1V Atv Or US ARMY MS $ A-873
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r~—————> D 739 .F6713 , no i •A-873 ; MS ,|f A_5?3 16 Dec 19^ c. 2 Fgn MS ^ Siegfried Von ".Yaldenburg Brigadier General U. S. Array Military History Institute „. 1V aTV Or US ARMY MS $ A-873 COMITLfSMT 07 THE 116th P.WZER DIVISION IN THE ARDSNFES I9hk/h5 (First part from 16-19 Dec 19UU) IS # A-873 -1- Siegfried von WALDENBURG St. Germain, 16 Dec Brig, Gen. Commander of the 116th Panzer Division On 1 May 1*7 > Waldenburg submitted corrections to MS $ A-873 These corrections have not been incorporated in the following translation. Capt. J. F. Scoggin. 27 Oct 1*8. COMMTEfiNT OF THE 116th PANZER DIVISION IN THE ARDEME3 (First part from 16 - 19 Dec 19W*) This report was made: 1. According to the questionnaire, 2. From memory, because no records were available, 3. Using the map 1 : 100000. Organization of the 116th Panzer Division: 2 Panzer Grenadier Regiments (each of 2 battalions) 1 Panzer Regiment (2 battalions) 1 Reconnaissance Battalion (k troops) 1 Tank Destroyer Battalion (1 assault gun company and 1 anti tank gun company) 1 Artillery Regiment (2 light and 1 heavy battalions) MS # A-873 1AM Battalion (2 heavy and 1 light battaries) 1 ^ngineer Battalion (2 companies) 1 Signal Battalion (2 companies) Rear Services. Temporary assigned: 1 Mortar Battalion and for the start of the attack Elements of a Volks-^rtillery Corps. I. The First Day (16 Dec 1. The Division had the task to break through the American positions in the sector of the LVIU Pz Corps between HECKIJSCHEIDT and LUTZHAKPEtJ, to seize the OUR crossings in the sector BURG REULAKD - OB©SRHAUSM as .soon as -oossible and to thrust from there in a general north western direction to the fr;EU3E. For this purpose the troops were committed as follows: 60 Pz Gren Regt on the right side. Mission: to break through between HECKUSCHEIDT and KjiSFELD and to capture the crossing point at BURG SEDIAND. Ig6 Pz Gren Regt placed the TD Bn. on the left side. Mission: to break through on both sides of LEID3NBCRN and to seize the crossing points at STOUBACM and OBERHUJS2K. Schedule: 0530 haurs an assault comoany of each regiment, which had been especially organised was to jump off without artillery preparation. Ap proximately an hour later the bulk of the regiments were to follow the 13 # A-873 -3- assault companies and to penetrate where the assault companies had broken through. Searchlights which were projected against the sky illuminated the terrain. The objective was to be reached without regard to time, ad joining units or boundaries of the sector. Stronger enemy resistance was to be outflanked and was to be eliminated by the rear elements of the Div-or by the Army Corps. 2. The development of the situation the morning of the first day of the attack made a new decision necessary. The assault com pany of 60 Pz Cren Regt had been contained in the forests west of BERG by some enemy pockets of resistance and the company was nearly destroyed. The assault company of the 1^6 Regt, however, succeeded rapidly in pen etrating the first line of the enemy, and the company reached the vicin ity of OBERMUSEN. The attack of the Division was decisively influenced by the undestroyed tank obstacles of the .Test Wall which made it impos sible to commit and to deploy the tanks in the direction which had been ordered. Therefore the Division recommended to the Corps that it exploit the success of the l£6 Pz Gren Regt and seize next the crossing point at OUREM. The Corps approved this recommendation and at noon the Div received the order to veer to the west. 3. Reserves: a. The ??, Rert, reinforced by one engineer company. In the early hours of the morning the regiment had been brought up to the HOFSlVALD in order tc be committed for suoport of the 60 or 1^6 Fz MS # A-873 -U- Gren Regt according to the situation. b. The Reconnaissance Battalion reinforced by one panzer one engineer and one mortar company. The Battalion was situated in the south part of the HOFSW&LD waiting for the orders of the Corps. At daybreak the Panzer Regiment was brought up past KESFELD and committed between 60 and 156 Pz Gren Regt in order to reinforce the shock power of the attack of the two Panzer Grenadier Regiments. The Reconnaissance Battalion remained as reserve. U« Mien the attack jumped off the entire artillery of the Division and element of the Volks Arty Corps had occupied positions in the area of 1ASTHORN - HILL 568 - UTTFELD - EUSCHETD. We had resorted to preparation fire, because the enemy had to be taken by surprise. But a great number of artillery observers were attached to infantry and tanks in order to participate in the breakthrough and to direct fire against enemy resistance during the attack. A strong artillery group was at the disposal of the Division in order to engage enemy resistance appearing during the attack. After the start of the attack intense harrassing fire was laid on the crossing points of the OUR and combined surprise fire covered the positions of enemy reserves, approaching routes, staffs, etc. The congomerating wood and hill terrain made the observation difficult. Everything for the rapid displacement of the Division Artillery was pre pared. 5. The composit© on and organization of the Division was as usual. The personnel was nearly complete, but-not sufficiently trained. The continual preceding commitment of the Division had caused the loss -5- MS # A-873 of irreplacable experienced officers and EM. The engineer battalion had personnel for only two companies. The Panzer Regiment had approximately 50 - 60 tanks ready for commitment. The number of all types of infantry weapons was sufficient. The artillery was complete. Most of the motor vehicles were not in good condition. about They were too old and ws were short of spare parts. The Division had 60% of the complete number of vehicles. (For composition and organization of the Division see page 2.) 6. The main effort of the attack was on the left wing of was the Division in the sector of the 15>6 Pz Gren Regt, where the terrain Bn more favorable for the attack. Therefore one AG and one AT of the TD were committed in this sector. 7- Adjoining units: On the right side LXVI Army Corps (Gen. Lucht) with 18 and 62 VG Diyj on the left side g60 VG Div (only half of this Division had arrived when the attack started.) 8. The junro-off positions of the attacking regiments were situated in the old MRL northeast and east of L6jIT)3>JBORF. The reserves were situated in the HCFSVJALD. (For positions of the artillery see Par. d). After the Division had veered towards the west the intermediate objective was to cross the OUR near OUREN and to build up a bridgehead.. 9. life used the roads LUNNEBACH, EUSCHSID, UTTF3LD, LiSIDENBORH, LUTZKAMPEN, OUREN. 10. A.s already mentioned in Par. b) the 60 ?z Gren Regt could only overrun the enemy first l-©.ne but not seize the enemy pockets of resistance in the wooded area in the vicinity and west of BSRG. Only IviS # A-873 -6- some small assault detachments penetrated deeper into the forest. The contact between the regiment and the assault company, which was almost entirely destroyed, was lost. However the attack of the 15>6 ?z Gren Regt and its assault company made good progress. The assault company outflanked LUTZKA?.TEN and pushed to the vicinity of OBERHAUSEN. LUTZKAEPEN was captured by the regiment which followed quickly behind the assault company. After the breakthrough of the assault cjmoany the enemy resistance north and north- vrest of LUTZKAFPEN increased. The continuation of the attack in the ordered direction did not seem to promise much success, because the tanks could not be deployed in the unfavorable terrain. And it was possible that the attack of the 156 Regiment would also freeze in the congomerating terrain. .Test of LUTZKAKPEN the reconnaissance forces located an enemy resistance line which seemed to be occupied by weak forces only and extended to the vicinity of SfiVENIG, from where the Division received fire in the flank. In consideration of the reports and suggestions of the Div, the Corps ordered the Division to discontinue the attack in the old dir ection and to veer past LUTZKM2PEN towards the west in order to seize the bridge at OURSN. The 156 Pz Gren Regt carried out this order sup ported by elements of the tank regiment, which had oassed the tank obstacle west of LEIDEFBORN, broken through the American positions west of LtTZKAKpEN and by evening reached the OUR sector on both sides of OUREN at some points. Enemy infantry and mortar positioned in the vicinity of SfiVENIG were out flanked to the north, contained by artillery and heavy infantry weapons. MS # A-873 ~7 ~ The 60 Pz Gren Regt covered the east flank of the attack against OUREN in the area of BERG, and was afterwards brought up to the 156 Pz Gren Regt with the exception of some weak elements, which were left there as covering parties. > In general the American resistance was weak except in the woods west of BERG where the enemy fought very bravely and fiercely. The commitment of German tanks west of LUTZKAMPEN soon forced the enemy to withdraw from this position. Weak enemy harrassing fire was reported from KE3FELD, UTTFELD and LEIDEWBORN and from the road UTTFELD - LEIDENBORN - LUTZKAMPEN.