David J. Ulbrich. Preparing for Victory: and the Making of the Modern Marine Corps, 1936-1943. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2011. xiv + 285 pp. $35.95, cloth, ISBN 978-1-59114-903-3.

Reviewed by Edgar F. Raines

Published on H-War (August, 2014)

Commissioned by Margaret Sankey (Air University)

In Preparing for Victory, David J. Ulbrich, a committee organized by the assistant comman‐ 2007 PhD from Temple University currently teach‐ dant, Col. John A. Lejeune. In this last capacity ing at Rogers State University, has written the frst Holcomb became one of the frst Marines to work book-length biography of Thomas C. Hol‐ out the implications of the plan for a naval cam‐ comb, the commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps paign against Japan, War Plan Orange, for the from December 1936 until December 1943. Re‐ Marines’ advanced base force concept. As a placing two pioneering articles by John C. Gordon, during he commanded the 2d Battal‐ the book is by far the most authoritative and de‐ ion, 6th Marines, at Belleau Wood and Soissons, tailed account available of Holcomb’s life and ca‐ winning the Croix de Guerre on both occasions. reer.[1] Born in 1879, the son of a prosperous Del‐ Promoted to lieutenant of the 6th Marines, aware attorney and state legislator, Holcomb ob‐ he acted as the plans ofcer for the regiment. He tained a commission in the Marine Corps in 1900. ended the war as one of the most decorated Ma‐ In the next seventeen years he held a succession rine ofcers of the confict. of important and prestigious assignments that After the war Holcomb received a series of as‐ prepared him for even more important postings. signments that suggested that senior leaders in He served tours with the Atlantic Fleet; with the the Marine Corps were grooming him for the Marine Guard in ; in Washington, DC, as an highest positions in the organization. He was a aide to President Theodore Roosevelt; as acting student at the U.S. Army Command and General quartermaster for Marines stationed in the Philip‐ Staf School from 1924 to 1925 at a time when the pines; as post quartermaster of the Marine Corps school was focused on how best to breach a stabi‐ Barracks in Washington, DC; as aide to the com‐ lized front. In 1925 he became the director of the mandant of the Marine Corps, Maj. Gen. George Operations and Training Division, Headquarters, Barnett; and as a member of an ad hoc war plans U.S. Marine Corps, and held the position for two H-Net Reviews years, a period in which Marine planners frst de‐ Ulbrich is very scrupulous about not pushing veloped detailed plans for amphibious landings in his analysis any further than his limited evidence support of the Orange plan. As a student in the se‐ will allow. Holcomb was a very junior brigadier nior course at the , 1931–32, he general (only ninth in overall seniority among participated in war games simulating a naval Marine Corps generals) when President Franklin campaign to relieve the . Holcomb ex‐ Delano Roosevelt selected him to become com‐ plored the technical issues involved in mounting mandant of the corps beginning in December an amphibious assault while a student at the 1936. Not since 1864, when Abraham Lincoln se‐ Army War College during the 1932–33 academic lected Maj. to be commandant, had a year. Assignment to the Naval War Plans Division president selected such a junior ofcer for the from 1932 to 1935 post. The author identifes three fgures likely to followed. At the end of that tour he was promoted have been key to the decision: President Roo‐ to brigadier general and appointed commandant sevelt, who had known Holcomb ever since he of the Marine Corps School. These tours ensured served as assistant secretary of the Navy in the that Holcomb was repeatedly exposed to the latest Wilson administration;Assistant Secretary of the thinking about the Marines’ advanced base force Navy Henry Latrobe Roosevelt, who was both the concept, to War Plan Orange as it evolved from a president’s cousin and a retired Marine Corps cavalry charge across the Pacifc to a careful step- colonel who probably knew Holcomb at least by by-step advance, and to the development of Ma‐ reputation; and the retiring commandant, Maj. rine Corps amphibious doctrine and equipment. Gen. John R. Russell, who was a proponent of both Holcomb’s surviving correspondence from amphibious warfare and promotion by selection. this period is sparse; Ulbrich nevertheless weaves Sometime in 1935 Henry Latrobe Roosevelt ap‐ a very interesting outline of a life and a career proached the president and suggested that he ap‐ from ofcial documents, interviews with Hol‐ point Holcomb commandant when Russell re‐ comb’s contemporaries, and news accounts. The tired. FDR was open to the idea but told his cousin types of sources Ulbrich used often limits him to to check with Russell and get back to him. Henry showing that Holcomb was exposed to certain de‐ Latrobe Roosevelt apparently did so, although, as velopments but not how he contributed to them. Ulbrich points out, the evidence is ambiguous be‐ While Holcomb was commandant of the Marine cause Henry died unexpectedly before the presi‐ Corps School, for example, the faculty and stu‐ dent made the ofcial announcement. So much dents were engaged in either writing or revising for the mechanics of the appointment. The rea‐ what the chief historian of the Marine Corps, sons for Holcomb’s selection were his unfappable Charles D. Melson, labels “the Holy Trinity” (p. 35) temperament, his obvious intelligence, his diversi‐ of Marine Corps doctrine—the Tentative Manual ty of career assignments, and his support for the for Landing Operations (1934), the Tentative Man‐ Marines’ amphibious warfare mission. Nowhere ual of Advanced Bases (1936), and the Small Wars does the author’s skills as an analyst stand out Manual (1935). The available evidence does not better than in his discussion of Holcomb’s selec‐ indicate, however, what personal impact Hol‐ tion. comb had on these documents, or even what he The core of Preparing for Victory consists of thought about them. This circumstance is some‐ fve chapters that Ulbrich devotes to Holcomb’s what frustrating for the reader, but it must have service as commandant from December 1936 un‐ been even more frustrating for the author. til December 1943. Fortunately, Holcomb’s person‐ al correspondence has survived from these years, while the ofcial documentation is very rich given

2 H-Net Reviews his position. His tenure naturally divides into and Melvin J. Maas and Senator David I. Walsh. three phases: 1936–39, the Depression-era Marine He made a point of always giving a direct, Corps; 1940–41, preparing the Corps for war; and straightforward answer when testifying before 1941–43, mobilizing and fghting the Corps. Ul‐ congressional committees and when he did not brich devotes one chapter to each of the frst two know an answer stating that he would get back to phases and three chapters to the war. In many the questioner the next day with the facts. Over ways the Corps of which Holcomb assumed com‐ time he developed trust, but in the short term he mand was already a going concern. Since early was hard-pressed just to maintain the existing 1934, his predecessor Russell had arranged for budget against economizers. The Corps that Hol‐ Marine participation in annual feet exercises in comb inherited consisted of some 17,200 ofcers the Caribbean that included simulated opposed and men, a force smaller than the contemporary landings. They gave Marines an opportunity to New York City Police Department. Holcomb’s ini‐ test both emerging amphibious doctrine and to tial objective was the buildup of the Fleet Marine identify equipment shortfalls. The most important Force, an organization created by Russell, so that of these were the lack of specialized craft to carry it had real military capacity. To achieve this objec‐ assault forces from ship to shore, revealed glar‐ tive, he needed to increase the active duty force to ingly in the 1937 exercises, the frst conducted its peacetime legal limit of 17,000 enlisted men, while Holcomb was commandant. The problems but he discovered that the Marine Recruiting Ser‐ in the exercise led the Navy Equipment Board to vice was too anemic to maintain the force, let fund one prototype fat-bottom Eureka boat man‐ alone provide modest growth. Holcomb’s solution ufactured by Andrew Jackson Higgins. That same was to shift money and men into the service so year Holcomb became interested in Donald Roe‐ that it could. At the same time, his staf began a bling’s “Allegator,” a true amphibian. In 1938 Hol‐ detailed study of how headquarters could expand comb saw a the Corps in an orderly fashion to its wartime lim‐ demonstration of a prototype that Roebling had it of 57,000 enlisted men in the event of an emer‐ built with his own money and exclaimed: “My gency. These early years were frustrating for Hol‐ God, that’s the future of the Marine Corps!” (p. 55). comb, but they prepared the ground for his future Even with his strong personal backing, however, success. Holcomb could not convince the Navy Equipment The plan to increase the Corps paid of follow‐ Board to fund even one prototype until 1941—so ing the German invasion of Poland on September tight was the Navy’s development budget. Fortu‐ 1, 1939. The Corps grew to 26,000 by July 1940 nately, Roebling continued to use his own funds to with plans to expand to 50,000 by July 1941. refne his craft. This lack of funds may also ex‐ Working closely with Representatives Vinson and plain why Holcomb chose not to replace the bolt- Maas, Holcomb secured congressional authoriza‐ action 1903 Springfeld with the semiautomatic tion for such an enlargement. When recruiting M1 Garand when the Army ofered it in 1939. In fell of in early 1940 as the economy began to re‐ contrast, Ulbrich claims that the overriding factor vive due to war orders from the Allies, Holcomb was Holcomb’s technological conservatism—a reorganized Marine Corps headquarters, creating point that I do not fnd altogether convincing (pp. a Recruiting Division reporting directly to the 97–98). commandant, and gave it the men, resources, and Throughout his years as commandant, Hol‐ publicity to meet and exceed the goal for 1941. At comb placed great emphasis on cultivating close the same time, expanding the force meant shifting relations with key members of the Naval Afairs emphasis from developing new amphibious committees, such as Representatives Carl Vinson equipment to outftting new Marines with exist‐

3 H-Net Reviews ing equipment. Fleet Exercise 7 in early 1941 The Marine Corps grew from 51,000 on December showed that both the Higgins boat and Roebling’s 7, 1941 to 55,500 on December 31, 1941. By July Allegator were very useful in landings. Moreover, 1942 it reached 143,000. Holcomb successfully op‐ Holcomb was fnally able to secure funds from posed congressional eforts to immediately in‐ the Naval Equipment Board—he had been trying crease the Corps to 200,000 by July 1942, explain‐ since 1937—to redesign the Higgins boat by ing that the available training facilities limited ca‐ adding a bow ramp, which would be the fnal re‐ pacity for the moment to a force of 150,000. The design of what became the landing craft, vehicle, Marine Corps expansion was much more orderly personnel (LCVP). The main point of contention in than might have been anticipated given the mag‐ 1941 (it would continue through the Guadalcanal nitude of the increase over a seven-month period. campaign) was who would command the landing What is even more impressive is that all these force once ashore—the senior admiral afoat or men were volunteers. The success owed much to the senior Marine Corps ofcer ashore. the Division of Public Relations led by Brig. Gen. Following the fall of in June 1940, the Robert L. Denig, Sr. Holcomb’s relations with new chief of naval operations, Adm. Harold R. Denig illustrated one of his great talents as a lead‐ Stark, articulated Plan “Dog” as the proper strate‐ er—an almost intuitive ability to assess the gic stance for the . In the event of strengths and weaknesses of his subordinates and war, the United States would take the ofensive then to place them in positions that used their against frst and stand on the strategic abilities to best advantage. Holcomb was content defensive in the Pacifc until Germany was defeat‐ to give general direction to the public afairs ef‐ ed. Adopted by the Roosevelt administration, the fort and leave the day-to-day decisions to Denig, plan as developed by Stark involved holding a de‐ who responded with a brilliant campaign to sup‐ fensive line west of Hawaii and maintaining a line port the recruiting drive. of communications to the Philippines, Australia, and Malaya. Holcomb began organizing Marine Holcomb was not nearly as successful when defense and dispatching them initially forced to confront social issues, but here he mir‐ to Midway, Johnson, and Palmyra Islands with rored the attitudes and prejudices of his genera‐ subsequent deployments planned to Wake, Guam, tion. He succeeded in barring open homosexuals and Samoa as Marines became available. At the from the Corps—as did all the other services. same time, Holcomb organized two Marine divi‐ Presidential directives followed by legislation sions destined to be the Corps’ amphibious strike forced him to accept women and blacks in the force. In the midst of these momentous changes, Corps over his vehement objections. Holcomb in‐ the president opted for continuity and reappoint‐ sisted that the latter serve in a segregated battal‐ ed Holcomb as commandant for a second tour. ion led by all white ofcers. Later, commenting on Holcomb remained unfazed by the disastrous new units in the Corps, he observed that war dogs opening of the war in the Pacifc. He set an exam‐ were a great success, that the women Marines ple, working quietly at his desk, showing “urgency were working out better than he had anticipated, ... but not frantic desperation” (p. 106). In so do‐ and that the black troops “made it difcult to car‐ ing, he demonstrated both his strength of charac‐ ry out our work,” apparently referring to the di‐ ter and what Ulbrich, drawing on the work of po‐ version of scant training resources from white litical scientist Fred I. Greenspan, labels “emotion‐ units (p. 168). At the same time, when he had a al intelligence”—the ability to master and direct positive attitude toward a racial group, he could his emotions toward completing the task at hand. be inclusive. Holcomb became an enthusiastic proponent of the Navaho code talker program. In‐

4 H-Net Reviews clusiveness did not extend, however, to most spe‐ retire for age when he reached his sixty-fourth cialized units. In his view, all Marines were elite. birthday in September 1943. He intended to rec‐ He saw no need for an elite within the elite. He re‐ ommend Vandegrift as his replacement. At the marked that any “properly trained and led feet end of the inspection, he took Vandegrift back to Marine rife ” could do anything that a Nouméa for a two-day conference with the the‐ Marine raider battalion could do (pp. 124-125). ater commander, Vice Adm. William F. Halsey, Once again, however, the president’s opposing and the naval amphibious commander, Rear view prevailed. Adm. Richmond Kelly Turner. The Marines were The interwar Marines were a naval service, a hanging onto the beachhead at Guadalcanal—but small, relentlessly tactical organization focused just barely. Holcomb’s and Vandegrift’s report on on a few lines of efort. The rapid mobilization of conditions there elicited from Halsey the commit‐ the Corps and the importance of the amphibious ment that he would give the Marines “everything mission changed both the organization and the he had.” As important as this commitment proved role of the commandant. Holcomb attended the for the ultimate success of the Guadalcanal cam‐ Washington ARCADIA Conference (December paign, Holcomb brokered an agreement about 1941–January 1942) at which he advised the con‐ command relations in amphibious operations that ferees on possible amphibious operations in the proved equally important in the long term, both Pacifc. ARCADIA was the frst high-level confer‐ during the war and after. Disputes about com‐ ence to which a Marine Corps commandant had mand had continued throughout the campaign. been invited. Holcomb’s growing importance and The conferees agreed that during the planning that of the Corps were confrmed in January 1942 phase the senior Navy and Marine commanders by his promotion to lieutenant general. At this would have co-equal responsibilities. During the time, the Naval War Plans Division envisioned a movement to the objective and the assault phase, limited counterofensive in the Solomon Islands the senior naval ofcer would command. Once to protect the line of communications to Australia ashore, the senior Marine ofcer would command beginning in early 1943. The under-strength, par‐ all ground forces and shore-based air forces. Hol‐ tially trained 1st Marine Division deployed to New comb then shepherded this agreement up the Zealand in May and June 1942 intent on a six- chain of command all the way to Washington month shakedown before commitment to combat. where it became ofcial doctrine. In recounting The Japanese advance in the Solomons changed this episode Ulbrich puts all of Holcomb’s consid‐ the time table, and Operation WATCHTOWER, the erable skills as a military politician on full display. landing on Guadalcanal on August 7, 1942, was Once the Marines reached a strength of the result. 143,000, Congress established a new objective of Ulbrich devotes an entire chapter to the 223,000 by July 1943. The Corps exceeded this fg‐ Guadalcanal campaign, a decision that makes ure by January 1943. These new Marines were, sense on several levels. The Guadalcanal cam‐ however, the last of the volunteers. Beginning in paign was the end to which the initial Marine mo‐ February 1943, as mandated by FDR’s Executive bilization was directed. Moreover, the 1st Marine Order 9279, the Navy (and its Marine Corps) must Division was commanded by Holcomb’s protégé, receive all new members from Selective Service. Maj. Gen. Alexander A. Vandegrift. Holcomb also Holcomb spent his last year battling to maintain visited the island in October 1942 to monitor the Marine standards when accepting new inductees. progress of the campaign. During the visit, he took The victorious end of the Guadalcanal campaign Vandegrift aside and told him that he intended to in February 1943 raised morale and validated all the Marine Corps’ eforts to develop the amphibi‐

5 H-Net Reviews ous concept during the interwar period. The hor‐ authority to capable subordinates. He set goals rendous losses at Tarawa in August 1943 suggest‐ and coordinated the eforts of subordinates but ed that everyone, including the Marines, had left them free to achieve those ends in what they more to learn. An emergency kept Vandegrift in conceived the most efcient manner. He stressed the Pacifc longer the open fow of information both up and down than expected, and the president extended Hol‐ the chain of command and across divisions. This comb’s tour until the end of the year. interpretation gives thematic unity to Preparing Holcomb was nevertheless serious about the for Victory. Apparently Holcomb did not study need for a younger man with recent combat expe‐ formal management theory, but these ideas per‐ rience to take over as commandant. As he re‐ meated his times. Furthermore, he got to see one marked to his successor on January 1, 1944, his of the very best early practitioners of progressive last day in ofce, when he walked out the door management in action—Maj. Gen. John A. Leje‐ twenty years was going to lift of his shoulders une, when commandant in the early 1920s. and fall on Vandegrift’s. As he went through that Ulbrich’s end notes and bibliography attest to door, Holcomb wore on those shoulders the four the fact that he is an assiduous researcher. Given stars of a full general. He was the frst full general his painstaking and detailed work, I was sur‐ in Marine Corps history. prised to discover that he had not visited the After Holcomb stepped down as comman‐ Franklin Delano Roosevelt Presidential Library. Of dant, President Roosevelt appointed him U.S. min‐ course, FDR was notorious for doing business ister to the Union of South Africa. Somewhat sur‐ orally and not committing details to paper, but his prisingly, however, Holcomb reacted very nega‐ impact on Holcomb’s life and career would have tively to race relations in South Africa. He justifed at least an exploratory trip to Hyde Park. damned both the supposedly liberal prime minis‐ Marine Corps historiography is with a few ter, Jan Christian Smuts, and the opposition honorable exceptions notably parochial, with Afrikaner Nationalist Party that favored an even many of the books written by serving or retired harsher policy of Apartheid. Ulbrich suggests that Marines. Ulbrich, of course, had to master this lit‐ perhaps Holcomb’s views on race had evolved erature, but he also appears to have absorbed since stepping down as commandant. That is pos‐ some of the attitudes through his pores. Douglas sible, although it is equally likely that Holcomb MacArthur was “delusional” to believe that he looked upon South African practices as more could successfully defend the Philippines (p. 64), nakedly exploitative than American segregation. but Navy and Marine Corps plans to defend Guam (Holcomb would have been most familiar with and Wake with Marine defense battalions pass race relations in , the District of Columbia, without comment (p. 80). The fact is that all Amer‐ Maryland, and Delaware.) It is never wise to un‐ ican leaders, civilian and military, underestimat‐ derestimate the ability of Americans to look at ed the Japanese army’s and navy’s military capaci‐ their own institutions and practices through rose- ty and the Japanese government’s recklessness. colored spectacles. Holcomb stepped down as Almost everyone thought that they would have minister in April 1948. Fully retired, he lived in much more time to get ready than they actually the Washington area until his death in 1964 at age did. eighty-fve. Something similar is at work in Ulbrich’s dis‐ Ulbrich sees Holcomb as a prototypical pro‐ cussion of the Roosevelt administration’s decision gressive manager who stressed rationality and ef‐ in 1941 to send marines to garrison Iceland rather fciency, streamlined bureaucracy, and delegated than soldiers. Ulbrich comments that marines

6 H-Net Reviews were selected because the soldiers were not “pre‐ ty. General Holcomb was a key fgure in the devel‐ pared” (p. 84). In mid-1941 neither Army nor Ma‐ opment of one of the most important military in‐ rine units were well trained compared to the lev‐ stitutions of the modern age. Students of the U.S. els of profciency they attained later. Army units Marine Corps, World War II, and modern military did not go to Iceland because they were flled with history generally will want to read and refect on draftees, guardsmen, and reserve ofcers, all of this book. whom were prohibited by law from serving out‐ Notes side the Western hemisphere. Marine units con‐ [1]. John W. Gordon, “General Thomas W. Hol‐ tained only volunteers and did not fall under this comb and ‘The Golden Age of Amphibious War‐ prohibition.[2] fare,’” Delaware History 21 (September 1985): Finally, in his discussion of the Guadalcanal 256–70, and “Thomas Holcomb, 1936–48,” in Com‐ campaign Ulbrich, drawing on the work of John B. mandants of the Marine Corps, ed. Allan R. Millett Lundstrom, presents a long discussion of the fac‐ and Jack Shulimson (Annapolis, MD.: Naval Insti‐ tors that caused Vice Adm. Frank Jack Fletcher to tute Press, 2004), 253–81. pull his carriers out of range of the island less [2]. For a discussion of the legal issues, see than three days after the initial landings (pp. 133– Stetson Conn, Rose C. Engleman, and Byron 134, 137–138). Then without any efort to explain Fairchild, Guarding the United States and Its Out‐ why this rationale was fawed, he casually refers posts, U.S. Army in World War II (Washington, to Fletcher having “abandoned” the Marines and DC: Ofce of the Chief of Military History, 1964), continues his narrative (p. 141). Left unanalyzed 469. is that this was the Marines’ frst experience in working with a carrier task force in wartime. Sim‐ ilarly, Admiral Fletcher, while very knowledge‐ able about carrier combat, had never worked with a landing force before. Both sides had a lot to learn, a task not made easier by the U.S. Navy’s very thin margin of carrier superiority in the Pa‐ cifc. Nowhere else in the book is its origin as a dissertation more glaringly on display than in this half-digested critique of Fletcher’s actions. In general, interservice rivalry is best left to the services. They are past masters of the genre. These faws are minor when compared to the author’s overall accomplishments. He has con‐ ducted in-depth research among many seemingly unpromising sources and has presented his fnd‐ ings in clear, unadorned prose. Ulbrich has both a real analytical fair and an ability to make signif‐ cant generalizations. His major conclusions are buttressed by an abundance of evidence. More‐ over, he has rescued an important fgure known only to a few specialists from undeserved obscuri‐

7 H-Net Reviews

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Citation: Edgar F. Raines. Review of Ulbrich, David J. Preparing for Victory: Thomas Holcomb and the Making of the Modern Marine Corps, 1936-1943. H-War, H-Net Reviews. August, 2014.

URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=36258

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