The “Scholastic” Marine Who Won a Secret War: Frank Holcomb, the Oss, and American Double-Cross Operations in Europe
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
The “Scholastic” Marine Who Won a Secret War: Frank Holcomb, The Oss, And American Double-Cross Operations In Europe Colonel Nicholas Reynolds Marine Corps History, Volume 6, Number 1, Summer 2020, pp. 18-29 (Article) Published by Marine Corps University Press For additional information about this article https://muse.jhu.edu/article/796459/summary [ Access provided at 28 Sep 2021 11:03 GMT with no institutional affiliation ] This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. The “Scholastic” Marine Who Won a Secret War FRANK HOLCOMB, THE OSS, AND AMERICAN DOUBLE-CROSS OPERATIONS IN EUROPE by Colonel Nicholas Reynolds, USMCR (Ret) Abstract: This article focuses on a little-known contribution to Allied victory in Europe after D-Day by a part of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the Special Counterintelligence (SCI) teams of the X-2 (Counterintel- ligence) Branch. Using a combination of private papers, unpublished studies, and OSS records, the author looks through the eyes of the commander of the SCI teams, Frank P. Holcomb, son of wartime Commandant General Thomas Holcomb. A Marine Corps reservist and OSS officer, Holcomb received a rudimentary orientation from the British in counterespionage and deception operations before creating his own highly successful units to perform those missions. In short order, the OSS went from having almost no such capability to neutralizing every German stay-behind agent in France and Belgium and turning a number of them back against the enemy to feed the Third Reich deceptive reports, accepted as genuine, thereby making a significant contribution to the security of the Allied armies. This article offers examples of OSS successes as testament to the skill and fortitude of a Marine Reserve officer serving on independent duty. Keywords: Office of Strategic Services, OSS, X-2, Double-Cross System, counterintelligence, Frank Holcomb, Thomas Holcomb, William J. Donovan, World War II, intelligence operations, Special Counterintelligence rom 1945 onward, scholars and practitioners spectively, on the organization’s overall contribution have asked: just what did America’s wartime in- to the war effort—OSS made a solid, if not dramatic, Ftelligence agency, the Office of Strategic Servic- contribution to victory—and on the campaign fought es (OSS), accomplish during World War II? To say that by Detachment 101 in faraway Burma, where there was OSS director William J. Donovan and his outfit pre- a very good return on a small investment of personnel pared the ground for the Central Intelligence Agency and materiel.1 Another way to answer the question is (CIA) is not enough. Recent attempts to answer this to take a close look at the record of X-2, the OSS’s question by Donovan biographer Douglas C. Waller counterintelligence element, in Europe during 1944– and intelligence historian Troy J. Sacquety focus, re- 45, particularly through the eyes of one of its leaders, Col Nicholas E. Reynolds, USMCR (Ret), was officer in charge of the U.S. Marine Corp’s History and Museums Division’s Field History Branch from 2000 to 2004, and he is also the author of a recent New 1 Douglas Waller, Wild Bill Donovan: The Spymaster Who Created the OSS York Times best seller entitled Writer, Sailor, Soldier, Spy: Ernest Heming- and Modern American Espionage (New York: Free Press, 2012); and Troy J. way’s Secret Adventures, 1935–1961 (2017). Sacquety, The OSS and Burma: Jungle War against the Japanese (Lawrence: https://doi.org/10.35318/mch.2020060102 University Press of Kansas, 2013). 18 SUMMER 2020 19 Donovan would report directly to the president. The aging but still very energetic lawyer and colonel in the Army Reserve, who was on leave from his firm, immediately tested and expanded his powers, which included scouting for organizations to support COI. One possibility was for the COI to affiliate with the U.S. Marine Corps in some way (undetermined at the time it surfaced), an idea that the Marines quickly and emphatically rejected. Marine Corps leadership feared that the COI tail might one day wag the Ma- rine Corps dog.3 The first step could be a presiden- tial order to give a Marine commission to Donovan, the amateur with political connections. The next step could be an influx of “personnel other than reg- National Archives identifier number 6851006, Portrait Photos of Donovan, ular Marine officers” who could “very easily get out 1942–1946, Records of the Office of Strategic Services, of hand and out of control.”4 Either would dilute the 1919–2002, RG 226, folder 19, NARA William J. Donovan, shown here as a brigadier general, the Office of professionalism of the Corps. At one point in Janu- Strategic Services director who was looking for “a special type of officer ary 1942, Commandant of the Marine Corps General . with a scholastic approach . tempered by practical experience.” Thomas Holcomb commented privately that he was “terrified that . [he] may be forced to take this man [the outsider Donovan]” into the Marine Corps.5 But, Frank Holcomb.2 This Marine Reserve officer’s re- perhaps as the result of a complaint from the Com- markable achievements, particularly in counterespio- mandant to the president, the COI stayed close to the nage and deception, show how quickly the OSS could White House, and Donovan and the Commandant’s learn and how much it could accomplish. Before 1943, the OSS had only a rudimentary grasp of any form of counterintelligence, let alone operations to find and turn enemy spies. OSS decided to enter that field and to develop a new capability. In short order, Holcomb learned how to become an effective practitioner of this arcane craft, and turn it to the Allies’ advantage after D-Day by neutralizing every spy the Germans had left behind in Western Europe as well as exploit- 3 MajGen Charles F. B. Price to Cmdt MajGen Thomas Holcomb, 16 ing many of them to report disinformation. January 1942, as reproduced in Maj Robert E. Mattingly, Herringbone Cloak—GI Dagger: Marines of the OSS(Quantico, VA: History and Muse- The story begins in the summer of 1941, when ums Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1979, 1989), 249, hereafter President Franklin D. Roosevelt created the Office of Price to Holcomb, 16 January 1942. Price even used the term hobby when the Coordinator of Information (COI) for Donovan. referring to Donovan’s activities. 4 Price to Holcomb, 16 January 1942. It would be one of the offices in the executive branch; 5 Thomas Holcomb to Samuel W. Meek, 19 January 1942, as reproduced in Mattingly, Herringbone Cloak—GI Dagger, 254. At page 313, Mattingly 2 The best detailed study of X-2 is by Timothy J. Naftali, “X-2 and the lists the names of 71 Marines who served in the OSS. While there is no Apprenticeship of American Counterespionage, 1942–1944” (PhD diss., one definitive roster, the overall total may have been higher, perhaps in Harvard University, 1993). An early, official postwar study by an OSS the hundreds. A World War II commemorative pamphlet discusses the officer focuses on France in 1944 and 1945. John B. Oakes, Edward R. variety of positions that Marines occupied in Europe and North Africa. Weismiller, and Eugene Waith, A History of OSS/X-2 Operation of Con- LtCol Harry W. Edwards, A Different War: Marines in Europe and North trolled Enemy Agents in France and Germany, 1944–1945, vol. I (Washington, Africa, Marines in World War II Commemorative Series (Washington, DC: Strategic Services Unit, War Department, 1946). DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1994). 20 MARINE CORPS HISTORY VOL. 6, NO. 1 relationship was never put to the test.6 Holcomb even proved willing to help Donovan solve another one of his threshold problems: how to get qualified people for his start-up. Donovan told Holcomb that he needed “a special type of officer, one with a scholastic approach to problems of war, tempered by practical experience in the field”—a variation on his supposed requirement for a PhD who could win a bar fight.7 Holcomb had just the right man for Donovan: the warrior-scholar William A. Eddy. He would eventually be assisted by Holcomb’s son Franklin, better known as Frank.8 Eddy had distinguished himself during World War I as the intelligence officer for the 6th Marines, the elder Holcomb’s wartime regiment, and after the war as the president of Hobart College in New York. Eddy joined COI in mid-1941, and was soon on his way to Tangier, Morocco, to serve Donovan undercover as naval attaché to the American Legation. Strategically located on the northwest shoulder of the continent just outside the straits of Gibraltar, it was the largest U.S. mission in North Africa. Eddy recognized the French-speaking Frank Holcomb’s potential for this assignment, and, while Official U.S. Marine Corps photo preparing to deploy, sounded him out about going to Gen Thomas Holcomb, 17th Commandant of the Marine Corps and father of Frank Holcomb. 6 Thomas Holcomb to Barney, 10 February 1942, as reproduced in Mat- tingly, Herringbone Cloak—GI Dagger, 265, implying a demarche: “This Tangier.9 The slight, intense 24-year-old had the quali- suggestion was made by very high authority, and . my reaction was ties that Eddy—and Donovan—were looking for: the complete disapproval of the idea.” “Barney” is almost certainly then- 10 BGen Clayton Barney Vogel; the “very high authority” was likely Roos- theoretical tempered by the practical. Frank Hol- evelt, with whom Holcomb had a warm relationship. See, for example, David J. Ulbrich, Preparing for Victory, Thomas Holcomb and the Making 9 Frank Holcomb stated simply, “I was contacted one day by an old [fam- of the Modern Marine Corps, 1936–1943 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute ily] friend, William A.