Pertti Luntinen
French Information on the RUSSIAN WAR PLANS 1880-1914 Societas Historica Finlandiae Suomen Historiallinen Seura Finska Historiska Samfundet
Studia Historica 17 Pertti Luntinen French Information on the RUSSIAN WAR PLANS 1880 1914
SHS • Helsinki • 1984 Cover design by Rauno Enden
ISSN 0081-6493 ISBN 951-9254-60-9
Gummerus Oy:n kirjapainossa Jyväskylässä 1984 Contents
1. PREFACE 7 2. THE FRANCO-RUSSIAN ALLIANCE IS BORN 11 2.1. The Diplomatic Background 11 2.2. The Military Convention 14 2.3. The Russian Army by the End of the Eighties 21 2.4. The Russian Ally Evalued in 1892 24 2.5. Troop Mobilization and Concentration in 1890-1897 33 3. DISTRACTIONS 39 3.1. The Near East 1895-1897 39 3.2. New Commanders 47 3.3. Rearmament and Disarmament 49 3.4. A Central Asian Diversion Against England 53 3.5. Russian Strength at the Turn of the Century 59 3.6. The Military and Constitutional Reform in Finland 63 3.7. Kuropatkin's Plans for War in the West 65 3.8. If Francis Joseph Should Die 69 3.9. The Dual Alliance Strengthened 73 3.10. Military Co-Operation Promised 76 4. ADVENTURE AND DEFEAT 82 4.1. Far Eastern Schemes 82 4.2. Russia's Strength Disappears to the Far East 86 4.3. The Defeat of an Ally 90 4.4. Changes in Russian Government and Politics 95 4.5. Powerless Russia 98 4.6. National Minority Problems in the Military Reconstruction 103 5. A SLOW AND DEVIOUS RECONSTRUCTION 107 5.1. Cold Comfort for France 107 5.2. Russia Retreats from the West 116 5.3. The French Are Worried 120 5.4. The Unshaken Intimacy of the Allied General Staffs 123 5.5. Colonel Janin Studies the Russian Army 128 5.6. The Balkan Wars 1912-1913 135 6. NAVAL PLANS 139 6.1. A Naval Convention Discussed 140 6.2. The Calamitous Odyssey 143 6.3. Reorganization 145 6.4. Coastal Defences 150 6.5. Naval Policy 153 6.6. The Naval Convention Signed 156 6.7. Building Programmes 159 7. PREPARING FOR THE GREAT WAR 164 7.1. The Dual Alliance Revitalized 164 7.2. The Problem of Wartime Communication Between the Allies 167 7.3. The Russian Army in 1912 170 7.4. The Problem of the Nationalities Still Unresolved 177 7.5. A Catalogue of Enemies 180 7.6. Planning the Russian Troop Concentration in 1912 184 7.7. Efforts to Improve the Plan 190 7.8. The Grand Programme for Increasing the Russian Army 196 8 CONCLUSION 201 MAPS 207 SOURCES 243 INDEX 247
6 1. Preface
The history of Russia's war plans 1880-1914 has been told by A.M. ZaionckovskiI in 1926.' Since then the original plans have remained in the secrecy of the Soviet archives.2 Not even Soviet scholars have been able to publish anything on the war plans, although the military organization and material preparation have been dealt with many times.3 But in the French war archives in the Castle of Vincennes there is a little additional
A.M. Zaion&kovskii, Plany voiny. Podgotovka Rossii k imperialistii
4 Etat-Major de l'armee de terre, Service historique, Chateau de Vincennes. In footnote references: EMATSH + file number Service Historique de la Marine, Chateau de Vincennes. In footnote references: SHM + file number Copies of the politically most important documents as well as the diplomatic reports are kept in Archives, Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres (nowadays: Archives et Documentation, Ministere des relations exterieures), Quai d'Orsay, Paris. In footnote references: AMAE + series and volume number. 5 No bibliography can be attempted within the space of this study. The reader must be referred to the available handbooks and bibliographies. 6 Documents diplomatiques fransais, l.ser. 1871-1900, I—XVI, Paris 1929- 1959. 2. ser. 1901-1911, I—XIV, Paris 1930-1955. 3. ser. 1911-1914, I—XI, Paris 1929-1960. In footnote references: DDF + series and volume number.
8 such. The plans reflect the reality of life, the desperate search for security in a threatening world, and the elusive dreams of domination and grandeur in competition with other armies. This is part of the prehistory of the Great War. The years 1880-1914 are often called the era of imperialism; imperialism in usually dealt with as an economic phenomenon, but it had a military side, too. This story of the military plans throws some additional light on the French influence on Russia's decisions, and on the influence of the Russian generals on the policy of their country. Reports concerning the Russian plans in or near Finland, in the Baltic area, are of special interest for a Finnish writer. I have, however, tried to avoid giving undue weight to this secondary theatre of operations, the problems of which have been dealt with in detail elsewhere.' Only the most salient features are described, with the necessary background information. Russia's war plans were one of the principal factors shaping the fate of all the Western provinces of the swollen empire.
A grant by the Academy of Finland and the Centre Nationale de Recherche Scientifique made possible the study in the archives of Chateau de Vincennes and Quai d'Orsay, for which I am deeply grateful. Gratitude is due also to the Akademija Nauk SSSR, which enabled me to study in the Lenin Library in Moscow. The University Libraries in Helsinki and Tampere have been most helpful. Many people have helped me with advice, discussion, or patiently listening to complaints about the impossibility of writing history. Kalevan lukio (The Kaleva Senior High School), my employer, magnanimously consented to grant me a lengthy leave of absence from my teaching duties. Dr. George Maude of the University of Turku has taken great pains to correct my English. Rauno Enden of the Finnish Historical Association has carried out the task of editing the text for publication in the Series of the Association. I should be
Tuomo Polvinen, Die finnischen Eisenbahnen in den militärischen und politi- schen Plänen Russlands vor dem ersten Weltkrieg. Helsinki 1962. Pertti Luntinen, Suomi Pietarin suojana ja uhkana venäläisten sotasuunnitel- missa 1854-1914. With an English Summary: Finland, Shield and Threat for St. Petersburg. Historiallinen Arkisto 79, Helsinki 1983. 9 extremely happy if the finished product would in any way be worthy of the trouble so many people have taken to help me in my study.
10 2. The Franco-Russian Alliance Is Born
2.1. The Diplomatic Background
The alliance of Russia with France was born out of mutual isolation. Russia had been made to feel her lonelyness in 1878 when her overblown appetites in the Near East had remained unsatiated in the Berlin Congress in spite of her previous victorious campaign. Then there had been the conflict with England in 1885 on the Afghan borders: a war with England would have involved also a naval threat against Russia's Baltic and/or Black Sea coasts. At the same time the Bulgarians had ungratefully emphasized their independence from Russia. Even though Prince Alexander was succesfully ousted, the Bulgarians elected another German, Ferdinand of Coburg, as their Prince. The consequent complications, especially the Serbo-Bulgarian war of 1886, brough about the danger of a further increase in Austrian influence in the Balkans. Russian frustration and jealousy was directed against Bismarck's Germany. The Dreikaiserbund crumbled. The Reinsurance Treaty of 1887 only papered over the cracks in the relations of Russia and Germany, especially as there was much bickering on financial and commercial questions. As a forerunner of the future political convergence, the Russian ministry of finance turned to the Paris market in its search for loans. The French, for their part, had been isolated by Bismarck's policy since 1871. They had also twice felt threatened with war, in 1875 and again in 1886-1887, although the danger 11 most probably existed only in their imagination. Nor were the French able to forget that they had lost their position as the principal great power to Germany; neither were they able to forgive the loss of the two provinces. In 1879-1882 a Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria and Italy was formed. Neither Russia nor France alone was strong enough to wage war against the Triple Alliance. The French general staff estimated the military forces of these powers as follows:
infantry cavalry divisions divisions cannons effectives Germany 73 9 3564 1550 000 Italy 22 2 1092 360 000 Austria 42 8 1776 900 000 the Triple Alliance 2810 000 France 75 7 3870 1550 000 Russia 66 20 3290 1600 000 the projected Dual Alliance 3150 0008
Thus together, France and Russia seemed to be stronger than the Triple Alliance. It was not easy to reach an understanding, however. There was the ideological, political and psychological difference between the tsarist autocracy and the atheist republic. The political aims of the two states were also somewhat divergent. The French soldiers hoped for military co-operation against Germany, and the French chauvinists dreamed of Russian support for the revanche. Katkov and other influential Panslavists spurred Alexander III on to approach the French. But Katkov was a dangerous man, because "he has only one dream, to launch France against Germany at her own risk and peril, in order to be free to act in the Balkans. The high command of the Russian army is afraid of Germany but sees an eventual conflict with Austria under very seducing colours. That is why Ignat'ev, ernjaev, Skobelev, Aksakov and others incite the French to revanche".9 The Emperor Alexander III was cautious enough to resist the
8 "Note" s.d., AMAE, C.P. Russie N.S. 30, p. 196— "Au sujet du role probable de la Russie en cas de conflit entre la France et l'Allemagne", Moulin to war minister 23.VI 1887. EMATHS 7 N 1471.
12 pressure of Russian as well as of French chauvinists, in spite of his own resentment against Germany. For instance, during the dangerous year of 1887 the French understood that they could not expect any other help from Russia except good offices in case of an unprovoked German attack.10 Alexander decided to proceed only after William II's "new men" got the Kaiser to renounce the Reinsurance Treaty in 1890. In the same year the naval might of England seemed to be added to the strength of the Triple Alliance. Already in 1887 the treaty confirming the Mediterranean status quo had been signed between England, Italy, and Austria. This had been Bismarck's counterstroke to Russia's plans in the Near East. And now in 1890 the agreement on the exchange of Zanzibar and Heligoland had the appearance of sealing the Anglo- German entente. Russia's traditional enemy was joining her new adversary. Discussions were started between French and Russian representatives. The result was an exchange of letters on 22.VIII 1891 between Ribot, the French minister for foreign affairs, and Mohrenheim, the Russian ambassador. They declared their identical aim of preserving peace, and promised to help each other in case of an attack by the Triple Alliance. The French wanted to limit the agreemet to Europe, because they did not wish to be drawn into a war against England in consequence of an eventual Russo-English conflict somewhere in Afghanistan or China." The chiefs of the French and Russian general staffs were then authorized to continue their discussions on the details of the military co-operation in case of war.12 — The diplomatic and military discussions were kept secret, but the new orientation was demonstrated with a French naval visit to Kronstadt. And in 1893 admiral Avellan's squadron was received in Toulon with acclaim."
10 = 9 11 MAE to Russian Ambassador 27. VIII 1891. AMAE, C.P. Russie N.S. 30 Note secrete pour le ministre 1.X 1896. AMAE, C.P. Russie N.S. 32. '-Z Freycinet, minister of war, to Ribot 9. VIII 1891. AMAE, C.P. Russie N.S. 30 13 A recent study of the diplomatic prehistory of the Dual Alliance is given by George F. Kennan, The Decline of Bismarck's European Order. Franco-Rus- sian Relations, 1875-1890. Princeton University Press 1979 A classic of undiminished value is Baron Boris Nolde, L'alliance franco-rus- se. Les origines du systeme diplomatique d'avant-guerre. Institut d'etudes slaves de l'universite de Paris, Collection historique VII Paris 1936 13 2.2. The Military Convention
The military discussions were started in 1890 parallel with the diplomatic talks which led to the exchange of letters forming the basis of the alliance. Generals Obrueev and Boisdeffre, the Russian and French chiefs of staff, had been in private contact for many years and had striven for the alliance. Now they informed each other of their respective plans for a war against Germany. Obrucev stated that if the Germans attacked France with the bulk of their army — at least 2/3 of their forces — Russia could attack Germany from Poland. If 2/3 of the Germans should turn to the east, Russia would be compelled to resort to defence with delaying tactics. Gurko, the commander-in-chief in Poland, would draw his forces to Brest(-Litovsk), leaving 100 000 men to delay the German advance by destroying all railway lines, towns, and villages. Obrucev suggested that the French should retire behind their border fortifications and let the German attack break up against them. But whatever the Germans did and whatever the French suffered, Russia was going to throw her principal forces against Austria. It was an absolute necessity to finish off Austria as soon as possible. She would grow in strength if given time, but if Russia attacked her at the very beginning, she would collapse, because her Slav peoples would not fight against Russia. Then Germany would be left alone against Russia and France. This cannot have been very comforting to Boisdeffre, but he was not able to make Obrucev change these plans. But he "understood" that Alexander III would not repeat Alexander II's "mistake" in 1870. "The Emperor knew" that the consequences would be grave also to Russia if France were to be destroyed. The agreed basis of military co-operation was that a German attack against France would be answered with Russian mobilization.' Next summer the discussions were continued. The French general proposed that the convention be made against the Triple Alliance, not only against Germany, lest she should wait
} Boisdeffre to Freycinet 15/20 VIII 1890: AMAE C.P. Russie N.S. 30. DDF VIII/1 n:o 165 14 until France was exhausted by a campaign against Italy and then intervene and dictate the peace. ObruLev agreed, of course, because Austria was for Russia of even more importance than Italy for France. We shall see later how France tried to get out of her obligations in respect of an Austro-Russian war. At this point, however, it was agreed that any act of aggression by the Triple Alliance was to be answered by an immediate mobilization in France and Russia, and the war was to be started on the first day of the mobilization. Obrueev said that he was planning for the launching of the Russian cavalry over the frontier to delay the mobilization and concentration of the enemy. Boisdeffre tried again to make Obr&ev change his mind about the primacy of Austria. The French general explained that the principal enemy, the most dangerous enemy, had to be defeated first. It would be dangerous if Russia attacked Austria or if France attacked Italy first. The secondary enemies could easily be defeated after Germany was beaten. But Obrueev could not admit this point of view. He saw no symmetry between Italy and Austria as enemies. It was of the utmost necessity for Russia to destroy Austria and dissolve her empire. This led the discussion to eventual war aims. Obrueev said that Russia wanted to liberate her brother Slays in Galicia. They were oppressed by the Austrian Poles, who also fomented discontent in the (Russian) Kingdom of Poland. Russia also needed the outlet of the Turkish Straits in order not to be left hemmed in the Black Sea, with all her seaports at the mercy of the English fleet. But Obrucev did not want Constantinople (in the 1915 treaty it was to be made an international city) nor any other conquests; Russia was already too extensive without them. For the Russian general it was "self-evident" that France wanted Alsace and Lorraine back. But it was better to defeat Germany before discussing advancing the French frontier to the Rhine, or the dismembering of the German empire. Boisdeffre did not say much about these questions, at least in his report. The French general staff was very much subordinate to the civilian government. Neither had Obrucev any authority to discuss grand political designs. But the Russian army and its leaders were subordinate only to the emperor, not to any government; and they were not known for any modesty in their 15 appetite for conquest. Of course, Obruäev aired his general ideas and had no definite plans of action. But his discussion reflected the main features of the war aims that Russia strove for in 1914-1917. The generals agreed that neither party wanted to start a war. If a convention was to be made, it must be a defensive convention. But both were ready to wage a war if compelled to do so.15 It is idle to discuss whether the alliance was defensive or offensive; these generals were no pacifists, nor, for that matter, was the emperor. The alliance was defensive as far as both parties were afraid of a German attack and wanted reciprocal support against it. And neither was willing to be dragged into a war under unfavourable conditions, nor to bear the odium of declaring war. But if a war had to be waged, it was better to win it, and to get some advantage out of it: the satisfaction of grievances, conquests, power, the permanent weakening of the enemy. The problem of deciding whether a war is offensive or defensive is more of a political or propagandist question than a historical one. The preamble of the convention thus declared: "France and Russia, animated with a desire to conserve peace, have composed the present note exclusively with a view of a defensive war provoked by the forces of the Triple Alliance against one or other or both of these Powers". A principle of complete reciprocity was decided on: if one of the signatories was attacked, the other was to help with all available force. Then there was much discussion on fixing the amount of available force. France was to concentrate practically all her troops against Germany, leaving only 1/6 of them, or 10 divisions, against Italy or in Africa. Thus she would be able to attack Germany with 65 divisions or 1300 000 men. Germany would not be able to transfer any troops from her western frontier to the east against Russia. The French hoped that Russia would adopt an identical
is Boisdeffre to Freycinet 16.VII 1891. AMAE, C.P. Russie N.S. 30. DDDF VIII/ 1, n:o 424
16 policy vis-å-vis Austria and leave only an indispensable minimum of forces against that power. The French general staff estimated that 11 Russian army corps would be enough to fend off the 14 Austrian corps. Thus there would be left 11 corps or 33 divisions or 700 000-800 000 men against Germany, which was enough to defeat the German army with the help of the 65 French divisions. The French admitted the problems of Russian mobilization and concentration: the state of Russia's communications meant that her military measures were much slower than Germany's and slower even than Austria's. But if the Germans saw at the beginning of the war that Russia was going to march, they would be compelled to keep part of their troops on their eastern frontier.16 Obrucev and Vannovskii — the minister of war — received the French proposition "with favour", but they had "a certain tendency to be preoccupied with Austria more than we should wish ...". Obruaev promised that he would organize demonstrations on the German border in order to worry the enemy and thereby prevent her from transferring her forces to the west. Obrueev estimated that the Triple Alliance would attack Russia with 13 Austrian, 3 Italian and 7 German army corps and with reserve troops, which would leave only 12 German and 9 Italian corps against France. He believed it to be of the utmost importance to attack the Austrian troop concentrations in Galicia first. A prompt victory over the Austrians would engender a respectful attitude in the Rumanians; but an even more important aspect was the fact that such a victory would be the precondition for a march on Breslau. That was the only direction of attack which could constitute a vital threat to the German heartland. Any attack further to the north would run into the German fortifications at Königsberg, on the Vistula, or at Posen.11 Boisdeffre admitted feeling assez triste because of Obrueev's tenacity. Now the French would have wanted the convention to be written against Germany only, not the Triple Alliance. The Austro-Russian rivalry was of no interest to them, and they did not like the eventuality of a Russo-Austrian war that might
16 "Note" s.d. AMAE, C.P. Russie N.S. 30, p. 196— 17 "Note" by Moulin 16. VII 1892. AMAE, C.P. Russie N.S. 31