles of each of the manufacturing build- fighting tools, such as shovels, sand, mops, and ings as well as over the headquarters office. fire beaters of Japanese design, as well as the 8. Control Center.—One room, approximate- posts of duty for personnel of each fire-fighting ly 20 by 15 feet in the central administration section, and they further supervised the entire building of the plant was used as a control cen- plant air-raid protection force drill which was ter. It was not given any particular protec- held regularly five times per month. tion other than the usual black-out equipment 5. Water supplies.—The water supply for and it was from this point that the general plant fire protection was secured from the city management of the plant and its assistants were of Kyoto, delivered to the plant through a prepared to direct the air-raid protection or- 6-inch main at a pressure never greater than ganization in the event of any emergency. 15 pounds per square inch. Gasoline-driven 9. Air-raid shelters.—a. Shelter preparation booster pumps were installed in the plant mains in the plant was rather meager in consideration to bring the static pressure for fire purposes up of the fact that an average 7,000 employees were to 45 pounds per square inch. Mains were laid on duty during the larger daylight shift. Two throughout the plant underground below the reinforced concrete shelters, 8 feet below 74 ground level, were constructed with 8-inch many pumping units as they deemed wise of decks and 6-inch sidewalls for the safety of the hand-operated 120-gallon type to the plant. plant management and of its staff. However, Conversely, as a post-raid mission, if the near- these two shelters could not conveniently ac- by communities were aflame and the plant not commodate more than 20 persons each. With- in immediate danger, the plant fire brigade, in the plant yard there were 250 small dug-out assisted by the fire pump groups, were to be type shelters capable of accommodating, in an dispatched to the assistance of the near-by com- emergency, not more than 6 to 8 persons each, munities. This arrangement met with the of the wood-frame, earth-covered type common wholehearted approval of plant employees who, throughout Japan. with their families, resided in these communi- b. All employees who could not be accommo- ties. dated in the shelters described were directed to 12. Dispersal plans.—Motivated by the in- leave the plant and run for the protection of the creased intensity of American bombing raids on nearby foothills, female employees and those industry, the Japanese Government on April 4, students in the training area of the plant be- 1945, ordered the dispersal of certain machine- ing evacuated first, then the skilled plant em- tool operations of this plant to points in the ployees, and last of all, the members of the air- nearby mountain foothills, as previously de- raid protection group who were permitted to scribed. Actual start of this movement was take shelter in one of the dugouts on the plant undertaken by management the following day premises. Shelter protection provided by and was about 80 percent completed at the time plant management could not accommodate, un- of the Japanese capitulation. During this der any circumstances, more than 2,000 persons transition period, production capacity dropped at any one time. to as low as 70 aircraft engines per month. 10. Emergency hospital facilities.—In addi- 13. Siimmary.—The air-raid protection or- tion to the emergency medical care and equip- ganization conceived and organized for the par- ment previously described, the plant manage- ticular needs of this particular type of indus- ment depended upon utilizing the Matsuho Hos- try and its geographical lay-out was, by com- pital, located at 21/2 kilometers distance, in case parison, far the best observed in Japanese in- of emergencies. The plant was not provided dustries. More care in training and equip- with ambulances for the transportation of the ment for the protection of these new buildings wounded, but relied on three cargo-type trucks and machine tools was demanded by the gov- for this purpose, if the emergency should arise. ernment and carried out by management. It 11. Mutual aid.—Mutual aid assistance was apparent and obvious, however, that the agreements existed between the plant and the fire-fighting equipment as well as the water auxiliary police and fire units (keibodan) of supply would have been totally inadequate to the nearby communities who, upon receipt of combat fires set by incendiary air raids in build- an air-raid alert, immediately dispatched as ings of this type of construction.

75 •- z < <

OO O I

CD CO

o uI— LU oI— Q- zI— < >- H 1- 2 -l < m EXHIBIT J Report on air-raid protection inspection of Kyoto Imperial University

1. Introduction.—Kyoto University is the tioned at the university. This unit originally national university of Japan, and is totally sup- included two manual pumps, one mobile pump ported by the Japanese government. It is a which was mounted on a 1926 Chevrolet chas- tremendous institution covering over 140 acres, sis, and crew totalling approximately 15 men. and its 227 buildings are sprawled in 3 main Although the list of equipment included ap- groups at the foot of a mountain. proximately 300 feet of hose, there was none a. The principal officials of the institution on the mobile pump, and the pump itself was are the president, Rishaburu Torigai, the busi- not in operating condition. There was in ad- ness manager, H. Honda, and the dean of the dition to this equipment other miscellaneous student body, S. Kimura. materials including fire beaters, pails of sand, b. Faculty and students.—The faculty was and buckets. None of the equipment was prop- composed of 981 professors and instructors, and erly maintained, and the mechanical apparatus the student body numbered 7,000. was in such a state of ill repair as to be inoper- c. Building constvuction.—The main build- ative. ings consisted of 75 reinforced concrete, 52 (2) Training.—Training of the city fire unit brick, and 190 wooden structures. was sporadic, and toward the end of the war 2. Organization.—a. The air-raid protection was discontinued entirely as a useless waste of organization of Kyoto University was probably time. Training of the volunteer fire squads in given the most academic treatment of any air- the various departments was about on a par raid protection organization in Japan. The with the equipment. About 17 or 18 police literature on the subject included 15 volumes of from the prefectural level came to the school over 200 pages each. The outline of the or- about two or three times a year and conducted ganization and the duties of the personnel was classes lasting approximately 1 hour and 20 thorough and searching. minutes. The first 20 minutes were spent in b. The president of the university was the lectures on fire-fighting technique, and the re- titular head of the air-raid protection organiza- mainder was spent in drilling and practice in tion, but he passed the actual planning and ad- ladder climbing, operation of the manual pump ministration on to his business manager, Mr. and operation of bucket brigades. In general Honda. Mr. Honda was also in charge of the it may be said that the fire department was in- general affairs division of the university and adequate, equipment was poor, training was as such his staff handled all administrative insufficient, and the attitude on the part of the matters for the air-raid protection organiza- personnel was one of futility. The volunteer tion. fire squad of the science department was composed of 87 men who were poorly organized, c. Break-dmun.—There were 16 departments poorly trained, and their leaders not only did in the university, a few of which included : Law, medicine, forestry, engineering, chemistry, and know how many men they had but could not literature. Each of these 16 departments had find the number in their own book governing their its own air-defense unit which was called the the organization of air-raid protection in "boedan," and the professor in charge of each department. department was responsible for his own air-raid (3) The Guard squad.—The science depart- protection. The organization of each department, which has been taken as a representative ment varied but in general contained an emer- unit, had 65 persons assigned to the guard gency medical squad, fire squad, liaison squad, squad ; their training was about on a par with guard squad, repair squad, and gas squad. that of the fire department and was given by Some units contained a supply squad and in the same instructors. The duties of the guards many cases the gas squad was made a part of were to act as aircraft spotters, guard impor- the fire-fighting squad. tant installations, protect valuable equipment, (1) Fire department.—The city of Kyoto watch over the dormitory area, control light- had a small unit of their fire department sta- ing, guide personnel to shelters, and take cus- 78 ;

tody of dangerous or valuable goods in the (8) Liaison sqiiad.—The liaison squad nor-

I event of air raid. mally contained approximately 60 members (4) Etnergency medical section. — Medical their duties were generally administrative but treatment for the school was handled by the they served as well as messengers and watchers. j

' Department of Medicine, which was composed 3. Water supplies.—Water supplies were ad- of over 70 doctors and 600 nurses who were equate for normal use. There were approxi- stationed at the university hospital. The emer- mately 460 hydrants fairly well distributed, gency medical station was the only section in but the hydrants were relatively useless due to the air-raid protection of the university which the fact that there was not enough hose to use could be considered adequately trained and them. There was no sprinkler system, and in equipped. First-aid stations were set up in general it may be said that there was insufficient the main administration building and the ag- equipment to utilize the static water available. riculture department building. Adequate med- 4. Air-raid warning system.—Air-raid warn- ical supplies were kept at these stations and ing was received from the city siren and from personnel included five doctors and three nurses a telephone call from Central Army headquar- at one station and three doctors and three ters. This call came in to the main switch- nurses at the other. The hospital was 400 me- board and was immediately transmitted to the ters from the university and all casualties were guard in charge of the section. This guard was taken there by stretcher. stationed in an office near the main switch- (5) Repair section.—Maintenance of build- board, and it is interesting to note that the ings, electrical equipment, gas, water works, room used by the guard for quarters and the was the duty of the official building mainte- room housing the switchboard had no air-raid nance personnel and generally was not under- protection. Signals used were standard and taken by the repair squad of the air-raid por- included blasts for the air alert, and one long tion unit. When a repair squad did assist blast for the air-raid alarm. In addition to in the defense unit they were used as technical the siren equipment, one guard was also sta- reserves to act as advisors and assistants to tioned in a nearby Buddhist temple and was oflScial maintenance personnel. No definite responsible for ringing the bell in that temple. figure was obtainable on the number of person- The bell was rung in the case of air-raid alarm. nel in the volunteer repair squads. 5. Control room.—The primary control room (6) Reserves.—Reserve personnel varied in was located in the main administrative build- all departments. However, the science depart- ing, and the secondary in the basement of an ment had 36 members assigned to the squad, adjoining unit. Communication was carried and these people were organized to assist wher- on solely by messenger and communication was ever needed, but in general were supposed to highly inadequate, due to the fact that only one assist fire fighting squads. telephone was available and all messages had (7) Gas squad.—In most cases the gas squad to be sent by individual messengers. Accord- was made part of the fire-fighting squad. ing to the organization chart this room was to There were only 100 gas masks available in the be staffed with the head secretary of the busi- institution, which obviously was not sufficient ness manager's office and he was assisted by and a list of instructions contained a statement ten men. to the effect that it would be wise for at least 6. Shelters.—The shelters for the university one member of the gas squad to be equipped were without exception inadequate and in some with a mask. The prefecture police and fire cases were actually useless. No one seems to office issued directives outlining the duties of know how many exterior shelters had been the gas squad which were to detect gas, give built, and no check could be made because they alarm, perform decontaminataion, and bring in had all been filled in. The total capacity of the casualties to the casualty station. Instruction shelters, including basements, which were used, and drill were handled and operated by each was 2,000, which obviously would not accommo- department and were given by the prefectural date the 7,000 students at the school. Prefec- police and fire departments on an average of ture order required all students to take shelter three times a year. at the air alert signal, but this policy was not 79 followed by Kyoto university ; the students nor- air-raid protection on paper. The volumes rel- mally waited for the air alarm and then entered ative thereto were thick and heavy and were the shelters which were available, and the over- completed with great dispatch and much indus- flow went to the hills. try, and then were placed on a shelf and thor- oughly ignored. Professors who were in 7. Mutual aid.—No mutual aid was expected charge of departments did not know anything from the auxiliary police and fire units (keibo- about the protection of their own area, could dan) or neighborhood groups (tonari gumi), not find any information in the book which gave but allowances were made whereby these units instructions concerning their area. Equipment might call upon the University for assistance, was completely inadequate and inoperative, and this assistance was in the form of students and had there been a great fire the school, fire to aid in fire fighting. equipment, and the books which outlined the 8. Comments.—Kyoto University went to details and instructions for the air-raid protec- much expense and trouble to organize their tion, would have all been destroyed. '

80 : EXHIBIT K

Report on air-raid protection inspection of the Miyako Hotel, Ltd.

5 Nov. 1945 squads, the fire-fighting squad (hokahan) and the first-aid squad (kyugohan). Each squad 1. Introduction, a. Location.—Kyoto San- had a complete staff for each shift and was go Awataguchi-Cho. organized as follows b. Ownership.—Stock corporation incorpo- a. The fire-fighting squad had a total of 30 rated in the amount of 2,000,000 yen. men and was composed of 8 pump-men, 4 lad- c. Ojfice force.—Ninety employees during the der bearers and a bucket brigade of 18 men. at present. This organization was war, 160 b. The first-aid squad had a total of 15 per- composed of one manager, three assistant man- sons which included 8 stretcher bearers and 7 of- agers, and the remainder was made up by individuals charged with administering first- guard, fice staff, clerks, cooks, waiters, night aid. gardeners. chambermaids, and c. Personnel was divided into day and night shifts, d. Shifts.—The hotel operated on two shifts, with approximately 85 percent of the with the larger portion of the staff present dur- personnel working days and 15 percent working ing the day shift. Officials interviewed were nights. This, of course, affected the size of Mr. Takino, hotel manager, Mr. Ito, the assist- the air-raid protection organization, but, how- engineer. ant manager, and the chief ever, in view of the fact that most of the hotel e. Area.—The grounds cover an area of ap- personnel lived on the premises they could be proximately 11 acres. called to duty on short notice.

f. Description.—The Miyako Hotel is unus- 3. Fire-fighting equipment. — Fire-fighting ually elaborate, the first four floors containing equipment was basically good. The hotel was nothing but dining rooms, lounges, and game equipped with emergency hoses which were 30 and recreation rooms. The remaining upper feet in length and could be found at 16 stations four floors contain the guest rooms, which were throughout the premises. The hose was all done in both Western and Japanese style. The linen, I14 inches in diameter, except the hose clientele was obviously exceptionally wealthy, in the kitchen area, which was 3 inches in diam- yet, in spite of the attractiveness of the hotel, eter and measured 50 feet. Buckets of sand it was unusual to have more than one-third of were placed at strategic points outside of the its 95 rooms occupied. building and glass bottles filled with carbon tetrachloride were to be found in the interior g. Type of building construction.—The hotel was built in several sections, all adjoining and in small numbers. In addition to the interior stepped up along a mountainside. All build- hydrants and hose equipment, the hotel boasted ings were of reinforced concrete, the front of one hand-drawn, hand-operated pump, com- building being six stories high and the rear plete with 50 feet of hose. adjoining buildings being three stories ; over- 4. Water supply.—The water supply for the lapping in such a fashion as to give a resultant hotel and its environs was excellent. The main height of eight stories. Although parts of the supply was through a 3-inch outlet from the building were over 30 years old, all of it had city water mains and the pressure at this sta- been modernized to such an extent that the tion was 45 pounds per square inch. The water whole edifice gave the appearance of a thor- in the mains was supplemented by a reservoir oughly modern and up-to-date hotel. which contained 118,870 gallons (504,000 liters) pool, which 20 by 40 2. Organization.—The air-raid protection of and a swimming was the Miyako Hotel was organized in conform- feet and contained approximately 30,000 gal- ance with the Kyoto prefectural police, as a lons of static supply. neighborhood group (tonari gumi), and was a 5. Air-raid shelters.—Shelter available to complete air-raid protection unit in itself. It hotel personnel was afforded by two flimsy was headed by the manager, Mr. Takino, and earth and wood shelters which were capable of his staff of three assistant managers. The accommodating 10 persons each. These were basic organization was broken down into two not gasproof or fireproof and even the manager 81 was apologetic concerning their lack of stabil- thority relative to warnings rested with the ity. The guests were taken to a specially pre- desk clerk. When the "all-clear" was sounded, pared exterior room located on the third floor guests and employees returned to their rooms in the event of an air raid. It was equipped or duties, respectively. with special shutters made of heavy 4 by 4 lum- a. Signals.—Signals were standard : "air ber solidly bound with iron straps and bolts. alert," one long blast on the siren of approxi- An adjoining room, similarly equipped, was mately 1 minute; "air alarm," 7 short blasts of available for hotel employees. The rooms were the siren; "release-from-alarm," 1 long blast 40 feet each and offered ample room, but 20 by of 1-minute duration. doubtful protection, even from near misses. 8. Light control. All rooms were equipped 6. Training.—The prefectural police office — with black-out curtains and the lights of the sent five policemen to the hotel on two occa- main dining room and the lounges were the sions to train personnel in first aid and fire responsibility of a specially assigned attendant. fighting. Personnel from the police and fire Each took care of lighting control in his area. unit (keibodan) paid one visit for the same purpose. Drill was conducted in each instance 9. Mutual aid.—The hotel manager stated but the over-all time of each visit was not over that regulations required that there be a mu- an hour and instruction given was not thor- tual-assistance program set up between the ho- ough. Subjects covered during these visits tel and the neighborhood groups. However, he included methods of first aid and how to form stated that such assistance was wishful think- and operate a bucket brigade. ing and was more in plan than in fact. He did 7. Air-raid warniyig system.—First informa- state, however, that he could expect aid from tion of an air-raid alert was obtained when the the city fire and police departments. city sirens sounded. No additional notice came 10. Summary.—Fire protection for this ho- from criers of official police and fire units and tel was adequate under normal conditions. no flags were visible in the area. Interior The manager stated that the attitude relative alarm was handled by the desk clerk. In the to hotels in this area was one of tolerance and case of an alert, he immediately telephoned all that little assistance was received from neigh- guest rooms and bellboys notified persons in the boring units or from the prefecture of city gov- gardens. For the final warning, or "air ernment. The hotel manager expected no as- alarm," the clerk called all departments and sistance and certainly intended to offer none. each chambermaid was required to knock at the He was well aware that his shelters were indoor of each guest room and guide the occu- adequate, but did not know how he could im- pant to the special shelter room. Each depart- prove them. The effectiveness of the provi- ment head was responsible for getting his per- sions which were made could not be adequately sonnel to the shelter room. In order of prefer- tested because Kyoto was never involved in any ence in the case of air raid were guests, women serious air raids. It is certain, however, that and children, then hotel employees. At night there was not enough equipment to protect the the night watchmen called in and informed the hotel in the event of even spill-over hits from clerk when they heard the siren. Final au- nearby areas.

82 EXHIBIT L

Report on air-raid protection inspection of the Daiken office building.

1. Introduction, a. Location. — Kyoto Shi, The hand-pump hose was 1-inch in diame- Shimokyoku, Karasurudori, Shijo Sagaru, ter and included 2 lengths of approximately Suiginyacho, 622. 33 feet (10 meters) each, making a total b. Oivnership.—Daiken Sangyo, Ltd. The of approximately 65 feet of hose for each Daiken Sangyo, Ltd., is a holding company with pumper. In addition to this miscellaneous a capital of 15,000,000 yen. The shares sold on equipment the building was equipped with the open market during the war at 80 yen per four hose stations. Each hose station had share. The greatest portion of the stock is two lengths of hose, ll4-in. linen, of 33 feet held by Mr. Chubei Ito; Mr. Takenosuke Ito; (10 meters) length, which, with the nozzle Mr. Sanichi Fujino. attachment, gave a usable length of ap- c. Floor space.—The building has a total of proximately 65 feet. This hose station 8 floors, comprising 90 offices, and each floor was equipped with an automatic device has approximately 38,856 square feet. that turned the water supply on immedi- d. Office Staff.—The building management ately when the hose was withdrawn from employed a staff of 30 persons. the rack. In addition to these hose sta- e. Tenants.—The office space was leased by tions there was a similar station on the three business firms, a textile company and roof and two stations on the main floor. two industrial concerns, which employed a total b. First-aid squad.—The first-aid squad had at the building. of approximately 600 persons a total of five men who acted both as stretcher f. Construction.—The building was of mod- bearers and bandagers. This unit was equip- ern construction, being built of structural steel ped with three stretchers, some emergency ban- and reinforced concrete. daging material and two sets of splints. There or- 2. Organization.—The air-raid protection was one casualty and first-aid station combined assistant ganization was headed by the manager in the lobby of the first floor. First aid was of the building, who, in turn, had one assistant administered at this point and any casualties as a staff member. The basic organization in- were assembled to be taken to the nearest hos- a cluded two squads, a fire-fighting squad and pital which was a 10-minute stretcher ride from first-aid squad. the building. This hospital had 5 doctors and a. Fire-fighting squad.— 30 nurses in attendance. (1) Personnel.—The squad is composed 3. Training.—The prefectural police visited of 3 guards, or watchers, 7 pump men, 5 the building twice per month and gave instruc- hose men and 30 men who formed a bucket tion. The classes lasted 1 hour each time and brigade. The bucket brigade was com- included instruction in the rudiments of first posed of employees of the building and also aid and basic fire-fighting techniques. Drills came from the tenants of volunteers who were conducted twice every 6 months and in- building. guards' sole duty was to the The volved the use of fire-fighting equipment on they were stationed act as ^vatchers and hand. on the roof. These men were in direct 4. Air-raid ivarning system. The members communication with the main office and — of the building received their air-raid warning were able to report incidents directly when by radio, siren, and telephone from the prefec- they occurred. Their duty was to watch tural police. The first and second assistant for bomb hits on or near the premises and managers were responsible for giving the in- no protection was afforded them other than terior alarm, which was a system of electric the elevator loft. bells controlled by a switch in the manager's (2) Equipment.—Included in the equip- oflSce. After this the "alert" signal was an- ment for the building were 100 buckets, the "alarm" 2 manual pumps capable of delivering a nounced by three short rings and pressure of approximately 30 pounds per signal was announced by one long ring, whereas square inch, 5 ladders, 10 picks, 5 shovels. the "release-from-alarm" was three short rings. 83 In addition to the electric bells, there were two used as a control center and operations head- hand bells available on each floor. quarters. He was able to get connection with 5. Operations.—When the "alert" signal was the various parts of the building through the given, all personnel who were assigned equip- regular telephone system. ment procured it and hastened to the first floor 8. Water supply.—Water was delivered to garage to await instructions. They were the building from the city water mains at a joined immediately by the remainder of the pressure of 70 pounds per square inch through fire-fighting and first-aid groups. Little atten- a 4-inch riser. The city water supply was sup- tion was paid to the "alert" by the tenants. plemented by two large static tanks of 390 gal- These people habitually waited until the lons each at the front and rear entrance and "alarm" before they took shelter. The only eight small 20-gallon tanks which were located shelters which were used were two basements, on each floor. There was no automatic sprin- one under the garage for the employees and one kler system in the building. under the main structure for the tenants. The 9. Mutual aid.—Arrangements were made to roof of the garage basement had a thickness of exchange assistance with the neighboring aux- approximately 10 inches of concrete and steel, iliary police and fire units (keibodan) and the whereas the overhead protection of the other neighborhood group (tonari gumi). The city basement consisted of all the floors above. fire department could also be depended upon to Neither shelter was gasproof, and no oxygen give assistance when needed. equipment was available, but both were fire 10. Comments. — The air-raid protection resistive. No guides were furnished by the group of the Daiken office building was quite management. All tenants knew where to go small and auxiliary equipment was characteris- and incidental visitors naturally followed the tically crude. The organization never was ac- crowd. tually tested due to the fact that Kyoto was 6. Light control.—All lights were extin- never subjected to a large incendiary raid. guished on all floors above the third floor every However, the building was equipped to sus- night before sundown. Normally, black-out tain and successfully fight off incidental damage was not observed but during raids curtains or fires. Should the building have been sub- were drawn in lighted offices. Office personnel ject to a direct attack it would not have been in each room was responsible for lights being able to cope with the emergency. The interest turned off at the end of the working day and a shown by the management was above average check was made by the management to assure for the Kyoto area, but below the average neces- that this was done. sary to combat actual saturation raid condi- 7. Control center.—The manager's office was tions.

84 : . EXHIBIT M

Report on air-raid protection inspection of St. Agnes' Episcopal Church and girls' school

7 Nov. 1945 were about 4 or 5 inches in diameter and were to be thrown at the base of the fire) 1. Introdnction. a. Location. — Kyoto Shi, Four or five of these balls were at each Kamikyo Kyuko, Karasumaru Dusi, Shimoto door. Churi. (7) Ten ladders. b. Description. The St. Agnes Episcopal — The pastor stated that by the time he received Church and Girls' School is a Protestant organi- instructions from the prefectural government zation which was constructed and operated on to purchase the fire-fighting equipment there funds furnished by the Episcopal Board of For- was none to be had and that he knew that the eign Missionaries. The pastor, the Reverend equipment which he did have was insufficient Matsutaro Okajima, is a Japanese citizen who but he could procure no more. received his college education at an Episcopal c. The emergency medical section.—This sec- seminary in New York City. The church, tion was headed by one teacher and a staff of school and rectory cover an area of approxi- nine assistants. The number of students par- mately one-quarter of a block and have a total ticipating varied from 50 to 100. This section of eight buildings. Four of the buildings were was exceptionally well trained because part of of wood, three of brick, and one of modern rein- the regular peacetime as well as wartime curric- forced concrete construction. ulum of the school included a course in first aid. c. Staff.—The pastor was assisted by an as- This course was taught as a formal subject and sistant pastor, instructors and 35 permanent several periods a week were devoted to it. The 15 part-time instructors. girls received further training by going to the 2. Organization.—The titular head of the air- local Red Cross hospital which was located raid protection unit was the pastor himself, but nearby. This hospital, which contained a staff due to the many pressing duties incident to his of approximately 30 doctors and 350 nurses, position he passed on the actual administration was used as a casualty station in view of the of the air-raid protection organization to one fact that it was only 3 to 4 minutes away by of his male instructors. stretcher. a. Breakdown.—The organization was bro- d. The guide section.—This section was ken down into five main sections. headed by one teacher and operated with a nor- (1) Fire fighting. mal complement of 30 students. The duty of a (2) Emergency medical. guide was to escort groups of girls to shelter (3) Guide. areas during emergencies. These girls were (4) Watchers. specifically chosen for their stability of char- (5) Liaison. acter and common sense plus the ability to re- b. The fire-fighting section. —The fire-fight- main calm under stress. ing section was composed of 18 teachers and e. The ivatcher section.—This section had between 100 and 200 students. The equipment one teacher as the head and was composed of for this section was very poor and included 20 students. The girls in this section were nothing but the most rudimentary tools, chosen for their initiative and were trained to namely identify aircraft and call this and other infor- (1) Hand pump, exceptionally small, mation through a megaphone. The pastor delivering only 20 pounds pressure and stated that the girls actually had to be trained having only 40 feet of 1-inch hose. to shout due to the fact that the normal Japa- (2) Two hundred and fifty buckets nese girl is very timid and shy and would, under (canvas). no circumstances, shout, even in emergency. (3) Forty beaters (wood and reed). These watchers were stationed on the roofs of (4) Ten hooks (wood). various buildings and were charged with the (5) Ten mats (grass). duty of informing the headquarters section or (6) Five hundred sand balls (these the control center of the approach of enemy 85 ;

planes. The control center, or headquarters ture advocated could be of any value whatso- section, was equipped with a radio and the ever, especially in view of the pathetic shortage pastor and his staff used to gather and listen of equipment. It was further stated that what to the radio and make a personal estimate as to instruction was given lacked force due to the whether enemy planes were going to bomb near instructor's lack of conviction. their area. 6. Mutual aid.—No arrangement was made 3. Air-raid warning system.—The original with local neighborhood groups (tonari gumi) information regarding an impending air raid or auxiliary police and fire units (keibodan) was received from the city siren and the radio. for mutual assistance. The only assistance siren audible to all the students The was and that could be expected in the event of fire was instructors and at the first warning (the "alert" from the city fire department. signal) all students stopped work, stood up and 7. Light control.—All lights were extin- awaited the command of the leader of their guished at sundown and if it became necessary group which was usually a member of the guide to use any lights after dark, certain rooms had section. Key personnel immediately assembled effective black-out curtains on them and could at the pastor's office to listen to the radio and be used. get the latest information. An estimate of the 8. Fire prevention. of the school build- situation was made at this time, and, if it was —Two decided that there was no immediate danger, ings had been torn down to act as fire breaks and to decrease the adjoining build- messages were sent to each room and classes hazard to ings in the of fire. were resumed. Should the decision be to the event contrary, girls were immediately marched to 9. Water supply.—Almost the only water the adjoining playground and were told to supply available was from the city mains, the hasten to their homes, in an effort to disperse hydrant of which was situated on a nearby cor- the students. The boarding students, who ner, but an insufficient number of inadequate numbered approximately 200, were sent to the tanks were sparsely distributed throughout the basement of the concrete building. area.

4. Shelters.—There were only two formal 10. Comments . —The pastor specifically shelters and these were inadequate. These stated that the raids on Osaka and Kobe had shelters were built of wood and earth, half had profound effect upon himself and his in- below the ground and half aboye the ground structors. He stated that he and his teachers the roof was less than 2 feet thick and was no were very suspicious of the efficiency of the protection against other than flying spinters or methods of fire protection that the prefecture incendiaries. The basement of the reinforced had suggested and felt that any effort to train concrete building was the main shelter but the in the use of such primitive equipment was less final refuge in the event of a heavy unan- than useless. The concensus was that, if the nounced raid was to use the imperial palace bombs did come, the best course of action would grounds which were across the street from the be to flee to a more secure position and thus school. save the students and themselves. They did 5. Training.—When the instructions were not believe in making futile attempts at the received from the prefecture to train the girls impossible and thus risk placing themselves and in defense, a request was made to the prefectu- their girls in a dangerous position from which ral police to send an instructor to the school there might be no escape. In this connection it to assist. In spite of the fact that the request was stated that the girls in general were very was repeated on several occasions, no aid was nervous and excitable during air-raid alerts and ever forthcoming. The school did the next best that the girls of the 13- and 14-year age group thing and trained the girls as best it knew how. were so excitable as to be useless even in air- This training involved instruction in ladder raid drill. It was, therefore, the policy to climbing, bucket-brigade operation, aircraft evacuate this group at once at the "alert" sig- identification, and shouting. Instruction was nal, even for drill purposes. Futility was the apathetic, however, and teachers did not believe impression gained and futility was the keyword that such rudimentary measures as the prefec- of their air-raid protection. 86 EXHIBIT N

Translation of table of contents and summary of air-raid defense book : "Training Orders, Training Notices, and Prefectural Orders Concerning Air Defense"; Kyoto prefecture police department. See Reference Item No. 21

Table of Contents

1. Regulations on Control of Sounds Re- partment. Chief of F'ire Defense. Governor sembling Air-Defense Warnings, 11 June 1938. of Kyoto Prefecture—Yukizawa, Chiyoji. Prefectural Order No. 23. Purpose of fire-defense units, organization, Types of air-defense warnings, training air- chain of command, duties, and responsibilities defense warnings, methods to be used in trans- of personnel and a chart on defense areas. mitting warnings, prohibition of sounds re- Amendments to Regulations Pertaining to sembling air-defense warnings, and application Lights Designated in article 5, section 2, of of fines and punishment in the event of any Light Control Regulations, 27 August 1940. violations. Chief of Kyoto Prefectural Police Department. 2. Rules for Light Control Operations, To Chiefs of all police stations. 9 August 1938. Prefectural Order No. 40. Notice to comply with Order No. 773 (20 Au- Information (kind of light, size of globe, gust 1940. Signed by Governor Kawanishi, reasons for using light, name, address, etc.,) Jitsuzo), which increases the distance of shop to be secured from individuals who desire lights, and business lights from a visible dis- special light permits referred to in article 5, tance of 50 meters to 100 meters. section 2, article 6, section 1, article 6, section 2, 8. Matters Pertaining to Brilliance of Lights article 8, and graphs 1, 2, 4 and 5 in the Light Referred to in article 4 of Light Control Control Regulations. Fines and punishment Regu- lations, 8 December 1941. Governor Ando, for violations. Kyoshiro. Kyoto Prefectural Notice No. 1259. 3. Procedure for Conducting Light Control, 9 August 1938. Prefectural Training Order Lights referred to in article 4 of the Light No. 28. Control Regulations will be concealed or con- Steps to be taken when various orders and trolled during security periods as designated permits are issued and persons to be notified. until further notice. Example: When making out a special permit 9. Matters Pertaining to Prohibition of according to article 6, section 2, of the Light Sounds Resembling Air-Defense Warnings Re- Control Regulations, the governor will be noti- ferred to in article 3 of Regulations on Control fied immediately. of Sounds Resembling Air-Defense Warnings, 4. Regulation for Kyoto Prefecture Air-De- 8 December 1941. Governor Ando, Kyoshiro. fense Observation Units, 27 August 1938. Kyoto Prefectural Notice No. 1260. Secret Instructions No. 3. Police Chief. Chief Sounds referred to in article 3 of the Regula- of Air Observation. Governor of Kyoto Pre- tions on Control of Sounds Resembling Air- fecture—Suzuki, Keiichi. Defense Warnings will continue to be pro- Purpose of air-observation units, organiza- hibited as specified until further notice. tion and administrative set-up, and duties and 10. Matters Pertaining to Light Control and responsibilities of officers. Organization charts. Defense Against Floods, 9 September 1940. 5. Amendments to Regulations for Kyoto Chief of Kyoto Prefecture Police Department. Prefecture Air-Defense Observation Units, To chiefs of police stations. 25 July 1941. Chief of Prefectural Police De- Usage of minimum practicable amount of partment. To chiefs of police stations. light in the event of floods which necessitate

Revisions and supplements to • regulations immediate repair work, rescut, and first air in covered in previous chapter. Changes in compliance with an order to this effect from the number of personnel, and elaboration on duties Engineering and Economics Bureau under the and responsibilities of officers. Ministry of Home Affairs. 6. Regulations for Fire Defense, 1 February 11. Matters Pertaining to Permits for Use of 1944. Secret Instructions No. 5. Police De- Lights in Local Railroad Emergency Repair and 87 '

Construction Shops, 24 February 1943. Chief 16. Air-Raid Defense Personnel's Allocation of Kyoto Prefecture Police Department. To During Security Alarm, 4 January 1943. Chief chiefs of police stations. of Kyoto Prefecture Police Department. Orders to notify all railroad personnel of Regulations concerning what individuals or manner in which special permits may be secured groups may be used for defense and fire-fighting to use certain lights necessary for the main- activities depending upon the gravity of the tenance of railway activities. Types of lights situation. which may be used, wattage limitations, and 17. Matters Pertaining to the Enforcement communication systems for receiving air-de- of Preparatory Control Referred to in article 4 fense warnings. of the Light Control Regulations, 10 February 12. Matters Pertaining to Air-Defense Ob- 1943. Chfef of Kyoto Prefectural Police De- Conscription of Per- servation Units and the partment. sonnel, 2 March 1942. Chief of Kyoto Prefec- To chiefs of all police and fire stations in the ture Police Department. To all police station prefecture. Regulations concerning the en- chiefs concerned. forcement of light control regulations which Air-observation units should not indulge too deal with outside lights (gate lights, shop freely in the conscription of civilians for ob- lights, advertisement signs, street lights). servation activities, except when they are vital- 18. Matters Pertaining to the Transmission ly needed and, then, only with the approval of of Air-Defense the governor. Warning Signals, 29 March 1943. Chief of Kyoto Prefectural Police De- 13. Matters Pertaining to the Transmission partment. of Air-Defense Warnings, 2 June 1942. Chief of Kyoto Prefecture Police Department. To To chiefs of all police and fire stations in the chiefs of police and fire stations. prefecture. Flags, sirens, bells, streamers, Different types of warnings, transmission of and other methods of transmitting the various alarms by sirens, radio, voice, and flags, and warnings and the proper procedure to be precautions to be observed when alarms are followed. sounded. 19. Matters Pertaining to Lights Designated 14. Matters Pertaining to Air-Defense Or- in article 5, section 2 of the Light Control ganization During Alert Periods, 20 December Regulations, 23 November 1943. Chief of 1942. Chief of Kyoto Prefecture Police De- Kyoto Prefectural Police Department. partment. To chiefs of all police stations in To chiefs of all police and fire stations in the the prefecture. prefecture. Regulations concerning movement Reminder to air-defense units to make cer- of trains at night and the control of lights used tain that their responsibilities are carried out by the railroads (car lights, station lights, efficiently. Also several regulations stating sparks, repair shop lights). that people who are in public places at the time 20. Matters Pertaining to the Appointment the "alert" is given should be advised to return of Permanent Personnel for Specific Observa- to their homes. tion Posts, 1 March 1944. Chief of Kyoto Pre- 15. Matters Pertaining to the Explanation of fectural Police Department. To those police Air-Raid Training Conditions, 30 December station chiefs concerned. 1942. Chief of Kyoto Prefecture Police De- Brief sketch on observation units' personnel, partment. mainly the appointment of students with per- To chiefs of all police and fire stations in the tinent responsibilities and details. prefecture. Manner in which various condi- 21. Summary of Preparatory Light Control tions (fire, damage) should be made known to Enforcement, April 1944. the people by the use of voice messages, flags, General regulations on outside lights, inside and signs during training. lights, factory lights, street lights, etc.

88 EXHIBIT O Pictures of: (1) conical-shape black-out street lighting unit; and (2) dome-shape street lighting reflector unit

Conical shape black-out street lighting unit replacing pendant enclosing globe units. Lamped with approximately a 20-watt lamp the unit is approximately 6 inches diameter and 8 inches deep mounted about 15 feet above the curb line. 89 Dome type street lighting reflector unit, typical unit used for illumination of some of the major streets in Kyo

90 : EXHIBIT P

Translation of bill proposed for effecting evacuation of persons, published by Kyoto prefecture, August 1945. (Reference Item No. 25.)

1. Purqiose.—As a means of increasing pro- attending to other business on evacuation, tection of cities against the air raids which are offices for the direction of evacuation will becoming more intense, we are to evacuate the be set up in the cities, and ward offices. old and young, the sick, pregnant women, and (4) For the sake of promoting plans those not required to remain in the city. for reception areas, the Kyoto prefecture 2. Methods.—a. Evacuation will not be com- reception center conference will be estab- pulsory but will be strongly recommended. lished. b. As a fundamental policy, evacuation will b. Time for carrying out the evacuation. It be to relatives so far as possible, people in the shall be begun on the 10th of August and com- prefecture or in nearby prefectures. In the pleted within approximately 2 months. case of persons without relatives or whose rela- c. Distribution of removal certificates.— tives live in distant places, plan to be set up to (1) In Kyoto city the distribution will receive them within the limits of the prefecture. be made by the ward leaders and in

c. Apart from those who need to remain in Maizuru, by the mayor. The form and the the city for defense purposes, priority will be handling will be determined separately. given in evacuation to the old and young, sick d. The payment of money to encourage re- people, pregnant women and attendants for moval. (Note) As a fundamental principle, such. For other people who do not need to such payments are not to be made. However, remain in the city, removal to agricultural dis- in the case of citizens who are exempt from the tricts in groups will be carried on as quickly as tax payments, if they go out by families (in the possible. They will be used for thorough-going case of a person whose presence is required in increase in food production for carrying the the city the remainder of the family will be war through. For those who need to remain considered as the unit) the sum of Y300 per in the city, accommodations for group housing family will be paid. This money will come will be set up and the city will give attention from the national treasury but will be handled to this matter. by the city. Details of these financial transac- city. d. Evacuation areas will be in Kyoto city and tions will be decided separately by the Maizuru city. e. The ynanagement of transportation.— In the matter of rail transportation, 3. Carrying out the ineasures.—a. Organiza- (1) tion for the administration of evacuation to be conference will be held with the head of set up. While the prefecture and city will co- the Osaka Railway Bureau and free trans- operate in directing and urging the perform- portation given to persons and their bag- ance of the plan, the main work will be carried gage. Attention will be given to speeding out by the city as follows up transportation and efficient use of the railroad through adequate planning. (1) All kinds of policies with reference to the evacuation of persons will be con- (2) In transportation other than by rail, sidered by the prefecture's evacuation com- just so far as there is no interference with mittee and a complete and speedy carry- the transportation of necessary articles for potential, ing out of these measures is to be expected. daily living in increasing the war (2) In the cities to be evacuated, a head- the vehicles for land transportation may quarters for directing evacuation of per- be allotted, and allotment of trucks may be sons will be set up and they will have considered as in the case of those who were charge of the evacuation in those districts. evacuated because of the tearing down of (3) In order to afford all facilities for buildings. evacuees, consultation offices on evacuation (3) As a fundamental principle, each will be set up in the prefecture and in the one is to see that his baggage is carried police offices concerned, and for the pur- to the railway station, but in special cases, pose of issuing evacuation certificates and methods for the handling of personal bag-

91 gage are to be considered and volunteer order to facilitate the finding of occupa- bodies among the populace are to be en- tions by evacuees and the transfer of their couraged to give their cooperation. children to local schools. (4) Each one is urged to provide his own g. Disposal of baggage left behind.— packaging materials and containers. (1) As a fundamental principle, evacuees (5) In order to expedite the transport are to take care themselves of the dis- of evacuation baggage, facilities for han- posal of baggage which comes outside dling baggage are to be set up in the neigh- transportation limits, but in addition to borhood of railway stations. that the following points are to be con- f. Handling of receiving centers,— sidered : Articles which can be kept in (1) Through the receiving center coun- safes will be attended to by the city. cile set up in the various cities, towns, and villages throughout the prefecture, guid- (2) The city will give attention to buy- ing, selling, and exchanging of second-hand ance is to be given in the matter of securing goods, and, in houses and rooms, consigning people to addition, will carry out the nearby farms, and urging a positive back- purchase of certain types of goods. to-the-farm policy for those who have rela- (3) In unavoidable circumstances, the tives on farms. use of a building of solid construction and (2) Evacuation of persons who have cellars will be planned for. relatives in nearby prefectures is to be h. Expenses.—Expenses arising from trans- facilitated. portation will be placed in the prefectural (3) Necessary measures are to be taken budget and money for the encouragement of for a sufficient distribution of supplies for removal and for the direction centers for car- living in the receiving areas. rying out evacuation in the cities and wards (4) All the organizations concerned are will be put in the budget of public bodies to take effective cooperative measures in concerned.

92 : EXHIBIT Q

Translation of section 3, "Prefectural Regulations for Wartime Damage Rescue Work," 18 March 1945, abstracted from Kyoto prefectural publication dated April, 1945, "Compendium of Matters Pertaining to War- time Damage Protection Law No. 71, Promulgated 24 February 1942." Reference Item No. 26

Sec. 3. Other matters.—a. In order to man- ing area and the relief headquarters and age matters pertaining to protection of suffer- investigation of the condition of sufferers. ers in accordance with the Regulations of the (3) Rescue.—Plan for evacuation; es- Kyoto Prefectural Headquarters for the War- tablishment of rescue centers and the time Damage Rescue Work, that office will be reception of sufferers. established in the Kyoto prefecture. (4) Housing.—Control of temporary b. There will be the chairman, vice chairman, housing; finding quarters for sufferers and and councilors. The chairman will have charge people obliged to remain in the city. of the duties of the Headquarters; the vice (5) Equipment.—Construction of tem- chairman will assist the chairman and take his porary residences ; demobilization and al- place in case of need ; councilors will assist location of personnel for construction of the chairman and take part in carrying out the temporary residences ; the preparation and work of the Headquarters. The chairman will storage of materials for temporary resi- be the deputy governor ; the vice chairman will dence construction. be the head of the section in charge of wartime (6) Medical.—Medical attention and ob- damage matters ; and the Governor will ap- stetrical care for sufferers ; the mobilizing point the councilors from among the section and emergency allocation of the personnel heads concerned. for rescue work; anti-gas and anti-epi-

c. The Headquarters will be divided into the demic work; emergency distribution of

drugs and medical materials ; testing, dis- following seven sections : General Affairs, Local Guidance, Rescue, Housing, Equipment, Medi- infection, and supply of water. cal, and Provision. Each section will have a (7) Provision.—The providing of rescue chief who will attend to the business of the materials and comfort to sufferers. section. The Governor will choose the section The Main Points in the Carrying Out of heads from among the prefectural section heads THE Work of the Above-Mentioned Head- concerned. quarters.

d. The members of the Headquarters will be Each section is to have confidential contact chosen from among the members of the Depart- with the local authorities concerned and is to ment of Internal Affairs and others designated leave no stone unturned in the speedy and by the Governor, and the section heads will effectual carrying out of relief measures for choose the section members from their own sufferers. Each section is to keep a daily departments in the prefecture and others desig- record of its work and to show it to the chair- nated by the chairman of the Headquarters. man of the Headquarters. Each section is to

e. Duties of the various sections. keep a record of the residences of the members (1) General Affairs.—Plans based on of his section to determine the method of getting in touch with them and to leave no stone the Rescue Law ; the control of regulations among the different sections handling unturned in times of emergency summoning to finance, rescue work, and supply of pro- their posts. The chief of the councilors is to visions for the keep a record of the residences of the personnel sufferers ; providing living necessities for the sufferers; the manage- who are held in reserve and to have all prepara- ment of control of this law; the preparations made for emergency mobilizing. The different sections are to formulate detailed tion of certificates ; matters pertaining to concrete plans for their work to a relief funds for the sufferers ; and any mat- and make ters not handled by the other sections. report to the chairman and in general to observe (2) Local Guidance.—Control of the the following guidance of the relief for sufferers in the 1. General Affairs Section.—a. This section, suffering area; liaison between the suffer- on the basis of report from the Guard Head- 93 : quarters (Keibi Hombu), will make immediate 3. Rescue Section.—a. This section will act contact with the Local Guidance Section who in accordance with a plan for rescue work for will investigate the state of the damage; will sufferers in Kyoto Prefecture. also gather reports and records of all sorts of b. Housing and protection of sufferers will matters and contact the various other sections be carried out in general in line with the fol- and have them take appropriate measures on lowing provisions the basis of the law for rescue. (1) Sufferers are to be divided into the b. It will maintain close contact with all the following three classes and provided for: different sections and see to it that the work is Persons with relatives to go to; persons carried out fully and quickly. without relatives to go to; and persons

c. It shall have charge of the finances of whose work compels them to remain in the rescue work and act on the basis of the detailed city. reports from all the sections and city, town, and (2) A distribution of sufferers—suffer- village chiefs concerned. ers who are caused to take immediate d. It shall determine methods for setting up refuge in schools and temples and the like consultation places for the sufferers in any are to be investigated as quickly as pos- areas where there is need for consultation on sible and then to be scattered to various personal matters. places in accordance with the following

e. After the Police Guard have furnished the principles: Refugees with relatives are to supply of boiled rice and other foods and living be sent to them and in the case where they necessities to the sufferers, this section shall have to go to other prefectures, the laws in carry on and make provision on the basis of the such places are to be followed ; those with- Wartime Damage Protection Law. out relatives are to be furnished with

f . It shall plan for close contact with the de- housing after those who remain in the city partments which have to do with clothing and for essential work have been taken care other materials for distribution and see that no of ; of those who stay in the city for essen- stone is left unturned in maintaining a supply tial work, those who have relatives in of such things. places from which they can travel easily

g. It shall make a distinction between the shall be sent to them but if they have no supply of rescue items to the sufferers accord- relatives, they are to be put in temporary ing to whether they are in the reception areas buildings for which priorities were given or in reception places at the evacuation point on contact with the Housing Section. and determine on concrete methods of dis- 4. Housing section.—a. So far as possible, tribution. rented houses and rented rooms suitable for long-time dwelling should provided 2. Local Guidance Section.—a. On the basis be for the of contact from the General Affairs Section, sufferers. they shall immediately set out for the actual b. In cases where it is difficult to provide spot (of disaster) and guide and control the dwellings for the sufferers in those cities, towns rescue work carried on by city, town, and and villages, to which they have been sent, help village heads, and maintain contact with the should be sought from other cities, towns, and Headquarters. villages.

b. They shall investigate the actual condition 5. Equipment section.—a. On the basis of of the disaster on the basis of the provisions in the Rescue Law determined by the General the law and quickly report the same to the Affairs section, when necessary, temporary con- head of the General Affairs Section. struction should be carried out quickly accord- c. The carrying out of rescue measures on ing to the general principles for temporary the spot is to be done on the basis of the plans housing. formulated in accordance with the law, in the b. The building sites for temporary resi- places entrusted with the Wartime Damage dences should be determined ahead of time and Rescue work, and in other places the work is the mobilizing and allocation of the building to be carried out in general in accordance with unit (personnel) should be arranged satisfac- the above. torily.

94 c. The preparation and storage of building materials, ample for the rescue of sufferers. materials should be provided for through close b. In order to raise the morale of the suf- contact with the sections concerned. ferers, plans for comfort and encouragement 6. Medical section.—a. Medical services for should be set up in the various reception places. time of disaster should be carried out on the 8. The summoning of the personnel con- basis of Kyoto Prefecture's regulations for Air- cerned and their allocation for duty. Defense Rescue. a. When the time comes for the carrying out b. All rescue places should be immediately of wartime damage or rescue work, the chair- opened and, according to necessity, the rescue man will give notice to each section head. personnel mobilized and quick and proper medi- b. When the various section heads receive cal treatment for wounded and sick people car- the orders from the chairman, they will imme- ried out satisfactorily. diately summon the section personnel and have

c. The necessary drugs and medical supplies them take their assigned posts. should always be kept on hand in the rescue c. The chairman, in order to expedite work, places and in case of an insufficient supply, an may give orders to the personnel of one section emergency distribution should immediately be to help another section. carried out. d. The chairman, on the request from any d. The section should always make sure of section chief, may mobilize the reserve person- the condition of supply of medicines and medi- nel and attach them to the section which needs cal supplies and plan to keep on hand a suitable help. amount. e. Each section chief may make arrange- 7. Provision section.—a. This section will ments for exchange of personnel as the length maintain contact with the Supply Department of the operation demands. and in times of necessity, will encourage The (Explanatory Note.) —These directions are Imperial Rule Assistance Association and the followed by tables showing how the different Greater Japan Women's Association and all sections in this organization are to be linked up other bodies and associations among the popu- with existing sections in the Kyoto Prefecture lace to provide a sufficient supply of rescue and municipal offices.

95 : EXHIBIT R

Translation of questionnaire designed to determine destination of persons seeking other locations. Reference Item No. 27

Form for the Investigation of the Real At the back of the form are instructions to Circumstances of Applicants for Evacua- the one who fills out the form. Among other TION. items are given the classes eligible for

1. Head of household. evacuation 2. Number in household. ^ Those over 65, primary school pupils, 3. applying for evacuation. Number children under 7.

4. Desired destination. o r» ^ ii, -iv, u • -n ,. 2. Pregnant women, those with chronic ill- ^ _, , , , . ,-, 5. Presence or absence ot relatives at the xi. j j^ j . , ness, the deformed, desired, destination., j^. j^. . ^ . , ^' F'^'^i^^s or survivors of men m the service, Membership in necessary in the city. Neighborhood Group'ofli;;!;;;;.';^!"""";; ^^^^ ^^^ "o* Block Association of 4. Others not necessary in the city: people Federated Block Association of Ward living on pensions, annuities, rentals, interest. Seal of Block Association Leader. allowances, and people without occupation. Name and seal of Neighborhood Group. 5. People necessary to care for the helpless.

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EXHIBIT S

Translation of compendium of regulations relating to school children group evacuation. Issued by educational section of Kyoto prefecture, May, 1945. Reference Item No. 28

Abstract of Contents force thoroughgoing evacuation in A class cities, either to relatives or by Page 1, 2 Sept. 1944: groups. Also have first and second Encouragement of evacuation to relatives years go to relatives ; carry on school- made known through literature and ing for those who have no relatives but meetings of guardians. if guardians request, group evacuation Those to be evacuated first may be carried out when occasion arises. 1. Those living near important instal- Also have seventh and eighth grades go lations. to relatives, but if they have none, send 2. Those in densely populated areas. boys to farms and girls to places where 3. Those too weak to join in group they can do light work. Use the school evacuation. buildings, except a part for school of- Report desire to principal of school, who fice, for necessary purposes. Education reports to mayor on each occasion, while Minister to decide on A and B cities, on mayor reports to governor at end of each consultation with other ministries con- month. Principal also sends word to cerned. school principal at destination. If any present receiving centers are Page 4, 3 April 1945 : deemed unsuitable, let there be re- Further exhortation to evacuate to rela- evacuation. tives. Period of evacuation may be extended be- Regulations for group evacuation. yond one year if advisable. Expenses all assumed by city except month-

ly tuition. Page 21, 22 March 1945 : Receiving centers to be towns and villages Communication from Head of National in Kyoto Prefecture, but unsuitable School Bureau of Educational Depart- places to be avoided. Number to be ment to Governor of Kyoto Prefecture evacuated from Kyoto and Maizuru esti- emphasizes the strengthening Group mated at 20,000, and receiving areas to Evacuation for school children. basis. be sought on that In "A" cities, first and second grade in- Twenty-five to a dormitory is standard. struction may be suspended temporarily, Students from city to be added to classes but the third to sixth grades inclusive in country, but where this crowds things should carry on at receiving centers. too much additional classes are to be Page 24, 22 March 1945 formed. Laundering and mending to be done by National School Bureau to Governor. local women if possible. Government Ordinance No. 94. Checked baggage limited to one piece of "A" cities: Tokyo (55 wards), Osaka, 20 kilograms or less, including bedding. Nagoya, Yokohama, Kobe, Kawasaki, Individual meetings with parents not Amagasaki. allowed. "B" cities: Kyoto, Kure, Maizuru, Yoko- suki, Hiroshima. Page 16, 22 March 1945 Vice Minister of Educational Ministry to Page 25, 29 May 1945 : Governor. (Decision of Cabinet meet- School Ordinance No. 1337. ing, 16 March 1945. Government Ordi- Deputy Governor to Principals of Evacua- nance No. 93.) tion Schools. Need felt for increased emphasis on school Inclusions and exclusions from group children evacuation. evacuees. Divide cities into A and B classes, and en- As participation in evacuation is desirable,

97 : : : ; : : : :

get in touch with officials in receiving 5. Physical Welfare Sanitation centers and, so far as accommodations Section Section. allow, have students participate before a. Anti-epidemic. anything happens. b. Medical Treatment. Exclusions as a fundamental rule will not c. Health. be allowed. d. Medical Where illness has made participation in Supplies. group evacuation impossible, or where parents have moved to country, exclusion 6. Transportation Transporta- may be allowed. In such cases, consul- a. Pupils. tion Section. tation with authorities concerned should b. Supplies. be carried out ahead of time. Page 39, 29 May 1945

Page 27, 29 May 1945 : School Children Evacuation Liaison Com- A headquarters for school children evacua- mittee of Kyoto Prefecture. tion (Gakiido Sokai Hombu) to be estab- Headed by the Governor and Deputy Gov- lished in the Prefectural Office. ernor, and consisting of Prefectural Chairman—The Governor. Sections heads and officials and other Vice Chairman—the Deputy Governor bodies at the Reception Centers. (head of Administrative Section). Page 43, 29 May 1945 Councillors All Department Heads. — Society of Backers of School Children Secretaries—Heads of the Sections Evacuation. concerned.

Page 51, 29 May 1945 : Six sections Education at the Reception Centers. Purposes 1. General Affairs Tie-in with Prefec- tural organization 1. To build up future citizens with an Section understanding of the purpose of the a. Planning

holy war and . present war con- Office. ' ditions. b. Budget 2. To build strong minds and spirits. Office. 3. To give thoroughgoing training in c. Liaison Educational group living. Office. section. 4. To give education in the various 2. Educational branches of learning. Section. 5. To train as citizens, with a knowl- a. Personnel. edge of local customs and traditions. b. Inspection. 6. Teachers to lead by their example, as well as word. 3. Control Section Local Section. Page 57, 30 Dec. 1944: a. Investigation Transfer of school en- School Regula- 4. Supply Distribu- rollment. tion 3671. tion Section Page 59, 30 March 1945: a. Rice. Agriculture Organization of school in School Regula- Section. reception center. tion 597. b. Supplemental Sea Foods

Page 62, 4 April 1945 : food. Section. Regulation of dormitory School Regula- c. Necessary Commerce and arrangements. tion 619. articles. Industry Section. Page 66, 6 April 1945 d. Fuel Section. Forestry Regular reports. School Regula- Section. tion 640. 98 : : :

Page 71, 6 April 1945: Page 91, 6 April 1945:

Imperial grant. School Regula- . Physical welfare. School Regula- tion 652. Physical examinations. tion 651.

Page 77, 4 May 1945 Page 93, 10 April 1945 Control of life in dormi- School Regula- Carrying out welfare School Regula- tories. tion 1016. measures. tion 671.

Page 79, 16 May 1945 : Page 100, 20 April 1945 Administration of educa- School Regula- Control of disease and School Regula- tion. tion 1171. physical training. tion 877. Transfer of school Knowledge of prophylactic rolls, evacuated and measures. local schools, re- Nourishment. ports to be made out separately, physical Page 119, 6 April 1945: examinations. Formation of Society of School Regula- Backers of School Chil- tion 641. Page 81, 26 March 1945 : dren Evacuation. Rationing and distribution Agricultural

of food. Ministry Page 125, 18 May 1945 : Regulation Labor service. School Regula- 1413. tion 1170.

99 : EXHIBIT T

Translation of: (1) Ration card for sufferers; and (2) Sufferer's certificate. Reference Item No. 29

Sufferer's Certificate Ration Card for Sufferers

1. Residence. (Explanatory Note) : This ration card has 2. Head of household. 12 coupons for the purchase of emergency sup- 3. Head of household's occupation and age; plies. There is space for the residence of the number in the household. sufferer, the head of the household and the Certificate residence at the reception center, also the num- It is certified that the above became sufferers ber of the sufferers, indicating the wounded or on. (date) sick ; the number below 2 years of age, Japa- This is to be signed by the mayor or ward nese count. leader or head of town and village, or police There is a place for the seal of the city, town, chief, or of block association or of neighborhood or village head, as the case may be. group. The coupons are for different commodities (Note) : This certificate must have the seal signed dated the back. of an official in the evacuation center or at the and must be and on reception center, otherwise it is invalid. This certificate must be guarded carefully and In case of moving before suffering disaster, in case of moving before suffering damage, it this certificate is to be returned to the head of is to be returned to the head of the block the block association. association.

100 : EXHIBIT U

Guide to wartime damage insurance (translation)

The following is an explanation of Wartime Damage Insurance National Service Rein- Damage Insurance and how application may be surance Law (Songai Hoken Kokuei Sai Hoken made for a policy. The Wartime Damage In- Ho). surance Law (Senso Hoken Rinji Sochi Ho) c. Animals and plants. (which appeared in the Official Gazette d. Other items as designated by the Minister (Kampo) dated 19 December 1941) and the of Finance. At present enemy property is regulations putting it into effect (Official classified as such according to the enemy prop-

Gazette dated 12 January 1942) will be con- erty custody law ( Tekisankanri Ho ) , as set sidered in detail. forth in official report No. 17 dated 21 January

1. Insurance covering damage due to enemy 1942. action.—War Damage Insurance insures the 4. A person cannot take out insurance for policyholder against loss or damage from fire rent lost from a house destroyed by air raid. or damage attributable to air raids or other Therefore, the actual value of the house only forms of enemy action. As long as the cause shall become the insured value of the object of is enemy action, damage resulting from meas- insurance. ures essential to taking refuge as well as fire 5. The amount of contract must not be over fighting and spreading of fire are included in 90 percent of the insured value. For example, the clauses. Fire insurance does not insure one cannot insure for over Y9,000 a house against fire resulting from air raids. There- valued at Y10,000. Should he apply for in- fore, even though one has a fire insurance surance in the amount of Y10,000, coverage for policy, damage in the first air raid cannot be the remaining Yl.COO will be without effect. insured against unless one has in addition a In case several policies are taken out on the Wartime Damage Insurance policy. same object, the total sum of the policies must be 90 percent or less of the insured value. 2. Articles insurable by Wartime Damage 6. The company will pay the amount of dam- Insurance.—Articles within Japan proper cov- age multiplied by the proportion of contracted ered by fire insurance, and articles within to the insured value. Japan proper not covered by fire insurance, provided they meet the following stipulations: Contract amount Amount of damage — a. Buildings and their adjacent fixtures. Insured amount b. Movable merchandise and household ef- For example, if a man takes out insurance for a fects located in one place. house having an insurance value of Y10,000 and c. Goods in transit. contract amount of Y9,000 and that house sus- d. Trains, street cars, automobiles, and other tains damage amounting to Y5,000 he will be vehicles, and aircraft on the ground. paid Y4,500 or Y5,000 x Y 9,000 e. Ships, floating cranes, dredges, and auxiliary equipment. Y10,000 f. Other articles as designated by the Min- 7. Premium will be determined by the Min- ister of Finance (at present buildings are desig- ister of Finance ; at present by official report nated in Art. 177 of the Official Gazette dated No. 288 dated 25 May 1942. It is quoted as 13 Apr. 1942). follows 3. Articles not insurable by Wartime Dam- (1) For property other than goods in age Insurance.—The following articles are not transit the rate of premium is Y3 per insurable by Wartime Damage Insurance. Y1,000 for a period not longer than 6 Even though they are insured, the policy is void. months. For a storage warehouse owner, a. Currency, securities, stamps, precious goods stored by him under a contract in his metals, precious stones, documents, curios, warehouse, insurance will be issued on a works of art, manuscripts, specifications, de- monthly basis at a rate of Y0.6 per Y1,000 signs, models, bonds, account books, etc. per month. b. Ships insured under reinsurance of the (2) For goods in transit the rate of

101 : . .

premium shall be Y0.75 per Y1,000 for authorization is so indicated by a sign at his any one movement. office.

8. The period for ivhich the company takes b. If anyone taking out war insurance on responsibility.—a. The company's liability be- given property already has that property cov- gins not when the contract is made but when ered by insurance, the war insurance must be the period of insurance commences. The taken out through the company already covering the property. For example, on buildings, period of insurance is six months commencing

fire insurance ; on goods in transit, transporta- at 1600 on the day following that on which the tion insurance; on automobiles, automobile in- contract is made. (Contract is considered surance. He must take out war insurance from made upon the actual presentation of applica- the same company with which he has contracted tion together with payment of premium) and for other insurance. If he has divided the in- ending at 1600 of the last day of the contract surance between several companies on the same period. Therefore, one cannot take out in- property, the war insurance must be divided surance upon application to take effect at once as such also. If the property is not already and thus commit the insurance company to im- covered by insurance he can insure it with any mediate responsibility ; he must allow an inter- company so authorized by the Ministry of val before the time of danger from an ex- Finance. pected air raid. If he wishes to postpone the commencement of the contract for some reason c. When anyone takes out insurance he shall he can select any given commencing day within make two copies of an application duly filed by his 10 days after the contract is made. In this him and stamped with personal stamp, and case the contract begins at 1600 on the com- present it to the company together with the mencing day. premium. The two application blanks must agree in form and content. The item of the b. When anyone takes out insurance for contents of the application blank shall be as goods in transit the period of insurance shall follows be referred to Rule No. 9 in the Enabling Law (Seko Kisokii) for execution. (1) Subject matter insured (household effects, dwelling house, factory, etc.). c. The effect of the insurance contract in case (2) Location of subject matter of in- of partial loss. In case of partial loss the — sured, number, name of town, name of amount of the contract less the amount of pay- city, etc. ment shall be the insured amount for the re- (3) (a) Construction of houses or maining period. But when the amount remain- buildings where contents to be insured may ing is less than 10 percent of the former in- be stored. sured amount or YlOO, the contract loses its (b) Use of the buildings. effect. (c) The occupation of the person who 9. Application for insurance contracts.— uses the buildings. To illustrate a. The application shall be made to the regu- the above. lar fire insurance companies as designated by 1 Construction : wooden, two- the Minister of Finance. At present, as re- storied with so much floor space. ported in official report No. 15, dated 21 Janu- 2. Use: Dwelling house, fac- ary 1942, almost all insurance companies do- tory, shop. ing fire insurance business in Japan (including 3. Occupation (in case of dwell- Korea, Formosa, and Karafuto) are authorized. ing house no entry needed). Persons may apply for insurance either at the (4) Estimation of the insured value. main office of such companies or their branch (The actual market value of the subject offices. If application is made through an in- matter insured at the time of contract will surance agent, an individual must make sure be used.) that the insurance he takes out actually deals (5) As above mentioned, the amount of with war insurance. Such an agent receives a the contract must be less than 90 percent letter of instruction from the company author- of the insured amount) izing him to engage in the business and this (6) Period of insurance.

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(7) Premium. the contract of the insurance so the applicant (8) Name and address of the assured. must keep it carefully. (The assured is the person who has the 11. The time when the coirtvact of insurance right to claim payment of insurance— it takes effect.—The war insurance contract will may be the same person who appHes for take effect at such time when the application the insurance or a different person.) reaches the company together with the

(9) In case other insurance is in effect premium. on the same property, the kind of in- 12. Responsibility of the contractor and the surance, the name of the company, the in- assured.—a. The assured must endeavor to pro- sured amount, and the number of the tect the company against undue loss on prop- policy. erty covered for him, even if it involves expense to the owner. If he neglects to do this, d. The items headed on the application blank he may not be paid all or some part of the for insuring goods in transit. insurance amount.

(1) Subject matter insured. b. The assured must communicate promptly (2) Estimation of insured value. to the company any changes affecting the mat- (3) Insured amount. ters written on the application form. Such (4) Premium. matters include the following: (5) In case other insurance is in effect (1) Change of location of the subject on the same goods in transit, the kind of matter insured. insurance, name of the company, insured (2) Change in construction of the building of amount, number of policy. the insured ; in construction of build- (6) Method of transportation. ings where insured contents are stored. (7) Name of carrier. Changes in their use and in the occupation (8) The places where the carrier re- of the users of the buildings. ceives and delivers the insured goods. (3) In case of insurance on trains, electric cars or other vehicles, aircraft, steam- Note. In case of insui-ance on trains, electric cars, ers, etc., changes of their shed, mooring automobiles or other vehicles, aircraft on land, steamer place, use, number or any particulars of or on other mobile transportation facilities having no the fixed location it is necessary not only to mention par- subject matter insured. ticulars under Nos. 1 and 3 to 9 but also to mention c. Any changes of the above must be sent to this fact and to give exact location as to where the the company without fail. property is stored or moored, insofar as it is possible d. If the person taking out the insurance or to do so. other assured is informed of accident to the in-

e. Cases in which necessary evidence for the sured objects, he must notify the company with- estimation of insurance value is required are as out delay. This notification may be made ver- follows bally or in writing but it must be made (1) When war damage insurance is immediately. taken out without fire or transportation 13. Procedure for making claims for insurance insurance on the same subject matter. payment.—a. The assured must present the (2) When the amount of war damage estimate of war damage together with its insurance exceeds 90 percent of the amount proving documents and the insurance policy to of fire or transportation insurance. If a the company within 30 days after notification to person neglects to attach the documentary the company that damage has occurred. evidence or if such evidence is insufficient b. The application for prompt payments can he will lose the benefit of insurance owing be made in such cases as are mentioned in the to the difficulties of establishing the claim. next article. 10. Form of policy.—When the company re- 14. Payment of claims loill be postponed (in ceives two copies of application together with principle) until the time decided by the Minis- the premium it will stamp one of them and re- ter of Finance but in the following two cases turn it to the applicant. This will be called the only payment will be made promptly war insurance policy and it is the only proof of a. In case the subject matter insured is the

103 dwelling house or the household effects, up to est will be paid at the rate of 2.4 percent per Y2,000 for each will be paid at once. For annum for the amount postponed. The inter- example, the claim amount being Y3,000, est will be calculated by the compound interest Y2,000 will be paid promptly and the payment method and paid together with the insurance of Y1,000 will be postponed. The dwelling amount.

house may be used at the same time as a shop 17. Cases in lohich payment ivill not he or a factory. The amount of household effects made.—a. If the assured neglects to protect the may include partly the amount of merchandise property and to defend it against damage by or other effects than those used for house- violating the air-defense law, all or a part of keeping. the insurance amount may not be paid. b. If recovery of the damage is deemed to be b. In case the claim amount is less than Y30 in the national interest the company will pay for any one accident the amount will not be the total promptly on approval of the amount paid. Minister of Finance. 18. Instruction concerning the use of in- 15. If the company postpones payments it surance money. If the payment exceeds will issue a war damage certificate to the as- Y10,000 the Minister of Finance may, if he sured which will be proof of the right to receive deems it necessary, determine the methods of payment of claims at a future time and must its use. be kept carefully. January 1942 16. If the payment of claims is postponed, interest will be paid on the insured amount. If Superintendent the payment is postponed over one year, inter- Bureau of the Department of Finance

104 :

EXHIBIT V

Translation of Wartime Disaster Protection Law

Senji Saigai Hogo Ho prefectural governor can in instances which he deems necessary superintend installations, 1. Concerning the Law.—A. Wartime dis- utilize (land), houses, or commodities aster protection law (24 Feb. 1942, Law property designated imperial edict, and No. 71) by temporary appropriate commodities, Chapter 1 take custody of and employing those persons as are designated by Article 1.—This law compensates Japanese nationals who are injured due to wartime dis- imperial edict. asters, as well as their families and the sur- Article 10. viving family members. (1) The prefectural governor is empowered, Article 2.—In this law wartime disasters when necessary for the purpose of preparations shall be defined as disasters due to enemy ac- for superintending, utilizing, expropriating, tion, as well as disasters resulting from such. and taking custody, according to the foregoing article, to enter and inspect places where com- Article 3.—There are three types of commodities are to be taken in custody and places pensation (1) relief, (2) pension, and (3) land, houses, and allowance. where there are installations, commodities. Article 4.—With respect to compensation, it is authorized shall be done by the prefectural governor of (2) The prefectural governor the area in which the claimant maintains his to exact necessary information from persons permanent residence (in case of relief, his who have been charged with custody of com- present residence). modities in accordance with the provisions of the above article (10) and to have authorized Chapter 2 public officials enter and inspect places where Article 5.—Relief shall be given to persons there are commodities. who need emergency relief immediately after meeting with some wartime disaster. Note. In the case of entry made in accordance with the provisions of above, the custodian of the installa- Article 6.—Types of relief are as follows (2) tions, land, houses, and the place shall be informed in a. Supplying of household effects. advance of the purpose of the visit. An authorized b. Giving food in case of being burned out. government official who makes entry in accordance with c. Giving and loaning of clothing, bedding, sections (1) and (2) above shall bear credentials to and other essentials. prove his identity. Mayors, town, and village chiefs and their assistants as mentioned in article 14, section 1, d. Medical and maternity expenses. when they have been vested with the proper authority e. Giving for school supplies. according to the regulations in sections 1 and 2, shall f. Funeral expenses. be regarded as competent authorities in sections 1 and g. In addition, any items deemed necessary 2 above. by the prefectural governor. The prefectural Article 11. In the event one is called upon governor can, in cases which he deems neces- — to participate in the effecting of relief accord- sary, disburse sums of money to persons needing to the provisions of article 7 he shall be ing relief (in case of funerals to the person compensated to the extent of the actual costs as who performs the funerals) regardless of the decided by imperial edict. provisions mentioned above. Items pertaining to the extent of the relief, the method and the Article 12.—In the case of injury, hospitali- length of time shall be determined by orders. zation, or death of a person participating or cooperating in effecting relief according to the Article 7.—The prefectural governor is au- provisions of articles 7 and 8, relief money will thorized to employ in the effecting of relief be paid as decided by imperial edict. those persons designated by imperial edict. imperial Article 8.—The prefectural governor is au- Article 13.—As determined by thorized to have those persons needing relief edict, losses will be compensated for in the cooperate in the effecting of relief. event commodities are expropriated or taken Article 9.—In order to carry out relief, the into custody or in the event land or houses are 105 : utilized and the installations supervised ac- or becomes ill, and who are ascendents of that cording to the provisions of article 9. person. (4) The wife of a person who dies due to Note. In the event a person eligible to receive com- disaster, person is pensation under the provisions of the above paragraph wartime a who a descendent is dissatisfied with the amount of compensation, he may and is in the same family or household continu- ordinarily file suit in a court within 6 months from ously from the time of that person's death, or a notification of the of money the date he receives amount person who is an ascendent of that person and decided upon. who is in the same family or household contin- Article 14.—The prefectural governor can, uously from the time that the deceased met by orders, invest the mayor and town and vil- with wartime disaster. lage chiefs and their assistants with a portion Note.—Persons who receive or who are eligible to of authority with respect to relief as determined receive pension according to this law cannot receive by this law. pension during the period in which they are receiving relief. Relief cannot exceed the limit necessary to Note. In cases mayors, town, and village chiefs where existence. and those under them perform duties derived from the authority (mentioned in the provisions mentioned Article 17. —Kinds of pension are as fol- in article 7-10) vested in them by the prefectural gov- lows: ernor (in accordance with the provisions of the above 1. Living pension. section), the stipulations of articles 5 and 6 of the Ad- 2. Medical attention pension. ministrative Execution Law {Gyosei Shikko Ho) and orders based thereon shall apply. 3. Delivery pension. 4. Occupation pension. Article 15.—The prefectural governor can Article 18. Pension cannot be given after have the mayors, and town and village chiefs — the lapse of a period of time to be determined in Hokkaido and each prefecture (Fu and Ken) by imperial edict, from the time the injury due make temporary substitute payments for ex- to wartime disaster is received. penses necessary in relief, as decided in orders, Note. Items concerned with the amount and meth- when it is deemed essential for relief. — ods of payment of pensions will be determined by orders. Chapter 3 Article 19. —In case the person who receives Article 16.—Relief is given to persons who the pension dies, funeral expenses may be paid have difficulty in earning a living due to death to the person who performs the ceremony, as of a person who comes under one of the follow- determined by orders. ing categories, and to persons who receive Article 20.—In case the person who receives slight injuries, serious injuries, or who become the pension is sentenced to more than 6 years' sick under any one of the following categories penal servitude or imprisonment, no pension (though no relief can be given in instances will be given to that person. In case one is where injury, sickness or death is intentional sentenced to penal servitude or imprisonment or is the result of carelessness by either the for less than 6 years the same shall apply until

person, or an eligible person) : the sentence is concluded. Persons become sick or who re- (1) who Article 21.—For any one of the following ceive injuries due to wartime disasters. reasons a person who receives or who is eligible (2) Persons who recover from injuries or to receive pension may be disqualified

illnesses incurred in wartime disasters but 1. Disobeying without legitimate reason the whose freedom of body movement is still se- directions of the prefectural governor concern- riously restricted. ing pension. (3) Spouse, or person mentioned in 2 above 2. Opposing, without legitimate reason the (includes person who has actually entered into investigation concerning pension. a marriage contract, though no notification has 3. Disorderly conduct and extreme idleness. been made) or a person who is a descendent Chapter 4. Disbursing of Allowance and in the same family or household as the per- Article 22.—As determined by imperial son mentioned in (2) above. Persons who are edict, an allowance shall be paid to the surviv- in the same household or family from the time ing family of one who dies in a wartime disas- the person mentioned in (2) above is injured ter. An allowance shall also be given to a

106 person who is injured or becomes ill clue to Article 27. —-Funds received under this law wartime disaster and who for that reason re- shall not be subject to taxation. mains physically handicapped. Article 28.—Money given under this law cannot be lawfully seized by any other person Article 23.—In case of loss or damage to whether or not it has been actually issued. house or household eflfects (including boats Article 29. When this law is applied in which serve as houses for persons who live — Chosen, Taiwan, or Karafuto, if necessary, afloat) an allowance shall be paid the owner special imperial edicts be issued for that thereof as determined by imperial edict. may purpose. Article 24.—An allowance shall be given to persons or to families of persons, as determined Chapter 6. Punishment by imperial edict, who, because of the nature of Article 30.—Persons who do not obey the their duties are required to carry them out re- provisions in article 7 will be imprisoned for gardless of risk in wartime disasters, and who, not more than 6 months, or fined not more than while performing such duties under those cir- 500 yen. cumstances are injured, killed, or become ill. Article 31. —Persons who receive compensa- In this case, the allowance mentioned in Art. 22 tion by fraud or any other illegal means, shall will not be given. be imprisoned for not more than 6 months, or fined not more than 500 yen. Note.—The duties mentioned above will be deter- Article 32. refuses, mined by imperial edict. —Any person who ob- structs or avoids the entry and inspection of the Article 25.—Allowance will not be paid to officials or their staff according to the pro- a person who opposes, without legitimate rea- visions of article 10, sections 1 or 2, or who son, the investigation concerning payment of does not make any report, or makes a false re- allowance. port according to the provisions of article 10, Article 26. —With respect to the application section 2 shall be fined not more than 500 yen. this shall into of other laws, compensation under this law is The date on which law go effect not considered to be relief or pension from will be determined by imperial decree. public funds for poverty. (Effected on 30 April 1942)

107 UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

LIST OF REPORTS

The following is a bibliography of reports resulting 21 Vereinigte Deutsche Metallwerke, Hildesheim, Ger- from the Survey's studies of the European and Pacific many wars. Certain of these reports may be purchased from 22 Metallgussgesellschaft GmbH, Leipzig, Germany the Superintendent of Documents at the Government 23 Aluminiumwerke GmbH, Plant No. 2, Bitterfeld. Printing Office, Washington, D. C. Germany 24 Gebrueder Giulini GmbH, Ludwigshafen, Ger- European War many 25 Luftschiffbau Zeppelin GmbH, Friedrichshafen Office of the Chairman on Bodensee, Germany 26 Wieland Werke A G, Ulm, Germany 1 The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: 27 Rudolph Rautenbach Leichmetallgiessereien, Solin- Summary Report (European War) gen, Germany 2 The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: 28 Lippewerke Vereinigte Aluminiumwerke A G, Lu- Over-all Report (European War) nen, Germany 3 Effects of Strategic on the German The Bombing 29 Vereinigte Deutsche Metallwerke, Heddernheim, War Economy Germany 30 Duerener Metallwerke A G, Duren Wittenau-Ber- Aircraft Division lin & Waren, Germany

(By Division and Branch) Area Studies Division 4 Aircraft Division Industry Report 5 Inspection Visits to Various Targets (Special Re- 31 Area Studies Division Report port) 32 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing on Hamburg Airframes Branch 33 A Detailed Study of the Effects or Area Bombing on Wuppertal 6 Junkers Aircraft and Aero Engine Works, Dessau, 34 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing Germany on Dusseldorf 7 Erla Maschinenwerke GmbH, Heiterblick, Ger- 35 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing many on Solingen 8 A T G Maschinenbau, GmbH, Leipzig (Mockau), 36 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing Germany on Remscheid 9 Gothaer Waggonfabrik, A G, Gotha, Germany 37 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing 10 Pocke Wulf Aircraft Plant, Bremen, Germany on Darmstadt 'Over-all Report 38 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing 11 Messerschmitt A G, Part A on Lubeck Augsburg, Germany Part B 39 A Brief Study of the Effects of Area Bombing on Appendices I, II, III Berlin, Augsburg, Bochum, Leipzig, Hagen, Dort- 12 Dornier Works, Freidrichshafen & Munich, Ger- mund, Oberhausen, Schweinfurt, and Bremen many 13 Gerhard Fieseler Werke GmbH, Kassel, Germany Civilian Defense Division 14 Wiener Neustaedter Flugzeugwerke, Wiener, Neu- 40 Civilian Defense Division—Final Report stadt, Austria 41 Cologne Field Report 42 Bonn Field Report Aero Engines Branch 43 Hanover Field Report

44 Hamburg Field Report—Vol I, Text; Vol II, Ex- 15 Bussing NAG Flugmotorenwerke GmbH, Bi-uns- hibits wick, Germany 45 Bad Oldesloe Field Report 16 Mittel-Deutsche Motorenwerke GmbH, Taucha, 46 Augsburg Germany Field Report 47 Reception Areas in Bavaria, Germany 17 Bavarian Motor Works Inc, Eisenach & Durrerhof, Germany Equipment Division 18 Bayerische Motorenwerke A G (BMW) Munich, Germany Electrical Branch 19 Henschel Flugmotorenwerke, Kassel, Germany 48 German Electrical Equipment Industry Report 49 Brown Boveri et Cie, Mannheim Kafertal, Germany Light Metal Branch Optical and Precision Instrument Branch 20 Light Metals Industry (Part 1, Aluminum of Germany |Part II, Magnesium 50 Optical and Precision Instrument Industry Report

108 Abrasives Branch 83 Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Nurnberg, Nurnberg, Germany Abrasive Industry 51 The German 84 Auto Union A G, Chemnitz and Zwickau, Germany Schmidt, Offenbach on Main, Germany 52 Mayer and 85 Henschel & Sohn, Kassel, Germany Anti-Friction Branch 86 Maybach Motor Works, Friedrichshafen, Germany 87 Voigtlander, Maschinenfabrik A G, Plauen, Ger- 53 The German Anti-Friction Bearings Industry many 88 Volkswagenwerke, Fallersleben, Germany Machine Tools Branch 89 Bussing NAG, Brunswick, Germany 54 Machine Tools & Machinery as Capital Equipment 90 Muehlenbau Industrie A G (Miag) Brunswick, 55 Machine Tool Industry in Germany Germany 56 Herman Kolb Co, Cologne, Germany 91 P'riedrich Krupp Grusonwerke, Magdeburg, Ger- 57 Collett and Engelhard, Offenbach, Germany many 58 Naxos Union, Frankfort on Main, Germany Submarine Branch Military Analysis Division 92 German Submarine Industry Report 59 The Defeat of the German Air Force 93 Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Nurnberg A G, Augs- 60 V-Weapons (Crossbow) Campaign burg, Germany 61 Air Force Rate of Operation 94 Blohm and Voss Shipyards, Hamburg, Germany 62 Weather Factors in Combat Bombardment Opera- 95 Deutschewerke A G, Kiel, Germany tions in the European Theatre 96 Deutsche Schiff und Maschinenbau, Bremen, Ger- 63 Bombing Accuracy, USAAF Heavy and Medium many Bombers in the ETO 97 Friedrich Krupp Germaniawerft, Kiel, Germany 64 Description of RAF Bombing 98 Howaldtswerke A G, Hamburg, Germany 64a The Impact of the Allied Air Effort on German Lo- 99 Submarine Assembly Shelter, Farge, Germany gistics 100 Bremer Vulkan, Vegesack, Germany

Morale Division Ordnance Branch 64b The Effects of Strategic on Bombing German Mo- 101 Ordnance Industry Report rale, Vol I II. & Vol 102 Friedrich Krupp Grusonwerke A G Magdeburg, Medical Branch Germany 103 Bochumer Verein fuer Gusstahlfabrikation A G, 65 The Effect of Bombing on Health and Medical Care Bochum, Germany in Germany 104 Henschel & Sohn, Kassel, Germany Munitions Division 105 Rheinmetall-Borsig, Dusseldorf, Germany 106 Hermann Goering Werke, Braunschweig, Hallen- Heavy Industry Branch dorf, Germany 66 The Coking Industry Report on Germany 107 Hannoverische Maschinenbau, Hanover, Germany 108 Gusstahlfabrik Friedrich Krupp, Essen, Germany 67 Coking Plant Report No. 1, Sections A, B, C, & D 68 Gutehoffnungshuette, Oberhausen, Germany Oil Division 69 Friedrich-Alfred Huette, Rheinhausen, Germany 70 Neunkirchen Eisenwerke A G, Neunkirchen, Ger- 109 Oil Division, Final Report many 110 Oil Division, Final Report, Appendix 71 Reichsviferke Hermann Goering A G, Hallendorf, 111 Powder, Explosives, Special Rockets and Jet Pro- Germany pellants, War Gases and Smoke Acid (Ministe- 72 August Thyssen Huette A G, Hamborn, Germany rial Report #1) 73 Priedrich Krupp A G, Borbeck Plant, Essen, Ger- 112 Underground and Dispersal Plants in Greater many Germany 74 Dortmund Hoerder Huettenverein, A G, Dortmund, 113 The German Oil Industry, Ministerial Report Germany Team 78 75 Hoesch A G, Dortmund, Germany 114 Ministerial Report on Chemicals 76 Bochumer Verein fuer Gusstahlfabrikation A G, Branch Bochum, Germany Oil 115 Ammoniakwerke Merseburg GmbH, Leuna, Ger- Motor Vehicles and Tanks Branch many—2 Appendices 77 German Motor Vehicles Industry Report 116 Braunkohle Benzin A G, Zeitz and Bohlen, Ger- 78 Tank Industry Report many 79 Daimler Benz A G, Unterturkheim, Germany Wintershall A G, Luetzkendorf, Germany 80 Renault Motor Vehicles Plant, Billancourt, Paris 117 Ludwigshafen-Oppau Works of I G Farbenindus- 81 Adam Opel, Russelsheim, Germany trie A G, Ludwigshafen, Germany 82 Daimler Benz-Gaggenau Works, Gaggenau, Ger- 118 Ruhroel Hydrogenation Plant, Bottrop-Boy, Ger- many many, Vol. I, Vol. II

109 —

119 Rhenaiiia Ossag Mineraloelwerke A G, Harburg 153 City Area of Krefeld Refinei'y, Hamburg, Germany 154 Public Air Raid Shelters in Germany 120 Rhenania Ossag Mineraloelwerke A G, Gi'asbrook 155 Goldenberg Thermal Electric Power Station, Refinery, Hamburg, Germany Knapsack, Germany 121 Rhenania Ossag Mineraloelwerke A G, Wilhelms- 156 Brauweiler Transformer & Switching Station, burg Refinery, Hamburg, Germany Brauweiler, Germany 122 Gewei'kschaft Victor, Castrop-Rauxel, Germany, 157 Storage Depot, Nahbollenbach, Germany Vol. I & Vol. II 158 Railway and Road Bridge, Bad Munster, Germany 123 Europaeische Tanklager und Transport A G, 159 Railway Bridge, Eller, Germany Hamburg, Germany 160 Gustloff-Werke Weimar, Weimar, Germany 124 Ebano Asphalt Werke A G, Harburg Refinery, 161 Henschell & Sohn GmbH, Kassel, Germany Hamburg, Germany 162 Area Survey at Pirmasens, Germany 125 Meerbeck Rhoinpreussen Synthetic Oil Plant 163 Hanomag, Hanover, Germany Vol. I & Vol. II 164 MAN Werke Augsburg, Augsburg, Germany 165 Friedrich Krupp A G, Essen, Germany Rubber Branch 166 Erla Maschinenwerke, GmbH, Heiterblick, Ger- many 126 Deutsch Dunlop Gummi Co , Hanau on Main, Germany 167 A T G Maschinenbau GmbH, Mockau, Germany 127 Continental Gummiwerke, Hanover, Germany 168 Erla Maschinenwerke GmbH, Mockau, Germany 128 Huels Synthetic Rubber Plant 169 Bayerische Motorenwerke, Durrerhof, Germany 129 Ministerial Report on German Rubber Industry 170 Mittel-Deutsche Motorenwerke GmbH, Taucha, Germany Propellants Branch 171 Submarine Pens Deutsche-Werft, Hamburg, Ger- 130 Elektrochemischewerke, Munich, Germany many 172 Multi-Storied Structures, 131 Schoenebeck Explosive Plant, Lignose Sprengstoff" Hamburg, Germany 173 Continental Gummiwerke, Werke GmbH, Bad Salzemen, Germany Hanover, Germany 174 Kassel Marshalling Yards, Kassel, Germany 132 Plants of Dynaniit A G, Vormal, Alfred Nobel & 175 Ammoniawerke, Merseburg-Leuna, Germany Co, Troisdorf, Clausthal, Drummel and Dune- 176 Brown Boveri et Cie, Kafertal, Ger- berg, Germany Mannheim, many 133 Deutsche Sprengchemie G m b H, Krailburg, Ger- many 177 Adam Opel A G, Russelsheim, Germany 178 Daimler-Benz A G, Unterturkheim, Germany Over-All Economics Effects Division 179 Valentin Submarine Assembly, Farge, Germany 180 Volkswaggonwerke, Fallersleben, Germany 134 Over-all Economic Effects Division Report 181 Railway Viaduct at Bielefeld, Germany Gross National Product 1 Special papers 182 Ship Yards Howaldtswerke, Hamburg, Germany Kriegseilberichte which together [ 183 Blohm and Voss Shipyards, Hamburg, Germany Herman Goering Woi'ks f comprise the 184 Daimler-Benz A G, Mannheim, Germany Food and Agriculture above report J 185 Synthetic Oil Plant, Meerbeck-Hamburg, Germany 134a Industrial Sales Output and Productivity 186 Gewerkschaft Victor, Castrop-Rauxel, Germany Physical Damage Division 187 Klockner Humboldt Deutz, Ulm, Germany 188 Ruhroel Hydrogenation Plant, Bottrop-Boy, Ger- 134b Physical Damage Division Report (ETO) many 135 Villacoublay Airdrome, Paris, France 189 Neukirchen Eisenwerke A G, Neukirchen, Ger- 136 Railroad Repair Yards, Malines, Belgium many 137 Railroad Repair Yards, Louvain, Belgium 190 Railway Viaduct at Altenbecken, Germany 138 Railroad Repair Yards, Hasselt, Belgium 191 Railway Viaduct at Arnsburg, Germany 139 Railroad Repair Yards, Namur, Belgium 192 Deurag-Nerag Refineries, Misburg, Germany 140 Submarine Pens, Brest, France 193 Fire Raids on German Cities 141 Powder Plant, Angoulene, France 194 I G Farbenindustrie, Ludwigshafen, Germany, 142 Powder Plant, Bergerac, France Vol. I & Vol. II 143 Coking Plants, Montigny & Liege, Belgium 195 Roundhouse in Marshalling Yard, Ulm, Germany 144 Fort St. Blaise Group, Metz, France Verdun 196 I G Farbenindustrie, Leverkusen, Germany 145 Gnome et Rhone, Limoges, France 197 Chemische-Werke, Huels, Germany 146 Michelin Tire Factory, Clermont-Ferrand, France 198 Gremberg Marshalling Yard, Gremberg, Germany 147 Gnome et Rhone Aero Engine Factory, Le Mans, 199 Locomotive Shops and Bridges at Hamm, Germany France Transportation Division 148 Kugelfischer Bearing Ball Plant, Ebelsbach, Ger- many 200 The Effects of Strategic Bombing on German 149 Louis Breguet Aircraft Plant, Toulouse, France Transportation 150 S. N. C. A. S. E. Aircraft Plant, Toulouse, France 201 Rail Operations Over the Brenner Pass

151 A. I. A. Airci-aft Plant, Toulouse, France 202 Eff^ects of Bombing on Railroad Installations in 152 V Weapons in London Regensburg, Nurnberg and Munich Divisions

110 20"> German Locomotive Industry During the War (Kawanishi Kokuki Kabushiki Kaisha) 204 Geinian Military Railroad Traffic (Airframes) 19 Kawasaki Aircraft Industries Company, Inc. Division Utilities Corporation. Report No. IV (Kawasaki Kokuki Kabushiki 205 German Electric Utilities Industry Report Kogyo Kaisha) 206 1 to 10 in Vol. I "Utilities Division Plant Reports" 207 11 to 20 in Vol. II "Utilities Division Plant Re- (Airframes & Engines) ports" 20 Aichi Aircraft Company 208 21 Rheinische-Westfalische Elektrizitaetswerk A Corporation Report No. V G (Aichi Kokuki KK) (Airframes & Engines) Pacific War 21 Sumitomo Metal Industries, Propeller Division Office of the Chairman Corpofatio7i Report No. VI (Sumitomo Kinzoku Kogyo KK, Puropera 1 Summary Report (Pacific War) Seizosho) 2 Japan's Struggle to End The War (Propellers) 3 The Effects of Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki 22 Hitachi Aircraft Company Corporation Report No. VII Civilian Studies (Hitachi Kokuki KK) (Airframes & Engines) Civilian Defense Division 23 Japan International Air Industries, Ltd. 4 Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Corporation Report No. VIII Allied Subjects, Tokyo, Japan (Nippon Kokusai Koku Kogyo KK) 5 Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and (Airframes) Allied Subjects, Nagasaki, Japan 24 Japan Musical Instrument Manufacturing Com- G Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and pany Allied Subjects, Kyoto, Japan Corporation Report No. IX 7 Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and (Nippon Gakki Seizo KK) Allied Subjects, Kobe, Japan (Propellers) 8 Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and 25 Tachikawa Aircraft Company Allied Subjects, Osaka, Japan Corporation Report No. X 9 Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and (Tachikawa Hikoki KK) Allied Subjects, Hiroshima, Japan—No. 1 (Airframes) 10 Summary Report Covering Air Raid Protection and 26 Fuji Airplane Company Allied Subjects in Japan Corporation Report No. XI 11 Final Report Covering Air Raid Protection and (Fuji Hikoki KK) Allied Subjects in Japan (Airframes) 27 Showa Airplane Company Medical Division Corporation Report No. XII 12 The Effects of Bombing on Health and Medical (Showa Hikoki Kogyo KK) Services in Japan (Airframes) 13 The Effects of Atomic Bombs on Health and Medi- 28 Ishikawajima Aircraft Industries Company, Ltd. Corporation Report No. XIII cal Services in Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Ishikawajima Koku Kogyo Kabushiki Morale Division Kaisha) (Engines) 14 The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japanese 29 Nippon Airplane Company Morale Corporation Report No. XIV Economic Studies (Nippon Hikoki KK) (Airframes) Aircraft Division 30 Kyushu Airplane Company 15 The Japanese Aircraft Industi'y Corporation Report No. XV 16 Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. (Kyushu Hikoki KK) Corporation Report No. I (Airframes) (Mitsubishi Jukogyo KK) 31 Shoda Engineering Company (Airframes & Engines) Corporation Report No. XVI 17 Nakajima Aircraft Company, Ltd. (Shoda Seisakujo) Corporation Report No. II (Components) (Nakajima Hikoki KK) 32 Mitaka Aircraft Industries (Airframes & Engines) Corporation Report No. XVII 18 Kawanishi Aircraft Company (Mitaka Koku Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha) Corporation Report No. Ill (Components)

111 —

SS Nissan Automobile Company fiO Effects of Air Attack on the City of Hiroshima Report No. XVIII Corporation Military Studies (Nissan Jidosha KK) (Engines) Military Analysis Division 34 Army Air Arsenal & Navy Air Depots 61 Air Forces Allied with the United States in the Corporation Report No. XIX War Against Japan (Airframes & Engines) 62 Japanese Air Power 05 Japan Aircraft Underground 63 Japanese Air Weapons and Tactics Report No. XX 64 The Effect of Air Action on Japanese Ground Army Logistics Basic Materials Division 65 Employment of Forces Under the Southwest Pacific oG Coal and Metals in Japan's War Economy Command 66 The Strategic Air Operations of Very Heavy Bom- Capital Goods, Equipment and Construction Division bardment in the War Against Japan (Twentieth 37 The Japanese Construction Industry Air Force) 38 Japanese Electrical Equipment 67 Air Operations in China, Burma, India—World 39 The Japanese Machine Building Industry War II 68 The Air Transport Command in the War Against Electric Power Division Japan 69 The Thirteenth Air Force in the War Against 40 The Electric Power Industry of Japan Japan 41 The Electric Power Industry of Japan (Plant Re- 70 The Seventh and Eleventh Air Forces in the War ports) Against Japan Manpower, Food and Civilian Supplies Division 71 The Fifth Air Force in the War Against Japan Division 42 The Japanese Wartime Standard of Living and Naval Analysis Utilization of Manpower 72 The Interrogations of Japanese Officials (Vols. I and 11) Military Supplies Division 73 Campaigns of the Pacific War 43 Japanese War Production Industries 74 The Reduction of Wake Island 44 Japanese Naval Ordnance 75 The Allied Campaign Against Rabaul 45 Japanese Army Ordnance 76 The American Campaign Against Wotje, Maloelap, 46 Japanese Naval Shipbuilding Mille, and Jaluit (Vols. I, II and III) 47 Japanese Motor Vehicle Industry 77 The Reduction of Truk 48 Japanese Merchant Shipbuilding 78 The Offensive Mine Laying Campaign Against Japan Oil and Chemical Division 79 Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party Foreword, Introduction, Conclusions, and Gen- 49 Chemicals in Japan's War eral Summary 50 Chemicals in Japan's War—Appendix 80 Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En- 51 Oil in Japan's War closure A), Kamaishi Area 52 Oil in Japan's War—Appendix 81 Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En-

Over-All Economic Effects Division closure B ) , Hamamatsu Area 82 Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En- 53 The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japan's War closure C), Hitachi Area Economy (Including Appendix A: U. S. Eco- 83 Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En- nomic Intelligence on Japan Analysis and Com- — closure D), Hakodate Area parison; Appendix B: Gross National Product 84 Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En- on Japan and Its Components; Appendix C: Sta- closure E), Muroran Area tistical Sources). 85 Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En- Transportation Division closure F), Shimizu Area 86 Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En- 54 The War Against Japanese Transportation, 1941- closures G and H), Shionomi-Saki and Nojima- 1945 Saki Areas 87 Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En- Urban Areas Division closure I), Comments and Data on Effectiveness 55 Effects of Air Attack on Japanese Urban Economy of Ammunition (Summary Report) 88 Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En-

50 Effects of Air Attack on Urban Complex Tokyo- closure J ) , Comments and Data on Accuracy of Kawasaki-Yokohama Firing

57 Effects of Air Attack on the City of Nagoya 89 Reports of Ships Bombardment Survey Party ( En- 58 Effects of Air Attack on Osaka-Kobe-Kyoto closure K), Effects of Surface Bombardments 59 Effects of Air Attack on the City of Nagasaki on Japanese War Potential

112 Physical Damage Uivision 1 (10

G-2 Division

97 Japanese Military and Naval Intelligence 98 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the

Japanese Homeland, Part I, Comprehensive Re- port 99 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japanese Homeland, Part II, Airfields

-77 iV »'.*