David J. Ulbrich. Preparing for Victory: Thomas Holcomb and the Making of the Modern Marine Corps, 1936-1943. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2011. xiv + 285 pp. $35.95, cloth, ISBN 978-1-59114-903-3. Reviewed by Edgar F. Raines Published on H-War (August, 2014) Commissioned by Margaret Sankey (Air University) In Preparing for Victory, David J. Ulbrich, a committee organized by the assistant comman‐ 2007 PhD from Temple University currently teach‐ dant, Col. John A. Lejeune. In this last capacity ing at Rogers State University, has written the frst Holcomb became one of the frst Marines to work book-length biography of General Thomas C. Hol‐ out the implications of the plan for a naval cam‐ comb, the commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps paign against Japan, War Plan Orange, for the from December 1936 until December 1943. Re‐ Marines’ advanced base force concept. As a major placing two pioneering articles by John C. Gordon, during World War I he commanded the 2d Battal‐ the book is by far the most authoritative and de‐ ion, 6th Marines, at Belleau Wood and Soissons, tailed account available of Holcomb’s life and ca‐ winning the Croix de Guerre on both occasions. reer.[1] Born in 1879, the son of a prosperous Del‐ Promoted to lieutenant colonel of the 6th Marines, aware attorney and state legislator, Holcomb ob‐ he acted as the plans officer for the regiment. He tained a commission in the Marine Corps in 1900. ended the war as one of the most decorated Ma‐ In the next seventeen years he held a succession rine officers of the conflict. of important and prestigious assignments that After the war Holcomb received a series of as‐ prepared him for even more important postings. signments that suggested that senior leaders in He served tours with the Atlantic Fleet; with the the Marine Corps were grooming him for the Marine Guard in Beijing; in Washington, DC, as an highest positions in the organization. He was a aide to President Theodore Roosevelt; as acting student at the U.S. Army Command and General quartermaster for Marines stationed in the Philip‐ Staff School from 1924 to 1925 at a time when the pines; as post quartermaster of the Marine Corps school was focused on how best to breach a stabi‐ Barracks in Washington, DC; as aide to the com‐ lized front. In 1925 he became the director of the mandant of the Marine Corps, Maj. Gen. George Operations and Training Division, Headquarters, Barnett; and as a member of an ad hoc war plans U.S. Marine Corps, and held the position for two H-Net Reviews years, a period in which Marine planners frst de‐ Ulbrich is very scrupulous about not pushing veloped detailed plans for amphibious landings in his analysis any further than his limited evidence support of the Orange plan. As a student in the se‐ will allow. Holcomb was a very junior brigadier nior course at the Naval War College, 1931–32, he general (only ninth in overall seniority among participated in war games simulating a naval Marine Corps generals) when President Franklin campaign to relieve the Philippines. Holcomb ex‐ Delano Roosevelt selected him to become com‐ plored the technical issues involved in mounting mandant of the corps beginning in December an amphibious assault while a student at the 1936. Not since 1864, when Abraham Lincoln se‐ Army War College during the 1932–33 academic lected Maj. Jacob Zeilin to be commandant, had a year. Assignment to the Naval War Plans Division president selected such a junior officer for the from 1932 to 1935 post. The author identifies three fgures likely to followed. At the end of that tour he was promoted have been key to the decision: President Roo‐ to brigadier general and appointed commandant sevelt, who had known Holcomb ever since he of the Marine Corps School. These tours ensured served as assistant secretary of the Navy in the that Holcomb was repeatedly exposed to the latest Wilson administration;Assistant Secretary of the thinking about the Marines’ advanced base force Navy Henry Latrobe Roosevelt, who was both the concept, to War Plan Orange as it evolved from a president’s cousin and a retired Marine Corps cavalry charge across the Pacific to a careful step- colonel who probably knew Holcomb at least by by-step advance, and to the development of Ma‐ reputation; and the retiring commandant, Maj. rine Corps amphibious doctrine and equipment. Gen. John R. Russell, who was a proponent of both Holcomb’s surviving correspondence from amphibious warfare and promotion by selection. this period is sparse; Ulbrich nevertheless weaves Sometime in 1935 Henry Latrobe Roosevelt ap‐ a very interesting outline of a life and a career proached the president and suggested that he ap‐ from official documents, interviews with Hol‐ point Holcomb commandant when Russell re‐ comb’s contemporaries, and news accounts. The tired. FDR was open to the idea but told his cousin types of sources Ulbrich used often limits him to to check with Russell and get back to him. Henry showing that Holcomb was exposed to certain de‐ Latrobe Roosevelt apparently did so, although, as velopments but not how he contributed to them. Ulbrich points out, the evidence is ambiguous be‐ While Holcomb was commandant of the Marine cause Henry died unexpectedly before the presi‐ Corps School, for example, the faculty and stu‐ dent made the official announcement. So much dents were engaged in either writing or revising for the mechanics of the appointment. The rea‐ what the chief historian of the Marine Corps, sons for Holcomb’s selection were his unflappable Charles D. Melson, labels “the Holy Trinity” (p. 35) temperament, his obvious intelligence, his diversi‐ of Marine Corps doctrine—the Tentative Manual ty of career assignments, and his support for the for Landing Operations (1934), the Tentative Man‐ Marines’ amphibious warfare mission. Nowhere ual of Advanced Bases (1936), and the Small Wars does the author’s skills as an analyst stand out Manual (1935). The available evidence does not better than in his discussion of Holcomb’s selec‐ indicate, however, what personal impact Hol‐ tion. comb had on these documents, or even what he The core of Preparing for Victory consists of thought about them. This circumstance is some‐ five chapters that Ulbrich devotes to Holcomb’s what frustrating for the reader, but it must have service as commandant from December 1936 un‐ been even more frustrating for the author. til December 1943. Fortunately, Holcomb’s person‐ al correspondence has survived from these years, while the ofcial documentation is very rich given 2 H-Net Reviews his position. His tenure naturally divides into and Melvin J. Maas and Senator David I. Walsh. three phases: 1936–39, the Depression-era Marine He made a point of always giving a direct, Corps; 1940–41, preparing the Corps for war; and straightforward answer when testifying before 1941–43, mobilizing and fghting the Corps. Ul‐ congressional committees and when he did not brich devotes one chapter to each of the frst two know an answer stating that he would get back to phases and three chapters to the war. In many the questioner the next day with the facts. Over ways the Corps of which Holcomb assumed com‐ time he developed trust, but in the short term he mand was already a going concern. Since early was hard-pressed just to maintain the existing 1934, his predecessor Russell had arranged for budget against economizers. The Corps that Hol‐ Marine participation in annual feet exercises in comb inherited consisted of some 17,200 officers the Caribbean that included simulated opposed and men, a force smaller than the contemporary landings. They gave Marines an opportunity to New York City Police Department. Holcomb’s ini‐ test both emerging amphibious doctrine and to tial objective was the buildup of the Fleet Marine identify equipment shortfalls. The most important Force, an organization created by Russell, so that of these were the lack of specialized craft to carry it had real military capacity. To achieve this objec‐ assault forces from ship to shore, revealed glar‐ tive, he needed to increase the active duty force to ingly in the 1937 exercises, the frst conducted its peacetime legal limit of 17,000 enlisted men, while Holcomb was commandant. The problems but he discovered that the Marine Recruiting Ser‐ in the exercise led the Navy Equipment Board to vice was too anemic to maintain the force, let fund one prototype fat-bottom Eureka boat man‐ alone provide modest growth. Holcomb’s solution ufactured by Andrew Jackson Higgins. That same was to shift money and men into the service so year Holcomb became interested in Donald Roe‐ that it could. At the same time, his staff began a bling’s “Allegator,” a true amphibian. In 1938 Hol‐ detailed study of how headquarters could expand comb saw a the Corps in an orderly fashion to its wartime lim‐ demonstration of a prototype that Roebling had it of 57,000 enlisted men in the event of an emer‐ built with his own money and exclaimed: “My gency. These early years were frustrating for Hol‐ God, that’s the future of the Marine Corps!” (p. 55). comb, but they prepared the ground for his future Even with his strong personal backing, however, success. Holcomb could not convince the Navy Equipment The plan to increase the Corps paid off follow‐ Board to fund even one prototype until 1941—so ing the German invasion of Poland on September tight was the Navy’s development budget. Fortu‐ 1, 1939. The Corps grew to 26,000 by July 1940 nately, Roebling continued to use his own funds to with plans to expand to 50,000 by July 1941.