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Introduction New Evidence on the Polish Crisis 1980-1982

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Introduction New Evidence on the Polish Crisis 1980-1982 NEW EVIDENCE ON THE POLISH CRISIS 1980-1982 3 New Evidence on the Polish Crisis 1980-1982 Introduction By Malcolm Byrne n November 1997, an extraordinary multinational and the impact of American efforts to forestall such an gathering took place of personalities who figured in outcome. One issue that came under intense scrutiny was I the tumultuous 1980-81 Solidarity crisis. For two- whether Jaruzelski was a hero or a traitor: Did he declare and-a-half days two dozen Poles, Americans, and martial law on 13 December 1981, as a patriotic act to Russians, one-time allies and adversaries alike, met in the prevent the slaughter of tens of thousands of Poles that village of Jachranka just outside Warsaw, to revisit the would surely have followed from a Soviet/Warsaw Pact events of that crucial period. invasion? Or was he simply doing Moscow’s bidding, On the Polish Communist Party and government side, using the threat (spurious in this view) of an invasion as a former Party leaders Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski and pretext and/or justification for martial law, and thus Stanis»aw Kania, former Prime Minister Mieczys»aw sparing the Soviets the multiple costs of intervention? Rakowski, and several of their colleagues sat across from As with all Archive/CWIHP conferences, documents ex-Solidarity figures Tadeusz Mazowiecki (later the played a crucial part. For several years before the country’s first post-Communist prime minister), Karol Jachranka gathering, directed research had been underway Modzelewski, Zbigniew Bujak, and others. Filling out the in the archives of the former Soviet bloc and the United spaces at the large, square meeting table were States specifically geared toward preparation of a “briefing representatives of the two superpowers whose book” for each of the participants. Over 100 top-level involvement in the crisis (albeit in very different forms) documents were selected, ranging from Soviet and Polish ensured its global impact. From the American side: politburo minutes and Warsaw Pact meeting transcripts, to Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter’s National Security Solidarity National Coordination Commission materials, to Adviser; Richard Pipes, a senior member of President U.S. National Security Council records and Defense Reagan’s National Security Council (NSC) staff; Gen. Intelligence Agency reports.3 The goal was not only to William Odom, NSC military aide in 1980 and head of bolster the public record but also to help jog the memories U.S. Army Intelligence in 1981-82; Jan Nowak, formerly of participants and keep the discussions as closely of Radio Free Europe and a consultant on Poland to the anchored to the facts as possible. As often happens, Carter and Reagan administrations; and Carter NSC staff additional materials emerged during the course of the aide, Stephen Larrabee, were present. From the former conference itself.4 Soviet side: Marshal Viktor Kulikov, Commander-in- Several new documents dealt with the central, and Chief of Warsaw Pact forces; Gen. Anatolii Gribkov, related, questions of Soviet intentions and Jaruzelski’s Warsaw Pact chief of staff; Central Committee expert motivations. They seemed to seriously undermine the Georgi Shakhnazarov; and Valerii Moussatov of the former Polish leader’s published rationales. For example, Foreign Ministry. a telegram from Col. Ryszard Kuklinski, the CIA’s long- The conference, “Poland 1980-1982: Internal Crisis, time source inside the Polish general staff, reported in International Dimensions,” was one of a series of meetings early December 1980 that Jaruzelski had ordered his organized by the National Security Archive in partnership Defense Ministry to approve Kremlin-sponsored plans to with scholars and institutions in Russia and Eastern allow 18 divisions of Soviet, Czechoslovak and East Europe—and in close cooperation with the Cold War German troops to enter the country, a revelation that left International History Project—aimed at expanding the every Pole privy to the decision “very depressed and historical record and informing the public debate over key crestfallen,” Kuklinski reported.5 A Czechoslovak crises in the Cold War.1 Shouldering most of the military document around the same date appeared to responsibility for the Jachranka event were Andrzej confirm this report. Paczkowski, Ryszard Zelichowski, Pawel Machcewicz, Apparently even more damning to Jaruzelski was a Darius Stola, Krzysztof Persak, Ewa Balcerek and their series of handwritten notebook pages prepared in the early colleagues at the Institute of Political Studies of the Polish 1980s by Soviet Lt. Gen. Viktor Anoshkin, for years an Academy of Sciences. adjutant to Marshal Kulikov and his principal notetaker Highlights of the conference were numerous, and throughout the Polish crisis. During the planning stages of have been written about elsewhere.2 The discussions the conference, the organizers had asked every prospective brought out new facts and perspectives on the internal participant to dig through their own files for documents to dynamics of the crisis, the roles of Kania and Jaruzelski, bring to the table. Kulikov agreed to ask Anoshkin to the question of whether the Soviets intended to invade, bring along his notes.6 Immediately after the Marshal 4 COLD W AR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 11 referred to those notes during the conference to back up Archive, 1997). his claim that the Soviets never intended to intervene 4 Many scholars and archivists throughout Eastern Europe, in military in Poland, he and Anoshkin were approached Russia and the United States contributed materials (and (accosted?) by various participants. Anoshkin eventually translations), all of which are available as part of the Archive/ agreed to let several pages be copied, which, as Mark CWIHP’s Russian and East European Archival Documents Kramer’s piece below suggests, appear to show that Database (READD) in the National Security Archive’s reading contrary to Jaruzelski’s assertion that he tried to keep room in the Gelman Library, Suite 701, 2130 H Str., NW., Soviet troops out of the country, he actually counted on Washington, DC 20037. The 1980-81 collection includes hundreds of other documents obtained by the Archive through them to back up Polish forces in case martial law failed. the U.S. Freedom of Information Act and other sources. An Revelations of this sort prompted some of the most early exchange of source materials on the 1980-81 crisis took dramatic interactions of the conference, such as when place at a workshop organized by the Archive/CWIHP and Jaruzelski confronted Kulikov during a break following Institute of Political Studies (Warsaw) in the Polish capital in the Marshal’s denial that Moscow contemplated an August 1995. invasion. In front of several witnesses, an emotional 5 Mark Kramer, director of the Harvard Project on Cold War Jaruzelski said, in Russian: “You know what you said to Studies, contributed (and translated) this and two other Kuklinski me then. How could you let them do this to me—in front telegrams, among other materials, for the briefing book. 6 of the Americans!” In addition to Gen. Anoshkin, other former officials who generously contributed documents were Zbigniew Brzezinski, Questions about the crisis persist, of course, even Valerii Moussatov, and Gen. Jaruzelski. about Jaruzelski. But the truly multinational, cooperative effort by scholars, archivists and others involved in this “When foreign troops invaded our country on the night of project has helped to advance our understanding of key the 20th to the 21st of August, 1968, and abducted its aspects of the 1980-81 crisis. The essays that follow political representatives, something happened for which a below both add to the growing databank and represent parallel would be difficult to find in modern history. some of the first attempts to come to grips with the new Within several hours our society began to unite quite evidence. As documentary and oral history work unexpectedly in a peaceful and dignified demonstration in continues, these interpretations will no doubt themselves defense of the independence of the state and the civic become grist for further debate. freedoms that had been achieved.” . Malcolm Byrne is the Deputy Director of the National Security Archive, a non-governmental research institute and repository based at George Washington University. ————— 1 Under the rubric of the “Openness in Russia and Eastern Europe Project,” the Archive, along with CWIHP and its other partners, have run conferences on the Prague Spring and the subsequent Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia (Prague, April 1994), the Hungarian revolution (Budapest, September 1996), and the 1953 uprising in East Germany (Potsdam, November 1996). The Archive’s principal partners include: the Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences; the Institute of Contemporary History and the recently-formed Center for Advanced Studies of the Anti-totalitarian Resistance of the Czech Academy of Sciences; the Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution; the Civic Academy Foundation (Bucharest); the Institute of General History of the Russian Academy of Sciences; and “Memorial” (Moscow). Generous support over the years has come mainly from the Open Society Institute, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, “I am happy that the cooperation between the National the Smith Richardson Foundation, and the German Marshall Security Archive in Washington and the Czech foundation Fund of the United States—in addition to local sponsors for each ‘Prague Spring 1968,’ has resulted in this voluminous event. 2 For a summary, CWIHP Bulletin readers can refer to collection of documents, which, I hope, will lead readers to Raymond Garthoff’s report in Issue 10, pp. 229-232. Other a closer understanding of the dramatic events that the accounts appeared in The New York Times, Los Angeles Times, then Czechoslovakia lived through three decades ago.” and International Herald Tribune. < 3 Malcolm Byrne, Pawel Machcewicz, Christian Ostermann, From the preface by V clav Havel, eds., Poland 1980-1982 Internal Crisis, International President of the Czech Republic Dimensions.
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