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100 Days Under Xi Jinping, Focusing on Military Reshuffle and Anti-Corruption

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100 Days Under Xi Jinping, Focusing on Military Reshuffle and Anti-Corruption :: Issue Analyses 100 days under Xi Jinping, focusing on military reshuffle and anti-corruption Shin Kyung-jin Researcher of JoongAng China Institute he country is eternal. You only need to remember four characters─Jun dui ( ) Mei guo ( )” The four characters, which mean military and the U.S., ‘‘ T were what Deng Xiaoping said to Jiang Zemin when handing over the power to his successor. The anecdote at Zhongnanhai (中南海), the government compound, shows that military revamp is a matter of most concern to China’s top leader. February 22 marks the 100th day since Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, took the helm of the world’s second largest economy. On November 15, Xi began his term as China’s top leader by entering the press conference at the Great Hall of the People, led six newly elected members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau. Holding a microphone, Xi made an impressive speech, about 1,500 characters long, which lasted about 20 minutes. He mentioned the word “people” 19 times. “To meet the people’s desire for a happy life is our 105 Spring 2013�POSRI Chindia Quarterly mission,” he stated, “To forge iron, one must be strong.” Although “rich people” and “anti-corruption” were the keywords of Xi’s first speech, “military” still weighted heavily on his mind. ○● Xi Jinping’s unreserved steps for military reshuffle Unlike Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao who had been timid before the military authorities, Xi Jinping has made strong and fast moves. Xi has taken largely four steps to control the military. The first is the appointment of top military officers, called “new five horses to the capital (新五馬進京)”. About sixty years ago, in Autumn 1952, Liu Shaoqi (劉少奇) advised Mao Zedong to call in provincial party chiefs to the capital in order to reorganize the central party and government bodies, and eventually won ratification. Soon Gao Gang (高崗) of Northeast China, Rao Shushi (饒漱石) of East China, Deng Zihui (鄧子恢) of Central South China, Deng Xioping of Southwest China, and Xi Zhongxun (習仲勳) of Northwest China were summoned to Beijing; this move is known as Mao Zedong’s “five horses to the capital (五馬進京)”. As a result, the new Republic of China was able to remove the existing powerful forces and potential threats from the outer regions. Mao's political move was also the reason Xi Jinping was born in Beijing, not in his hometown Northwest China, in June 1953. After taking power, Xi Jinping readopted Mao’s “five horses to the capital” policy. At the 7th Pienum of the 17th Communist Party Congress (CPC) held on November 4, right before the 18th CPC, two vice chairmen of the Central Military Commission (CMC) were appointed. It was the finale of the appointments of military officers led by Xi after the Beidaihe (北戴河) meeting. The gist of military appointments, which took effect at the end of October in four PLA General Departments, Army, Navy, Air Force, Second Artillery Corps, and seven military theaters, was to call in five local military bigwigs to Beijing. The key appointments are as follows: Fan Changlong (范 106 POSRI Chindia Quarterly�Spring 2013 :: Issue Analyses 長龍), former commander of the Ji’nan Military Region, was If Xi fails to achieve his named vice chairman of the signature goals of “national CMC; General Fang Fenghui prosperity” and “China’s (房峰輝), former commander of dream”, the public will turn the Beijing Military Region, as their backs on him at once. chief of the General Staff of the People's Liberation Army (PLA); Zhang Yang (張陽), former political commissar of Guangzhou Military Region, as the Director of the General Political Department; General Zhao Keshi (趙克石), as secretary of the PLA General Logistics Department; General Zhang Youxia (裝又俠), as secretary of the General Reserve Department. In addition, on November 23, one week after the end of the 18th CPC, Xi promoted the newly-elected Second Artillery Command Wei Fenghe (魏風和) to the rank of full general in a special ceremony. The promotion ceremony was held before Xi was sworn in as the General Secretary. Despite the party principle which holds that”The party controls the gun (黨指揮槍)”, debate has been raised over whether thepromotions were unconstitutional. The reaction bespeaks the boldness of Xi's move. The second is discipline. On December 21, 2012, Xi Jinping delivered ten regulations to the military in the name of CMC. The regulations prohibit favorable treatment for high-ranking military officers, extravagant banquets, luxury vehicles, excessive guards, wordy, hollow speeches, unnecessary overseas visits, and liquor during receptions for military officers. These changes set him far apart from Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, who tried to win over the military authorities as they took power. The regulations clearly show the commander-in-chief’s determination not to tolerate relaxing military disciplines. The third is a military code hidden in the new speech during Xi’s southern tour (新南巡講話), his first visit to the country. On December 8, 107 Spring 2013�POSRI Chindia Quarterly during his visit to Guangdong (December 7-11), Xi boarded the destroyer Haikou (海口艦), a part of the fleet patrolling disputed waters in the South China Sea. On the 10th, he visited the 42nd Group Army during his first trip to military bases as the CPC chairman. Deng Xioping, on his visit 20 years earlier, had ordered the 42nd Group Army to “protect China's Reform and Opening Up, as if they were escorting and guarding the Emperor (保駕護航) to attain reform and opening up”. The 42nd Group Army has the shortest history among army groups. During the Korean War, the 124th Amphibious Mechanized Infantry Division of the 42nd Group Army built a reputation for its fierce combats against the U.S. 1st Marine Division and South Korea’s 5th and 7th Divisions. Its relationship with the Korean Army might even be characterized as ill-fated. After the war, the 124th Division was assigned to ward off attacks from Jiang Jieshi of the National People’s Party. One of the main duties of the 124th Division, located in Luofu Mountain near Guangzhou, is to land on the southern area of Taiwan in an emergency and annihilate the Taiwanese Army. The division still regularly conducts amphibious landing exercises jointly with the South China Sea fleet. On the 12th, Xinhua News Agency released a report on his visit to PLA bases accompanied by a photo of Xi on board a state-of-the-art amphibious assault vehicle. The article used the word “Guangzhou War Zone (戰區)”, not “Guangzhou Military Theater (軍區)”, indicating Xi’s direct message for military preparedness. While making a series of speech calling for stronger, combat-ready fighting forces, Xi emphasized, “We must pursue the goals of becoming a wealthy nation and a strong military at the same time”. Fourth, Xi has taken a “soft” approach domestically but adopted a hard line abroad. On the domestic front, Xi won over the hearts of military authorities through unprecedented promotions. On the international front, however, he prevented the enemy’s provocation sternly. Provincial-level military appointments made in late October were the most drastic in the last 108 POSRI Chindia Quarterly�Spring 2013 :: Issue Analyses decade. Xi named Fan Changlong (范長龍), former commander of the Ji’nan Military Region, as vice chairman of the CMC, even though he was not a CMC member. It was an unprecedented, radical appointment. He also appointed Xu Qiliang (許其亮), former air force commander, as the vice chairman of CMC. It was the first appointment to install an air force commander as the CMC vice chairman. Experts believe that these appointments show the PLA’s strategy for the future. In addition, there are rumors of an imminent sweeping reshuffle of the command and control system, including the seven military theaters. This means that the PLA is preparing to make over itself into a strong futuristic military. On the external front, media coverage on military technologies have risen in frequency after Xi took over. On November 25, Chinese media announced that J-15 jets made a successful take-off and landing on the aircraft carrier Liaoning (遼 寧). After the coverage, it became popular across China to imitate the pose of take-off instruction action, known as the “aircraft carrier style”. There are also some media reports on the possibility of China building nuclear- powered aircraft carriers. China’s fast growing military costs are high enough to raise concerns. By sending strong signals to the U.S., Japan, and other neighboring countries, China desires to both prevent any provocation from outside and please the hawks in military. ○● War on corruption At the press conference on November 15, which functioned as a de facto inauguration ceremony for Xi Jinping, the entire Standing Committee of the Political Bureau except one member showed up to the hall in dark charcoal suits and red ties. The exception was Wang Qishan, Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), who wore a blue tie, signifying a war on corruption. In his farewell address at the 18th Communist Party Congress, Hu Jintao warned, “Failing to tackle corruption could bring down the party and the 109 Spring 2013�POSRI Chindia Quarterly state.” Xi designated “corruption” as a keyword to push for innovation as he started off his rein. In his campaign against corruption, Xi has vowed to crack down on both “tigers” and “flies”─powerful leaders and lowly bureaucrats. He also proclaimed, “Power should be reined in a cage of regulations”. Since then, he has practiced what he said. One Hong Kong magazine reported in its latest issue that China has created the Central Anti- Corruption Leading Group (中央反腐領導小組) in order to tackle corruption, showing Xi’s determination for his anti-corruption drive.
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