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Ÿþm Icrosoft W Chapter 4 Chapter 4 Norway and "Rhodesia": 1965-19801 Wolf Lorenz Introduction This chapter will examine what has been called "the Rhodesia issue" in the years between 1965 and 1980. The emphasis will be on Norwegian diplomatic history and to a lesser extent on humanitarian assistance to the liberation movements and popular involvement as manifested in the work of Norwegian NGOs. I have for reasons of convenience chosen to call the territory concerned Rhodesia. Its official name was Southern Rhodesia, in Norway "Rhodesia" was the most commonly used term, although "Southern Rhodesia" was frequently used during the 1960s. "Zimbabwe" was little used except by the liberation movements themselves and the political left and the solidarity organisations in the 1970s. Rhodesia was the term used by the territory's white leader Ian Smith, and it consequently became widely used. Since Northern Rhodesia changed its name to Zambia at independence in 1964, there was no practical reason to distinguish between Northern and Southern Rhodesia. Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi) gained independence from Britain in 1964, and were thus admitted to UN membership. Southern Rhodesia, under the leadership of a white minority never exceeding 5% of the total population, was unable to negotiate independence from Britain because of the unwillingness of the regime to award equal political rights to the territory's African majority. As more and more of the former colonies achieved their independence in the 1960s, the problems in Southern Rhodesia attracted great international attention, and when Ian Smith unilaterally declared Rhodesia independent in November 1965, this action was widely condemned as an illegal act. In the years to follow, the UN Security 1 The following chapter is based on my thesis Norge og Rhodesia-sparanflet, 1965-79 (Norway and the Case of Rhodesia, 1965-79), completed at the University of Oslo. The thesis examines Norways involvement with the situation that arose after Ian Smithls unilateral dedaration of independence for Rhodesia in 1965. The main aim is to examine diplomatic history based on the archives of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Norwegian Ministry of Trade and Shipping on the treatment of the issue in the National Assembly, in the archives of the Norwegian Shipowners' Association, as well as in the archives of involved NGOs. Little or no research has been done on the period up to 1965. Council imposed a range of mandatory sanctions on Rhodesia. The sanctions were, however, not able to topple the regime, as some countries covertly disregarded the sanctions, and others, namely Portugal and South Africa, openly ignored them. Since sanctions largely failed and the British government had vehemently rejected military intervention, the illegal regime was able to hold on to power. The prospects for the African majority, severely controlled, poorly organised and politically divided, seemed bleak. It was only the fall of the dictatorship in Portugal in 1974, and the subsequent independence of its African colonies, most importantly Angola and Mozambique, that altered the stalemate in Southern Africa. With South Africa its only ally, and a hostile regime installed in the renamed Mozambican capital of Maputo, Rhodesia was soon to find herself in dire straits. In a military sense, the liberation movements had up to this time not constituted any major challenge to the Smith regime, whose armed forces were well equipped. Liberation movements in Rhodesia were generally characterised by shifting alliances and internal problems. These divisions were actively exploited by the Rhodesian government in their policy of divide and rule. Successive nationalist movements had been banned, bishop Abel Muzorewa's African National Council (ANC) being the only organisation to be allowed a certain freedom by the regime. The white population regarded the ANC as "moderate" and of little consequence because it possessed no military strength. Two important organisations had been banned: the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), led by Joshua Nkomo, and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), led initially by Ndabaningi Sithole and later by Robert Mugabe. Mainly for strengthening their position in international negotiations, ZANU and ZAPU were later to form the Patriotic Front (PF). Their guerrilla armies as well as their political organisations were, however, kept intact. The white minority sought co- operation with Muzorewa in the "internal solution" in 1978, which produced multiracial elections from which the PF was excluded. A Muzorewa-led government was the result. In the first free elections in 1980 ZANU won a landslide victory. Norway and Rhodesia had few links, and from a Norwegian point of view, the problems in Rhodesia did not touch upon traditionally sensitive foreign policy issues such as security and European integration. As Norwegian trade interests in Rhodesia were limited to the import of tobacco and sugar, and exports were limited to urea (fertiliser), fish produce, paper and cardboard, trade interests between the countries were not significant. In 1965, Norway imported Rhodesian goods for 12.2 million Norwegian kroner, while exports ran at 10.9 million NOK.2 Norwegian multinational companies like Norsk Hydro and Elkem dominated this trade, as did Rhodesian tobacco. Norwegian shipping interests, with one of the largest 2 Norwegian Yearbook of Statistics, 1966. merchant fleets in the world, not least oil tankers, were affected however by the sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council. It was inconceivable that the Norwegian Shipowners' Association would dispute the decision of the UN Security Council. Another matter was what one tried to accomplish within the law, or at the side of the law. In some isolated instances Norway violated UN sanctions. Norway was able to terminate trade with Rhodesia relatively quickly, but compared to Sweden's abrupt cessation of trade, Norwegian trade continued for a long time. In 1965 and 1966, before full and mandatory sanctions had been imposed, the conservative Minister of Trade and Shipping, Kdre Willoch, was quite liberal in granting licenses for exports to Rhodesia. Imports, on the other hand, were quickly banned. Many Western countries actually increased trade with Rhodesia in these early years.3 The early years Contact between the Rhodesian liberation movements and the Norwegian authorities had been made even before Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) in 1965, similarly links between these movements and the Norwegian NGO Norwegian Action against Apartheid (NAMA) had been established. The contact was however sporadic, and there is no evidence that Norwegian authorities, i.e. the Norwegian Embassy in London or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Oslo, regarded the exchange of information with the liberation movements as particularly interesting. From an official Norwegian point of view the Rhodesian issue could primarily be viewed as a symbolic question up to the mid-seventies, and, had it been given, Norwegian humanitarian support to the liberation movements would probably not have been opposed by her allies. However, the liberal-conservative government that ruled Norway from 1965 to 1971 showed little interest in the issue. There was a feeling that sanctions needed time and full implementation to yield definite results, and that patience was vital. Besides, Norway's primary concern was her own role in Europe, and compared to the wars in Vietnam and Biafra, the situation in Southern Africa was of minor interest. This was to change, albeit not in any revolutionary fashion (see chapter 1). Politicians taking an interest in Rhodesia were mainly to be found on the far right and among socialists; on the far right the Anders Lange's Party, formed in 1973 was alone in its wish to abandon sanctions, backed by its political sympathy for the Smith regime and by the laissez-faire view that 3 UD 25 4/ 25 B, 11, memorandum First Political Division. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, several countries had increased their exports to Rhodesia: France by 200%, Portugal by 350%, the FRG by 64%, the Netherlands by 49% and Japanby 38%. trade should not be restricted in any way. 4 This argument was raised when the United States unilaterally lifted its sanctions on Rhodesian chrome ore in 1973. On the other side of the political spectrum, Finn Gustavsen, representing the Socialist People's Party, was the single most important proponent of majority rule in Rhodesia. His party took a strong anti-imperialist stance. From time to time he raised the issue in the National Assembly, Stortinget, while also co-operating with the Norwegian Action against Apartheid, and later with its successor organisation, the Norwegian Council for Southern Africa. These two parties were the only parties represented in the Norwegian parliament not to be part of any government during the 14 years of illegal rule in Rhodesia.5 As the other parties largely ignored the question, all the more influence was left to the senior civil servants of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, LID. Few of these took any interest in the question at an early stage, with one important exception; Secretary General Boye, ranked first in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His personal views are among the very few discernible up to 1973, and they were manifested on various occasions. When Ian Smith had unilaterally declared Rhodesia independent in 1965, many countries, such as Sweden and Finland immediately broke off their diplomatic ties with Salisbury. Norway and Denmark, however, took their time. While Denmark maintained representation in Salisbury and Bulawayo, Norway maintained her honorary consulate in Salisbury. Not until Smith declared Rhodesia a republic in 1970 were these relations broken off, even then against the strong and repeated advice of Boye. On one occasion he argued that the consulate should be kept open because any concession made to "our sunburnt friends in Africa" would only lead to further demands.6 A similar question was raised at the same time.
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