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Regional Conflict Artical Name : What Does the Quick Finalization of The Artical Name : Regional Conflict Artical Subject : What does the Quick Finalization of the Battle of Tal Afar Mean? Publish Date: 03/09/2017 Auther Name: Dr. Muthana Al-Obeidi Subject : 10/1/2021 12:29:11 PM 1 / 2 Unlike the expectations of the international coalition to combat terrorism, Iraqi forces finalized the battle of liberating Tal Afar quickly and with limited losses compared to other confrontations against ISIS in other Iraqi cities and towns, which the organization has controlled since June 2014. The battle of Tal Afar lasted only for few days, after Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi announced launching military operations on August 20, 2017 ±that is more than a month after finalizing the battle of liberating Mosul. Although the Iraqi army retrieved most of Tal Afar¶s neighborhoods and areas, ISIS is still stationed in some areas on the Iraqi-Syrian borders, which stretch for 605 kilometers. ISIS members also launched a surprise attack against Iraqi forces stationed in Tal Afar.Why Tal Afar? The Tal Afar district is in the Nineveh governorate in North Iraq, 70 kilometers west of Mosul. It is also close to the Iraqi borders with Syria. Zummar, Rabia and al-Ayadieh are three sub districts of Nineveh. To the east lies the Mosul district, to the north lies the Dohuk district, to the west lies the Sinjar district and to the south lies Al-Hadar district. It is the second largest district in the governorate as Mosul is the largest. Its society is diverse as ethnically there are Arabs and Turkmen, and religiously there are Sunnis and Shi¶ites. The Turkmen represent the majority of the population in the city. Liberating the city from ISIS is significant, because the city was the last ISIS stronghold in Nineveh. Tal Afar was also one of ISIS¶most important strongholds, as it is located on the supply routes between Mosul and Syria. Controlling the city will allow Iraqi troops to control the borders between Iraq and Syria.A number of ISIS commanders are actually from the city. After Mosul was liberated, hundreds of the organization members fled to it. The city is also considered an axis of the Iranian-Turkish regional struggle over influence in North Iraq.Participating TroopsSince liberating Tal Afar was of paramount significance, a large number of factions and units participated in liberating the city, since their expertise after liberating Mosul and in besieging ISIS members was highly needed. The most important troops and factions, which participated in the offensive are:1. The Iraqi army including the 9th armored division, the 15th and 16th divisions, the artillery battalions and the army¶s engineering and medical departments.2. Counter-terrorism forces affiliated with the first and second special operations¶unit.3. A number of the federal policemen affiliated with the armored division, the special elite force and the 6th division.4. Popular mobilization battalions including 5,000 fighters from Tal Afar itself.5. Iraqi air force in cooperation with the US-led international coalition air force.Field DevelopmentsThe Tal Afar offensive was launched on August 20, 2017. Joint Iraqi troops advanced in some areas on the first day reaching 30 kilometers into the city. The plan was to break through ISIS frontlines so they can infiltrate the center of the city. Federal police troops liberated the small area of Al-Abra aided by the Iraqi army¶s air force.Three days after launching the offensive, Iraqi troops stormed the center of Tal Afar from the eastern, western and southern sides. Abdul Amir Rashid Yarallah, the Commander of the ³We Are Coming Nineveh´operations, said the 9th armored division and the battalions 2, 11 and 26 of the Popular Mobilization stormed Tal Afar from the eastern side, adding that the counter-terrorism forces stormed al-Kifah neighborhood, the city¶s first neighborhood. Other counter-terrorism troops stormed the city from the southwestern side aided by the artillery division and the air force.The federal police troops and the Popular Mobilization also managed to secure a vital passage for the troops north of Tal Afar and they stormed al-Tank neighborhood. By day 6, the joint forces advanced to the center of the city and seized control of a number of neighboring towns in the district. They also seized control of al-Moalemeen neighborhood and liberated large parts of al-Rabee and al-Saad neighborhoods. They also stormed al- Taliaa and al-Rabee neighborhoods after ISIS members retreated to other neighborhoods in the city and put concrete barricades to prevent Iraqi troops from advancing towards the center of the city.The Iraqi joint operations command announced on day 7 of the offensive that it seized control of the city¶s center and of its historical castle and groves, in addition to a number of villages. It also seized complete control over Sheikh Ibrahim Mountain and the Zumbar mountains and liberated al-Ouruba 2, al-Salam, Al- Qadissiya 1 and 2 and al-Rabee neighborhoods and the Hasan Kawi and al-Bawari areas. The counter-terrorism task force, which invaded the city from the southern axis, announced the end of its combat missions.The federal police, which raided the city from the northwestern axis also announced the end of its combat missions. Other troops participating in the fighting are about to do so as well now that 27 neighborhoods out of 29 have been liberated. The commander of the ³We Are Coming Nineveh´said ³military operations will continue until al-Ayadieh and surrounding areas are liberated.´Quick FinalizationThe battle to liberate Tal Afar from ISIS was short and more decisive, if compared with other battles fought by Iraqi troops to liberate other cities, which ISIS controlled, especially Mosul.The quick pace at which Tal Afar was liberated is because it is smaller and its population is less than that of Mosul, which is Iraq¶s second largest city. Tal Afar was liberated from the left side in a short time while the problem was in the right side, or what is known as the old city, which has narrow roads, adjacent roads and crowded neighborhoods. This was particularly difficult when ISIS besieged thousands of civilians in these neighborhoods and used them as human shields.On another hand, ISIS fiercely fought in Mosul considering it is the city from where it announced its alleged ³state.´It resorted to different approaches to recruit hundreds of fighters and resorted to street fighting, ambushes, mines, booby-trapped cars and snipers, in an attempt to maintain control over the city. Iraqi troops, however, achieved great victory and liberated it. Tal Afar, on the contrary, is different as it is less important for ISIS at this time when it is suffering from consecutive defeats. In addition to all that there are the increased experience and skills which Iraqi troops gained from fighting other battles, particularly Mosul¶s. This contributed to finalizing the Tal Afar battle at a quicker pace than other battles.Post-liberationThe quick liberation of Tal Afar from ISIS raises several questions about how to manage the post-liberation phase, deal with the diverse ethnic and sectarian components and resolve problems, which weakened the society against ISIS expansion.Although preliminary data pertaining to the post-liberation phase does not clearly indicate how the future will be, some matters show that Tal Afar will be an axis of struggle over regional influence, particularly amid the high demand for reconstruction requirements and the lack of available resources to do so given the austerity measures and decrease of oil prices.It is probable that Tal Afar will be a major point in the tensions between the Iraqi central government and the Kurdistan region¶s government, considering it is a disputed area and Kurdish political parties demand that it becomes a part of Kurdistan. This means that escalating the situation to control the city is a strong possibility.Finally, control over Tal Afar sparks a regional conflict between Turkey and Iran. Ankara seeks to control the city to protect the Turkmen in it and this pushed it to militarily intervene in Iraq and deploy its troops in the camp of Bashiqa. Meanwhile Tehran is adamant about controlling the city to protect the Shi¶ites to secure the passage that links between Tehran and Beirut. This increases the possibilities of reigniting the conflict between Iraqi factions and major regional troops that are closely related to Iraqi matters in order to control Tal Afar. 10/1/2021 12:29:11 PM 2 / 2.
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