The Role of Russia, China, Iran and Their Foreign Policies Towards Syria on the Arab Spring

THE ROLE OF RUSSIA, CHINA, IRAN AND THEIR FOREIGN POLICIES TOWARDS SYRIA ON THE ARAB SPRING

MISS WARAPORN RAKSORN

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE THAMMASAT UNIVERSITY ACADEMIC YEAR 2015 COPYRIGHT OF THAMMASAT UNIVERSITY THE ROLE OF RUSSIA, CHINA, IRAN AND THEIR FOREIGN POLICIES TOWARDS SYRIA ON THE ARAB SPRING

MISS WARAPORN RAKSORN

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Thesis Title THE ROLE OF RUSSIA, CHINA, IRAN AND THEIR FOREIGN POLICIES TOWARDS SYRIA ON THE ARAB SPRING

Author Miss Waraporn Raksorn Degree Master of Political Science in International Relations Major Field/Faculty/University International Relations Faculty of Political Science Thammasat University Thesis Advisor Professor Jaran Maluleem, Ph.D Academic Years 2015

ABSTRACT

Since the Arab Spring has driven the political turmoil in Middle East and Northern African countries, the global political actors have been involved in order to assist the crisis. Syrian uprising is a selected case that this research examines. Despite the fact that there are only some countries that are good allies to Syria while majority states condemned Assad’s government. This research focuses on the role of Syrian allies: Russia, China, and Iran. It attempts to find the key factors that contribute the allies to support Assad regime. The paper intends to investigate Russia, China and Iran’s foreign policies towards Syria since the 2011 Arab Spring until 2014. They maintain their policies not to intervene in the Syrian Civil war. The analysis and argument are based on Realism lens and by applying the game theory to test the hypothesis. This research examines how game theoretic analyses of externals’ foreign policies have shown their national interests and cooperation strategic movement. Therefore, it has proven their interdependent strategies among the players (Syria and its allies). Thus, Constructivism theory is used to analyse the norms, beliefs and ideas that shape (2) state’s foreign policy. It also finds out how these norms, beliefs, and ideas shape the allies’ foreign policies. This research paper argues that Syria’s external allies continue to support Syria to gain their common interests, and play the major roles in regional and global politics. Nevertheless, relationship between Syrian government and allies appears to be continued and they will keep supporting Assad regime. Finally, this paper highlights the important motivations for policy makers of the Syrian’s allies that they are involved in Syrian crisis acting on both regional and international stages.

Keywords: Arab Spring, Syria, Syrian Civil War, Bashar al-Assad, Russia, China, Iran, Foreign policy, Game theory, Constructivism, National Interests

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis is part of the Master Degree in International Relations, Thammasat University. I would like to express the deepest appreciation to my thesis advisor Prof. Dr. Jaran Maluleem who has great knowledge about Middle East politics and he has never hesitated to tell me about Middle East and Islam. I would like to thank the co-advisors Dr. Srawut Aree and Asst. Prof. Dr. Wasan Luangprapat for their time, suggestions, and guidance to this research. I would not have completed it without their greatest supports. And I also would like to thank others IR professors who provide their lifetime knowledge and experiences to me. I would like to express the deepest appreciation to Prof. Dr. Mohammad Savadi (Al-Mustafa International University, Iran), Dr. Pichai Israbhakdi (Former Thai Ambassador to Iran), lecturer Jittipat Poonkham (Russian expert, Thammasat University) who have given the in-depth knowledge and experiences to my research. Without their guidance and kindness, this thesis would not have been possible. Moreover, I would like to express the greatest gratitude to my family, my parents, brothers and sister who always stand by me when I need moral and financial supports. Thanks to my best friends Nuy, Fai, and Uhu gang for their supports and cheering. I would like to thank all my MIR16 friends; Mew, Nat, Bambi, Sandy, Mai, Man, Mook, Tim and others, it is really blessed to know all of you. Thanks to P’Nong and P’Su who always provide guideline for completing this thesis in time. Lastly, thank to Zafar, my closest Pakistani friend who always supports me and provides Shia-Sunni knowledge, also useful perspectives on the Syrian conflicts. The writing of this thesis has been an awesome journey to discover so many things about Syria, as well as the sorrowful stories when reading about the humanitarian crisis, refugees, the massacre by the terrorists and the misuse of Islam. Lastly, I wish to dedicate this research to all Syrians who have been involved in this crisis. Every life who has suffered from the seemingly endless Civil War since 2011, being misplaced, became refugees and homeless, losing their beloved ones, I hope with my heartfelt wishes that this crisis will be solved soon with the ideally peaceful resolution and no more damages. Miss Waraporn Raksorn (4)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page ABSTRACT (1) ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS (3) LIST OF TABLES (7) LIST OF FIGURES (8) LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS (9)

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1

1.1 Background and Issues 2 1.2 Research Questions 7 1.3 Objectives of Study 7 1.4 Conceptual Framework 7 1.4.1 Game Theory 8 1.4.2 Constructivism 11 1.4.3 National Interests 14 1.4.4 Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) 15 1.5 Hypothesis 16 1.6 Methodology 16 1.6.1 Research Methods 17 1.7 Scope of Study 18

CHAPTER 2 REVIEW OF LITERATURE 20

2.1 Syrian Uprising since the Arab Spring 2011 20 2.2 The Role of Bashar al-Assad Government 26 2.3 Syria Relations with Russia, Iran and China during the Arab Spring 28 2.3.1 Literature Review about Russia and Syria 28 2.3.2 Literature Review about China and Syria 31 (5)

2.3.3 Literature Review about Iran and Syria 33

CHAPTER 3 SYRIAN’S IMPORTANT ALLIES AND THEIR RELATIONS 38

3.1 The Important Ally (1) Russia 38 3.1.1 History of Russian Foreign Policy in the Middle East 39 3.1.2 Russian Foreign Policy towars Syria 41 3.1.3 Role of Russia in UNSC and its Veto Power 43 3.1.4 Econoic and Military Relations 46 3.1.5 Russian Geo-politic strategy towards Syria 48 3.2 The Important Ally (2) China 50 3.2.1 China’s Relationship to the Middle East 50 3.2.2 Chinese Foreign Policy Towards Syria 52 3.2.3 Role of China in UNSC and Its Veto Power 53 3.2.4 Economic Cooperation 56 3.3 The Important Ally (3) Iran 58 3.3.1 Iran’s Position in the Middle East and Relationship with Syria 59 3.3.2 Iranian Foreign Policy towords Syria 61 3.3.3 Iran-Syria and Hezbollah Relationship 63 3.3.4 Iranian Geo-Politic Strategy towards Syria 65

CHAPTER 4 DISCUSSION OF ALLIANCES’ FOREIGN POLICIES TOWARDS SYRIA 67

4.1 Analyse with Game Theory and FPA 68 4.1.1 Observing the Strategic Concerns in the Game Theory 68 4.1.2 Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) 79 4.2 Discussion, Applying Realist and Constructivist Agruments 89 into Consideration 4.2.1 Realist’s Perspective of Material Factors 89 4.2.2 Constructivist’s Perspective of Ideational Factors 92 4.3 Results 96 (6)

CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 105

5.1 Conclusion 105 5.2 The Afterward of 2014 Syrian Crisis and International Involvements 110 5.3 Implication and Recommendations 114

REFERENCES 115

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A President Al-Assad’s Interview with ABC News 126 APPENDIX B Iranian President in a Meeting With Syrian Parliament 147 Speaker APPENDIX C President Assad’s Russian TV Interview 149

BIOGRAPHY 152

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LIST OF TABLES

Tables Page 3.1 Summary of United Nations Security Council Concerning Syria – Veto List on Draft Resolutions 57 3.2 Summary of UNSC – Adopted Resolutions on Syria 58 4.1 Similarities and Differences Factors of Alliance with Syria 69 4.2 Summary of the Three Syrian Allies’ National Interests 88 4.3 Arms Exports to Syria 91

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LIST OF FIGURES

Figures Page 4.1 Game Theory of Non-zero Sum Game (Positive Sum Game) 70 4.2 Foreign Policy Sources, Constraints, and Opportunities 82

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Symbols/Abbreviations Terms

FPA Foreign Policy Analysis FSA Free Syrian Army GCC The Gulf Cooperation Council IRGC The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps ISIS The Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham NCC The National Coordination Committee for Domestic Change R2P Responsibility to Protect SNC The Syrian National Council UNDP United Nations Development Program UNSC United Nations Security Council 1

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

The “Arab Spring” has shaken global politics and has brought many changes to the region. Many states have become interested in this political phenomenon. The “Arab Spring”, or “Arab uprising”, began in Tunisia at the end of 2010. It has demonstrated the ongoing conflict between opposition groups and governments, and has resulted in a huge loss of human life. The political uprising and regime1 change affected global politics and foreign policies toward Northern African and Middle Eastern countries. This paper concentrates on Syria and its ongoing Civil War. Many states have had economic sanctions on Syria, such as the United States and the European Union. The Arab League also suspended Syria’s membership in November 2011 and condemned the Syrian government of Bashar al-Assad for using violence against their citizens2. Empirically, while some states have called the Syrian government as brutal for using violence to crackdown on protestors, Russian, Chinese and Iranian leaders still support the Assad regime. Russia, China and Iran have policies to not intervene in Syria’s political matters and are considered to be important Syrian allies. Through the lens of Realism and the use of Game Theory, this research examines Russian, Chinese and Iranian policies that support the Syrian regime. Constructivism will also be used to help clarify factors and policies. The purpose of this paper is to provide an analytical framework to understand external motivation of involvement in Syrian domestic issues. This paper also presents an overview of the role of Syria’s allies in various facets.

1 The definition of “regime’ in political science is the set of rules, or cultural or social norms that regulate the relations between rules and rulers…a regime may be a monarchy whose king is selected by divine right and whose laws are applied by his feudal retainers. Fawaz A. Gerges, The New Middle East: Protest and Revolution in the Arab World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 2 Mujae Kucukkeles, “Arab League’s Syrian Policy,” SETA Policy Brief 56 (2012): 1-17. 2

1.1 Background and Issues

The Middle East is an important region located near Europe, Asia and Africa. It is the world’s key supplier of oil and gas. Oil reservoirs in the Middle East are considered to be among the world’s largest oil resources and many countries are interested in getting access to that energy supply. Since the 9/11 incident in 2001, the Middle East has been a hotspot for anti-terrorism and has attracted global attention. Apart from the notable geography, oil reserves, and the 9/11 incident, we have recently seen the emergence of the “Arab Spring”, which occurred at the end of 2010 in Tunisia. The world paid undivided attention to the event and the term “Arab Spring” has been used since then. The “Arab Spring”, “Arab Uprising” or “Arab Awakening”, are all terms first used when the protests began against authoritarian regimes in the region, which inevitably disturbed the status quo of Arab governments3. There was the self-immolation of a Tunisian street vendor, Mohammad Bouazizi, who was oppressed by government officers who took hold of his vegetable stall on December 17th, 2010. This self-immolation led to the quickly spreading mass demonstration that forced Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali, who had been the Tunisian President for more than 20 years, from power4. The Tunisian uprising inspired similar protests in Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, Syria and other Middle East and Northern African countries. Gerges mentions that “millions of Arabs revolted against al- istibdad (repression), defying fear and bullets and daring to call for effective citizenship and more representative and egalitarian political and economic systems”.5

The protestors called for rights and freedom in politics. The countries shared a common feature, authoritarian regimes. For instance, Hosni Mubarak was in power for 30 years and Muammar Gaddafi for 42. The protestors had also been suffering from poverty and unemployment. Similarly, it was inevitable that Syria would be affected by the Arab Spring. The conditions were ready in Syria and

3 Abdullah Alsaidi, “Three Years after the Arab Spring, the War between Hope and Despair Continues,” The Global Observatory, http://theglobalobservatory.org/2014/05/ three-years-after-the-arab-spring-the-war-between-hope-and-despair-continues/, (accessed May 9, 2015). 4 Reese Erlich, Inside Syria: The Backstory of Their Civil War and What the World Can Expect (USA: Prometheus Book, 2014), p. 81. 5 Gerges, p. 3. 3 according to Erlich, “Syrians lived under a dictatorial regime of Bashar al-Assad where criticism of the government meant jail and torture”.6 The Syrian economy was deflated and according to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 45 percent of the population were living in poverty which caused the rate of unemployment to surge to 29.8 percent during 2010-2014. The wide spread of the Arab Spring frightened Arab regimes and economic conditions pushed people to protest for a change at better living conditions. Fawcett describes the significance of the Arab Spring as: A contagion effect by which uprisings in one Arab state inspired imitations in another (within the Arab World) – amplified by pan-Arab satellite television and other forms of trans-state technology by which movements shared tactics, and a resultant perception by all Arab governments that they were all vulnerable – was indicative of a shared Arab public space.7

In Tunisia and Egypt, the protests expanded quickly through social media, such as Facebook and Twitter, used by the youth and younger generation of protestors. For example, in Egypt, the Tehrir Square gathering was arranged via the Facebook page “We all Khaled Saeed”, asking people to come out for commemorating the death of Khaled Saeed who was beaten to death by Egyptian police.8 The use of the social media movement had proven that it worked well for gathering people together efficiently to arrange a meeting point of protest. In Syria, there was a Facebook page named “Syrian Revolution 2011” calling for the “Day of Rage” to call people for demonstrations in Damascus. Many scholars have explained the causes of the revolts and the role of the social movement, which played a crucial role in bringing about the revolution. In addition, the term “Arab Spring” signifies rebirth and renewal, but that rebirth may be counter to U.S. interests. The renewal may be about Islamic political

6 Erlich, p. 82. 7 L’Estrange Fawcett, International Relations of the Middle East (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 157. 8 Wael Ghonim, Revolution 2.0: The Power of the People Is Greater Than the People in Power: A Memoir (UK: Harper Collins, 2012). 4 power antithetical to Western interests.9 The U.S. has a very powerful military and political ideology, while the Arab leaders, especially autocratic regimes in Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria have proven to be weak economically and militarily, despite wealthy and strong appearances.10 The U.S. interest in Middle East oil and counter terrorism strategies are its main goals, while Middle Eastern countries concentrate on regional stability. Narrowing down the topic of research, as an International Relations student the Syrian uprising is a thought-provoking issue. The Syrian revolution was chosen to be the topic of this study because the Syrian crisis has been ongoing for more than four years and it developed into an endless Civil War. The questions about Syria, which inspired the author to conduct the research, are: “How can the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad stay in power?”, “While many countries have placed sanctions on Syria, why are Russia, China and Iran still supporting Syria?” and “What factors have led Syria to have an ongoing violent Civil War?” Previous research illustrates the outcome of the Arab Spring in various countries: In Tunisia, the leader was exiled from the country. In Egypt, the leader was forced into exile by the military after a few weeks of fighting. In Libya, the leader was killed after a prolonged attack assisted by NATO warplanes and intervention. In Yemen, the leader is gone, but the control of the country remains, at least in part, with his family and loyalists. In Syria, the leadership responded to street protests with horrific violence.11

Assad is still in power as the President of Syria despite being accused of using violence during political crackdowns and killing innocent civilians. That is the reason why Syria was banned from the Arab League in November 2011 and why economic sanctions were imposed that froze Syrian government assets in Arab countries. It is interesting that other countries that had been in political crises during

9 Sue Mahan and Pamala L. Grieset. Terrorism in Perspective, 3rd ed. (U.S.A: Sage, 2013), pp. 351-380. 10 Wassam Yafi, Inevitable Democracy in the Arab World: New Realities in an Ancient Land (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), p. 79. 11 Mahan and Grieset.

5 the Arab Spring either terminated or changed their leadership, while Syria’s condition developed into a violent Civil War. The situation seems endless and finding a suitable political solution is puzzling in Syria. The Syrian uprising has continued since the violence erupted in March 2011. The Syrian revolution started similarly to how they started in other Arab Spring countries, as waves of revolution. The conflict is in its fourth year since the rebellion erupted. President Bashar al-Assad remains in power and so does the escalating violence and high numbers of deaths as vast protests continue. The protests started in the middle of March 2011 when the protestors called for the reformation of government and asked for political freedoms, freedom of expression, and freedom of press. The biggest protest was taking place in the south of Syria, the city called Daraa.12 There were protestors calling for the resignation of President Assad, demanding for equal rights for Kurdish citizens and the end of long oppressive Ba’ath party rule for more than three decades.13 Moreover, it is believed that Assad has backing from Iran, Russia and Lebanese Hezbollah to strengthen the Assad regime. The situation has been getting worse, there are claims that the government has been using violent crackdown against protesters and killing innocents. The Daraa crackdown was believed to be the starting point of the endless revolution. From 2011 to 2014, the period that this research focuses on, is critical for solving the conflict. The Syrian crisis seems to be an endless Civil War, spread all over Syria and Iraq. CNN reports that the United Nations revealed a hundred thousand people died and more than 680,000 people have been wounded. There have been at least 6.5 million people that have been internally displaced, and nearly four million people have fled to other countries as refugees.14 The refugee problem will have a long term impact to Syria’s neighbouring countries and to Europe. For Syria, the crisis has been ongoing and no one can predict the end of the Civil War for the foreseeable future.

12 Adeed Dawisha, The Second Arab Awakening: Revolution, Democracy, and the Islamist Challenge from Tunis to Damascus (New York: Norton, 2013), p. 33. 13 Gevin L. James, The Arab Uprisings: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 14 Lucy Rodgers et al., “Syria: The Story of the Conflict,” BBC News, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26116868 (accessed July 2, 2015). 6

Without compromising from President Assad, this Civil War could lead to further losses of civilian lives and victims of human trafficking. Furthermore, there are external factors, especially other powerful actors within and outside the region that are involved in the Syrian crisis. There is participation by international organizations as well as nation-state involvement. The news about the Middle East usually shows the involvement of external actors, such as the United States, Russia, France, China, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran, other states, and International Organizations. There is a visible division among the P-5 members, especially the U.S. and Russia on the Syrian matter. This research paper focuses on Syrian regime supporters, namely Russia, China and Iran. There are explanations about why these three state actors were selected in the next chapter. To be aware, this research does not analyse each Arab Spring countries and what happened, but this research presents some case studies to be examined and compared when the situation is necessary. Syria has been in good relationships with Russia, Iran and China as good a good ally. The author earlier mentioned that Russia, Iran and China are supporters of the Syrian government. The reasons that the author would like to explore the roles of Russia and China are that they are permanent member of the UN Security Council (P-5) and they have significant positions in global affairs. Secondly, Russia and China’s role in global politics are always crucial. Some claim that it was because of Russia’s veto power that the UNSC could not move forward or agree upon the UN resolution and China agreed with Russia. Thirdly, from the literature review, Iran and Syria have had a continuing alliance for a long time. Their governments have a military and economic relationship and both support Hezbollah. Therefore, the author would like to understand more about Russia, China, and Iran’s geopolitical strategies and their impact on the recent Syrian uprising. These third parties may become the main players in assisting the Syrian government’s resolving of the conflict. This paper considers their foreign policies toward Syria and examines the relationship between Russia, Iran and China with Syria, and to clarify the factors that motivate their foreign policies in supporting the Syrian government during the crisis.

1.2 Research Questions

1. What are the important factors that construct the foreign policies of Russia, China and Iran towards supporting the Syrian regime during the Syrian uprising and Civil war? 2. To what extent have the factors shaped foreign policies of external actors towards supporting the Syrian regime?

1.3 Objectives of Study

This research aims: 1. To analyse influential roles of external actors, i.e., Russia, China, and Iran and their foreign policies and impacts on the specific case of Syria’s internal conflict during the Arab Spring. 2. To examine factors and reasons why Russia, China and Iran have supported the Syrian government. 3. To understand global politics when there is involvement of external actors into one particular internal event.

1.4 Conceptual Framework

To find the answers of the research questions, the author used the theoretical approaches of Realism, Game Theory, Constructivism, National Interest and Foreign Policy Analysis. The framework of Game Theory helps explain the situation among the external actors and their foreign policies, and the impacts on Syria during the Arab Spring. The author considers that game theory can offer a testable hypothesis and it has been used to explain decision making of political leaders and their policies previously. The core assumption of Realism is that world politics operate in an international system of Anarchy. Through Realism, we can understand the actions of states by arguing about the balance of power, sovereignty and national interest. 8

The author also consults with the Constructivism school of thought in order to discuss how Russia, Iran and China project their norms of non-intervention, respect of sovereignty and political ideas to support the Syrian government during the crisis. Constructivism can offer the structure that can shape a state’s foreign policy and its behaviour. The mixture of both Game theory and Constructivism can be a better combination to analyse factors driving foreign policies of external actors toward Syria. Theoretical Approach 1.4.1 Game Theory There have been several times that “Game theory” has been used to analyse economic behaviour and decision-making in foreign policy. Game theory is the analysis of how decision making is done and how choices are made in relation to another. In International Relations, theorists use “Game theory” to test a hypothesis of action in military decision making in war, to make policy decisions, and to examine the strategies of one state towards another. Game theory helps explain why the decision-makers decided to act or react one way in one situation rationally. Game theory takes part in the Realist approach. It is related to the study of conflict and cooperation that focuses on strategic interaction between rational actors who can strive for either competitive or collaborative strategies towards one another.15 The player, meaning the policy-maker, makes the decision for the state. Here, the policy-makers are often leaders of states, Foreign Ministers, heads of organisations or presidents. It deals with problems in which each player’s strategy depends on what the other player does. Game theory extends the strategic situation to interdependent decisions, in which the options being evaluated are functions of the player’s choices.16 The sequence of moves is called a strategy, so an optimal strategy is a sequence of moves that results in your best outcome. They will think strategically and be concerned about how to make a move. Games can be divided into two types: Two-Player games which have two decision-makers and n-person games, which have three or more players. We have

15 Richard Little, “International Regimes,” in The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, 5th ed., eds. John Balis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owen (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 300. 16 Ibid. 9 often heard about a zero-sum and a nonzero-sum game when we have studied about theory. The zero-sum game is when one player will win and another will lose and they have no common interests, whereas in a nonzero-sum game, players typically have both competitive and complementary interests.17 The rule of the game can be separated into: a non-cooperative game and a cooperative game. Zagare and Slantchev have clearly stated about the rules of the game, “for non-cooperative games, players may be unable to make coordinated choices, unable to communicate to enforce an agreed upon joint strategy,”18 while a cooperative game, the players are able to coordinate and communicate. In IR, non- cooperative games are more popular when states are competitive, however, in the case of Syria and its allies, we tend to study about the cooperative strategy between the alliances. John Nash, the game theorist, introduced “Nash-programme” that showed equilibrium outcomes. Turocy and Stengel present that “the concept of the Nash Equilibrium recommends a strategy to each player that the player cannot improve upon unilaterally, that is, given that the other players follow the recommendation. Since the other players are also rational, it is reasonable for each player to expect his opponents to follow the recommendation as well”.19 Zagare and Slantchev points out that “Nash showed that at least one such outcome exist in every finite non-zero cooperative game, nonzero-sum games included”.20 In other words, the games always have an equilibrium point where all players choose their actions. That choice will be best for them and the choice is to give a choice to their opponent. Game theory focuses on strategic interactions relevant to central issues. The author will discuss how to use game theory to understand the impact of Russia, Iran and China’s foreign policy towards Syria.

17 Steven J. Brams, Game Theory and Politics (London: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1975), p. 26. 18 Frank C. Zagare and Branislav L. Slantchev, “Game Theory and Other Modeling Approaches,” http://slantchev.ucsd.edu/incollection/pdf/IRCompend-W02F.pdf (accessed June 11, 2015). 19 Theodore L. Turocy and Bernhard von Stengel, “Game Theory,” CDAM Research Report, London School of Economics, 2001. 20 Zagare and Slantchev. 10

Thus, coalition games can also be applied to analyse the case of this research. Coalition means one player is willing to cooperate on the part of another that can lead to a better outcome. Steven J. Brams states that “a coalition’s ability to enforce an agreement seems clearly related to its power and how it might be valued as defined by the characteristic function”.21 In contrast to a zero-sum game, a “positivesum game implies that player may have interests in common, to achieve an outcome that maximizes total payoffs”.22 According to Game theory, players and their circumstances can be defined into a table or illustration, which can be seen clearly below. The author has separated each player (Russia, China, and Iran) with Syria and their strategic moves according to their national interests and relationship. The two-person nonzero-sum game model will be used to discuss and analyse. For the rules of the game, the author has chosen to use a cooperative game. Even though the cooperative game is less popular than non-cooperative games in world politics, the author applies the theory according to external actors (Russia, China, Iran) and their relationships with Syria. They must have some common interest and coordination will lead to the best outcome. In terms of Realism, Donnelly mentions that the “anarchic pressures towards balancing and against cooperation are reinforced by the relativity power”…[and] he quoted from Waltz that the relativity of power requires states to ‘be more concerned with relative strength than with absolute advantage’.23 Donnelly further states that the actors who focus on relative gains will be less likely to cooperate. National interests, the seeking of power, and the idea that states are the most important actor, will be used to discuss Foreign Policy Analysis. The following table is a model of the analysis according to a two-person nonzero-sum game guide. The players are divided into 1. Syria and Russia; 2. Syria and China; and 3. Syria and Iran. Syria is represented by A, while Russia is B, China is C and Iran is D.

21 Brams, p. 78. 22 Game Theory, “Positive-Sum,” http://www.gametheory.net/dictionary/Positive Sum.html (accessed May 11, 2015). 23 Jack Donnelly, “Realism,” in Theories of International Relations, 5th ed., eds. Scott Burdrill et al. (Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013), pp. 32-56. 11

Syria (A)

Cooperative Defect

Cooperative (3,3) (2,4) (B, C, or D)

Defect (4,2) (1,1)

Key (x,y) = pay off to A, pay off to B,C or D. 4 = Best; 3 = next-best; 2= next-worst; 1=worst

The table of the two-person nonzero-sum game model above is used for investigating Russia, Iran and China’s foreign policies toward Syria. We are able to analyse how they select their policies toward Syria and see which factors they are based on. The discussion part is presented in Chapter 4. The reason why the author does not use the n-person game is because each player has his or her own interests, which cannot be compared together. So, the separated analysis is more suitable for each player.

1.4.2 Constructivism Constructivism is an approach to international politics that considers the centrality of ideas and human consciousness; stresses a holistic and idealist view of structures; and how the structure constructs the actors’ identities and interests, how their interactions are organized and constrained by that structure, and serve to either reproduce or transform that structure.24 The intellectual constructivism’s keys are composed of the social forces: ideas, norms, knowledge, and rules; that influence state’s identities and interests. Constructivists support that “normative or ideational

24 Michael Barnett, “Social Constructivism,” in The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, 5th ed., eds. John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 148-165. 12 structures” are as important as material structures which can shape the behaviour of social and political actors, both individuals or states.25 Constructivism school of thought explains the state’s behaviour that is shaped by ideas, norms and values. The keys of Constructivism are “concerned with human consciousness, treat ideas as structural factors, consider the dynamic relationship between ideas and material forces as the results of how actors interpret their material reality, and are interested in how agents produce structures and how structures produces agents”.26 Alexander Wendt introduced the agent-structure problem to IR scholars about how to conceptualize the relationship between agents (states) and structures (the international structure).27 Constructivists show a wider understanding of non-material structures. The condition of actors’ identities is crucial since identities inform interests and finally do some actions in response. Reus-Smith points out that how actors develop their interests is crucial to explaining a wide range of international political phenomenon. Constructivists focus on the social identities of individuals or states.28 He states that Constructivists “are not opposed to the idea that actors might be self-interested but they argue that this tells us nothing unless we understand how actors define their ‘selves’ and how this informs their ‘interests”.29 The actors or political players of Constructivism can be individuals or states. In this research, the author tries to offer the state’s behaviour, rather than the individual’s. Even though the decision-maker in game theory can imply to an individual, this research tends to examine the state’s decision-makers as a whole. Anarchy in constructivism is opposite to Neo-Realism and Neo-Liberalism. The famous quote from Wendt states that “Anarchy is what states make of it”, pointing the meaning that states might have different ideas about sovereignty, intervention, humanitarian and others, the most importance is to know what are the norms states believe in and what structures are they in. It also depends on the

25 Christian Reus-Smith, “Constructivism.” in Theories of International Relations, 5th ed., eds. Scott Burdrill et al. (Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013), p. 224. 26 Reus-Smith, p.159 27 Ibid. p.152 28 Ibid. p.224-225 29 Ibid. 13 interactions between states. Constructivists believe that the world has not been given or is already out there, it depends on the ideas of people who are involved in it. The relationship among alliances can be explained by viewing the world structure. Barnett states that “the normative structure shapes the identity and interests of actors such as states, while knowledge shapes how actors interpret and construct their social reality”.30 Power in constructivism “is not only the ability of one actor to get another actor to do what they would not do otherwise, but also as the production of identities, interests, and meaning that limit the ability of actors to control their fate”.31 It allows us to think of an alternative world where states have a choice to construct their policies under the circumstance of the world structure. Sovereignty is another concern of Russia, China and Iran that is not allowing Western intervention into Syria. Barnett points out that the rules of sovereignty not only regulate state practices but also make possible the very idea of a sovereign state. It is important that “Rules are not static but rather are revised through practice, reflection, and arguments by actors regarding how they should be applied to new situations”.32 We need to see the normative world and observe how the situation is likely to be. Taking into consideration, Constructivism offers another point of view to International Relations; it views the world differently. Constructivist can highlight the issue of how states emphasize their place, national identity as a core objective in their foreign policies. The normative way of describing a state’s behaviour can add up the elements of constructivism in order to provide a wider range of perspectives. Therefore, Constructivism can clarify a state’s perception about sovereignty, non- intervention, and norms, which of course the states can have different perspectives. It also allows actors in the international world to be informed and share understanding among actors. Under the structure of a Multi-polar world, the alliances of the Syrian government with Russia, China, and Iran have particular factors that allow conducting foreign policies that are supporting Syria. This research examines all possible factors and variables that shape external states’ behaviours and decision-making. Apart from

30 Barnett, p. 152. 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid., p. 159. 14 material interests such as resources, military and economic power, and geo-politics, this research considers Russia’s, China’s, and Iran’s perception of Sovereignty, Non- intervention, and Anti-western viewpoint (the U.S.).

1.4.3 National Interests National Interest in IR is another concept that is used to examine the relationships among states and helps analyse Foreign Policy Analysis. In Realism, following Morgenthau, states are the key actors in IR and other players, such as individuals, economic enterprises and pressure groups merely exist within the state33. Morgenthau saw power as the most important variable and states desire to persue and gain from relationships. The national interest is commonly related to a strategic and economic capability as Realists behold that the struggle for power between states is the most significant motivation. In other words, states try to maximize their national interests, by searching for their power and places in world politics. According to Dunne and Schmidt, “states with more power stand a better chance of surviving than states with less power”, therefore, “power is crucial to the realist lexicon and has traditionally been defined narrowly in military strategic terms.”34 National interest is an indicator to evaluate foreign policy promoted by state leaders. National interests also shape a state’s foreign policy more than other factors and ideology. Nuechterlein contends that there are several definitions of national interest among scholars; therefore, he suggests that it is useful to divide national interests into four basic national interests as the following:35 (i) Defence interests: the protection of the nation-state and its citizens against the threat of physical violence directed from another state, and/or an externally inspired threat to its system of government. (ii) Economic interests: the enhancement of the national-state’s economic

33 Chris Brown, Understanding International Relations, 3rd ed. (Hampshire: Palgrave McMillan, 2005). 34 Tim Dunne and Brian C. Schmidt, “Realism,” in The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, 5th ed., eds. John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 87. 35 Donald E. Nuechterlein, “National Interests and Foreign Policy: A Conceptual Framework for Analysis and Decision-Making,” British Journal of International Studies, 2, no. 3 (1976): 246-266. 15

well-being in relations with other states. (iii) World Order interests: the maintenance of an international political and economic system in which the nation-state may feel secure, and in which its citizens and commerce may operate peacefully outside its borders. (iv) Ideological interests: the protection and furtherance of a set of values which the people of a national-state share and believe to be universally good. These points are stated clearly and can be used for analysing the foreign policy of state. Thus, it requires more of state’s compromising to each other in order to gain these national interests accordingly.

1.4.4 Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) When someone, specifically one who studies IR or is an IR theorist, cannot explain a current situation or foreign policy behaviour, FPA is always a great choice to begin with. In order to develop my hypotheses, I have to discuss Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA). The features of foreign policies of external states are important and affect the situation in Syria and the Assad regime. FPA will be used to help explore the foreign policies of Syria’s allies. Following Hudson, “Foreign policy decisions should be seen primarily as heightened moments of commitment in a perpetual process of action, reaction, and further action at many different levels and involving a range of different actors”.36 Therefore, FPA is regularly recognized as “decisions taken by human decision-makers in positions of authority to commit the resources of the nation-state”.37 According to Webber and Smith, “the foreign policy-maker is seen as responsible for maximising the gains and minimising the losses”.38 This research analyses bilateral relations between Syria and its allies, and tries to understand foreign policy through the lens of Realism. It emphasizes state actors, foreign policy and most importantly, state national interest. Realists concentrate on the anarchic nature of the

36 Valerie M. Hudson, Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory, 2nd ed. (Maryland: Rowman & Littkefield, 2014). 37 Ibid., p. 4. 38 Mark Webber and Michael Smith, Foreign Policy in a Transformed World (Essex: Pearson Education Limited, 2002). 16 state system that can bring about foreign policy and a state’s reaction towards other states. Using FPA helps analysis and greatly benefits the research, making it more understandable and resulting in a good piece of writing.

1.5 Hypothesis

1. The involvement of Russia, China and Iran is a response to strategic concerns related to their interests in Syria, as in game theory. They continue to support the Syrian government and assist the Assad regime in solving the conflict. The first hypothesis shows that the participation of the Syrian allies is according to their national interests. It is believed that national interests are the most powerful factors that influence a state’s policy towards another. Therefore, the Syrian allies will continue to support the Assad government to fight against terrorists and prevent international intervention. Their involvement will be essential for the Assad government. 2. Russia, China and Iran’s perceptions of sovereignty and non- intervention are considered the most valuable and powerful factors in maintaining the political regime in Syria.

The second hypothesis assumes that the ideaological principles of respecting sovereignty and non-interference are another important factor influencing the Syrian allies’ continuing support for the Assad regime. The Syrian allies have to assist Assad to maintain his position and to not let international intervention take place like what happened in Libya.

1.6 Methodology

In this research, the author uses the qualitative method. Qualitative methodology can help generate an outcome with insight and a deep analysis of the information. In-depth interviews are very important for this research and are not less important than content analysis. This research describes and explains relationships between external actors’ foreign policies and the impact on Syria. The author 17 examines foreign policies and state behaviour and their correlation to explain the recent crisis situation in Syria. Economic, political, military and social contexts are included in the study. While some people have argued that using a quantitative methodology could provide a better understanding of foreign policy, the author’s qualitative open-ended questions and use of in-depth interviews open the likelihood of more opinions and answers to find important factors motivating foreign policy choices of external actors protecting the Syrian regime.

1.6.1 Research Methods Documentary research: Content Analysis Books, articles, academic journals, and news from websites will be examined using Content Analysis. Since the Arab Spring is a fairly recent issue, finding the literature review was difficult. There have not been many books and scholarly articles written about the issue. However, there are some relevant books and academic journals which give scholarly perspectives on this research topic, not only from Western scholars but from the Middle Eastern side as well. Although literature review of books and journal articles are limited, the author would like to use documentary research in order to get extra information from other sources as well. Syria’s crisis is a recent issue, therefore, current news websites and government publications have been reporting on the situation. Content analysis from articles, journals and the news provides more information about the current situation. The author is also able to gather primary sources from websites. For instance, interviews of President Vladimir Putin, President Hassan Rouhani, President Xi Jinping, various Foreign Ministers and representatives, and specially President Bashar al-Assad on websites like Al-Jazeera, Al Arabiya, BBC, CNN, the Moscow times, Syrian Arab News Agency and other channels, which can be primary sources for obtaining information about political strategies related to Syria’s uprising and civil war. The secondary resources are from related books, scholarly journals, articles and research. Elite Interviewing Elite interviewing is another selected useful research method. Specific professionals, who can provide information, ideas, as well as suggestions for this 18 research, are interviewed. Note taking and transcripts are taken meticulously during and after each interview. Email interviewing is another method to get related answers. In order to do so, the author had a chance to meet one political science professor from Al-Mustafa University, Qom, Iran during a university study trip. The author sent questions via email to the professor regarding research related to Iran- Syria relations and policies. Political Science professors and Former Thai Ambassadors were key interviewees who provided in-depth Information about Russia and Iran politics. Moreover, policy announcements, press releases from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Syrian Arab Republic, and interviews of Syrian government officials can be analysed and used in the research as primary sources too.

1.7 Scope of Study

This research paper focuses on Syria’s uprising during the Arab Spring by examining the foreign policies of Russia, China and Iran, who are good allies to Syria. It emphasizes factors that influenced the foreign policies of external actors to support the regime of President Bashar al-Assad. During the Arab Spring, foreign policies of external actors in relation to Syria are varied. Most states, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Turkey, and the international community, including the United Nations and the Arab League, condemned the Syrian government for using violence to crackdown on political dissidents resulting in the killing of thousands of innocent civilians. The research’s focal point concentrates on the selected alliance states to the Syrian government, which are the Russian Federation, the People’s Republic of China and Islamic Republic of Iran, and attempts to disclose the motivating factors that generate their foreign policies to support the Assad regime. The scope of time for this research is from 2011 to 2014. The author is aware that during the time of this study, there was the emergence of ISIS or the Islamic States of Iraq and Al-Sham and their terrorist destruction of parts of Iraq and Syria, which has caused hardship to the world and humanitarian and refugee crises. To scope the thesis, the author does not look into the details of ISIS but does not underestimate its role either. 19

Lastly, the author is aware that the situation may evolve after the scope of this study and the author is concerned about how pivotal the future involvement of Syrian allies will be. However, the future circumstances will not affect the research result.

CHAPTER 2 REVIEW OF LITERATURE

2.1 The Syrian Uprising since the Arab Spring 2011

After the self-immolation of a Tunisian man in December 2010, the awakening of the so-called “Arab Spring” or the Arab Uprising erupted calling for the end of long Arab regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain and Syria. It took a year for some of the leaders to give up their long-governed regimes. While some of the leaders have been ousted, some leaders were re-elected, and others, like President Bashar al-Assad of Syria, are still in power. This part presents the Syrian uprising during the Arab Spring, which started in 2011, up until the ongoing civil war in the country. The importance of Syria in the Middle East will also be discussed. To begin with, the Syrian uprising was triggered by other “Arab Spring” inspired movements calling for the end of regimes. Erlich states that the “Syrian uprising lacked cohesive political or military leadership. Young men from the same village or town grouped together to form ad hoc local militias. They armed themselves with homemade rifles or supplies captured from the Syrian military”.1 Syria was a “secular dictatorship” where the rebels were confronted by torture and jailed for criticizing President Assad. Syrians usually disregarded religious differences. However, when the rebellion had begun, leaders on both sides exploited religion to create separation and to rally their troops. In addition, the “rebels relied on the Sunni Muslim majority, whereas Assad appealed to minority groups such as Alawites, Christians, and Shia Muslims”.2 Some may argue that President Assad is not a very strict religious man, however, sectarian differences cannot be overlooked. To understand the Alawites sect of Islam (the sect Bashar al-Assad believes in), one must understand some background knowledge. The Alawis or Alawites are

1 Reese Erlich, Inside Syria: The Backstory of Their Civil War and What the World Can Expect (USA: Prometheus Book, 2014), p.16. 2 Ibid., p.18. 21 believed to be a branch of the Shia Islam Sect. The word Alawi itself literally means “those who adhere to the teaching of Ali”.3 The meaning of Alawi or Alawite means: the follower of Ali, who was a cousin and son-in-law of the Muslim Prophet Muhammad, … Alawis regard Ali as a deity or God in human form and that provokes disdain from some orthodox Sunni Muslims… [S]ome scholars argue this is a misinterpretation and Alawis actually believe Ali to be an essence or form, rather than a human being, through which followers can try to “grasp God”.4 Shia Muslims also disagree with Alawites in regard to Ali being God. Alawites are around 12 per cent of the Syrian population and have been the ruling class controlling the Syrian majority, who are Sunni Muslims, for more than 40 years5. It should be noted that while Alawites possess high positions in the army and intelligence services, Sunni Muslims are underrepresented in government positions or other professions, which has created displeasure in the inequality. For President Assad, Erlich states that “Assad’s family was Alawite, a Muslim sect that had suffered poverty and discrimination under previous regimes. Alawites practiced a less-strict interpretation of Islam, and many became secular”.6 As it has been said, the Assad family is not overly religious. Assad’s father, the former President Hafez al-Assad, established “unwritten rules that every combat unit would be under the command of an Alawi officer related to him by blood or bonds of allegiance, such as the praetorian units, which were stationed around big cities, especially Damascus, and were mostly staffed by Alawis who also formed up to 25 per cent of the overall military”.7 Later in the 1980s, they acted as ‘the army of the regime’ by committing widespread massacres, and were at the forefront of the shock

3 Reuters, “Syria’s Alawites, a Secretive and Persecuted Sect,” http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/02/us-syria-alawites-sect-idUSTRE8110Q72012020 2, (accessed June 5, 2015). 4 BBC News, “The 'Secretive Sect' in Charge of Syria,” http://www.bbc.com/ news/world-middle-east-18084964 (accessed June 5, 2015). 5 Ibid. 6 Erlich, p. 69. 7 Fawaz A. Gerges, The New Middle East: Protest and Revolution in the Arab World (USA: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 194. 22 strategy used by the regime in 1982 to crack down on Hama8 which is known as the Hama Massacre.9 In the Middle East, there are four countries that have a Shia majority population: Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq, and Bahrain, while there are minority Shia populations in various countries, such as, Lebanon, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Aceh in Indonesia and many other countries. Sunnis are the majority in Syria, and Shias (including Alawites) are the minority. The Alawites are considered the Elite class in Syria and have high ranking positions in the government. It is obvious that inequality in employment exists and Sunni Muslims are under circumstances which restrict obtaining high ranking positions like the Alawites. The division of labour was inherited by Bashar al-Assad. After the uprising erupted, Alawites were believed to be victims because they are from the same sect as President Assad. These sectarian killings happened in Homs, Hama and other cities of Syria.10 However, not all Alawites have sided with President Assad because many of them still live in poverty. Only a small group of Alawites have benefits from Assad.11 The uprising began in March 2011 and even though sectarian differences were not the main issue, the gap among Syrians being treated as equals was evident. The core of the conflict is the fight between the Syrian regime and the rebel opposition groups. People are dissatisfied with the long-promised economic and political reforms. The rebellion was started by numbers of young Syrians, such as students, activists, intellectuals and leftist political parties who did not agree with the socio-economic policies of the government12. The rebels began from Homs, Aleppo, Kobane, and finally to Damascus, the capital of Syria. Firstly, the opposition called for equality in economic, social and political rights and did not mean to topple the Assad regime. Soon after the rebellion began there was a violent crackdown, which was believed to be authorised by the government. Shortly afterwards, the resignation

8 Hama is the fourth-largest city in Syria, and it was main area of Syrian civil war in 2011. 9 Gerges, p. 195. 10 Reuters. “Syria’s Alawites.” 11 Ibid. 12 Angela Joya, “Syria and the Arab Spring: The Evolution of the Conflict and the Role of the Domestic and External Factors,” Ortadogu Etutleri 4, no. 1 (2012): 27-52. 23 of President Assad was called for. The Muslim Brotherhood was the most powerful opposition, which was embodied by the Syrian National Council (SNC). It received support from Qatar, Libya and the West.13 The SNC gathered around twenty separate groups and became the voice of opposition internationally.14 They aimed to overthrow the Ba’ath regime and Ba’ath party,15 who has been ruling Syria for more than forty years. Another opposition group was the Free Syrian Army (FSA). They “began to claim responsibility for mounting military operations against the Assad regime”.16 The FSA has received support from Turkey and Gulf states. In interviews with Russian TV President Assad said that “the Free Syrian Army is widely considered to be the core of the armed and organized opposition movement. Assad believes the FSA is not free or an organized army”.17 Other domestic groups were the National Coordination Committee for Domestic Change (NCC) and Kurdish parties.18 These three were the significant domestic opposition groups protesting against the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad. Although, they received support from external states, they formed and launched the protests within the country. Next is al-Nusra, “an Islamist organisation with links to al-Qaeda that is emerging as the best-equipped, financed and motivated force fighting al-Assad’s regime”.19 The Guardian had interviewed one of the FSA members and he stated that Ideology is a powerful factor attracting FSA fighters to join al-Nusra. The factors are “Islamic doctrine: Jihad and martyrdom, sincerity, good funding and advanced weapons”.20 Cafarella states that Jabhat al-Nusra “is more subtle and insidious than ISIS, with a flow of foreign fighters and special forces”.21 Another noticeable one is ISIS or Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham. This terrorist group was believed to be the

13 Joya, p. 32. 14 Dawisha, p. 199. 15 The Ba’ath party, is the Arab socialist party branched in Syria and Iraq, has the ideology of Arab nationalism, Pan-Arabism, and Arab-socialism. 16 Dawisha, p. 184. 17 See Appendix C 18 Joya. 19 Mona Mahmood and Ian Black, “Free Syrian Army Rebels Defect to Islamist Group Jabhat al-Nusra,” The Guardian, May 8, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/ 2013/may/08/free-syria-army-rebels-defect-islamist-group. 20 Ibid. 21 Jennifer Cafarella, “Jabhat Al-Nusra in Syria: An Islamic Emmirate For Al- Qaeda,” Middle East Security Report 25 (2014): 11. 24 most hostile and cruel, the richest terrorist group, advanced in technology and media, funded by many groups, and using weapons that the U.S. provided to the Syrian opposition. ISIS has taken over parts of Syria, such as Raqqa, and Fallujah, Mosul, and others in Iraq. They have captured and killed many civilians, including foreign journalists. They have claimed to have fighters from around the world like the U.K, France, many Arab states, and Asia. ISIS is funded by the Gulf Arab states who support its fight against al-Assad.22 It is also separate from other Syrian opposition groups. It is believed that al-Nusra and ISIS have the same ideological approach to recruitment of foreign fighters including “a revived establishment of Islamic Caliphate”.23 However, there are also clashes between these opposition groups and Islamists groups. Now, ISIS has become the most hostile and advanced well-equipped terrorist groups. The emergence of ISIS in 2013 and its rise at the end of 2014 have increased international awareness of global threats to the international community. The situation became more complicated after the government used force to crackdown and stop the protests. The peaceful protest movement was turned into a devastating uprising and finally it escalated into the full-scaled Civil War that it is today. The Syrian Civil War started and the question was whether President Assad would continue to rule Syria or resign from his position of power. So far, Assad has refused to step down. In an interview with the BBC24 Assad said he would not expect more calls for protests and refused to admit that his government used force against civilians and protestors. He also promised to have reform and a future election. At that time, according to Erlich, the world community reacted and condemned the Assad regime for using sarin gas which killed hundreds of civilians, including children.25 In response to this massive use of force, the Obama administration prepared to bomb Syria in retaliation. The rebels hoped that this American action would destroy Assad’s air force and bring success to the opposition. However, the U.S. did not follow through with the bombing and managed to avoid being drawn into an active military

22 BBC News, “Syria Iraq: The Islamic State militant Group,” http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24179084 (accessed November 10, 2015). 23 Cafarella, 1-66. 24 BBC News, “Syria Conflict: BBC Exclusive Interview with President Bashar Al-Assad,” http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-31327153 (accessed July 22, 2015). 25 Erlich, p. 101. 25 intervention.26 Later on, UN inspectors investigated the use of sarin gas and chemical weapons and the UNSC called for their removal. Assad agreed to remove chemical weapons in August 2013 after the Ghouta attack. Russia and China’s roles in the UNSC resolutions will be discussed in the next chapter. Currently, the humanitarian and refugee crisis is the most concerning point for this Syrian Civil War. According to the statistics on the refugees from Syria, nearly four million people fled to neighbouring countries, such as Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey. It was considered to be the largest refugee crisis since WWII27. Due to this refugee crisis, external state actors and international organizations have become involved in assisting with this problem. Syria has always been an important state in the Middle East and in global affairs. Erlich states that although Syria has no strategic minerals, is not a main oil producer, and has no important seaports or military bases, but it has a great location.28 Syria borders Turkey, Iraq, Lebanon, Israel, and Jordan. Hinnebusch mentioned that “Syria was a pivot Arab State, when it was united under Hafiz Al-Assad, it became a regional player able to punch well above its weight. When it is divided, it becomes an arena for the struggle of external forces, all seeking to shift the regional balance of power in their favour”.29 That is evident from the role of Syria since the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1948. The Syrian uprising that led to the Civil war was in the world’s spotlight and the Syrian government’s coping response was in the forefront. The international community’s response was to maintain peace in the world. Dalacoura states that the revolution of Arab states during the Arab Spring had a complex impact on the West’s interests and policies towards the Middle East. Western actors responded to the uprising in several ways.30 She further said that the reaction towards Syria has been more ambiguous because of the “historical, political and economic relations, which

26 Marc Lynch, The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East (New York: Public Affairs, 2012). 27 Lucy Rodgers et al., “Syria: The Story of the Conflict,” BBC News, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26116868 (accessed July 2, 2015). 28 Erlich, pp. 218-219. 29 Raymond Hinnebusch, “Syria: From Authoritarian Upgrading to Revolution?” International Affairs 88, no. 1 (2012): 95-113. 30 Katerina Dalacoura, “The 2011 Uprising in the Arab Middle East: Polical Change and Geopolitical Implications,” International Affairs I, no. 88 (2012): 63-79. 26 ties it to Europe, and its sensitive geopolitical position, make al-Assad less expendable than Gaddafi”.31 That could be the reasons we have seen different approaches on Syria compared to other Arab Spring countries.

2.2 The Role of Bashar Al-Assad Government

Bashar al-Assad became the President of Syria in July 2000 after Hafez al- Assad’s death in June. Hafez al-Assad, who was the former president of Syria since 1970, had been grooming his son Bashar for several years to take over the family business of running Syria. The Syrian parliament even changed the qualifying age of the president to 34 years old.32 While this book and other journals state that Bashar was groomed to be the President by his father, President Assad spoke by himself in an interview with ABC News that his father had never talked about politics with him and never prepared him to succeed his father’s place.33 In particular, he gave Syrians hope that he would make some changes and reform the system. However, he was not successful in some ways and disappointed many Syrians by failing to loosen the dictatorial political policies of his father. “The Syrian Constitution specifies that the Ba’ath Party is the only legal political party which Assad promised to reform by allowing multiple parties”.34 Thus, the Ba’athist military and officers are still in high- ranking positions. Assad lived in a political shield absolutely convinced that he was immune from the Arab Spring. He believed his own public relations propaganda that “Syrians would never rebel against a pan-Arabism, anti-Israel, anti-imperialist fighter like himself”.35 Hinnebusch states that Assad had a project to “modernize authoritarianism in Syria”.36 With the optimism of a young man, he was determined to modernize Syria by opening the economy to the world market and adapt the country to the age of globalization. The success of Assad was that he built up his confidence in his presidential role. He successfully limited economic liberalization, for instance, he

31 Dalacoura, p. 77. 32 Erlich, p. 72. 33 See Appendix 1: ABC’s interview 34 Erlich, p. 74. 35 Ibid., p. 82. 36 Hinnebusch, p. 95. 27 ended all food and heating subsidies that not only affected the Syrian lower classes but also powerful business groups.37 The slogan ‘social market’ economy was adopted in 2005, but it was unsuccessful because the regime had no action plan for implementing a social market economy and it initially contrasted with ideologies of the Ba’ath party. Moreover, Assad allowed no genuine opposition parties, functioning trade unions, or opposition media. Jenkins reveals that the conflict in Syria will be long since there are several factors that led to the continuing civil war. After the rebellion began, there was a claim that the government responded by using force against the protestors. In an interview with ABC news, the reporter asked the President concerning this issue and President Assad responded that one should not believe what the media tells you because they do not tell the truth. After the protests called for more freedom, the government reformed laws and regulations, and revised the constitution in the country.38 He also believed that no other countries in the region, such as Turkey, Jordan or the Arab League, could isolate Syria because of Syria’s role in the region. Thus, he said that the economic sanctions from regional and international actors would not affect Syria if implemented. Finally, Assad is confident that he has the support of the majority of Syrians. Three months after the rebellion began, in June 2011, Assad gave his speech on the protests in the country. Reuters reported that “Assad believes that the unrest in Syria happened because of a foreign conspiracy that was carried out by saboteurs and extremists”.39 He has promised to reform “national dialogue, political legislation, parliamentary elections, extending Amnesty, the Muslim Brotherhood, and tackling corruption”. Moreover, he stated that, “there is no political solution with those who carry guns [saboteurs] and kill people”.40 Even though he was under pressure from media but he refused to make political reforms when extremists were still carrying out the sabotage in Syria.

37 Owen, Roger, The Rise and Fall of Arab Presidents for Life (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2012). 38 See Appendix A 39 “Highlights: Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad’s Speech on Unrest,” Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-assad-speech-idUSTRE75J1U720110620 (accessed December 10, 2015). 40 Ibid. 28

The promise of political reforms by the government and the presidential election with more than one candidate helped Assad. The election was held after three years of Syrian Civil war, in June 2014. The result was Assad won, with the successful winning of 183 parliamentary seats out of 25041 and a continued presidency for a third term. This election was criticised by some Syrians and the opposition, however, it also somehow proved that the majority of Syrians believe that Assad should be the one leading their country during this chaotic time.

2.3 Syria Relations with Russia, China and Iran during the Arab Spring

In this section, all the literature review is related to the relationship between Syria and its allies. The previous research will help the author gather information as well as to investigate them. Thus, the literature review provides a crucial background to my research. The author has separated the literature review into three topics: Russia and Syria, China and Syria, and Iran and Syria.

2.3.1 Literature Review about Russia and Syria The first article, by Allison, explains the relationship between Russia and Syria. Dr. Roy Allison is a university lecturer in the International Relations of Russia, Eastern Europe, and Eurasia, at the University of Oxford. He conducted this research in 2013 and his work provided a strong argument that is useful for my research. According to Allison, “Russia is the power which has most prominently provided a diplomatic shield for the Syrian state and bolstered it with arms suppliers, although Moscow talks about the need to ‘balance’ between the warring parties in Syria. Its de facto alignment with Damascus, reaffirmed at the June 2013 G8 Summit, has left Russia increasingly isolated internationally”.42 Thus, he argues that “the Russian critique of past western-inspired interventions is insufficient by itself to explain its policy towards Syria”.43 Therefore, the foreign policy concept of Russia is “aimed at overthrowing legitimate authorities in sovereign states under the pretext of protecting

41 Dawisha, p. 198. 42 Roy Allison, “Russia and Syria: Explaining Alignment with a Regime in Crisis,” International Affairs 89, no. 4 (2013): 795-823. 43 Allison, 795. 29 the civilian population’, efforts to ‘manage crises through unilateral sanctions and other coercive measures are a risk to world peace and stability”.44 He further discusses

Russian behaviour during the Syria crisis, the cohesion with its neighbouring countries, and the influence of the Russian arms trade with Syria which led to decision-making strategies, military security, and regional and global geopolitical considerations leading back to Russian power. Most of the concerns of Allison are oriented around Russian policy and national interests, and mainly focus on how Russia will get involved in Syria’s domestic affair. The second literature review is from Monaghan’s “the New Russian foreign policy concept: evolving continuity, written in 2013. Dr. Andrew Monaghan is a Research Fellow in the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House and Academic Visitor at St. Antony’s College, Oxford. He argues that the decision- making of Russian policy included various problems and variables. The tension between Russia and the West reflected Russia’s affairs especially over Syrian revolution over the concept of universal democracy.45 He introduced that Russia used ‘soft power’ in order to intervene in other’s internal affairs and destabilize them by manipulating public opinion. His main focus is active and evolving foreign policy which creates the gap between Russia and the West. However, this research does not specifically focus on Syria or the Middle East during the Arab Spring. It is more concentrated on Russian foreign policy towards the West. The Third article is related to the Russia-Syria relationship. The author has observed further that there are deeper reasons why Russia has got involved in the Syrian conflict. The writer, Dr. Talal Nizameddin, is the Dean at the American University of Beirut in Lebanon, writing on Russia and the Middle East during the Putin era. He revealed that Russia used a new strategy in its Middle East policy under President Putin. The arms trade and military are particularly of concern of the United States. It is similar to Allison’s argument about arms exporting. It is one of the Russian factors influencing policy-making. Thus, geopolitics or geo-strategic factors are important to Russia’s policy concerning the interfering in neighbouring countries’

44 Ibid., 796. 45 Andrew Monaghan, The New Russian Foreign Policy Concept: Evolving Continuity (London: Chatham House, 2013), pp. 1-8. 30 affairs. He compared the first term and second term under Putin’s presidency and criticizes the policies. Interestingly, he states that in the “Russian mind-set, Syria was a means of stonewalling Western influence in Southwest Asia…and Iran and Syria are Russia’s two major friends in the region”.46 Putin’s choices and Syria’s framework were regime protection and religious issues. The strength analysis by Nizameddin gave insight into the deep personal relationship between both leaders. Overall, global security is mentioned as well as regional strategic concerns. The fourth article is written by Dr. Dmitry Primus Gorenburg, an associate at Harvard University’s Davis Centre for Russian and Eurasian Studies, and who has expertise on Russian and Eurasian security issues and Russian politics. Gorenburg’s main arguments are: first, “Russia’s leaders’ primary goal has been to prevent the establishment of a norm that allows for international intervention in response to government repression of domestic protests or violent uprising”, and second, the “Russian government has sought to counter what it perceives as U.S. strategic gains in the Middle East, especially economic factors”.47 He explained the reasons Putin is pushing Russian foreign policy toward supporting the authoritarian regime of Syria. He noted that Russia became the protector of the Assad regime due to Russian economic investment as well as the historic relationship with Syria. He argues that Russia’s foreign policy participate in forming the response in the Arab Spring and the spreading of political instability, both in economic and strategic interests.48 Economically, Russia fears regime change in Syria because it will affect the trade of Russia. Moreover, more important than economic effects are the political factors that will emerge if Syria’s regime fails. Russia will lose a dependable ally as well as a naval logistic base in Syria. Gorenburg further discussed the UNSC vetoes by Russia, which were different for the Libya and the Syria Resolution from the Security Council. Lastly, “Russia’s Policy on Syria: On the Way to Isolation?” by Dr. Margarete Klien, a Senior Associate from the German Institute for International and

46 Talal Nizameddin, “The Reasons Behine Putin's Support for Bashar Al-Assad's Regime,” Cicero Foundation Graet Debate Paper 12, no. 5 (2012): 1-10. 47 Dimitry Gorenburg, “Why Russia Supports Repressive Regimes in Syria and the Middle East,” Ponars Eurasia 198 (2012): 1-5. 48 Ibid. 31

Security Affairs (SWP). She explained why Russia is the key player in Syria’s crisis. She agrees with other scholars that Russia acted as a protector of the Assad regime and Syria is of geopolitical importance to Russia. Their bilateral relationship led to Russia’s UNSC veto blockade, the refusal to condemn Assad’s regime, and Russia’s position in the Arab awakening of democracy.49 She presents Russia’s interests and motives as Syria’s economic trading partner, especially in terms of Weaponry. However, Russia’s policy towards Syria can be risky and could affect Russia negatively. The protecting of the Assad regime could isolate Russia internationally. Regionally, apart from Russia, only Iran tends to protect Syria. She argues that if Russia supports Syria until the end, Russia will be forced to expand its relations with Iran, which is not an ideal outcome for Russia.50 So, at the same time, Russia has to find a way to save its face if the Syrian crisis does not turn out as Russia would expect.

2.3.2 Literature Review about China and Syria First of all, the main factor of Chinese foreign policy is international law and the right of intervention. Christopher Holland has written about China’s role in the UNSC, sovereignty and intervention.51 Part of his research is contributed to China’s position on Syria and its Veto power. There are some veto votes from China and Russia concerning the sanctions against Syria. China has reasons according to the UN Charter about the principles of non-interference and China has had experience from the Libya resolution earlier. For Syria, China may have evaluated that there was “nothing to gain” from supporting the resolution on Syria. Thus, China’s veto power is very important and China reaffirms its principle of Non-Intervention. National Interests and benefits are the reasons that China is concerned with voting in the UNSC on the Syrian resolution. The characteristics of Realism can be seen in this review article. National interests are key for decision-making. This article assures the principle of non-intervention that China experienced during the time of the Libya

49 Margerete Klien, “Russia's Policy on Syria: On the Way to Isolation?” Syrian Center for Politics & Strategic Studies, http://www.scpss.org/libs/spaw/uploads/files/Policy/ 03-30-2012_Russia’s_Policy_on_Syria_Klein.pdf (updated March 30, 2012). 50 Ibid., p. 9. 51 Christopher Holland, “Chinese Attitudes to International Law: China, the Security Council, Sovereignty, and Intervention,” NYU Journal of International Law and Politics Online Forum (July 2012): 1-44. 32 resolution. It is easy to see how China exercises its veto power in the UNSC. The relationship between China and Russia is also a main reason for China making the decision to veto and also to warn the West about their close relations. The second journal is “Syria: What China had learned from its Libya experience”,52 written by Yun Sun who was a former visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution. Sun also considers China’s veto in the UNSC of the Syria resolution and he agrees with the article above. The writer also discovers that China has developed its own strategy to deal with the Syrian situation which China chooses to “wait and see”. The result of China’s veto can protect Syria and Assad from military intervention. Since China abstained for Libya rather than use veto power, it had given the lesson to learn for China. So that, Chinese government considers that it would not be better if they voted for the UNSC Resolution against Syria. The effort that China did in Libya turned out to be negative and the West will look at China as “an undemocratic country with poor human rights record and the Arab States will always side with the West”.53 In contrast, China’s veto could help Russia not being isolated on the international stage. Thus, China could also gain Sino-Russia diplomatic cooperation. In sum, Sun concludes that China’s policy and the new strategies towards the Arab Spring were getting more mature, flexible, and sophisticated ways. “Chinese Views of the Syrian Conflict”54 by Michael D. Swaine is another noteworthy research. It stated about Chinese foreign policy and applied it into many current conflicts in the recent decade. This research described how China has faced and taken part in solving international crises. In conclusion, Swaine evaluates Chinese leadership’s perspective towards Syria and its role in the UNSC. The UN Charter does not give states the right to carry out military intervention into another state in attempt to solve a dispute. Using force is not always the way to solve a problem. It is also reaffirmed that China believes in the principle of non-intervention and the notion of sovereignty, which does not allow states to intervene into other states. So, there is no sign that China will accept any attempt of using force to militarily intervene or

52 Yun Sun, “Syria: What China Has Learned From Its Libya Experience,” Asia Pacific Bulletin 152 (2012): 1-2. 53 Ibid., p. 2. 54 Michael D. Swaine, “Chinese Views of the Syrian Conflict,” China Leadership Monitor 39 (2012): 1-18. 33 sanction international pressure against Syria. From China’s previous vetoes in the UNSC, it is clear what China’s motivations are. Following Swaine, they are to prevent the establishment of legal patterns for military intervention by the international community and to prevent the U.S. and Western powers to use the R2P norm in order to topple sovereign governments. However, the writer suggests that China gains a positive outcome as well. Other states could not intervene into China either. Lastly, the final literature review also focuses on the role of China and Russia in the UNSC and how they vetoed for the UNSC Resolutions against Syria three times.55 The vetoes from China and Russia signify that their strategies of decision-making contrast to the previous votes for Libya. The crux of this research is that the writer has brought the intention of Russia and China to the forefront. They aim to challenge the West, especially the U.S. position in global affairs. China is mostly concerned about the American government’s view of the rise of China’s power and they do not want to allow anything to disturb their rising prosperity. In conclusion, Ferdinand pointed out that Russia and China have a shared common value as members of the UN P-5. Their decisions in the UNSC are significant and can affect how the UN moves forward. At the same time, it presents a challenge to their status against the U.S.

2.3.3 Literature Review about Iran and Syria The first piece of literature is from David Warren Lesch, who is a professor at Trinity University and author of many books concerning Middle East affairs, especially in Syria. He depicts the relationship between Syria and Iran and Iranian’s influence into the Middle East through the old Arab proverb “the enemy of my enemy is my friend”. Since Syria supported Iran in its fight against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein, they have had a close relationship in which is an important alliance. From his study, he argued that Iran and Syria are good allies as long as their policies are anti-US domination in the region. The relationship between Syria and Iran can be noticed since the period of Hafiz al-Assad, the Iranian Revolution in 1979, and the

55 Peter Ferdinand, The Positions of Russia and China at the UN Security Council in the Light of the Recent Crises (Brussel: Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, 2013), pp. 1-37. 34

Iraq-Iran War in 1980s.56 In addition, Iran is a sponsor of Hezbollah, both military and financially, which led Syria to have a closer relationship with Lebanon.57 He states that he was not surprised by the strong relationship between Damascus and Tehran, but he was surprised about the escalation of violence in Syria’s revolution, which could lead to the fall of President Assad. Another literature review, written by Dr Katerina Dalacoura, is about the uprising in the Arab Middle East. Dr Katerina Dalacoura is an Associate Professor in International Relations from the London School of Economics and Political Science. She is an expert on Western policy and the Middle East, Middle East Affairs and Political Islam. She is concerned about the geopolitics of the Middle East and relationships among Arab States during the Arab Spring. She states that “geopolitically, the Syrian crisis has even more profound implications for Iran”.58 The effect of the Arab Spring may cause an important “decline of one Islamist model (Iran’s) and the ascent of another (Turkey’s)”.59 Therefore, the role of Iran in the region could be affected by this uprising more or less. She noted that the Arab uprising may impact the balance of power between the United States and Iran, but it will not challenge the core tenet and concerns of US policy in the Middle East.60 In sum, she concluded that the Arab Spring may affect the balance of power of the whole region and also will affect the status of non-Arab powers like Iran, Turkey, Israel and the West too. The article also discusses geopolitics and the balance of power, the core factors of realism. Fred H. Lawson has studied about the relationship between Syria and Iran and their strategic partnership.61 He is a professor at Mills College and has written many books and articles about Middle East affairs. This paper takes a close look at the policy-oriented research between Syria and Iran. He discusses the relationship between Syria and Iran by showing Syria’s policies towards adversaries (Turkey, Iraq

56 David W. Lesch, Syria: The Fall House of Assad (New Heaven and London: Yale University Press, 2012), pp. 125-127. 57 Ibid., p. 126. 58 Dalacoura, 79. 59 Ibid., 77. 60 Ibid., 78 61 Fred H. Lawson, “Syria's Relations with Iran: Managing the Dilemmas of Alliance,” Middle East Journal 61, no. 1 (2007): 29-47. 35 and Israel). If the Syrian government decided to conciliate with the main adversary states, Iran would be apprehensive that Syria would abandon it. He states that “when Damascus has policies challenging its opponents, Iran can assume to be more confident and assertive”.62 He further explains about Iran’s role in Lebanon and the relationship between Syria and Hezbollah. It has been a long relationship between Syria and Iran. Notably, Lawson sums up the relationship of Iran and Syria, by saying “Allies are less likely to restrain themselves under these circumstances: since 1) they stand to lose nothing if the initiatives they undertake further alienate their alliance partners and 2) dangerous initiatives might actually convince straying partners to return to the fold”63 Thus, he discusses Glenn Synder’s “alliance dilemma” by showing many cases when Syria had moderate policies toward adversaries, which directly affected Iran’s policy as well. In sum, this article describes that when one state (Syria or Iran) uses moderate strategies and policies with their opposed states, its ally will assume to have a preliminary policy towards that adversary too. Mohammad Ayoob writes about “Turkey and Iran in the Era of the Arab Springs”64 in which he compares the relationship between Syria-Iran and Syria- Turkey and also sees the involvement of Iran and Turkey in the Arab Spring. The “two major non-Arab” powers are mentioned to be Iran and Turkey. They have played a crucial role in the Arab Spring and in the Middle East region. Syria has been a key ally of Iran since the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and also supported Iran during the Iraq-Iran war, while almost all Arab states supported Iraq. The response of Iran and Turkey during the Arab Spring was quite clear. They would like to see a democratic uprising. Turkey was always a role model for Arab countries to have democracy and overthrow authoritarian leaders. At the same time, Iran would like to see Arab revolutions, which means an overthrow of pro-Western Arab dictators like Gaddafi and Mubarak. However, Ayoob noted that both Turkey and Iran were in jeopardizing relations because of the unpredictable outcomes of the Arab Spring and the upheavals and civil wars like in Syria. Turkey has faced many refugees and Syria

62 Lawson, 30. 63 Ibid., 33. 64 Mohammed Ayoob, “Turkey and Iran in the Era of the Arab Spring,” in The New Middle East: Protest and Revolution in the Arab World, ed. Fawaz A. Gerges (USA: Cambridge, 2014), pp. 402-417. 36 did not follow their promise to seek a peaceful resolution. Instead they used force and brutal suppression against protesters. Therefore, this turned Turkey against the Assad regime. Tehran could not let the Assad regime fail and continues supporting Assad. Components of realism can be seen in this paper by looking at national interests that both Iran and Turkey will gain from relations with Syria. All in all, the literature review provides sufficient information and previous research. Most scholars are concerned about policy makers and national interests that lead to policy decisions. Therefore, this research will be conducted by finding in- depth motivated factors that explain why Russia, China, and Iran have been supporting Syria. Realism best explains national interests, state concerns, and game theory. That understanding will clarify policy strategies and allying with Syria. Game theory, which the author has introduced in the previous chapter, is key to this research in finding out why these Syrian allies act the way they do and to prove their actions by using the game theory pattern. The impact of external actors’ foreign policy on Syria influences strategies at both the regional and international level. Some argue that Russia played a role and paid attention to neighbouring countries, which led to its rising image in the international relations arena. Whereas others argue that it might lead to isolation to Russia itself. Moreover, Russia’s and Iran’s anti-western ideology uses the Syrian strategic variable to prevent western influence in the Middle East region. These Syrian allies fear the failing of Syria’s regime and that affects their relationships in the Middle East. The author will conduct and reveal factors that these external allies have projected towards Syria. Syria is a good ally with Russia, China and Iran and what interests or gains Syria can get, outside of the continuation of the regime, will also be discussed. The author has reviewed the literature and seen that the argument of Realist are suitable for explaining the decisions of Russia, China and Iran’s relations to Syria. However, the Constructivism school of thought can also be applied to understand the idea about ideas, norms and other elements that can lead states to behave in one way and shape their foreign policies. In terms of Realism, Lawson states that “the Structural Realists give the main priority to maximizing their individual well-being, and do their best to guard against being attacked, conquered, or otherwise exploited 37 by others”.65 He further suggests that when the states pursue for reaching the most of their security under other states’ anarchy, it will culminate in jeopardizing other states’ interests. The distribution of power is also taken into consideration. The U.S. is labelled to be a superpower and they acted unilaterally when they sent troops to Iraq in 2003. While Russia is considered to be the main competitive power, China and the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) are also rising powers, especially economically. Lawson describes a “Multipolar World”66 as a world with more than three great powers and more groupings of states. In the Middle East, there are regional powers, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and non-Arab states like Israel and Iran. Iran is a powerful regional player and according to Fawcett, Iran became stronger after the 2003 Iraq War.67 Iran appears as a state that has an anti-Western state policy, therefore, it is hard to reconcile with the wider regional or international community. Constructivism can explain principles that states believe in. For example, constructivism offers an open perspective to look further than just material factors like economics and military. It looks deeper into the structure of how states behave according to their state identities and structure of power. The foreign policy can be shaped from norms and beliefs of state actors or individuals. Constructivism is another selected school of thought to be used as a framework to analyse data in this research.

65 Fred H. Lawson, “International Relations Theory and the Middle East,” in International Relations of the Middle East, 3rd ed., ed. L’Strange Fawcett (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 21. 66 Ibid., p. 22. 67 Fawcett, p. 187. 38

CHAPTER 3 SYRIAN’S IMPORTANT ALLIES AND THEIR RELATIONS

In order to understand one foreign policy of one state, it is important to study and comprehend briefly about their historical relationship among selected states. It is crucial to know about basic national interests, political situations, and economic, social, and other related variables. The principles of sovereignty and non- intervention and anti-western sentiments will be focused on. These variables are the general background that can be applied to the analysis part of the next chapter. This chapter is divided into three parts; the explanation of the three important external allies which are Russia, China and Iran respectively.

3.1 The Imporatant Ally (1) Russia

Russia is the largest country in the world and has been playing a crucial role on the international stage since World War I. Russia remains a very significant player in international affairs in all aspects; politically, economically, militarily, social and others. The chief of state is President Vladimir Putin, who was appointed in May 7, 2012. The goal of Russia’s foreign policy during the last decade was “to create a multipolar system on the basis of statist values and norms, with Russia as an indispensable pole”.1 In order to do so, Russia needs a lot of power and influence and support from other states who are willing to pursue the same goal. In particular, Russia and Syria are considered as important allies with longstanding ties. This part of the research explores their relationship before and during the Arab Spring, and attempts to investigate Russian foreign policy towards Syria. An elite interview with Lecturer Jittipat Poonkham, who is an expert on Russian political affairs, at Thammasat University, is another beneficial facet to this research.2 He pointed out significant factors for Russia’s goal of gaining status of a superpower and participating in most of the global affairs to show its ability and

1 Azuolas Bagdonas, “Russia’s Interests in the Syrian Conflict: Power, Prestige, and Profit,” European Journal of Economic and Political Studies 5, no. 2 (2012): 72. 2 Jittipat Poonkham (Lecturer at Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University) in discussion with the author, August 2015. 39 responsibility as a superpower. Russia also presents its role through the UNSC as a mechanism to defend itself as a superpower.

3.1.1 History of Russian Foreign Policy towards the Middle East To begin with, the Russia Empire in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries expanded to southward regions. The expansion brought frequent conflicts with the Ottoman Empire and Persia, as well as with the competing empires of Britain and France. During that time, the Soviet Union under Lenin, Stalin, and their successors, engaged in active diplomacy in the region and competed for territory and influence with the countries of the Middle East and with Western “imperialism”.3 Even though, the collapse of the USSR occurred after the Second World War, the Russian Federation has been geographically separated from the Middle East by having the Caucasus and Central Asia in between. Moscow has essential interests in the Caucasus areas, which were former Soviet republics, because of the large energy reserves they contain. Likewise, Russia has foreign policy interests towards the Middle East because of the energy resources. That has made the area a high priority for Russia.4 Russia has long been in a relationship with the Middle East. Russia has the primary concern of being in relationship and remaining cooperative with the Persian Gulf States, not only for oil, but also for other objectives. According to Donaldson and Nogee, Russia’s relations with the Arab world and its goals are as the following:5 1) Ensuring Russia’s national security, 2) Preventing the spread of political and military fires in the Middle East to the increasingly unstable regions of the Caucasus and Central Asia, 3) Making use of the potential in the Arab states to help solve Russia’s economic problems. During the Cold War period, there were struggles between two major powers, the United States, and Russia. Syria and Russia’s relations were re- established after it was in decline in the 1980s because of Russia’s relationship with

3 Robert H. Donaldson and Joseph L. Nogee, The Foreign Policy of Russia: Changing Systems, Enduring Intersts, 4th ed.(New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2009). 4 Ibid., p. 296. 5 Ibid., p. 305. 40

Israel. The U.S. was strong with its political ideology of democracy, economy and military strengths, while Russia was respite from armed conflict and rebuilding its economy. Judah emphasizes that Russia had made attempts to remove American influences in Central Asia and become a closer partner with China to counter America in the UNSC, and to maximize relationships with the U.S. foes such as Venezuela, Iran and Syria.6 In addition, “Vladimir Putin worked to rebuild Russia’s relations with the Middle Eastern allies from the Cold War period. Syria, Libya, and Iraq were at the centre of an attempt that could provide the counterbalance to U.S. dominance in the region. Iran, a vehement opponent of the U.S. and a close ally of Syria, was also part of this axis”.7 Under Putin, relations with Syria and the Middle East can be said to be pursuing Russian security, economic interests and a competing role to the U.S. Russia and the Middle East have had a key economic alliance. Russia has worked to develop relations across the region. For instance, in 1993, Russia and Kuwait signed a military cooperation agreement for joint manoeuvres and exchanged military delegations. Russia sold arms to Kuwait worth $750 million.8 Moreover, Russia and Syria had an agreement for the repayment of debt from 1994 to be paid in 2015. Obviously this cooperation paved the way for better relations. Nowadays, Russia has a presence at a Mediterranean naval base in Syria along with 2,000 military personnel and civilians and specialists working in Syria.9 Russia sustains its influence on Iran, and has considerably expanded ties with Turkey, Israel, and Afghanistan from time to time. Lastly, Russia has sought to restrain Western leaders from military intervention or imposing additional sanctions on Iran, while trying to make negotiations. With the arms trade and agreements between Russia and other Arabs states, it can be said that they are close partners.

6 Ben Judah, Fragile Empire: How Russia Feel In and Out of Love with Vladimir Putin (Cornwall: TJ International, 2013). 7 Dimitry Gurenburg, “Why Russia Supports Repressive Regimes in Syria and the Middle East,” PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo no. 198 (2012): 3-4. 8 Donaldson and Nogee, p. 306. 9 Ibid., p. 313. 41

3.1.2 Russian Foreign Policy towards Syria Russia’s relationship with the Middle East is important and a key point to investigate is Russia’s foreign policy towards Syria. Russia is concerned with the Middle East issues and the events that happen in the region as part of its policy to expand its power. The external events and structural changes could not been ignored, such as the Arab Spring. These events have had an impact on Russia’s foreign policy. The Russian government has been responding to the Arab Spring as one of the important political players. However, the response choices have been mediated by internal political factors, and by collective and individual perceptions. Allison explained that after Putin became the Russian President for the second time the “Russian Foreign ministry’s foreign policy concept disdained the idea of implementing and aiming to overthrow legitimate authorities in sovereign states under the pretext of protecting the civilian population”.10 In other words, Russian government disagree with toppling down a legitimate regime or government of one sovereign state. Cadier and Light emphasize the contrary perception of President Putin in relation to public protests, opposition movements, and the interpretation of and reaction to the Arab Spring. These responses should be examined by focusing on Russia’s internal situation, which is not simply through a regime change lens. These movements could bring Sunni fundamentalists into power like those who fight against Russia in the North Caucasus.11 Likewise, Klein states that Moscow cares about the Arab Spring where “Islamist forces were able to expand their power after overthrowing previous rulers”. Therefore, “Russia is fearful that the Islamist forces could destabilise its own fragile southern flank (the Northern Caucasus and Central Asia)”.12 While Poonkham draws attention to the “Grand project” of Russia, which is to be recognized as a world superpower, Russia acts to protect its intimate allies in the Middle East and its neighbour’s issues, such as Crimea.

10 Roy Allison, “Russia and Syria: Explaining Alignment with a Regime in Crisis,” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944) 89, no. 4 (2013): 796. 11 David Cadier and Margot Light, Russia's Foreign Policy: Ideas, Domestics and External Relations (Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015). p. 215. 12 Margerete Klein, “Russia’s Policy on Syria: On the Way to Isolation?” Syrian Center for Political & Strategic Studies, http://www.scpss.org/libs/spaw/uploads/files/policy/ 03-30-2012_Russia’s_Policy_on_Syria_Klein.pdf (updated March 30, 2012). 42

According to Cadier and Light, there is a major military build-up which is designed to build a foundation for Russia’s foreign policy autonomy, while guarding against attempts to achieve forcible ‘regime change’ at home. Russia is “convinced a strong army is needed in the unfolding world order”, especially as Western “use of military force has undermined many of the ethical norms of international relations”.13 The West justified attacking and intervening in Yugoslavia, Iraq and Libya, on humanitarian grounds, but in the end the world witnessed that weaker states get attacked while stronger ones do not. For example, the US-led intervention in Iraq in 2003 and the regime of Saddam Hussein was eliminated, while the nuclear regime in North Korea, which is considered to have an inferior human rights record, remains untouched.14 The Arab Spring showed the vulnerability of longstanding authoritarian rules. The Libya intervention led by Western states illustrated “how action for humanitarian objectives could easily escalate into a determination to replace the local leadership”.15 Russia has numerous motivations to support the Syrian regime of Assad. Russia and China have the common motivating force of not allowing Western- supported regime change in sovereign states. Donaldson and Nogee state that Putin criticized NATO-led intervention in Libya. Russian President believes that the humanitarian support should not have resulted in the execution of Gaddafi and to the fall of his regime. Putin also insisted that there should not be an intervention in Syria like the Libyan scenario. Poonkham emphasizes that Libyan situation is significant for Russia and proves that humanitarian intervention cannot always solve internal conflicts. Libya is not better than previously under Gaddafi’s regime. According to Chivvis and Martini, the situation in Libya after the war and NATO intervention is difficult. It is now “a country that lacks basic political and security institutions, without some direct international military support”16 as well as the need of economic reforms. Particularly, this was the reason why Russia and China vetoed the UN

13 Cadier and Light, pp. 72-73. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid., p. 85. 16 Christopher S. Chivvis and Jeffrey Martini, “Libya after Qaddafi Lessons and Implications for the Future,” RAND (2014): 1-97. 43

Security Council resolutions that could have led to authorization of armed intervention in Syria.17 Russian foreign policy towards Syria and limiting U.S. influence in the region can be seen as noteworthy variables. Syria is one of the Middle East states that is not under U.S. domination. Therefore Syria has had long relations with Russia and is willing to cooperate. The obvious response of Russia to the Assad regime is Russia will stand by Syria and will not allow the regime to easily fall. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov argues that the dangerous part of the whole internal crisis was the belief that foreign countries would help to overthrow the regime and assistance from the international community is like an invitation to civil war.18 These acts of Russia’s support of Assad were blamed by the Obama administration, claiming that Russia’s arms and uncompromising vote at the UN have kept Assad in power. Secretary of State John Kerry also blamed the Russians for continuing to arm Assad, which is creating an outrageous problem.19 Erlich states that Russia has been enabling the regime to brutally repress its own people while maintaining Russian influence in the region because Russia has its own perceived national interests at stake.20

3.1.3 Role of Russia in UNSC and Its Veto Power The role of Russia in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is remarkable. Russia has consistently supported the Syrian regime by vetoing military intervention in Syria. Russia has four diplomatic strategy principles at the UN, which are:21 1) a steadfast adherence to absolute sovereignty and the prioritization of dialogue over the use of force to resolve conflicts;

17 Donaldson and Nogee, p. 20. 18 Allison, 797. 19 Erlich, p. 227. 20 Ibid., p. 228. 21 Peter Ferdinand, The Positions of Russia and China at the UN Security Council in the Light of the Recent Crises (Brussel: Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, 2013), p. 13. 44

2) the conviction that Chap. VII operations must have the consent of governments against whom they are directed, expect where UN agencies can show clear evidence of breaches of UN rules; 3) support for government efforts to promote social and economic development, with stability prioritized over human rights; 4) the upholding and strengthening of the rule of law in international relations. Russia is concerned for the UN principle of state sovereignty and can be seen from above as Russia’s main diplomacy. Previously, the representatives of the Soviet Union and Russia in the UNSC repeatedly voted to support international sanctions on Iraq, but Moscow probably ranked second only to Baghdad itself in the amount of economic harm it suffered as a result. It resulted in a huge amount of debt and gave Russia an economic crisis. Yeltsin’s persistence in supporting costly UN Sanctions was prominently used by his domestic political opponents as a prime example of Russia’s sacrificing its own interests to satisfy the West.22 Moreover, Russia decided not to veto UNSC resolution 1973 concerning Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi and the use of force against him. That means Russia does not always block and refuse western-led interventions. Bagdonas reveals that “Russian foreign policy decision-makers felt that Russia’s abstention on UN Security Council’s resolution 1973 authorizing a no-fly zone over Libya was grossly misinterpreted and abused by Western countries to oust Gaddafi and change Libya’s regime”.23 According to Chivvis and Martini, “Russia, China and South Africa argued that NATO was exceeding the mandate approved in Resolution 1973 and had crossed the line between civilian protection and regime change… NATO was now seeking to overthrow Gaddafi”.24 At the same time, Russia was worried about revolutions in the Middle East, and Russian officials continued to voice concern about the possible radicalization of Middle Eastern states. Gurenburg supports the argument that Russia did not wish to alienate Western leaders who were pushing for the intervention, and Russian leaders did not expect to be accused of obstructing the intervention in

22 Donaldson and Nogee, p. 305. 23 Bagdonas, 57. 24 Chivvis and Martini, 1-97. 45

Libya.25 He states that Russian leaders were willing to allow a no-fly zone, but they did not want to witness a NATO-led military intervention to oust the Libyan authoritarian regime that was a close ally to Russia. In comparison, Russia and China vetoed the U.S.-European-sponsored UNSC draft resolutions regarding Syria. Syria’s situation was influenced by the situation in Libya. Russia feared that these resolutions would be interpreted in a way to give permission for military intervention and regime change in Syria, similar to Libya. Tsygankov reaffirms that, the Russian government instead supported for negotiations between Bashar al-Assad and the military opposed groups.26 Furthermore, in April 2012, the BRIC summit in India additionally promoted negotiations in Syria. Hereafter May 2012, the Kremlin took steps to accept the possibility of removing Assad from the position, but not at the cost of dismantling the Syrian regime or losing Russia’s influence over it”.27 It can be stated that Russian government became aware of the military intervention in Libya case that ousted the regime of Gaddafi. They do not intend the same outcome for the Assad. Russia’s witnessing of the Libya regime getting overthrown made Russia more concerned of its voting and vetoing power in the UNSC about resolutions that could bring about intervention. The list of UNSC resolutions vetoed by Russia and China are presented in TABLE 1, and the list of approved UNSC resolutions are in TABLE 2. Russia traditionally has strong ties with Syria. Russia’s support for Syria’s Assad regime has confronted intense criticism from the United States and Europe. Cadier and Light mention that two weeks after Putin’s second term of Presidency, Russia and China teamed up for the first of their double vetoes in the UNSC on resolutions to take action against Assad’s government for its brutal suppression of opposition groups that sought to bring the Arab Spring to Syria.28

25 Gorenburg, 4. 26 Andrei P. Tsygankov, “Foreign Policy,” in Return to Putin's Russia: Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain, 5th ed., ed. Stephen K. Wegren (Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), pp. 246-247. 27 Ibid. 28 Cadier and Light, p. 129. 46

Furthermore, the UN doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) was brought to attention. The Principle of R2P was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2005. The R2P is described as: the principle that if a states fails to protect its populations from mass atrocities –or is in fact the perpetrator of such crimes –the international community must step in to protect the victims, with the collective use of force authorized by the UNSC.29 In other words, if one state is unable to protect their citizens or reluctant to protect the people, the international community can seek to adopt the R2P. Erlich states that Russia would likely veto any such authorization concerning R2P and humanitarian intervention in the Security Council. “If a multinational force cannot be assembled, then at least some countries should step up and organize Syria’s democratically oriented rebel groups to provide the necessary force on the ground”.30 Hence, Russia vetoed the Syria draft resolution against the use of force by UN-led authorization in Syria. Russia has its own stance when getting involved in international issues and conflicts. Russia has to show its power and concentrate on its main policy goals. Nevertheless, by blocking international intervention in the UNSC, Russia maintains its influence in the region as well as the balance power with the U.S. The strategic concerns of Russia are the most considerable factors that influence Russia to support Syria.

3.1.4 Economic and Military Relations During the Cold War, Russia had a difficult time dealing with the collapse of the Soviet Union, especially economically. Russia has undergone significant changes since the collapse of the Soviet Union, moving from a globally-isolated, centrally-planned economy towards a more market-based and globally-integrated economy.31 Russia and Syria have had a long trading relationship, even though Syria is not in the top ten trading partners of Russia.

29 Erlich, p. 225. 30 Ibid. 31 CIA World Factbook (Washington DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2015), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rs.html. 47

The Middle East is the second largest market of Russia’s arms exports. According to Gorenburg, before the Arab Spring occurred, “Algeria, Syria, and Libya were regularly featured in lists of the top five customers for Russian military equipment, while Yemen, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Morocco have also signed contracts for Russian arms in recent years”.32 The arms trade between Russia and Syria is crucially importance. Russia and Syria have been trading arms and military equipment since the 1950s. Statistics show that in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War (Yom Kippur War) Syria imported 4,000 tons of Russian weaponry to rearm the Syrian and Egyptian army.33 Once Russia suspended the arms trade with Syria in 1976 but they restarted trading two years later. After the Soviet Union collapsed, Russia resumed trading with Syria. According to Bagdonas, 78 percent of all arms trade from Russia to Syria was during 2007-2011.34 However, Syria is not considered a large arms trade partner with Russia when compared to China, India and Iran. Although the arms market in Syria is not considered a large market for Russia, Russia still backs up Syria due to many other variables. The Presidents of the two countries have exchanged visits to each other’s country. In January 2005, President Bashar al-Assad visited Moscow and agreed to pay Syrian debt to Russia (the outstanding debt was from under President Yeltsin of Russia with an amount of from $13.4 billion to $3.6 billion during the Cold War).35 In 2010, President Medvedev visited Damascus and expressed that Syria is important to Russia and its presence in the Middle East. He will continue to assist the peace process for the Arab-Israel conflict.36 Syria purchased fighter jets and surface-to-air missile systems from Russia37 and in 2011 a report shows that the Syrian government purchased $1 billion worth of arms.38 This indicates that Russia and Syria are willing

32 Gorenburg, 2. 33 Global Security, “Syria – Arms Imports,” http://www.globalsecurity.org/ military/world/syria/arms-imports.htm (accessed December 15, 2015). 34 Bagdonas, 65. 35 Donaldson and Nogee, p. 313. 36 Andrej Kreutz, “Syria: Russia's Best Asset in the Middle East. Russie.Nei. Visions no. 55 (2010): 1-23. 37 Donaldson and Nogee, p. 313. 38 Global Security. 48 to continue their relationship in the arms trade even though Russia has faced criticism from the U.S. to cease selling arms to the Assad regime. The main economic relations between Russia and Syria are dealing arms. However, Moscow and Damascus’ relationship is not reliant on economics alone. There is also a strategic military facet to their relationship. Moscow has access to the Mediterranean through their naval base in Syria at the Naval base port of Tartus. It was established in 1971 to train military and naval activities until 1991. Since then, it has mainly been used for resupplying warships.39 Gurenburg states, The Tartus port is not a true military base, because there are Russian military personnel no more than 50 sailors. There are two floating piers, a floating repair facility, and a supply depot. It mainly uses for repairing and resupplying Russian navy ships transiting the Mediterranean.40 However, this Navy base is regarded as the most important Russian navy base in the Middle East. The Tartus port allows Russia to reach the Indian Ocean and Red Sea via the Suez Canal. One can notice that this may be the reason why Russia supports Syria. It has a military base that allows access to the Middle East. Therefore, if the Syrian regime fails, it could lead to the closing of this Naval base and its facility in Tartus. Russia has a strong interest in this important naval base because it is the only path to the Mediterranean Sea. Russia will not allow the regime of Assad to easily collapse by international intervention.

3.1.5 Russian Geo-Politic Strategy towards Syria Russia has a fair relationship with the Middle East and supports the peace process between Israel and the Arab countries. Syria appears to be the closet Middle East country to Russia. Geo-politically, Syria is located among major Arab states and has been a key Arab state. When the Arab Spring occurred, Russia had to assist Syria to get through the crisis. First of all, Russia views the Syrian conflict through the lens of a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran in the Greater Middle East. Cadier and Light illustrate that for Moscow, “Saudi Arabia and its friends are viewed as geopolitical foes

39 Bagdonas, 61. 40 Gurenburg, 3. 49 because they support jihadist groups in the North Caucasus in Russia and secondarily in central Asia and Afghanistan”.41 Iran is Russia’s geopolitical ally in this regard because Iran also views Saudi Arabia as a competitor to be the leader of the Islamic world. Bagdonas suggests that there are two broad areas of Russia’s strategic interests that explains Russia’s role in supporting the Assad regime. First, Russia has attempted to re-establish itself as a global actor and be a great power whose concerns and interests have to be accommodated to or at least taken into account and to balance power with U.S. world hegemony.42 Therefore, Russia exercises power through the UNSC. Second, Russia would like to expand or at least preserve its influence in the Middle East. Syria and Iran are main allies to Russia in the region. All in all, Russia has proven that it supports the Syrian government and is against international attempts to impose sanctions and conduct military intervention against Syria. Russia has provided a diplomatic shield by vetoing the draft resolutions in the UNSC. It is clearly showed that Russia has attempted to warn the international community not to repeat Libya’s lesson of intervention. It has also proved the close alliance they have and are willing to let the government of al-Assad to handle the civil war without international intervention. One of the reasons is that Russia is not willing to witness the regime of Assad to be overthrown and eliminated like Libya’s Gaddafi, which will be another western-led intervention to overthrow the legitimated and authoritarian leadership. Another is that Russia has close relations with Syria and would like to respect the sovereignty of Syria. Russia’s attempt to be part of the global conflict and shows it desires to be seen as a superpower. The material interests of Russia may be part of the reasons that Russia has backed Syria’s regime, however, if one looks over all of the national interests, it is clear that a long and strong relationship between Russia and Syria exists.

41 Cadier and Light, p. 132. 42 Bagdonas, 67. 50

3.2 The Important Ally (2) China

China or the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is one of the important political actors in the global affairs. According to Harris, China is not just an emerging power anymore; it is a significant regional great power with a major global role.43 Xi Jinping has been the President of the PRC since 2013. China’s core interests are: to maintain China’s fundamental system and state security, to protect state sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to maintain the continued stable development of the economy and society.44 China’s needs of energy also lead the Chinese government to search for energy resources in the Middle East, Africa and South America. China is one of the five Permanent members of the UN Security Council (P-5). China has been playing an active role in the international arena. Recently, China, together with Russia, had vetoed the draft resolutions concerning Syria’s crisis. However, Allison states that China has kept a low profile over the conflict.45 This part of research aims to gather information about China and its foreign policy towards the Middle East, particularly in Syria during the Arab Spring. Thus, it presents the role of China in the UNSC and the principles of non-intervention.

3.2.1 China Relationship with the Middle East China and Middle Eastern countries established diplomatic relations in the 1950s. According to Zhenqiang, China and some Middle Eastern countries, such as, Egypt, Syria, Yemen, Southern Yemen, Iraq, Morocco, Algeria, Sudan, Tunisia and Mauritania established diplomatic relations from 1956 to 1965.46 At that time, China’s policy under President Zhou Enlai towards the Middle East was: 1) Supporting the Arab countries in their struggles against imperialism, and for their national independence;

43 Stuart Harris, China's Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014). 44 Ibid., p.71. 45 Allison, 795. 46 Pan Zhenqiang, “China and the Middle East in China's Growing Role,” in The Middle East: Implications for the Region and Beyon, eds. Abdul Aziz Sager and Geoffrey Kemp (Washington: The Nixon Center and the Gulf Research Center, 2010), pp. 73-95. 51

2) Supporting the Arab governments in pursuing peaceful, neutral, and non aligned policy; 3) Supporting the Arab people in achieving the aim of realizing unity and unification in a way as chosen by themselves; 4) Supporting the Arab countries in the resolution of disputes among themselves through peaceful consultations; and 5) Advocating respect for the sovereignty of various Arab countries by all other countries, and opposing invasion and intervention from any other outside powers.47

From these policies, China was supporting the Middle East in various ways. China has respected the principles of peaceful coexistence with the Middle East and other states. Even though China and Middle Eastern countries are far from each other, their relationships are tied together with economics and cooperation. China also respects state sovereignty and thus resists invasion and intervention. When the Cold War was ended, Chinese foreign policy focused on developing economic and creating a peaceful international environment. Chinese foreign policy concentrated on moderation and integration. In the 20th Century, Globalisation brought the world more interconnected. China opened itself to the world with growing integration, especially its economy. Globalisation is another element that China is concerned about, mainly its effects on foreign policy. China’s role in the UNSC has made China part of the global governance while maintaining national sovereignty.48 The influences of an interconnected world bring impacts of one state issue to impact other states and regions. Harris states that “China’s leaders remain wary of the impacts of globalization in the political and social arenas, such as those underpinning the Arab Spring”.49 Since the Arab Spring caused the regime changes in some countries like Egypt and Tunisia, China has to pay attention that these regime changes might more or less affect China’s role and economy in relation to the Middle East.

47 Zhenqiang, 75. 48 Ferdinand, p. 14. 49 Harris, p. 49. 52

3.2.2 Chinese Foreign Policy towards Syria Basically, Chinese foreign policy towards global politics concentrates on economics and development. According to Harris, China’s leaders employ its foreign policy the same as most countries do. He states that “China uses coercion (force or economic pressure), inducement (most commonly trade, aid and investment), or persuasion (including reputation, ideology and soft power more generally) to pursue their international objectives”.50 Chinese foreign policy has shifted towards the multi- polar world, economic and military development. In addition, some argue that China’s grand strategy attempts to see “peace and development” and “China’s peaceful rise”.51 While Holland supports that China’s foreign policy goals have been focused on “regime security, preserving territorial integrity, and promoting China’s image as a responsible international power”.52 Chinese foreign relations have emphasized the following national strategies: 1) protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity, 2) promote economic development and modernization as the major drivers behind its comprehensive national strength, and 3) earn international respect and maximize, or at least consolidate, China’s status as a great power.53 China aims to accomplish these goals as Heilmann and Schmidt state, a non-ideological, pragmatic, stability-enhancing, and moderate foreign policy stance has been put into action, highlighting international engagement with the outside world, acceptance of international standards, attempts to reassure neighbours of China’s peaceful development, and

50 Harris, pp. 49-50. 51 Ibid., p. 50. 52 Christopher Holland, “Chinese Attitudes to International Law: China, the Security Council, Sovereignty, and Intervention,” NYU Journal of International Law and Politics Online Forum (July 2012): 1-44. 53 Sebastian Heilmann and Dirk H. Schmidt, China's Foreign Political and Economic Relations: An Unconventional Global Power (Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), p. 9. 53

countering by any means possible future constraints on the nation’s modernization.54 According to Roy, China will prevent intervention and let the conflict continue as an internal issue between the Assad regime and the rebels.55 China does not support the Western powers military intervention and regards Western interference in Syria as dangerous. Chinese foreign policy revolves around respecting sovereignty and a strong adherence to non-intervention principles. Particularly, China and Syria are long diplomatic allies and trade partners. In 2009, Chinese Vice Premier Hui Liangyu visited Damascus and met President Bashar al-Assad56. Assad gave a speech saying “China will deepen relations with mutual benefits and cooperation between the two countries in various fields, and to push bilateral ties to a new height”57. The Chinese vice premier also presented China’s determination to strengthen coordination and expand their relations too because they have had a diplomatic relationship with Syria for more than five decades.58

3.2.3 Role of China in UNSC and Its Veto Power China, as a permanent member of the UNSC, has the right to veto. The presence of China in P-5 shows the importance of China’s role. China has limited Western power. Normally, China uses its veto power to support its allies, such as Pakistan, Burma and Zimbabwe, or against UN peacekeeping troops in the countries where they have diplomatic relations with Taiwan.59 According to Kim, China’s perspective towards the UNSC is as “the important arena for demonstrating its status

54 Ibid. 55 Steven Roy, “China’s Strategic Position on Syria,” Academia, https://www.academia.edu/5131818/Chinas_Strategic_Position_on_Syria (accessed August 1, 2015). 56 People's Daily Online, “Syrian President Vows to Deepen Bilateral Ties with China,” http://en.people.cn/90001/90776/90883/6818766.html (accessed August 1, 2015). 57 Ibid. 58 Roy. 59 Harris, p. 57. 54 as a global power and pursuing its maxi/mini realpolitik but not a world-order actor in the promotion of collective security”.60

At the UN, China has a few primary concerns:61 1) protecting sovereignty, autonomy and its independence of decision- making there; 2) maintaining geostrategic balance and national security; 3) cultivating a favourable international image and status as a responsible member of the international community and a great power; 4) promoting China’s economic and political interests. China exercised its role in the UNSC during the Gulf War. At that time China was successful in altering the draft UNSC Resolution 678 to eliminate any explicit reference to “use of military force”.62 However, China did not cast a vote on this resolution and abstained. It implies that China does not have nor wishes to gain any self-serving interests in the Middle East region. During the Arab Spring, the role of the UNSC is obvious in trying to solve conflicts and offer resolutions to relieve the disputes. Libya was a notable case that somehow effected the decisions of Russia and China on Syria. The UNSC resolution was calling for the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad to stop using violence against the protestors, and later asked Assad to step down. China did not veto the UNSC Resolution 1973 on Libya in 2011, but after one year, China decided to veto the February 2012 UNSC draft resolution that called for the Syrian President to resign.63 It is obvious that Libya’s case affected China’s decision about intervention in Syria. While China and Russia abstained in the Libya case, they vetoed the Syrian case. This shows the important shift of their foreign policies and decision-making was related to

60 Samuel S. Kim, China and the World: Chinese Foreign Relations in the Post- Cold War Era, 3rd ed. (Colorado: Westview Press, 1994), p. 143. 61 Ferdinand, p.13. 62 Kim, p. 142. 63 Harris, p. 57. 55 experiences of the Arab Spring. China also talked to the Syrian oppositions and attempted to be the mediator for solving the disputes.64 China follows principles of non-intervention and promotes peaceful coexistence as a core policy. During the crisis in the Arab Spring, humanitarian intervention became the focus of the international community. The Chinese government believes that the international interest in humanitarian intervention that includes regime change is a major concern for China’s elites and China’s allies. During the Syria crisis, Harris emphasizes that the UN resolutions that sought to change the leadership is an unpleasant principle among Chinese leaders and they also expressed concern about these ideas to the West, particularly about “reforms in domestic governance processes that involve human rights and democracy”.65 Moreover, the Chinese government has attempted to restrict the transferring the political ideas that associate greater integration into the international system.66 Harris points out that China is against international intervention that seeks to change a regime; it is also suspicious of Western unwillingness to be limited by the terms of UN resolutions.67 Following China’s perspective, the UNSC should not be an instrument for regime change because it would not help reduce bloodshed. Harris further states that the Syrian policy is complex, has many political and religious interests competing for influence, and whose interactions with neighbouring countries would lead to considerable regional instability.68 China’s non-interventionist policy can be condensed to the view that “intervention has provided few episodes of peace and prosperity” and is typically driven by “geopolitical considerations”. China’s willingness to use its veto most likely reflected a willingness to support Russia in something that China was unhappy about in any case. The costs that China incurred were substantial: the Arab countries in general supported the

64 “The Great Well of China,” Economist, June 20, 2015. http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21654655-oil-bringing-china-and- arab-world-closer-economically-politics-will. 65 Harris, p. 57. 66 Ibid., pp.71-72. 67 Ibid., p. 57. 68 Harris, p. 58. 56 resolution; members of the BRICS on the UNSC voted for it; and China’s soft power campaign more generally suffered a setback.69

3.2.4 China-Syria Economic Cooperation The fact that China has the largest population in the world, it needs enormous resources to serve its people and country. China focuses upon economic objectives through its foreign policy. China’s continued success in economic growth is due to the fact that international integration has been a critical factor in its continued legitimacy. However, Roy reveals that in 2013, “out of the $2.1 billion in trade between the two states, only $5.6 million represented Syrian exports to China highlighting the one-sidedness of their commercial relationship”70, which means China did not base their position towards Syria during the Arab Spring on trade relations, but they are more concerned of political position. China’s energy and trading relations with the Middle East has been growing. Middle East oil is a resource for China’s energy oil supplies. China’s Oil interests could be one factor to shape Chinese foreign policy towards the Middle East. The Economist indicated the statistics of oil imports of China. More than 50 percent was imported from the Middle East. In 2014, China imported 51.2 percent of its oil from Middle East and the rest from Russia, Latin American countries, and others for a total import of 6.2 million barrels per day.71 In 2015, China became the world’s largest importer of crude oil with more than 3 million barrels per day,72 which is more than the U.S. Syria is not a main oil-producing country, so why did China veto to protect the Syrian regime. The Economist points out that in Egypt, Iran and Syria, Chinese cars are the most famous as well as Chinese’s cloths, toys and plastics. China has influenced the global economy not only in Asia but also across regions to Europe and America. China has been searching for an energy supply in many regions from Latin America, Africa and the Middle East. With China’s need for

69 Ibid., p. 58. 70 Steven Roy, “China’s Strategic Position on Syria,” Academia, https://www.academia.edu/5131818/Chinas_Strategic_Position_on_Syria (accessed August 1, 2015). 71 “The Great Well of China.” 72 Ibid. 57 oil, China sells military equipment to the Middle East. Lastly, China’s growing global role is getting stronger. After China vetoed the UNSC resolution on Syria, it was labelled as a Assad regime supporter. That affected Chinese economic trading partners from Arab states. China has very important political and economic ties with member states of the Arab League and the African Union.73 China and Saudi Arabia are also important trade partners and have a good diplomatic relationship. Notably, during the conflict, China could still maintain its role and relations with Saudi Arabia even though China is named to be a Syrian government supporter. Although the Chinese economy was impacted by the Middle East crisis, it did not impact the Chinese world market as a whole. China still continues to be a strong and rising economic power.

Table 3.1 Summary of United Nations Security Council concerning Syria –Veto list on Draft Resolutions Date Draft Agenda Item Permanent member casting Negative vote 22 May 2014 S/2014/348 Middle East- Syria China Russian Federation 19 July 2012 S/2012/538 Middle East- Syria China Russian Federation 4 February 2012 S/2012/77 Middle East- Syria China Condemned the Russian Federation violence in Syria and supported the Arab League decision to facilitate a Syrian-led political transition

4 October 2011 S/2011/612 Middle East- Syria China Condemned the Syrian Russian Federation crackdown on protestors Source: United Nations, “UN Security Council – Quick Links,” http://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick (accessed July 25, 2015).

73 Michael D. Swaine, “Chinese Views of the Syrian Conflict,” China Leadership Monitor 39 (2012): 1-18. 58

Table 3.2 Summary of UNSC – Adopted Resolutions on Syria Date Resolution Concerns 14 April 2012 S/RES/2042 The Syrian Civil War observer force resolution 21 April 2012 S/RES/2043 Establishes of the United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria 20 July 2012 S/RES/2059 Renews mandate of Syrian Observer Mission for 30 days 27 September 2013 S/RES/2118 Syrian civil war, Framework for Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons 22 February 2014 S/RES/2139 Syrian civil war, access for humanitarian aid Source: United Nations, “UN Security Council – Quick Links,” http://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick (accessed July 25, 2015).

3.3 The Important Ally (3) Iran

The Islamic Republic of Iran is another important ally to Syria. Iran has attempted to establish itself as a key state in the Middle East and the Muslim world. The significant change for Iran was the Iranian Revolution. The Iranian Revolution in 1979, led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, united several groups, classes, and parties who were against the old regime of Shah Pahlavi.74 Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini believed that Iran and actually the entire Muslim world should be governed by trusted religious figures under the concept of “Guardianship of the Jurisprudent” or Valiyat-e- Faqih. Although, Syria has not been governed by religious figures like Iran, Iran and Syria are still close allies because they have the common enemies of the U.S. and Israel. Iran has a major policy against the U.S. and Israel. Khomeini became the symbol of Muslim opposition to the U.S. At the present, Iran’s Supreme Leader is Ayatollah Ali Khomeini. There have been two presidents during the Arab Spring; first is President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad who served from 2005 to 2013, second is President Hassan Rouhani who was elected as President and sworn in on August 4, 2013. President Rouhani has moderate characteristics compared to the former President Ahmadinejad, and Rouhani offers Iranians a “promising moderation, rationality and more engagement with the

74 Nikki R. Keddle, Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), p. 240. 59 outside world”.75 The transition of Iranian Presidents did not affect the strong ties between Iran and Syria. Iran carried on their foreign policy as a good ally supporting Syria. Iran and Syria have been building their alliance and maintaining their firm relations for more than thirty years. During the past couple of years, Iran has played a significant role during the Arab Spring, especially in Syria. Tehran has been supporting the Assad government in Syria with mostly military aid. This part examines the relationship between Iran and Syria in four dimensions: political relationship, Iranian foreign policy towards Syria during the Arab Spring, Hezbollah support, and geo-politic strategy.

3.3.1 Iran’s Position in the Middle East and Relationship with Syria Syria and Iran have had a close alliance and have maintained their relations since the 1970s. During the Iranian Revolution in 1979, Iranian leader Ayatollah Khomeini searched for political allies in the Middle East and built a relationship with Hafez al-Assad,76 who was the father of Bashar al-Assad and at that time was the President of Syria. The Islamic Revolution in Iran was a symbol of a successful political movement. The Iran-Iraq War was another period to prove the Syrian alliance to Iran. The Iran-Iraq War or so-called the Persian Gulf War, was an armed conflict between Iraq and Iran, it lasted for eight years (September 1980 to August 1988).77 Syria, Libya, South Yemen were friendly countries towards Iran during the Iran-Iraq War. Syria took the controversial stance of supporting Iran during the Iran-Iraq war while other Arab states supported Iraq. The significant action by Syria towards Iran is that Syria closed Iraq’s main pipeline which was Iraq’s only means of exporting oil. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states gave financial support to Iraq as they feared an Iranian victory and overthrow of the Gulf monarchies. The war ended with UNSC Resolution

75 Bio, “Hassan Rouhani Biography,” http://www.biography.com/people/hassan- rouhani-21313175 (accessed August 2, 2015). 76 Religious Literacy Project, Country Profile: Syria (Massachusetts: Harvard Divinity School, 2014), pp. 1-12. 77 John Bulloch and Harvey Morris, The Gulf War Its Origins, History and Consequences (London: Methuen, 1989). 60

598, which both states accepted the UN ceasefire. With the decision of Syrian leader Hafez al-Assad to support Iran at that time, Syria became the closest Iran ally in the region and became a strategic alliance ever since. Since the unrest in Syria began in 2011, the alliance between Iran and Syria has showed more correlations and common interests. By backing Iran since the 1979 Revolution and the Iran-Iraq War, Syria became Iran’s the closest Arab state and strategic ally. In particular, Iran has conducted a complex strategy with Syria with the three main pillars of Iranian foreign policy. Bazoobandi indicates the main pillars of Iranian policy are: first, to maintain the strategic grounds of retaliating to Israeli military aggression; second is support and sustain its relationship with Syria and the Assad regime; and third is to maintain the balance of power in the Middle East region.78 Certainly, Iran’s military assistance in Syria has prevented the collapse of the Assad regime. As mentioned earlier concerning the religion factor, Iran views Syria as a Sunni country ruled by the Assad family, who are Alawites. Venetis states that “Iranian politicians and religious leaders regard Alawites as being ideologically close to the Twelver Shiites of Tehran”.79 Iran’s clerical regime is also Shia. This point was culturally given opportunities to Iranian cultural foreign policy in order to promote the Persian language and culture in Syria80. Politically, the Syrian alliance has given benefits and provided Iran help to Shia allies, such as the delivery of weapons to Lebanon and Hezbollah. A later section is going to talk about the relationship among Iran, Syria and Hezbollah. Lastly, Iran has strong economic ties with Syria. According to Venetis, “Iran has pursued the policy of economic involvement in Syria as a means of boosting traditionally strong political ties with Damascus, and they have a bilateral agreement on trade”.81 All these acts of Iran towards Syria have proven that Iran is perhaps the

78 Sara Bazoobandi, “Iran's Regional Policy: Interests, Challenges and Ambitions,” ISPI, 275 (2014): 1-7. 79 Evangelos Venetis, “The Rising Power of Iran in the Middle East: Forming as Axis with Iraq, Syria and Lebanon,” working paper no. 21/2011, Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy, 2011, pp. 1-40. 80 Ibid., p. 35 81 Ibid. 61 only honest and truly ally to Syria. Iran has revealed its policy by their reaction to the Syria crisis and maintaining its significant role in regional affairs.

3.3.2 Iranian Foreign Policy towards Syria Iranian regional policy is changing due to internal and external factors. In terms of Iran’s foreign policy, the Supreme Leader Council makes strategic decisions, while the President acts according to the policy. According to Bazoobandi, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who is the Iranian Supreme Leader, directly and personally supervises the country’s foreign policy.82 She explains that the former President Mahmood Ahmadinejad had a completely aggressive method of revitalizing revolutionary value in contrast to the period of Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989-1997) and Mohammed Khatami (1997-2005), who had normalized relations with the global and regional powers such as Saudi Arabia. At present, President Hassan Rouhani appears to have a moderate approach towards the West concerning the nuclear agenda, while other Iranian strategies remain the same as Ahmadinejad’s period. The characters of Iranian foreign policy makers are conservative and moderate. For the conservative side, Venetis states that Iranian foreign policy maker leans towards the Iranian nuclear programme and enhances relationships with Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. It is also a tool to counter US influence in the region.83 The moderate foreign policy makers also support a tight relationship with Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, and a rapprochement with the West. Their main arguments are related to broadening geopolitical development to build up Iran’s power. According to Bani Nasur, Iran’s work with Syria is a “vital tool to assert their political elites, to further their interests, and to increase cooperation for manoeuvring by diminishing the American influence in the region”.84 He also states that the core priority for both countries is regime survival while the second priority is “national security and the maintenance of the territorial integrity”.85 It is obvious that both Iran and Syria share common priorities which are against the influence of the

82 Bazoobandi, 2. 83 Venetis. 84 Nader Ibrahim M. Bani Nasur, “Syria-Iran Relations (2000-2014),” International Journal of Humanities and Social Science 4, no. 12 (2014): 80-88. 85 Ibid. 62

U.S. and Israel in the Middle East. During the Arab Spring, Iran aimed to provide full support to the Syrian regime. Furthermore, the Iranian policy towards Syria can be investigated by examining meetings between the leaders or representatives of the governments. At the recent meeting between President Hassan Rouhani and the Syrian Parliament Speaker on June 2nd, 2015, the President Rouhani underlined that “the Iranian people and government will stand by the Syrian nation to the end of the crisis, added that no alien countries will ever be able to impose their own will on the Syrian nation”.86 This point assures that Iran will always support the Syrian regime. An email interview with Dr. Mohammad Ali Savadi, an International Relations Professor at Al-Mustafa International University, Qom, Iran, is another asset to this research.87 He states that Iran and Syria have a very close brotherly relationship. Since the Syrian crisis began, the Iranian government has helped and assisted Syria through the advisory, diplomatic activities, and media. Dr. Savadi revealed that Iran has defended the Syrian nation against terrorist groups and their satanic supporters. His view towards the Arab Spring in Syria is that “Syria’s case was different from other Arab Spring movements. In fact, some Western powers and the reactionary governments of the region tried to make use of those movements to overthrow the axis of resistance and the revolutionary government of Syria”. Considering foreign policy decision-making, Dr. Savadi states that the most prominent factor of Iranian foreign policy makers is the real expediency of humanity. The National Security Council, Foreign Ministry, and the Parliament continuously observe the activities of foreign policy, and the Great Leader observes the policy through his general guidelines. Dr. Savadi agrees that Foreign Policy characteristics are seen as more flexible and acceptable under the Rouhani presidency. Finally, he defines the important factors that Iran supports Syria which are “defending truth, justice, rationality, moral values, freedom, independence, self-determination and international security”. When we met in Qom, Iran, Dr. Savadi told me that Syria‘s case was complex and involved many internal and external factors. He also suggested

86 See appendix B. 87 Mohammad Ali Savadi, e-mail message to author, August 25, 2015. 63 that the author should use literature from Middle Eastern scholars rather than just views from Western scholars.

3.3.3 Iran-Syria and Hezbollah Relationship There is an existing powerful relationship between Syria, Iran and Hezbollah in Lebanon. Basically, Syria’s location provides Iran a channel to send arms via Damascus overland to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Goodarzi reveals that while Turkey, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arab states began to provide support to the Syrian opposition, Iran and Hezbollah have thrown their fully support to Assad regime.88 Erlich assured that Syria became Iran’s only Arab ally and a key supporter of Hezbollah.89 This part presents the relationship among the three important regional actors in the Middle East and their interconnected Shia-alliance. Since the start of the Arab uprisings, there have been several discussions about the role of Iran in regional politics and its strategy towards the Arab world. Erlich states that in 2011, the Iranian government sent riot-control equipment to the Syrian authorities, trained their police, and helped establish local militias.90 The Iranian authorities learned to control situation, cope with the protestors and suggested the Syrian government crush the movement early by striking hard. Iran has been backing Syria by sending military supplies, including ground forces. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) of Iran is a powerful ground force. Iran sent the IRGC to assist Assad’s counterinsurgency in eastern and northern Syria in summer 2012. However, Fulton, Holliday and Wyer claim that because of the involvement of IRGC and the strategic approach to control the insurgency, it led Syria’s situation to turn to civil war.91 Hezbollah was founded in the 1980s with help from the IRGC to provide support to freedom movements in the world, including Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, Hamas,

88 Jubin M. Goodarzi, “Syria and Iran: Alliance Cooperation in a Changing Regional Environment,” Ortadoğu Etütleri 4, no. 2 (2013): 31-54. 89 Erlich, p. 219. 90 Ibid., p. 146. 91 Will Fulton, Joseph Holliday and Sam Wyer, Iranian Strategy in Syria (U.S.A.: Institute for the Study of ar and AEI's Critical Threats Project, 2013), pp. 1-43. 64 and Islamic Jihad and Iranian Shiite terrorist groups.92 The IRGC can transfer weapons to Hezbollah via Syria and train and plan attacks against Israel, thus, it could help establish a pro-Assad militia that can provide support to the Assad regime.93 Iran and Hezbollah also back the Syrian regime. Over the years, Iran has developed strategic interests in Syria and Hezbollah. Getting involved in the prolonged Syrian Civil war was inevitable. The fact is Iran’s Revolutionary Guard helped create the Lebanese Shia group Hezbollah and has remained a key source of military and economic aid to Hezbollah and Syria has helped form an Iranian- influenced region from eastern Lebanon through Iraq, Iran, and western Afghanistan.94 However, there is no concrete evidence to prove that Hezbollah is physically or materially involved in supporting the Syrian regime, noted by Saab.95 Moreover, U.S. Official Hearing Reports reveal that Iran and Russia have been sending arms to Assad’s forces with daily flights from Iran to Syria. Thus, Iran and Hezbollah have been helping to ensure the stabilization of Assad regime.96 Bagdonas supports this argument that a change of regime in Syria would disconnect Iran from Hezbollah because Syria is the route to transfer Iranian training, assistance, and weapons.97 In agreeing with Prof. Savadi, Saab states that if the Assad regime falls, Hezbollah will lose an important partnership, especially for weapons transferring from Syria. it all depends on the situation in Syria. The civil war will determine the fate of the Assad regime. Iran is going to figure out the strategic relationship among Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah.

92 Stephen Hoffman, “The Iranian Revolutionary Guard's Involvement in Syria,” Backbencher, http://thebackbencher.co.uk/iran-revolutionary-guard-in-syria (updated June 22, 2013). 93 Hoffman. 94 Erlich, p. 146. 95 Bilal Y. Saab, “Axis of Resistant: Syrian Uprising Threatens Hizbullah's Strategic Alliances,” IHS Defense, Risk and Security Consulting (2012): 26-33. 96 US Congress House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa, Examining the Syrian Refuge Crisis: Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives One Hundred Thirteenth Congress First Session September 19, 2013, Serial No. 113-51 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing House, 2013). 97 Bagdonas, 70. 65

3.3.4 Iranian Geopolitics Strategy towards Syria Geopolitics is another crucial factor to understand Iranian strategy. Iran has played a significant role in key areas that concern the International community, such as the 2003 Iraq crisis and recently for Syria after the Arab Spring erupted in 2010. In terms of geo-politics, according to the Thai Former Ambassador to Iran, Dr. Pichai Israbhakdi,98 he sees that Syria is not only an important ally to Iran, but also the geopolitical strategic spring board for Iran to enter Lebanon and Palestine. To illustrate, Syria has a conflict over the Golan Heights with Israel, whereas Iran’s main policy is to support Palestine and is anti-Israel. In 2006, “Iran and Syria signed a defence treaty against their common opponents: Israel and the U.S. Iran also supplied military equipment and some of Syria’s military purchases.99 In agreeing with Dr. Pichai, Professor Savadi mentioned that Palestine is the most important issue for the foreign policy of Iran. Therefore Syria is seen as a crucial neighbour state bordering Israel. Thus, Syria also acts as a prominent bridge between Hezbollah and Hamas. Syria has continued to be a geopolitically important location for Iran. The failure of the Assad government would not affect the regional power of Iran in the region. Israel and the U.S. have tried to separate Syria from Iran. But Syria has continued to stay in an alliance with Iran and that is one of the main justifications of the Western attempts to overthrow Assad.100 Erlich states that Iran also feels threatened by pro-US regimes in Arab states, such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Jordan. He affirms that if Assad’s regime falls, it would radically shift the geopolitics of the region and it is going to be difficult for Iran.101 The U.S. has had a tense relationship with Iran since the 1979 Iranian Revolution and Iran has a stringent anti- US policy, which makes the Iranian-Syrian relationship unpalatable for the US. The U.S. prioritizes anti-terrorism whereas Iran and Syria have been state sponsors of terrorism, like Hezbollah and Hamas.

98 Pichai Israbhakdi (Former Thai Ambassador to Iran, 2009-2012), in discussion with author, September 2015. 99 Venetis. 100 Erlich, p. 219. 101 Ibid., p. 146. 66

Moreover, Syria is important for Iran’s gas pipeline route of “Iran-Iraq-Syria- Mediterranean Sea pipeline” to Europe through the Eastern Mediterranean.102 Syria’s location is significant to Iran for geopolitical interests. This point could be one of the important factors for Iran to support Syria. All in all, it shows strong ties between Syria and Iran since the Gulf War until the Arab Spring exists. They have been supporting each other when the crisis occurs and they attempt to support each other. At the regional level, Iran is the strongest supporter of Assad. With all the military cooperation, economic cooperation and geopolitics, you can start to understand Iran’s role in Syria during the Arab spring and its support to Syria in the foreseeable future.

102 Venetis. 67

CHAPTER 4 DISCUSSION OF ALLIANCES’ FOREIGN POLICIES TOWARDS SYRIA

The “Arab Spring” occurred more than four years ago and has drawn international attention to this political uprising. This research focuses on the external actors’ roles towards Syria during the Arab Spring and the Syrian Civil war. It concentrates on the involvement of Syrian close ally states, which are Russia, China and Iran. It is also important to consider their actions and foreign policies to enhance the knowledge of one state’s actions and roles towards another particular state during the crisis. This chapter presents the discussion and the results are proven by theories and empirical analysis. The previous chapter showed documentary research, content analysis and elite interviews. The author has conducted both documentary and content analysis on the relevant role of external allies towards Syria. The result from this research methodology shows the key significant findings, and discusses possible answers in the discussion part. In order to answer research questions and to test the hypothesis, the author uses qualitative methodology to conduct the primary and secondary data. The involvement of external actors who have played crucial roles during the Syrian crisis is observable. This research argues that the involvement of external actors, who are Syrian good allies, could play very influential roles in supporting the sovereignty of Syria and the Syrian government of Bashar al-Assad, and fighting against ISIS. Their involvement can bring significant changes to the Syrian crisis. The factors that lead the allies to have foreign policies that support Syria are investigated in the analysis by game theory. While Game theory helps clarify the concrete factors, such as economic relations and military cooperation with elements of Realism, the Constructivist school of thought helps explain conceptual motivations, such as the ideas, beliefs, norms and perceptions of each ally. After all, this research can show both material and ideational factors that drive state behaviour and action towards another state.

4.1 Analysis with Game Theory and FPA

4.1.1 Observing the Strategic Concerns in the Game Theory The situation in Syria is complex and involves a Civil War, fighting against rebels and the increase of terrorist attacks by ISIS. This research not only delves into the involvement of the alliances supporting the Assad government’s fight against the rebels and international interference, but also against fighting the rise of ISIS. This thesis suggests the aims of the cooperative game for the alliances are to maintain Assad in power in order to cope with the internal Civil War situation and to reform Syria politically and economically by avoiding the toppling of the Syrian regime by the West, and to fight against terrorism. In cooperating with the Assad regime to achieve the mentioned purposes, it is believed that the alliances also have their own national interests while helping Assad. The research uses Game theory to analyse the material factors of interests among the players. It helps identify the material causes that shape foreign policy of each ally: Russia, China and Iran. Game theory also explains the strategic concerns, acts by a state, and shows their foreign policy behaviour. According to this preliminary study, Russia has relatively strong relations and interests with Syria, which can be categorized into different factors. The following table summarizes that Russia, China and Iran have commonalities and differences in ways they are supporting the Syrian government. It is worth mentioning that the selected Syrian alliances have similarities in their interests: a long diplomatic relationship, economic and trade partners, military cooperation, and anti-US characteristics. While Russia and China are permanent members in the UNSC, Iran does not belong to the UNSC, but is a UN member. The table illustrates the factors divided by the findings from the previous chapter.

Table 4.1 Similarities and Differences Factors of Alliance with Syria Factors/ Alliances Russia China Iran Diplomatic Yes, close and Yes, allies with the Yes, brotherly relations strong relationship Arab League close. Economic and Yes Yes Yes Trade relations US$1,222 m. US$171 m. US$20 m. (Arms Transfers 2010-2014)1 Military Yes, Tartus Port Not strong until Yes, support by cooperation and willing to give engaged in 2015 IRGC troops military supports Relations with No No Yes, important Hezbollah Anti-US Yes, competitive/ Yes, competitive, Yes, Iran has been characteristic would like to be the rise of China, under sanctioned world superpower. rule by Communist by the U.S. /having Different party issue with Iranian perspective of Nuclear Democracy development UNSC Permanent Yes (P-5) Yes (P-5) No, Iran is Membership membership of the UN. Respect of Yes, respect of Yes, believe in Yes, respect Principles of Syria sovereign and principle of non- sovereignty. sovereignty and not support the intervention. non-intervention. Western-led regime change.

From the table, the shared and differing factors of each alliance are clear. Russia and China share common characteristics while Iran differs. However, they all have foreign policies that support and don’t sanction Syria. This data is used in the framework of game theory as the author has drawn a testable hypothesis that is derived from the elements and functions of “Game Theory”. The following table is a model of the analysis according to the two-person nonzero-sum game guide. The game of Non-zero Sum can be divided into two games, a Positive Sum Game and a Negative Sum Game. In the Positive Sum Game, the players have to try to decide the strategy that could lead to a win-win result for all players. At the end, the result has to be positive and the players will gain more than

1 “TIV of Arms Exports to Syria 2010-2014,” Arms Trade, http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/html/export_values.php (accessed December 15, 2015). 70 they lose. Even though one player might not gain as much of their interests as another, there will be no absolute loser or winner in this situation. This positive sum game framework is applied for analysing the relationship between Syria and its allies. This following figure is the framework that tests the hypothesis of the nonzero sum game, in which the players are Syria (A) and Russia (B). This figure is also applied for China-Syria, and Iran-Syria, by replacing China or Iran to Russia’s position of (B).

Figure 4.1 Game Theory of Non-zero Sum Game (Positive Sum Game)

Syria (A)

Cooperative Defect

Russia, Compromise China, (3,3) Iran Cooperative (2,4)* (B) Defect Conflict (4,2)* (1,1)

Key (x,y) = pay off to A, pay off to B,C or D. 4 = Best; 3 = next-best; 2 = next-worst; 1= worst, *= Nash equilibrium

The figure shows the game theory of a two-person non-zero sum game with applied to Russia and Syria as the players. This game shows how two players are better off to cooperate. The first roll is a cooperative strategy which mean when both players cooperate with each other, they get the result as (3,3) which implies that it is the “best” result when states compromise with each other. While the outcome of (2,4) and (4,2) is called the Nash Equilibrium, which mean both players cannot improve unilaterally, then they follow the other player’s recommendation to get the best outcome. In contrast to the “Chicken Game”, when the situation of (2,4) and (4,2) means that one player will win over another player. In the Syria situation, the alliance will not seek to win the conflict. They seek to help the Syrian government to solve the problems. The games always have an equilibrium point which all players choose their 71 actions that are the best choice for them and to provide choices to their opponents as well. Both countries wish to gain the best option for them. In a non-zero-sum game, “each player seeks to solve the problem or to minimize its impact”.2 They will prevent the situation of (1,1) which mean that the conflict in Syria will likely to continue with more violence. One could question why the author does not use a non-cooperative game to show another result. The reason is that the author analyses the alliances’ cooperation, which requires a cooperative strategy, otherwise it would not be for allies but for enemies. Also, if the three main allies of Syria do not support Syria, it is obvious that the Assad regime would fall and could not stand under this pressure any longer. The non-zero sum game or positive sum game is best suited to apply and analyse the Syrian situation and its alliances, which function as a non-zero game. It clearly explains the the best outcomes for all players comes from cooperation. From the literature and context that this research found out, Syria’s allies supported Syria before and after the Arab Spring. Even though China seems to be neutral, China was labelled as being on Syria’s side because China vetoed the UNSC resolution. Russia and Iran relations with Syria are said to be strong, even before the crisis, and getting stronger during the Arab Spring. Klein mentioned that Moscow and Tehran value Damascus as a counterweight to American dominance in the region, which this thesis agrees with.3 Therefore, the cooperative game that all players will play is the most suitable game to apply. On the other hand, the zero-sum game means that one state will be a winner and another one will be a loser, or winner takes all. This game cannot explain the situation between Syria and its allies. Russia and Syria According to the Game From the figure of the non-zero sum game above you can see that Russia’s actions clearly show that Moscow has asserted itself as a supportive “player” for Syria during the Arab Spring. To illustrate, when Syria is in a situation that the Syrian government could not perform well or to cope with international pressure, Syrian

2 Frank C. Zagare and Branislav L. Stantchev, “Game Theory and Other Modeling Approaches,” http://slantchev.ucsd.edu/incollection/pdf/IRCompend-W02F.pdf (accessed June 11, 2015). 3 Magerete Klein, “Russia’s Policy on Syria: On the Way to Isolation?” Syrian Center for Political and Strategic Studies, http://www.scpss.org/libs/spaw/uploads/files/ policy/03-30-2012_Russia’s_Policy_on_Syria_Lkein.pdf (updated March 30, 2012), pp. 1-11. 72 leaders can follow suggestions that Russia gives as advise. For example, when Russia vetoed the draft Syrian resolution in the UNSC, Assad followed the resolution by eliminating the chemical weapons.4 This shows that the Syrian government trusts the Russian leaders and reacts according to Russian advice. In fact, Russia utterly has more power than Syria on the global stage as a member of the UNSC P-5. As an influential state power, Russia has the capability to negotiate and veto. Furthermore, the decisions of Russia on how to deal with Syria are also best for Syria. As seen from the game, both states chose to cooperate in their quests for a big payoff. In the Syrian crisis, Syria’s best choice is to cooperate with Russia to gain support and to gain reinforcements from Russia on international issues. Russia has power on the global stage. Otherwise, an international intervention from NATO, the UN or the West could take place in Syria. Therefore, Russia chooses to be cooperative and strategically support Syria, who is Russia’s closest ally in the Middle East. The best action for both is to make cooperative moves. However, one can argue that Russia can defect from the Syrian civil war, so there will be an international intervention to ease the crisis. Klein states that Moscow is the key player in the Syrian crisis and has been since the beginning when Russia used its veto to block external intervention in the UNSC.5 This thesis argues that Russia does not agree with the Western-led intervention into Syria because it will repeat the situation that happened in Libya. Russia cannot afford to lose Syria and the regime of Assad, as well as to see a massive attack that could massacre civilians. In October 2011 and January 2012, Russia attempted to cooperate with the Arab League in order to create a Peace Plan, calling the Assad regime to “withdraw armoured vehicles and stop violence against protesters, [and] release all political prisoners and begin a dialogue with the opposition”,6 but the Arab League failed to withdraw its observers from Syria. Trying to play a mediator role in the Syria crisis, Russia was disappointed when the Arab League failed to negotiate with Assad. However, Russia has not given up on the peace plan process with the Arab League

4 Marc Lynch, The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East (New York: Public Affairs, 2012). 5 Klein. 6 Azuolas Bagdonas, “Russia’s Interests in the Syrian Conflict: Power, Prestige, and Profit,” European Journal of Economic and Political Studies 5, no. 2 (2012): 55-77. 73 and Syria as a political resolution. I agree with Bagdonas, Russia’s diplomatic activities only provide Assad a diplomatic shield from international pressure and is not an applicable resolution for the Syrian government to follow. The relationship with Syria, regarding Russian interests, will remain in its present state. Russia’s foreign policy towards Syria helps promote peace and stability without intervention. Thus, Russia’s presence in the Syrian crisis during the Arab Spring can be described as being based on two main factors: material and ideological. The material factors that can be seen in Russia-Syria relations are the diplomatic relationship, the military cooperation, the economic relations and the position of Russia in the UNSC. Russia’s concern about the relationship with Syria is the strength of their diplomatic relationship and the fact that Syria is Russia’s closest ally in the Middle East. Therefore, a long-lasting diplomatic relationship between Damascus and Moscow is more considerable than other factors. Whereas the economic and military factors are influential elements, both Russia and Syria have been depending on each other during war time, the Cold war, and other crises. Klein argues that Russia views Syria as a weapons market, in which Syria is important for the Russian armaments industry; in 2011, “Syria (with 8%) was the fourth largest armaments market for Russia”.7 Syria enjoys the great backing from Russia. Therefore, the weapons embargo against Syria would affect the Russian market. Simultaneously, Russia cannot abandon Syria like other states because Russia has a strategic military base in the Tartus port of Syria. Even though the port is not a full- fledged military base, it is the only Russian naval facility that is located in the Middle East. According to Klein, the “Russian government attempted to establish logistical supply bases for its navy in other countries, like Libya and Yemen, but did not have any success”.8 If the Putin government does not support Assad, the Russians could probably lose its Syrian alliance and lose the naval base too. Likewise, the Syrian army is greatly dependant on Russian military arms and weaponry. The Syrian government will continuously need heavy support from Russia. These factors can be considered to be the cornerstone of their relationship where one can observe their relations throughout the period of time.

7 Klein. 8 Ibid. 74

The ideological factors are according to Russia’s grand strategy to be a world superpower, to compete with the U.S, and principles of non-intervention and the respect of sovereignty. Foreign Minister Lavrov states clearly that there have been many times that U.S.-led Western intervention, with a unilateral use of force and military interference has become a norm recently. The unilateralism was unsuccessful in 2013 against Syria9. Lavrov believes that there are many purposes of the ‘colour revolutions during the Arab Spring that aim at regime changing, the overthrowing of authoritarian leaders, and to stir up disorder and instability in the region.10 These ideological factors also contribute to Russia’s decision-making process when interacting with the UNSC and throughout the President’s interviews with the media. The status of Russia on the international stage is active and functioning as a world power. The position of Russia in the UNSC seems to benefit Syria. Russia can negotiate and balance the decisions of the UNSC resolutions away from American or Western favour. To compete with the role of the U.S., the Russian president has attempted to balance world power in the UNSC as mentioned above. Russia will not repeat the mistakes from the lessons learnt from Libya and the Western-led intervention because of its belief in the principle of non-intervention. If there will be a military intervention, “Moscow will object at the UNSC to legitimising direct military support of the Syrian opposition with weapons deliveries, training of soldiers or direct intervention in fighting”.11 These arguments conform with Lavrov’s speech12 that the most important solution for global disorder today is not unilateral acts because there are still double standards in the approaches to conflict settlement. From the point of view of respecting sovereignty, Russia has been supporting the Syrian president Assad to deal with his own domestic crisis, which implies that Russia respects Syria’s sovereignty. One can argue that Russia intervened in the Crimea crisis in 2014. It can be said that the Crimea crisis was different from the Syrian crisis in that Russia was fully involved in the situation as a main actor in

9 Sergey V. Lavrov, “Statement at the 69th session of the UN General Assembley,” Speech, September 27, 2014, United Nations, http://www.un.org/en/ga/69/meetings/ gadebate/pdf/RU_en.pdf. 10 Ibid. 11 Klein. 12 Lavrov. 75

Crimea. While Russia is an external player in the Syrian crisis, it has played an influential and consequential role in acting in support of the Syrian government. Russia has attempted to mediate among protesting groups and balance power in the UNSC. So far, Russia has willingly given support to Syria with diplomatic protection, military support, and amongst other things. Putin’s influential decision to support Assad remains an important aspect that helps the Syrian regime. It has also proved to other international actors about the Grand strategy of Russia to regain its superpower role. Russian and Syrian relations have been stable during the crisis and Russia will continue to support Syria. It can be argued that the combination of material and ideological factors have resulted in the supportive policy towards Syria. Without one of the factors, Syria would not have the strong and solid support from the Russian government. Regardless of the national interests that Russia and Syria will gain from these relations, it can be stated that Russia will continue to sustain its relationship with Syria due to the historic and diplomatic relationship. Iran-Syria Relations According to the Game For Syria-Iran, the positive sum game explains the situation when Iran has cooperated and supported Syria since the beginning of the Arab Spring and throughout the Syrian Civil War. The research examines Iranian foreign policy and how Iran and Syria maintain their relationship. These factors and characteristics of Iran towards Syria are shown in TABLE 4.1. It finds out that Iran shares some common factors with Russia and China, which are the long diplomatic relationship between Iran and Syria, their economic ties, their strong military cooperation, and the belief in principles of non-intervention and respect of sovereignty. Moreover, Iran has another notable factor, its influential relationship with Syria and Hezbollah. These factors together show the importance of Iran’s presence for Syria as a close brotherly ally in the region. It has proved that Iran- Syria’s brotherly relationship is steadfast and Iran will not abandon Syria. Iran helped Syria in terms of military aid, militants, financial aid and the strategy that the Iranian government used to handle the rebellions. Iranian foreign policy towards Syria can be explored by game theory’s positive sum game. The best outcome for Iran-Syria strategic move is of course the 76

(3,3) which mean they are cooperative with each other. While the Nash Equilibrium are (2,4) and (4,2) which means they have to choose what is a better strategic move to lead to better outcomes. The Syrian government of Assad is extremely self-assertive with the Iranian support. According to an interview of President Assad, he is not afraid of economic sanctions from the U.S, EU, the Arab League or Turkey because he said that Syria was isolated for 30-35 years and it was not something new to be worried about.13 According to Dawisha,14 economic sanctions include freezing the assets of Syrian companies, banning any development loans to Syria, and placing an embargo on Syrian oil. This point shows that Assad has a strong determination that he will not depend on other countries, like the West. He has support from truly durable friends like Iran. The Iranian strategy seeks to preserve the Assad regime by assisting and supporting. Moreover, Iranian leadership has made the strategic decision to support Syria by providing physical aid, such as militants, financial support, and providing intellectual suggestions to the government. Both are crucial for Assad to handle the situation. However, Iran has been financially impacted while helping Syria throughout the crisis. From 2011-2014, it is reported that Iran’s GDP decreased by 15.95 percent per year and the rate of youth unemployment is between 24 to 27 percent.15 From this point, financial support to the Syrian regime is negatively affecting Iran’s economy itself and it is as worse as during the Iran-Iraq war.16 Syrian Economic Forum reports in April 2015 that “Iran has paid more than $10 billion to the Assad regime since the revolution started, only to keep him in power”.17 One can see the dilemma for Iran, having to face economic suffering at home and helping Assad remain in power and fight against the opposition.

13 See Appendix A 14 Adeed Dawisha, The Second Arab Awakening: Revolution, Democracy, and the Islamist Challenge from Tunis to Damascus (New York: Norton, 2013), p. 186. 15 Ahmed Al-Ashqar and Abdullah Hamada, “The Impact of the Syrian Revolution on the Iranian Economy,” Syrian Economic Forum (2015): 1-9. 16 Ibid. 17 Syrian Economic Forum, “Implications of the Syrian Crisis on the Iranian Economy: Analyic Study. Syrianef.org. http://www.syrianef.org/En/wp-content/uploads/ 2015/05/english.pdf. (accessed September 15, 2015),

In June 2011, Iran influenced Syrian security institutions when the Iranian government provided equipment and help to Assad to suppress protests, and they were designated to assist the Syrian regime in its violent crackdown.18 According to Fulton et al, “Syria has been Iran’s strategic partner in deterring Israel from attacking Iran’s proxies (Lebanese Hezbollah, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad) or its nuclear programme”19. Simultaneously, Iran is able to continue to deliver military equipment to Hezbollah as long as they can gain access through the Syrian border to Lebanon. Thus, Iran and Hezbollah cannot afford to lose Damascus because Iran cannot allow a Sunni government to rule Tehran’s closest ally. It can be argued that if Iran does not support the Assad regime and the regime falls, Iran will lose its capabilities in the region. Another important factor is that Iran and Syria both aim to prevent the influence of the U.S and Israel in the Middle East. As stated above, Iran’s first priority about foreign policy is to support the status of Palestine, against Israel and U.S. support to Israel. Syria has a conflict over the Golan Heights with Israel and they support Palestine and Hamas, whom the U.S. views as terrorist groups. Klein reveals that there are fears among Russia’s political security elite that “the overthrow of Assad is part of a strategy to destabilise Iran”20, which is also threatening to Russia, who could lose two important allies. Iran and Syria have the same rivalry, the U.S., therefore, the strategic move is for them to cooperate to gain stronger ties and fight against the common enemy. Iran, as one of the most important states in the Middle East, has a very strong regional role. The Syrian leadership could affect Iran’s regional power. One can argue that the situation in Syria can be viewed as a zero-sum game because after the regime of Bashar al-Assad, there will be a challenging regime which could be difficult for Iran if that new regime is pro-U.S. However, Professor Savadi states that Iran’s regional role will not be affected if the regime of Assad falls because Iran is an

18 Will Fulton, Joseph Holliday and Sam Wyer, Iranian Strategy in Syria (USA: Institute for the Study of AR and AEI’s Critical Threats Project, 2013), p. 9. 19 Ibid., pp. 14-15 20 Klein. 78 independent state21. It can be said that there are more or less effects if Assad falls. Iran will lose one of its most important allies in the Middle East. To sum up, the positive sum game suggests that they should cooperate and that will bring the best result for them both. When they decide to cooperate in the game, their common interests are to maintain Syria’s status quo among Iran-Syria- Hezbollah, to fight against the influence of the U.S. and Israel, and to maintain the Shia government alliance of Assad, who is the closest ally of Iran. With all the support Iran provides to the Syrian regime, it is agreed that Iran has not just considered Syria as a key neighbour to supply arms to Hezbollah, but also to strengthen the alliance with Syria to keep Assad in power as long as possible. China-Syria Relations According to the Game The next is China-Syria in the game theory explanation. China’s main focus is on economic involvement, as well as the role of China in the UNSC, which China exercised its power on the UNSC Syrian draft resolution. The trade relationship between China and Syria is an important factor, even though Syria is not in the top- ten of Chinese trade partners. China has a strong belief in the principle of non- intervention and China’s role in the UNSC will be examined by game theory below. From the figure 4.1 of the positive sum game above, when China uses a cooperative strategy with Syria, the result is (3,3), which mean it is the best outcome for both players. TABLE 3.1 shows the numbers of draft resolutions that China and Russia vetoed in order to oppose the international interventions into Syria. After China vetoed the draft resolutions in UNSC, China was labelled as a Syrian supporter, which could affect the Chinese economy and its rising power. However, China chose to follow its main principle of peaceful coexistence. The game in terms of Chinese diplomacy could prove to the world that China’s power is rising and China should be regarded as powerful in global politics. It is important to notice that China also vetoed alongside Russia in agreeing to protect Syria. It could be argued that China vetoed the resolution as a favour for Russia. While China and Russia vetoed the resolutions on Syria, they did support the

21 Mohammad Ali Savadi, e-mail message to author, August 25, 2015. 79 international community’s stance to “discard violence” and supported the mediators from the Arab League and the UN.22 According to Swaine,23 China’s stance on the Syrian issue has two factors; 1) preventing the establishment of legal or procedural precedents for military interventions by the international community against sovereign states, except under extremely rare and narrow circumstances; 2) preventing Western powers, and especially the United States, from using international bodies such as the UN and evolving norms such as the R2P norm to undermine or overthrow sovereign governments in pursuit of larger geostrategic objectives. From this perspective, China sees that the intervention could benefit the West rather than really help figure out the problem in Syria. Thus, the Chinese government will not agree with an external-led intervention against sovereign governments. Considering China’s actions, it can be said that China attempted to be neutral on the global stage. The situation in the game falls on the Nash Equilibrium point of (4,2) which means China can defect and be neutral, while Syria is cooperative. However, it is not clear that the Equilibrium outcome will be the best because we can see that the actions and behaviour of Chinese leaders will be supporting the principle of non-intervention and try to be neutral on this situation. Further discussion about the principle of non-intervention and norms that analyse Chinese’s behaviour are discussed in the Constructivist perspective portion.

4.1.2 Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) Foreign policy is an important unit of analyse of one particular state’s behaviour. When a political crisis occurs, one policy can shift from one way to another, as well as it can remain the same. Since the eruption of the Arab Spring, international states and organisations have played crucial roles in handling the crisis and passed humanitarian intervention resolutions to some countries. For Syria’s

22 Michael D. Swaine, “Chinese Views of the Syrian Conflict,” China Leadership Monitor 39 (2012): 1-18. 23 Swaine. 80 political situation, the role of external allies and their foreign policies are powerful in order to deal with the crisis, in being mediators on the international stage and as well as not letting the regime of President Bashar al-Assad to be eliminated. To begin with, Foreign policy analysis can explain how states interact with other states. This research uses elements of Realism to analyse FPA, mainly national interest. While Realists are concerned with national interests and the pursuit of goals for national aims, the constructivist believes that ideas, social contexts, norms and other things can shape a state’s behaviour to act and interact with other states. Firstly, the author has briefly touched upon Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) in the first chapter. This part demonstrates the framework of FPA. To begin with, Holsti presents that politics together with foreign policy purposes and actions are planned by decision-makers to “sustain or alter a current object, condition, or practice in the external environment, while some policies are designed to change conditions abroad for their own sake, most are designed to promote some domestic purpose”.24 We have to see what the states often do and how they pursue their goals. National security, welfare, autonomy, and prestige basically rose from domestic needs that one state previously searched for.25 The policy-makers have to make choices that are according to their national interests and goals. Variables are important keys to understand foreign policy. Some countries may have many variables that they consider to design one particular policy, such as location, culture, religion, dominant personalities and other factors. However, this does not mean two states that have close borders will conduct the same policy. It is remarkable that a state’s foreign policy towards Syria was challenged in many countries. Most of the international community and the West condemned the Assad government for its brutal crackdown and sanctioned Syria. Russia and China faced criticism during their vetoes of the UNSC draft resolutions on Syria. Iran, which is known to be Anti-U.S., once herself was under economic sanctions for many years by the U.S. Supporting the Syrian government of Bashar al-Assad has made the

24 Kalevi J. Holsti, Explaining Foreign Policies in International Politics: A Framework for Analysis, 6th ed. (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1992), p. 269. 25 Ibid, p. 269. 81

Russian, Chinese and Iranian governments maintain strong determination in standing steadfast to their principles. At this level of analysis, this research uses the speeches and interviews of the Presidents. The governments of Russia, China and Iran, have the common characteristics of strong leaders and foreign policies derived from their President’s command. Some can argue that what a President says might not be the same as decision-making, but for these three countries what the leader says matters. These countries are not the same as a liberal democracy like the U.S. or the U.K. They have their own ways of democracy. For Russia, that means having a sovereign democracy. According to Poonkham, “Russian advisors use the term sovereign democracy to President Putin”.26 It is a democracy that emphasizes sovereign rights and security over the rights of the people. It means that the state security prevails over human security. The key actors are President Vladimir Putin and the Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who determine the Russian foreign policy. China is the largest communist state, which is ruled by the Communist Party with Chinese President Xi Jinping as the head of state. Therefore, the President’s speeches and interviews can be seen as a decision that can be analysed. Chinese foreign policy is still based on the five principles of Peaceful Coexistence by Zhou Enlai from the 1950s.27 Lastly is Iran. Iran is different from Russia and China. The Supreme leader is the most important person. While the President is the highest state authority, he follows the Supreme Leader’s will. Therefore, this is the level of analysis that shows the commonality of the three allies. They support forms of democracy domestically; from inside, not from outside like Western-Liberal democracy. The author has selected to use the “External/Systemic Influences on Policy” framework by Holsti to analyse Russia, China and Iran’s foreign policies.

26 Jittipat Poonkham (Lecturer at Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University) in discussion with the author, August 2015. 27 Pan Zhenqiang, “China and the Middle East,” in China’s Growing Role in the Middle East: Implications for the Region and Beyond, eds. Abdulaziz Sager and Geoffrey Kemp (Washington: The Nixon Center and the Gulf Research Center, 2010), p. 75. 82

Figure 4.2 Foreign Policy Sources, Constraints, and Opportunities Framework

Source: Kalevi J. Holsti, Explaining Foreign Policies in International Politics: A Framework for Analysis, 6th ed. (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1992).

We can apply this framework to the foreign policy of Russia, China and Iran towards Syria during Arab Spring. The structure of the system can show the distribution of power that has influenced the nature of the international agenda28. In this current global system, we can say that the world is in a “Uni-polar system”, in which the United States of America is the world’s superpower. Some can also say that the world is now in a more “Multi-polar system” in which there are many great powers in global affairs and we can look at the P-5 members of the United Nation Security Council (UNSC), the USA, United Kingdom, Russia, China, France, the

28 Kalevi J. Holsti, Explaining Foreign Policies in International Politics: A Framework for Analysis, 6th ed. (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1992), p. 271. 83 rising power like Brazil, India in BRICS, and the groups of non-states actors to validate that point. In this framework, we concentrate on the global and regional problems. This research focuses on the Arab Spring and the case study of the Syrian uprising. The Arab Spring is a global issue that the world is concerned with. It is an international phenomenon that affects humanitarian crises, regional affairs in the Middle East and Northern Africa, and the whole globe. In other words, the Arab Spring is interconnected and impacts not only Syria but the whole world. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the regime of Bashar al-Assad has relationships with Russia, China, and Iran. Syria is connected to global players. Therefore, Syria’s uprising is considered as an issue that can dictate foreign policies and decisions of external states. In brief, Russia, China and Iran have responded to this Syrian uprising in opposition to other states, such as the USA, EU, Arab League and others. There are many variables that could affect foreign policy choices. To achieve explanatory understanding, FPA must examine all levels of analysis for possible impacts on foreign policy choice. Hereby, this research assembles the information about Russia, China and Iran’s foreign policy and behaviour. These variables are analysed in the discussion part. The mode of explanation is to “show how particular values of these macro level variables lead to a probability distribution over certain types of foreign policy choices, and that this probability distribution does affect foreign policy decision-making in a particular context”29. For the macro level, it is suitable to cover explanations that involve psychological factors, small and large group effects, culture and social discourse and domestic politics. There are variables such as size, natural resources, geography, and so forth. The elements of constructivism also play into the FPA framework. The norms and perceptions are also factors determining how states behave and perform their actions through policy. Each state has their own perception and act based on their believed place in the world structure. To be specific, the norm of respecting state sovereignty, non-intervention principles, and an anti-western stance are key

29 Valerie M. Hudson, Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory, 2nd ed. (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), p. 162. 84 components to be analysed. In particular, these factors shape the foreign policies of Russia, China, and Iran towards Syria and their support for the Assad government. This research reveals both material and ideological factors which according to Hudson’s foreign policy analysis contribution, material and conceptual factors are important to identify a state’s behaviour. The decision-maker is either the head of state or foreign ministers, so it is crucial to examine both material and conceptual factors. Realism states that humans are always selfish and cooperation can occur when it fits into their national interests. When the decision-maker is human, one can assume that there will be national interests involved in the process of decision making on foreign policy. Therefore, it is good to be aware that the leaders are good friends to President Assad. Diplomatic friends who have close relationships can bring a stronger tie between them, as well as gaining national interests at the same time. From figure 4.2 Foreign Policy Sources, Constraints, and Opportunities of Holsti, there are only some factors that can explain and analyse the situation of Russia, China, Iran’s foreign policies toward Syria. This framework is in-depth FPA analysis in which the author would have had to go through all of the domestic contexts of the three allies and the external factors of each country as well. Therefore, the author could not use this framework to explain the situations. However, some of the external factors selected to be used to explain the reasons of why Russia, China and Iran support Syria. External/Systemic factors Firstly, the structure of System (latitude of choice) is considered to be one of the important factors. Structure of system implies the distribution of power in the world system. Russia and China are concerned about polarity in the world order and aim to balance power with the U.S. Therefore, the actions of Russia and China can be viewed as creating a multi-polar world, as well as, diminishing American influence in the UNSC and in the regional crisis, such as in the Arab Spring. Iran also balances its power in the region by being alongside with the Syrian government. Iran also has strong determination to balance power with Saudi Arabia, Turkey and other Middle East states, as well as to hedge against the U.S. and Israel dominance in the region. Secondly, global and regional problems are a concern after the Arab Spring that shook world politics. Regime changes and the chaos that happened throughout 85 the Middle East raised awareness in the international community about the humanitarian crisis, refugee problems, the use of violence against protesters, authoritarian leaders, and terrorist groups like ISIS. Therefore, it can be said that Russia and China have played their roles in the UNSC and used their P-5 position to support Syria. One can argue that they decided to abstain rather than veto for Libya, which authorized the fighters in the airspace and led to the NATO intervention and apparently the execution of Libyan President Gaddhafi. According to Danahar, when discussing Syria, the Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov stated, “they [Russia] would never allow the UNSC to authorize anything similar to what happened in Libya”30. It was a strong position, whether the West attempted to create the resolution against Syria or not, Russia and China vetoed them. Moreover, in January 2012, Foreign Minister Lavrov states “Russia will not be able to prevent foreign military intervention in Syria, but will never allow such intervention to be sanctioned by the UNSC”.31 Systematically, Russia and China would not like history to repeat itself in Syria. Consequently, they cannot afford to see the loss of thousands of civilian lives like what happened in Libya. The Realist school of thought explains material factors and how states seek their national interests. For realists, the pursuit of security, endeavouring for national and self-interests, are seen to be the main determinants of state behaviour and maintenance of foreign policies. After examining Russia, China and Iran, the research found that they have interests in Syria. However, the main factor in supporting Syria is beyond just national interests or the pursuit of security. As mentioned in Chapter 1, about the “World Order Interests” according to Nuechterlein,32 it can explain the allies’ presence in Syria in order to gain the World Order interests. Firstly, Russia needs to present itself as a global power in which any problems or issues that happen in one particular state, such as Crimea, Central Asian states, or even Syria, Russia has

30 Paul Danahar, The New Middle East: The World After Arab Spring (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), p. 357. 31 Yu Bin, “China-Russia Relations: Succession, Syria ... and the Search for Putin’s Soul,” Comparative Connections A Triannual E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations (May 2012): 1-11. 32 Donal E. Nuechterlein, “National Interests and Foreign Policy: A Conceptual Framework for Analysis and Decision-Making,” British Journal of International Studies 2, no. 3 (1976): 248. 86 to be part of the issues solution or be involved in the crisis. Russia is seeking to gain its status of world superpower. Therefore, the role of Russia in the UNSC can prove that Russia has the potential to be a superpower. However, the relationship between the U.S. and Russia in terms of competition in global politics is concerning. It can be said that Russia’s grand strategic interest is to be the world superpower and that is why Russia gets involved into other state’s internal issues and tries its best to prove to the global community that Russia can help solve problems. Russia considers both material and conceptual factors in its interactions with Syria during the crisis. Secondly, China has fewer interests in Syria compared to other Arab states or other countries. The research reveals the scope of cooperation between China and Syria is limited and Syria is not a main trade partner with China. Even though China has energy interests in the Middle East, Syria is not a top trade partner with China. However, when Chinese leaders supported the Syrian government, it affected Chinese trading as a whole. Some countries do not agree that China supports the Syrian government, who was believed to be using violence to crackdown on Syrian people. With the beliefs of peaceful coexistence and principle of non-intervention, China has to prove it is a rising power. China claims to aim at peaceful coexistence and thus does not agree to use military intervention into Syria. Looking from the Realist perspective, it can be said that China is rationally acting and interacting with Syria in a neutral way. China’s interests in Syria belong to “Economic interests and Ideological interests”. Material factors for China are less concerning than conceptual factors, since Chinese leaders believe in the principle of non-intervention and respect of sovereignty. FPA of Iran’s foreign policy towards Syria indicates that Iran considers both material and conceptual factors. The Iranian decision-making process has faced internal and external challenges during the Arab Spring. Internal issues of Iran are related to their nuclear programme, economic sanctions and embargos. External issues stem directly to the possibility of Assad’s regime collapsing. An examination of Iranian national interests, gives insight into Iran’s foreign policies. Iran has various aspects to be discussed. Firstly, Iran has national interests related to Syria in terms of geopolitics, diplomatic relationships, and the Hezbollah relationship. Syria is the bridge between Iran, Lebanon and Palestine and can provide protection for Hezbollah 87 and Hamas too.33 These factors can be considered as “Defence interests”. Iran might fear if there is intervention in Syria, Iran could be impacted. Thus, Iran still needs a friendly Syria for the presence of Hezbollah. As mentioned throughout the research, Syria is important to Iran as a corridor to Palestine and for Hezbollah. The Realist approach explains that Iran regards assisting Syria is in their national interest and considers it a win-win outcome. The Iranian government helps the Syrian government by sending IRGC troops and weapons to handle the protestors. There were weapon supplies from Iran to Syria and Syria to Hezbollah. It has been reported that, “Syria was the top destination for illicit arms shipments from Iran, which were then passed on to Lebanese and Palestinian militants”.34 However, Iranian foreign policy is not limited to only giving military support to the allied government. There is also financial support. In reference to the win-win outcome, Iran has to help the regime of Assad, whose government belongs to a Shia sect. Iran is not willing to allow a Sunni leader in Syria because it will affect regional Shia alliances of Iran-Syria-Hezbollah. They are not only fighting U.S. and Israel’s influence in the region, but also to balance the Shia-Sunni balance of power in regional politics. However, Iran has been suffering from economic sanctions itself and it is believed that Iran is going to continue to support Syria as long as it does not affect Iran’s economic situation any further. Regarding the connection between the two countries, Iran gave assistance to Assad so he could sort out his country’s situation. During the Arab Spring, the Syrian government of Assad was being condemned by the international community and was on the verge of collapse like Egypt, Tunisia and Libya. Iran sees Syria as a brother state with strong bonds between the two countries. Iran helped Syria with all material offers and mentally supported how to deal with the crisis and the protest. President Ahmadenajad and President Rouhani also promised that Iran will not leave and abandon Syria. Iran will continue to support Syria. President Rouhani also firmly stated that Iran would stand by Syria until the end of the crisis.35 The conceptual

33 Evangelos Venetis, “The Rising Power of Iran in the Middle East: Forming as Axis with Iraq, Syria and Lebanon,” working paper no. 21/2011, Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy, 2011, pp. 1-40. 34 Fulton, Holliday, and Wyer, 16. 35 See Appendix B 88 factors for Iran are related to the role of Iran’s regional power, diminishing U.S. and Israel influence in the region, and reinforcing the Shia sect of Islam. According to the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei (or Spiritual leader), the civil war happening in Syria is “a much broader ideological battle, it is the war between the front of hegemony and the front of resistance”.36 In other words, the Iranian leader sees the chaos occurring in Syria possibly leading to Syrian regime change, which could provide a safer place for Israel. From these points, it can be seen that the Iranian government needs to maintain “World Order interests” in Iran’s regional status, as well as in the world. It is the “Ideological Interests” that underscore why Iranian leaders are trying to protect their Alawite alliance. The Iranian government would do anything to support the Alawite regime of Assad to prevent U.S. and Israel influence, and to secure Iran’s only ally since the Iraq-Iran war. All in all, Iranian decision- makers use all elements of both material and conceptual factors to create their policy considerations in supporting the Syrian government of Assad.

Table 4.2 Summary of the Three Syrian Allies’ National Interests Syrian Defence Economic World Order Ideological alliances / Interests Interests Interests Interests National Interests Russia Yes Yes China Yes Yes Iran Yes Yes Yes

The above table shows a summary of national interests that the three main Syrian alliances have towards Syria during the current Syrian crisis. It also presents their national interests at the global level. As foreign policy analysis shows, there are influential factors that could lead a state to have a particular policy towards one another. Syria’s allies also show that they have national interests related to Syria.

36 Holly Yan, “Syria Allies: Why Russia, Iran and China Are Standing by the Regime,” Editioni CNN, http://edition.cnn.com/2013/08/29/world/meast/syria-iran-china- russia-supporters/(accessed December 15, 2015). 89

However, they are not only supporting Assad to fulfil their national interests only, there is politics involved that we need to understand to explain the cooperation of the alliances.

4.2 Discussion, Applying Realist and Constructivist Agruments into Consideration

4.2.1 Realist’s Perspective of Material Factors When one state acts differently from the majority, it is noticable that there are national interests behind it. As a logical element of Realism, national interest potentially dictates what one state decides and uses as foreign policy towards others. Russia’s foreign policy towards Syria indicates it is a very strong supporter. One can say that without Russia, the regime of Bashar al-Assad would have fallen long ago. It is important to observe Russian national interests related to Syria. From the methodology, the research finds out that Russia has a strong diplomatic relationship with Syria. Their relationship and the close relationship between the leaders are very significant. The number of exchange meetings between the leaders and ministers is proof that they have a strong diplomatic relationship. Russia’s military base at the Tartus port of Syria is the only Russian port in the Middle East, as mentioned above. Russia maintains the Tartus port in Syria to get easy access to the Middle East. Apart from these factors, there is also an economic relatioship between them. Russia is a large arms provider to Syrian. The Syrian government needs to continue to import Russian arms. Russian financial and military equipment support are crucial factors for Syria. Syria needs the Russian presence. Chinese national interests in Syria can be said to be less than Russia’s. One must wonder why China supported Syria in the first place and is labeled as Syria’s ally while the majority of states abandoned Syria. China has growing energy relations with the Middle East and was Syria’s third largest importer in 2010. In 2014, CIA.gov reported that China represented 5.5 percent of total imports of Syrian import partners,37 which was less than 2013’s 12 percent ($690 Millions).38 FAO.org reports

37 Central Intelligence Agency, “CIA World Factbook: Syria,” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sy.html (accessed December 10, 2015). 90 that Syria imported soybeans, cotton lint, Rubber Nat Dry, and palm oil from China in 2011.39 In 2010, Syria imported 9.95 percent of its goods from China and 4.92 percent from Russia.40 This research argues that China’s interests in Syria is an economic one. However, the China-Syria trade partnership is lower than other main Chinese importers, which means trading with Syria does not account for China’s deep engagement into this conflict. The Iranian government, unlike other regional governments that have isolated President Assad, remains in a close relationship with Syria and remains the only regional player that has supported and has been involved in the Syrian crisis. For Iran, their national interests in Syria vary. First is the geopolitical location of Syria that is the path to Labenon, Israel, and a way to transport military support to Hezbollah. Syria is the important pathway for Iran to Lebanon and Syria is also close to the border of Palestine. Supporting Palestine is one of Iran’s first priorities. It could be said that Iran aims not only to preserve the Syrian regime, but also to secure the Iranian interests of weapon transfer to Hezbollah. Second are the ties between the diplomatic relationship and shared historical context between Iran and Syria. The Iranian government does not want to witness the Syrian regime collapse like other Arab authoritarians did during the Arab Spring. Syria is regarded as the closest Middle Eastern country to Iran. Another important factor is the regional role of Iran against Saudi Arabia. This point is very important as the findings shows that Iran and Syria have a brotherly close relationship. They are an ideal alliance in the Middle East. Iran will always support the Syrian government to get through a hard situation. The arms and weapons trade are also other notable factors for the alliance. There is no exact source for the Syrian rebels to receive weapons, but Syrian allies export arms to the Syrian government. While other countries maintain arms

38 The Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC), “Syria (SYR) Exports, Imports, and Trade Partners,” http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/syr/ (accessed December 10, 2015). 39 FAO, “Country Profile: Syria,” http://www.fao.org/countryprofiles/index/ en/?iso3=SYR (accessed December 15, 2015). 40 Economy Watch, “Syria Export, Import and Trade,” http://www.economywatch.com/world_economy/syria/export-import.html (accessed December 15, 2015).

91 embargoes against the Syrian government, Russia and Iran continue to supply it with arms.41 The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), TABLE 4.2, shows the arms transfers to Syria from 2010-2014 from the three Syrian allies: Russia, China and Iran.

Table 4.3 Arms Exports to Syria42 Countries/ 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total Years Russia 238 282 351 351 1,222 China 15 5 20 Iran 45 86 20 10 10 171 298T 368 371 361 15 1,413 otal *Figures are SIPRI Trend Indicator Values (TIVs) expressed in US$ m., generated March 4th, 2016.

The fugures show that Russia is the most important Syrian arms trade partner. According to Wezeman, Russia delivered “60 tonnes of ammunition and explosives to Syria and would continue to supply KAB-500 guilded aircraft bombs to Syria in 2012”.43 Roy argues that Putin presents himself as a reliable global arms salesman and supplier, however, the Russian arms trade to Syria counted for only 5 percent of the total arms sales of Russia.44 Iran is also continuing to supply large quantities of weapons to Syria, as it shows in the table. On the other hand, the rebels were said to recieveweapons from the U.S., Qatar, Saudi Arabia and other states but no government openly admitted to supplying arms to the Syrian rebels.45

41 Pieter D. Wezeman, “Arms Transfers to Syria,” in SIPRI YEARBOOK 2013 Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 69-273. 42 “TIV of Arms Exports.” 43 Wezeman, p. 270. 44 Roy Allison, “Russia and Syria: Explaining Alignment with a Regime in Crisis,” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944) 89, no. 4 (2013): 805. 45 Wezeman, p. 270. 92

The power distribution in global politics is very povital. The power distrubution is related to relationships among states in the world. Russia, China and Iran have contributed that they would like the world to be multi-polar, not uni-polar. We can see that sometimes the U.S. acts unilaterally. One specific global situation was when the U.S. used a pre-emptive strike in Iraq in 2003 without the permission of the UN. During the Arab Spring, there were multilateal acts related to Libya and support for a no-fly zone, cooperation among the UN and NATO, and other states for intervention into Libya. The result of the intervention was not satisfying for all states, including Russia and China. Therefore, Russia and China were not willing to see historyrepeat itself in Syria, implying they do not agree with intervention that may cause destruction and the loss of lives. Whereas, Iran has been the only regional player in the Syrian crisis. It shows that Iran attempts to balance its power and strategic concerns in relation to Syria’s geopolitics. Iran as a Shia government, attempts to maintain its influence on the Syrian government. It helps Assad to maintain Syria’s regional position at the same time. All in all, for these three Syrian allies, the national interests are one of the factors that contribute to their support of Syria. The research adds that it is a fact that Russia, China and Iran will not let the Syrian regime collaspe like other regimes during the Arab Spring.

4.2.2 Constructivist’s Perspective of Ideational Factors Constructivists explain how ideas and norms can influence a state’s behaviour, which can lead to decisions and a state’s policy. Constructivism regards the structures of society as being constructed by actors. An actor’s behaviour is determined by social and cultural beliefs and the social and global forces are factors that affect decision-makers. Therefore, when policy-makers are designing one particular policy, they are influenced by beliefs, norms, and ideas. The research findings show that ideas, norms and beliefs, as Constructivists say, are one of the major factors that can lead a state to act in one particular way towards another. It is agreed that states consider their material interests as well as their ideational factors that they believe in. As Wendt mentioned, “the shared ideas 93 must be considered alongside material forces in any empirical analysis”. In other words, both material and ideational factors have an effect on decision-makers. For Russia, it is noted that Russian President Putin has played a crucial role in supporting the Syrian government of Bashar al-Assad, especially during the Arab Spring. In many of Putin’s interviews he stated that he supports Assad’s fight against the terrorists. Through a constructivist’s view, the principle of non-intervention and the respect of sovereignty are main factors. Moscow maintains their policy of preventing the spread of political and military fires in the Middle East, which clearly that Arab Spring was. It did not spread to the Caucasus and Central Asian countries which have Muslim minority populations. Klein reveals that Russia’s policy on Syria respects “the international legal norms with respect to territorial integrity and national sovereignty in international relations are generally being softened, that humanitarian reasons are increasingly used as an argument for military intervention and, in this way, and precedents are being set for regime change from outside”.46 Therefore, Russia acts according to the guardian of the Westphalia understanding of sovereignty. Politically, Russia has consistently supported Syria at the UNSC. Russia vetoed numerous UNSC draft resolutions regarding the Syrian issue. While Russia used its veto power to promote its own status as a global state power in the UN, it also used its veto power to protect Syria from intervention or the path of authorizing the UN intervention in Syria. On one hand, it is can be seen through a Realist spectrum that Russia seeks to expand its power by being a mediator on global issues. In contrast, Constructivism says that the increasing or decreasing of one state’s power can be constructed and achieved by the state’s behaviour and ideas. This means that Russia had its own strategies to handle the situation in Syria via the UNSC. The ties between them have paved the way for the Russian leader to react and determine his intention in supporting the Syrian government. For a wider perspective, it is noticed that in the late decade, Russia has tried to gain its status back as a world superpower and to be able to compete with the U.S. and participate in the global issues. Russia has shown attempts to prevent America’s influence in the Middle East region. Some scholars argue that there are American

46 Klein. 94 interests behind the regime changes during the Arab Spring and the Russian government does not trust the U.S.’ use of the humanitarian excuse to intervene in Syria. Constructivism accepts that states use power to gain their interests, as it is important, but, it is ideas that explain a state’s or policy maker’s act towards one particular issue. In this concern, the Russian government repeatedly acted by vetoing in the UNSC, which could obstruct the U.S.’ attempts to intervene and operate military strikes on Syria regarding the humanitarian crisis and chemical weapons. Constructivism can explain the Chinese relationship with Syria and the conceptual factors that contribute to the Chinese foreign policy of supporting Syria. As mentioned above, China believes in peaceful coexistence and principles of non- intervention. This research finds out that these factors are very important for Chinese decision-makers who apply the principles to their foreign policy. Interestingly, Holland reveals that China may get some positive benefits from vetoing the resolutions. China still “adheres to the principle of non-interference, and it will allow China to continue to invest, trade and develop relationships with a wide variety of regime types”.47 Reuters interviewed Xi Jinping about his meeting with U.S President Obama. Xi Jinping told Reuters that the Syrian crisis cannot be solved by using military strikes and he suggested that Assad should talk to the opposition groups to meet their demands, and possible political reforms will help the Syrian government solve the problem.48 Xi further states that China believes in maintaining the norms of international law and the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons.49 The constructivist view is that the Chinese President is attempting to prove his neutral position and not taking sides with the Syrian government. Agreeing with the Chinese President, Chinese foreign Minister Wang Yi stated that “a political solution is always the only realistic means to resolve the Syrian issue”.50 With the intense situation in Syria, Chinese reactions and foreign policies must be considered well so that it will

47 Christopher Holland, “Chinese Attitudes to International Law: China, the Security Council, Sovereignty, and Intervention,” NYU Journal of International Law and Politics Online Forum (July 2012): 40-41. 48 Sui-Lee Wee, “China’s Xi Tells Obama Syria Crisis Can’t Be Resolved with Military Strike,” Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-china- idUSBRE9850BY20130906 (accessed December 15, 2015). 49 Ibid. 50 Yan. 95 not affect the Chinese position in the world order. China must also maintain its principles of non-intervention and peaceful co-existence. According to Dawisha, the referendum on a new constitution that Assad released during the midst of the crisis was beneficial to himself.51 The new constitution’s main features are the end of the Ba’ath Party’s role and allow a multiparty system with the right to have a candidate for the presidency, and two consecutive seven-year terms. Therefore, with the endorsement from Russia and China, Assad was provided a presidential green light to stay in power until 2028. In the case of Iran and Syria, Constructivism explains their relationship is due to their shared historical context, religion, and geopolitics. The norms of this brotherly alliance show the strength of the relationship is from the policy of cooperation. It can be said that Iran would like to maintain its regional power and being involved in the Arab Spring, especially in Syrian Civil war, can increase Iran’s regional power and balance power in the Middle East. Iran also believes in the principles of non-intervention and the respect of state sovereignty, therefore, Iran has been supporting the Assad regime since March 2011, the time of the eruption of the Syrian crisis. Moreover, religion is another way to understand Iran’s actions toward Syria. As mentioned in an earlier chapter, the Syrian leader is Alawite, an offshoot of the Shia sect of Islam. Iran, as the leading Shia country, supports Assad and the fight against Sunni-rebels, who have support of Sunni dominated states like Saudi Arabia and Qatar. In December 2012, there was an attempt from the Iranian government to announce a peaceful transition in Syria. According to Katzman, “a six-point plan for a peaceful transition in Syria would have culminated in free, multiparty elections”, however, “the plan was rejected by Syrian rebels because it allowed Assad to compete in the 2014 elections”.52 Realism and Constructivism are contrasting ideas and theories, but this research shows that the two theories are the best in explaining the results of the research questions and the findings of the thesis. Therefore, analysis by using Realism

51 Dawisha, pp. 194-195. 52 Kenneth Katzman, Iran's Foreign Policy (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2016) R44017. 96 and Constructivism can provide more ideas and interesting results by viewing the problem differently.

4.3 Result This part shows the important factors that contribute to the foreign policies of Russia, China and Iran which have supported the Syrian regime during the Syrian uprising and civil war. The factors can be divided into two parts, material and conceptual factors. The results are as followed: The first one is Material factors. One: The diplomatic relationship between Syria and its three significant allies: Russia, China and Iran, who have longstanding historical and diplomatic relations with Syria. This factor is crucial for Syria to have true, trustworthy alliances that can support the Syrian government during crises. Bilateral relations between Syria and its allies have grown stronger and the level of visits from both sides is evident of that. Therefore, Russia, China and Iran regard Syria as one of their significant allies in the region and they are going to assist Syria in times of crisis. They will continue to support the Syrian regime of Assad in dealing with the internal situation. Russian and Syrian Presidents are close and they exchange visits with each other. There is also the significant relationship between the Syrian and Iranian leadership. They have had a friendship since the Iraq-Iran War in the 1980s. Overall, you can describe the relationships as a strategic partnership. Two: “Economic Interests” make up the economic ties between Syria and the allies. Syria is one of the main trade partners of Russian military equipment, and Chinese goods. Syria has imported a lot of Chinese goods and Russian military arms before and after the Arab Spring. Russia’s advanced military could provide the Syrian government a lot of arms to protect and prevent attacks. In comparison, Russia has larger economic ties with Syria and influence than China. In fact, China has fewer interests in Syria than Russia overall. It could be said that Russia’s presence during the Syria crisis plays a larger role in supporting the Assad regime. Iran has also provided financial aid to Syria during the crisis. Three: Military cooperation or “Defence Interests” is another factor. Russia has significant military cooperation with Syria. Russia sends military arms to Syria 97 and has a military base at the Tartus port that can be used as a pathway to gain access to the Middle East from the Mediterranean Sea. Iran also has a strong military relationship with Syria, in terms of both Hezbollah and the IRGC militants. The important geopolitics between Iran-Syria and Hezbollah is one of the important factors that explain why Iran supports Syria. The Shia-alliance’s strength and power helps to maintain the Shia political presence in the Middle East. According to SIPRI, the arms transfers from Russia, Iran and China to Syria from 2010-2014 consisted of aircrafts, air defence systems, missiles, and sensors. It indicates that Russia has transferred a total of 1,222 million USD, while Iran sent 171 million USD and China 20 million USD.53 It can be concluded that the three alliances have provided the Syrian government weaponry to fight against the rebels and terrorist groups. The second is the Conceptual factors (“Ideological and World Order interests”) One: The principle of non-intervention is clearly the main point for Russia and China to veto the draft resolutions on Syria in the UNSC. It is believed that Russia and China learnt a lesson from the UNSC resolution 1973 on Libya, that authorized NATO “to take all necessary measures” to protect Libyan civilians. The operation led to the fall of the Gaddafi regime.54 The UN authorization led to the NATO-led intervention, which was in fact, a western military operation.55 Russia and China do not believe that Syria, or even Libya, deserve to be eliminated or that military intervention to end the conflict within the country should be done. The UNSC resolutions can be misinterpreted as authorisation for regime change, which is counter to Russian and Chinese policies. Both countries vowed to “prevent a repeat of the Libyan scenario in Syria”.56 Thus, they believe that the Syrian civil war should be regarded as a domestic affair in which the Syrian government should handle. However, both Russia and China have attempted to find a conflict settlement for Syria, without repeating the intervention in Libya. President Putin reiterated that “there would not be a ‘Libyan’ scenario for Syria. Russia can only be brought to a

53 “TIV of Arms Exports,” 54 Imad Mansour, “The Middle Powers Amid the Arab Revolts,” MEIRP, http://www.merip.org/mero/mero092911 (accessed December 15, 2015). 55 Klein. 56 Mansour. 98 constructive stance on the condition that the option of outside military intervention is ruled out or considered only with very tight limits”.57 With the intensifying violence in Syria and the terrorism threat of ISIS and other terrorist groups, Russia and Iran have strongly confirmed that they need Assad’s presence to fight against terrorists. Commenting on ISIS, FM Lavrov stated that “The struggle against terrorists in the territory of Syria should be structured in cooperation with the Syrian government, which clearly stated its readiness to join it”.58 Two: The principle of respecting sovereignty is another factor that all three alliances believe in. Respecting Syrian sovereignty means that internal conflicts caused and triggered by the people and government, should be solved by the government of Syria, not external states. The allies have committed to support Syria’s sovereignty and agree that Assad should “reform” the country without external intervention. Even though the internal politics of Syria is in chaos, the principle of sovereignty dictates that the government of a specific country should be the first one to handle internal situations, not an outside state. It is linked to the previous non- intervention principle too. The Iranian and Russian Presidents have now stated clearly that the first priority is now to defeat ISIS. On the other hand, the international community is convinced that the situation in Syria cannot be ignored and needs an external organization to handle the problems, such as the refugee crisis. Three: The religious factor applies to Iran, whose population primarily follows the Shia sect of Islam. Syria is a Sunni Muslim majority country governed by minority Alawite Muslims. The Alawites are considered as an offshoot of the Shia sect of Islam and believe in the importance of Imam Ali. As for a politic explanation, Iran wants to have the leadership to remain Shia, such as in Bahrain or Azerbaijan. Therefore, Iran is not willing to lose the Alawite regime of Assad. They do not want it to be replaced by any Sunni-led government supported by Saudi-Arabia, Qatar or the Gulf Monarchies. This research argues that this Syrian crisis is not a sectarian war between Shia-Sunni Muslims, but it is a political crisis in which there is a misuse of Islam and a misunderstanding of the conflict as being about religion. The Syrian war

57 Klein. 58 Lavrov.

99 is a political conflict that involves terrorist groups that use Islamic principles to attract and recruit fighters from around the world. Thus, the fall of Assad would likely bring about a shift of balance in regional power between Iran and pro-western governments. Four: The common enemy: anti-US ideology is another pivotal point. Russia is competing with the U.S. to be the world leader and world superpower. Russia cannot permit the U.S. and Western-led intervention into Syria like what happened earlier in Libya. Russia has to protect the Syrian government from unilateral acts and attempts in the UNSC regarding the authorisation of the UNSC resolution on Syria. China is also growing more power economically and politically, not only in Asia, but all over the world. China has got involved in the Syrian affairs in order to show its ability to promote the multilateral world. Otherwise, this Syrian issue could be a fight between the U.S. and Russia.59 Therefore, China has to be involved on the global stage as the Arab Spring is a global issue. Allowing the Arab Spring to be dealt with by the U.S. and Russia alone would belittle China. Iran has also been sanctioned economically by the U.S. because of issues related to the nuclear development program. Since the Iranian revolution, the U.S. has been viewed by the Iranian government as negative. The Iranian people do not wear neckties, a symbol of the West. Regarding the Syrian crisis, the U.S. government has called for Assad to step down as a political solution to the crisis. However, the Iranian government and foreign policy makers have been trying their best to protect Assad. Rouhani states clearly that Assad needs to remain to fight against terrorists with support from Iran.60 It is unsurprising that Iranian leaders decided to do so because Syria is the closest Middle Eastern ally to Iran and it benefits Iran-Hezbollah and their Shia-alliance relationship. Also the main foreign policy of Iran is to support Palestine. The next is to answer the second research question, which is how factors shape the foreign policies of external actors who are supporting the Syrian regime.

59 Pang Zhongying, “China’s Role in Syria,” China US Focus, http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/chinas-role-in-syria/ (accessed December 16, 2015). 60 Steve Inskeep, “Transcript: Iranian President Hassan Rouhani's Full NPR Interview,” NPR, http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2015/09/28/443982798/transcript- iranian-president-hassan-rouhanis-full-npr-interview (accessed January 15, 2016). 100

This research shows both material and ideational factors. Consequently, how can all the factors shape Syria’s allies’ foreign policy to support the Syrian regime. First of all, national interests are what a state considers first and foremost to create one policy. It is clear that Russia, China, Iran have national interests related to Syria, but in different areas. Russian policy makers consider the Russian Grand strategy to be becoming the Superpower in global politics. This ideational factor of “world order interests” drove Russian foreign policy towards involvement in the Syrian Civil war, and in dealing with ISIS and other terrorist groups. At the same time, the Russian government has a diplomatic and economic relationship with Syria. Russia cannot abandon the Syrian government of Assad because of the long-existing diplomatic relationship. Putin and his policy concepts show disagreement over “the idea of overthrowing legitimate authorities in sovereign states under the pretext of protecting the civilian population”.61 It shows that Russia’s disdain of overthrowing legitimate regimes or governments of one sovereign state. Thus, the military relations and arms shipments with Syria are another main reason for Russia’s support. This research argues that Russia does not consider only the Tartus naval base in Syria. The Russian government, especially the Putin government, has proven that Russia will continue to support the Assad government’s fight against terrorism. Moreover, the Russian government disagrees with Western intervention, which recently happened in Libya. Russia realizes the collapse of the authoritarian regime of Gaddafi could perhaps happen to Assad. To prevent this, Russia will provide a diplomatic shield in the UNSC. Military support can be a great help to Assad and Russia can gain from selling arms to Syria. It can be concluded that ideational factors shape Russian foreign policy to support the Syrian government while material factors are benefits. Russia can gain from Syria and Syria can also gain diplomatic, military and financial support from Russia as well. Chinese foreign policy towards Syria is also shaped by ideational interests more than material interests. The Chinese government believes in peaceful coexistence with other countries in a multi-polar world. Non-intervention and the respect of sovereignty are the principles that China claims to be important. China did not support the UN intervention and the UNSC resolution condemning the Syrian

61 Allison, 796. 101 government. This research argues that China plays a neutral role in the Syrian crisis, even though China is labelled to be Syria’s ally. One of the reasons China vetoed the Syrian resolution is from the impact from abstaining in the Libya case. Holland states that “China felt it gained nothing while losing everything”62 after the abstention on the Libya resolution because it allowed Western intervention. Therefore, China was “criticised for compromising its principles on non-interference and for failing to participate directly in military action in Libya”.63 Much of the evidence shows that China considers humanitarian reasons and non-intervention seriously because of the lesson from Libya. China does not want the history of Libya to be repeated in Syria. Swaine mentions that “Chinese officials criticised the military actions undertaken by U.S. and NATO forces in Libya, declaring China’s opposition to not only ‘the use of force in international relations’ but also ‘the abuse of force that can cause more civilian casualties and a bigger humanitarian crisis”.64 He further states that Beijing strongly vetoes according to these mentioned matters and also calls for the immediate ceasefire and a peaceful settlement of the issue.65 However, this diplomatic action of veto from the Chinese government could be related to the solidarity between China and Russia to strengthen their global roles and strong ties in international issues. For Iran, both material and ideational factors appear in Iranian foreign policy considerations for the relationship with its brotherly state. Iran’s Spiritual leader and President are supportive towards Assad. It is believed that Syria is the most important Iranian ally, therefore, Syria is important to Iran geopolitically. Syria’s location can provide Iran a place to transfer weaponry to Hezbollah in Lebanon, which strengthens their Shia-alliance. Syria and Iran are both determined to diminish American and Israel influence in the region. Ideationally, Iran has been experiencing long-term economic sanctions, so Iran understands what the Syrian government is going through. Syria was one of the couple of Middle Eastern states that stood by Iran during the Iran-Iraq war. Since then, they have had a brotherly relationship. Iran will continue to support Syria during the crisis too. The Shia-Alawite sect relationship between Iran and Assad is an important variable. This research argues that the Iranian

62 Holland, 39. 63 Ibid. 64 Swaine, 6. 65 Ibid. 102 leader will need Assad’s presence in the region to balance power with Sunni Arab states. Even though the fall of Assad may not affect Iran’s position in the region, it is believed that Iran will lose one of its most important allies. It can be said that both material and ideational factors equally drive Iranian foreign policy to be supportive towards Syria during the civil war. It proves hypothesis 1. Russia, China and Iran respond to strategic concerns of interests from Syria as in the game theory. They continue to support the Syrian government to help assist Assad’s government to solve the conflict. Since these alliances support Syria, the Syrian regime of Assad is strong and Assad is still in the position of President of Syria solving Syria’s situation as the nation’s leader without intervention from external states and organizations. According to President Assad, from his interview with Russian TV, “Russia and China have supported Syria and backed Syria in the UNSC and are supporting neither the regime nor Assad himself as the head of state, but international stability”.66 It could be said that Assad is appreciative for Russia and China’s support in the UNSC. He believes that Russia and China have attempted to maintain peace and stability in the region by not letting the Western-led intervention into Syria. The intervention would not only affect Syria only, but to Syrian neighbour countries as well. The alliance supports the positive sum game that all players get the best outcomes even though the outcomes are not equal. Syria is one of the most important Russian allies. In terms of “world order interests”, Russia endeavours to achieve recognition as the world superpower. Russia exercises its power in the UNSC and helps its ally (Syria) to get the best outcomes. The involvement of China and Iran also helps Syria to get positive outcomes. China vetoed the draft resolutions on Syria. It learnt from the intervention in Libya and does not expect to repeat intervention into Syria. The economic interests of China in Syria are considerable, but may not equal its ideological interests or project China’s role in the world order. While Iran continues to support Syria, Iran works closely with the Assad regime in order to deal with the crisis at the first stage. It must also handle the revolution in the country. It is believed that Iran has provided a lot of material support to Syria, such as financial aid, weapons, and the IRGC fighters. As President Rouhani stated in his interview, Iran will never leave Syria alone and

66 See Appendix C 103 will continue to support Syria and the Assad regime. Iran has maintained its regional role and has not lost the Syrian regime of Assad as a close Middle Eastern ally, while Syria has gained strong support from Iran. Assad is still the president and is handling the domestic situation and the international pressure. All in all the involvement of these external Syrian alliances are essential to Assad and are bringing the best outcomes to the Syrian government to cope with the internal situation, to have internal political reforms, to deal with Syrian opposition groups and to handle pressure from the international community. The involvement of these alliances means they do not intervene in the domestic situation of Syria and help protect Syria with diplomatic protections, such as in the UNSC. This has allowed the Syrian government a chance to deal with the domestic situation without intervention by international actors, with the protection from its allies. Assad has completed the promised presidential election and aims to figure out political resolutions. For the second hypothesis: Russia, China and Iran’s perceptions on respecting sovereignty and non-intervention are considered the most valuable and powerful factor in maintaining the political regime in Syria. This research claims that Constructivism’s contribution is the crucial influences that shape the allies’ foreign policies. Constructivism shows how states shape their behaviour according to the beliefs, norms and ideas they strictly believe in and act for. This is the constructivist understanding of interests and identities of states. This hypothesis is also valid because the perception of the respect of sovereignty and non-intervention is crucial to the base of the decision makers to decide one policy. When states strongly believe in these principles, their policies also show that they meant to continue considering these principles into the real situation. When the Arab Spring in Syria erupted, there were many international organisations and external state actors who placed sanctions on Syria. However, when these Syrian allies showed that they supported the Syrian government, it provided Assad back up to help face the internal crisis. Russia, China and Iran have showed that they respect Syria’s sovereignty and do not expect an intervention in Syria as they have learnt from Libya’s case already. The result shows that strategic interests exists for these actors, but these strategic interests are largely shaped by ideological factors, which concerns great power, ideas about pluralist global orders like the belief in the principle of non- 104 interference, and the respect of sovereignty. It can be summarized that there are material national interests, but these material interests are first shaped by ideological interests. The status of Russia, China, and Iran in global politics is recognized as important global and regional players. It is clear that the relationship between Syria and its allies is significant. The allies’ cooperation in either material or ideological factors will lead them to continue to support the Syrian government of Assad. Both factors contribute to the decision-making process for the policy makers of Assad’s allies. Their policy to support and back up Assad throughout the crisis will continue. 105

CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Conclusion

The Syrian crisis has brought significant changes and disturbances to the region and international system. This research probed the in-depth information and analysed Syria’s alliances and their support of the regime of Bashar al-Assad, which impacted the Syrian regime. The case of Syria during the Arab Spring showed historical links and related factors of Arab states that share common characteristics. Since this research focuses on the Syrian turmoil and the involvement of Syria’s allies, Russia, China and Iran, it helped reveal the main factors of why the allies have been supporting the Syrian government. The key objectives of this research were to analyse the roles of external actors (Syrian’s allies) and their foreign policies toward Syria, to examine the effects of their policies to the Syrian situation. The scope of this thesis clearly shows impacts of foreign policies related to the Syrian situation, which makes the Syrian situation differ from other Arab Spring countries. The literature review in chapter 2 shows the previous research on Syria and its alliances. It presents related literature reviews on the issues. Therefore, this research presents a different perspective to the issue of Syria and develops arguments. Using the element of Game theory in Realism and Constructivism, it helped identify the factors that led to the decision-making according to national interests of each ally. The motivations of each state and their relationship with Syria were summarized into concrete evidence and ideational factors. Even though the Syrian crisis is a current situation, there were sufficient literature reviews and previous research that was useful for this research. Moreover, this research puts forth an observation of the elements of foreign policy decision-making and the motivations for supporting the regime of Assad. Through the documentary research in chapter 3, there are related and relevant content about Syria, Russia, China and Iran with variable topics. It shows the relationships of the alliances starting from Russia-Syria, then China-Syria, and finally Iran-Syria. It is 106

divided into different observable points of the relationship between Syria and its allies. The elite interviews allowed for a more comprehensive understanding about the relevant factors that the author aimed to find. All factors that were presented in chapter 3 were used for analysis and discussion in Chapter 4. This qualitative methodology helped obtain the intensive information. Chapter 4 laid out discussion, analysis, and the results of the research questions. The aspects of the study in focus were the supporting alliances of Syria with the awareness of the similar and different factors of each ally. These factors are very significant in terms of finding the reasons why they supported the Syrian government. The research found out that the focal point of each ally is their national interests and their positions in the global system that lead them to get involved with helping the Syrian government deal with the internal conflict. Another notable focal point is Syria itself as a state. It has remarkable relationships with each ally that is very determined and influential to draw attention and involvement from its ally’s support. Moreover, the geopolitics of Syria, the location of Syria is actually strategic for the allies and the world. Syria’s location is important to Russia for access through the Middle East, to Iran for transferring support to Hezbollah and Palestine, and to China to expand their trade market. Clearly there were some obstacles during the theory analysis and the hypothesis test. It was a difficult task and challenging to the researcher to find more information and make the argument stronger. The Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) framework is very crucial to finding out the motivations and applying both material and ideational factors to the analysis. In the discussion of FPA, Realism and Constructivism revealed the related context and reasons behind the actions of each state. In conclusion, this research attempted to analyse the case study of the Syrian crisis during the Arab Spring and the involvement of Syrian alliances. It can be seen that the alliances have significant roles in solving conflicts and supporting the Syrian government. Supporting the Assad regime can also meet the national interests of the allies. The theories that this research used more or less proved the hypothesis. The more involvement by the allies, the more conflict will likely continue because Assad will remain in power. However, this thesis suggests that Assad and his 107

alliances are fighting against the terrorist groups and ISIS. Assad’s government also has had political reforms in Syria. At this stage, it is clear that the conflict can be solved with the involvement of the Syrian allies and their commitment to the Syrian regime as well. For Russian, its involvement regards the regime of Bashar al-Assad as an important Middle Eastern ally. To help Assad maintain his position Russia must prevent the Western-led intervention, the changing of the regime and overall interference. Syria provides Russia a military hub at the Tartus Port, which Russia can use to access the Mediterranean. Even though this port is not a full military base, it can assure Russian presence in the Middle East. Realism would conclude that Russia is attempting to promote its status in world politics, as well as maintaining power in the Mediterranean Sea through the Tartus naval base. National interests are political, military and economic interests, which are key for foreign policy makers in getting involved in the Syrian conflict. These material factors contribute to Russian foreign policy and the actions toward supporting the Syrian government. Therefore, Assad can be assured that the Russian government can provide a diplomatic shield against the influence of the U.S. Furthermore, Syria always receives weapons and technology support from Russia more than from other allies. It can be said that both Syria and Russia gain their national interests in their existing relationship and they will continue to have a strong alliance. The author agrees with Klein that Russia needs to find “a solution that is both face-saving and provides for the possibility of engaging in a tougher stance on the Syrian government will become more challenging with each passing day”.1 The situation is becoming more violent and causing more loss of life since the expanding of ISIS and their devastation. However, that devastation is not the justification for Russia’s support for Assad as a personal close ally or for really protecting the regime from the western-led intervention. Both material and ideological factors are the motivation for Russia’s position in the Syrian conflict. Game theory suggests that the relationship between Russia and Syria produces cooperative gains and belongs to a non-zero-sum game, which means both

1 Margerete Klein, “Russia’s Policy on Syria: On the Way to Isolation?” Syrian Center for Political & Strategic Studies, http://www.scpss.org/libs/spaw/uploads/files/Policy/ 03-30-2012_Russia’s_Policy_ on_Syria_Klein.pdf (updated March 30, 2012). 108

players are able to gain their interests, according to their strategy. Russia has been immensely cooperative towards Syria during the Syrian Civil War. Russia proved its stance by vetoing the draft resolutions regarding Syria. In agreeing with Constructivism, Russia respects Syria’s sovereignty and learnt lessons from Libya’s case after the NATO-led intervention. It can be concluded that Russia follows a Realist view of national interest. Russia is attempting to regain its power as a superpower in global affairs. Similar to Russia, Iran has been steadfast in responding to the Syrian conflict and providing support to Assad. This research has shown the Iran-Syria nexus during the Arab Spring and Syrian Civil War. Iran is one of the major supporters of Assad and has provided both political and financial support to the Syrian government. The Iranian government has committed their foreign policy and continued support to Syria to ensure that the regime of Assad will stay longer in power. The Syrian crisis has given Iran a hard time and the status quo is just not enough. Iran must continue to support Assad. Their relationship as brotherly neighbours is significant and Iran cannot leave the Syrian government during the crisis. Iranian-Syrian relations is significant for both states to foster their national interests as well as to prevent the influence of the U.S. and Israel in the region. Moreover, after the long-standing war in Iraq and Afghanistan for more than a decade, unilateral intervention by the U.S. government into the Syrian Civil War will be difficult. Therefore, if there will be an intervention in Syria, there will be the involvement of Iran standing by its brotherly ally. It can be summed up that Iran’s role during the Syrian political crisis since 2011 has been utterly important and cooperative. Iran has helped support the Assad regime by assisting militarily, economically, diplomatically, and financially. The Iranian strategy has been to preserve the Assad regime for as long as possible. Thus, Iran intends to continue supporting the Assad regime in order to maintain the Shia-alliance of Iran-Syria-Hezbollah. The Syrian crisis has brought Iranian leaders opportunities and challenges for Iran to show its ability at a regional event. It could be summarised that without the strong and full-scale of the Iranian military support, the regime of Assad would have fallen apart after international pressure and domestic opposition. China has been different from Russia and Iran. China is neutral and moderate towards the Syrian crisis. Since the Chinese government has handled the 109

Syrian situation by blocking the UN resolutions, it is obvious that the Chinese strategy is outside of its domestic politics. Remarkably, China’s veto has provided Assad a diplomatic shied from international intervention. China is unwilling to see a repeat lesson occur in Syria like what happened to the Libyan authoritarian regime of Gaddafi. The Chinese government has attempted to assist Syria, not by military or financial aid, but by promoting mediation and dialogue to further the political process. The Chinese government hopes that political reform would help solve the Syrian conflict peacefully. China respects the ideals of sovereignty and non-intervention. This research agrees with Yun Sun that China’s policy towards Syria and the Arab Spring is considered to be neutral, pragmatic and flexible. From the research, the regime of Assad can remain in power in the country without international intervention mainly because of the help from Russia, China and Iran. While Russia and China provide the block of international intervention by veto in the UNSC, Iran regionally assists with the IRGC militant troops, Hezbollah groups, and political suggestions and promises to stay alongside the Syrian government. Russia and Iran share strategic concerns and national interests in Syria, which is to prevent American influence to seep into the conflict. They are regarded as the most important allies of Assad. China acts neutral in order to deal with Syrian domestic conflict and tries not to get involved much more than just in the UNSC. Russia and China have shown their potential in the UNSC regarding the handling of the situation in Syria and during the Arab Spring. They project a multilateral solution rather than a unilateral act in the UNSC and a multilateral world. Both hypotheses have been proven to be accurate. The first hypothesis projects the involvement of Syrian allies. They will continue to be involved in the Syrian conflict, domestically and internationally in order to achieve a positive sum game. It is understandable that the allies did not get fully engaged in the Syrian Civil war, which is regarded as a domestic matter from 2011-2014. They have engaged by providing political, financial and military support to Syria, which has allowed Assad to prove himself and deal with the domestic crisis. It is possible to see more engagement and military assistance from the allies in later 2015, especially by Russia and Iran. The second hypothesis is that Russia, China and Iran’s perceptions of sovereignty and non-intervention is considered the most valuable and powerful factors 110

to maintain the political regime in Syria. It is justified that the perception of respecting sovereignty and non-intervention are important, as well as material factors. However, it is not possible to justify whether the material or the ideological factors are more important. Both factors contribute to the engagement of Syria’s alliances. The allies’ foreign policies reveal that the alliances have some shared common interests and some different elements in relation to Syria. It can be concluded that the Syrian alliances have been involved and playing crucial roles in the Syrian crisis up to 2014. They seem to be continuously engaged in the Syrian crisis and will continue to fight against terrorists. Their involvement has provided Assad the necessary benefits to remain in power and to resolve domestic affairs without international intervention, like other Arab Spring countries. They have gained a positive sum game even though it is not a definite win- win situation in some cases. They have achieved cooperative gains, which is at the Nash Equilibrium point, which suggests a fair strategic outcome. The game shows the relevant strategic movement between the alliances. However, in reality the relationship between Syria and its allies is more complex. The situation must also be concerned about the rebels, the opposition groups, and other international players, like the U.S. and the “West” overalls. Realism and constructivism find a common agreement; the actors regard the beliefs and norms of sovereignty and non- intervention along with national interests and material factors. The Syrian allies act and react to the Syrian crisis based on all the above mentioned factors. In other words, Constructivist elements inspire the actors to have a policy congenial with their alliances along with Realist elements of national interests and the maximisation of their power. Without the support from the three main Syrian allies, it would be much more difficult for Assad to cope with all the internal and external issues, including fighting against ISIS’ influence spreading throughout the region.

5.2 The Afterward of 2014 Syrian Crisis and International Involvements

The escalation of violence has spread in Syria and Iraq and as have its affects on neighbouring and European countries. The Humanitarian crisis is one of the most concerning issues. The BBC reports that in 2015, 1.2 million refugees were 111

driven from their homes to seek safer places in Europe and Syria’s neighbour countries.2 The number of refugees going to Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan is 2.7 million, 1.06 million and 0.64 million respectively (update March 2016).3 Violent and terrorist acts by ISIS have been increasing and spreading through social media, which we can see from media channels online. The well-known Jihadi John, or Mohammed Emwazi, lived in and graduated from London, UK, and often appears on videos of beheaded hostages.4 Foreign journalists have been captured and executed. In September 2015, a female journalist, Ruqia Hassan, was murdered by ISIS. Previously she wrote about daily life in occupied Raqqa and was believed to be a spy for rival Syrian groups.5 Another unforgettable incident was when the Japanese journalists Haruna Yukawa and Kenji Goto were beheaded in January 2015 after ISIS asked for a ransom of US$200 million from the Japanese government.6 The important players in the Syrian crisis “game” are the U.S. and Russia, who have different perspectives toward the Syrian crisis. The U.S. Security of State John Kerry sent a clear message to stop killing in Syria. According to UN.org, he wanted to a political transition process and to give the Syrian people a choice between war and peace, which is made evident by UNSC resolution 2254 (2015).7 Kerry also said that Assad had lost the ability and credibility to unite his country, thus “President Obama had set three goals: to support friends and ensure that instability in Syria did not spread; to provide humanitarian assistance and to help neighbours; and to defeat ISIS”.8 The Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov said that UNSC resolution 2254 referred

2 Lucy Rodgers et al., “Syria: The Story of the Conflict,” BBC News, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26116868. (accessed July 2, 2015). 3 Ibid. 4 Dominic Casciani, “Islamic State: Profile of Mohammed Emwazi Aka 'Jihadi John',” BBC News, http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-31641569. (March 12, 2016). 5 Aisha Gani and Kareem Shaheen, “Journalist Ruqia Hassan Murdered by Isis After Writing on Life in Raqqa,” The Guardian, January 5, 2016, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/05/journalist-ruqia-hassan-killed-isis-raqqa- syria. 6 Kiyoshi Takenaka and Nobuhiro Kubo, “Islamic State Says It Has Beheaded Second Japanese Hostage Goto,” Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis- japan-hostage-idUSKBN0L40VA20150201 (accessed March 12, 2016). 7 “Security Council Unanimously Adopts Resolution 2254 (2015), Endorsing Road Map for Peace Process in Syria, Setting Timetable for Talks,” United Nations, http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc12171.doc.htm (accessed March 12, 2016). 8 Ibid. 112

to a re-implementation of the Geneva Communique and can gather all influential players to discuss a political settlement9. He emphasizes the “need to cut off financing to terrorists” and counter-terrorism “should be consistent and selfless because the notion of good and bad terrorists was unacceptable”.10 Russia has been said to be the most important player in this Syrian conflict. If Assad was overthrown, it would affect Russia economically and weaken Russia geopolitically as well. That is part of the reason why Russia supports the Assad regime. It has been assisting Assad with military actions in Aleppo and has eliminated rebel groups. That has allowed Assad to retain power and to fight against ISIS.11 In May 2015, Palmyra, the UNESCO World Heritage site, was captured and destroyed be ISIS. BBC News reports that recently in March 2016, the Syrian army was able to recapture Palmyra. That shows the success of President Assad and his army, which also proved to the world that his strategy to fight against terrorism is working.12 It further exhibits that Assad appreciates the assistance of Russian airstrikes and the Shia militias, while a Kremlim spokesman said that “President Assad knew that it would have been impossible without Russia’s support”.13 Since September 2015, we have been witnessing Russia fully engage by utilizing air support in the Syrian crisis, targeting and attacking the Islamic State. Meanwhile the Chinese government declared a fight against ISIS and its threat to Xinjiang province, which impacts the Uyghurs and Han people alike.14 Assistant Prof. Chen reveals the reasons for China to join an international coalition to fight ISIS is that ISIS has already become a threat to China’s national security and has territorial ambitions towards Xingjiang.15 Joining the fight against ISIS also provides benefits

9 “Security Council Unanimously.” 10 Ibid. 11 Bridget Kendall, “Is Syria's 'Truce' Worth the Paper It's Printed on?.” BBC News, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35561834. (accessed March 13, 2016). 12 “Syria Civil War: Assad Hails Palmyra Recapture from IS,” BBC News, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35906568. (accessed March 28, 2016). 13 Ibid. 14 Dingding Chen, “Dealing with the ISIS Challenge: What China Might Do and Its Implications for China’s Anti-terrorism Policy,” China Policy Institute Policy Paper 2015 1 (2015): 1-4. 15 Ibid. 113

for China’s image internationally. It is still up in the air whether military action can end the Syrian crisis or not. At the same time, Iranian leaders have been supporting President Assad with Shia militias and financial support in order to fight against ISIS. In 2015, Iranian and Lebanese Hezbollah troops landed in Syria to fight along with Russian air strikes and to recapture the territory that Syria had lost to ISIS.16 Alaeddin Boroujerdi, Head of Iran’s Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Commission states that “Iran is serious about the fight against terrorism. We have supplied aid and weapons and sent advisers to Syria and Iraq”.17 However, BBC reports that during the four years since the crisis began, there have been “at least 400 Iranians and Iran-based Afghan volunteers htat have been killed”.18 Iranian and Hezbollah troops are key supporters to the Syrian regime’s fight against the rebels and terrorists alongside Russian troops. In January 2016, American and Russian representatives attempted to set up peace talks with the opposition by attending “proximity talks” in Geneva to “discuss a Security Council-endorsed road map for peace, including a ceasefire and a transitional period ending with elections.”19 It is evident that Russia has changed their strategy from fully backing Assad to having a ceasefire and constitutional reforms. In September 2015, Russia launched an air campaign aiming to stabilise the Assad government after it suffered defeats. The campaign targeted terrorists, but it was criticised for mostly attacking Western-backed rebel groups.20 Consequently, Putin decided to intervene in Syria. According to Gerges, Putin sent “new fighter jets, military advisers and advanced weapons, to stop the bleeding of the Syrian army. That

16 “Reports: Iranian Troops in Syria for Joint Offensive,” Al-Jazeera, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/10/reports-iranian-troops-syria-joint-offensive- 151001143337046.html (accessed March 16, 2016). 17 Ibid. 18 Hossein Bastani, “Iran Quietly Deepens Involvement in Syria's War,” BBC News, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34572756. (accessed March 12, 2016). 19 Rodgers et al. 20 “Syria War: Why Has the Conflict Lasted Five Years?” http://www.bbc.com/ news/world-middle-east-35806229 (accessed March 20, 2016). 114

allowed a shift from defence to offence”.21 Russia’s new strategic military interests and involvement in Syria in September 2015 is what Gerges calls a game-changer. It is unforseeable how the Syrian crisis is going to turn out. International involvement has played a huge role in Syria and in fighting against terrorism; particularly, the Syrian alliances. Without the forces and support from Russia, Iran and China, it would be dire for Assad to handle the situation alone.

5.3 Implications and Recommendations

This research analysed the issue of Syria and her alliances during the Arab Spring from 2011 until 2014. Recommendations for further research would include a multitude of topics related to the Syrian crisis, the ISIS group, current international involvement from the U.S. versus Russia and its consequences. It must be noted that during the time of this research in 2015, the situation in Syria was very intense. The involvement from international actors is getting stronger, especially Russia and the U.S. Around October, 2015, Russia sent troops and jets to Syria, which means President Putin decided to fully engage in the Syrian situation and fight against the uncontrollable variable of ISIS. The involvement of Russia was neither meant to change the Syrian regime of Assad nor was it to transform the country. It was in fact to show continuous support to Assad. Another level of the crisis is the refugee problem. In late 2015, the refugee crisis became very concerning for the global system, especially the flow of refugees to Europe. As it can be seen from everyday news, hundreds of thousands of people have been displaced from their hometown and have been walking from border to border to Europe and other nearby countries because their homes have been destroyed by war. The refugee crisis is an urgent topic for international study that needs further study and a quick solution.

21 Fawaz A. Gerges, “Syria War: Tide Turns Assad's Way Amid Ceasefire Push,” http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35562943. (accessed March 12, 2016). 115

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Elite Interview

Poonkham, Jittipat. (Lecturer at Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University) in discussion with the author, August 2015. Israbhakdi, Pichai. (Former Thai Ambassador to Iran, 2009-2012) in discussion with author, September 2015. Savadi, Mohammad Ali. E-mail message to author, August 25, 2015.

125

APPENDICES 126

APPENDIX A PRESIDENT AL-ASSAD’S INTERVIEW WITH ABC NEWS

TRANSCRIPT: ABC's Barbara Walters' Interview With Syrian President Bashar al-Assad

Dec. 7, 2011—The following is the transcript of the interview ABC's Barbara Walters conducted with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. It was his first American interview, and the president was asked about Syria's role in the Arab League and how he is treating protesters in his country.

ABC's Barbara Walters: Mr. President, you have invited us to Damascus and you have not given an interview to the American media since this crisis began. What is it you want us to know?

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad: I would like to reiterate what I used to say after 11th of September, to every American delegation I met, first of all I think the American people, people should know more about what's happening beyond the ocean, second the American media I would like them to tell only the truth about what's happening in the world, and for the American administration. Don't look for puppets in the world.

Walters: Don't look for puppets?

Assad: Only deal with administration that, on people that can tell you know about the truth, because what's happening in the world now is taking the world toward chaos, what we need now is we need to deal with the reality. So the message now is about the reality.

Walters: Tell me what the reality here is your country is. What is the reality?

Assad: It's too complicated, it takes hours to talk about... so let's be specific.

Walters: Not long ago you were widely seen as a fresh pragmatic leader, a doctor whose life was in healing people, now sir, much of the world regards you as a dictator and a tyrant. What do you say to that?

Assad: What's important how the Syrian people look at you, not how you look at yourself. So I don't have to look at myself. This is... second, it's about the system. You have a dictator and you have dictatorship, there's a big difference between the two, dictatorship is about the system, we never said we are democratic country, but we're not the same, we-- we are moving forward in, in reforms, especially during the last nine month, so I think we are moving forward, it takes a long time, it takes a lot of maturity to be full fledge democratic country, but we are moving that, that direction, for me as a person, whatever I do should be based on the will of the people, because you need popular legitimacy and this is against dictatorship for person. 127

Walters: But you talk about the support of your people. You did have the support of your people, and then began these demonstrations, which I will discuss in more detail and crackdowns, and you have people now who don't want you to lead. You don't have the support of your people.

Assad: You always--Walters: Of all of your people. You always have people that don't want you to be in that position, that's self-evident, that's normal, you cannot say that having the support of the people. All the people support you means something absolute. You're talking about the majority, and people are against you, they're not majority, when they are majority you don't have to stay in that position.

Walters: But you have people who are against you who are protesting every day. It started with people marching with olive branches and with their children asking for more freedom, for freedom of press, for freedom of expression, and much of the country now, sir, is not supporting you, that's what these, that's what your crisis is about.

Assad: Yeah. That's why we had the reform started quickly, after the very beginning that you described as simple, so we didn't take the role, we didn't play the role of stubborn government, they say they need more freedom. We right away had new party laws, new media law, new election law, new local administration law, and we are revising our constitution now.

Assad: Showing your opinion, whether you like somebody or doesn't like government or president or whoever, should be through the election, the ballot box, this is the only way.

Walters: If you have elections, will they be elections for president?

Assad: No, no, we are going to have first of all the local administration election this month...

Walters: Local administration, but what about the president?

Assad: Yeah, after that, we are going to have the parliamentarian election, which is the most important. Talking about presidential election, it's going to be in 2014, this is the...

Walters: People don't want to wait that long, till 2014.

Assad: Which people?

Walters: The people who are protesting.

Assad: How, how, how much, how many, are they majority or not, that's why you need, you need to wait first of all for the parliamentarian election, these election will tell you are you going to have majority or minority, then when you can think about presidential election, but not before, before that you don't have any indication, any clear indication. 128

Walters: In 2014, when there are presidential elections, will you allow opposition parties?

Assad: That's why we are changing the constitution.

Walters: OK. And if somebody else wins, will you step down in 2014?

Assad: If he wins he's going to be in my position, I don't have to step down, he's going to be president. So you don't step down. He will win the election, he will be president. So step down means you leave, while if you win the election, he's going normally, he's going to be in that position instead of me.

Walters: Mr. President, you once had positive things to say about President Obama. Now President Obama says, and I quote, "President Assad has lost his legitimacy to rule, he should step down." What do you say to President Obama?

Assad: I'm not a political commentator. I-- I comment more on action rather than word. At the same time if I want to care about something like this I would care, I would care about what the Syrian people wants. Nobody else outside Syria is part of our political map, so whatever they say we support, we don't, he's legitimate, or he's not, it's the same for me. For me what the Syrian people want, this is the popular legitimacy that put me in that position, and this is the only thought that can make me outside, so anyone could have his own opinion, whether president, official or any citizen, it is the same for me, outside our border.

Walters: But Syria is almost completely isolated. The prime minister of Turkey, who was your ally has said, and I quote, "no regime can survive by killing or jailing." Jordan says you should step down, the Arab League, Syria was a founding member, have said that they have suspended you, you've lost all the support of your neighbors and friends. Does that matter to you?

Assad: That depends how do you describe, or how do you define isolation and support? How did they support, how did they support me and how did they isolate me? Isolation is not by visitors or by supporting by words, it's about your role, your position.

Assad: Nobody can support-- can isolate Syria because of our position. That happened in 2005 and they couldn't, Bush tried to isolate Syria, Chirac, Blair... everybody, they couldn't, we have role to play. We are related to two different problems. If they isolate Syria, Syria will collapse and it's going to be doing effect, everybody will suffer, so they don't have interest to isolate Syria, we're not isolated.

Walters: Sir, they are isolating you, they have economic sanctions against you, they may have further sanctions, all of these neighbors, so-called friends, have now abandoned you.

Assad: We've ban-, we've been under isol-, of, under embargo for the last 30, 35 years, it's not something new, but it's fluctuating, up and down depending on the situation, those country that you're talking about, they have little influence on the 129 situation in Syria.

Walters: Your neighbors have no influence?

Assad: No, no, we have, we still have good relation with them, they're not, we're not isolated. You have people coming and going, you have trade, you have everything, so that's why I said, how do you define isolation, if you don't define it, it's just term. In reality, we're not isolated here.

Walters: They have sanctions against you.

Assad: What kind of sanctions, nothing?

Walters: Economic sanctions against you.

Assad: It's not implemented. They're going to suffer, the countries around Syria the countries suffer. What about the transit, what about many, many other things, they have common interests with us, they won't implement it, or they cannot or they're going to suffer. That depends on the option that they are going to take, that's why I said, isolating Syria is not something easy. It's not only a decision that you implement, it's not easy. So it's not about the economy, it's about the whole role in the, in the political arena in the Middle East, it's not only about the economy.

Walters: You know, sir, that many leaders in the region have been overthrown. You have seen, I am certain, the pictures of Egypt from the President Mubarak in jail, pictures of, uh, in Libya of Moammar Gadhafi killed, are you afraid that you might be next?

Assad: No, I am afraid that the people won't support me, Syrian people.

Walters: That they won't support you?

Assad: Thing that you should be afraid of not to be in jail or things like this.

Walters: Do you feel now that you still have the support of your people?

Assad: If you don't have the support of the people you cannot be in this position.

Walters: But--

Assad: This is Syria. It's not easy, it's very compli--, it's very difficult country to govern if you don't have the public support.

Walters: But Mr. President, you have people an hour and a half away from here protesting you have people who have been killed and people who have been tortured and still they are protesting and you say you have the support of your people?

Assad: No, no you are mixing between the protesters and the killing, it's different. Now we are having terrorists in many places killing. 130

Walters: Now?

Assad: No, no, not only now, no from the very beginning, no not now, now it's recognized in the media that the difference, that from the very first few weeks we had those terrorists they are getting more and more, more aggressive, they have been killing. We have 1,000-- over 1,100 soldier and policeman killed, who killed them peaceful demonstrations. This is not logical this is not palatable.

Walters: Let me ask the question again, do you feel now, even with people who have been protesting, that you have the support of your people?

Assad: The majority or the minority? Because you are talking about protesters.

Walters: The majority, the majority of the people you feel still support you?

Assad: Not the majority of the people only in the middle always, the majority of the Syrian people are in the middle and then you have people who support you and you have people who are against you. So the majority always in the middle. Those majority are not against you. If they are against you you cannot have stable most of the city is not Syria let's say, as you see, you've been here for two days now.

Walters: You feel the majority of the people in this country support you?

Assad: I say the majority are in the middle and the majority are not against -- to be precise.

Walters: OK, the majority that is in the middle support you.

Assad: Yeah.

Walters: The protest really began with after the detention and torture of children who were writing graffiti calling for your downfall; I've seen awful pictures of what happened, why was there such a brutal crackdown?

Assad: What happened?

Walters: Well I will give you some examples and you can tell me if you've seen these, these are some of the images and stories and some of the images that I saw, a 13-year-old boy who was arrested in April, a month later his body was returned to his family bearing scars of torture. A famous cartoonist whom you know who was critical of you badly beaten his arms are broken. A singer, famous singer who wrote a popular song calling for your oust he was found with his throat cut. You have seen these pictures, have you not?

Assad: No, but I, I...

Walters: Is this news to you?

Assad: No, no, no it's not news. I met with his father, the father of that child and he 131 said that he wasn't tortured and he appeared on the media, you have to see, we have to see things with a stereoscopic vision with two eyes, not with one eye to be frank.

Walters: The cartoonist who was critical of you, I have seen his pictures, his hands were broken, he was beaten.

Assad: Many people criticize me, did they kill all of them, who killed who, most of the people that have been killed are supporters of the government not the vice versa.

Walters: But in the beginning, what about the singer with his throat cut?

Assad: I don't know about him, I don't know about every single case.

Walters: He was a famous singer, a famous song, you don't know about it?

Assad: No I don't think he's famous. I don't know about him.

Walters: You don't know about him? Well I saw those pictures.

Assad: Famous in the United States but not in Syria.

Walters: This is.

Assad: Do you know about him? This is editing, I don't know, I don't know.

Walters: You don't know?

Assad: No. I didn't hear this story, it's the first time for the child I met with his father and there were special investigation committee to see if there was torture, there was no torture. This is only false allegations to be frank with you that's what I said at the very beginning of my message for the media to tell the truth not to listen to rumors.

Walters: Well in the beginning these protests, the women were marching with children carrying olive branches nobody at that point was asking for you to step down. It has escalated. Do you think that your forces cracked down too hard?

Assad: They are not my forces, they are military forces belong to the government.

Walters: OK, but you are the government.

Assad: I don't own them. I am president. I don't own the country, so they are not my forces.

Walters: No, but you have to give the order?

Assad: No, no, no. We have, in the constitution, in the law, the mission of the institution to protect the people to stand against any chaos or any terrorists, that their job, according to the constitution to their-- to the law of the institution.

Walters: The crackdown was without your permission? 132

Assad: Would you mind, what do you mean by crackdown?

Walters: The, the reaction to the people, the some of the murders some of the things that happened?

Assad: No, there is a difference between having policy to crack down and between having some mistakes committed by some officials, there is a big difference. For example, when you talk about policy it's like what happened in Guantanamo when you have policy of torture for example we don't have such a policy to crack down or to torture people, you have mistakes committed by some people or we heard we have some allegations about mistakes, that is why we have a special committee to investigate what happened and then we can tell according to the evidences we have mistakes or not. But as a policy, no.

Walters: Have there been mistakes made in this crackdown, yes?

Assad: Yes, for one reason because we don't, when you don't prepare yourself for new situation you are going to make mistakes.

Walters: OK, have the people who made the mistakes been found accountable, have they been punished?

Assad: Some of them yes, according to the evidences, but you cannot puni--, punish anyone according to rumors or allegations so this is judicial committee independent judicial committee, it's, it's, uh, job to detain people if they are guilty and to send them to the court for prosecution.

Walters: So some people have been found accountable?

Assad: Yes, according to my knowledge from the very beginning.

Walters: Last week an independent United Nations Commission who interviewed more than two hundred and twenty five people issued a report what it said was that your government committed crimes against humanity and they went on torture, rape and other forms of sexual violence against protesters including against children, what do you say to them, I mean what I am saying again and again is that protesters were, were beaten, things happened to them, um, do you acknowledge that, do you acknowledge what the U.N. said?

Assad: Very simply I would say send us the documents and the concrete evidences that you have and we will see if that is true or not, you have not offered allegations now.

Walters: Did the U.N. not send you these documents?

Assad: They didn't say. They don't have even the names, who are the rape people or who are the tortured people who are they, we don't have any names, they didn't.

Walters: They have accused you and your regime... 133

Assad: According to what?

Walters: Well according to what they said is 225 people, witnesses, uh, men, women, children, whom they interviewed and identified and that's when they called it crimes against humanity.

Assad: They should send us the documents, as long as we don't see the documents and the evidences we cannot say yes that's normal, we cannot say just because the United Nations who said that the United Nations is a credible institution first of all.

Walters: Who says if the United N--

Assad: Who said? We, we, we know that you have the double standard in the world in the United States policy in the United Nations that is controlled by the United States and this so it has no credibility so it's about evidences and documents, whenever they have we can discuss it just to discuss the report that we don't see in reality related to it. It is just a waste of time.

Walters: You do not think the United Nations is a credible organization?

Assad: No, for one reason, they haven't implemented, they never implemented any of the resolutions that related to the Arab world for example the Palestinians to the Syrian land why don't they, if they talk about human rights what about the Palestinians suffering in the occupied territory, what about my land is my people that live their land because it's occupied by Israel, of course not.

Assad: For every citizen it is not for me as president I am telling you about the perception in the whole region.

Walters: You do, you do not think the United Nations is credible?

Assad: No.

Assad: Never it's not something before my generation it's something we inherited as a concept as a belief.

Walters: You have an ambassador to the United Nations.

Assad: Yeah, it's a game we play. It doesn't mean you believe in it.

Walters: I see. Even some of your armed forces are not remaining loyal. Some of them have defected and some of them are fighting now against you, what do you say to that?

Assad: What do you mean by defected?

Walters: Well they are-- some of your armed forces have left the military.

Assad: But every year, in the normal situation you have thousands of soldiers that fled from the army. You have it normal when you have this situation you have a little 134 bit more you have higher percentage and then you have some few officers that leave the army to be against you and this cannot say if you talk about deflection in the army different from having few people deflecting so we cannot generalize.

Walters: You don't think that they are a great many, you think it's just a few.

Assad: No, otherwise we have different situation. You are in Syria now you see most of the things are stable if you have defection in the army you cannot have stable country or stable major cities like Damascus, Aleppo and the majority of Syria is stable.

Walters: You describe your country now as a stable country?

Assad: In most of the areas, yes. We have trouble we have turbulence but not, not to the extent that you have a divided army. If you have divided army you are going to have real war. You don't have war, you have-- instability is different from war.

Walters: You do not feel now that you are at the brink of a civil war?

Assad: No. No, not because of our policy because of the history of this society. We don't think that we are on the brink of civil war because the people are aware about the need to live together that's why.

Walters: Do you see that as something important, people fighting for their freedom or do you see it as a little something here and a little something there?

Assad: No it's, you have different components. Not everybody is fighting for the freedom, you have people who want freedom and that's why we have reform because we recognize those people and most of the people that they need freedom. Not everybody in the street was fighting for freedom. You have different components, you have extremists, religious extremists, you have outlaws people who have been convicted in the courts and they have been escaping for, for years now.

Assad: Drugs smugglers and you have like-minded people of Al Qaeda and those so it's different components. You have money coming from outside just for the media, uh, propaganda they give money to people they demonstrate for 15 minutes or for half an hour and in the media you see demonstration. You have everything, you have real demonstrations, you have peaceful demonstrations you have militants, you have terrorists, you have everything in the same place sometimes.

Walters: So here you have what seems to be much of the world condemning you so what's the biggest misconception why is there this misconception in the USA, the country is stable, we have some factions what is the misconception?

Assad: First of all who is most of the world, most of the West do you mean?

Walters: Not just the West-- Turkey, well Turkey, Jordan.

Assad: Turkey is not most of the world. 135

Walters: The members, that is not the West, the members of the Arab League, they are saying to you they are imposing sanctions, some of them are telling you to step down these are your neighbors?

Assad: There is an agenda for those countries. It's not, it's political gain it's not because they don't care about the killing, they don't care about democracy most of these countries they have agenda not going to talk about it now, I am not going to talk about their agenda because we have information but when we have evidence we will announce it. But this is not because they care about the Syrian people.

Walters: Right.

Assad: If we talk about Turkey and the Arab League.

Walters: Yeah.

Assad: But going back to the condemnation no we still have good relation with most of the world and not vice versa, even with the neighboring countries we still have normal relation.

Walters: But what is the agenda, for example, of Turkey or Jordan or the Arab League, why?

Assad: I'd rather ask them. I wouldn't answer on their behalf.

Walters: OK.

Assad: They will tell you they have an agenda.

Walters: Do they want to destroy you?

Assad: You should ask them, I cannot talk about their will I don't know about their will to be frank.

Walters: One of the things that the Arab League has asked for consistently is to have monitors, to have objective people come and visit these areas where there is discontent. Will you allow monitors? Will you now allow monitors to come into this country?

Assad: We want that but in line with our sovereignty.

Walters: What does that mean?

Assad: What does it mean to everything in cooperation with the Syrian government you have a state here?

Walters: Yeah but if--

Assad: They cannot just come and do whatever they want. 136

Walters: But if you had monitors they have to be free to look around they can't be.

Assad: Of course they are free.

Walters: They can't, but you are saying they have to be free with your people accompanying them.

Assad: They ask for protection so they need our people, they are asking for protection how can they go to conflicts and being killed if they want this is their responsibility.

Walters: I am going to ask this again because I want it very clear this is important. Will you allow monitors outside monitors to come into your country and look around to go to these other cities, to Homs for example will you allow them to come, yes or no.

Assad: Yes as a principle, of course we would say yes.

Walters: Under what circumstances?

Assad: To be in line with our sovereignty to do everything in cooperation with the Syrian government, they cannot say that we're going to send, send say, for example, 15,000. It's two sides. It's contract you don't make contract from one side it's a technical issue you have technicalities I don't know everything about these technicalities.

Assad: How to move, how to prepare, how to protect them, what their job, what's our job? We are party, you cannot have protocol just to explain to you very clearly you cannot accept protocol that is made there and we don't have anything to discuss, very simply.

Walters: Are you now negotiating with the Arab League?

Assad: Of course that is what we are doing. Yeah, yeah.

Walters: You are?

Assad: Of course we are still negotiating, yes.

Walters: So you think that monitors will be allowed to come soon?

Assad: Of course, as I said we ask this before.

Walters: Can they travel wherever they want?

Assad: Of course. But according to certain rules, how to discuss this rules, they are going to, when you make contract you discuss it. At the very beginning they didn't want to discuss it with us. We said no if we don't discuss it we cannot sign it, it will be discussed in details.

Walters: Are you now discussing with the Arab League allowing monitors to come? 137

Assad: Yeah, yeah.

Walters: Can outside foreign reporters come, they have not been allowed?

Assad: No, they were allowed and you are here.

Walters: I am here and I have a correspondent here, but in--

Assad: But you have been here for two days now did anyone tell you where to go or where not to go nobody you are free to go wherever you want.

Walters: I am appreciative that I have been allowed here and that you've granted an interview, can other foreign correspondents, American and others come into this country now?

Assad: Yeah, exactly.

Walters: We have not heard this, you will say yes?

Assad: You have to hear; to hear the truth, you have to look for the truth, the truth--

Walters: Well I'm, I'm asking you now.

Assad: But that doesn't mean they can come without a visa. We are a country where they have to take visa. We give visa to people, maybe we don't give visa to-- we are like any other country against our sovereignty.

Walters: OK, but in--

Assad: That doesn't mean anyone can come any time and do whatever they do.

Walters: I grant you but as soon as you say visa it means this one can't come, that, in general now can foreign correspondents come to this country.

Assad: Of course. Yes, and we have been receiving the delegations from Europe, from the United States, from the rest of the world.

Walters: No sir, you have not been receiving delegations.

Assad: I met with them, I met with them.

Walters: Foreign correspondents?

Assad: Of course, of course foreign, they can give you the article they made interviews with me.

Assad: I met with two British recently, one a French we meet we had and others.

Walters: Let me ask you once more time so we are clear, in general, can foreign correspondents, if they are accredited, come to this country? 138

Assad: Of course they can come.

Walters: You said that if there is any outside attempt to bring you down it would mean an earthquake, what do you mean by that?

Assad: Syria is the fault line in the Middle East. You know, the Middle East is generally it's very diverse in ethnicities, in sects, in religions, but Syria the most diverse and this is the fault line where all these diversity meet so it's like the fault line of the Earth of the, of the Earth. When you play with it, you will have earthquake that is going to effect the whole region. So playing don't mean to overthrow me or to deal with me it's not about me it's about the, the, the fabric of the society in this region that is what I meant.

Walters: You know your father led this country for 30 years until his death. You have now led the country for more than a decade.

Assad: Yes.

Walters: If the Arab Spring means anything it seems to be that the era of one-family rule is over.

Assad: OK, no I never supported being a dynasty, is that correct?

Walters: That's correct.

Assad: Yeah of being a dynasty.

Walters: You are not raising your son to succeed you?

Assad: No, no and my father never spoke with me in politics, you don't believe this. We never and he never tried to prepare me. He always wanted me to be a president against what you hear in the media that he asked me to come from London. He wanted me to go back to London to continue and I refused.

Walters: But your older brother was supposed to be, take your father's place when he was killed.

Assad: No, he had no posit--

Walter: Your father asked you to come back?

Assad: My brother had no position when my father was there and I had no position. I wasn't, I was nothing in the party, I was only, I was in the military since I was a doctor, nothing else.

Walters: But your father did not expect his sons to take his place?

Assad: Never, he never spoke about this.

Walters: Then, then with all due respect you're a doctor you're an ophthalmologist 139 how did you become the leader of this country?

Assad: I was a military doctor and according to our laws that military law you can move from how to say sector to sector within the army.

Walters: OK.

Assad: So I left the, I was military doctor. Even when I was in London I was a military doctor. They only sent me to London not the Ministry of Higher Education, for example, or anything or the university or university. And so I was in the army since 1985 since I was made a student at the school, few people knew that. I wasn't civil doctor. So anyway when I became, when I became president, I became president through the party after President Assad died. Not, not-- When he was alive I was not there I didn't have any position.

Walters: But when your father died the son became the leader.

Assad: Yes.

Walters: So there were not free elections to make you the leader.

Assad: No anyway we don't have free election we have referendum this is our constitution.

Walters: So your constitution said we want the son?

Assad: No not the constitution, the party.

Walters: The party said?

Assad: And the people demonstrating and they surrounded the parliament they said we need a president so many people who didn't want the president in the government they accepted this new president and I nominated myself, before that I never thought about it.

Walters: So when you have elections which you say is in 2014, you will have opposition parties?

Assad: We have them already now.

Walters: OK and if they want somebody else and not you, you say OK and you step down?

Assad: The people will say OK, the people say OK. Of course you have to be, to leave that is self-evident you don't have to discuss it. To stay to be president while the people don't want you how can you, how can you succeed.

Walters: You are not training your eldest son who is now, 8?

Assad: No I was never trained to be in this place. 140

Walters: Do you sometimes wish that you were still an ophthalmologist?

Assad: No, because I was in the public sector anyway as son of president, I couldn't have my own clinic and get money from the people, so I was in public sector now in wider public sector in the same place. So you wish you still have kind of let's say emotion and feeling toward that job and I am still in touch with the new innovations in that field. But you cannot look back to see yourself as a doctor now we have more important position.

Walters: You have said often that you don't see yourself doing this job for life. You've said you're doing it for your country. With all the turmoil in your country is it perhaps better for Syria that you no longer remain its leader?

Assad: I don't have problem. For me Syria as a project, project of success, if you don't succeed you don't have to stay in that position and that success again depends on the public support without public support you cannot, whether you are elected or not. It's not about the election, now it's about public support. This is the most important thing. So when I feel that the public support declined, I won't be here even if they say, if they ask or not I shouldn't be here if there is no public support.

Walters: So you are still having protests and now your military is involved and there are armed people on the other side there is turmoil in your country but you are saying that in general you have the support of your people?

Assad: Yeah but let's wait for the elections to be, to be clear.

Walters: That's too, no but that's, that's, this is 2011 we are talking this can't go on for two years.

Assad: No, no, no I am talking now about these next elections now we are going to have the parliamentary elections.

Walters: And...

Assad: I belong to the Bath Party we will see what the position of our party is because this is an indication it's important it's not only the person you are part of another party of another identity.

Walters: Yeah but your party is not going to want to give up power?

Assad: Yeah no to give up why to give up if the party has the right like the other party to compete and win the elections. But to see through the election do we still have support as a party, if yes well this is an option and if not they have another option.

Walters: And your parliamentary elections which are when in two months?

Assad: In three, two to three months.

Walters: And they will be open enough so that people can vote against it? 141

Assad: Of course. Anyone.

Walters: And that would be the end of the Bath Party and you as terms of leadership?

Assad: If the people said no to the Bath Party, if they lost you, can say this is the end.

Walters: Is there an opposition that they can go to?

Assad: We have opposition but it takes time to have strong opposition you have so many figures now if they unified themselves and go to the election you can have one strong election that depends on the tactic that they are going to adopt I cannot tell you they are going to be strong or not I don't know. And I don't know about how much among the people they have, how much support they have among the people I cannot tell you.

Assad: As I said, it's about personal mistakes. Not about policy. There was no policy of cracking down.

Walters: Who made them?

Assad: There was policy of facing the terrorists when you have militants; you have to face the militants. You don't allow in the United States to have militants, and remember what happened in Los Angeles in the '90s, when you send the army to the city, to face the terrorists. That the same.

Walters: Our protest, we don't kill people. And we have-- we have press seeing it all.

Assad: Yeah, but nobody knows yet who killed the people. Because-- when the same question who killed the 1,100 soldiers. If you don't know, if you don't know who killed those, you can't tell who killed the civilians.

Walters: The crackdown in the beginning, the brutality. Do you think it went too far?

Assad: I cannot tell you this, without the evidence. You ask me to tell you according to rumor, or to reports. It's not enough for me, as president. For me, when there is policy, I could say yes, or no, when there is individuals with concrete evidence, who committed mistake, I will say yes or no.

Walters: Did you give the order? For the crackdown?

Assad: No, we gave the order to implement the constitution, and the law. That's the order and that's the job of the president.

Walters: You gave-- but who gave the order to react against the protests?

Assad: You don't need order, because this is their job.

Walters: You know, use guns, somebody had to say their arrests.

Assad: No, no. There was even written not to use guns, that's why I said it wasn't 142 policy. Their job is to prevent people like any other country, you have the own means. Whenever they used machine guns against civilians, this is breaching of the law.

Walters: It happened.

Assad: In some cases yes, and they were caught, and they were detained I mean.

Walters: People went from houses to houses. Children were arrested. I saw those pictures.

Assad: When, but you, to be frank with you, Barbara, I, you don't live here-- how did you know all this-- this-- you have to be here to see. We don't see this. So it cannot depend on what you hear in the United States. You have to--

Walters: But I saw reporters who brought back pictures.

Assad: Yeah but how did you verify those pictures? Yeah so, that's why we are talking about false allegations and distortion of reality in this region, and most of the things that happened. In Syria, not reflected in the media, I'm being frank with you. So I cannot answer about fake pretenses, I can only talk about reality. Yeah.

Walters: Some people say that it's not the protests that may bring you down, but the economic sanctions, uh, now. Not just the West, but your, as we said, your former allies having imposed economic sanctions on your country.

Walters: Shell Oil for example, which is the largest oil production in Syria, has stopped production. How much are the economic sanctions are going to hurt Syria?

Assad: How much, it's difficult to tell. But it-- it will hurt from us, one aspect, but from another aspect, it will have positive effects because of course this is surprising. But actually, we were under sanctions, strong sanction, in the second half of the '80s, and we built our industry in that period of time. So you can use sanctions for example the-- agreement between Syria and Turkey, wasn't fair.

Assad: It was against our interest. Many industrialists in Syria, many business men, most of the economic sector were against it, and they asked our government many times, to stop working with this treaty. They sent to see-- I think two folds, export, something like this, I don't have the numbers now, so, you have-- if you-- if you are smart enough, if you are creative enough. You know, every cloud has silver lining, and we have a lot of political clout in this region. So we have lot of silver lining, but you have to see the silver lining to know how to-- to have the positive. So it will affect you badly, from one side, but you can decrease the harm. I wouldn't say you can win now, let's not exaggerate, but you can decrease this harm and get some benefits from it.

Walters: How can you get benefits from economic sanctions?

Assad: First of all we are not oil producing country, we are not like Iraq. Iraq was depend-- oil dependent. We are not oil dependent, we produce. We can leave the-- we 143 export the food. We eat our food.

Walters: So you were saying that it would take more maybe creativity, more industry.

Assad: Exactly.

Walters: In this whole country to become independent.

Assad: Exactly. And we can. We don't have problems if-- and this could be the strong point of Syria. That's why I said they cannot isolate Syria.

Walters: I have seen the markets filled with food so I, you are able to-- to keep feeding your people.

Assad: Of course, no, we don't have trouble. We can-- we can eat two years without, with full embargo. We export wheat to many countries.

Walters: Your wife was raised and went to school in England. It has been said that she is a force for moderation. I'd like to know, when you and she discuss things, um, what has she said about what's happening in your country?

Assad: We are used to live as one family in Syria, because Syria is small country. Whenever you have one crime, the whole country will hear about it. It's very safe country. Of course it's still the same pain, to feel-- we feel sorry about what's happening, but at the end-- the-- the, the discussion-- is always and I think everywhere in Syria is part-- what can we do to have to prevent more blood shedding in Syria.

Walters: Your wife has her own projects in the country.

Assad: Yes. Development project. Charity of course.

Walters: But do you discuss the situation?

Assad: Of course yes. That's what I said, part of the solution is how to make life better in different aspects. Development is part of the solution. It's not only about demonstrations and militants and terrorists and things like that.

Walters: Is your wife a source of support for you?

Assad: Of course, all my family.

Walters: Let me ask about the children. Because you have three young children, 9, 8 and 6.

Assad: Yes.

Walters: What have you told them about what's happening in this country?

Assad: What-- what I told you. 144

Walters: What do you say to them?

Assad: I told them about terrorists, I told them about people-- innocent people being killed. About investigation we have to know who-- who helped looked for the reason. Everything.

Walters: You've told them about innocent people getting killed?

Assad: Of course.

Walters: Some of whom are children.

Assad: Uh we didn't talk about whether-- innocent is innocent. Whether it's children or-- is innocent.

Walters: Do they see pictures? Do they have Facebook?

Assad: They can watch the Internet every day. Of course. They ask a lot.

Walters: Pay attention?

Assad: They are very curious to know.

Walters: What do they say?

Assad: About the question-- about what's happening? Why-- why do you have militants, why do you have evil people? Why do the-- why do those people want to kill?

Walters: I want to hear the answers, what do you say?

Assad: I told them a lot of things. Sometimes people commit mistakes, sometimes you have bad people. In every society you have bad people. So they kill more to undermine the government, that's what you explain to the children.

Walters: How does this all end? How do you restore peace?

Assad: By reform and facing the terrorists.

Walters: Is the reform, too little too late?

Assad: No, because anyway, the reform will not have direct impact on the terrorists, because most of the terrorists, and I would say, all the terrorists, they don't have political agenda. They don't care about reforming. The reform is for the majority in the middle that I told you about and the people who support you, and the people who are against you. But terrorists don't care about this.

Walters: Will you allow freedom of expression, freedom of press?

Assad: We already have it. 145

Walters: You don't have freedom of press, they can't criticize you.

Assad: We have in every-- every society, you have a, like-- I wouldn't call taboo? You have a limit.

Walters: Taboo? Not in mine. We have freedom of press. How do you hope that you will be remembered?

Assad: By doing the best I can, can for, for this country. Whether you agree, or whether the people agree or don't, don't agree, but at-- at the end, I was not a puppet. I care a lot about being independent president for independent Syria. And do my best, according to my convictions. That's the most important thing. At the end, even if they disagree with you, they will respect you.

Walters: What do you think is the biggest misconception that my country has of what's happening here, if indeed there is a misconception?

Assad: Misconception about a lot of things. I cannot tell you, because it's so many facts, distorted facts, you have them in the media. But the most important thing, as accumulation of these facts, you don't have vision. The problem with the West in general, especially the United States, They don't have vision about-- at least my region, I wouldn't talk about the rest of the world -- failing in Iraq, failing in Afghanistan, failing in fighting terrorism.

Assad: The situation is getting worse and worse in the rest of the world. The question you ask as American, what did you get? Well, where did you win? Well, you spent trillions, where you could spend few hundred of millions, and get the terrorists out. So that will-- you-- it harms your interest, but at the same time, it harms others', interest. So this is the misconception I think.

Walters: Dealing with the protest-- with the protesters. What is the misconception, if there is any?

Assad: About this situation?

Walters: About the protests, that's what is being focused on now.

Assad: OK, we don't kill our people, nobody kill. No government in the world kill its people, unless it's led by crazy person. For me, as president, I became president because of the public support. It's impossible for anyone, in this state, to give order to kill people.

Assad: We have militants, those militants killing-- soldiers and killing civilians. This morning, we lost nine civilians, killed in Homs, in the middle of Syria, and they are supporters. Most of the victims are support government supporters. That's something they don't know, they think every civilian is demonstrator, and every civilian is against the government, which is not true.

Walters: But the protesters in the beginning, who were killed. 146

Walters: OK. Our view is there are peaceful protesters, they were killed, some were tortured. It was a brutal reaction. Are we wrong in thinking that?

Assad: Every single-- every brute reaction, was by individual. Not by institution. That's what you have to know.

Assad: We don't have institution that kill people, or give order to-- for brute reaction. This is individual-- and that's what I call-- what I describe as-- individual mistakes.

Walters: OK. Done by the military, or done by whom?

Assad: We don't know everything. In some cases done by the police. In some cases done by civilians.

Walters: But not by your command?

Assad: No, no, no. We don't have-- nobody-- no one's command. There was no command, to kill or to be brutal.

Walters: So that was individual people?

Assad: What do you mean remorseful? You mean being sad or-- or regret?

Walters: Regret.

Assad: No, a regret-- you regret when you do-- when you do mistakes, when you commit a mistake. I always try to protect my people. How can I feel remorseful if I try to protect the Syrian people?

Walters: But people were killed. You're not remorseful?

Assad: Well, just let me be. So you mean remorseful be sad?

Walters: Yeah, do you feel guilty? Guilty. Guilt.

Assad: Because if you mean guilty, it means you made the mistake. That's why I have be precise. So if you can change the term just for me to--

(side chat)

Walters: And then I'm done. Do you feel guilty?

Assad: I did my best to protect the people, so I cannot feel guilty, when you do your best. You feel sorry for the lives that has been lost, but you don't feel guilty -- when you don't kill people.

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APPENDIX B IRANIAN PRESIDENT IN A MEETING WITH SYRIAN PARLIAMENT SPEAKER

President in a meeting with Syrian Parliament Speaker:

Tuesday 02 June 2015 - 09:54

Iran has stood beside Syrian government and the people / Aliens could never impose their wills on Syria

President Hassan Rouhani underlined that the Iranian people and government will stand by the Syrian nation to the end of the crisis, added that no alien countries will ever be able to impose their own wills on the Syrian nation.

He made the remark in a meeting with the Syrian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Jihad Al-Laham.

Expressing optimism about the ultimate victory of the Syrian nation and army in fight against terrorists, he said that now after four years of resistance and struggle the enemies of Syria have come to realize that their dreams of gaining dominance over Damascus in just a few months were hollow ones.

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Stressing that terrorists could never succeed in their plots against Syria, President Rouhani regretted that some regional countries suffered from a huge miscalculation thinking that they could always use terrorists as a tool to get to their own purposes. However, the president added, they were not aware that these groups would eventually become a nightmare for them.

The Syrian official said his nation and government would never forget the support of their Iranian brothers and friends. He slammed the inefficiency of the United Nations in addressing world problems and criticized it for inability to implement the proposed plan by the Iranian President for creating a world free of violence and extremism.

He also regretted that some regional countries were supporting terrorist groups in Syria and said these countries were in fact implementing the plots hatched by the US and the West to serve the interests of the Zionist regime.

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APPENDIX C PRESIDENT ASSAD’S RUSSIAN TV INTERVIEW |

The media war with the West was lost the day the Syrian uprising began, President Assad told a Russian broadcaster. The authorities appear ready to start another round by showing to the world the foreign mercenaries captured in Syria.

A number of key questions have arisen since Assad gave his last interview over half a year ago. Assad answered them all in a new interview with Rossiya-24 TV channel.

'West outplayed Syria on media battlefield'

Assad admits that Syria is losing the media war against the West, but says “the reality is what really matters” and not “the illusions” created by the media.

He said that the media outplayed the Syrian government in the very beginning of the conflict by making up stories and spreading rumors. But in the long term the media cannot beat the reality, he added, and eventually the circumstances have changed because what is really happening is very much different from what the media reports.

Assad also said that the Syrian government repeatedly tried to express its point of view to numerous international journalists, but the agencies kept sending to Syria only those people who would stick with the same lies and false picture created in the first days of the conflict.

Not so Free Syrian Army

Assad says that the Syrian National Council, an “opposition” operating from abroad, has from little or no influence on what is happening in Syria and does not have any kind of significance within Syria. Though on the ground the Free Syrian Army is widely considered to be the core of the armed and organized opposition movement, Assad believes the FSA has not much to either with freedom or the organized army.

“First of all they are not free,” the head of state said, explaining that they will never be free while they are supplied with guns and funded from abroad.

He described the Free Syrian Army as a crowd of convicted criminals, comprised among other things of Al-Qaeda type religious fanatics, extremists and terrorists and to some extent of foreign mercenaries, predominantly from other Arab states.

Assad revealed that Syrian forces had captured a number of foreign mercenaries who were fighting for the opposition. He explained the authorities had not advertised the fact until now because they did not have enough evidence to prove the fighters were indeed mercenaries.

"Some [of the mercenaries] are still alive,” he said. “They are being detained and we

150 are preparing to show them to the world. Many of them have been killed.”

Syrian rebels are also known to have gone to Kosovo to study partisan warfare tactics, Assad added. “There is information that a group of people who call themselves opposition went to Kosovo to train in organizing military intervention by NATO into Syria,” he told Rossiya-24.

Western sanctions and UN mission – both one-sided

At the moment there are 212 military observers and 68 civilian staff working for the UN observer mission in Syria monitoring the implementation of Kofi Annan’s peace plan.

Assad says that a decrease in direct military confrontation with the opposition due to the redeployment of the military was the only positive result of the mission’s arrival. At the same time, he says, the number of terror attacks targeting civilians has sharply increased and is now at its highest level since the beginning of the crisis.

The West keeps talking “about violence, but violence from the side of the government, not a word about the terrorists,” the Syrian leader said. “Mr. Annan will come to Syria this month, and I will ask him about this matter.”

Slapping Syria with all sorts of sanctions and embargoes is another one-sided decision by the West, Assad believes.

“Sanctions affect only ordinary people, not the government,” Assad explained.

He said that the world is wide enough not to focus only on the US and Europe.

“We are finding alternatives to overcome these difficulties,” he said. “We have wonderful relations with the greater part of the world, except for the West.”

Not a regime but a form of government

President Assad believes that what Russia and China, who repeatedly expressed their support for Syria and backed the country in the UN Security Council, are in fact supporting is neither the regime (Assad prefers the expression “form of government”) nor Assad as the head of state, but international stability.

Both Russia and China have a good grip on the geopolitical situation in the region and they understand that without their support not only Syria but a lot of its neighbors will plunge into chaos, Assad explained.

“It is not a question of Syria, it is a question of international stability,” Assad said.

Syrian President Assad warns against "sowing chaos" in Syria

BEIJING, May 17 (Xinhuanet) -- In an interview with a Russian television station, Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad has spoken out against nations he believes are

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"sowing chaos" in the country. In an apparent reference to Saudi Arabia and Qatar, who back the rebel forces opposing Assad, the President said the leaders of some countries are only promoting terrorism and unrest in Syria.

MOSCOW, May 16 (Xinhua) -- The parliamentary elections held in Syria on May 7 showed Syrian people's supports to the country's course of reform, said President Bashar al-Assad in an interview aired here on Wednesday.

"This is an important step, part of the reforms we have started about a year ago. The results show Syrian people still support the course of reforms, the majority supports the state's order," Assad told the Russia-24 TV channel. "This is a serious message to all both inside and outside the country. Syrian people was not scared by threats of terrorists who attempted to disrupt the elections."

Assad also said Damascus was going to ask UN-Arab League joint envoy Kofi Annan why the United Nations spoke solely about the violence from the Syrian government but kept silent on "terrorists. "

"They only speak about violence from the government. There is no word about terrorists. We keep waiting. Mr. Annan will come to Syria this month and I'll ask him, what's the matter," Assad said.

Assad added that the number of terror attacks in Syria has increased since the UN observers arrived in the country, insisting "the situation has not been improved."

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BIOGRAPHY

Name Miss Waraporn Raksorn Date of Birth August 13, 1986 Educational Attainment 2009: Bachelor of Arts, Chiang Mai University 2011: Post-Graduate Diploma, International Relations, Brunel University Work Position Business Owner, Rice Mill, Suphanburi, Thailand Work Experiences Researcher Africa Division, Department of South Asia, Middle East and African Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bangkok, Thailand

Student Internship Royal Thai Embassy, London, United Kingdom