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Inadmissible Protocol No. 1, Article 1

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Inadmissible Protocol No. 1, Article 1 [] HONECKER v. GERMANY AXEN, TEUBNER and JOSSIFOV v. GERMANY Protection of property – inadmissible Protocol No. 1, Article 1 Confiscation of assets acquired by dignitaries of GDR through abuse of power On November a Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights unani- mously declared inadmissible the applications in the cases of Honecker v. Germany and Axen, Teubner and Jossifov v. Germany. Summary of the facts The first applicant is the widow of Erich Honecker, the former president of the State Council of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), who died in . The three other applicants are the widow and daughters of Hermann Axen, a member of the Politbüro of the Central Committee of the GDR’s Socialist Unity Party (SED), who died in . Between the fall of the Berlin wall on November and German reunifica- tion, which became effective on October , Mr Honecker and Mr Axen had requested the conversion into Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) Deutschmarks (DEM) of credits in GDR marks appearing in their bank accounts. The origin of those amounts was ordinary income. In July a special committee of the GDR Parliament, set up to examine the origin of assets for conversion into DEM, gave a decision based on a Law of the GDR on convertible assets (a Law which was to become a federal law after reunification) confiscating the credits belonging to Mr Honecker and Mr Axen on the ground that the credits in question had been ac- quired by a misuse of power to the detriment of the public interest. On October Mr Axen’s heirs, the applicants who lodged the second application, applied to the Administrative Court to challenge the confiscation. Their application was dismissed on the ground that the conditions enacted by the Law on Convertible Assets had been met because Mr Axen’s credits had originated from savings acquired by a misuse of power to the detriment of the public interest. On appeal by the applicants, the Administrative Court of Appeal nonetheless set [] aside the special committee’s decision and ordered the accounts in question to be unfrozen. The court held that a confiscation measure of that kind could not apply to savings from ordinary income. However, that judgment was quashed by the Federal Administrative Court, with which the State had lodged an application to reopen the proceedings. The applicants subsequently applied to the Federal Con- stitutional Court. In July that court dismissed their appeal, holding that un- der the Law on Convertible Assets credits originating from ordinary income saved by virtue of advantages obtained by flagrantly immoral means could be excluded. As for the first applicant, in a judgment of June the Administrative Court upheld the main provisions of the special committee’s decision, except for a sum originating from her pension fund. The court upheld the committee’s deci- sion that the remaining credits fell within the scope of the Law on Convertible Assets because they had originated from savings acquired by a misuse of power to the detriment of the public interest. The applicant did not appeal. Complaints The applicants submitted that the law and decisions confiscating the bank ac- counts of Mr Honecker and Mr Axen violated Article of Protocol No. Decision The confiscation of the applicants’ credits amounted to an interference with their right to peaceful enjoyment of property. Although the confiscation resulted in a deprivation of property, it fell within the scope of the general rules designed to check the origin of assets in GDR marks for conversion into DEM. Accordingly, the interference amounted to a measure controlling the use of property. The measure had been based on the GDR’s Law on convertible assets, which had subsequently become federal law in the FRG. The interference in question had pursued an aim that was in the general inter- est. The legislature and the court had deemed it legitimate to verify the means by which credits in GDR marks for conversion into DEM had been obtained and had done so by virtue of public-morality requirements. With regard to the proportionality of the interference, the Administrative Court which heard the applicants’ appeals had examined the applicants’ arguments in detail and had thoroughly analysed the nature of the allegations against Mr Honecker and Mr Axen, and the origin of the amounts appearing in the applicants’ bank accounts in their capacity as heirs. Evidence of this lay in the fact that the court .
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