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Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (Cfe)

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CFE TEXT TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE (CFE) Signed: 19 November 1990. inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Entered into Force*: 9 November 1992. Charter of the United Nations, Duration: Unlimited. Depository: The Netherlands. CONSCIOUS of the need to prevent any military conflict in Europe, Number of States Parties: 30 — Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Re-public, Denmark, France, Georgia, CONSCIOUS of the common responsibility which Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, they all have for seeking to achieve greater stability Kazakhstan, Luxembourg, Moldova, the Netherlands, and security in Europe, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation*, Slovakia, Spain, Tur-key, Ukraine, Striving to replace military confrontation with a new United Kingdom, and United States. pattern of security relations among all the States Parties based on peaceful cooperation and thereby to *On 14 July 2007, Russia announced that it would contribute to overcoming the division of Europe, suspend implementation of its Treaty obligations, effective after 150 days COMMITTED to the objectives of establishing a secure and stable balance of conventional armed The Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Bulgaria, forces in Europe at lower levels than heretofore, of Canada, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the eliminating disparities prejudicial to stability and Kingdom of Denmark, the French Republic, the security and of eliminating, as a matter of high Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, priority, the capability for launching surprise attack the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Iceland, the and for initiating large-scale offensive action in Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, Europe, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese RECALLING that they signed or acceded to the Republic, Romania, the Kingdom of Spain, the Treaty of Brussels of 1948, the Treaty of Washington Republic of Turkey, the Union of Soviet Socialist of 1949 or the Treaty of Warsaw of 1955 and that they Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and have the right to be or not to be a party to treaties of Northern Ireland and the United States of America, alliance, hereinafter referred to as the States Parties, GUIDED by the Mandate for Negotiation on COMMITTED to the objective of ensuring that the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of January 10, numbers of conventional armaments and equipment 1989, and having conducted this negotiation in limited by the Treaty within the area of application of Vienna beginning on March 9, 1989, this Treaty do not exceed 40,000 battle tanks, 60,000 armored combat vehicles, 40,000 pieces of artillery, 13,600 combat aircraft and 4,000 attack helicopters, GUIDED by the objectives and the purposes of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, AFFIRMING that this Treaty is not intended to affect within the framework of which the negotiation of this Treaty was conducted, adversely the security interests of any State, RECALLING their obligation to refrain in their AFFIRMING their commitment to continue the mutual relations, as well as in their international conventional arms control process including negotiations, taking into account future requirements relations in general, from the threat or use of force for European stability and security in the light of against the territorial integrity or political political developments in Europe, independence of any State, or in any other manner Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes TCFE-1 © Center for Nonproliferation Studies CFE TEXT HAVE AGREED as follows: Slovak Federal Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Poland, Romania Article I and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, or the group of States Parties that signed or 1. Each State Party shall carry out the obligations set acceded to the Treaty of Brussels** of 1948 or the Treaty of Washington*** of 1949 forth in this Treaty in accordance with its provisions, including those obligations relating to the following consisting of the Kingdom of Belgium, Can- five categories of conventional armed forces: battle ada, the Kingdom of Denmark, the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and combat helicopters. the Hellenic Republic, the Republic of Ice- land, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Nether- 2. Each State Party also shall carry out the other lands, the Kingdom of Norway, the Portu- measures set forth in this Treaty designed to ensure guese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the security and stability both during the period of reduc- Republic of Turkey, the United Kingdom of tion of conventional armed forces and after the com- Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the pletion of reductions. United States of America. 3. This Treaty incorporates the Protocol on Existing (B) The term "area of application" means Types of Conventional Armaments and Equipment, the entire land territory of the States Parties hereinafter referred to as the Protocol on Existing in Europe from the Atlantic Ocean to the Types, with an Annex thereto; the Protocol on Proce- Ural Mountains, which includes all the dures Governing the Reclassification of Specific European island territories of the States Par- Models or Versions of Combat-Capable Trainer Air- ties, including the Faroe Islands of the craft Into Unarmed Trainer Aircraft, hereinafter re- Kingdom of Denmark, Svalbard including ferred to as the Protocol on Aircraft Reclassification; Bear Island of the Kingdom of Norway, the the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Reduction islands of Azores and Madeira of the Portu- of Conventional Armaments and Equipment Limited guese Republic, the Canary Islands of the by the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Kingdom of Spain and Franz Josef Land and Europe, hereinafter referred to as the Protocol on Novaya Zemlya of the Union of Soviet So- Reduction; the Protocol on Procedures Governing the cialist Republics. In the case of the Union of Categorization of Combat Helicopters and the Re- Soviet Socialist Republics, the area of appli- categorization of Multi-Purpose Attack Helicopters, cation includes all territory lying west of the hereinafter referred to as the Protocol on Helicopter Ural River and the Caspian Sea. In the case Recategorization; the Protocol on Notification and of the Republic of Turkey, the area of appli- Exchange of Information, hereinafter referred to as cation includes the territory of the Republic the Protocol on Information Exchange, with an An- of Turkey north and west of a line extending nex on the Format for the Exchange of Information, from the point of intersection of the Turkish hereinafter referred to as the Annex on Format; the border with the 39th parallel to Muradiye, Protocol on Inspection; the Protocol on the Joint Patnos, Karayazi, Tekman, Kemaliye, Feke, Consultative Group; and the Protocol on the Provi- Ceyhan, Dogankent, Gzne and thence to the sional Application of Certain Provisions of the Treaty sea. on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, hereinafter referred to as the Protocol on Provisional Application. (C) The term "battle tank" means a self- Each of these documents constitutes an integral part propelled armoured fighting vehicle, capable of this Treaty. of heavy firepower, primarily of a high muzzle velocity direct fire main gun neces- Article II sary to engage armoured and other targets, with high cross-country mobility, with a 1. For the purposes of this Treaty: high level of self-protection, and which is not designed and equipped primarily to (A)The term "group of States Parties" transport combat troops. Such armoured ve- means the group of States Parties that signed hicles serve as the principal weapon system the Treaty of Warsaw* of 1955 consisting of of ground-force tank and other armoured the Republic of Bulgaria, the Czech and formations. Battle tanks are tracked ar- Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes TCFE-2 © Center for Nonproliferation Studies CFE TEXT moured fighting vehicles which weigh at (F) The term "artillery" means large calibre least 16.5 metric tonnes unladen weight and systems capable of engaging ground targets which are armed with a 360-degree traverse by delivering primarily indirect fire. Such gun of at least 75 millimeters calibre. In ad- artillery systems provide the essential indi- dition, any wheeled armoured fighting vehi- rect fire support to combined arms forma- cles entering into service which meet all the tions. other criteria stated above shall also be deemed battle tanks. Large calibre artillery systems are guns, howitzers, artillery pieces combining the (D) The term "armoured combat vehicle" characteristics of guns and howitzers, mor- means a self-propelled vehicle with ar- tars and multiple launch rocket systems with moured protection and cross-country capa- a calibre of 100 millimeters and above. In bility. Armoured combat vehicles include addition, any future large calibre direct fire armoured personnel carriers, armoured in- system which has a secondary effective indi- fantry fighting vehicles and heavy armament rect fire capability shall be counted against combat vehicles. the artillery ceilings. The term "armoured personnel carrier" (G) The term "stationed conventional armed means an armoured combat vehicle which is forces" means conventional armed
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