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Congressional Record—Senate S9106 S9106 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE September 13, 2004 to share information with State and seven or more distinctly different jobs mate judgment on tactical measures local law enforcement and to access or places of employment throughout must be made by someone with the req- their capability. This is not happening. his or her worklife—intelligence agen- uisite strategic vision and authority. The third failure is the failure to es- cies continue to seek to employ people For that reason, and because of the tablish within the intelligence commu- who are prepared to make a lifetime significant confusion that the FISA nity priorities and then deploy behind commitment. process—the process by which a war- them. Rather than set up intelligence Our Joint Inquiry recommended a se- rant was obtained to either place a systems to validate convenient polit- ries of reforms to bring the human tal- wiretap or review the effects of a for- ical notions, we need a system that ent in the community, which is in line eign person—caused for the FBI in pursues mutually agreed upon intel- with the current challenges, to the in- seeking to investigate suspects prior to ligence priorities. To that end, the telligence community. Those included 9/11, it is important we reform the way President must assure that clear, con- a focus on bringing midcareer profes- the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance sistent, and current policies are estab- sionals into the intelligence commu- Act is now taught and applied. lished and enforced through the intel- nity, allowing for more time-limited For example, the officials of our Gov- ligence agency. The President needs to service for college graduates, finding ernment who are charged with making charge the National Security Council ways to bring more native language the ultimate decision on these war- with the preparation of a government- speakers into the intelligence agencies, rants, the Attorney General and the wide strategy for combating terrorism and other efforts at diversification. Secretary of State or their delegates, at home and abroad. It is an outrage At this point, I commend the former must place the individual application that we are now more than 3 years Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. of such a warrant into the context of from September 11 and we do not have George Tenet, for the work he has done U.S. strategic global interests. a clear national strategy of how we are to initiate these policies. I am pleased There are areas where the Congress, going to eradicate international terror- that the recently enacted Defense ap- through oversight, can and must play a ists. propriations bill for fiscal year 2005 in- significant role. In a subsequent state- The restructuring of the intelligence cludes seed money for the development ment, I will review in more detail the community suggested above can sig- of a reserve officers training corps role of Congress in the oversight and nificantly contribute to a more coher- style program for the intelligence com- direction of the intelligence commu- ent set of intelligence initiatives, but munity at several universities, a re- nity and some of the reforms that I without leadership and commitment cruitment and training program which suggest should be made in order to from the President, little progress will will provide financial aid in exchange more effectively carry out that respon- be made. for a commitment of service within the sibility. Fourth, the intelligence community intelligence community. America lost more than 3,000 of our has not implemented the policies nec- This could be a significant response people on September 11. But we lost essary to recruit, train, reward or sanc- to the need for proficiency in some of something else. We lost our innocence. tion, maintain the talents, or diversify the world’s most difficult languages We can never bring back those people its human intelligence capabilities. and least known cultures and histories. we lost, nor will we ever restore Amer- The intelligence community’s current Having these students under super- ica’s innocence. What we can do is recruitment and training regime has vision during their college careers honor their memories. What we can do been inadequate to overcome this would also facilitate the clearance of is learn from their loss by embarking handicap. first-generation Americans of Arab on the road from innocence to wisdom. Of particular concern to me is the background into the intelligence serv- Government must lead when the peo- difficulty of receiving a security clear- ices. And it would have, as does the ple hesitate. And the people must lead ance for a first-generation American of military reserve officers training when our Government, as it has under Arabic ancestry. These young Ameri- corps, the further attribute of facili- our current President, falters. Our cans, who have a heritage in the coun- tating jointness; that is, the willing- safety and our future are too impor- tries of the Middle East and Central ness of people to see the mission rather tant to be left to change. Luck may Asia, are most likely to have absorbed than stop their vision at the particular spare us. It will never protect us. colloquial Arabic, Farsi or Pashtun, at agency at which they serve. Once these The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- home, and could have the personal young people enter their respective in- ator from Minnesota. skills that will increase their value as telligence agencies, many of them will Mr. DAYTON. Mr. President, I ask a case agent. Of course, they are likely have known each other during their unanimous consent that notwith- to have something else; that is, they shared preparatory experience and, standing the previous order I be al- are likely to have a family. therefore, will be more likely to work lowed up to 10 minutes to speak as in An intelligence security background effectively together. morning business. check—an important part of assuring The fifth failure is the failure to real- The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without the patriotism of our intelligence com- ize that many of the most important objection, it is so ordered. munity—includes interviews with fam- decisions made by the intelligence f ily members. And if those family mem- community that were previously de- bers live in Syria, for example, it may scribed as tactical have now become FAILED POLICY IN IRAQ be difficult or impossible to get a clear- strategic. Mr. DAYTON. Mr. President, 3 days ance. If one of the family members, There have been too many instances, ago, a picture appeared in the Min- even a distant one, has been in the most of which we cannot talk about in neapolis-based Star Tribune newspaper, service of that foreign government, the open session, when mid-level bureau- accompanying a Los Angeles Times ar- recruit is likely to be rejected, even crats in the intelligence community ticle whose headline read: ‘‘U.S. Makes though he or she may meet every have made decisions at a tactical level Show of Strength in Fallujah.’’ standard of being a patriotic American. without a more strategic view as to the Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- By failing to find ways to overcome implications of those decisions. These sent that the article be printed in the this bias, we are denying ourselves the can be seemingly as simple as the rota- RECORD following my remarks. benefit of one of our Nation’s greatest tion of surveillance aircraft or other The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without assets, our diversity. means of surveillance which, when dis- objection, it is so ordered. Another frequently cited reason for covered, set off a diplomatic firestorm (See exhibit 1.) difficulty of recruitment of intel- with one of our friends or with one of Mr. DAYTON. The picture, for the ligence officers is the mid-1950s culture our enemies. record, showed about 30 Iraqi civilians of the intelligence community. While The leadership of the intelligence standing amidst the rubble of bombed most other aspects of our society have community has a special responsibility buildings in the Iraqi town of Fallujah. become accustomed to frequent turn- to determine if there is a full under- In the forefront of the picture were five over in careers—in fact, the average standing of the implications, rewards, Iraqi children, and the caption beneath American can anticipate working at and risks of an action. Review and ulti- the picture read: VerDate Mar 15 2010 22:09 Jan 29, 2014 Jkt 081600 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 4624 Sfmt 0634 E:\2004SENATE\S13SE4.REC S13SE4 mmaher on DSKCGSP4G1 with SOCIALSECURITY September 13, 2004 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S9107 An Iraqi boy weeps, as people survey the the truth. Thank goodness someone is Americans on the ground or in the air destruction in a neighborhood, following a telling us the truth, the truth about to cause this kind of destruction that U.S. airstrike overnight. Twelve Iraqis what the Bush administration has got- that picture capsulizes which is going were killed, including several women ten us into and where their present to wreak future destruction on our own and children. policies will leave us. cities and our own people. President Bush makes a show of What he can’t tell us, because no one This is a failed policy. It is a disas- strength, and an Iraqi boy weeps. I say can, is how many more Americans will trous policy. It is one for which this ‘‘President Bush’’ because this is not die in Iraq during those 10 or 20 years; administration should take responsi- the U.S. military. They are carrying how many more Americans will die bility.
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