ANALYSIS CHINA

HOW FAR WILL THE NPC GO

IN IMPLEMENTING REFORM?

Introduction

ABOUT by François Godement The Chinese have long been obsessed with strategic culture, power balances and geopolitical shifts. Academic institutions, think tanks, journals The annual meeting of China’s National People’s Congress and web-based debate are growing in number and (NPC) opens on 5 March, and this year, there is far less quality and give China’s foreign policy breadth and speculation about the event than there has been in previous depth. years. It is easy to see why expectations are low. Just a few China Analysis, which is published in both French months ago, the party announced a long list of reforms. But, and English, introduces European audiences to reading the fine print of the 60-point “Decision on Major these debates inside China’s expert and think-tank Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reforms”, world and helps the European policy community almost 200 reforms were proposed by the Central understand how China’s leadership thinks Committee at the Third Plenum in November 2013. How about domestic and foreign policy issues. While freedom of expression and information remain could the government possibly announce more? restricted in China’s media, these published sources and debates provide an important way of Moreover, Xi Jinping’s mandate at the helm of the understanding emerging trends within China. Communist Party and the state has asphyxiated the contentious debates of the last few years. And his vigorous Each issue of China Analysis focuses on a specific theme and draws mainly on Chinese mainland anti-corruption campaign has engendered real fear among sources. However, it also monitors content in China’s officials. Right now, it is ensnaring just about every Chinese-language publications from Hong Kong known relative of Zhou Yongkang, a former Standing and Taiwan, which occasionally include news and Committee member who once wielded fearsome authority analysis that is not published in the mainland and at the head of China’s domestic security agencies. reflects the diversity of Chinese thinking.

The French version of China Analysis can be But Xi is not omnipotent: environmental pollution has accessed online at www.centreasia.eu. reached unbearable levels in Beijing and the Northern Plains. And the country has just been hit by an extremely audacious act of terrorism, killing 29 people and injuring 109 in Kunming. People in China are talking less about Xi’s long-term goals or orientation than about his actual capacity to implement the reforms put forward in November 2013. How many of the reforms will see some concrete 2 March 2014 CHINA ANALYSIS The abolition of re-education by labour has been confirmed. of issue This special In the last three years, the biggest loophole has been loophole In years,the biggest the lastthree ee poic sronig ejn poue ams as almost produces Beijing surrounding province Hebei Perhaps the most interesting development is notanactof development most interesting Perhaps the One possiblereasonforthemoveisthatifChinatoreinin a swathethroughChina’senergysector. although they still account for only 2 percent of new financing to dowiththe that musthavesomething an achievement recently. Chinaisreiningin Other titbitshaveemerged as theirapplicationinpoliticsremainsverylimited. on economy andcoordinateprocess.Thesources and the of shape In particular,the issue. in this are described as local actors, firms, and civil society worked to drive change. accomplished with a good measure of bottom-up initiatives, China’s National SecurityCommissionisnowclearer. It will getting a green light from the political leadership. Andthe a greenlightfromthepolitical getting setal a itraec bd udr he tp leaders top three under body inter-agency an essentially eta bn hs las gie” h mre, essentially market, the “guided” always has bank central ofcourse, isdoubtful, It process. sure-fire a as currency f eom n hn ae cpia o te o-on process top-down the of sceptical are China in reform of other moves such as a share divestiture by Sinopec,China’s other movessuchasasharedivestiture not be a Western-style national security council, but instead runaway credit via shadow banking,loopholes. runaway creditviashadow it mustclose move autonomous unprecedented the is all: it reform at accelerated, been have IPOs New “airpocalypse”. region’s capacities: and steel coal and new railway construction new would that a situation outline system legal reforming the whether the central bank could have done this without this have done bank could central the whether China’s of appreciation gradual the see to come had which rumours of are There regulations. exchange currency with system, legal party, the over the authority can exercise who much steel as Europe and the United States combined, States United and the Europe as steel much exponents Long-time concerns. these reflects meeting, markets trading renminbi, in order to lend money in China money markets tradingrenminbi, lend in orderto time that the central bank has taken the market bysurprise central bank has takenthe time thatthe through phonecallstoChinesebanks, which invariably renminbi in the depreciate bank to taken byChina’s central the valueoftheircapitalonlyequalsthatChina’s SOEs. announcements implications ofthese Plenum, andthe the in thisway. implementation attheNPCmeeting? some ofitsrunawayinfrastructureinvestment,including hopeful international investors, has now been provided international investors, has nowbeen hopeful listen to what the government tells them. But this is the first late February. The movecameasasurprisetothemarkets, cut campaign anti-corruption an after company, oil largest economy, even within the regulation law andautonomous Shanghai’s new Free Trade Zone, which had disappointed Trade Zone, which Free Shanghai’s new since made been have already announcements new Some for firms. More private firms have appeared, even though even appeared, have firms private More firms. for favoured by Xi. Major changes since 1978 have always been orwn ofhr, seily n og og n other and Kong Hong in especially offshore, borrowing of rule the implement to will the elsewhere: impossible be China Analysis , previewing the NPC the , previewing The move will have its undesirable international effects – international effects have itsundesirable will The move But it does show thatthecentralbank But itdoeshasbeengivena against some powerful vested interests. The key question of The keyquestion interests. vested powerful against some and unpredictableagent? to give lesson limits. Whatbetter credit escape and thereby degree of financial autonomy, and it represents amove itrepresents and autonomy, financial of degree other stepstowardstheregulationofvestedinterests. the next few days is whether the NPC will set in motionany NPC willset the days iswhether next few the to use the central bank, for the first time, as an autonomous than to set example better turn intoabloodbath?Andwhat renminbi can on the forward betting that them than toshow practices Chinese actorsindulgingin these the powerful for example, it will feed international currencydepreciation. for example,itwillfeed emerge from the Plenum. Both fear that this concentration 1. Battling interest groups: a case for enlightened of power will be a barrier to the success of reform. despotism The Huanqiu shibao editorial is more reserved in its Agatha Kratz criticism: it says that the fulfilment of the reform programme will depend on aligning attempts to carry out reform and the Sources: benefits derived from the programme with Chinese society. Ding Xueliang, “After the Third Plenum: empty words As society becomes more complex, it becomes harder to vs implementation”, Financial Times (Chinese version), apply purely “top-down” (自上而下, zishangerxia) plans 26 November 2013.1 and to ensure that all levels of government participate Editorial, “The power of ‘interest groups’ should not properly in achieving results. If the plan is to succeed, the be overestimated”, Huanqiu shibao – Global Times, current reform proposals will have to address this problem. 20 November 2013. Zhang Qianfan says that, ahead of the Third Plenum, Liu Shengjun, “How will China overcome the obstacle of Chinese researchers and experts presented six proposals to special interests?”, Aisixiang, 23 December 2013.2 the government.5 Three of these proposals were included Wu Guoguang, “Modernisation in China: discussion on in the government’s plan: economic reforms, legal reforms, th the Third Plenum of the 18 Congress”, Epoch Times, and respect for the constitution. But the government ignored 3 29 November 2013. the other three: democratisation of the Communist Party, Zhang Qianfan, “The risks of centralised reform”, standardisation of elections, and the extension of freedom Financial Times (Chinese version), 20 November 2013.4 of expression. Zhang says that these omissions show the government is keeping a tight hold over the reform process. On 15 November 2013, at the Third Plenum of the The leadership has conceived, directed, and controlled the 18th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress, the reform programme based on a highly centralised model. 373 members of the Central Committee adopted a 60-point plan for reform titled the “Decision on Major Issues This centralisation leaves no space for the “people” (民众, Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reforms” (中央关 minzhong) or for “society” (社会, shehui) to participate 于全面深化改革若干重大问题的决定, zhongyang guanyu in ensuring the success of reform. Zhang says that the quanmian shenhua gaige ruogan zhongda wenti de government has promoted the idea of “delegating power jueding). Chinese researchers mostly approve of the reform to society” (社会放权, shehui fangquan). However, this programme. They recognise the “extended” (广, guang), kind of devolution cannot be achieved without integrating “deep” (深, shen), and “complete” (全, quan) nature of the three missing proposals into the reform programme the road map. Many commentators believe that the plan and giving the people the chance to take part in the reform could generate a real “reform dividend” (改革红利, gaige process. The absence of these proposals betrays the hongli). However, critics say that the reform programme government’s fears that the people will become a threat to was designed with too great a degree of centralisation. And the “one-party” (一党, yidang) system. By leaving no room because of the involvement of powerful interest groups, for public participation, the leadership has made the reform implementing reform could be difficult. programme “the government’s own internal affair” (改革成 了政府自己的内部事务, gaige chengle zhengfu ziji de neibu Centralisation and reform shiwu).

Zhang Qianfan and Wu Guoguang say that power has Over-centralisation of the reform process is dangerous become increasingly centralised since Xi Jinping took over because it means reform’s chances for success rest as China’s leader. Zhang says government has become a on two dubious assumptions: that the leadership is “one-man show” (独角戏, dujiaoxi). Wu Guoguang thinks “benevolent” (善心, shanxin) and that it is “omnipotent” the consolidation of power was the biggest development to (万能, wanneng). Assuming a benevolent leadership gives too much importance to the human dimension. And no 1 Ding Xueliang is a professor in the Social Science Division at Hong matter how benevolent they are, the seven members of Kong University of Science and Technology. the Standing Committee cannot supervise all aspects of 2 Liu Shengjun is executive deputy director of the China Europe the reform process without help. They will have to give International Business School Lujiazui Institute of International Finance, Shanghai. some tasks to other organisations, and these other bodies 3 Wu Guoguang is a former secretary-general of the Chinese Academy will thus have significant power over the process. Zhang of Social Sciences, former editor-in-chief of the opinion section of the points out that delegating authority can lead to “abuses” People’s Daily, and a former member of the Communist Party Central (滥用, lanyong) and corruption. Moreover, to monitor the Committee’s political reform discussion group. He has been a researcher progress of reform, the central leaders will have to rely on at Harvard University, Columbia University, and the Chinese University of Hong Kong, as well as a lecturer at various Chinese and international potentially unreliable feedback channels, which could cause universities. 5 These proposals were part of a joint publication by 70 Chinese 4 Zhang Qianfan is director of the Centre on the People’s Congress and academics, “Written proposal for a consensus on reforms” (改革共识倡 Parliamentary Studies at Peking University Law School, Beijing. 议书, gaige gongshi changyishu). 3 4 March 2014 CHINA ANALYSIS dcsv” ( “decisive” 领导 i ipn ad i “eta Laig ml Gop for Group Small Leading “Central his and Jinping Xi Without changing things so that the market is under better market isunder that the so things changing Without ( “flaw” main the that believes Guoguang Wu 2013 in the Beijing-based newspaper, 5 ecn o rsodns ad ht h mi barrier main the that said respondents of percent 75 ( ( Ding says that, because of this, the most important element November 23 on published poll a quotes Xueliang Ding xiaozu a great deal of resentment among the Chinese people and people among theChinese a greatdealofresentment Qianfan says that during previous reform efforts in the 1980s, ( groups” “interest see commentators Other achievement ofgovernmentpolicies. opeesvl Deeig eom ( Reform” Deepening Comprehensively The influenceofinterestgroups groups have either directly managed or exerted significant exerted or managed directly either have groups Zhang (SOEs). enterprises state-owned and governments written has Shuli Hu programme. reform government’s degradation, andadeclineinmoralspirit. ( disintegration” “social to lead will This worse. get only will abuses control, in the has civilian oversight,which form of in the channel considerable benefits. could makethereformers’taskmoredifficult. economic matters. A good reform plan would be one that one be would reform plan good A matters. economic zhongguo moshi debibing zhongguo moshi vrrlac o te akt s o te nwr Markets answer. the not is market the on over-reliance “liberal” a himself considers he that says Wu market. the of of the new wave of reform is the affirmation of the market’s liyi jituan liyi biduan ed o e ujc t dmcay n te ue f law. of rule the and democracy to subject be to need was a key factor in the events of 1989. Since then, interest then, Since 1989. of events the in factor key a was market, not interest groups, must provide leadership on leadership provide must groups, market, notinterest and in many editorials,bothin English, warning Chinese to reform would be interest groups, specifically, local specifically, groups, interest be would reform to influence the increase would and power more model this “dictatorship” a and market neoliberal a of coexistence the the reform project is that it reproduces a “Chinese model that information a powerful of itself isdepriving leadership the influence over reform programmes, in the process gaining process the in programmes, reform over influence corruption. Thiscreated and through revenues industrial increased through substantially, profited groups interest will And they or manipulated. distorted be information to has serious shortcomings for the country” ( bureaucracy thatcannot onasprawling have todepend past uncovered abuses of power and other obstacles to the to obstacles and other power of abuses uncovered past facilitates the primacy of the market, and the success of the of success the market, and the of primacy the facilitates be completely controlled. By rejecting public participation, public rejecting By controlled. completely be respected economiccommentatorsin China. 6

自由派 专 Hu Shuliiseditor-in-chief of 制 小 , ) against “special interests” ( interests” “special against ) 组 ). The proposed reform programme would give programme would reform proposed ). The , zhuanzhi , ziyoupai ) as a potential obstacle to the success of the of success the to obstacle a potential ) as zhongyang quanmian shenhua gaigelingdao 决定性 社会分化 ta ecuae “apatc” ( “malpractice” encourages that ) , ), but that inChina’scurrentsituation, ), but juedingxing , Xin Shiji ). This model is characterised by characterised is ). Thismodel shehui fenhua ) role. From now on, the role. Fromnow ) andoneofthe most famousand 既得利益 Beijing bao 中央全面深化改革 ), environmental 中国模式的弊病 , 败 6 jide liyi jide 笔 , , inwhich 利益集 baibi ) that 弊端 ) in 团 , , ,

“sacked” ( Xi JinpingandLiKeqiang. ( ( For reform to be successful, the process must have support must process the successful, For reformtobe He suggests involving the powerful Central Commission for Like Ding Xueliang and Liu Shengjun, discipline icpie npcin ad vn doae te s o the of use the advocates even and Inspection, Discipline groups interest that ensure to plan action an suggests Ding Ding says that civil servants who do not meet the targets the meet not do who servants civil that says Ding shuanggui shuanggui as well as the performance targets must be published, so published, be must targets performance the as well as government agencies and SOEs are the most important most are the and SOEs government agencies o o hl u rfr. is, pol ms b dat with dealt be must “people First, reform. up hold not do concerned than the other commentators about the potential than the othercommentatorsaboutthe concerned corruption willremainthenorm. guiding the If reformistobesuccessful, economic policies. other, competing interest clusters exist within Chinese within exist clusters interest other, competing harmreform groups todoserious the interest of the government’s own internal affair”. reform programme depends on implementing this kind of on implementing reform programme depends reform. The central government retains “absolute authority” and power of abuse says, Ding transparency, Without not. “philosophical” a mainly is “Decision” the projects, reform while he does not support the abusive or illegal use of the of use abusive orillegal the not support does he while mobilised and prepared to implement the reform plan. Ding public participation,the the the interestgroupsthathaveupuntilnowmonopolised that the public can monitor whether they are achieved or are achieved they can monitorwhether public that the in Xi’s China t al te itrs cmuiis ( communities” “interest the calls it groups. Butthe interest suggests a radical way to ensure support from government support ensure to a radicalway suggests society, especially on the Internet. Over the last few years, last few Internet. Overthe onthe especially society, of thepolicies punished. Thedetails be severely should real reform. carry out to government the motivate so asto 7 has enough power to influence the implementation of implementation the influence to power enough has Liangyu under Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao and against Jiang Jiemin under reform programme“the leadership hasmadethe By leaving no room for programme. process. It says that not even the most powerful of what of powerful most the not even that It says process. targets intoperformance translated to be need principles Party investigatesitsmembers. from the public and fromkeystakeholders,whomustbe public from the benefits ofgrowthandreform. be reform should opposes who bureaucracy: anyone ( affairs” before 8

绝对权 哲学 Shanggui Ding cites as positive examples the procedureslaunched against Chen , zhexue 威

in the shadow of in theshadow 撤 , is an internal procedure under which the Chinese Communist , December2013. process,coercionistheonlywaytobreak up process to guarantee compliance process toguarantee 职 juedui quanwei juedui ) document that does not provide real-world provide not does that document ) , chezhi 先 办 ), or even “punished” ( 人后

shuanggui” Huanqiu shibao Huanqiu 办

See 事 ). The editorial notes that notes ). Theeditorial

, 8 Marc Julienne,“Reviewing Party , xian banrenhoubanshi China and Power Analysis: Law Huanqiu shibao Huanqiu 利益群体 e eivs that, believes He ig as that says Ding auditing mechanisms need mechanisms to be implemented. to beimplemented. and targets performance like manyprevious editorialisless 惩处 . 7

He adds that adds He , , chengchu liyiqunti says ). ). ) traditionally disadvantaged groups have demonstrated that they can bring significant pressure to bear when they 2. The new Central National Security Commission are unhappy: some groups have shown their strength, for example, in opposing forced evictions and polluting Marc Julienne industrial projects. For this reason, the situation should not be viewed as a binary opposition between interest groups Sources: and reforms. This limited reading only serves to divide “Communiqué from the Third Plenum of the 18th CCP Chinese society into supporters and opponents of reform. Congress”, Xinhua, 12 November 2013. According to Huanqiu shibao, that would be a mistake. “CCP Central Committee’s Decision on Major Issues The reform programme is so broad and far-reaching that Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reforms”, it will affect the whole population, and everyone in China, Xinhua, 15 November 2013. regardless of background, will in practice be part of one or Xi Jinping, “Press Release on the CCP Central Committee’s more “interest community”. Decision on Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reforms”, Xinhua, 15 November 2013. Liu Shengjun believes that the interest groups are only one of several potential obstacles to reform. Ideological resistance Lu Gang, “The mechanisms of national security at the and bureaucratic inertia will also be problematic. However, top, from the historical point of view of foreign policy 9 Liu says that special interests will be the most difficult decisions”, Wenhuibao, 12 November 2013. obstacle to overcome, because the main interest groups Xiao Hui, Chu Xinyan, and Xing Shiwei, “Experts shed are very powerful. They include government departments light on the National Security Commission, a tradition such as the National Development and Reform Commission among the great powers”, China News, 14 November (NDRC) and the China Securities Regulatory Commission 2013.10 (CRSC), both of which may end up losing much of their Han Yong, “Decrypting the National Security authority in the reform process. Large SOEs will also resist Commission: twice the pressure to improve the national reform, to avoid losing their market monopoly, preferential security system”, China News, 28 November 2013.11 treatment, and exemption from paying dividends. The aim of the Third Plenum of the 18th Chinese Communist Liu sees three possible solutions to combat these interest Party (CCP) Congress, which was held in Beijing between groups, with varying chances for success. The first, which 9 and 12 November 2013, was to set down a framework Liu does not believe would work, would be to appeal to the for “comprehensively deepening reforms” (全面深化改革, goodwill and conscience of the agents involved. The second quanmian shenhua gaige). One of the reforms announced would be to make use of popular pressure. However, this was the creation of a National Security Commission (NSC, method could lead to unrest, as seen in Tunisia and Egypt. 国家安全委员会, guojia anquan weiyuanhui).12 This The third would involve the leadership using its authority innovation attracted a lot of attention from the media and to threaten and coerce. The central administration has the from observers in China and abroad. On 24 January 2014, power to punish recalcitrant civil servants and interest the foundation of the Central National Security Commission groups. The leadership should, therefore, be directly (中央国家安全委员会, zhongyang guojia anquan involved in implementing reform. Xi’s “iron fist” (铁腕, weiyuanhui) was officially announced, and some members tiewan) policy is the most likely way of ensuring the success of its board of directors were named. Few details have been of his reform programme. provided about the commission. But even so, some of the commission’s aims can be inferred by examining the official Liu says that the implementation of reform will be China’s information released after the Plenum alongside analyses biggest challenge in the coming years. But if half of Xi’s made by Chinese experts. proposed reforms have been introduced by the end of his term in office, the president would be able to consider this Interpreting official statements wave of reform a clear success. On the evening of 12 November, a press release was published announcing the broad outline of future reforms, including the creation of the commission. On 15 November, the Central Committee published a 60-point blueprint for reform, the “Decision on Major Issues Concerning

9 Lu Gang is a professor of political science at East China Normal University, Shanghai. 10 Xiao Hui, Chu Xinyan, and Xing Shiwei are journalists with China News. 11 Han Yong is a journalist with China News. 12 Note that in November 2013, the official Xinhua press agency translated the term as State Security Committee, but on 24 January 2014, changed it to National Security Commission. 5 6 March 2014 CHINA ANALYSIS pbi scrt sse” ( system” security “public Xi Jinping assigned four responsibilities to thecommission, four responsibilities Xi Jinpingassigned explicitly however, statement, November 15 Jinping’s Xi anquan he shehuiwending anquan anquan zhanlüe, he guojia quebao guojia anquan tizhi 家安全 家安全委员会，完善国家安全体制和国家安全战略，确保国 ( ( ( In the 15 November 60-point “Decision”, point 50 discusses Between 12 and 15 November, many articles were published yali and implement a nationalsecuritystrategy;to promotethe and implement ( order” and foreign mention not did NSC’screation announcing the China faces a “twofold pressure” ( pressure” “twofold a faces China and the system national security Commission, improvethe a day, same That Reforms”. Deepening Comprehensively tixi governance system. drug safety,reinforcingnaturaldisastermanagement and for food system regulatory the for strengthening calls ( development” development of a national security law; to create a national law; tocreate of anationalsecurity development to develop range ofcompetences: covering arelativelywide stability” social and security political “maintaining for calls zhuquan, anquan, fazhan liyi of the main questions raised was whether the commission of themain questions raisedwaswhether of thePlenum’sconclusions. organs are not meeting the country’snational security organs arenotmeeting eain. u o a rs rlae f ,0 characters, 5,000 of release press a of Out relations. needs. For this reason, China needs to establish a platform needs. Forthisreason,China needs toestablish interests” development and security, sovereignty, national that explained refers toexternalsecurity.Thepresident national security strategy, ensure national security” ( would focus on internal or external security: would it have it would security: on internalorexternal focus would mechanisms, andinstatingamorerobustInternet release press November 12 the However, affairs. military ut 5 caatr dat ih h cmiso. Within commission. the with dealt characters 158 just The affairs? foreign or security public over jurisdiction to “plan”( the NSC, again in terms ofinternalsecurity.Part of the Security National a “Establish security”: “national to “new about talked statement the description, brief this in China and abroad about the proposed commission. in One China andabroadabouttheproposed eto o “oil oenne ( governance” “social on section ( governance” social security issues. important national and resolve study and to policy; security point 50 is aimed at “improving the public security system” security public the “improving at aimed is 50 point and foreign to refers usually security” “national phrase long statement signed by XiJinpingprovidedmoredetails signed long statement 对内维护政治安全和社会稳定 对外维护国家主权、安全、发展利益 健全公共安全体系 ). Only the last sentence in the description referred in thedescription ). Only thelastsentence . xenl rsue eestts h “rtcin of “protection the necessitates pressure External ). , ). sheli guojia anquan weiyuanhui, wanshanguojia sheli guojia 统筹 社会安定有序 , 社会发展 tongchou , jianquan gonggong anquan tixi 新社会治理 , ) nationalsecurityactivities. 公共安全体系 , shehui fazhan shehui anding youxu ). XisaysthatChina’ssecurity , ). And internalpressure , duinei weihu zhengzhi weihu duinei xinshehui zhili 社会治理 双重压力 , duiwai weihu guojia duiwai , , sca stability “social ), gongong anquan , , shuangzhong shehui zhili ), and the , “social ), 设立国 ). It ),

ry PA Ntoa Dfne nvriy el the tells University Defence National (PLA) Army And both structures make use of the services, such as of the make use And bothstructures News ( iteration first the that Xing and Chu, Xiao, tells (CICIR), Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group was created in 1958 in created was Group Small Leading Affairs Foreign an important roleduringtheCuban For example,itplayed years ago of “non-traditional gongzuo xiaozu S S. hn hs led pt n lc vros high- various place in put already has China NSC. US to seems NSC US the And Russia. and Kingdom United Lu Gang says that since the emergence 30 years ago of “non- Lu Gang reviews the evolution of Chinese national security national Chinese of evolution the reviews Gang Lu a high-ranking Chinese delegation met with the US NSC at NSC US the with met delegation Chinese high-ranking a Missile Crisis and during the normalisation of the US the normalisation of the Crisis andduring Missile ruqin The evolutionofnationalsecuritymanagement Group ( Group Relations International Contemporary of Institutes China creating abodyinspiredbythe China hasconsidered different ministries to help the country cope better with better the countrycope ministries tohelp different The the between act asanintermediary commission could responsibilities. well-defined have still departments entities are chaired by the incumbent Chinese president. Chinese incumbent the by chaired are entities Committee’s Central The structures. decision-making US model,includingthe on the based agencies created of the NSC was crafted, if not implemented, in 1997 after 1997 in implemented, not if crafted, was NSC the of security”, national security is lingdao xiaozu lingdao of theministriesforeign and publicsecurity. affairs, defence,statesecurity, ed fr ptnil frin nain ( invasion” “foreign potential a for ready the of only prerogative the no longer is national security research, meeting preparation, and communication, research, meeting national securityadvisortoPresidentRichardNixon. as Kissinger Henry by instigated China, with relationship well as addressing risks related to the economy, the Internet, the economy, the to risks related as addressing well ways to deal with the threats of terrorism and trafficking, as Since the emergence 30 ministries of foreign affairs, defence, state security, and security, state affairs, defence, foreign of ministries transversal and transnational, but traditionalgovernment nolongercentresontheneedtobe that nationalsecurity ( security” traditional the WhiteHouse. have been remarkably efficient since its creation in1947. creation its since efficient remarkably been have no longertheprerogativeonly public health, and the environment. These new threats are threats new environment. These and the health, public public security. Professor Xu Hui of the People’s Liberation ee dcso-aig tutrs L Wi a eerhr at researcher a Wei, Li structures. decision-making level Several researchers point out that this is not the first time first the not is this that out point researchers Several have already (NSC). Severalcountries Council Security 中央外事领导工作小组 journalists, Xiao Hui, Chu Xinyan, and Xing Shiwei, Xing and Xinyan, Chu Hui, Xiao journalists, ). Instead, ensuring national security involves finding involves security national ensuring Instead, ). 中央国家安全领导小组 ) was established in September 2000. Both 2000. September in established was ) . h Ntoa Scrt Laig Small Leading Security National The ). 非传统安全 , zhongyang waishi lingdao , zhongyang anquan guojia , fei chuantong anquan Many Chinese Chinese NSC and Chinese commentators external threats. noted the potential potential the noted the USNational internal and similarities between the between 外敌入侵 , China waidi ),

provided by the Central Foreign Affairs Office 中央外事办( Politburo Standing Committee, will be vice-presidents. 公室, zhongyang waishi bangongshi) under the principle of “two brands, one institution” (两快牌子，一套机构, liang The nomination of Xi Jinping as president of the kuai paizi, yi tao jigou).13 commission was not a surprise. Since coming to power, he has centralised all the key functions of head of state and It seems, therefore, that there are multiple decision-making party. Neither Chinese nor outside observers expected that and advisory structures for national security in China. In Li Keqiang would be given such an important role, probably addition to the ministries and the two Leading Small because he has so far largely been in Xi Jinping’s shadow – Groups discussed above, Han Yong talks about two new but he was also given the number two position in the Leading Leading Small Groups, one of which deals with counter- Small Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms terrorism (国家反恐工作领导小组, guojia fankong gongzuo (全面深化改革领导小组, quanmian shenhua gaige lingdao lingdao xiaozu), and the other with maritime rights and xiaozu), which was established after the Third Plenum and interests (中央海洋权益工作领导小组, zhongyang haiyang is led by Xi Jinping. quanti gongzuo lingdao xiaozu).14 And the Politics and Law Commission (PLC, 中央政法委, zhongyang zhengfa wei), The remaining members of the commission were not which comes under the authority of the Central Committee, named, although Hong Kong media outlet Mingjing News is the highest-ranking public security decision-making body published a list of likely members on 20 November based in China. on information provided by a source in Beijing.16 Mingjing News was correct about the roles taken by Xi Jinping and An anonymous researcher with the PLA told Xiao, Chu, Zhang Dejiang. The article said that Liu Yunshan and and Xing that the large number of national security Yu Zhengsheng, both members of the Standing Committee, organisations makes for a lot of “infighting” 各自为战( , gezi would be named as vice-presidents. It suggested that wei zhan). Each body is reluctant to share the information Geng Huichang, minister for state security, would be NSC it has collected; for example, the defence and state security secretary general, with Wang Yongqing of the PLC and ministries do not coordinate well. As a result, the country’s Wang Jianping of the People’s Armed Police as deputy leaders make decisions inefficiently. The NSC aims to secretary generals. The other members of the commission, bring together the skills and knowledge of each of these according to Mingjing News, would be director of the organisations. But how will this affect the role of the other Central Policy Research Office and Politburo member Wang security bodies? Li Wei says that the new commission will Huning, Deputy Prime Minister Wang Yang, Minister of intervene only in times of crisis or in cases where it would not Public Security Guo Shengkun, president of the PLC Meng be appropriate for the other bodies to take action. However, Jianzhu, state councillor Yang Jiechi, army chief of staff Xi Jinping said that the commission will be responsible for Fang Fenghui, and Central Military Commission members developing a national security strategy and for drawing up a Fan Changlong, Xu Qiliang, and Chang Wanquan. national security law. This would make it a ministerial level body rather than a simple crisis management structure. This article has similarities to an article published in Mingjing yuekan in June 2013, which said that Xi had National Security Commission members appointed his close ally, current PLC president Meng Jianzhu, to set up the NSC.17 According to Mingjing yuekan, The Central National Security Commission was formally Meng was to be assisted by Wang Yongqing and Wang established on 24 January 2014 at a meeting of the Central Huning. Wang Yongqing is Meng Jianzhu’s right-hand Politburo of the CCP. The addition of the term “central” man; he has been a member of the Central Committee and (中央, zhongyang) to the title indicates that the commission secretary general of the PLC since 2012. Wang Huning is is under the supervision of the Central Committee. A a member of the Politburo and the director of the CCP’s press release in Xinhua said that the commission would Policy Research Office, as well as a personal advisor on be a decision-making and coordinating body for national foreign policy to Xi. security issues and activities, under the direct authority of the Politburo and Standing Committee.15 The statement Two of the three people appointed to create the commission said that Xi Jinping would be president of the commission. are from the world of public security and one is from foreign Prime Minister Li Keqiang and Zhang Dejiang, president affairs. Given these profiles, it seems that, as Xi’s press of the National People’s Congress and member of the release of 15 November indicated, the commission will be 13 For more information on the Leading Small Groups, see Alice Miller, responsible for both internal and external security. External “The CCP Central Committee’s Leading Small Groups”, China Leadership security may, however, only relate to China’s periphery. The Monitor, No. 26, Autumn 2008. “external pressures” mentioned by Xi are mainly found in 14 In contrast to the Central Leading Small Groups, the counter-terrorism group is a State Leading Small Group. It was formed at the end of August China’s immediate neighbourhood: border disputes with 2013 with Guo Shengkun, public security minister and member of the 16 Zhang Qian, “Zhang Dejiang, Yu Zhengsheng could join the NSC”, Political and Legal Commission, as president. Mingjing News, 20 November 2013. 15 “Xi Jinping to lead Central National Security Commission”, Xinhua, 17 Liu Ziwei, “Meng Jianzhu and Wang Huning help President Xi as 24 January 2014, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2014- he prepares to set up a national security committee”, Mingjing Yuekan 01/24/c_119122483.htm. (Mingjing News group), No. 40, 28 June 2013. 7 8 March 2014 CHINA ANALYSIS mrcn taei rblnig oad te Asia-Pacific the towards rebalancing strategic American ijag n Cnrl sa isaiiy ln te borders the along instability Asia; Central and Xinjiang ni, aa, n SuhEs Ai; errs tras in threats terrorist Asia; South-East and Japan, India, region. Each of these threats could alsohaveanimpacton threats region. Eachofthese ih fhnsa, aitn ad ot Kra ad the and Korea; North and Pakistan, Afghanistan, with internal security,unitingthetworemitsofcommission. i Zuhn sy ta X Jnigs rjc i ambitious, is project Jinping’s Xi that says Zhusheng Xie develop continuing to of importance the Jinpingstressed Xi ( ( For many years, academics in China have debated the China havedebated in years, academics For many h Cnrl omte’ “eiin n ao Issues Major on “Decision Committee’s Central The n pehs n 4 aur 21 ad 4 eray 2013, February 24 and 2012 January 24 on speeches In guanyu quanmian shenhua guanyu quanmian gaige ruogan zhongda wenti de jueding of HongKong. a death sentence, systematising respect for theconstitution respect a deathsentence,systematising to liable offences of number the reducing jurisdiction, and ocrig opeesvl Deeig Reforms” Deepening Comprehensively Concerning China. WhatformwillthisnewChineseruleoflawtake? law, of rule a new that announced The Plenum Congress. characteristics” ( characteristics” constitutionalisation of government. These concerns were government. These of constitutionalisation criminal procedure, thereform of there-educationthrough of law cannot be achieved without acknowledging China’s acknowledging without of lawcannotbeachieved 19 18 eeuain hog lbu, temiig or funding court streamlining labour, through re-education reflected in the agenda of the Third Plenum of the 18 the of Plenum Third the of agenda the in reflected of Some power. political in moderating law the of role ht e en b rl o lw I ms hv “Chinese have must It law. of rule by means he what the rule of law in China. Hu Jianmiao says that Xi qualified Xi that says Jianmiao Hu China. in law of rule the the more contentious issues have included the reform of the have included issues more contentious the in court proceedings, and increasing protection for private protection andincreasing in courtproceedings, society makeitsachievementessential. be“comprehensive” itmust And circumstances. specific property. Point 9 of the document outlines a programmefor outlines document the Point 9of property. particularly on judicial reform. The plan called for abolishing law is useless without also creating a society ruled bylaw. also creatingasociety without law isuseless labour system, the problem of judicial corruption, and the and corruption, judicial of problem the system, labour Huayi practice. but that the economic imperatives currently facing Chinese facing currently imperatives economic the that but in be promoted on moresolidfoundations,would based 21 20 – Studytimes 中央 综合版

3. Ruleoflaw:agameplanfortheeconomy i Nn “rm uiil eom o eomd justice”, reformed to reform judicial “From Nan, Xia caged the is who reform: or law of “Rule Zhusheng, Xie in Hiig “rcia polm cue b judicial by caused problems “Practical Huiling, Jiang 2013. Caijing wang Third Plenary Session of the 18 Hugo Winckler Hu Jianmiao, “Salient points on the rule of law from the from law of rule the on points “Salient Jianmiao, Hu reform”, bird?”, Sources: Hu JianmiaoisprofessoroflawatZhejiang University. Xie Zhusheng is the former dean of the law faculty at the University Xia NanisthepseudonymofChu Wangtai, a lawyerfromtheBeijing Jiang Huiling 关 18 于全面深化改革若干重大 , Nan Fengchuang –SouthReviews, zonghe ban Caijing, )

He frequently comments in the press oncurrent legal news. published after the Third Plenum focused Third Plenum the after published isaseniorjudgeatChina’s Supreme People’s Court. , 25November2013. , 10December2013. 中国版 4 December2013. ), because establishing the ruleof establishing ), because , Zhongguo ban th 问题 Congress”, 19 21 的决定 20 ), because the rule the ), because , 22 November Xuexi shibao Xuexi zhongyang th CCP

developing the rule of law. The Central Committee’s reform their budgets independently, without interference from plan has been endorsed by at least one of the figures who local administrations. Jiang also highlights the need for will have the most responsibility for its implementation: equalisation between the different provinces. The system in November 2013, the head of the Central Committee’s is to be run independently in each province, but poorer Politics and Law Commission, Meng Jianzhu, published an provinces must be able to obtain sufficient funding to article in the People’s Daily under the headline, “Deepening ensure that their judicial systems can properly develop. judicial reform” (深化司法体制改革, shenhua sifa tizhi gaige), examining the reform programme announced Jiang says that the reform plan proposes strengthening by the Plenum. Each of the measures proposed in the property rights by establishing legal safeguards against Decision represents a significant breakthrough. Chinese dispossession. Furthermore, the reform project aims commentators have tried to tease out and analyse the most to increase the responsibilities of investigators during important elements of the plan. enquiries, so as to prevent information being coerced and evidence being fabricated. Finally, the reform plan should Identifying what will change lead to the abolition of the death penalty for 13 offences, especially those related to non-violent economic crimes. The reform plan aims to create the structural conditions The system for reducing sentences should also be reviewed. necessary to establish an independent judiciary. The various measures proposed are still at the planning stage, but the The abolition of re-education camps was announced a long basics seem to have been decided on. Now, the evolution of time ago and is the result of earlier political decisions.22 the Chinese judicial system will need to be monitored. Even so, Hu Law can be used to “create Jianmiao says Jiang Huiling says that the cornerstone of the reform order out of chaos” in China’s that the Central project is the reform of the financing of the judicial system. economic development. Committee’s This will involve both judges’ salaries and court operating specific mention costs, in trial chambers and in investigative organs. A single of reforming authority at the provincial administration level (法检省 the system of re-education through labour represents 级统管, fajian shengji tongguan) will manage the justice a significant step towards increased protection of basic budget. Academics have long argued that this kind of freedoms in China. change to the financing system is needed as a fundamental guarantee of judges’ independence. Jiang Huiling says Making sense of the changes that a central system would have been too complex to implement and that a local system would in practice have Xia Nan says that for the last 15 years, the judicial system ended up being influenced by local politics. By taking the has evolved in a haphazard way, driven by the need to compensation system out of the hands of local interests, respond to specific events. Changes have been initiated not the reform programme aims to provide the judicial sector by political bodies but from within the judicial system itself. with the structural means to ensure its independence. The However, after the Central Committee’s “Decision”, Xia new system will include a national compensation system says the judicial system is now “being reformed” (被改革, for the Supreme Court and High Courts (最高法院和高 bei gaige).23 From now on, legal reform will be the result 级法院, zuigao fayuan he gaoji fayuan) and a provincial of a coordinated and systematic process led by the political compensation system for basic and intermediate people’s authorities. Moreover, the reform process is closely linked courts (基层法院, jiceng fayuan, 中级法院, zhongji fayuan). to work carried out at the national and local levels by the Jiang says this decoupling should help avoid most conflicts Central Committee’s Politics and Law Commission. The of interest. party has taken over judicial reform.

Another key element of the reform programme is the Because the current process has such close ties to the party, institution of a “separation” (两区适当分离, liangqu Xia sees it as the first significant reform project in years. shidang fenli) between legal and administrative And he believes that those in power are determined to see responsibilities. Each judge’s jurisdiction will include parts it through. However, he thinks that the reform process of several administrative districts and judicial nominations is missing one key element: genuine, committed public will no longer be the responsibility of local officials. This participation. The Politics and Law Commission carried should help to get rid of collusion between political leaders out all the meticulous research and preparation work for and the judiciary. And with local officials coming under reform and, as such, the reform programme is guided by the jurisdiction of more than one judge, corruption should the government’s point of view rather than informed by become more risky and more costly. any external perspectives. Without public participation, the

22 See Hugo Winckler, “Vers l’abolition des camps de rééducation par le Jiang says that while this step is crucial, if the corrupt travail”, China Analysis, No. 42, April 2013. links between politicians and the judiciary are to be 23 The first character here, 被, indicates the passive voice and is often completely severed, courts will also need to be able to set used in the Chinese media to imply involvement by the Party, without actually naming it. 9 10 March 2014 CHINA ANALYSIS “the law is the ‘caged bird’ of reform” ( reform” of bird’ ‘caged the is law “the 之 Xie Zhusheng foresees a new rule of law aimed at supporting aimed rule oflaw a new foresees Zhusheng Xie Xie believes thisreformwillbecrucialtoChina’s continued believes Xie ( ( This view of law as an economic tool creates a frameworkfor creates tool as aneconomic law This viewof “management” of one be longer no would role party’s The The main objective of these “top-down” ( oee, cnmcly oue lgl eom cno be cannot reforms legal focused economically However, Party cannotinterveneinprivateeconomicrelationships. sheji a paradigm for the debate on constitutionalisation of on constitutionalisation debate a paradigmforthe move frombeingcontrolled authorities. Thecountrywould dutn te uiil ytm o mre-retd logic. market-oriented a to system judicial the adjusting China, but legal protection is still too weak. too is still protection legal China, but oenet ht rcdd h 1t Congress. 18th the preceded that government suggests market. Xie the invisible handof the by governed growth. debate has been split into two different branches: economic different into two split has been debate development. economic development. Law can be used to “create order out economic reforms. Xie Zhushengsaysthatlegalreform offer a template for the new model. for the offer atemplate to being economy of the of thepartyascentralregulator ( chaos” of rule by law and political rule oflaw.Whatismissingfrom rule bylawandpolitical The economy. the primarily to applies on legality focus new will not only affect the judicial system, but will also involve also will but system, judicial the affect only not will more independent legal system that is better equipped to equipped that isbetter system legal more independent the trueruleoflaw–isasrevealingtheircontent. and constitutionalism of – anendorsement reforms today’s might zone trade a free Shanghai’s transformationinto that the challenges and stakes of reform, which aims to create a of reform,aimstocreate and stakes which challenges the transformation. implemented without some repercussions for the central for the repercussions some without implemented should define specific legal conditions to ensure thatthe ensure to conditions legal specific define should that says he means: any justify can that end an be to seems economic reform. says that,asaresult,reform support Xie understanding the debate on law reform. It also establishes reform. Italso on law debate the understanding play aregulatoryroleinChina’seconomicdevelopment. project willremainaninternalpartymatter. logic of the “priority doctrine” ( doctrine” “priority the of logic formulated by Deng Xiaoping calls for economic reform to reform economic for calls Xiaoping Deng by formulated y h “iil hn” ( hand” “visible the by to improvements by legal followed first, implemented be market andthestateinreformera ofthe1980s. 25 24 治理 管理 See 鸟 The image of abirdfreetoflyincage was afamousmetaphor for the ”, ) reforms is to support the Third Plenum’sproposed the support ) reformsisto , , fazhi chenglegaige“longzhongzhiniao zhili China Analysis guanli

The law must be adapted to keep up with economic with up keep to adapted be must The law 拨 ). 乱反正

, u ised ol ivle “governance” involve would instead but ), Market logic is now fairly well developed in developed fairly well now is Market logic

This rationaleiscentraltounderstanding : LawandPowerinXi’s China,December 2013. , boluanfanzheng 看得见的手 Translation: WordWorks Editing: JustineDoody 先行思维 , ) inChina’s economic 法治成了改革的

kandejian deshou The economiczone 顶层设计 , xianxing siwei

”) The current 24 , 25 . dingceng China’s “ 笼 中 ) )

About the authors: ABOUT ECFR

The European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) is the first François Godement is an associate researcher at pan-European think-tank. Launched in October 2007, its Asia Centre, a senior policy fellow and head of the objective is to conduct research and promote informed debate China & Asia programme at the European Council across Europe on the development of coherent, effective and on Foreign Relations, he can be reached at francois. values-based European foreign policy. [email protected]. ECFR has developed a strategy with three distinctive elements that define its activities: Marc Julienne is a research assistant at Asia Centre since April 2013. He specializes on security and • A pan-European Council. ECFR has brought together a defence issues. He can be reached at m.julienne@ distinguished Council of over two hundred Members - politicians, centreasia.eu. decision makers, thinkers and business people from the EU’s member states and candidate countries - which meets once a year as a full body. Through geographical and thematic task Agatha Kratz is the chief editor of China Analysis, forces, members provide ECFR staff with advice and feedback she can be reached at [email protected]. on policy ideas and help with ECFR’s activities within their own countries. The Council is chaired by Martti Ahtisaari, Hugo Winckler’s research focuses on the Joschka Fischer and Mabel van Oranje. • A physical presence in the main EU member states. ECFR, functioning of the Chinese judicial system and uniquely among European think-tanks, has offices in Berlin, on China’s as well as Taiwan’s innovation-based London, Madrid, Paris, Rome and Sofia. In the future ECFR economy, he can be reached at hugowinckler@ plans to open offices in Warsaw and Brussels. Our offices are gmail.com. platforms for research, debate, advocacy and communications. • A distinctive research and policy development process. ECFR has brought together a team of distinguished researchers and practitioners from all over Europe to advance its objectives ABOUT ASIA CENTRE through innovative projects with a pan-European focus. ECFR’s activities include primary research, publication of policy Asia Centre, founded in August 2005, conducts research and reports, private meetings and public debates, ‘friends of ECFR’ organizes debate on international relations and strategic issues, gatherings in EU capitals and outreach to strategic media as well as on the political and economic transformations in the outlets. Asia-Pacific; promotes cooperation and second track dialogue with partners in Asia, Europe and the world; publishes timely ECFR is backed by the Soros Foundations Network, the Spanish information and analysis from the region, executive briefs and foundation FRIDE reports from our research team. (La Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior), the Bulgarian Communitas Foundation, the Italian Asia Centre programs cover the prevention of conflicts and UniCredit group and the Stiftung Mercator. ECFR works in regional integration, the challenges of democracy and partnership with other organisations but does not make grants governance, globalisation and national strategies, energy, to individuals or institutions. proliferation and sustainable development. They also draw contributions and viewpoints from research associates and a www.ecfr.eu network of research institutions. This issue of China analysis was produced with the support of www.centreasia.eu Stiftung Mercator.

www.stiftung-mercator.de

This paper represents not the collective views of ECFR or © ECFR / Asia Centre 2014 Asia Centre, but only the view of its authors. Contact: [email protected], [email protected] Copyright of this publication is held by the European Council on Foreign Relations and Asia Centre. You may not copy, reproduce, republish or circulate in any way the content from this publication except for your own personal and non-commercial use. Any other use requires prior written permission.

11