The Politics of Visibility in Urban Sanitation: Bureaucratic Coordination and the Swachh Bharat Mission in Tamil Nadu, India

By

Prassanna Raman

S.M. in Architecture Studies, MIT (2012) B.A. in Economics and Art History, Williams College (2008)

Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy in International Development

at the

MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

May 2020

© 2020 Prassanna Raman. All Rights Reserved

The author hereby grants to MIT the permission to reproduce and to distribute publicly paper and electronic copies of the thesis document in whole or in part in any medium now known or hereafter created.

Author______Department of Urban Studies and Planning (February 14, 2020)

Certified by______Gabriella Y. Carolini Associate Professor of International Development and Urban Planning Department of Urban Studies and Planning Dissertation Supervisor

Accepted by______Jinhua Zhao Associate Professor of Transportation and City Planning Chair, PhD Committee Department of Urban Studies and Planning The Politics of Visibility in Urban Sanitation: Bureaucratic Coordination and the Swachh Bharat Mission in Tamil Nadu, India

by

Prassanna Raman

Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning on February 14, 2020 in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Development

ABSTRACT

Often linked with class and caste and mired in socio-cultural taboos, sanitation has a reputation problem in India. The introduction of the Swachh Bharat Mission (SBM) aims to address these challenges not only at the individual level, but also at the organizational level. SBM heavily banks on the use of reputational devices such as social media campaigns and city rankings to incentivize the sub-national implementation of reforms. While literatures on sanitation implementation highlight coordination between agencies and between agencies and NGOs as key to service improvements, few if any, explore how organizational reputation may affect that coordination. Given the importance afforded to SBM within India’s current march toward sanitation reform, this scholarly lacuna is surprising.

My dissertation aims to address this knowledge gap through an in-depth study of coordination, and the role of organizational reputation in the roll-out of SBM in the South Indian state of Tamil Nadu. First, I ask what impacts public sector coordination in urban sanitation under SBM. Second, I examine whether SBM’s reputational devices have any effects on coordination. Within Tamil Nadu, I focus on two major streams of work within the SBM Urban portfolio—toilet construction and solid waste management—in the cities of Chennai, Coimbatore, and Trichy. To conduct my study, I use semi-structured interviews with bureaucrats and NGOs, document and social media analysis of SBM materials, and participant observation of behavioral change campaigns run by public agencies and sanitation-centric NGO partners.

I found that SBM’s reputational devices were no match for entrenched institutional weaknesses, like poor bureaucratic capacity and administrative incoherence, to incentivize coordination either between agencies or between agencies and NGOs across the three cities. Instead, SBM’s emphasis on social media, city rankings, and certifications has exacerbated the burden of documentation and the “tick-box” culture within agencies. However, I also found that in some cases, SBM’s reputational devices have empowered existing sanitation NGOs by increasing demand for their services. I conclude that SBM’s emphasis on visibility rather than deep institutional reform obfuscates the kind of work needed to improve outcomes in the urban sanitation sector.

Thesis Supervisor: Gabriella Y. Carolini Title: Associate Professor of International Development and Urban Planning

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Acknowledgements

It takes a village to finish a PhD, and I have been incredibly fortunate to have had so much guidance and love from my international tribe. At MIT, I am grateful for the support and guidance from my stellar dissertation committee. I would like to thank Gabriella Carolini for being an exceptional mentor and a creative and inter-disciplinary scholar. Thank you for always pushing me to do and be better. I do appreciate it, even if my face sometimes says otherwise. I am grateful for Balakrishnan Rajagopal’s expansive knowledge of South Asian history and his incisive views on international development, particularly in South India. Thank you for challenging me to analyze a problem from different angles. I would also like to thank Jim Wescoat for his emphasis on intellectual and methodological rigor. Thank you for continuing the sanitation journey with me from my Master’s thesis. I promise to at least try to make fewer toilet-related puns moving forward.

In addition to my dissertation committee, I have had several wonderful teachers around the world from Cedar Girls’ Secondary School in Singapore to La Jolla Country Day School, Williams College, and MIT in the United States: Ooi Kok Leng, Vimala Kumar, Esther Chiam, Doc Stevenson, Marsha Boston, Alice Thornton-Schilling, Tom Perrotti, Billy Simms, Sarah Bakhiet, Lucie Schmidt, Jon Bakija, Elizabeth McGowan, Guy Hedreen, Jon Mee, Tiku Majumder, Peter Low, Anand Swamy, David Tucker-Smith, Holly Edwards, Michael Lewis, Rick Spalding, Diane Davis, and Graham Jones. My teachers have inspired and encouraged me with their intellectual curiosity and commitment to holistic learning. Special thanks to Sandy Wellford, Ellen Rushman, Eran Ben-Joseph, Sylvia Hiestand, Melanie Mala Ghosh, and Madeline Smith for their wisdom and support in helping me navigate the labyrinthine logistics of the PhD process.

It was my privilege to learn with and from the PhD students I met at DUSP, who have been an incredible source of friendship and community. I am so excited to share in your post-PhD adventures and accomplishments. Profound thanks to: Elise Harrington for being my virtual fieldwork muse and Instagram victim; Yasmin Zaerpoor for mocking me for my youthful proclivities; Jeff Rosenblum for all the hugs, coffees, and dinners; Hannah Teicher for her special brand of “prickly” friendship and Sham’s dinners; Jason Spicer for being the Blanche to my Sophia; Aria Finkelstein for her sophisticated views on reality TV; Laura Delgado for being a fellow Eph and Trader Joe’s aficionado; Isadora Cruxen for introducing me to brigadeiros and caipirinhas; Asmaa Elgamal for the BollyX classes and performance power poses; Chaewon Ahn for the “indoor hikes;” Shenhao Wang for the late night chats; Cressica Brazier for her dedication to climate change research and activism; and Minjee Kim for being a kickass co-instructor.

My dissertation fieldwork in Tamil Nadu has been one of the most valuable learning experiences in my life, both personally and professionally. It was generously supported by MIT-India, the Center for International Studies, and the Lloyd and Nadine Rodwin International Travel Fellowship from DUSP. I would like to thank Resilient Chennai for the opportunity to collaborate with them on their resilience strategy during my fieldwork. I am particularly grateful for the mentorship and kindness of the Chief Resilience Officer, Krishna Mohan Ramachandran. Besides my affiliation with Resilient Chennai, the richness of my fieldwork experience is a result of the generosity and warmth of my

3 numerous gatekeepers and interview participants, many of whom took a personal interest in my work and encouraged me to challenge existing conceptualizations of sanitation, policy implementation, and bureaucracies in Western ways of looking at the world. Thank you for being so patient with all of my questions as I attempted to reconcile theoretical frameworks and empirical data. I am incredibly humbled and inspired by your dedication to your work, despite the layers of complexities inherent in navigating the politics of implementation and socio-environmental justice in India.

I could not have started or finished the PhD without the love and support of my friends, who have provided me with much-needed perspective, comfort, and comic relief when I was feeling overwhelmed by the banality of academic formalities and personalities.1 Heartfelt thanks to: Rachel Fevrier for being the Charles to my Jake; Carynne McIver Button for being “my person;” Sara Siegmann for being my favorite Hoebag, Anna Rutkovskaya for being the best Babushka; Uzaib Saya for being the Stevie to my Moira; Betsy Todd for recommending the most bizarre TV shows for my entertainment; Selmah Goldberg for our regular lunch dates that kept me sane; Yock Theng Tan for always holding space for me; Jane Lim for all the productive café work dates; Sadiqa Mahmood for living with my dissertation-related spaciness and experimental stress baking; Natasha Ali for introducing me to the wonders of Westside, Big Basket, and Sea Rock; Gayatri Ramdas for her eviscerating meme skills and our epic shopping dates; Sarvesh Ashok for constantly rolling his eyes at my bluntness and for indulging my ardent love for Vijay Sethupathi; and Arjun Bhargava for his affection and all the bickering.

I am also grateful to my family who have embraced my graduate school adventures with equal parts love, encouragement, and skepticism. Many thanks to my family in and from India for making data collection so enjoyable. Raju Mama, Janakam Mami, Jayashree Mami, and Kumar Chithappa went out of their way to connect me to people, and made me feel at home in a city I barely knew two years ago. Thank you also to my late grandparents, whose flat I stayed in during fieldwork. Gomia Thatha and Pati, you would have been proud of and entertained by my life in Sampoorna Apartments with its zany inhabitants.

Finally, I would like to thank my parents and brother, who have been my ultimate source of unwavering love, strength, and inspiration. Their bemusement and amusement at the arcane academic rituals I endured, combined with their steadfast belief in me, have helped me cope with the many troughs of PhD life and have sweetened my celebration of its rare peaks. My father is a lawyer and my mother and brother are both physicians, and are thus naturally befuddled by the social sciences and my unusual fondness for exploring toilets and trash. Nevertheless, they were enthusiastic research assistants during fieldwork, stoically suffered through reading multiple drafts of dissertation proposals and chapters, and provided real-time encouragement and loving insults on our WhatsApp family group chat, aptly entitled “The Bestest Family Everrr.” My family has taught me the value of hard work, how to navigate adversity with resilience, grace, and humor, and

1 I would also like to acknowledge here the entertainment and stress relief provided by MIT’s GroupX classes (special thanks to Anna Grossman, Fen Tung, and Dalia Debs) and the Dance Complex. I am also grateful for the timeless wisdom of writers I revisit, especially when life feels bleak: L.M. Montgomery, Louisa May Alcott, J.K. Rowling, Rainer Maria Rilke, Mary Oliver, C.P. Cavafy, and Susan Coolidge.

4 the importance of using our privilege to lift up those around us. Amma, thank you for teaching me to fight and to always stand up for who I am and what I believe in. Appa, thank you for teaching me to think critically about the world, and to bravely speak truth to power. Vignesh, thank you for being the best baby brother ever and for modeling grit and passion. I may even forgive you sometime soon for performing surgery on my poor dolls when we were kids. But not yet.

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Table of Contents

Chapter 1: Invisible and Intractable: The Sanitation Challenge p. 7

Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework: Organizational Reputation p. 53 and Coordination

Chapter 3: Horizontal and Vertical Coordination between Agencies in p. 77 Tamil Nadu

Chapter 4: Agency-NGO Coordination in Tamil Nadu p. 112

Chapter 5: Does a Rising Tide Lift All Boats? SBM and p. 137 Organizational Reputation

Epilogue on Positionality p. 161

References p. 164

Appendix A: Partial List of Interviews p. 189

Appendix B: Interview Protocol p. 193

Appendix C: List of Swachh Survkeshan 2019 Indicators p. 197

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1| INVISIBLE AND INTRACTABLE: THE SANITATION CHALLENGE

1.1 Motivation

“I am only an IAS2 officer in name. I am actually just a garbage man3.” At a conference on waste management in Chennai last year, a panelist from the National

Institute of Urban Affairs mentioned this quote from a commissioner at a large municipal corporation in India to illustrate the urgency in Indian cities around environmental sanitation. This sector, which includes access to working toilets, solid waste management, and improvements to sewerage systems, remains a persistent challenge in 21st century cities, despite global advancements in technology and medicine and the creation of the

Millennium and Sustainable Development Goals (CDC 2012; Water Aid 2016; George

2008; Winters et al. 2014; WSP 2011). The World Health Organization and UNICEF reported in 2010 that 2.5 billion people around the world did not have access to improved sanitation infrastructure, which included facilities that ensured hygienic separation of human contact and human waste (CDC 2012). South Asia bears one of the biggest sanitation burdens, with only 41% of the region’s population using improved sanitation facilities (CDC 2012). Further, 33% of the 2.01 billion tons of municipal solid waste generated annually across the world is not managed in an environmentally sound manner

(World Bank 2018). Besides contributing to environmental pollution, poor sanitation causes disease and death, affects participation in education and the labor market, and leads to a life without dignity (Sahoo et al. 2015; CDC 2012).

2 The Indian Administrative Service (IAS) is the country’s elite bureaucratic service. 3 Roadmap to Zero Waste conference organized by the Madras Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Chennai, November 9, 2018.

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Often deemed the “ugly stepsister” to the water sector, sanitation interventions are less favored in policy circles due to socio-cultural aversions to talking about human waste, and because successful sanitation interventions offer long-term benefits, beyond electoral windows of politicians (George 2008; Winters et al. 2014; WSP 2011). In Indonesia, for example, Bahasa Indonesia does not have a formal word for defecation, and discussions around human bodily functions and their disposal are not considered culturally acceptable (WSP 2011). Similarly, there are more celebrities participating in high-profile charity work for clean water, like Matt Damon and Jay-Z, than for global sanitation ventures (George 2008). The lack of language and unwillingness to publicly articulate sanitation concerns are fundamental challenges in broaching the topic of sanitation, much less mainstreaming the sector’s concerns in government. Here, toilets and trash diverge. Cultural taboos in discussing bodily functions are more challenging when discussing toilet interventions, compared to solid waste management which does not elicit similar feelings of shame and disgust. Further, conventional sanitation interventions like wastewater treatment plants and underground sewer lines are capital- intensive and provide tangible benefits in the long run, which may not coincide with political election and re-election calendars (Winters et al. 2014). There is also a significant amount of resistance to the construction of solid waste management facilities near homes and businesses (World Bank 2018). These characteristics make environmental sanitation an unattractive policy priority for politicians, compared to the relative visibility and glamor offered by parks, football stadiums, and lake restoration efforts.

To transform the “ugly stepsister” into Cinderella, interventions since the mid-

2000s have incorporated visibility initiatives to normalize discussions around sanitation, and to educate the public on cultivating hygienic and environmentally friendly habits like

8 toilet adoption and composting (Water Aid 2006; CLTS website, Ekane et al. 2014;

George 2008; Doron & Jeffrey 2018). One example is World Toilet Day (November 19), which was started in 2001 by Jack Sim, a Singaporean philanthropist, and later adopted by the United Nations in 2013 in an effort to inspire action around the global sanitation crisis and to raise awareness of Sustainable Development Goal 6 (World Toilet Day website). 4 In a similar vein, Nelson Mandela participated in a hand washing commercial to popularize the Millennium Development Goals’ half-hearted attempt to tackle sanitation (George 2008). When shown at the AfricaSan conference, the sanitation community was bowled over the pedestrian commercial because of how neglected and

“unloved” they felt (George 2008, p. 123). These efforts to induce behavioral change in sanitation occur in both the Global North and South. For instance, the Niagara Falls Solid

Waste Education and Enforcement Team in Buffalo, New York, introduced a mascot called Totes McGoats in 2015 to teach kids the importance of recycling (Basu 2015). On the other side of the world, at the Sanitation and Drinking Water National Conference in

Indonesia in 2016, a comic strip describing the persistence of sanitation challenges in slums helped repackage open defecation in rivers in a more entertaining way

(Tampubolon 2016). These efforts focus on improving public communication by local governments and international organizations, and are part of the behavioral approach to sanitation in the sector, which earlier solely relied on the construction of physical infrastructure (Water Aid 2006).

Initially, sanitation interventions to improve toilet access emphasized supply-side policies, like infrastructure investments and subsidies for individual household latrines

4 This goal promises improved sanitation globally by 2030.

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(the “hardware”), but it became clear that there was a profound disconnect between sanitation policies, practices, and outcomes on the ground (Mosler 2012; Water Aid

2006). Sanitation and hygiene guidelines issued at the national and international levels were not followed at the local level, and even when sanitation facilities were available, people did not choose to use them (Nawab & Nyborg 2009; Ekane et al. 2014; CLTS website). In the 2000s, this troubling phenomenon prompted the incorporation of behavioral change policies (the “software”) in the sanitation sector at the international level to understand and address the cultural and behavioral barriers to adopting healthy sanitary practices (Mosler 2012; CLTS website; Kar & Chambers 2008). In conjunction with the Millennium Development Goals, the United Nations declared 2008 the

International Year of Sanitation in the Water for Life Decade (2005-2015) to highlight the centrality of sanitation in eradicating poverty and improving health and well-being worldwide (UNICEF 2007; UNDESA 2015). This effort to foreground sanitation as a global challenge emphasized coordination between “hardware” and “software” strategies

(UNICEF 2007).

Taking their cue from the United Nations, countries, like India and Indonesia, started implementing behavioral change programs in urban and rural areas to complement structural interventions. However, behavioral change programs have run into many obstacles on the ground (Hueso & Bell 2013; Engel & Susilo 2014; Galvin 2015).

Bureaucrats trained in constructing sanitation “hardware” did not have adequate training in communicating “software” strategies to communities, and struggled with community engagement, as seen in the Total Sanitation Campaign in India (Hueso & Bell 2013;

Center for Public Impact 2017). Further, behavioral change policies, like the prominent

Community-Led Total Sanitation (CLTS) program, have often had unintended negative

10 social consequences for individuals and communities.5 For instance, Engel & Susilo

(2014) question the program’s emphasis on using shaming as a trigger to encourage behavioral change without explicitly addressing structural and governance failures in

Indonesia.6 The authors also describe how the use of coercion by implementers external to the area has reinforced and exacerbated intra-community hierarchies in their study

(Engel & Susilo 2014). Similarly, Galvin (2015) explores the erosion of human rights and individual dignity in CLTS implementation, when the achievement of the goal of ending open defecation is more important than the means to the end. While behavioral change policies offer a more holistic way of tackling sanitation challenges, they need to be crafted and implemented in a manner that responds to community needs and preferences without condoning structural failures.

In solid waste management, “hardware” and “software” strategies have been more intertwined. While attempting to expand decentralized waste management and processing facilities, national and local governments have long emphasized the importance of consumer behavior in waste disposal (World Bank 2018; UNEP & ISWA).

For example, national and local laws governing waste management include environmental standards for waste management and disposal, and typically also describe guidelines for households and businesses on the proper disposal of waste (World Bank

2018). In plastic waste management, for instance, interventions often start at the

5 CLTS is the dominant behavioral change framework in sanitation, pioneered by Kar & Chambers (2008). Primarily implemented in rural areas, CLTS utilizes public shaming and community pressure to induce healthy sanitation habits. For detailed case studies on the social impact of CLTS at the community level, see: Engel & Susilo (2014); Galvin (2015); and Bardosh (2015). 6 Interestingly, some of the sanitation NGOs I talked to who work in rural and urban areas said that while they use the CLTS framework, they choose not to employ shaming as a trigger for behavioral change. The CEO of Gramalaya, Mr. Sai Damodaran, noted that his organization prefers to use tools of positive reinforcement, like showing communities examples of best practices in similar areas (Interview at Gramalaya Headquarters, Trichy. Sep 5, 2018).

11 household or commercial level to raise awareness and create habit change (World Bank

2018). Social networks are leveraged in behavioral change campaigns and community leaders are tasked to spread awareness of healthy solid waste management habits, like the

Environmental Wardens in Jamaica, who are employed by the country’s National Solid

Waste Management Authority (World Bank 2018). These wardens are tasked with enforcing environmental laws in their neighborhoods, and are trained in solid waste management best practices and the prevention of environmental pollution (World Bank

2018).

Along with the expansion of the range of sanitation interventions, the number of actors has also increased in the delivery of public sanitation. In concert with bureaucratic agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have become prominent in improving sanitation “hardware” and “software” in in the Global South, as a response to the public sector’s inability to provide high quality service coverage in cities (UNDP 2006; Ayee &

Crook 2003; Glasbergen et al. 2007). In particular, NGOs have undertaken most of the responsibility for behavioral change efforts, given the close ties they share with the communities they serve (Center for Policy Impact 2017; Pervaiz et al. 2008). Despite the plethora of actors, coordination between them to improve sanitation outcomes remains a challenge. For example, it is often difficult in Indian cities to articulate which agency should assume responsibility for sanitation in slums or informal settlements, which often leads to stasis (Connors 2005; Connors 2007; Pervaiz et al. 2008). Further, scaling up of bottom-up efforts depends on the strength of horizontal ties in community groups and their vertical relationships to decision-makers in water and sanitation agencies (Das

2015; Pervaiz et al. 2008).

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In solid waste management, governments struggle with clearly articulating responsibilities among agencies since its activities cut across departments and bureaucracies (World Bank 2018; UNEP & ISWA). Further, the informal sector in solid waste is often separate from formal waste services in cities, resulting in gaps in service provision and depriving informal workers of a sustainable livelihood (World Bank 2018).

Efforts to address coordination in solid waste management include the creation of agencies dedicated to coordination between cities and bureaucracies, like the Sindh Solid

Waste Management Board in Pakistan, and the establishment of knowledge management systems to collect and exchange data and best practices from the national and local levels, like in Japan (World Bank 2018). However, these coordination mechanisms are more exceptions than norms (World Bank 2018). Despite the multitude of interventions and actors, urban sanitation remains an intractable challenge.

1.2 Sanitation in India: Toilets, Trash, and Bollywood

Why India?

In my dissertation, I explore urban sanitation governance in India, which introduced the Swachh Bharat (Clean India) Mission (SBM) in 2014 to address both structural and behavioral obstacles in sanitation. The flagship policy of the national government, SBM has promised to end open defecation and improve solid waste management in the country with an unprecedented combination of political will at the highest echelons, financing, and a massive, multi-faceted public communications initiative that leverages social media and incorporates elements of drama and

13 competition to spark a social “revolution.”7 In the global sanitation community that is and has often felt neglected as water’s homely sidekick, SBM is an anomaly.

Urban Sanitation Governance in India

SBM hopes to solve India’s sanitation crisis, and builds on a series of national-level policies and investments. The state of urban environmental sanitation in India is dire

(IIHS 2014; Wankhade 2015; Chaplin 1999; Chaplin 2011; WSP 2011; World Bank 2018).

According to the 2011 Census, 31.16% (377 million) of the country’s 1.21 billion people live in urban areas (IIHS 2014). Among urban Indian households, 81% have toilets within their houses, 6% have access to public toilets, and 12% (roughly 10 million) openly defecate (IIHS 2014; Coffey et al. 2014). The country also generates 100,000 tons of municipal solid waste per day; 83% of this waste is collected and only 30% is treated (Park

& Singh 2018). Despite the tremendous and growing need for urban environmental sanitation infrastructure and services across the solid waste management and sanitation value chains, from capture and containment to transport, treatment, and reuse/disposal, there is an acute gap in both “hardware” and “software” services in Indian cities (TNUSSP

2016; World Bank 2018). These details paint a sobering picture of urban environmental sanitation in India that is simultaneously a public health and environmental disaster.

Besides these constraints, India also faces labor and human rights challenges in the sanitation sector; manual scavenging still persists despite the laws and policies specifically prohibiting it (Doron & Jeffrey 2018; SBM Manual 2017). Manual scavenging is the practice of forcing individuals from certain lower castes to clear human waste from toilets and septic tanks, largely without adequate pay, technology, and protective gear

7 Interview with Mr. Prasanth, social entrepreneur in waste, No Dumping, ASLRM. Coimbatore, Aug 20, 2018; Interview with Mr. Nirmal Kumar Singh, Sulabh International. Chennai, Dec 4, 2018.

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(Singh & Singh 2019). It is related to Hindu notions of purity and pollution which are then mapped on to social groups. The upper castes are considered to be purer than the lower castes, and thus do not engage in “dirty” activities that involve the cleaning up of human waste (Gupta et al. 2016). Manual scavengers largely belong to the Dalit or Untouchable community, and continue to service insanitary latrines even in 21st century India.

A recent survey done by the Indian government estimated that more than 40,000 manual scavengers exist in the country across 14 states, and 70 percent of them are women (Mishra 2019). One of the biggest human rights challenges in India is the frequent deaths of those engaged in manual scavenging as a result of their efforts to clean up sewers and septic tanks with no machinery or protective equipment. 620 cases have been reported from 1993 to 2019, and many manual scavenger deaths go unreported (Nath

2019). In addition to the physical risks manual scavengers face, they are permanently locked into this line of work because of caste-based stigma that prevent them and future generations from pursuing alternative livelihoods (Nath 2019).

In my dissertation, I focus on the institutions in urban sanitation provision. One of the primary reasons for poor access to environmental sanitation services in Indian cities is the fragmented landscape of water and sanitation governance, particularly for the urban poor (Das 2015; Connors 2005; Connors 2007; TNUSSP 2018). The 74th

Amendment in the Indian Constitution decentralized basic urban service provision in the

1990s, including water and sanitation, to urban local bodies (ULBs) to increase the efficiency of resource allocation through the enhancement of relationships between citizens, bureaucrats, and political representatives on the ground (Das 2015). In operationalizing the gargantuan task of providing basic services for cities that are spatially and socioeconomically diverse, state governments set up highly specialized agencies

15 dedicated to different facets of urban services (Connors 2005; TNUSSP 2018; Bach &

Wegrich 2019). For example, in very large cities in India, separate water and sanitation utilities are in charge of water supply and sewerage systems, while municipal corporations oversee stormwater drains and solid waste management, among other infrastructure services (Connors 2005; TNUSSP 2018). Water and sanitation access for the urban poor and slum dwellers is even more complex with the involvement of additional agencies, like the state slum clearance boards and city planning agencies (Connors 2005; Connors

2007).

This state of fractured governance, along with weak bureaucratic capacity and a lack of political will and funds dedicated to urban sanitation improvements, has created a substantial void in sanitation services, which is often filled by NGOs (Das 2015; Winters et al. 2014). Prominent NGOs, like Sulabh International, Arghyam, Gramalaya, and

Chintan, have stepped up to provide both “hardware” and “software” services, particularly in underserved areas. Sulabh International, headquartered in New Delhi, has been working on improving human rights and access to environmental sanitation services across the country since 1970. Arghyam emphasizes community-driven solutions to water and sanitation challenges, and hosts the India Water Portal, a knowledge database for water and sanitation research and data. Gramalaya, based in Trichy, has been focusing on delivering “hardware” and “software” sanitation interventions to urban slums and villages in the area for over thirty years. Finally, Chintan is a research and action group specializing in environmental sustainability, including solid waste management interventions.

Relationships between NGOs and municipal corporations and other water and sanitation agencies have been checkered over time, particularly due to the rising

16 popularity of private-public partnerships (PPPs) for infrastructure projects in the last two decades (Das 2015). The public sector in Indian cities has drifted away from partnerships with NGOs in favor of courting the private sector for sponsorships and corporate social responsibility (CSR) funds (Dutta 2017). The Reserve Bank of India noted that the number of PPPs in energy, telecommunications, transportation, and water and sewerage has increased from 1 in 1990 to 60 in 2006 (RBI). Further, special purpose vehicles

(SPVs), like the Smart Cities Mission, have emerged in the urban infrastructure sector to leverage private capital for public benefit under the auspices of the central government, and are envisioned as complementary to the public sector. Thus, the water and sanitation landscape of Indian cities is populated with a number of distinct agencies and organizations at varying levels of government, all with different agendas and priorities.

Coordination between these actors is a problem on the ground in the water and sanitation sector. In her work, Connors (2005; 2007) describes how water provision for the urban poor in Bangalore come under the purview of the water utility, the slum clearance board, and the municipal corporation, which obfuscates the distinct responsibilities of each agency and produces poor service standards. Further, her research illustrates how “elite NGOs” in the city pressured public agencies for better services by leveraging the Right to Information Act and using high-quality data analysis to emphasize gaps in performance (Connors 2007).8 Similarly, in neighboring Pakistan,

NGOs have generated information relevant to public agencies’ mandates to encourage them to improve services in underserved communities. Bureaucracies may not have up- to-date or granular enough knowledge about these communities, hindering service

8 NGOs founded by high-level professionals and scholars to transform civic participation and urban governance in India, unlike grassroots NGOs (Connors 2007).

17 provision. The best-known example of this is the Orangi Pilot Project (OPP) in Karachi, which has produced detailed maps on sewer lines in the city’s informal settlements to scale up community-level sanitation efforts with the help of the public sector. (Pervaiz et al. 2008; Hasan 2006). Unlike the “elite” Bangalore NGOs, the OPP is a community- driven organization, supported by social scientists and researchers trained in sanitation construction and mapping. The OPP’s success in Karachi has been replicated in other areas to varying degrees, depending on the level of interest and involvement from implementing communities and agencies (Pervaiz et al. 2008).

Until the introduction of SBM, India’s approach to urban sanitation has mainly focused on “hardware”, and behavioral change efforts have been more common in rural interventions, like in the Total Sanitation Campaign. In the urban sphere, “software” initiatives have been piecemeal and spearheaded by a variety of international and sub- national actors. For example, NGOs working in Mumbai slums have organized “toilet festivals,” with the assistance of the World Bank, to reframe the humiliation associated with poor sanitation as a source of technological innovation (Appadurai 2001; McGeough

2013). Further, street plays, a cornerstone in public communication efforts in sanitation, education, and hygiene in villages, have grown in popularity in cities as an effective platform for sanitation outreach, with the support of municipal corporations and local and national corporate sponsors (Sekar & Sinha 2015). While the National Urban

Sanitation Policy in 2008 emphasized the need for both “hardware” and “software” interventions to tackle environmental sanitation challenges in the country, behavioral change initiatives did not become a linchpin in urban sanitation implementation until

SBM.

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Solid waste management efforts in Indian cities have similarly been disjointed until SBM. In 2000, the Ministry of Environment, Forests, and Climate Change issued municipal solid waste rules for cities to provide a legal framework for waste collection, segregation, transportation, processing, and disposal, based on the recommendations of a Supreme-Court-appointed committee (Ministry of Environment and Forests 2000;

Sambyal 2018; Pandey 2018). However, cities did not have the infrastructure or in-house capacity to implement these rules, and struggled to cope with burgeoning solid waste as a result of increasing urbanization (Sambyal 2018; Lahiri 2019). Municipal corporations are unable to keep up with the demands of door-to-door garbage collection, and waste is often haphazardly dumped outside cities and in waterbodies because of a lack of processing and treatment facilities (Kumar et al., 2017; Pandey 2018). Further, the informal sector, which is made up of waste pickers who collect and sell trash from streets and landfills, is unintegrated with formal management systems (Gupta & Gupta 2015).

Different cities have attempted various initiatives to tackle solid waste. The municipal corporation in Chandigarh, for instance, entered into a private-public partnership with the Jaypee Group of New Delhi to construct a solid waste processing plant in 2008 (Gupta & Gupta 2015). The city also advised bulk generators like malls, colleges, and hospitals to take responsibility for segregating and processing organic waste, and started issuing fines for violators of the solid waste management rules since 2013

(Gupta & Gupta 2015). Similarly, in Mysore, the Federation of Mysuru City Corporation

Wards Parliament, a local NGO, runs zero-waste processing plants for half the city’s one million residents (Chatterjee 2016). In partnership with the city corporation that implemented door-to-door collection of solid waste before SBM, the NGO segregates, labels, and sells trash to scrap merchants (Chatterjee 2016). While cities have attempted

19 to address solid waste management independently, the issue has not been nationally addressed. It was included as part of the environmental sanitation sector within the

National Urban Sanitation policy, but this was never implemented.

Key Urban Sanitation Interventions Before 2014

Recognizing the severity of the sanitation crisis, the Indian government launched several initiatives to improve outcomes in the country, although institutional reform has not been their main focus (Center for Public Impact 2017; SBM Manual 2017). While SBM is India’s most recent and heavily publicized attempt at overhauling sanitation, the policy stands on the shoulders of three giants in India’s sanitation history: the rural Total

Sanitation Campaign (TSC), the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission

(JNNURM), and the National Urban Sanitation Policy. Table 1 summarizes the key features of all four policies:

Total Sanitation JNNURM National Urban Swachh Bharat Campaign Sanitation Mission Policy Year Launched 1999 2005 2008 2014 Urban/Rural Rural Urban Urban Rural & Urban Main Goals Integrate behavioral Urban Institutional End open change; End open development; reform; City-wide defecation; defecation Governance sanitation Improve solid reform planning; waste Environmental management sanitation approach Role of NGOs in Supporting role in Watchdogs for Supporting role in Key Sanitation implementation public agencies implementation implementing partners Public Rankings; media None Rankings Rankings; media Communication campaigns and social media Efforts campaigns; Bollywood movies

Table 1: Milestones in India’s urban sanitation history

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Launched in 1999, TSC was India’s first sanitation policy to integrate both

“software” and “hardware” interventions in rural areas (Center for Public Impact 2017).

It was also the first policy to draw attention to the importance of bureaucracies in sanitation because of its highly public implementation challenges (Chattopadhyay 2015;

Hueso & Bell 2013; Center for Public Impact 2017). The primary reason for the failure of

TSC was the lack of coordination between and across government agencies and local bodies, which proved doubly problematic because the campaign was a major departure from previous supply- and subsidy-oriented rural sanitation programs (Center for Public

Impact 2017). Therefore, the alignment of goals and strategies between the national, district, and sub-district levels did not occur, and many frontline bureaucrats were unable to adapt to the new combined “software” and “hardware” approach to implementation that involved greater community participation (Center of Public Impact 2017; Hueso &

Bell 2013). While NGOs were recognized for their “special” role in helping to mobilize communities for sanitation improvements, they were not considered to be crucial partners to the implementing bureaucracies (Center for Public Impact 2017). TSC, like

SBM, emphasized public communication (Center for Public Impact 2017). Villages were publicly recognized and rewarded for achieving sanitation milestones, like eradicating open defecation and improving solid waste management practices9 (Center for Public

Impact 2017). The TSC was one of the foundational policies SBM Urban and Rural were based on; it was renamed the Nirmal Bharat Abhiyan, which eventually became SBM

Rural in 2014 (PIB 2014). Unfortunately, TSC did not effectively use the funds allocated

21 for behavioral change; a CAG (2015) report found that the funds were instead diverted towards administrative expenses. Thus, behavioral change campaigns at the national level did not get a meaningful push until SBM.

The next sanitation milestone was JNNURM in 2005, which was not a policy dedicated to sanitation, but one that more generally sought to improve the quality of infrastructure and governance in Indian cities and upgrade living conditions for the urban poor (Wankhade 2015). Sanitation received 24% (US$ 2.5 billion) of the funding dedicated to urban infrastructure and governance, which has been one of the largest investments in urban sanitation (Wankhade 2015). These funds were mostly used to retrofit or expand sewerage networks, and solid waste management was a sector eligible for funding if municipal corporations had solid waste management projects they wanted to implement (Wankhade 2015; PIB 2011). In addition to infrastructure improvements, service level benchmarking and data collection were hallmarks of this program. The government wanted to shift the focus from infrastructure investments to service delivery outcomes, and a list of performance parameters for the urban water and sanitation sector was drawn up to this end (MoUD 2010). This emphasis on service delivery and data collection is echoed in SBM (Swachh Survekshan Toolkit 2018).

Besides improving urban infrastructure, JNNURM also emphasized the necessity of governance reform, particularly in revising accounting practices and creating an e- governance infrastructure, in parastatal agencies and urban local bodies to improve the provision of basic services (“JNNURM Overview”). It tied these reforms to the access to additional funds for cities and state governments to ensure compliance (Mahadevia 2011).

Further, this policy championed the PPP model of implementation, and did not consider

NGOs, resident welfare associations (RWAs), and other community partners as key

22 implementers (“JNNURM Overview;” MOHUPA 2011). Instead, this policy envisioned the role of NGOs as watchdogs to keep public agencies accountable (MOHUPA 2011).

Unlike SBM and TSC, public communication was not a prominent part of JNNURM, which was envisioned solely as a policy aimed at upgrading urban infrastructure and governance (MOHUPA 2011; “JNNURM Overview). Despite the ambitious goals of the policy, a 2012 CAG report eviscerated its implementation, critiquing the central government’s inability to monitor outcomes and release funds on time to states. Further, the country’s preeminent auditor found that some of the funds were diverted to “ineligible beneficiaries” and that mandated third party inspections had not occurred on the ground

(CAG 2012). In addition, Wankhade (2013) corroborated the results from the CAG (2012) report and declared that the lack of inter-sectoral planning and bureaucratic noncoordination hampered capacity building in ULBs, particularly in water and sanitation provision.

The third giant in India’s urban sanitation history is the National Urban Sanitation

Policy, which was launched in 2008, the International Year of Sanitation as declared by the United Nations. This policy was unusual because its focus was exclusively on sanitation and it had no urban water counterpart (Wankhade 2015; MoUD 2014). Unlike

JNNURM, it welcomed all types of interventions from states and cities, not just specific

“hardware” solutions like sewerage systems (Wankhade 2015; MoUD 2014). The policy specified a comprehensive environmental sanitation approach, outlining interventions to increase toilet production and adoption and to improve solid waste management (MoUD

2014). The urban poor were also at the heart of this policy, and it called for the uncoupling of tenure status and service provision to expand formal service provision in poor areas

(Wankhade 2015; MoUD 2014). Institutional reform to achieve these goals was an explicit

23 goal of this policy, which highlighted coordination as a significant obstacle to urban sanitation planning in Indian cities (MoUD 2014). This policy advised cities and state governments to create multi-stakeholder city sanitation task forces to carry out policy implementation, and invited state governments and ULBs to oversee coordination with other agencies, NGOs, and community groups involved in urban sanitation efforts, especially in areas with slum dwellers and the urban poor (MoUD 2014). While this policy remains a visionary document in advocating for context-sensitive, city-wide sanitation planning combining both “hardware” and “software” as needed, the lack of explicit funding resulted in no major interventions associated with it in cities (Wankhade 2015;

Leavens 2010). However, it continues to be influential in subsequent state- and city-level urban sanitation planning (Wankhade 2015). The National Urban Sanitation Policy taught SBM the value of providing national funding for sanitation efforts, beyond planning and technical assistance, to encourage implementation at the state and city levels.

Similar to SBM, this policy also conducted city rankings, although the purpose was different. The National Advisory Board for Urban Sanitation (part of the Ministry of

Urban Development) ranked cities on different measures of environmental sanitation as a technical resource for ULBs to help them identify their baseline needs and performance improvements if the policy was implemented; it was not primarily envisioned as a strategy to increase the visibility of sanitation challenges and interventions for citizens (WSP 2011;

SBM website). According to Mr. Somnath Sen, an advisor for institutional development and strategy with experience working on this policy, it was an effort implemented by

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s technocratic administration that focused on expanding sanitation interventions in India beyond the construction of toilets and sewage

24 treatment plants.10 While rigorous in nature about improving urban sanitation, it lacked the “filmy” quality that has made SBM so attractive with citizens, politicians, and bureaucrats.11

The Swachh Bharat Mission

In 2014, SBM was announced with much fanfare. Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who ran and won on a sanitation-focused platform, declared that the policy will help India eradicate open defecation by October 2019, in time to honor Mahatma Gandhi’s 150th birthday. SBM is part of the Modi government’s strategy to turn Indian cities into engines of economic growth through upgrading urban infrastructure (Tewari et al. 2016; Jha &

Udas-Mankikar 2019). In addition to SBM, the Smart Cities Mission and the Atal Mission for Rejuvenation and Urban Transformation (AMRUT) were also launched in 2015 to this end (Jha & Udas-Mankikar 2019; Smart Cities website; AMRUT website).12 The scale, visibility, and political buy-in at the highest echelons of power in SBM is unprecedented, both in India and in the universe of sanitation, which has felt “unloved” (George 2008, p.

123).13

In updating previous efforts at addressing sanitation, SBM encourages a broad approach to environmental sanitation using a combination of both “hardware” and

“software” interventions (SBM website). SBM policy guidelines and its advertising campaigns explicitly highlight that making India clean is a shared social responsibility, and that sanitation improvements cannot be accomplished through government efforts alone (SBM Manual 2017; SBM Facebook page). The policy thus highlights the

10 Phone interview with Mr Somnath Sen. Chennai, December 14, 2018. 11 Ibid. 12 AMRUT is the updated form of JNNURM. 13 SBM is also India’s first national effort to simultaneously address both urban and rural sanitation needs.

25 importance of community actors like NGOs and RWAs, along with conventional implementers like government agencies and municipal corporations (SBM website; SBM

Manual 2017). ULBs are still considered the main implementer of SBM, and are expected to coordinate activities with other key implementers (SBM Manual 2017). While institutional reform in sanitation governance is not explicitly stated as a goal of SBM or

Swachh Survekshan, the indicators for rankings clearly assume coordination between agencies and between agencies and NGOs to fulfil the criteria. For example, in the toilet construction indicators, the Swachh Survekshan Toolkit directs ULBs to also ensure constant water supply to the latrines, which may or may not fall under the purview of the agency, depending on the city. Further, the beautification of slums, another indicator, does not specify coordination between ULBs and the state slum clearance boards to achieve this goal but assumes it (Swachh Survekshan Toolkit 2018).

While SBM asserts the importance of different types of stakeholders in achieving a clean India, it also emphasizes accountability and transparency of local governments and service providers through documentation, data-based governance, and improved communication between agencies and citizens (SBM website). To this end, SBM has introduced the Swachhata app, which is a mobile app that provides a platform for the public to report sanitation-related complaints in their neighborhoods for the municipal corporations to resolve. SBM has also implemented Swachh Survekshan, an annual survey and ranking of cities, which started in 2016. Swachh Survekshan relies on data provided by municipal corporations, data from direct observation by third-party verification teams, and citizen feedback (Swachh Survekshan 2018 Toolkit). In 2018, service level progress counted for 35% of the total number of marks, direct observation was 30%, and citizen feedback was 35% (Swachh Survekshan 2018 Toolkit). The service-

26 level progress indicators evaluate a city’s open-defecation-free (ODF) status, solid waste management practices, “software” strategies, capacity building, and innovation around service delivery and behavioral change (Swachh Survekshan 2018 Toolkit). The citizen feedback component emphasizes the importance of public communication of SBM from the nodal agency to the public (SBM website).14 Cities can also obtain awards and certifications under Swachh Survekshan, like “India’s Best City in Innovation and Best

Practices,” “ODF+,” and “7-Star Rating for Garbage-Free Cities.” A list of all the indicators from the recent Swachh Survekshan 2019 are available in Appendix C. Cities and citizens have become acutely aware of these rewards, rankings, and certifications that have become the face of SBM on the ground.

In addition to the Swachhata app and Swachh Survekshan, SBM has initiated a wave of media and social media campaigns in multiple languages to create awareness and behavioral change around sanitation and hygiene across the country.15 A television series called Navrangi Re! to raise awareness on the importance of fecal sludge management aired in February 2019, with the support of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and

Media Action (Minhas 2019).16 The two organizations also helped the Indian government launch a Hindi radio series on behavioral change in 2017 and produced five short films highlighting innovation in local public communication and waste management efforts

(BBC Media Action). On social media, Indian celebrities like actor Amitabh Bachchan and

14 The citizen feedback part consists of six questions for residents about SBM and their perceptions on improvements in environmental sanitation in their neighborhood in the last year. It also includes data from the Swachhata app on the number of downloads and the percentage of complaints timely resolved (Swachh Survekshan 2018 Report) 15 The use of social media is particularly associated with SBM because it is one of India’s first national policies implemented in the age of social media by a ruling political party (the Bharatiya Janata Party or the BJP) that is known for its success in leveraging technology and social media to “organize online for success offline” in the 2014 elections (Jha 2017). 16 The literal translation of Navrangi Re is “nine colors.”

27 cricket player Sachin Tendulkar are using their online fan base to communicate the urgency of sanitation challenges, knowledge about SBM’s initiatives, and the public’s responsibility to enthusiastically participate in this sanitation movement. In these outreach efforts, SBM skillfully invokes references to Gandhi to appeal to the emotions of the Indian public. SBM uses Gandhi’s glasses as its logo, has set the deadline for an open- defecation-free India on his 150th birthday, and has framed many of its advertising campaigns around his writings on sanitation (SBM website; SBM Facebook page;

“Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi”). Besides the political value the central government derives from its alignment with him, the use of Gandhi as a marketing tool for SBM is a shrewd move; he is a (mostly) beloved and familiar figure in Indian society, cutting across geographical, caste, and class divisions. Combining the relatively universal appeal of Gandhi with contemporary Indian celebrities in television and social media campaigns makes the messaging of SBM more attractive to citizens.

The Bollywood movie industry has also embraced SBM, firmly entrenching sanitation in the Indian cultural imaginary. Toilet: A Love Story was released in 2017 and

Pad Man was released in 2018, both starring well-known Bollywood actor, Akshay

Kumar, in sanitation-centric roles. Toilet: A Love Story (2017) is a romantic comedy about a man in an Indian village whose wife leaves him because his house does not have a toilet. In the same vein, Pad Man (2018) depicts the real-life story of an Indian entrepreneur in Coimbatore who started manufacturing low-cost sanitary pads to address menstrual hygiene problems and taboos in the country. This marriage of Bollywood,

Gandhi, and city rankings has rendered SBM a highly prominent policy in India, compared to previous sanitation efforts.

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1.3 Research Question

SBM implicitly speaks to coordination in its ambitious goal to improve all aspects of urban sanitation, from ending open defecation to implementing door-to-door garbage services to slum beautification projects (SBM website; SBM Manual 2017; Swachh

Survekshan Toolkit 2018). City bureaucracies are at the forefront of this movement, and are expected to coordinate between themselves and with NGOs to implement SBM (SBM

Manual 2017). SBM’s public communication efforts, like the rankings, certifications, and the app, present agencies with opportunities to improve their reputation with different audiences, from the public, state and central governments, to international financial organizations.17

I explore the relationships between organizational reputation and bureaucratic coordination in sanitation in the context of Tamil Nadu, a South Indian state. Tamil Nadu is the most urbanized state in India, and has focused its sanitation efforts on building

“hardware” before the introduction of SBM. Since 2016, the state has incorporated

“software” strategies. Within Tamil Nadu, I focus on Chennai, Coimbatore, and Trichy.

These cities have emerged as the top three in the state in the Swachh Survekshan 2018 rankings, which suggests that they have been actively using some or all of the SBM reputational tools.18 I chose variation in cases according to where sanitation services are coordinated entirely within government and where sanitation services require coordination between government and other actors. Chennai is an example of public

17 Agencies are also expected to coordinate with community-based organizations and RWAs. I focus on service providers, and only examine NGOs in my study. 18 Trichy was 13th, Coimbatore was 16th, and Chennai was 100th out of 471 large cities in India in 2018 (Swachh Survekshan website). Erode came in at 51 but it is a smaller city compared to the other three. I focus on large cities in my study.

29 sector dominance in sanitation provision. In Coimbatore and Trichy, NGOs and municipal corporations work in the sanitation sector.

The existing literature on coordination has identified five factors: bureaucratic capacity, administrative coherence, bureaucratic autonomy, the ability of NGOs to share expertise, and civic participation. However, the literature ignores the potential effects of organizational reputation on coordination between agencies and between agencies and

NGOs. During my preliminary fieldwork in Tamil Nadu, I was struck by how different stakeholders in environmental sanitation, including bureaucrats, referred to the reputations of various agencies as opposed to their mandates. Agencies were frequently described as corrupt, under the influence of a particular politician, or a “black box” to indicate the lack of transparency in decision-making. For instance, a participant at the

CAG workshop on rethinking urbanization referred to the Chennai Metropolitan

Development Authority as “incoherent,” noting the agency’s haphazard efforts at city planning.19 Further, Senior Bureaucrat A, who is familiar with SBM implementation in

Chennai, mentioned that it would be difficult to coordinate with Chennai Metro Water, the water and sewerage utility in the city, because the beleaguered agency needs to take care of its many problems before it can look outwards.20 In this context, what impacts coordination between agencies and between agencies and NGOs? Do the reputational devices offered by SBM impact coordination? If so, under what conditions? While bureaucratic coordination has been well-studied in several sectors and even within India, it has not been the focus of scholarship in sanitation. Further,

19 Citizen Consumer and Civic Action Group (CAG) Workshop. Rethinking Urbanization and Right to the City. Chennai, Oct 2, 2018. 20 Interview with Senior Bureaucrat A. Chennai, Nov 23, 2018.

30 despite the explicit leveraging of reputational devices in SBM, the effects of organizational reputation on coordination have not been adequately explored.

1.4 Reviewing the Literature on Bureaucratic Coordination

Bureaucracies in a decentralized society divide the labor of government on the ground through specialization and delegation to improve resource allocation and service provision at the most local level. A result of this specialization is that bureaucracies dedicated to service provision have narrow and specific mandates (Bach and Wegrich

2019). Scholars argue that the negative implications of this is that cross-cutting policies may not be effectively implemented because of departmental boundaries (Bach and

Wegrich 2019). In addition to administrative silos, factors that complicate the implementation of complex policies include capacity levels in agencies, administrative coherence, and bureaucratic autonomy, particularly in the Global South. Further, factors that impact coordination between agencies and NGOs include the ability of NGOs to share data and expertise with bureaucracies to help them fulfill their mandate and civic participation.

Bureaucratic Capacity

Bureaucracies in the global South operate under severe resource-constrained settings, and often lack adequate access to financial and human resources and trainings to effectively carry out their work (Heims 2019; Pritchett et al. 2010). Therefore, coordination is a “peripheral task” for bureaucracies because it is an additional task outside their organizational mandate (Heims 2019, p. 115). SBM, for example, asks ULBs to implement its expansive vision of urban sanitation in addition to their daily work, and to coordinate with and oversee a host of organizations from NGOs to city planning

31 agencies and slum clearance boards (SBM Manual 2017). Pritchett et al. (2010) term this phenomenon of not recognizing and addressing bureaucratic constraints in policy implementation as the “Asking Too Much of Too Little Too Soon Too Often” syndrome.

Andrews et al. (2017) also point to isomorphic mimicry in agencies of the Global South, where form and function are conflated. These scholars argue that the appearance of carrying out a task, like passing a law, is counted as a win, even if the law is not actually enforced (Andrews et al. 2017). When bureaucracies are trapped in an environment of isomorphic mimicry, existing strategies for organizational development, like training and compliance, have little effect on transforming bureaucratic capacity (Andrews et al. 2017).

If organizations are unable to even fulfill their own mandate, it is unlikely that they will turn their attention to coordination with other agencies.

Further, in India, Pritchett (2014) describes how bureaucracies are designed to carry out “thin” tasks over “thick” tasks. In his study of the Indian educational system,

Pritchett (2014) argues that agencies are largely built to implement “thin” logistical tasks, like running a post office, and are used to being evaluated with “thin” criteria: has the letter been delivered? However, bureaucracies in the 21st century need to perform “thick” tasks that are transaction-intensive and require expertise and discretion in decision- making (Pritchett 2014). Sanitation is an example of a “thick” sector that cannot be improved or measured with “thin” indicators. For instance, improving sanitation outcomes is more than constructing toilets and checking them off when they are built. It requires bureaucrats to work with other agencies, communities, and NGOs to figure out if these toilets are being used in the long run and if they are accessible to all members of the community.

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Administrative Coherence

In addition to bureaucratic capacity, administrative coherence is essential in inter- agency coordination. Evans (1995) describes embedded autonomy as a set of diverse relationships between the developmental state and significant social and private sector groups to transform society. Chibber (2002) applies this to the Indian context and argues that while an effective bureaucracy with ties to social groups and the private sector is necessary, it is also imperative that relationships between agencies need to be first established to distribute power accordingly. He compares the developmental states of

India and South Korea and highlights how in the South Korean case, economic planners had the power to discipline other state agencies, which led to administrative coherence

(Chibber 2002). In post-independence India, the Planning Commission was initiated at the national level to act as a coordinating agency between different ministries in the formulation, implementation, and evaluation of industrial policy (Chibber 2002).

However, there was no system set up to share information between the ministries and the

Commission, and the ministries resisted transmitting information since they viewed it as a loss of their autonomy (Chibber 2002). The Commission also did not have the authority to demand compliance beyond sending ministries repeated requests for information

(Chibber 2002). In contrast, in Korea, the Economic Planning Board was endowed with the authority to discipline ministries, which adapted their functioning around the coordinating agency (Chibber 2002). Thus, Korea was able to implement industrial policy in a cohesive manner, and India’s developmental dreams were dashed by bureaucratic incoherence (Chibber 2002).

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Bureaucratic Autonomy

Bureaucracies are political actors, and they often serve at the pleasure of politicians, compromising their autonomy (Bach & Wegrich 2019; Iyer & Mani 2007).

Water and environmental sanitation agencies are not immune to the vagaries of local and state politics, and the organizations’ priorities may be co-opted for better or worse by high ranking bureaucrats and politicians. Iyer and Mani (2012) illustrate the tension between political and professional productivity, using the example of how junior Indian bureaucrats choose to pursue political loyalty over productivity for career development.

Further, Iyer and Mani (2007) use a 2005 dataset on the career histories of officers in the

Indian Administrative Service to determine if bureaucrats were transferred more frequently than normal, and the reasons for these transfers. The authors found that politicians wield some power over bureaucratic assignments, choosing to reward bureaucrats loyal to them with prized positions, and assigning punishment posts to their opponents (Iyer & Mani 2007). Tamil Nadu politicians, particularly the erstwhile Mr. M.

Karunanidhi and Ms. J. Jayalalithaa who took turns as Chief Ministers for the Dravida

Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) and All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam

(AIADMK) respectively, are well known for their manipulation of state and city bureaucracies bureaucracies (Mehar 2017; Dharmaraj 2014; Times of India 2013). For instance, the Commissioner at the Coimbatore Corporation was unceremoniously transferred in 2014 after one and a half years at her post because she authorized the shutdown of a building that was constructed without proper permits, which was owned by the granddaughter of Mr. Karunanidhi (Dharmaraj 2014; Times of India 2013). Undue political interference in the bureaucracy thus constrains its ability to make its own decisions, including the decision to coordinate or not.

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Relevance of NGO Expertise in Agency-NGO Coordination

In response to increasing demand for service provision in the global South, NGOs have emerged to fill the void and their importance as service providers is growing (Lewis

& Kanji 2009; Najam 2000; Ayee & Crook 2003). There are four models of NGO involvement in service provision: complements to the state and private sector, partners with state and private sector, substitutes for the state and private sector, and ‘cocooning’

(Najam 2000; Lewis & Kanji 2009; Pritchett et al. 2010). Pritchett et al. (2010) use

‘cocooning’ to emphasize how NGOs often work in parallel to bureaucracies and are successful at the project-level but are unable to scale up due to limited bureaucratic capacity that prevent implementing NGO models for a larger population. Partnerships between NGOs and the public and private sectors are heralded as the best way to provide services at levels higher than private-public partnerships (UNDP 2006; Ayee & Crook

2003; Glasbergen et al. 2007).

One of the major incentives for the public sector to coordinate with NGOs is the ability of NGOs to share crucial data, knowledge, and expertise with agencies to help them fulfill their core mission (Pervaiz et al. 2008;). The Orangi Pilot Project’s (OPP) work in

Karachi, Pakistan with the water and sanitation agency, illustrates the importance of this ability. The OPP, one of the best-known examples of community-driven urban sanitation, is an NGO that is helping residents in Orangi and other informal areas in Pakistan build low-cost “internal” sanitation infrastructure, like household latrines and underground sewers (Pervaiz et al. 2008; Hasan 2006). The OPP relies on residents to organize themselves and finance the construction, and provides maps and plans, estimates for labor and supplies, and training to conduct the work (Pervaiz et al. 2008; Hasan 2006).

One of the NGO’s greatest accomplishments is the mapping of water and sanitation

35 infrastructure in informal areas in Karachi and in other Pakistani cities, which the agencies did not have before (Pervaiz et al. 2008; Hasan 2006). Providing the Karachi

Metropolita Corporation (KMC) with data enabled the NGO in this case to then negotiate with the agency to influence sanitation planning in informal settlements and to replicate low-cost sanitation implementation in other areas (Pervaiz et al. 2008; Hasan 2006). The

OPP’s specialized knowledge of sanitation planning and implementation in informal areas of Pakistani cities thus helped improve sanitation services and provided an avenue for the NGO to coordinate with public agencies.

Civic Participation

Another factor identified by the empirical scholarship as an influence on how well

NGOs and bureaucracies work together for water and sanitation provision in Asia is the importance of civic participation. Civic participation in this context refers to the existence of democratic mechanisms for people to pressure local agencies for better services

(Winters et al. 2014). These mechanisms include electoral processes, civic education, and community-based groups like NGOs. Weak demand for basic services can be attributed to upper income class use of private arrangements, poor quality of public services, expensive and inconvenient services, and cultural factors (e.g. education for girls not prioritized in some communities) (Winters et al. 2014; WDR 2004). In Indonesia, low- income residents may not want to pay for the cost of setting up new sewerage connections, and upper income classes do not need to lobby the government for service provision since they already would have private providers (Winters et al. 2014).

Citizens also need to be well informed to understand the links between basic services and human flourishing, and to also learn how to effectively lobby the government for better services (Winters et al. 2014; WDR 2004). For example, local governments in

36

Indian districts perform better at distributing disaster relief supplies in areas with higher newspaper circulation (WDR 2004). In Uttar Pradesh, an Indian state with dismal human development outcomes, citizens recognize that the quality of service provision is low but do not know how to remedy the situation (WDR 2004). In addition to education, high rates of civic activism help shape implementation since policies can galvanize existing work on the ground, carried out by public agencies, NGOs, and CBOs (WDR 2004). In

Kerala, for example, its high human development outcomes can partly be attributed to the society’s commitment to gender equality and anti-casteism (WDR 2004).

Connors (2005) illustrates how participatory governance by NGOs in Bangalore’s water sector improved service provision. NGOs like the Public Affairs Centre, Civic

Bangalore, and Janaagraha were engaged in increasing the level of civic participation during the period when the Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board was slowly embracing service delivery to slums (Connors 2005). These NGOs encouraged residents to get involved in ward-level meetings, and in educating themselves on how different government agencies worked, and provided performance report cards for various agencies (Connors 2005). While these NGOs did not exclusively focus on improving living conditions in slums, they made efforts to include slum dwellers in their meetings and raised their issues in mainstream discourse (Connors 2005). These NGOs also regularly attended public hearings and were in touch with senior officials at government agencies and the media, which allowed them to gain popular support within Bangalore and beyond

(Connors 2005). In this climate of greater public participation with NGOs playing a prominent role, the agency improved communication with residents through new complaint monitoring systems and monthly forums at the sub-divisional level where residents could discuss their water problems with each other and the area’s engineers

37

(Connors 2005). An engaged citizenry thus encouraged coordination between NGOs and the agency in improving service provision.

1.5 Study Methods

Case Selection

To study this question on coordination, I focus on the South Indian state of Tamil

Nadu within India since my interest is in urban sanitation. According to the 2011 census, this was the most urbanized state. From a feasibility standpoint, I am fluent in Tamil, which was tremendously helpful in conducting interviews and developing relationships, especially with mid-level bureaucrats and NGO leaders outside of Chennai.21 I examine coordination in the three most politically and economically significant cities in the state:

Chennai, Coimbatore, and Trichy. These cities were also the top three in the state in the

2018 city rankings, and in the top 100 in India (Swachh Survekshan 2018). Chennai is the capital city of Tamil Nadu and the financial capital of South India. The state bureaucracy and politicians are located there. Coimbatore is known for its educational institutions and entrepreneurship sector, and is a major manufacturing hub in the region (Smart Cities

Coimbatore). Similarly, Trichy is also a manufacturing hub, and a prominent Hindu religious pilgrimage destination (Smart Cities Trichy). Thus, the three cities are sites of economic and political power in the region. As a result, their municipal corporations have more access to resources that would enable them to use the public communication tools provided by SBM. As leading cities in the state and the region, the three cities also have reputational incentives to perform well in SBM.

21 Tamil is my mother tongue, and I have formally studied it as my second language in primary and secondary school in Singapore.

38

While SBM advocates for an expansive environmental sanitation approach that ranges from ending open defecation to fecal sludge management, I focus only on

“hardware” and “software” interventions aimed at improving toilet construction and usage and solid waste management in my study. These are the two issues that received the most attention in the three cities that I was studying from 2017 to 2019 (SBM website).

Chennai, Coimbatore, and Trichy differ institutionally in the urban sanitation sector, which provides a rich set of data to examine both inter-agency and agency-NGO dynamics. Chennai has a municipal corporation that is in charge of solid waste management and stormwater drains, and Chennai Metro Water Supply and Sewage

Board (CMWSSB, colloquially known as Metro Water), the public utility, oversees water supply and sewerage. In contrast, Trichy and Coimbatore both have municipal corporations tasked with providing water and solid waste management services and constructing sewers for the cities. The Tamil Nadu Slum Clearance Board (TNSCB) is the state agency tasked with implementing improvements in slums across the state, which is one of the goals of SBM (SBM Manual 2017; Swachh Survekshan Toolkit 2018). TNSCB focuses on toilets. The NGO landscape also differs across the three cities. Chennai currently has no major environmental sanitation NGOs that are service providers. In

Coimbatore, the numerous sanitation NGOs work in concert with one another in a cohesive network and focus on building toilets and improving solid waste management.

On the other hand, in Trichy, there are two large NGOs which focus on expanding toilet coverage.

Table 2 presents a summary of the key characteristics of the three cities. While they differ in size and local political environments, I chose them because of the institutional mix among the three cities around inter-agency and agency-NGO coordination. I am also

39 comparing three prominent cities in the same state implementing the same national policy, which helps in minimizing drastic variations in politics and bureaucracies.

Chennai Coimbatore Trichy Population (2011) 4.6 million 1 million 850,000 Area (sq. km) 426 246.8 167.2 Solid waste 4880 783 455 generated (TPD) No. of hhs with 2888 239 6936 insanitary latrines No. of hhs with open 6553 84 4273 defecation Municipal No; Metro Water in Yes Yes corporation in charge of sewerage charge of solid waste management and sewerage? Sanitation NGOs? No Yes Yes

Table 2: City profiles Sources: Census 2011; Smart Cities Trichy; Smart Cities Coimbatore; GCC website; SBM website

Overview of State and Local Politics

There are currently two major political parties in the state, both of which are regional and not national. The current party in power is the All India Anna Dravida

Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK). Ms. J. Jayalalithaa belonged to this party and was Chief

Minister of the state until her death in 2016. In 2011, she won in the Srirangam constituency in the Trichy district. The current Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu is Mr.

Edappadi K. Palanisami. The main opposition party in the state, led by Mr. M.K. Stalin, is the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK).22 Mr. M. Karunanidhi, Mr. Stalin’s father, was the leader of the DMK and also served as Chief Minister between 1969 and 2011. He won in the Chepauk constituency in Chennai in 1996, 2001, and 2006 (India Today 2018).

22 Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam loosely translates into English as the Party for the Advancement of the Dravidian people.

40

For the 2019 national elections, AIADMK aligned itself with the Bharatiya Janata

Party (BJP), a move that was unpopular for many parts of the state. With its emphasis on speaking the Hindi language and its championing of the Hindu nationalist agenda, the

BJP is unpopular in the state that is proud of its Tamil identity and language (Ramajayam

2019). Traditionally, the AIADMK has been perceived as the party associated with upper caste South Indian Hindus, while the DMK is viewed as a party for Tamil people with different caste and religious identities (Wyatt 2013; Ramajayam 2019). Further, the

AIADMK prides itself on its policies focusing on uplifting women and poor in the state, especially with a female leader in power until 2016 (Wyatt 2013). The DMK too focuses on the poor, but also caters to the needs of the socially vulnerable, which includes Dalits and other lower caste communities (Wyatt 2013). The state is currently in a political vacuum after the deaths of Ms. Jayalalithaa in 2016 and Mr. Karunanidhi in 2018.

The AIADMK has been popular in Trichy, partly due to Ms. Jayalalithaa’s personal and political affiliation with the city. In the 2011 mayoral elections, an AIADMK candidate, Ms. A. Jaya, was elected to serve until 2016 (Kumar 2016). Similarly,

Coimbatore’s last mayor was also from the AIADMK - Mr. Ganapathi P. Raj Kumar. Three out of four mayors in Coimbatore since 2001 were from the AIADMK (The Hindu 2016).

In Chennai, the last two mayors were from the DMK (Mr. M. Subramaniam, 2006-2011) and the AIADMK (Mr. Saidai Sa. Duraisamy, 2011-2016) (Ramakrishnan 2011). In the absence of local elections since 2016, senior bureaucrats, often the commissioners of the municipal corporations, have been designated as Special Officers. This lack of public representatives attenuates the ability of citizens, community groups, and NGOs to pressure agencies for better service provision under SBM. Further, ward councilors or

41 mayors who were previously policy champions for water and sanitation may not have the clout to catalyze policy implementation on the ground.

Methods

In my study, I am first looking for evidence on what drives coordination or non- coordination between agencies and between agencies and NGOs in SBM. Second, I am investigating the potential effects of SBM’s reputational devices on coordination, if any, and how these reputational tools interact with drivers of coordination. The dependent variable is coordination. The dependent and independent variables are operationalized in the following manner:

i. Coordination (dependent variable). Are there partnerships and collaborations

at various levels between agencies to implement SBM? Are there partnerships

and collaborations at various levels between municipal corporations and

NGOs?

1. Method 1: Semi-structured interviews with nodal officers, officials in

charge of information, education, and communication (IEC)

activities for SBM, officials in solid waste management and health

departments in the three municipal corporations.

• Example interview question: Do you collaborate with other

agencies to implement SBM? If so, which agencies (e.g.

CMWSSB, TNSCB, CMA etc.)? How long have you had this

relationship?

2. Method 2: Semi-structured interviews with NGO leaders and

participant observation of behavioral change campaigns to

determine nature and quality of collaborations, if any.

42

• Example interview questions: What would you say your

expertise is in - solid waste management, toilet building,

behavioral change, or a mixture of the above? Do you work

with the corporation to implement SBM? If so, what kinds of

activities do you work on together? How long have you had

this relationship?

3. Method 3: Document analysis of manuals on Swachh Survekshan

ranking and implementation methodologies.

• Question: How is bureaucratic coordination framed and

incentivized in the SBM policy documents and in Swachh

Survekshan? ii. Administrative coherence and bureaucratic capacity (independent

variables). Can agencies work together for SBM implementation? Why or why

not? How does SBM fit in with the existing workload of bureaucrats at the

municipal corporations? What are the potential effects of SBM’s reputational

devices on these variables, if any?

1. Method 1: Semi-structured interviews with bureaucrats at the

municipal corporation and state bureaucrats who are policy

champions for water and sanitation.

• Example interview questions: Are there any inter-agency

collaborations (e.g. inter-agency task forces, seconded

positions) implemented by the Tamil Nadu state government

for SBM? Why or why not? Have there been any intra-agency

changes (e.g. increase in number of meetings between solid

43

waste management department and stormwater drains

department) as a result of SBM from 2016-2019? Are the SBM

bureaucrats only dedicated to its implementation in the

municipal corporations or do they have other work to do?

2. Method 2: Document analysis of MAWS’ policy notes on SBM from

2016 to 2019 to determine if there are any state-led coordination

efforts for SBM. iii. Bureaucratic Autonomy (independent variable). Are there any reports of

political interference in the municipal corporations in SBM implementation? If

so, who are the politicians and how and why are they meddling in the agencies?

What are the potential effects of SBM’s reputational devices on these variables,

if any?

1. Method 1: Semi-structured interviews with SBM bureaucrats at the

municipal corporations, sanitation consultants familiar with

government-agency relationships in sanitation in India, and NGO

leaders in sanitation.

• Example interview questions: Have local politicians been

helpful in getting the message out about Swachh Survekshan

to residents? How would you describe the relationships

between politicians and the corporation in this city? How long

has it been like this?

2. Method 2: Analysis of media coverage on possible political

interference in municipal corporations in the three cities from 2016-

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2019 in prominent national newspapers (e.g. The Hindu and Times

of India) and local news outlets (e.g. Citizen Matters, DT Next). iv. NGOs’ ability to share expertise and civic participation (independent

variables). Are NGOs’ able to share their expertise with municipal

corporations? Why or why not? How does civic participation, and in the case of

Tamil Nadu, the lack of local elections since 2016, impact relationships between

NGOs and agencies? What are the potential effects of SBM’s reputational

devices on these variables, if any?

1. Method 1: Semi-structured interviews with NGO leaders in

sanitation, SBM bureaucrats at the corporations, state bureaucrats

who are policy champions for water and sanitation, and sanitation

consultants who work across the private, public, and NGO sectors.

• Example interview question: What stakeholders, besides the

corporation, do you think have contributed to your city’s high

rankings in Swachh Survekshan? Why do you think so? Have

you worked with them for a long time? What kind of

information do they have that is useful for your job?

2. Method 2: Participant observation of NGO behavioral change

campaigns for SBM to determine type and level of engagement

between NGOs and bureaucrats in attendance, if any, and private

sector stakeholders, if any. v. Reputation (independent variable). How do the municipal corporations use

SBM’s public communication tools? What Swachh Survekshan certifications do

the three cities have? What type of social media presence do the municipal

45

corporations have on Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube for SBM, if they do?

What types of offline efforts are the agencies using for behavioral change (e.g.

television, radio, grassroots campaigns)? Are the cities promoting the

Swachhata app? Why or why not?

1. Method 1: Semi-structured interviews with SBM bureaucrats

• Example interview questions: What types of certifications in

Swachh Survekshan are you working towards (e.g. ODF+, 7-

star garbage rating)? Do you or your colleagues use social

media to communicate information about sanitation, SBM,

and Swachh Survkeshan? If so, what types of social media do

you use, and do you find it helpful? Have you found the

Swachhata app helpful in grievance redressal? What offline

efforts have you undertaken to improve behavioral change?

2. Method 2: Media and social media analysis of bureaucracies’ social

media usage, if any, to analyze type of posts, number of followers,

comments, and retweets

I used purposive and snowball sampling for my interviews. I identified and contacted people from municipal corporation and SBM websites, relevant policy documents, and newspaper reports and social media posts on SBM in Tamil Nadu from

2016-2019.23 At the end of my interviews, I asked participants if there were other people

I should talk to, and if they could connect me to them. In Chennai, access built on my internship with Resilient Chennai, a partnership between the Greater Chennai

23 My fieldwork revealed that there is generally a two-year lag between the announcement of a national policy and its implementation by municipal corporations at the level of cities.

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Corporation and the Rockefeller Foundation’s 100 Resilient Cities program, from

November 2017 to January 2018 and from July 2018 to December 2018. During this period, Resilient Chennai was in the middle of preparing a set of resilience strategies around informality, civic governance, water, solid waste management, and infrastructure financing for the city. I helped facilitate multi-stakeholder focus groups and interviews with people working in the urban environmental planning and governance sector. My affiliation with them offered me valuable opportunities to meet key informants in the bureaucracy, particularly with senior and retired bureaucrats who are policy champions for water and sanitation in Tamil Nadu. In addition, Resilient Chennai’s office was located within the Greater Chennai Corporation’s Special Projects Department, next to the

Chennai Smart City team. I went to the agency in Chennai almost every day during my fieldwork. Having a dedicated place to work on my research and talk to people in the department was instrumental in cultivating relationships with bureaucrats in the building and in understanding the nuances of bureaucratic norms and culture and project implementation within the agency in an immersive process.

My primary method was semi-structured interviews. I interviewed bureaucrats

(largely engineers) at the municipal corporations familiar with SBM implementation, senior and retired bureaucrats who have led infrastructure development projects in water and sanitation in the state, sanitation consultants who work with the private and public sectors and NGOs to implement sanitation projects across India at various levels of government, Swachh Bharat ambassadors designated by each city to promote the policy, scholars who study the politics of water and sanitation challenges in the state, and sanitation NGO leaders. A detailed list can be found in Appendix A. The majority of my interviews were in Tamil, and my interviews with senior bureaucrats in Chennai were

47 mostly in English. I conducted 62 repeated, in-depth interviews, averaging around two hours. 20 interviews were with NGOs and 24 were with bureaucrats. A list of themes and questions covered in my interviews are in Appendix B. I kept my interviews loosely structured at the beginning of my fieldwork to gently guide the conversations but left it open ended enough to develop new ideas. I also learned that going into interviews with themes, and not specific questions, helped the conversations flow more easily in Tamil.

During the last phase of my fieldwork in the summer of 2019, I designed interview questions specifically to examine the factors affecting bureaucratic coordination in each city. I also attended five waste management and environmental planning conferences in

Chennai during my fieldwork, which helped contextualize SBM interventions in the city

(Appendix A).

I met people in their professional settings to better understand the physicality of their working conditions, which helped in contextualizing information from the interviews. For example, I interviewed bureaucrats in their offices, whether at the municipal corporation, their current agency, or at the zonal offices. This strategy was especially useful in Coimbatore when I met with NGO leaders in the various environments they were embedded in from the businesses they owned to their NGO headquarters. My interviews lasted from twenty minutes to more than four hours, with a mean around two hours. Several interview participants, especially in Coimbatore and Trichy, told me that researchers were not common in their cities, particularly in sanitation, and they welcomed the opportunity to discuss the intricacies of SBM implementation at length.

I verified the data derived from interviews with other interviews and relevant media coverage from trusted national and local news outlets and SBM policy manuals. I interviewed several people more than once, and I have kept in touch with many of them

48 through my affiliation with Resilient Chennai and WhatsApp, where we exchange articles and videos on sanitation and updates on my research and their work. These strategies have been helpful in building trust and in putting people at ease when discussing sensitive issues, like political meddling in the bureaucracy and implementation failures in SBM. I attempted to work with the structure of bureaucratic hierarchy when possible out of respect for the interview participants. I requested permission from senior bureaucrats in each municipal corporation, either in writing or in person. Here, I outlined my research and asked to speak with the relevant teams. This was successful in Chennai and Trichy, but not in Coimbatore. In the latter city, bureaucrats wanted to speak with me on the condition of anonymity so they could candidly describe their experiences of working in a politically constrained environment. The Commissioner was also not available to meet when I was in the city.

My supporting methods are document and media analysis and participant observation. SBM and Swachh Survekshan have published many manuals detailing the policy’s goals, ideal implementation structure, data collection methods, indicators, and ranking methodologies. I studied these along with Policy Notes from the Tamil Nadu

Municipal Administration and Water Supply. The notes from 2016 to 2019 detail the state’s strategy and updates for SBM, and earlier documents highlight Tamil Nadu’s various interventions in sanitation. To gain a deeper understanding of the landscape of

SBM interventions in the state and their political context, I examined articles in prominent news outlets, such as The Hindu, Times of India, and DTNext, from 2016 to

2019. I asked my interviewees for trusted local news sources in each city, and scanned them for news related to SBM, particularly looking for responses to SBM’s public communication efforts and articles or posts detailing relationships between the municipal

49 corporations and local and state politicians. Given SBM’s emphasis on social media, I started following its accounts on Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter. Out of all three cities,

Trichy was most prolific in social media usage for SBM. I followed the Trichy City

Corporation on YouTube and Twitter and the Commissioner on Twitter to analyze their posts. The Coimbatore and Chennai Corporations also have Facebook accounts documenting their SBM efforts, and the Coimbatore Corporation website has links to photos and videos of its meetings and announcements. In addition to document and media analysis, I used participant observation to understand the nature and quality of coordination between NGOs, agencies, and other stakeholders in grassroots behavioral change efforts. The NGOs I met with in Coimbatore and Trichy generously invited me to participate in their behavioral change workshops and their field visits to households.

These events provided me with wonderful opportunities to observe stakeholder interactions between bureaucrats, NGOs, sanitation workers, and households.

Based on my primary and secondary methods and background research from my work with Resilient Chennai, I wrote extensive field notes with photographs I took when permitted. I did not record my interviews since I had noticed in my previous public health work in India that people were uneasy with being recorded, kept looking down at my phone (my recording device), and getting distracted. Instead, as approved by MIT’s

Committee on the Use of Humans as Experimental Subjects, I obtained verbal consent at the beginning and end of each interview in Tamil or English, depending on the person’s choice and comfort level.24 My notes included transcriptions of interviews, details of the

24 In this statement, I summarized my research objectives and asked them four questions on privacy and consent: Can I use your name in my dissertation? If not, how would you like to be referred to? What designation should I use for you? Can I use direct quotes from the interview or should I paraphrase? Can I contact you again with follow-up questions, if I need to? I made sure that people knew that the dissertation

50 physical environment, and personal reflections (Emerson 2011). These notes helped me capture the ethnographic flavor of my fieldwork and organize information from multiple sources, from casual conversations to social media posts. In my analysis, I coded my notes three times by actor, city, factors affecting coordination, and SBM’s reputational devices to ensure consistency.

1.6 Structure of Dissertation

In Chapter 2, I expand on my theoretical framework linking organizational reputation, as proxied by public communication efforts, and coordination. I review the literature on organizational reputation, and identify four key questions for my study of

Chennai, Coimbatore, and Trichy: Who is the audience for agencies in SBM implementation? What dimensions of reputation are being emphasized by SBM’s reputational tools? What strategies are agencies using to augment their reputation? What are the limits of reputational tools? In Chapter 3, I describe how inter-agency noncoordination is a function of weak bureaucratic capacity and administrative incoherence. SBM’s reputational tools have not had a significant impact here. Instead, they have exacerbated two aspects of bureaucratic capacity: the emphasis on documentation and mechanically checking off of boxes. In Chapter 4, I explore how SBM’s reputational devices have empowered NGOs in Coimbatore, which are already embedded in business and community networks and have strong ties to the agency. These NGOs are in part strengthened by the lack of bureaucratic autonomy at the Coimbatore Corporation as a result of political meddling. In Chennai and Trichy, SBM’s reputational tools do not

would be available online. For people who wished to be anonymous, I assigned them a unique identifier and have attempted my best to de-identify them within the dissertation (see Appendices A and B).

51 have an effect on agency-NGO coordination. Exploring the historical context around partnerships between the two reveals that rise of PPPs, environmental activism, and matching agency priorities to NGO expertise affect coordination. In Chapter 5, I explain how SBM’s public communication efforts, while a galvanizing force on the ground for existing sanitation efforts, have not been able to address the institutional barriers to sanitation improvements. Further, I emphasize how while SBM has certainly raised the profile of sanitation in India, the policy’s focus on visibility as opposed to institutional reform obfuscates the amount of work needed in the urban sanitation sector to improve outcomes. I then highlight the cultural rootedness of SBM’s programming, which offers lessons for other countries wishing to implement a similar policy in sanitation or in other sectors. I conclude with an epilogue, reflecting on my positionality during fieldwork.

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2| THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: ORGANIZATIONAL REPUTATION AND COORDINATION

2.1 The Cultural Politics of Reputation in Sanitation

“It’s so nice to see someone like you interested in sanitation.” I received many variations of this remark during my fieldwork. I was initially bemused by these comments and upon clarification, I was told that foreign women from elite North American universities are not considered “typical” sanitation researchers in India. When I pushed them for what a conventional researcher looked like, people were confused and no clear answer emerged. What was evident, however, was that sanitation was collectively deemed an unworthy line of inquiry for me or the hallowed halls of MIT. These interactions crystallize how reputational indicators like social class and status are wrapped up in sanitation, even in its study. Various authors, including George (2008), Alok (2010), and

Brewis and Wutich (2019), have pointed out how peculiar sanitation and its interventions are compared to other service sectors like energy and water; reputational concerns infuse every dimension of sanitation, particularly in India.

Ideas of cleanliness, purity, and hygiene that undergird sanitation are inextricably linked to class, caste, religion, and social status in the country (Coffey et al. 2017; Vyas &

Spears 2018; Alok 2010). For instance, those who traditionally have had poor access to toilets and solid waste services, like slum dwellers and the urban poor, are deemed filthy and inferior by upper classes (Walters 2013). Manual scavengers are expected to handle human waste without question because they scrape the bottom of the caste system (Doron

& Jeffrey 2018). Sanitation workers are essential but invisible cogs in environmental

53 sanitation services, and yet their work is socially stigmatized because of their close contact with waste (WHO 2019). Further, reputation is used as a tool in behavioral interventions.

CLTS, for example, employs blaming and shaming as triggers to induce habit change, without considering structural constraints or human dignity (Doron & Raja 2015). In contrast, reputation-based interventions do not emerge in the water sector, for instance, to prevent illegal pipe connections or to address water scarcity. As a result of these cultural and social factors wrapped up in sanitation, it is considered socially taboo and therefore receives less policy attention compared to other types of public services (George 2008;

WSP 2011).

Given the importance of reputation in sanitation, what are its effects on policy implementation? SBM is a policy that heavily leverages reputation to encourage behavioral change in individuals and organizations. These behavior-based policies have become prominent in the last decade in many sectors around the world, from public health to transportation, in an effort to understand human decision-making and their impact on development outcomes (World Bank 2015). However, behavioral policies largely focus on understanding how individuals behave, and not organizations. In my study, I explore how SBM’s reputational “nudges” may impact coordination behavior in agencies through the lens of organizational reputation.

2.2 Behavioral Policies and Organizations

Public health interventions have drawn on psychology and sociology for years to design health promotion campaigns, and have used social cognitive theory to identify role models to model healthy behavior (World Bank 2016). While the field of behavioral economics emerged in the 1970s (Datta & Mullainathan 2012), foundational economic

54 thinkers have been interested in the relationships between human decision-making and economics for centuries, starting with Adam Smith (World Bank 2015). In The Theory of

Moral Sentiments (1759), Smith wrote about how the psychology of economic decision- making is caught between “passions” and the “impartial spectator” (World Bank 2015;

Cullen 2006). John Maynard Keynes described the “money illusion” (thinking of money in nominal versus real terms) and “animal spirits” (relying on instincts and feelings to make long-term investments) (World Bank 2015). F.A. Hayek believed that there are limits to how much information an individual can process, and that humans are unable to weigh the costs and benefits of outcomes for every decision (World Bank 2015). Albert

Hirschman outlined the value of loyalty and cooperation in human decision-making

(World Bank 2015).

The 2008 financial crisis increased public policy interest in behavioral economics, viewed then as heterodox economics, because the global meltdown revealed the flagrant limitations of neoclassical economics and de-regulation (Oliver 2013). There was also support for behavioral economics from people who were against regulations from both sides of the political spectrum (Oliver 2013). This group was interested in how people’s behavior can be changed with regulations or bans (Oliver 2013). In this political environment, Thaler and Cass Sunstein, a jurist, published a book called Nudge in 2008, which examines the applications of behavioral economics in public policy. Thaler and

Sunstein develop a framework based on libertarian paternalism, which empowers policymakers to create an appropriate “choice architecture” that “nudges” individuals to make sensible decisions without infringing on their personal freedoms. Thaler and

Sunstein went on to serve as leaders in “nudge units” in the UK and US governments respectively to apply behavioral insights in various policy realms (Afif 2017). There has

55 also been interest in behavioral public policy from the global South, including the

Peruvian and Indian governments (Afif 2017; Rajyadaksha 2016; Sharma & Tiwari 2016;

Gupta 2018).

In international development, the behavioral paradigm has highlighted the importance of understanding the psychology of decision-making in the poor, given their drastically different constraints and burdens (Datta & Mullainathan 2012; Banerjee &

Duflo 2011). The emphasis on behavior has foregrounded the importance of understanding psychological, social, and cultural factors that influence development outcomes (World Bank 2015). This paradigm overturns the notion in neoclassical economics that individuals are rational, utility-maximizing economic agents, and reminds economists that human beings are simply human (Datta & Mullainathan 2012;

Bogliacino et al. 2016). Unlike the elusive Homo Economicus, humans throughout the policy chain are forgetful, have limited attention spans, have biases, and have problems with self-control (Datta & Mullainathan 2012; Bogliacino et al. 2016; Kahneman 2013;

Shelton et al. 2013). Examples of effective behavioral interventions in development include reminders (e.g. text messages to take HIV drugs for patients in Kenya), nonmonetary gifts (e.g. lentils and plates given to parents who bring their children for vaccination campaigns in India), making interventions convenient (e.g. free chlorine dispensers near water sources in Kenya), and tweaking the timing of conditional cash transfers (e.g. releasing part of cash transfer when school enrollment decisions have to be made in Colombia) (World Bank 2015).

Randomized, controlled trials (RCTs), which emerged in the late 1990s and 2000s, shifted the emphasis in development from macro-level policies to micro-level interventions (Banerjee & Duflo 2011). RCTs in development explore behavioral

56 differences across intervention and control groups to determine how an intervention shapes human behavior (Banerjee & Duflo 2011). For example, does access to microloans induce poor people to start businesses? Does paying a nominal fee for a bed net encourage more people to use these nets compared to when they receive them for free (Banerjee &

Duflo 2011; Datta & Mullainathan 2012). While RCTs are generally considered the “gold standard” in development economics, critics like Nancy Cartwright and Angus Deaton warn against overestimating the strength of causal relationships emphasized by RCT researchers (Deaton & Cartwright 2018; Cartwright 2011). They argue that social interventions are highly context-specific and that RCTs cannot “randomize” away confounding variables (Deaton & Cartwright 2018). Instead of only asking how an intervention fails or succeeds, researchers need to ask why the outcome occurred to fully understand the context-specific causal mechanisms (Deaton & Cartwright 2018). Further,

Lant Pritchett and other development economists assert that RCTs’ focus on micro-level interventions fail to produce systems-level changes needed to produce any meaningful improvements in society (Pritchett 2014a; The Guardian 2018).

In 2015, the World Bank published its World Development Report, entitled “Mind,

Society, and Behavior,” explicitly linking the recent explosion of research in behavioral science to development practice. The report describes two major insights that apply to international development: people think automatically (individuals think narrowly and are not deliberate in their thought processes) and people think with mental models

(individuals use examples, narratives, and stereotypes drawn from their own communities and experiences that may not always be objective). These mental models are of particular significance to implementation because it shapes the ways in which implementers and policy beneficiaries perceive institutions, the policy issue at hand, and

57 the implementation process (World Bank 2015). Mental models are powerful and persist even when our environment changes. Nelson Mandela captured the stickiness of mental models when he flew from Sudan to Ethiopia and realized that the pilot was Black:

We put down briefly in Khartoum, where we changed to an Ethiopian Airways flight to Addis. Here I experienced a rather strange sensation. As I was boarding the plane I saw that the pilot was black. I had never seen a black pilot before, and the instant I did I had to quell my panic. How could a black man fly an airplane? (Mandela in World Bank 2015)

Despite the persistence of these mental models, it is possible to try to slowly alter them through policies like changing institutions (e.g. starting affirmative action programs for female leaders in patriarchal societies to change perceptions of women among men), the media (using the media to highlight small families to encourage families to have fewer children), and educational interventions (using cooperative learning methods to improve social capital) (WDR 2015).

WDR (2015) also stresses the importance of studying how behavioral interventions should be implemented; in particular, it emphasizes that policymakers, development professionals, and implementers should reflect on their own biases when designing and implementing behavioral change policies, and underscores the need for implementing agencies to engage in several iterations of implementation, experimentation, and evaluation to better understand how different types and delivery modes of behavioral interventions work. They suggest using pilot projects to test out the efficacy of different interventions and implementation modes, and incorporate the feedback into future iterations of policy implementation (WDR 2015). Unfortunately, their recommendations do not appear feasible for many local implementing organizations in the global South, caught in “capability traps” (Pritchett et al. 2010).

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Behavioral science enthusiasts claim that a more nuanced understanding of human behavior and decision-making can lead to better policies and to a deeper understanding of why some interventions have failed in the past (Bogliacino et al. 2016;

Datta & Mullainathan 2012; Chetty 2015; Weber 2013). Datta and Mullainathan (2012) refer to how behavioral economics can lead to a “science of policy design,” and can offer a different approach to framing problems and interventions. For example, to figure out why people do not take medicines regularly on time, a behavioral approach re-defines the questions, possible interventions, and the scope of the problem: Do people not take medicine because they are forgetful or is it because they are anti-medicine? Will text reminders or financial incentives change their behavior? Is it possible to sustain behavioral change over time? (Datta & Mullainathan 2012). Behavioral science hopes to align interventions with human behavior for effective policy outcomes.

Critiques of the behavioral approach fall into four camps. First, some critics find the concept of nudging, as defined by Thaler and Sunstein, vague. Can nudges be regulations? Policies? At what level should nudges be incorporated (Bogliacino et al.

2016)? Second, scholars have pointed out the disconnect in behavioral economics between the acknowledgement that people think in mental models that are socially and culturally constructed and the insistence of some researchers on studying individuals and not communities (Bogliacino et al. 2016). Third, the ethics of behavioral interventions have received the most attention in the literature. “Who nudges the nudger” (Bogliacino et al. 2016)? How does the nudger determine the “appropriate” choice architecture? From where does the nudger derive their legitimacy? Are behavioral interventions, particularly those that wield shame as a lever, ethical? (Bogliacino et al. 2016; Engel & Susilo 2014;

Bartram et al. 2012). These questions interrogate the assumed neutrality of the

59 policymaker and implementer. Fourth, there is a risk of relying only on behavioral interventions and ignoring large-scale structural investments and policy tools in the public sector (Bogliacino et al. 2016). For example, in response to the United Kingdom’s recent focus on behavioral science, The Lancet (2012) published a scathing critique of the government’s use of behavioral interventions in healthcare as lazy substitutions for evidence-based state legislation, like the implementation of soda and cigarette taxes to improve public health.

To date, the literature on behavioral interventions has concentrated on understanding why and how individuals make decisions, and how policy environments can be constructed to “nudge” people toward better choices. In my study, I explore how

SBM uses reputational tools to “nudge” agencies toward coordination. While the behavioral public policy literature has examined “nudging” and “budging” in individuals,

I investigate if these actions work on organizations, specifically the agencies involved in

SBM implementation in Tamil Nadu, India.

2.3 Organizational Reputation, Communication, and Coordination

Reputation and Bureaucracies

Similar to sanitation’s lowly status, the bureaucracy is a much-maligned entity in many countries. While bureaucracies were initially envisioned as more efficient, meritocratic, and impartial alternatives to corrupt, absolutist state systems, they have come under flak for hundreds of years for their rigidity, disorganization, and oversimplification of human life and activity (Weber 1978; Ljungholm 2016; Scott 1998).

Max Weber set the tone for how modern bureaucracies are perceived in his description of their general characteristics: rational, hierarchical, file-based, and rule-bound (Weber

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1978). His depiction of this soulless machine has been echoed in disciplines beyond sociology, extending to popular culture. Within academic circles, economists consider bureaucracies inflexible and inefficient, and consider it a form of government intrusion in private life (Carnis 2009; Gajduschek 2003). The most influential critique in this discipline emerges from Ludwig Von Mises, an economist in the Austrian School. While he acknowledges the need for bureaucracy in some instances like the protection of property rights to ensure social cooperation, he argues that all other agencies are tools of unnecessary state intervention, unchecked by profit and loss calculations (Mises 1944).

In political science and anthropology, researchers point out how bureaucracies fortify socioeconomic inequalities and create an illusion of progress and legitimacy through their emphasis on documentation, “audit cultures,” and more recently, e-governance mechanisms (Strathern 2000; Mathur 2017; Hetherington 2011). Scholars argue that documentation, whether online or offline, has become a false symbol for legitimacy and action within agencies, recalling Andrews et al. (2017) description of isomorphic mimicry

(Mathur 2017; Strathern 2000; Hetherington 2011). Navaro-Yashin (2012) explores how identity documents issued by the internationally unrecognized Turkish Republic of

Northern Cyprus shape personal, social, legal, and political identities among Turkish-

Cypriots in the United Kingdom and Cyprus. In Pakistan, Hull (2012) describes how

“graphic artefacts,” like maps, manuals, and files, shape urban development patterns in

Islamabad and their socio-spatial consequences for residents. Scholars in this tradition thus illustrate how bureaucratic rituals and “rational” logics negatively impact everyday lives of their clients.

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The enduring image of the bureaucracy as a place of Byzantine rituals and indolence has been amplified in popular culture. For instance, Alain De Botton, a British philosopher and author, writes in The Pleasures and Sorrows of Work:

The true nature of bureaucracy may be nowhere more obvious to the observer than in a developing country, for only there will it still be made manifest by the full complement of documents, files, veneered desks and cabinets - which convey the strict and inverse relationship between productivity and paperwork. (De Botton 2009, p. 59)

Similarly, Russian write Mikhail Bulgakov emphasizes how powerful this paperwork is in articulating human identity in the Soviet Union in The Master and Margarita:

“What you say is true,” the master observed, struck by the neatness of Koroviev’s work, “that if there are no papers, there’s no person. I have no papers, so there’s precisely no me.” (Bulgakov 1996, p. 300-301)

On television, one of the best-known caricatures of bureaucracies is BBC’s Yes Minister and its sequel, Yes, Prime Minister, from the 1980s. In addition to unpacking the perverse dynamics in bureaucrat-politician relationships in Britain, the show also depicts senior bureaucrats’ aversion to streamlining and modernizing the civil service in order to preserve their power and social status. Across different types of media, the bureaucracy is thus vilified as a fastidious machine devoid of humanity.

In India, perceptions of bureaucracies are equally dismal. Agencies are universally dismissed as corrupt and incompetent in both scholarship and popular culture. For example, the British referred to Indians working in the colonial administration as ‘Babus,’ a term that is now derogatorily used to refer to current bureaucrats, particularly IAS officers (CPR 2018; Malik 2017; Davis 2016).25 Mathur (2016) explores the effects of this

25 Babus is a term used to describe Indians working in the British colonial administration. It was sometimes used respectfully in deference to their perceived status and power, and sometimes derogatorily by the public. In post-colonial India, this word has come to be associated with bureaucratic ineffectiveness and indolence (Davis 2016).

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Babu culture in obstructing the implementation of progressive policies and laws in India.

Using the case of a small Himalayan town, she outlines how the translation of anti-poverty development policies on the ground is complicated by bureaucratic hierarchies and fidelity to paperwork. In short, implementing the letter of the law obfuscates the spirit of the law. Similarly, Chatterji and Mehta (2007) argue that bureaucratic form and practices impact government responses to religious violence in Mumbai. They describe how the processes of setting up investigative committees and documentation of the riots from the agencies’ perspectives shape narratives of violence and slum redevelopment in the city that privilege the perspective of the state over that of the people (Chatterji & Mehta 2007).

In the media, Indian bureaucracies continue to be the public face of state failure.

From engaging in corruption to mismanaging projects and natural hazards, agencies’ missteps are visibly splashed across newspaper headlines. For example, one of Delhi’s civic bodies is currently being investigated for financial “irregularities” (Rajput 2019). In

Tamil Nadu, local agencies were viciously attacked for their inadequate and poorly coordinated responses to the devastation caused by the 2015 floods in Chennai

(Thangavelu 2015). In 2018, India Today’s headline was “Battling Babudom,” and the title of its cover story was “Lord of the Files” (Jha 2018) (Figures 1 and 2). Reforming the

Indian bureaucracy to improve everyday facets of Indian life, from incorporating technology to modernize bureaucracies to augmenting the financial viability of municipal corporations, is a popular topic for media pundits (EPW 2019; Viswanathan 2012). In response to these negative perceptions, the Indian government has undertaken public sector rankings and rewards to motivate agencies and to improve their reputation with the public (Dash 2018).

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Figure 1: India Today’s cover story in Oct 2018 (Jha 2018)

Figure 2: Cartoon accompanying the India Today cover story entitled, ‘Lord of the Files’ (Jha 2018)

In fiction, too, bureaucracies receive a brutal treatment. English, August is perhaps the best-known book on the insidious absurdities of Indian bureaucratic rituals.

Upamanyu Chatterjee (1988) explores this intricate world carefully held together with red

64 tape by bureaucrats fighting to protect their personal spheres of influence and power.

Twenty years later, Aravind Adiga won the Booker Prize in 2008 for White Tiger, which places bureaucracies at the center of the production and reproduction of corruption in governance systems in India. Given these bleak perspectives of bureaucracies across various platforms, their reputation becomes particularly important in policy implementation, especially with the rise of behavioral change policies that hinge on cooperation between agencies and the public.

Organizational Reputation and Public Sector Behavior

The importance of reputation is not a new idea in academia. In 1956, Erving

Goffmann described how individuals seek to control and manage other people’s perceptions of them by altering their behavior or physical appearance. Goffmann (1956) asserted that the avoidance of embarrassment, whether of oneself or others, was the fundamental principle guiding social interactions. However, only in 2001 did a conceptual framework coalesce for organizational reputation in Daniel Carpenter’s research.

Charting the evolution of various United States bureaucracies, like the Food and Drug

Administration and the Department of the Interior, Carpenter (2001; 2010) illustrates how reputational calculations impact organizational behavior, ranging from responses to reputational threats to communication strategies. Carpenter’s (2001; 2010) research focuses on explaining the origin and shape of bureaucratic form and power through a reputational lens. Scholars building on his work have subsequently used reputation to investigate other aspects of agency behavior: claiming jurisdiction (Maor 2010), strategic communication (Gilad et al. 2013; Maor et al. 2013), and decision-making in regulatory bodies (Gilad 2009; Etienne 2015; Maor & Sulitzeanu-Kenan 2012). An emerging strand of research within this scholarship has recently started to investigate bureaucratic

65 coordination (Busuioc 2016; Busuioc & Lodge 2016; Busuioc & Lodge 2017; Moynihan

2012).

Carpenter (2001; 2010) presents reputation as an alternative way of explaining public sector behavior, beyond the traditional positioning of bureaucracies as rational actors. He emphasizes how reputations are embedded in culture, history, and status, which enriches the discussion on bureaucratic behavior and incentives, allowing for a more context-sensitive analysis of policy implementation (Carpenter 2010). This perspective on reputation is particularly salient for the study of sanitation and behavioral interventions. The 2015 World Development Report explores how mental models are sticky; even when reality changes, mental models do not (WDR 2015). Mental models matter in implementation because people are less likely to trust the authority of bureaucracies that they have deemed inefficient and corrupt for a long time, even if agencies have reformed (WDR 2015). Mental models are also important in sanitation.

SBM, at its core, is a national-level push to unstick long-held perceptions on sanitation, caste, and class. The lens of organizational reputation thus allows for a more nuanced exploration of bureaucratic behavior that is grounded within the culture and history of a particular place and sector.

What is organizational reputation and why does it matter in understanding bureaucracies? According to Carpenter (2010), reputation is “a set of symbolic beliefs about an organization embedded in multiple audiences” (p. 10). An agency’s reputation can “animate, empower, and constrain” bureaucracies, and is a source of bureaucratic autonomy and power (Carpenter 2010, p. 33). In Reputation and Power, Carpenter

(2010) investigates how and why the FDA has garnered so much influence in the face of an ever-changing regulatory environment. He argues that the agency’s authority, both

66 domestic and international, lies in its reputation to evoke praise and fear from its multiple audiences, ranging from pharmaceutical companies, scientific communities, and other organizations competing on its turf like the National Cancer Institute and the American

Medical Association (Carpenter 2010). Tracing the history of the FDA and “disease politics” in the United States, Carpenter (2010) demonstrates how the agency’s reputation can impact its relationships with the public, its legal standing, and its capacity to frame debates in the public sphere using its technical expertise. Busuioc (2016) also points out that an agency’s positive reputation plays a protective role; it can help in reinforcing the organization’s autonomy, building public support for its policies, and ensuring its survival. Further, Ingold & Leifeld (2014) highlight how a good reputation is critical in effective policy implementation across different sectors, ranging from telecommunications to climate change and environmental health, in Switzerland and

Germany. In short, an agency’s reputation affects its ability to carry out its mandate.

Picci (2011) argues that reputation has become a particularly useful lens in the study of the public sector because of the rise of data-based governance and social media usage in the twenty-first century. He points to how reputational mechanisms, like rankings evaluating agency performance and publicly available data on policy implementation, can pressure agencies to behave honestly and efficiently in an effort to be well-regarded by their constituents and other agencies (Picci 2011). This is reminiscent of Connors’ (2005; 2007) finding on how NGOs in Bangalore issued report cards for local bureaucracies to improve accountability and transparency. SBM employs this logic at the national level. Each indicator in Swachh Survekshan has a description of the type of documentation needed to evaluate it. For instance, to verify that sanitation workers are afforded health benefits and protective gear, ULBs are asked to upload evidence

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(documents and photos) indicating the size of the sanitation workforce, use of protective gear by workers, and linkages with the Ayushman Bharat health scheme (Swachh

Survekshan Toolkit 2019). This emphasis on documentation and evaluation is a bid to methodically improve different parts of environmental sanitation in Indian cities using data, and to incentivize agencies to perform better with public rankings.

Audiences in Agency Reputation

Existing scholarship explores three aspects of organizational reputation: the network of audiences which help craft the agency’s reputation, dimensions of reputation, and strategies employed by bureaucracies to improve reputation. Carpenter (2010) links the types of audiences an agency has to its power. Common audience types include legislatures, policy beneficiaries, scientific communities, politicians, and the media

(Carpenter 2001; 2010; Lee & Van Ryzin 2019). Each audience provides a different type of power. Legislatures authorize agency funding (Carpenter 2010). Policy beneficiaries

(firms, households, and people) obey the agency’s rules and guidelines or undermine its legitimacy by challenging its authority (Carpenter 2010). Scientific and technical organizations and academic institutions can accept or reject the agency’s technical expertise during implementation (Carpenter 2010). The media shapes perceptions of agencies through its coverage of the agency’s successes and failures (Carpenter 2010).

Based on its legitimacy, politicians may choose to not interfere in bureaucratic autonomy

(Carpenter 2001).

In this web of audiences, Lee and Van Ryzin (2019) emphasize that organizational reputation is fluid. What one audience sees is not what another sees. Perceptions, judgements, and reputational threats thus vary across audiences, shaping the power of these agencies, and by extension, the state (Carpenter 2010). Carpenter (2010) highlights

68 how an agency can present “different faces for different audiences” (p. 68). This phenomenon can emerge from turf wars between an agency and its competitors; the

American Medical Association, for instance, would see a different side of the FDA compared to a pharmaceutical company being vetted by the agency (Carpenter 2010). It can also come from an agency’s mandate to regulate and play the bad cop in enforcing laws (Carpenter 2010). Busuioc and Lodge (2017) assert that within this network of audiences, a hierarchy exists. The authors theorize that an agency chooses which audience(s) to be accountable to in order to enhance its reputation (Busuioc & Lodge

2017). Reputation thus functions as a “filtering mechanism” for organizations to prioritize which external demands to privilege (Busuioc & Lodge 2017).

Dimensions of Agency Reputation

In addition to different audiences, agencies have multiple dimensions of reputation, which explain how beliefs about an agency are structured (Carpenter 2010).

The literature on organizational reputation in public administration outlines four dimensions: performative, moral, technical, and legal-procedural (Carpenter 2010;

Carpenter & Krause 2012). The business literature on corporate reputation adds a fifth dimension: emotional. All five dimensions are outlined below:

1. Performative. What is the quality of decision-making and the capacity of an

agency in carrying out its mandate and announced goals (Carpenter 2010)?

How aggressively and visibly is the organization pursuing implementation

(Busuioc & Lodge 2016)? Busuioc and Lodge (2016) argue that the visibility of

efforts is important in this dimension since organizational reputation is

augmented by implementing popular policies.

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2. Moral. Does the organization have moral and ethical goals and processes

(Carpenter 2010)? Does it protect its constituents (Carpenter 2010)? Carpenter

(2001) describes how the United States Post Office was regarded as a moral

guardian in the Progressive Era because it protected families from sins like

pornography and gambling.

3. Technical. Does the organization have the capacity for technical, professional,

and technological expertise (Carpenter 2010)? Carpenter (2010) discusses how

the FDA’s reputation as a bastion of regulatory knowledge and effective

enforcement has produced FDA-like entities across the world.

4. Legal-Procedural. Does the organization follow established legal norms in

decision-making and policy implementation (Carpenter 2010)? One of the

reputational threats to the FDA emerged in the late 1970s and 1980s when the

agency came under pressure to minimize restrictions on experimental drugs to

combat the HIV/AIDS crisis (Carpenter 2010). It faced the dilemma of

choosing between following its established protocols to preserve its legitimacy

and responding to a public health crisis (Carpenter 2010).

5. Emotional. What feelings and attitudes exist about an agency and its mission?

Fombrun et al. (2000) and Schwaiger (2004) argue that emotional responses

to organizations are important in shaping its reputation. This is especially

relevant in a policy like SBM that aims to capture the hearts and minds of

Indian citizens with a heady mix of Bollywood and post-colonial nationalism.

These different dimensions of reputation address the concerns of an agency’s multiple audiences, which can range from citizens and NGOs to regulators, and other national and sub-national authorities.

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Strategies of Building Reputation

The third aspect of organizational reputation discussed in the literature is how agencies build reputation. Drawing on theoretical and empirical studies of international pharmaceutical industries, Maor (2007; 2011), describe how agencies wishing to improve their reputation after a crisis can emulate practices and policies employed by other agencies with good reputation. Petkova (2012) echoes this notion of positive association in her analysis of corporate reputation. According to her, organizations can seek affiliations with other stakeholders with high reputations and can hire well-regarded management teams (Petkova 2012). The last and most common lever outlined in the literature is the use of communication. Waeraas and Byrkjeflot (2012) assert that communication in the public sector influences perceptions and “closes the gap between organizational identity and reputation” (p. 191). The authors declare that the most effective messaging boosts the organization’s visibility, and connects emotionally with the public to improve reputation (Waeraas & Byrkjeflot 2012). Examples of communication include publicly announced changes in an agency’s mission or its rebranding through different logos (Waeraas & Byrkjeflot 2012). In addition, Maor et al. (2012) explore the relationship between reputation and communication in the Israeli banking sector. Based on their analysis of the banking regulator’s responses to public opinion from 1998 to

2009, they find that central banks that have a long history of being seen as credible and effective enjoy a strong reputation and do not feel the need to communicate to their various audiences (Maor et al. 2012). However, banks with poor reputation have to

“shout” (Maor et al. 2012). Organizations can thus use communication strategically to achieve their goals, depending on their reputations with their different audiences.

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Organizational Reputation and Coordination

The literature on the impact of organizational reputation on coordination is limited. In the few studies on coordination, authors unanimously agree that coordination goes against an agency’s mandate and reputational incentives affect decisions to coordinate (Busuioc 2016; Maor 2013; Moynihan 2012; Wilson 1989). For example,

Wilson (1989) declares that agencies are dedicated to their individual mandate, and any activity that takes away from the execution of this mandate is thus avoided. Maor (2013) reinforces this point. He argues that organizations are evaluated on whether they can deliver on their mandate efficiently “by avoiding visible failures,” not if they coordinate or not (Maor 2013). If cooperation is necessary, reputational calculations factor into decision-making: does coordination provide the organization with a big enough gain?

What is the cost of this coordination (Busuioc 2016)? For agencies, the benefits of coordination rarely outweigh its costs, which include increased inefficiencies in bureaucratic processes and the emergence of new rivals on their turf (Busuioc 2016).

In their empirical analyses of reputation and coordination, Busuioc (2016) and

Moynihan (2012) find that decisions to coordinate are dependent on “reputational uniqueness,” turf wars, and blame avoidance. An agency’s survival depends on its distinctive reputation which is achieved through the carving out and protection of its turf, either physically or in the regulatory sense (Busuioc 2016). Coordination can thus be a threat to the organization’s ability to distinguish itself from similar stakeholders (Busuioc

2016). Busuioc (2016) analyzes how reputation influences coordination in two agencies in the European Union: Europol and Frontex. Both agencies were created to fulfill the need for coordination in approaches to transboundary challenges in the region; Europol is in charge of crime and Frontex deals with illegal migration (Busuioc 2016). In the case

72 of Europol, cooperation threatens the “reputational uniqueness” of national offices overseeing criminal activities, disincentivizing coordination (Busuioc 2016). Since crimes occur locally, crime prevention and responses augment reputations of these offices

(Busuioc 2016). By sharing data with Europol, national agencies are giving away their intelligence, depleting their reputation (Busuioc 2016). On the other hand, horizontal coordination between national immigration authorities and vertical coordination between national agencies and Frontex enhance reputation of all stakeholders involved

(Busuioc 2016). Through sharing of information and transnational enforcement, coordination helps all agencies fulfill their mandate of reducing illegal migration (Busuioc

2016).

In the United States, Moynihan (2012) illustrates how blame avoidance in public service networks hampers coordination. Using the case of Hurricane Katrina, he argues that factors like trust, reputation, and reciprocity matter for policy implementation

(Moynihan 2012). During Katrina, relationships within the federal government (White

House, Department of Defense, Federal Emergency Management Agency, and

Department of Homeland Security) and between federal and state agencies in Louisiana became increasingly tense, obstructing coordination despite the existence of a political framework articulating agency responsibilities (Moynihan 2012). As the disaster unfolded in a highly public manner, officials at both the state and federal levels spent more time blaming each other for inadequate responses, instead of addressing the problems at hand

(Moynihan 2012). Both Moynihan (2012) and Busuioc (2016) thus highlight that, from a reputational standpoint, it is much easier for agencies to not coordinate.

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Limits of Organizational Reputation Theories

While organizational reputation can provide a culturally rich lens to study public sector behavior, to what extent is it generalizable? Maor (2015) considers the limits of the reputational perspective. He argues that agencies might be constrained in boosting their reputation through a lack of funding, administrative culture, or political interference

(Maor 2015). He also describes how reputational tools, like using the media, can be a double-edged sword for bureaucracies (Maor 2015). By opening themselves up to media scrutiny, agencies may not be able to exert control over journalistic narratives, which could be detrimental to their existing reputation (Maor 2015). Further, Maor (2015) questions if all agencies are reputationally sensitive. Some agencies may be shielded from reputational consequences if they share close, protective ties with politicians or have passive audiences who do not leverage their influence over an agency’s reputation to agitate for better performance (Maor 2015). There are few empirical studies that highlight the limits of organizational reputation. Notably, Christensen and Laegrid (2015) find that reputation management in the public sector may not always have an effect. Using the case of the Norwegian police after a terrorist attack in 2011, they assert that if trust in public institutions are historically high, short-term reputational threats and agency responses may not disrupt the status quo (Christensen & Laegrid 2015).

2.4 Theoretical Framework: Connecting Reputation and Coordination in Sanitation

The literature on organizational reputation in the public sector almost exclusively focuses on agencies in the Global North, with an emphasis on the United States and

Northern Europe. Further, the pharmaceutical industry has been the main unit of analysis for many empirical studies, inspired by Carpenter’s (2010) foundational work on the FDA.

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While reputation has been used to explain different varieties of public sector behavior, its insights on bureaucratic coordination are also limited. My dissertation contributes to these gaps in the literature. Sanitation is a field rife with reputational tensions, especially in India. Adding to this, Indian bureaucracies have a poor reputation in policy implementation (CPR 2018). Given the decentralized nature of sanitation implementation in the country, organizational reputation becomes especially valuable since bureaucracies in states and cities function with high levels of autonomy and discretion. SBM can only have an impact on the ground if agencies are able to carry out their mandate.

Figure 3 illustrates the theoretical framework linking coordination and reputation in urban sanitation. I explore how the lens of organizational reputation helps explain bureaucratic coordination and how reputation interacts with the other factors impacting coordination in sanitation. Drawing on the literature on reputation, I ask four questions:

Who is the audience for municipal corporations implementing SBM? What dimensions of reputation are being emphasized by the municipal corporations’ use of SBM’s reputational devices - Swachh Survekshan rankings and rewards, the Swachhata app, and media and social media campaigns? What reputational strategies are agencies using (or not using) under SBM, and why? What are the limits, if any, to reputation management in SBM? In Chapters 3 and 4, I present my findings on bureaucratic coordination in

Chennai, Coimbatore, and Trichy.

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Figure 3: Theoretical Framework

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3| HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL COORDINATION BETWEEN AGENCIES IN TAMIL NADU

3.1 Introduction

SBM’s reputational devices, particularly the Swachh Survekshan indicators that measure service-level progress, hope to incentivize coordination between agencies in cities to improve sanitation provision. In Chennai, this means coordination between the

Chennai Corporation and Metro Water to work on solid waste management and the sewerage system, and between the municipal corporation and the Slum Clearance Board to augment slum health. In Coimbatore and Trichy, inter-agency coordination needs to occur between each city’s municipal corporation, the Slum Clearance Board, and the

Tamil Nadu Water and Drainage Board. However, I find that in the three cities many of these relationships suffered from weak bureaucratic capacity and administrative incoherence. Despite the Swachh Survekshan indicators assuming inter-agency coordination, SBM’s reputational devices were no match for entrenched institutional weaknesses to encourage horizontal coordination between agencies in the state. In fact, implementing these reputational strategies added to the existing workload in agencies.

What was surprising, however, was the increase in vertical coordination between the three municipal corporations and national-level actors, like the Ministry of Housing and Urban

Affairs and the National Green Tribunal, because of the policy’s emphasis on documentation. This was a welcome development for city agencies since the implementation of national policies may not always feel locally grounded.

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3.2 National-Level Actors in Urban Sanitation Governance in India

The 74the Amendment to the Constitution was passed in 1992 to empower urban local bodies (ULBs) in charge of water and sanitation to improve urban service provision

(IIHS 2014; Wankhade 2015). The process of devolving responsibilities and finances from the state level has been fragmented, and ULBs often do not have the capacity for service provision (IIHS 2014). Despite the devolution of powers in urban sanitation, the central government retains a lot of influence in this sector; a significant portion of capital investments in urban sanitation has come from the central government, and projects are approved based on technical specifications constructed at the national level (IIHS 2014).

Figure 4 provides an outline of the key national-level actors in urban sanitation in

India. The Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs (MoHUA) is the primary organization that designs, implements, and funds urban development policies, including the National

Urban Sanitation Policy and SBM. 26 The Public Health Engineering department and the

Central Public Health and Environmental Engineering Organization (CPHEEO) within

MoHUA provide technical assistance on water and sanitation technologies for the

Ministry and states (CPHEEO website; MoHUA website).27 CPHEEO is also vital in

“processing” water and sanitation projects funded by international financial institutions

(CPHEEO website; MoHUA website). Similar to CPHEEO, the Central Pollution Control

Board (CPCB), housed in the Ministry of Environment, Forests, and Climate Change, is a statutory organization that monitors and provides technical assistance on issues like

26 The National Urban Sanitation Policy was implemented by the Ministry of Urban Development, MoHUA’s former name. 27CPHEEO was initially part of the Ministry of Health when it was launched in 1954 under the recommendations of the Environmental Hygiene Committee, and has been part of all national sanitation efforts since then. In 1973, CPHEEO joined MoHUA, when it was known as the Ministry of Works and Housing (CPHEEO website).

78 waste management, water quality management, and air quality management to central and state governments (CPCB website). On the labor side, the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment oversees policies for the manual scavenging community (PIB 2018a).

Figure 4: National actors in urban sanitation

In response to skyrocketing levels of environmental pollution as a result of rapid industrialization and urbanization since the 1980s, the central government established the National Green Tribunal in 2010 to efficiently adjudicate and mediate legal disputes related to environmental protection and conservation (Vardhan 2014; NGT website). This move was intended to operationalize a citizen’s duty to protect the environment, and a citizen’s right to live in a healthy environment in India under Constitution Articles 51-

A(g) and 21 respectively (Vardhan 2014). In its capacity as the national mediator and watchdog for environmental disputes, the Tribunal has recently ordered studies on determining what constitutes toxic waste and has heard cases on the illegal dumping of waste in water bodies by private and public actors (NGT website).

By the 1990s, urban growth in India had slowed, and primarily occurred in developed states (Kundu 2014). This shift can be attributed to the central government’s liberalization policies, which channeled infrastructure and industrial investments to urban centers in these states (Kundu 2014). The central government also became interested in transforming living conditions in larger cities to make them more attractive for foreign and domestic investment in the 1990s and 2000s (Kundu 2014). Subsequent

79 policies, including JNNURM, the National Urban Sanitation Policy, and SBM, have thus been focusing on expanding service provision in cities (Wankhade 2015; “JNNURM

Overview”). Another policy priority has been tackling public health issues in slums that have emerged as a result of haphazard urban planning (Wankhade 2015; SBM Manual

2017).

After decentralization in the 1990s, states were given the autonomy to design institutions around water and sanitation provision (IIHS 2014; Wankhade 2015). In urban areas, ULBs, most often municipal corporations in large cities, were charged with this task. In line with Pritchett et al.’s (2010) argument that bureaucracies struggle with implementation because they are overburdened, municipal corporations are responsible for managing a wide variety of urban issues, ranging from infrastructure construction to overseeing government-run schools to revenue collection.28 These ULBs are usually headed by officials from the country’s most elite bureaucracy, the Indian Administrative

Service (IAS). In my interview with Sanitation Consultant A in Coimbatore, who has had extensive experience working with local agencies to implement sanitation policies across

India, he asserted that IAS officers, trained to be managers and generalists, often lack the specialist skills necessary in understanding the needs of the water and sanitation sectors.29 Further, he pointed to how the practice of transferring IAS officers from one post to another, either a consequence of political meddling or routine rotation, hinders policy continuity.30 For example, during the course of my fieldwork from 2017 to 2019, the former Commissioner of the GCC was transferred to the Commisionerate of Municipal

Administration, and is now at the Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority; both

28 The authors aptly title this the “Asking Too Much of Too Little Too Soon Too Often” syndrome. 29 Interview with Sanitation Consultant A. Coimbatore, Aug 23, 2018. 30 Ibid.

80 transfers happened in 2019. This is consistent with Iyer & Mani’s (2007; 2012) work on the role of politics in bureaucratic reassignments in India. IAS officers conventionally remain in their positions for at least two years. Sanitation Consultant A described how when officers assume a new leadership role, they often reinvent the wheel and revamp the priorities in an agency based on their interests, instead of building on its previous work.

He referred to this phenomenon as a perpetual “war of egos” between IAS officers.31 As a result, the extent to which a policy is implemented with the full force of the bureaucracy is reduced to the will of transient leadership.

The central government has clearly articulated the roles at different levels to implement SBM (Figure 5). At the national level, the National Advisory Committee, SBM

National Mission Directorate, and the Project Management Unit are all housed within

MoHUA. In turn, each state has a State High Powered Committee, an SBM State Mission

Directorate, and a Project Management Unit. The Committee is chaired by the state’s

Chief Secretary and has members from relevant departments. At the district level, members of parliament, district collectors, and ULBs are tasked with implementation.

ULBs are also charged with coordinating between ward committees, resident welfare associations (RWAs), and NGOs (SBM Manual 2017).

31 Interview with Sanitation Consultant A. Coimbatore, Aug 23, 2018.

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Figure 5: Institutional framework for SBM implementation (SBM Manual 2017)

3.3 State- and City-Level Actors in Urban Sanitation Governance in Tamil Nadu

In Tamil Nadu, SBM builds on a legacy of investments in urban sanitation infrastructure led by state politicians that privileged community and public toilets, colloquially referred to as CT/PTs, and underground sewerage systems.32 Urban Tamil

Nadu experiences high rates of open defecation (16%) and improper management of solid waste services and on-site sanitation systems (TNUSSP 2017; Karthikeyan 2018). The government exclusively addressed these challenges in the last two decades through the construction of sanitation infrastructure in various urban development initiatives.33 The

World Bank-supported Third Tamil Nadu Urban Development Project (2005-2014),

Integrated Urban Development Mission (2011), and the Chennai Mega City Development

Mission (2011) expanded underground sewerage and storm water drains in cities (MAWS

32; Interview with Ms. Kavita Wankhade. Chennai, Nov 28, 2018; Interview with Mr. Phanindra Reddy. Chennai, Dec 6, 2018. 33 Interview with Mr. Phanindra Reddy. Chennai, Dec 6, 2018.

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2012; “Mega City Mission 2018;” World Bank TNUDP III).34 In 2013, the state government launched the well-known Namma Toilet (“Our Toilet”) project, which aimed to end open defecation in the state through the construction of modular, naturally ventilated public toilets in high-traffic areas (SBM Manual 2017). While these toilets were initially popular with the public, they have not been properly maintained by officials, and are largely no longer in use (Srividya 2015). Mr. Phanindra Reddy, an IAS officer who served as the Principal Secretary of Municipal Administration and Water Supply from

2014-2017, noted that maintenance has also been an issue with CT/PTs, and linked it to incidents of vandalism and theft, poor awareness of toilet usage, and a weak sense of ownership over the facilities.35 In particular, he described the lack of a coherent city identity in Chennai, which draws people from all over India and the world, to explain the absence of ownership over sanitation infrastructure.36

Despite these attempts to improve access to sanitation “hardware,” the state faces legislative, governance, and human rights challenges in implementation (TNUSSP 2017).

Beyond the state’s 2014 Septage Management Guidelines, Tamil Nadu’s current state laws37 governing environmental sanitation are not comprehensive enough to address its problems (TNUSSP 2017).38 There is a need for updated, dedicated laws and policies targeting improved sanitation and public health outcomes (TNUSSP 2017). Further, there

34 The Integrated Urban Development Mission and the Chennai Mega City Development Mission have recently been renewed (“Mega City Mission” 2018). 35 Interview with Mr. Phanindra Reddy. Chennai, Dec 6, 2018 and Mar 28, 2019. 36 Ibid. 37 The Acts in the state that currently govern urban sanitation are: 1971 Tamil Nadu Town & Country Planning Act; 1920 Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act, 1939 Municipal Corporation Acts & 1939 Public Act; 1972 Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Building Rules; and 1986 Environment Protection Act & 1974 Water Prevention & Control of Pollution Act (TNUSSP 2017; TNUSSP 2018). 38 Tamil Nadu is one of the first states in India to recognize the importance of investing across the sanitation value chain, particularly in the often-overlooked fecal sludge management sector. These guidelines provide suggestions for the proper containment, transport, and disposal of fecal sludge from septic tanks.

83 is no clear chain of command in sanitation governance in the state, which is currently populated with multiple stakeholders and laws (TNUSSP 2017). Figure 6 shows the organization of government stakeholders in urban sanitation in Tamil Nadu:

Figure 6: Organization of stakeholders in urban sanitation in Tamil Nadu. Adapted from TNUSSP (2016)

This figure highlights the plethora of agencies in charge of urban sanitation across the state, and illustrates how coordination between these different stakeholders presents a challenge for effectively planning, implementing, and enforcing sanitation policies

(TNUSSP 2018).

Further, Figure 8 demonstrates how urban sanitation in Chennai is governed differently, compared to other cities in the state. The Chennai Corporation and the

Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board (CMWSSB, colloquially known as Metro Water) oversee urban sanitation for the city, instead of the Commissionerate of

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Municipal Administration (CMA) (TNUSSP 2018). As the largest city (land-wise and population-wise) in the state, Chennai has a separate structure of sanitation governance and financing. The Integrated Urban Development Mission, for example, was launched by the CMA, and implemented improvements in sanitation infrastructure in Tamil Nadu cities, except for Chennai (TNUSSP 2018). Instead, infrastructure improvements in

Chennai were implemented under the Chennai Mega City Development Mission (“Mega

City Mission” 2018). The Namma Toilet scheme was initiated by the CMA in cities other than Chennai, and the first public toilet was piloted in Trichy (TNUSSP 2017). Its initial success led to the expansion of the program in Chennai, but ultimately the scheme was unsuccessful because of a lack of interest from the private sector in helping to finance the program (Philip 2014).

Another implementation obstacle in the water and sanitation sector is the relationship between the Tamil Nadu Water and Drainage Board and the ULBs. The

Board is still in charge of service provision in the state, despite the 74th Constitutional

Amendment that charges ULBs with this responsibility (TNUSSP 2017). The devolution of service provision to ULBs is thus incomplete and fragmented, which leaves them unable to effectively implement and finance service provision (TNUSSP 2017). Finally, since on-site sanitation systems do not receive much attention from the government, households have to make their own arrangements with private contractors to collect and dispose fecal sludge (TNUSSP 2017). These operators are largely unregulated, and often dump fecal sludge in the nearest water body (TNUSSP 2017). As a response to this dire situation that also affects water quality in this parched state, the Tamil Nadu Urban

Sanitation Support Program (TNUSSP), in concert with the Gates Foundation, is

85 supporting the state government in incorporating fecal sludge management in Tamil

Nadu’s urban sanitation strategy.

Dr. Karen Coelho from the Madras Institute of Development Studies and Ms.

Kavita Wankhade, who leads TNUSSP, described the strength and cohesion of the state bureaucracy, compared to other Indian states.39 They pointed to successful implementation of state policies like the mid-day meals program and rainwater harvesting, and highlighted how agencies continue to function even in the face of political turmoil.40 Ms. Wankhade also said that MAWS was a powerful agency in directing urban development in the state.41 Despite the relative competence of the state bureaucracy, coordination between agencies is a significant challenge. At the Resilient Chennai

Strategy Launch in June 2019, the former Deputy Commissioner of Works at the Chennai

Corporation identified a lack of coordination between agencies in the state as an impediment in policy implementation, and said that few mechanisms exist for agencies to coordinate with each other.42 He pointed to the potential of national policies like Smart

Cities to function as a platform for inter-agency coordination, bringing together the expertise and mandates of various agencies to implement urban development policies.43

While Ms. Wankhade maintained that inter-agency coordination was better in

Tamil Nadu compared to other states in India, she agreed with Dr. Coelho’s assessment of the “culture of top-down-ness,” entrenched in the deeply hierarchical state

39 Interview with Ms. Kavita Wankhade. Chennai, Nov 28, 2018 and Jul 3, 2019; Interview with Dr. Karen Coelho. Chennai, Jul 6, 2019. 40 Ibid 41 Interview with Ms. Kavita Wankhade. Chennai, Jul 3, 2019. 42 Resilient Chennai Strategy Launch. Chennai, Jun 27, 2019. 43 Ibid

86 bureaucracy.44 Both of them stressed the need for buy-in at the state level in order to effectively implement a policy.45 Dr. Coelho also noted that overburdened ULBs in Tamil

Nadu “strenuously resist coordination” because of the staggering workload involved in fulfilling their agency’s mandate, reinforcing Pritchett et al.’s (2010) and Bach and

Wegrich (2019) insights on bureaucratic capacity and implementation silos.46 Dr. Coelho described institutional coordination in Tamil Nadu as a project-based endeavor spearheaded by the state government, and pointed to the Chennai Rivers Restoration

Trust (CRRT) as the existing model of inter-agency coordination in the city’s water and sanitation sector.47 Launched in 2006, CRRT was created by the state government to specifically overcome coordination issues in the environmental sector to construct an eco- park and conduct river restoration in Chennai. The directors of CRRT are secretaries from relevant state departments like the Public Works Department, MAWS, and the

Environment and Forests Department (CRRT website). The state-level sub-committee includes the managing director of CMWSSB, the Greater Chennai Corporation

Commissioner, and the managing director of the Tamil Nadu Slum Clearance Board

(CRRT website). This committee oversees the work of the technical committee, which is made up of the superintending engineers of the various state departments and agencies involved in the project (CRRT website). CRRT is feted as a standard-bearer of institutional coordination in Tamil Nadu policy circles because of its highly visible achievements in successfully building and maintaining a large eco-park in a central part

44 Interview with Ms. Kavita Wankhade. Chennai, Nov 28, 2018 and Jul 3, 2019; Interview with Dr. Karen Coelho. Chennai, Jul 6, 2019. Quote from Dr. Coelho. 45 Ibid. 46 Interview with Dr. Karen Coelho. Chennai, Jul 6, 2019. 47 Ibid.

87 of Chennai, and for its ongoing efforts to work with slum dwellers as part of its mission to restore the Adyar and Cooum rivers (Resilient Chennai 2019; Pattabiraman 2017).

In addition to coordination challenges in sanitation implementation, the persistence of manual scavenging remains a significant blind spot in Tamil Nadu. The state reportedly has the highest number of manual scavengers in the country – 462 as of

2015, although manual scavengers dispute this figure as being less than a tenth of the real number (Bajaj & Venugopalan 2018).48 Numbers of manual scavengers reported by state and central governments vary wildly in an attempt to cover up manual scavenging practices. For example, the 2011 census reported that around 2.1 million toilets needed to be cleaned manually in the country but the total number of manual scavengers was only estimated to be 13, 639 (Shaikh 2018). Several states like Bihar, Telengana, and Haryana have even claimed that they have no manual scavengers (Mishra 2018). It is thus possible that Tamil Nadu has the highest reported numbers, simply because the state has been more forthcoming about its data. The state government has made half-hearted attempts to survey the number of manual scavengers but there has been no real commitment from its side to address the concerns of this community and actively help in its rehabilitation

(Bajaj & Venugopalan 2018). When the Safai Karamchari Andolan (SKA), the preeminent activist NGO on manual scavenging issues, gave a list of 3032 names to the Tamil Nadu government, officials allegedly used the list to threaten and harass people (Bajaj &

Venugopalan 2018). While SBM mentions the rehabilitation of manual scavengers in policy documents, there is little action on the ground despite Prime Minister Modi wielding the broom in photo opportunities in an effort to destigmatize waste workers.

48 For more details on the politics of counting manual scavengers, see: Mishra (2018) and Shaikh (2018).

88

Thus, at both the central government and state levels, manual scavengers continue to be neglected at best and persecuted at worst in sanitation interventions.

In the next three sections, I present my findings on how national and state actors work together with local agencies to implement SBM. First, I discuss how bureaucratic capacity and administrative coherence are limiting factors in the agencies’ use of SBM’s reputational devices. Then, I explain how the emphasis on documentation and the general interest nation-wide in sanitation issues as a result of SBM, particularly in solid waste management, has improved coordination between national actors and local agencies.

3.4 Horizontal Coordination and Bureaucratic Capacity in Tamil Nadu

Reinforcing the “Tick-Box” Culture:49 Documentation and Online Platforms in SBM

Many of the bureaucrats I spoke to in Chennai, Coimbatore, and Trichy were indeed “Lord[s] of the Files,”50 their desks and offices overflowing with stacks of papers and files. Figures 7 and 8 taken in Chennai and Coimbatore provide a taste of the massive number of documents that are collected and transported throughout and between agencies. Documentation of tasks constitutes a large part of an agency’s daily work, and

SBM’s reputational devices have added to this, intensifying its existing workload.

49 Phone interview with Mr. Somnath Sen. Chennai, Dec 14, 2018. 50 This is a reference to India Today’s cover story on Indian bureaucrats called “Lords of the Files” described in Chapter 2 (Jha 2018).

89

Figure 7: Sacks of files at the Chennai Corporation being transported to another building (Photo by author)

Figure 8: Papers piled up in the corner of an office at the Coimbatore Corporation (Photo by author)

Ms. Reeba Devraj and Dr. Suneethi Sundar at the Tamil Nadu Urban Sanitation

Support Program (TNUSSP) asserted that bureaucratic capacity is a major stumbling

90 block in inter-agency coordination for sanitation in the state.51 They pointed out that while SBM has strengthened the mandate for sanitation, it has not enhanced the ability of bureaucracies to take on more tasks.52 Officials at the Chennai Corporation and the

Trichy Corporation who are leading the implementation of SBM in their cities, for example, noted that they are fulfilling the Swachh Survekshan indicators on top of their existing workload, which include the daily management of solid waste and addressing citizen requests.53 There were no new positions created within agencies solely dedicated to SBM implementation. This finding is consistent with the literatures on public administration and bureaucratic coordination on how the nature of bureaucracies and their capacity affect coordination. Bach & Wegrich (2018) emphasize that agencies have distinct mandates, which is their primary focus, and that coordination with other agencies is not part of their performance evaluation. Pritchett et al. (2010) also highlight how policy implementation becomes unsuccessful if governments continue to push through policies on overburdened bureaucracies without first improving administrative capacity.

In effect, SBM’s reputational devices have actually exacerbated two aspects of bureaucratic capacity in the three cities: amplifying the burden of documentation and the

“tick-box” culture. SBM strives for accountability and transparency in its quest to reform

Indian sanitation. At the level of agencies, this has taken the form of increased documentation that needs to be uploaded to the SBM portal for the Swachh Survekshan rankings. As a point of reference, Swachh Survekshan 2019 had 33 distinct indicators, listed in Appendix C, each with a different set of paperwork needed for evaluation

51 Interview with Ms. Reeba Devaraj and Dr. Suneethi Sundar, Tamil Nadu Urban Sanitation Support Program. Chennai, Jul 3, 2019. 52 Ibid. 53 Interview with SBM Team, Greater Chennai Corporation, Nov 23, 2018; Interview with Trichy City Corporation officials. Trichy, May 29, 2019.

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(Swachh Surekshan 2019 Toolkit). Officials at all three municipal corporations acknowledged that the implementation of SBM necessitated a significant increase in paperwork,54 but it was the Deputy Commissioner of Health at the Greater Chennai

Corporation who eloquently critiqued it in a question to an SBM administrator at a waste conference in Chennai: Is SBM about cleanliness or documentation?55 His question

(which elicited many emphatic nods from other bureaucrats in the audience and received a vague answer) implies a tradeoff in agencies between bureaucrats spending their time collecting paperwork for the annual Swachh Survekshan exercise and focusing on substantive tasks that improve the implementation of sanitation interventions.

This emphasis on documentation has also intensified the “tick-box” culture within agencies.56 This refers to the tendency bureaucracies have in focusing exclusively on checking off narrow tasks and indicators in their list of duties, without paying attention to their usefulness or larger significance. In SBM, this mechanical checking off of boxes is most evident in the rush to declare cities and states open-defecation-free (ODF) in Tamil

Nadu. Attaining 100 percent ODF status by Gandhi’s 150th birthday in 2019 has been one of the policy’s most publicized and controversial goals; supporters welcome the realization of the independence leader’s dream of a clean India, and critics question the effectiveness of this target in improving outcomes along the environmental sanitation spectrum in the country (Dewoolkar 2018; Sanan 2016). To achieve ODF status under

SBM, urban local bodies (ULBs) first declare themselves ODF based on the policy’s protocols (SBM ODF website). Then, a third-party verification team from the Quality

54 Interview with Trichy Corporation officials. Trichy, Sep 4, 2018; Interview with SBM Team. Chennai, Nov 23, 2018; Interview with Coimbatore Corporation officials. Coimbatore, Dec 11, 2018. 55 Madras Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Roadmap to Zero Waste in Chennai. Chennai, Nov 9 and 10, 2018. 56 Phone interview with Mr. Somnath Sen. Chennai, Dec 14, 2018.

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Council of India verifies their status in person, and submits a report and certificate on the

SBM-ODF Dashboard (SBM ODF website). This certification is valid for six months to ensure that ULBs continue to monitor incidences of open defecation (SBM ODF website).

In line with other Indian cities, Chennai, Coimbatore, and Trichy have all declared their

ODF status (SBM ODF website). However, there is some cognitive dissonance in bureaucracies between what the ODF status means under SBM and what “real” ODF looks like. For instance, officials at the Coimbatore and Chennai Corporations noted that the

ODF certification has motivated their bureaucracies to identify and monitor areas with high incidences of ODF, to enforce fines for public urination and open defecation, and to channel resources into improving toilets in those areas.57 However, they also recognized that SBM’s ODF certification did not translate into ODF cities in reality, a goal they acknowledged that can only be achieved with much more time and resources.58 After all, as Mr. Phanindra Reddy noted, “sanitation is not a five-year affair.”59 This discrepancy between what ODF means in SBM’s world of rankings and indicators, and what it means in the real world undermines the value of this certification and status, and casts doubt on the ability of SBM’s indicators and certifications to effect change on the ground. As

Dewoolkar (2018) emphasizes in her critique of Mumbai’s ODF declaration, attaining

ODF is a “self-congratulatory” move for an agency, rather than translating into real world improvement. It highlights the performative dimension of an agency’s reputation, perhaps only to other agencies, SBM administrators, and the central government, without demonstrating the agency’s technical or moral commitments to increasing toilet usage

57 Interview with SBM team. Chennai, Nov 23, 2018; Interview with Coimbatore Corporation officials. Coimbatore, Dec 11, 2018. 58 Ibid. 59 Interview with Mr. Phanindra Reddy. Chennai, Dec 6, 2018.

93 and ending open defecation. In short, the audience that is privileged in ODF declarations appear to be SBM administrators and not the public.

The NGOs I spoke with had a different perspective on the benefit of ODF targets in improving sanitation. Officials at both Gramalaya and Scope in Trichy agreed that SBM’s

ODF declarations did not accurately reflect reality and were results of performative politics.60 For example, Mr. Elangovan from Gramalaya remarked that “the government will just declare ODF status [in 2019] and then move on to the next scheme. This is just politics.”61 Mr. Elangovan was right. Prime Minister Modi claimed on October 2, 2019, that India had achieved ODF status on schedule and was given the Global Goalkeeper

Award from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (AFP 2019; Doshi 2019). However,

Mr. Damodaran, the Chief Executive Officer of Gramalaya, emphasized that ODF targets were not the issue but the manner in which they are executed.62 He pointed to how

Gramlaya has been using the ODF status as an incentive in its work within Tamil Nadu since the 1990s. He described how NGO teams worked closely with residents, other

NGOs, and local agencies to build sanitation facilities and cultivate toilet usage. In these visits, NGO officials also elucidated the links between open defecation and poor health in the area, particularly for children. Once the neighborhood had fully transitioned toward using toilets and open defecation had been eliminated, Gramalaya issued them with banners with this achievement, which are proudly displayed outside the neighborhood

(Figure 9). Mr. Damodaran also highlighted that the NGO’s work did not end there. They

60 Interview with Mr. Sai Damodaran. Trichy, Sep 5, 2018; Interview with Mr. M. Subburaman. Trichy, May 29, 2019. 61 Interview with Gramalaya team. Trichy, Sep 6, 2018. 62 Interview with Mr. Sai Damodaran. Trichy, Sep 5, 2018.

94 plan visits every few years to these ODF areas to ensure that residents continue to use toilet facilities without any problems.63

Figure 9: An example of an ODF certification assigned in 2008 by Gramalaya and partner NGOs in Salem, Tamil Nadu (Bansal 2015)

The difference between Gramalaya’s ODF certifications and SBM’s illustrate the difference between “thin” and “thick” tasks in sanitation (Pritchett 2014). SBM’s certification rests on a layer of “thin” indicators, including the number of individual household latrines and the verification that a system is in place to enforce fines for open defecation. It does not test for the “thick,” transaction-intensive methodology Gramalaya employs to ensure that residents understand the meaning of this certification and work towards achieving and maintaining it with the relevant agencies and other NGOs. While broad declarations of ODF across India feed into the publicity SBM has generated for sanitation, they also dilute the meaning of what this indicator means and obfuscates the amount of work that is needed to be truly ODF.

63 Interview with Mr. Sai Damodaran. Trichy, Sep 5, 2018.

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Social Media: The Magic Bullet to Behavioral Change?

SBM and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) have made social media a hallmark of policy implementation, touting its effectiveness in creating nation-wide behavioral change (Jha 2017; Thakurta & Sam 2019; SBM website). Swachh Survekshan rewards the use of its online platforms in its indicators, particularly in those measuring citizen feedback and innovative implementation strategies (Swachh Survekshan Toolkit 2019).

In Trichy, the Corporation’s use of social media is in line with the “tick-box”64 culture. The

Trichy Corporation and its former Commissioner, Mr. N. Ravichandran, have accounts on YouTube and Twitter, and have used these platforms for public outreach. However, a closer look at the analytics for these platforms reveals that while the Corporation is indeed employing social media, its online audience is limited. The Trichy Corporation’s YouTube account was started a year ago, and contains posts exclusively devoted to raising awareness about SBM and Swachh Survekshan.65 The Corporation hosted a short movie contest in 2018 on the importance of sanitation in the city, and the top three videos are posted on its account. Further, the agency uses this account to publicize the various SBM interventions it has undertaken in the city, like building and cleaning up parks, and invites community leaders to make short videos on keeping Trichy clean. The account also posts videos by these community leaders and the former Commissioner in detailing the questions residents may be asked by the third-party verification team for the Swachh

Survekshan rankings.

These videos, as a whole, check off three out of five dimensions of organizational reputation. They raise the visibility of the agency’s SBM efforts (performative), they

64 Phone interview with Mr. Somnath Sen. Chennai, Dec 14, 2018. 65 Trichy Corporation YouTube channel

96 highlight its technical and professional capacity to implement sanitation interventions

(technical), and they use community leaders to emphasize how residents are integral to the city’s success in the rankings (emotional). These videos thus have the capacity to nudge mental models of the agency held by Trichy’s residents who may view the

Corporation as perennially corrupt and ineffective. However, the impact of these videos is limited by the small size of online audience. The Corporation’s YouTube account has

1,050 subscribers, and most of its videos have received less than 200 views in a city that has almost a million people. While the first video received over 15,000 views in February

2018, there has been a general trend downward in the number of views, with the most recent one posted in November 2019 receiving 55 views.

The Trichy Corporation’s and the former Commissioner’s Twitter accounts are equally limited in their online reach.66 The Trichy Corporation’s Twitter account has

2,007 followers, and it follows 10 other accounts. These 10 accounts are chiefly of the

Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs, State Minister for Municipal Administration Mr.

S.P. Velumani, and other municipal corporations in India. The agency posts about its various SBM endeavors and highlights articles in the English and Tamil newspapers that describe its sanitation efforts. While the agency has posted 523 tweets since July 2016, it generally receives less than 50 likes, 10 retweets, and 1 comment per post. Similarly, the former Commissioner has posted 307 tweets since November 2017 on the agency’s various water, sanitation, and health initiatives, but has 642 followers. His posts also receive less than 50 likes, 10 retweets, and 1 comment per post. The number of people reached by the Trichy Corporation’s social media presence suggests that social media may

66 Trichy Corporation’s Twitter account and Trichy Commissioner’s Twitter account

97 not be the most effective platform for behavioral change communication in the city. The discrepancy between the consistent posting and the small online audience also extends

Pritchett et al.’s (2010) concept of isomorphic mimicry to the digital sphere. While the

Trichy Corporation presents a façade of active communication online, perhaps mimicking

Prime Minister Modi’s substantial Twitter presence that has infused SBM, its limited interactions question its effectiveness as a communication strategy. In short, maintaining a social media presence does not automatically translate into improved communication or behavioral change.

The inconsistency between an online platform and its reach is also evident with the use of the Swachhata app in Chennai and Trichy. The app is intended to streamline communication between municipal corporations and residents in improving service provision and addressing problems in sanitation in a timely manner. The SBM team in

Chennai noted that the former Commissioner Dr. D. Karthikeyan was attentive to the app’s data and emphasized the necessity of fast resolutions of complaints lodged through it.67 To increase the app’s reach, it was linked with the Namma Chennai (Our Chennai) app, developed by the Chennai Corporation and Chennai Smart City Limited in 2018.68

Despite these efforts, the usage data tells a different story. During my fieldwork from 2017 to 2019, a senior GCC official and sanitation consultant in the city estimated the number of app downloads between 10,000 and 20,000, with estimates falling between 12,000 and

15,000.69 For reference, the city’s population is between 4 and 8 million, depending on how the city is defined and if people considered to be part of the floating population are

67 Interview with Ms. D. Vijula. Chennai, Nov 23, 2018; Interview with SBM team. Chennai, Nov 23, 2018. 68 Interview with SBM team. Chennai, Nov 23, 2018. 69 Senior Bureaucrat A. Chennai, Nov 23, 2018; Sanitation Consultant C. Chennai, Mar 25, 2019.

98 included in the figure.70 While the indicators in Swachh Survekshan 2019, detailed in

Appendix C, measure both the number of active users and the number of downloads, the number of approximate downloads versus the total city population indicates that the app is not widely used.

Some of the bureaucrats I interviewed were not completely convinced by the effectiveness of the app in helping them fulfill their mandate. For example, in Trichy, officials have expanded the use of WhatsApp to communicate with the public on SBM- related issues, declaring it a more convenient and accessible platform for both the agency and residents.71 WhatsApp is widely used in India, both as a communication tool and as a social media platform, and its usage cuts across geographical, class, and age categories.

The Swachhata app, on the other hand, requires users to first know about the app and then know how to download and use it. In my experience using the app on my Android phone in India, I found the interface easy to navigate, and reported a couple of complaints about overflowing dumpsters in my neighborhood that were resolved within a day.

However, there were not many complaints lodged in the app. The number of requests for service usually hovered between 40 to 50 per day across the city, including as recently as

November 4, 2019. While the app can be a useful tool for people who use their smartphones frequently, it can be inaccessible or challenging for those who do not.

Public communication efforts in the three cities did not exclusively privilege online platforms. The Trichy Corporation officials I spoke with who are implementing SBM also reported that the Commissioner and senior engineers from the agency have increased their frequency of field visits to ward offices and to neighborhood behavioral change

70 The floating population in Chennai is estimated to be around a million by the Chennai Corporation, consisting of migrant and seasonal workers from other parts of Tamil Nadu and India. 71 Interview with Trichy Corporation officials. Trichy, Sep 4, 2018.

99 campaigns held by the Corporation and NGOs.72 In Coimbatore and Chennai, schools and slums are focal points in the agencies’ behavioral change campaigns, and these agencies do not prioritize energetic social media usage. Bureaucrats in Chennai, in particular, have consciously chosen to pursue offline interventions over offline ones in behavioral change.

Mr. Phanindra Reddy, former Principal Secretary of MAWS, and Dr. Srinivasan, who heads up the information, education, and communication (IEC) initiatives for SBM, questioned the ability of social media to effect change in the real world. Dr. Srinivasan declared that sanitation problems need be solved at the grassroots level when officials can

“meet people one-on-one.”73 Mr. Reddy reinforced this perspective, maintaining that people in most need of sanitation services are not active social media users.74

The emphasis on schools and slums in Chennai is not new. Dr. Srinivasan emphasized that the educating children on multiple topics, including voter education and sanitation, leads to cascading benefits; these students will then put pressure on their families to improve their habits and will grow up to be environmentally and socially conscious adults.75 In addition to students, the Chennai Corporation also works with slum dwellers, coordinating with the Slum Clearance Board. Focusing on the environmental health of slums has been a priority at the Chennai Corporation before SBM, and street plays demonstrating the importance of latrine use and hand washing were employed as outreach mechanisms, in concert with the Slum Clearance Board.76 Officials at the

Chennai Corporation noted that while they have expanded their presence in slums, they

72 Interview with Trichy Corporation officials. Trichy, Sep 4, 2018. 73 Interview with Dr. Srinivasan. Chennai, Mar 26, 2019. 74 Interview with Mr. Phanindra Reddy. Chennai, Mar 28, 2019. 75 Interview with Dr. Srinivasan. Chennai, Mar 26, 2019. 76 Interview with SBM team. Chennai, Nov 23, 2018.

100 still find it difficult to enforce fines for littering or open defecation because of interference and threats from local politicians.77

3.5 Administrative Coherence and Horizontal and Intra-Agency Coordination in Tamil Nadu

Besides bureaucratic capacity, inter-agency coordination is impacted by existing silos and hierarchies in public administration in Tamil Nadu. The state government, which has the authority to mandate cooperation between agencies, has not created any formal mechanisms for coordination specifically dedicated to SBM implementation. This is a problem particularly in Chennai because of the administrative division between the

Chennai Corporation and Metro Water. Table 3 summarizes the findings on inter-agency coordination in Chennai Coimbatore and Trichy:

Inter-Agency Chennai Coimbatore Trichy Coordination CMA Ideal Ideal Ideal YES YES YES TNSCB Ideal Ideal Ideal YES NO NO Metro Water Ideal N/A N/A NO TWAD N/A Ideal Ideal NO NO

Black refers to ideal coordination. Red refers to my findings on coordination under SBM during the study period from 2017 to 2019.

Table 3: Summary of inter-agency coordination relationships

This table illustrates how all three municipal corporations are coordinating with the

Commisionerate of Municipal Administration (CMA) to implement SBM, which is not a

77 Interview with SBM team. Chennai, Nov 23, 2018.

101 new relationship.78 The Chennai Corporation has built on its existing relationship with the Tamil Nadu Slum Clearance Board (TNSCB), but the Coimbatore and Trichy

Corporations reported no new partnerships for SBM.79 The latter two agencies also reported no new partnerships with the Tamil Nadu Water and Drainage Board (TWAD) for SBM.80 Further, the Chennai Corporation did not report coordinating with Metro

Water to implement SBM.81

When discussing Chennai’s performance in Swachh Survekshan and the certifications it is working toward, the SBM team said that while the city has achieved

ODF status and was working toward ODF+ status, it probably would not be able to attain

ODF++ since it required extensive coordination with Metro Water.82 The ODF+ certification, which is the next level from ODF, focuses on the quality of public and community toilets (SBM ODF Toolkit). ODF++ evaluates a city on how effective its sewage system is, which falls under the purview of Metro Water in Chennai (SBM ODF

Toolkit). The SBM team at the Chennai Corporation said that their connection to Metro

Water was limited, and that they could not ask the organization to coordinate with them.83

Senior Bureaucrat A at the Chennai Corporation also mentioned that before Metro Water can think of coordinating with other agencies, it needed to tackle its many challenges.84

He was referring to Metro Water’s highly publicized failures in water provision in the city, which regularly careens between floods and droughts. Dr. Karen Coelho from the Madras

78 Interview with Ms. D. Vijula. Chennai, Nov 23, 2018; Interview with SBM team. Chennai, Nov 23, 2018; Interview with Trichy Corporation officials. Trichy, May 29, 2019; Phone interview with Coimbatore Corporation officials. Chennai, Jul 3, 2019. 79 Ibid. 80 Interview with Trichy Corporation officials. Trichy, May 29, 2019; Phone interview with Coimbatore Corporation officials. Chennai, Jul 3, 2019. 81 Interview with Ms. D. Vijula. Chennai, Nov 23, 2018; Interview with SBM team. Chennai, Nov 23, 2018. 82 Interview with Ms. D. Vijula. Chennai, Nov 23, 2018; Interview with SBM team. Chennai, Nov 23, 2018. 83 Interview with Ms. D. Vijula. Chennai, Nov 23, 2018; Interview with SBM team. Chennai, Nov 23, 2018. 84 Interview with Senior Bureaucrat A. Chennai Nov 23, 2018.

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Institute of Development Studies added that engineers from both the Corporation and

Metro Water work together at the zonal level, but that the two agencies did not frequently coordinate at the organizational level.85 The lure of ODF++ thus is not powerful enough to encourage coordination between the two agencies, as envisioned by SBM. This lack of coordination bolsters Chibber’s (2012) critique of how fragmented relationships between

Indian agencies are a stumbling block in policy implementation, and his assertion that proper relationships between agencies first need to be established before they start fulfilling their mandate.

Coordination between the Chennai Corporation and the Slum Clearance Board has built on the relationship between the two agencies that existed before SBM. The Health

Department at the Corporation, which oversees SBM implementation in Chennai, is also in charge of school and slum health, the other two targets of behavioral change campaigns in the city as previously mentioned. According to the SBM nodal officer at the Chennai

Corporation, one of the benefits of SBM was the strengthened relationship between the agency and the Slum Clearance Board in improving environmental sanitation in the slums using both supply- and demand-side interventions.86 In Coimbatore and Trichy, coordination with the Slum Clearance Board happens on a project basis, and agencies in both cities reported no specific projects for SBM.

While my fieldwork focused on understanding relationships between agencies under SBM, bureaucrats in Trichy raised the issue of changes within the agency in response to the policy. I then followed up with the other two municipal corporations on possible internal changes. Intra-agency coordination in the three cities also built on

85 Interview with Dr. Karen Coelho. Chennai, Jul 6, 2019. 86 Interview with Ms. D. Vijula. Chennai, Nov 23, 2018.

103 partnerships that existed before SBM. The SBM team in the Health Department and an

Assistant Executive Engineer in the Solid Waste Management Department at the Chennai

Corporation reported that the two have always shared a close relationship, which has been helpful in implementing SBM.87 Similarly, in Coimbatore and Trichy, officials familiar with SBM said that the Solid Waste Management and Engineering Departments have natural overlaps in their work and have worked closely before SBM.88 There was no change in the frequency of meetings between these departments for SBM implementation. Officials in Trichy in charge of SBM did highlight that that the former

Commissioner Mr. N. Ravichandran tasked the entire agency, the Revenue Department in particular because they have the most face time with the public, to help raise awareness among residents about SBM and Swachh Survekshan.89 This was most likely for the question in the citizen feedback part of the indicators that asks residents if they have heard of SBM or the rankings (Appendix C). Further, the Trichy Commissioner ordered an inter-departmental task force in 2018, consisting of eight sanitary officers, executive engineers, and assistant executive engineers, to ensure that the agency would fare better in the 2019 rankings (Karthik 2018). This was in response to its performance in the 2018 rankings, when it lost marks on documentation (Karthik 2018). Other than these changes in Trichy, SBM’s reputational tools have not significantly disrupted coordination patterns between and within agencies.

87 Interview with SBM team. Chennai, Nov 23, 2018; Interview with Assistant Executive Engineer. Chennai, Dec 21, 2018. 88 Interview with Trichy Corporation officials. Trichy, May 29, 2019; Phone interview with Coimbatore Corporation officials. Chennai, Jul 3, 2019. 89 Interview with Trichy Corporation officials. Trichy, Sep 4, 2018.

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3.6 Making National Policies Feel Local: Vertical Coordination Between Cities in Tamil Nadu and the Central Government

SBM’s emphasis on documentation and monitoring has strengthened communication and coordination between the three ULBs in Tamil Nadu and the central government. In a decentralized country with ethnolinguistic and geopolitical fault lines resulting in tensions between North and South India and between Hindi speakers and everyone else, city bureaucrats may not feel a sense of ownership over national-level policies. An official from the Coimbatore Corporation familiar with SBM favorably compared it to JNNURM in promoting vertical coordination between city agencies and the central government.90 They noted that under JNNURM, city bureaucrats would mechanically implement central government policies since it was included in their list of tasks. SBM was different. The policy’s advertising materials for ULBs were published in a variety of regional languages, not just in Hindi and English, making it easier for bureaucrats to study them in their language of choice.91 Mr. Kowshik Ganesh from Athena

Infonomics, a global development consultant organization, reinforced this perspective and added that unlike JNNURM, SBM provided rigorous guidelines for data collection for agencies.92 These documents can largely be found online on the various SBM Urban websites, and cover a wide variety of topics from uploading the necessary data to the

Swachh Survekshan Management Information System, preparation for direct observation visits, and navigating SBM’s portals to apply for the various certifications. SBM administrators have also used WhatsApp to create an online community for key SBM bureaucrats in municipal corporations across India as a platform to exchange reports on

90 Interview with Coimbatore Corporation officials. Coimbatore, Dec 11, 2018. 91 Ibid. 92 Interview with Mr. Kowshik Ganesh. Chennai, Mar 25, 2019.

105 best practices and to remind agencies of upcoming deadlines for document submission.93

The Coimbatore Corporation official declared that these efforts to respect context sensitivity in policy implementation have helped in bridging the psychological distance between New Delhi and Tamil Nadu, and in acknowledging the prominent role of local bureaucracies in implementation.94 Through mandating regular uploading of data on the

SBM portal and sending direct observation teams for Swachh Survekshan to coordinate with ULBs, the central government has improved its communication with city bureaucracies through the expansion of vertical accountability mechanisms.

Vertical coordination between agencies in Tamil Nadu and the central government has been particularly prominent in solid waste management because of the 2016 Solid

Waste Management Rules from the Ministry of Environment, Forests, and Climate

Change and the emergence of the National Green Tribunal as a powerful force in disciplining entities that flout these guidelines. In 2018, the Indian Supreme Court cracked down on states which did not frame its own solid waste guidelines, as directed by the 2016 Rules (Sambyal 2018; “No Construction” 2018). The court stopped construction activities in some states and imposed fines on others, including Tamil Nadu, deeming their failure to comply with the order from the Ministry, “pathetic” (“No Construction”

2018). This motivated the Tamil Nadu state government to develop its own solid waste management guidelines in the same year (TN Govt Gazette 2018; Gautham 2019;

Sambyal 2018b). Officials at the Chennai and Trichy Corporations overseeing SBM pointed to the helpfulness of these rules and guidelines in overhauling solid waste

93 Interview with Coimbatore Corporation officials. Coimbatore, Dec 11, 2018. 94 Interview with Coimbatore Corporation officials. Coimbatore, Dec 11, 2018.

106 management in their cities.95 The Chennai Corporation finished the revision of its solid waste by-laws in 2019, in response to the national-level and state-level rules and guidelines.

Officials at the Trichy Corporation said that trust between the agency and the public significantly improved under changes in solid waste management rules triggered by SBM.96 For example, they pointed to their extensive rollout of household-level waste segregation efforts, which combined behavioral change education for households and expanding the capacity of ward-level waste collection and processing facilities. This change in perception of the Trichy Corporation is an example of how the implementation of waste segregation highlighted the professional competence of the agency in the eyes of the public, improving the technical dimension of its reputation. Mr. Subburaman from the Scope NGO in Trichy emphasized that the reciprocity of the public in Trichy in appreciating and cooperating with the agency’s initiatives has helped “habitualize” solid waste management within the Corporation, which will continue even after SBM has ended.97 This “habitualization” is a result of the national-level push to address solid waste from the National Green Tribunal combined with the interest in the sector demonstrated by the former Trichy Commissioner Mr. Ravichandran that was strengthened by SBM’s mandate. The agency indeed has gone on to incorporate solid waste management priorities in the implementation of other policies, like its Smart Cities project on bio- mining at the Ariyamangalam dump. Further, after he was transferred to the Avadi

Corporation in late 2019 as its Commissioner, Mr. Ravichandran has continued to

95 Interview with Assistant Executive Engineer, Chennai Corporation. Chennai, Dec 21, 2018; Interview with Trichy Corporation officials. Trichy, May 29, 2019. 96 Interview with Trichy Corporation officials. Trichy, Sep 4, 2018. 97 Interview with Mr. M. Subburaman. Trichy, May 29, 2019.

107 integrate his commitment to solid waste management by introducing plogging to the running groups in the area, and by overseeing behavioral change campaigns to promote source segregation and home composting (Figures 10 and 11).

Figure 10: Post on plogging from the Commissioner’s Twitter account, dated Jan 4, 2020

Figure 11: Post on solid waste management activities from the Commissioner’s Twitter account, dated Dec 12, 2019

108

Officials at the Trichy Corporation also identified the role of the National Green

Tribunal in motivating solid waste management activities in Tamil Nadu.98 They noted that the Tribunal has become more active since 2017 in monitoring how cities are managing solid waste under SBM. Effective and scientific management of solid waste is a top priority in the Tribunal, which ordered the Joint Secretary of SBM at MoHUA in 2018 to explain why the 2016 Rules were failing to address India’s burgeoning waste problem

(NDTV 2018). The enhanced focus on effective solid waste management by the Tribunal has increased the pressure on SBM and city agencies to address this challenge at the ground level. Together with the monitoring by national-level administrators, the National

Green Tribunal helps bridge the administrative space between city agencies and the central government, making national policies feel more local.

3.7 Concluding Remarks

In Chennai, the lack of coordination between the municipal corporation and Metro

Water is related to administrative incoherence, that was not impacted by the SBM indicators and rankings. However, the policy did provide an opportunity for the Chennai

Corporation to strengthen its existing relationship with the Slum Clearance Board to work on slum health interventions. In Coimbatore and Trichy, there were no new projects reported with the Water and Drainage Board or the Slum Clearance Board for SBM, again indicating the lack of administrative coherence within the state. SBM’s reputational

98 Interview with Trichy Corporation officials. Trichy, May 29, 2019.

109 devices had no effect here either. In all three cities, there were no state-driven efforts to address inter-agency coordination to fulfill SBM’s aims.

The usage of social media differed across the three cities. Trichy was the most enthusiastic about it, although its social media presence had limited reach. If the agency is not reaching a significant proportion of the city’s population through its YouTube and

Twitter presence, then who is its intended audience? The Trichy Corporation’s social media presence suggests that, at least online, the primary audience that is being privileged in the implementation of SBM are the SBM administrators who are awarding marks for the use of social media in the rankings. On the other end of the spectrum, the Chennai

Corporation viewed social media outreach in SBM as a questionable tool for behavioral change, and not as a reputational strategy for the city rankings. The audiences prioritized here, given the Chennai Corporation’s decision to focus on in-person behavioral change campaigns, are schools and slums where these campaigns are organized. In terms of social media usage, the Coimbatore Corporation was in the middle with a Twitter and Facebook presence, but posted sporadically for SBM.

The three cases also highlight how reputational strategies can exacerbate extant institutional weaknesses. Maintaining a social media presence and collecting documentation for the Swachh Survekshan indicators under SBM add to the existing workload of agencies, and do not necessarily lead to coordination attempts with other agencies or to improved sanitation outcomes on the ground. This is partly a result of the policy framing a “thick” sector like sanitation in terms of multiple “thin” tasks, ranging from app and social media usage to the range of indicators in the city rankings that seek to measure everything from the welfare of sanitation workers and slum beautification projects to waste segregation and the quality of public toilets. SBM may seek to uplift and

110 overhaul sanitation in India, but reputational devices are mere Band Aids on the bullet wounds already embedded in urban sanitation governance in the country.

111

4| AGENCY-NGO COORDINATON IN TAMIL NADU

4.1 Introduction

Unlike previous sanitation policies, SBM has emphasized how sanitation is a shared social responsibility in India, highlighting the role of non-governmental actors in rolling out sanitation reforms in concert with the municipal corporations tasked to implement SBM. In this chapter, I explore if and how agencies in the three cities coordinate with NGOs. During my fieldwork period, there were no sanitation NGOs in

Chennai. In Coimbatore, there is an existing network of water, sanitation, and environmental NGOs that work closely with the municipal corporation. I interviewed three NGOs in this network that predominantly focus on toilet construction and usage and solid waste management: RAAC, Toilet First, and No Dumping. There were two additional NGOs I spoke with that were oriented toward lake restoration efforts, but were heavily involved in the network’s SBM initiatives. In Trichy, I interviewed the two main sanitation NGOs - Gramalaya and Scope. In all three cities, different aspects of historical context emerged as explanations for agency-NGO coordination or non-coordination.

These aspects included prioritizing private sector partnerships in urban development, city identity, and a history of environmental activism that predates SBM. In Coimbatore and

Trichy, matching between the agency’s solid waste management priorities and NGOs’ expertise was an issue in determining coordination. Further, political interference in the

Coimbatore Corporation has led to an empowered NGO network in the city, strengthened by both SBM’s sanitation mandate and senior bureaucrats at the agency. During my fieldwork period, Tamil Nadu did not have any mayors or ward councilors. According to

112 the NGOs and bureaucrats in the three cities, the impact of public representatives on sanitation implementation was mixed before SBM.

4.2 Political Meddling and Embedded NGOs in Coimbatore

During my first visit to Coimbatore for fieldwork in July 2018, I heard the phrase

“political interference” repeatedly from NGO leaders in the city, darkly uttered with a meaningful look. I was perplexed by the ominous vagueness until I asked NGO Leader A to kindly clarify who exactly was interfering in what, why, and how.99 His explanation revealed that the city was under the control of one man. The man turned out to be

Coimbatore’s Lord Voldemort, Mr. S.P. Velumani.100 He is currently the State Minister for Municipal Administration, Rural Development, and Implementation of Special

Programs, and an MLA for the Thondamuthur constituency in Coimbatore. Mr. Velumani is also a member of the AIADMK, the party currently in power in Tamil Nadu, and is on the board of Metro Water in Chennai. His diverse set of affiliations in state and local politics and city bureaucracies render him a powerful force in Tamil Nadu.

NGO Leaders A and B and officials at the Coimbatore Corporation familiar with water and sanitation projects described how Mr. Velumani’s influence has hobbled the agency’s ability to improve sanitation under SBM.101 While the Corporation has announced several initiatives to expand solid waste management since the policy went into effect, the agency has not followed through on improving service provision

(Madhavan 2019). This resulted in Coimbatore’s ranking in Swachh Survekshan 2019 slipping from 16th in 2017 and 2018 to 40th place (Swachh Survekshan 2019 website). The

99 Interview with NGO Leader A. Coimbatore, Aug 21, 2018. 100 Lord Voldemort is the main villain in the popular Harry Potter series written by J.K. Rowling. 101 Interview with NGO Leader A. Coimbatore, Aug 21, 2018; Interview with NGO Leader B. Coimbatore, Aug 22, 2018. Interview with Coimbatore Corporation officials. Coimbatore, Dec 11, 2018.

113 decline in the city’s position prompted a blame game between officials and civic activists.

The agency claimed that the lack of public participation in the citizen feedback indicators, measuring user engagement and happiness with the app and residents’ perceptions of improvements in cleanliness in their neighborhoods, caused Coimbatore to perform badly

(Ramkumar 2019). On the other hand, civic leaders argued that the complaints lodged in the app were not addressed promptly, most people did not even know about it, and that the Corporation did not effectively maintain public toilets and improve waste collection to warrant a higher ranking (Ramkumar 2019; Madhavan 2019).

One reason for the agency’s inability to expand service provision is the administrative silos between the City Health Officer and the City Engineer discussed in

Chapter 3 that hinder the procurement of necessary equipment (Madhavan 2019). NGO

Leaders A and B and officials at the Coimbatore Corporation also pointed to the role of political interference in limiting the agency’s activities. Comparing themselves to Trichy, which has been consistently ranked the cleanest city in the state in the rankings, they declared that the lack of political interference with the Trichy Corporation has allowed it the autonomy to fully implement the Swachh Survekshan indicators and gain the most marks. In contrast, they asserted that in solid waste, the agency in Coimbatore has been forced to operate with half the number of trucks and workers it needs because the

Commissioner’s decisions are subject to Mr. Velumani’s approval.102 While Coimbatore has the resources and bureaucratic will to invest in hiring additional sanitation workers and waste collection and segregation vehicles for SBM, it is unable to do so because it is not in the personal and financial interests of the politician and his cronies. Gupta (2017)

102 Interview with NGO Leader A. Coimbatore, Aug 21, 2018; Interview with NGO Leader B. Coimbatore, Aug 22, 2018. Interview with CCMC officials. Coimbatore, Dec 11, 2018.

114 presents a typology of corruption in contemporary India in four major sectors: land, infrastructure construction, sale of public assets, and welfare and defense programs. He argues that in the case of infrastructure development, construction projects like roads, airports, and stadiums are more susceptible to rent extraction because of kickbacks that can be collected during the bidding process and the political act of land acquisition (Gupta

2017). Sanitation interventions like hiring more workers and buying garbage trucks, while open to being an avenue for corruption, may be less profitable compared to construction ventures.

Perhaps coincidentally, the Madras High Court is currently investigating Mr.

Velumani for corruption on the basis of petitions filed by the Organizing Secretary of the

DMK, the opposition party in the state, and Arappor Iyakkam, an NGO (Imranullah

2019). He has been accused of awarding 349 civil contracts to firms run by his friends and family through his influence over municipal corporations from 2014 to 2018 (Imranullah

2019; Sureshkumar 2019; Lobo 2018). NGO Leaders A and B and Coimbatore

Corporation officials claimed that the penalty for going against Mr. Velumani’s wishes in the agency would result in the reassignment of senior bureaucrats to less prestigious positions, dampening their career trajectories within the civil service. This is consistent with Iyer and Mani’s (2007; 2012) insight that Indian politicians often use transfers as a tool to exert control over bureaucrats, effectively calcifying bureaucracies’ independent decision-making power.

In response to political meddling in the Corporation, the network of environmental sanitation NGOs has become more prominent in sanitation interventions in Coimbatore, empowered by SBM’s national and local campaigns and supported by senior Corporation bureaucrats. These organizations are part of a vast group of NGOs in the area that focus

115 on various urban environmental justice issues spanning food justice and road improvements to cleaning up lakes and expanding urban forests, with an emphasis on entrepreneurship and start-ups, reinforcing Coimbatore’s identity as a business-forward city.103 Some of the prominent NGOs in environmental sanitation are the Residents

Awareness Association of Coimbatore (RAAC), No Dumping, and Toilet First. RAAC has been a driving force in helping the Corporation implement SBM, and has partnered with sanitary inspectors and workers to organize mass cleaning activities in busy locations in

Coimbatore, like the Coimbatore Junction Railway Station and the Ukkadam bus stand

(RAAC website). The organization has also conducted awareness campaigns to increase residents’ knowledge of the Swachhata app with mass app downloading events and workshops and SBM e-learning awareness held in schools and colleges (RAAC website).104

Besides leading interventions, RAAC, more specifically, Mr. R. Raveendran, the

Honorary Secretary of the organization, serves as an informal liaison between the

Corporation and the Coimbatore NGO network to design and implement sanitation interventions with the assistance of the Corporation (Srinivasan 2013).105 I met Mr.

Raveendran in his office at Cardwell Manufacturing, a firm that makes fabric processing machines. During our interview, he described how the NGOs in the city are close-knit and support one another by sharing resources, expertise, and volunteers. He said that there were no ego problems between NGO leaders in Coimbatore, and that they recognize the

103 Interview with Ms. Vijayalakshmi Murali. Coimbatore, Jul 16, 2018; Interview with Mr. R. Raveendran. Coimbatore, Aug 21, 2018; Interview with Ms. Timple Luloo. Coimbatore, Aug 22, 2018; Interview with Mr. Rajesh Subburaj. Coimbatore, Dec 10, 2018; Interview with Ms. Anusha Ananthakrishnan. Coimbatore, Dec 12, 2018. 104 Interview with Mr. R. Raveendran. Coimbatore, Aug 21, 2018. 105 Interview with Mr. R. Raveendran. Coimbatore, Aug 21, 2018.

116 value of collective action. This sentiment was also echoed by Ms. Vijayalakshmi Murali and Ms. Timple Luloo, fellow environmental leaders.106 RAAC functions similarly to a business incubator. People interested in working in the environmental sector in

Coimbatore approach RAAC or Mr. Raveendran, who advises them on how to develop their NGO or start-up and how to work with the Corporation. These nascent organizations are then mentored by RAAC for one year, which provides them with resources like meeting spaces and access to funds. After a year, the new NGOs are usually on firmer footing and join the NGO network.

One such NGO is No Dumping, a waste management organization specializing in waste segregation and processing. Mr. Prashanth and Mr. Saran Raj established the NGO with Mr. Raveendran’s help, which now serves 43 residential communities, 4200 houses, and the Coimbatore Airport (No Dumping website). It collects 5 tons of segregated waste a day, processes it, and sells inorganic, combustible, and non-recyclable waste to ACC

Cement as an alternative source of fuel (No Dumping website).107 No Dumping also conducts behavioral change workshops in solid waste management.108 I met Mr.

Prashanth in the Advanced Solid and Liquid Resource Management (ASLRM) Shed outside of Coimbatore, where he is working with a Town Panchayat to improve its door- to-door waste collection, segregation, and processing capacity. He showed me around the

Shed and explained the different technologies No Dumping is employing to bring sustainable waste management to the area, like vermicomposting and efficient, scalable processes to turn organic waste into biogas. I asked Mr. Prashanth how SBM had

106 Interview with Ms. Vijayalakshmi Murali. Coimbatore, Jul 16, 2018; Interview with Ms. Timple Luloo. Coimbatore, Aug 22, 2018. 107 Interview with Mr. Prashanth. Coimbatore, Aug 20, 2018. 108 Interview with Ms. Roopa Prasanth. Coimbatore, Aug 22, 2018.

117 impacted his work, and his answer was surprising. He declared that the extensive news coverage on SBM and the attendant sanitation “revolution” had convinced him to enter the waste entrepreneurship sector when he graduated from college in 2016. Along with

NGO Leaders C and D who are waste management experts and familiar with No

Dumping’s efforts, Mr. Prashanth asserted that celebrities’ and national politicians’ interest in SBM and the publicity generated by city rankings had energized the solid waste management sector in the city, and had made households more receptive to behavioral change campaigns targeting waste segregation.109 Without SBM as a catalyst, they felt that

No Dumping would neither have existed nor grown.

Mr. Prashanth also acknowledged the support of the former Commissioner of the

Coimbatore Corporation, Dr. K. Vijayakarthikeyan, for legitimizing the work of the NGO and sharing the agency’s resources with the organization.110 No Dumping, for instance, uses the Corporation’s composting facilities for its organic waste. All the NGO leaders I spoke with in Coimbatore extolled Dr. Vijayakarthikeyan, declaring him “a friend to the

NGOs,” without any prompting from me about their relationships with the Corporation.111

NGO Leaders A and B and Mr. Rajesh Subburaj from the Tamil Nadu Urban Sanitation

Support Program explained that as a trained medical doctor, the former Commissioner had a keen interest in implementing public health interventions in the city, which was

109 Interview with Mr. Prashanth. Coimbatore, Aug 20, 2018; Interviews with NGO Leaders C and D. Coimbatore, Aug 23, 2018. 110 There were two periods of bureaucratic reassignments in 2019 in the state that moved around senior bureaucrats. The current Commissioner of CCMC is Mr. J. Sravan Kumar, who assumed this post in Feb 2019, taking over from Dr. K. Vijayakarthikeyan. 111 Interview with Ms. Vijayalakshmi Murali. Coimbatore, Jul 16, 2018; Phone interview with Mr. Selvaraj. Chennai, Aug 16, 2018; Interview with Mr. Prashanth. Coimbatore, Aug 20, 2018; Interview with Mr. R. Raveendran. Coimbatore, Aug 21, 2018; Interview with NGO Leader A. Coimbatore, Aug 21, 2018; Interview with Ms. Roopa Prasanth. Coimbatore, Aug 21, 2018; Interview with Ms. Timple Luloo. Coimbatore, Aug 22, 2018; Interview with NGO Leader B. Coimbatore, Aug 22, 2018; Interview with NGO Leaders C and D. Coimbatore, Aug 23, 2018; Interview with Mr. Roosevelt. Coimbatore, Aug 24, 2018.

118 galvanized by SBM’s emphasis on environmental sanitation.112 They also noted that since the Coimbatore Corporation’s autonomy was constrained by Mr. Velumani, the former

Commissioner and other senior bureaucrats were active in championing the efforts of

NGOs’ in improving sanitation. For example, senior bureaucrats often attend behavioral change campaigns held by NGOs and events to clean up litter in various parts of the city, joining in the clean-up efforts with residents.113

In toilet construction, Dr. Vijayakarthikeyan led the establishment of Toilet First, a non-profit backed by the Corporation and NGO leaders aimed at crowdfunding toilets for poor households in the city in 2016 (Toilet First Facebook page; Sivaswamy 2016).

NGO Leader A explained that the Commissioner tried to circumvent politics at the agency by giving it to entrepreneurs instead of contractors.114 SBM’s philosophy of sanitation as a shared responsibility is operationalized in the structure for financing toilets; the central government contributes Rs. 4,000 for each individual household toilet, state governments pay a minimum of Rs. 2,667, and the rest of the funds are supposed to come from ULBs, beneficiaries, private sector participation, and CSR funds (SBM Guidelines

2017). The general estimate given by NGO Leader A and Sanitation Consultant A for the total cost of constructing a household toilet in Coimbatore is between Rs. 18,000 and Rs.

20,000, making toilets a significant investment even with SBM subsidies.115 To address this, Toilet First requested funding from corporations and community organizations to construct toilets for low income households in true SBM fashion - an attractive logo,

112 Interview with NGO Leader A. Coimbatore, Aug 21, 2018; Interview with NGO Leader B. Coimbatore, Aug 22, 2018; Interview with Mr. Rajesh Subburaj. Coimbatore, Dec 10, 2018. 113 Interview with Mr. Raveendran. Coimbatore, Aug 21, 2018; Interview with NGO Leader A. Coimbatore, Aug 21, 2018; Interview with NGO Leader B. Coimbatore, Aug 22, 2018. 114 Interview with NGO Leader A. Coimbatore, Aug 21, 2018. 115 Interview with NGO Leader A. Coimbatore, Aug 21, 2018; Interview with Sanitation Consultant A. Coimbatore, Aug 23, 2018.

119 extensive social media outreach, a Toilet First app, and a pithy motto (“Let’s Fund

Together, Build Together, Unite Together) (Sivaswamy 2016). The organization then rallied civil engineering students from the numerous universities in Coimbatore and framed its construct-a-thons as a way to gain hands-on building skills.116 Besides, constructing almost 2,500 household toilets in the city, the nonprofit also provided behavioral change education for users (Toilet First Facebook page).

Toilet First is an example of how senior bureaucrats at the Coimbatore Corporation manage to circumvent political meddling and support NGOs. Political interference in the agency has also created embedded NGOs in Coimbatore - NGOs with strong ties to the bureaucracy, community, and business. The embedded NGO is a twist on Peter Evans’s

(1995) concept of embedded autonomy, which describes “a concrete set of connections” between a developmental state and significant social groups which share a similar vision for societal transformation (p. 59). In Coimbatore, however, the embedded autonomy does not refer to the state - in this case the hobbled agency - but to the NGO network empowered by senior bureaucrats and its professional business ties. NGO leaders in

Coimbatore, unlike in Trichy, largely own their own businesses in Coimbatore’s major industries, in addition to being activists. For example, Mr. Raveendran is Managing

Director of Cardwell Manufacturing, Ms. Luloo runs her own ayurvedic practice, and Ms.

Murali and her family own a jewelry business (Dubey 2015).117 Ms. Vanitha Mohan, Vice

President of RAAC and co-founder of Siruthuli, a water resource management NGO, is the Chairman of Pricol Limited. Pricol is a large, Coimbatore-based automotive parts

116 Interview with Sanitation Consultant A. Coimbatore, Aug 23, 2018. 117 Interview with Ms. Vijayalakshmi Murali. Coimbatore, Jul 16, 2018; Interview with Mr. Prashanth. Coimbatore, Aug 20, 2018; Interview with Mr. R. Raveendran. Coimbatore, Aug 21, 2018; Interview with Ms. Timple Luloo. Coimbatore, Aug 22, 2018.

120 manufacturer, and Ms. Mohan also heads their CSR division (WEF 2014). Mr. Prashanth straddles both the business and NGO side of things in No Dumping in his capacity as a self-described waste entrepreneur, reflecting the entrepreneurial bent of the city. This is reminiscent of Connors (2007)’s findings that “elite NGOs,” or NGOs founded by professionals and scholars, are at the forefront of bottom-up societal change. In contrast, the leaders of Gramalaya and Scope, the two NGOs in Trichy, are experts in water, sanitation, hygiene, and rural development.118 The Coimbatore NGOs’ embeddedness in the business community enables them to fund their sanitation projects by leveraging CSR sponsorship, and not having to rely on the Corporation for capital. This is particularly helpful in SBM implementation that relies on private sector participation to complement funds from the central and state governments (SBM Guidelines 2017).

In comparison to Chennai and Trichy, Coimbatore was the only city in which NGO leaders generously offered to connect me with officials at the Corporation for my study.

Mr. Raveendran, Ms. Luloo, and Ms. Murali all had relationships with bureaucrats at different levels, from their ward supervisors to the Commissioner at the agency’s headquarters. They have developed these connections based on their NGOs’ work, and they reach out to the Corporation as needed to smooth the path for their efforts, like obtaining permits to hold events or requesting the relevant officials’ approval in using the agency’s resources, like the compost yard in the case of No Dumping.119 In concert with the senior bureaucrats’ support of their work, NGOs in Coimbatore have intimate

118 Interview with Mr. Sai Damodaran. Trichy, Sep 5, 2018; Interview with Mr. Subburaman. Trichy, May 29, 2019. 119 Interview with Ms. Vijayalakshmi Murali. Coimbatore, Jul 16, 2018; Interview with Mr. Prashanth. Coimbatore, Aug 20, 2018; Interview with Mr. R. Raveendran. Coimbatore, Aug 21, 2018; Interview with Ms. Timple Luloo. Coimbatore, Aug 22, 2018.

121 knowledge of how the agency functions and how to work with the agency in implementing sanitation interventions.

Besides having strong relationships with the private sector and the bureaucracy, the NGOs are also well-connected with community groups and the press. RAAC, for example, is based on a residents’ association formed by people living in certain parts of

Coimbatore, like Bharathi Colony, L.B. Colony, and Shringar Nagar (RAAC website). No

Dumping started providing solid waste management services in the city when Ms. Roopa

Prasanth approached them on behalf of her apartment complex, Sunny Side Apartments, to improve the community’s waste segregation, collection, and disposal efforts after reading about their work in the newspaper (No Dumping website).120 Ms. Prasanth later worked with No Dumping as a behavioral change communication expert, conducting awareness campaigns for domestic helpers and implementing household waste audits to evaluate their progress.121 In addition to these ties to social groups, Mr. Raveendran also noted that RAAC works closely with the press to highlight the NGOs’ work in sanitation in Coimbatore and to attract more investments and volunteers from the publicity.122

While Mr. Velumani’s “political influence” haunts the Coimbatore Corporation, the NGOs are at the forefront of environmental sanitation in the city, solidly backed by business, bureaucrats, and residents.

4.3 Toilet v. Trash: Relevance of NGO Expertise in Coimbatore and Trichy

In agency-NGO coordination, the type of expertise the NGO can provide to the bureaucracy matters. In the case of the Orangi Pilot Project (OPP) in Karachi, the NGO

120 Interview with Ms. Roopa Prasanth. Coimbatore, Aug 21, 2018. 121 Interview with Ms. Roopa Prasanth. Coimbatore, Aug 21, 2018. 122 Interview with Mr. R. Raveendran. Coimbatore, Aug 21, 2018.

122 extensively documented sewer lines in the city’s informal settlements using statistics and maps, granular information government agencies and foreign consultants did not possess

(Hasan 2006). The OPP’s work complemented the mandate of the Karachi Water and

Sewerage Board and the Sindh Katchi Abadi Authority (agency in charge of informal settlements), and increased its credibility with city, provincial, and national agencies in water and sanitation delivery in Pakistan (Hasan 2006). In Coimbatore and Trichy, the relevance of the NGOs’ expertise to the agencies’ SBM priorities impact coordination.

In Coimbatore, the NGO network focuses on both toilet construction and solid waste management with an emphasis on the latter, as evidenced by the discussion above on RAAC, No Dumping, and Toilet First. In addition, the Shunya Project was launched before SBM in 2013 as a pilot to implement zero waste solutions in the city. The

Corporation has invested Rs. 100 crore (USD 13.9 million) in this initiative, with an additional Rs. 85 lakhs (USD 118,000) contributed by AIFORIA, an international agency for sustainability based in the European Union (Madhavan 2013). ICLEI, an international organization dedicated to sustainable development in local government, is helping in implementation. This project aimed to make Ward 23 in Coimbatore a bin-free area; households were encouraged to segregate their waste and sanitation workers at the

Corporation were instructed to provided regular door-to-door collection of waste.123 In addition to SBM, the co-founders of No Dumping were also inspired by the Shunya

Project to pursue careers in waste processing and entrepreneurship (No Dumping website). The Shunya Project was declared a success by the Corporation, and a similar

123 Interview with Mr. Roosevelt. Coimbatore, Aug 24, 2018.

123 effort was implemented in adjoining Wards 22 and 24 in 2017 - this time, funded by the

Swiss Embassy and ICLEI (Times of India 2017).

During my fieldwork from 2017 to 2019, all three Corporations were privileging interventions in solid waste management over toilet construction under SBM. This was initially a surprise to me because the earlier critiques of the policy before I started fieldwork alleged the opposite - that while SBM intended to improve environmental sanitation, its chief operational concern was the frenzied construction of toilets across

India (Kumar 2015; Business Standard 2018; Alexander & Padmanabhan 2019). In

Chennai, Coimbatore, and Trichy, while the Corporations were building household latrines and community and public toilets as dictated by the Swachh Survekshan indicators, they were more enthusiastically pursuing solid waste management. The

Greater Chennai Corporation was in the middle of revising the 2016 solid waste management guidelines in response to SBM to better articulate responsibilities of stakeholders like bulk generators in improving waste collection and disposal in the city.124

Trichy and Coimbatore were attempting to implement 100% door-to-door waste collection, and Trichy was focusing on acquiring enough equipment like pushcarts and trucks to build its solid waste management capacity.125 Trichy officials also emphasized the importance of addressing the pollution and health hazards the Ariyamangalam dump yard poses to nearby residents.126

In Coimbatore, the NGOs’ general interest in solid waste management, particularly waste entrepreneurship, dovetails with the agency’s priorities in SBM. Besides the

124 Interview with Assistant Executive Engineer, Greater Chennai Corporation. Chennai, Dec 21, 2018. 125 Interview with Trichy City Corporation officials. Trichy, Sep 4, 2018; Interview with Coimbatore City Municipal Corporation officials. Coimbatore, Dec 11, 2018. 126 Interview with Trichy City Corporation officials. Trichy, May 29, 2019.

124 political meddling in the bureaucracy that has resulted in embedded NGOs, the organizations’ expertise in solid waste complements the agency’s agenda. However, the situation in Trichy is the opposite. Gramalaya and Scope both focus on water, sanitation, and hygiene interventions, and do not focus on solid waste management. Therefore, while their pre-SBM efforts were lauded by mid-level bureaucrats at the Trichy Corporation for improving access to community and public toilets especially in slums, senior bureaucrats prefer coordinating with RWAs for SBM. I interviewed Mr. Ravichandran, the

Commissioner of the Trichy Corporation, about his agency’s relationships with NGOs.127

He emphasized the Corporation’s innovative ways of using social media, media, and competitions to elicit public interest in SBM’s goals and in Swachh Survekshan, such as the jingle contest on sanitation the agency organized. He also listed the improvements in solid waste management the agency had undertaken, like updating equipment and expanding door-to-door service provision. When I asked him about the importance of

NGOs to Trichy’s success in the Swachh Survekshan rankings, he explicitly said that the agency’s relationships with RWAs were more important under SBM. Given the

Corporation’s solid waste management priorities, it makes sense that coordination with

RWAs is privileged. On the Commissioner’s Twitter account, for example, there are several posts documenting his attendance at various plogging events held by RWAs in the city. A Scandinavian fitness trend I learned of in central Tamil Nadu, plogging refers to the activity of picking up trash while running. The Trichy Commissioner observed this trend on social media and implemented it as part of the city’s SBM efforts.128 Thus, in

Trichy the expertise of Gramalaya and Scope were not seen as directly relevant to the

127 Interview with Mr. N. Ravichandran, Commissioner of Trichy City Corporation. Trichy, May 29, 2019. 128 Interview with Trichy City Corporation officials. Trichy, Sep 4, 2018.

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Corporation’s solid waste management priorities under SBM, in comparison to RWAs, which are key actors in the city’s quest to be garbage-free and bin-free.

4.4 Civic Participation and Coordination: Public-Private Partnerships, City Identity, and Public Representatives

In their empirical studies of NGO-agency relationships in the Indian and Pakistani water and sanitation sector, Connors (2005, 2007), Das (2015), and Hasan (2006) found that civic participation, or the degree of citizen engagement in democratic mechanisms that keep the public sector accountable, functions as a source of checks and balances to agencies. Across the three cities, three facets of civic participation emerged in agency-

NGO coordination: the championing of public-private partnerships (PPPs) in Tamil Nadu over NGOs in sanitation, city identity and environmental activism, and the capacity for public representatives to mediate between agencies and the public.

Public-Private Partnerships v. NGOs: The Rise and Fall of Exnora in Chennai

SBM did not introduce Chennai to the importance of solid waste management. In

1989, Mr. M.B. Nirmal started Civic Exnora, an NGO that emphasized source segregation in households and composting organic waste to address the city’s mounting garbage problems (Sridhar 2013). By the 1990s, it had emerged as one of the biggest environmental movements in India, with over 3,000 branches across the country

(Shekhar 1996). In Exnora, Mr. Nirmal emphasized the importance of community ownership of streets, and implemented door-to-door collection of waste with a household user fee in many areas around Chennai, cutting across income and class divisions (Sridhar

2013; Shekhar 1996). A “street beautifier” on a modified pushcart regularly collected trash on participating streets, and deposited them at the Corporation’s designated transfer

126 station (Sridhar 2013). The organization also relied on volunteers, and attracted the attention and involvement of several celebrities in the city like movie director Mani

Ratnam and actress Suhasini (Shekhar 1996). Mr. Nirmal underscored the importance of coordination with the Chennai Corporation, noting that Exnora was “not [a rival] of civic authorities. [Their] efforts [were] microcosmic because [they] still need the Corporation to haul the tons of garbage and build roads” (Mr. Nirmal in Shekhar 1996). While the

Corporation did not always share this collegiate sentiment and often viewed Exnora as a trespasser on their turf, Mr. Nirmal’s diplomacy and acknowledgement of the agency’s previous efforts in supporting the NGO defused tensions between the two (Shekhar 1996).

By 1996-1997, the organization was collecting 20 percent of the 3,000 tons of solid waste the city was generating and encouraging source segregation and zero waste behavior in households (Akshatha 2017; Shekhar 1996; Sridhar 2013).

However, as Sridhar (2013) notes, Exnora was a revolution in solid waste in

Chennai that almost happened. In 2000, the Chennai Corporation hired CES Onyx, a private contractor as a service provider in some parts of the city (Sridhar 2013; Akshatha

2017). While Exnora was ready to work with Onyx, Mr. Nirmal realized that their

“ideologies” were very different (Sridhar 2013). Onyx mixed segregated waste during collection and did not charge user fees, leading to a decline in the level of interest residents felt about waste segregation and ownership of their streets (Sridhar 2013;

Akshatha 2017). Exnora’s influence in Chennai and across India dimmed, and the NGO is no longer a major service provider. However, Mr. Nirmal’s expertise has been useful in the revived interest in solid waste management in Tamil Nadu since the mid-2010s. The co-founders of No Dumping, for instance, trained with Mr. Nirmal before launching their organization (No Dumping website).

127

This turn towards private contractors around 2000 impacted the role of NGOs as service providers in both solid waste management and toilet construction in Chennai. In my interview with Sulabh International, a prominent national sanitation NGO in India that focuses on sanitation and human rights, its officials in Chennai said that they were no longer active participants in the city’s sanitation efforts.129 About thirty to forty years ago, Sulabh assisted the Corporation in building a few hundred public toilets and was in charge of operation and maintenance until the 2000s, when the agency switched to private contractors. Currently, they are focusing their efforts on constructing toilets and implementing behavioral change programs on sanitation and hygiene in schools outside of Chennai.

In Chennai, the current absence of major NGOs in environmental sanitation provision can be partly attributed to the privileging of the private sector over NGOs in sanitation infrastructure in Tamil Nadu since the 2000s. As the capital city and the seat of state bureaucrats and politicians, the valorization of private sector participation is particularly tenacious in Chennai. Senior Bureaucrat B who is familiar with infrastructure development in the state questioned the incentives of NGOs to remain committed to sanitation provision, compared to the private sector that is driven by financial profit.130

The bureaucrat declared that monetary incentives would encourage improvements in service quality and was confused about what motivates sanitation NGOs to be efficient service providers. Similarly, NGOs have also turned to the private sector for support in

Tamil Nadu. Mr. Damodaran noted that corporate sponsors approach Gramalaya to fund their programs.131 The behavioral change workshop I attended for school teachers, for

129 Interview with Sulabh International officials. Chennai, Dec 4, 2018. 130 Interview with Senior Bureaucrat B. Chennai, Dec 6, 2018. 131 Interview with Mr. Sai Damodaran. Trichy, Sep 5, 2018.

128 instance, was sponsored by Merrill Lynch (Figure 12). Officials at the Trichy Corporation also mentioned that the prizes given out for their various SBM-related competitions held in schools were funded by local businesses.132 Thus, the allure of the private sector has animated both the public sector and NGOs.

Figure 12: School Teachers’ Training on Washman. Conducted by Gramalaya and co-sponsored by Merrill Lynch. Suvai Meeting Hall, Trichy, Sep 6, 2018

City Identity and Sanitation Activism

“You are nobody in Chennai.”133 Senior Bureaucrat B, who is familiar with infrastructure implementation across different Tamil Nadu cities, declared that given the city’s large size and demographic profile there is no coherent city identity or sense of belonging. He described how people in Chennai come from all over India and the world to make money, and feel no ownership over their space because many view it as a transient place. Comprising migrants from Northeastern India looking for jobs to Korean expats

132 Interview with Trichy City Corporation officials. Trichy, Sep 4, 2018. 133 Interview with Senior Bureaucrat B. Chennai, Dec 6, 2018.

129 who work for Hyundai, Chennai’s population is both socioeconomically and ethnically diverse compared to Coimbatore and Trichy. This demographic mixture and lack of place- based ownership makes it difficult for residents to organize around common social goals, unlike the SHGs in Trichy’s slums. Here, SBM’s public communication efforts have made little impact on addressing the need for a coherent city identity to encourage the grassroots revolution the policy envisions. While officials at the Chennai Corporation reported a little more interest in solid waste management activities from existing community groups, SBM has not prompted the creation of sanitation NGOs or community groups representing a broad coalition of residents to advocate for better environmental sanitation provision in the city.134

The link between city identity and civic participation in sanitation efforts was reinforced most strongly in Coimbatore by NGO leaders. Mr. Prashanth, Mr. Raveendran,

Ms. Prasanth, Ms. Murali, Ms. Timple declared that one of the primary reasons for the city’s relative success in SBM’s rankings compared to Chennai and Trichy is the history of environmental activism in Coimbatore that is rooted in feelings of ownership and civic pride.135 When I asked Ms. Murali why there were so many environmental activists in

Coimbatore compared to Chennai or even Trichy, she looked at me fairly blankly and stated simply, “This is our city. We care about it.”136 Mr. Raveendran expanded on this point, noting that unlike people living in Chennai, Coimbatore residents have lived in the city for generations and are proud of its environmental and economic resources.137

134 Interview with SBM team. Chennai, Nov 23, 2018; Interview with Dr. Srinivasan. Chennai, Nov 23, 2018. 135 Interview with Ms. Vijayalakshmi Murali. Coimbatore, Jul 16, 2018; Interview with Mr. Prashanth. Coimbatore, Aug 20, 2018; Interview with Mr. R. Raveendran. Coimbatore, Aug 21, 2018; Interview with Ms. Roopa Prasanth. Coimbatore, Aug 21, 2018. Interview with Ms. Timple Luloo. Coimbatore, Aug 22, 2018. 136 Interview with Ms. Vijayalakshmi Murali. Coimbatore, Jul 16, 2018. 137 Interview with Mr. R. Raveendran. Coimbatore, Aug 21, 2018.

130

NGO leaders and Coimbatore Corporation officials traced the roots of the current activism in sanitation to the founding of Siruthuli in 2003, an NGO that was started by

Coimbatore-based corporations to address the area’s severe drought (Siruthuli website).

The Bannari Amman Group of Companies, Pricol Ltd., LMW Group of Companies, ELGI

Group of Companies, and Sri Sankara Eye Society banded together to tackle the city’s water issues (Siruthuli website). These companies represent the major industries in

Coimbatore - automotive parts, textiles, and medical tourism - and are homegrown, indicating their close ties to the city. Siruthuli was successful in rejuvenating the Noyyal

River to help ameliorate drought conditions in the district, and has continued its work in water resource management and raising awareness around afforestation and waste management.138 Mr. Raveendran, who volunteered with Siruthuli before RAAC, emphasized that the NGO inspired a cascade of environmental activism in the region around water, sanitation, food, and forests.139 In addition to a coherent city identity, he stated that the city’s NGO network is fueled by two main groups in the city who are interested in volunteering for environmental causes - students at Coimbatore’s numerous colleges and universities and professionals in the many IT companies in the area. Mr.

Raveendran noted that in comparison to Trichy which has fewer educational institutions,

Coimbatore’s environmental sector is supported by college students. This is evident from

Toilet First, which leveraged the skills of civil engineering students to build low-cost toilets. Mr. Raveendran and Ms. Prasanth also ascribe the relative ease of implementation of SBM’s behavioral change interventions in the city to its history of activism since

138 Interview with Ms. Anusha Ananthakrishnan. Coimbatore, Dec 12, 2018. 139 Interview with Mr. R. Raveendran. Coimbatore, Aug 21, 2018.

131 residents have become conditioned to participating in various environmental campaigns for more than a decade and are therefore more receptive to SBM’s messaging.140

Trichy, too, experienced a pre-SBM sanitation revolution in the 2000s, but for different reasons. Mr. Subburaman from Scope, one of the prominent sanitation NGOs in the city, and Mr. Damodaran from Gramalaya outlined how toilet production became a focus of the Trichy Corporation, complemented by the NGOs’ initiatives.141 In the 2000s, the Collector, Corporation Commissioner, and Police Commissioner were collective policy champions for expanded access to toilets. In concert with the international NGO Water

Aid, the local NGOs and senior bureaucrats worked together to build community toilets and public toilets in the city. At the time, parts of Trichy were classified as rural by the state, which allowed the NGOs to apply for funds from the state government’s self- sufficiency scheme to construct toilets. The Rural Development and Panchayat Raj

Department in the Government of Tamil Nadu has been implementing this scheme to encourage public participation in government projects, and to encourage coordination between community groups and rural agencies (TNRD). Mr. Subburaman noted that in the 2000s, while toilet production and access were being promoted, solid waste management did not receive the same attention. Senior bureaucrats were less interested in it, perhaps because of the specialized expertise of Gramalaya and Scope, and no guidelines existed at the local level to address the city’s trash problems. Under SBM, he stated that the tables have turned in favor of solid waste management. In both Trichy and

140 Interview with Mr. R. Raveendran. Coimbatore, Aug 21, 2018; Interview with Ms. Roopa Prasanth. Coimbatore, Aug 21, 2018. 141 Interview with Mr. Sai Damodaran. Trichy, Sep 5, 2018; Interview with Mr. M. Subburaman. Trichy, May 29, 2019.

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Coimbatore, SBM has helped catalyze existing efforts in sanitation that have built on environmental activism and policy champions in the bureaucracy.

Public Representatives: Help or Hindrance?

Tamil Nadu has not had local elections since 2016, leaving cities and villages without elected representatives and mayors.142 There are several reasons given for this, ranging from administrative ones regarding the delimitation of local bodies to political explanations of the DMK’s and AIADMK’s desire to schedule elections at an opportune time for them (Ramakrishnan 2019). During the period of my study from 2017 to 2019, there were thus no elected representatives. However, many of the interview participants discussed the importance of ward councilors and mayors in sanitation implementation, drawing on previous experiences. Across the three cities, the impact of public representatives on sanitation is mixed.

Senior Bureaucrats A and B both asked me the same rhetorical question: Who holds the power in implementation - bureaucrats or politicians?143 They asserted that in contrast to popular perception, bureaucrats serve at the pleasure of elected officials in

Tamil Nadu, giving them the authority to influence implementation trajectories. When public representatives use this power for good, they can serve as a bridge between the service provider (agency or NGO) and the public, and can monitor agencies to keep them accountable. In the Shunya Project in Coimbatore, Mr. Roosevelt, the Project

Coordinator, highlighted how the ward councilor worked together with the ward supervisor from the Corporation and ICLEI officers to communicate information on

142 At the time of writing this dissertation, the state has announced local elections to be held in rural areas at the end of December 2019, leaving cities without a definite timeline. 143 Interview with Senior Bureaucrat A. Chennai, Nov 23, 2018; Interview with Senior Bureaucrat B. Chennai, Dec 6, 2018.

133 waste segregation to households and commercial establishments.144 The councilor also authorized the Corporation to disconnect the water supply in households that failed to comply after repeated warnings to encourage cooperation. Mr. Roosevelt asserted that without the support of this public representative, it would have been difficult to create sustainable behavioral change in the community around waste segregation. Mr.

Prashanth had a similar story about the Town Panchayat where he currently works. The local official, Dr. D. Ravi, ran for elections on a solid-waste-management-focused platform to address the area’s trash problems and to elevate the status of sanitation among residents.145 In an effort to signal to the community that living next to solid waste management facilities is not a social stigma, he directed the authorities to build a landfill near his house and invested some of his money in it to demonstrate his commitment. Mr.

Prashanth credits him for smoothing the path for No Dumping to implement its solid waste management model in the area.

However, public representatives may also be corrupt. NGO Leader B reported her experience dealing with various ward councilors in Coimbatore.146 When she realized that the councilors were more interested in politics and bribes than serving their constituents, she started circumventing them to approach the Corporation directly for assistance in infrastructure improvements in her neighborhood or her work in lake restoration. When one of the councilors realized that he had no hold over her, he told her neighbors at a public meeting to warn her to “watch out. She’s a woman living alone.”147 NGO Leader B

144 Interview with Mr. Roosevelt. Coimbatore, Aug 24, 2018. 145 Interview with Mr. Prashanth. Coimbatore, Aug 20, 2018. 146 Interview with NGO Leader B. Coimbatore, Aug 22, 2018. 147 Ibid

134 stressed that it was difficult, from her experience, to generalize about the impact elected officials have on sanitation since it is dependent on the individual.

When not threatening environmental activists and receiving bribes, elected representatives can serve as a form of checks and balance to public agencies in the state, similar to Connors (2007) description of how Bangalore’s NGOs issued report cards on the performance of bureaucracies to keep them accountable. Dr. Karen Coelho from the

Madras Institute of Development Studies, Ms. Reeba Devaraj and Dr. Suneethi Sundar from the Tamil Nadu Urban Sanitation Support Program, and Mr. Roosevelt emphasized that bureaucrats at the Corporation need to be monitored by ward councilors and the mayor to maintain or improve service provision in sanitation.148 Ms. Santha Sheela Nair, a retired bureaucrat who previously served at the Municipal Administration and Water

Supply, also underscored local elections as a cornerstone of civic participation in public affairs (Ramakrishnan 2019). Ramakrishnan (2019) directly connects the lack of elected officials to Tamil Nadu’s performance in SBM since 2016. Drawing on interviews with bureaucrats across the state, he posits that Trichy’s declining rank in Swachh Survekshan from 3rd in 2016 to 6th in 2017, 13th in 2018, and 39th in 2019 is associated with the absence of public representatives, hampering improvements in sanitation (Ramakrishnan 2019;

Jaisankar 2019). Here, SBM’s rankings, campaigns, and app have little bearing on public participation that is necessary for the revolution the policy envisions since the primary mechanism for civic participation does not currently exist.

148 Interview with Ms. Reeba Devaraj and Dr. Suneethi Sundar. Chennai, Jul 3, 2019; Interview with Dr. Karen Coelho. Chennai, Jul 6, 2019.

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4.5 Concluding Remarks

Political interference at the Coimbatore Corporation has created a unique situation in the city where senior bureaucrats, constrained by the State Minister for Municipal

Administration, have been championing NGO efforts in rolling out SBM. These NGOs pointed to the effectiveness of the policy’s energetic media and social media campaigns, emphasizing how demand for their services has increased in the city after the introduction of SBM. The difference between toilet construction and usage and solid waste management prominently emerges in this examination of agency-NGO coordination. In

Coimbatore, most of the NGOs were focused on solid waste management, which matched the agency’s priorities. However, in Trichy, Gramalaya’s and Scope’s expertise is in toilet construction and usage, which did not match the municipal corporation’s agenda under

SBM.

Historical context was particularly important in tracing the trajectories of agency-

NGO coordination across the three cities. City identity, a history of environmental activism, matching between NGO expertise and agency priorities, and the turn toward

PPPs in the 2000s all explain how and why agency-NGO coordination in Chennai,

Coimbatore, and Trichy have changed across time. While SBM’s campaigns have catalyzed the efforts of embedded NGOs in Coimbatore, they have not been able to address deeply rooted institutional constraints in the three cities like the loss of autonomy in the Coimbatore Corporation or the effacement of mechanisms for civic participation across the state. Similar to Exnora, SBM is a revolution that almost happened (Sridhar

2013).

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5| DOES A RISING TIDE LIFT ALL BOATS? SBM AND ORGANIZATIONAL REPUTATION

5.1 SBM and Organizational Reputation

Agencies involved in sanitation provision in the Global South have a double- reputation problem, particularly in India; bureaucracies are viewed as corrupt and ineffective, and sanitation is intertwined with class and caste (EPW 2019; Vishwanathan

2012; Coffey et al. 2014; Doron & Jeffrey 2018). In my study, I examined how SBM, a policy that combined aggressive marketing strategies, rankings, and rewards, impacted inter-agency and agency-NGO coordination in urban sanitation in Tamil Nadu. The existing literature on coordination describes the importance of bureaucratic capacity, administrative coherence, bureaucratic autonomy, relevance of NGO expertise, and civic participation (Bach & Wegrich 2018; Pritchett et al. 2010; Andrews et al. 2017; Chibber

2002; Iyer and Mani 2007; Connors 2005; Connors 2007; Pervaiz et al. 2008). I connected these factors with the literature on organizational reputation to examine what drove coordination and if SBM’s reputational devices had any effect on it.

The case of SBM in Tamil Nadu illustrates how reputational tools are no match for existing institutional weaknesses, like weak bureaucratic capacity, administrative incoherence, and political interference. In some cases, the use of these reputational tools can intensify existing institutional features, like increasing the burden of documentation in overloaded agencies. The case thus provides empirical evidence for Maor’s (2015) observations on the potential limits of organizational reputational theories in public administration to explain agency behavior. Examining coordination in Chennai,

137

Coimbatore, and Trichy also sheds light on the importance of tracing historical context in understanding agency-NGO coordination. Across the three cities, city identity, a history of environmental activism, previous partnerships, and agency preference for private sector partners in urban development projects illuminate why NGOs and bureaucracies work together in urban sanitation provision or not.

Inter-Agency Coordination and State Ownership of National Policies

I found that in the three cities coordination here is primarily a function of weak bureaucratic capacity and administrative coherence, reinforcing Pritchett et al.’s (2010) and Chibber’s (2002) insights. SBM’s reputational tools have no impact on incentivizing coordination. Bureaucrats tasked with implementing SBM at the three municipal corporations are also overseeing their city’s existing solid waste management and health needs. Coordination with other agencies, like Metro Water in the case of Chennai, does not fall within their direct purview, recalling Bach & Wegrich’s (2018) assertion that coordination is external to an agency’s priorities that focus on fulfilling its core mandate.

The lack of coordination between the Chennai Corporation and Metro Water also reflects

Chibber’s (2002) critique on the absence of relationships between agencies in India necessary for effective policy implementation. While coordination between Metro Water and the Chennai Corporation occurs at the zonal level, at the organizational level, the two agencies do not frequently coordinate.149

SBM’s public communication tools are no match for these institutional challenges.

The policy’s emphasis on social media usage and the Swachh Survekshan rankings and certifications have exacerbated two aspects of bureaucratic capacity: the burden of

149 Interview with Dr. Karen Coelho. Chennai, Jul 6, 2019.

138 documentation and the “tick-box”150 culture. Appendix C details the indicators in Swachh

Survekshan 2019 that require different types of documentation to be uploaded for evaluation. The amount of documentation required by SBM led the Deputy Commissioner of Health at the Chennai Corporation to ask an SBM administrator if the policy was intended to be about documentation or cleanliness.151 His view was shared by the

Commissioner of the Madurai Corporation who pointed to the importance of documentation and presentation in achieving a high ranking in Swachh Survekshan, noting that missing deadlines for uploading data costs cities marks (“Swachh Survekshan”

2018). This suggests that Swachh Survekshan, while framed as an incentive to encourage agencies to expand their commitment to sanitation, values the ability to document initiatives and meet deadlines - “thin” tasks according to Pritchett (2014) - over the capacity to implement sanitation interventions. Here, the concept of audience from the organizational reputation literature is relevant. The primary audience for municipal corporations in Swachh Survekshan is the administrators defining the parameters of implementation and evaluation. Since the administrators appear to reward the documentation of sanitation efforts over impact of these initiatives, agencies perceive this exercise as an assessment of their ability to meet documentation deadlines over improving sanitation outcomes. Perhaps reconstructing the indicators to measure sanitation outcomes instead of progress in SBM, particularly since the policy was slated to end in 2019, can help in moving the focus away from SBM’s marketing to the core aim of the policy - the improvement of sanitation outcomes on the ground.

150 Phone interview with Mr. Somnath Sen. Chennai, Dec 14, 2018. 151 Madras Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Roadmap to Zero Waste in Chennai. Chennai, Nov 9 and 10, 2018.

139

SBM’s other communication tools, social media and certifications, have resulted in agencies checking off “thin” tasks: Post videos of park beautification? Check. Declare city ODF? Check. Encourage people to use the Swachhata app? Check. The impact of these activities, however, is limited. Bureaucrats acknowledge the difference between ODF in

SBM and “real” ODF, and their online presence does not have a large enough reach to merit the term “public communication.” The agencies’ use of these reputational tools are reminiscent of Pritchett et al.’s (2010) description of isomorphic mimicry in the digital sphere. Swachh Survekshan encourages agencies to adopt social media in sanitation, perhaps to mimic the Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) social-media-based electoral success or to mimic viral social media campaigns worldwide.152 The Chennai Corporation was the only one in the study that questioned the ability of online revolutions to precipitate offline change.

The use of social media and empty ODF declarations highlight the performative and emotional dimensions of reputation, where the visibility of the policy and its unquestioned success are prioritized over improving the relationships within and between agencies to improve sanitation provision. SBM has also used patriotism to heighten emotional responses to its campaigns; its aim to declare India ODF by October

2019 was explicitly linked to the realization of one of the dreams Gandhi had about a clean

India. While the reputational strategies that emphasize performative and emotional dimensions have raised the profile of sanitation in the state, they have not contributed to the institutional reform needed to improve policy implementation.

152 The BJP’s success in the last two elections has been partly attributed to its ability to use social media platforms to communicate to voters and mobilize their supporters (Jha 2017; Thakurta & Sam 2019). Further, SBM’s desire to trigger a sanitation revolution was initiated by Prime Minister Modi’s interest in replicating the ALS ice bucket challenge that went viral online (PTI 2017; Press Trust of India 2014; FE Online 2014).

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My study also highlighted that state ownership of a national policy matters in bureaucratic coordination, and organizational reputation plays a part. Indian states have exercised significant discretion in implementing SBM, exploring different ways of using this policy to enhance their sanitation efforts. Sanitation Consultant A, for instance, highlighted how Andhra Pradesh, another South Indian state, instituted a state-level department called the Swachh Andhra Corporation to smooth the procurement of equipment needed for SBM implementation (Swachh Andhra website; ANI News

2018).153 In contrast, the Tamil Nadu state government has not undertaken any significant efforts at the state level for SBM; there are no inter-agency task forces like the

Chennai River Restoration Trust or entities like the Swachh Andhra Corporation to improve SBM implementation. This could be a result of two factors: 1. The state might be more interested in implementing its own policies over national ones, and 2. The political turmoil Tamil Nadu has experienced since 2016 with the deaths of its two rival political leaders, Ms. J. Jayalalitha and Mr. M. Karunanidhi, has eclipsed its commitment to SBM.

In my interviews, most people agreed that in Tamil Nadu, buy-in at the state level is needed for policy implementation. Ms. Kavita Wankhade, who leads the Tamil Nadu

Urban Sanitation Support Program (TNUSSP), noted that it would not have come into existence without the support of the state government and the Municipal Administration and Water Supply Department (MAWS).154 Ms. Reeba Devaraj and Dr Suneethi Sundar, also from TNUSSP, were in consensus, asserting that state ownership is needed for a national priority to be implemented in the state.155 Interestingly, TNUSSP was launched in 2015, a year after SBM was introduced. Yet, in TNUSSP’s introduction, there is no

153 Interview with Sanitation Consultant A. Coimbatore, Aug 23, 2018. 154 Interview with Ms. Kavita Wankhade. Chennai, Jul 3, 2019. 155 Interview with Ms. Reeba Devaraj and Dr. Suneethi Sundar. Chennai, Jul 3, 2019.

141 mention of its overlaps with SBM. The statement simply says it is intended to help the

“Government of Tamil Nadu in its Tamil Nadu Sanitation Mission” (TNUSSP website).

Dr. Karen Coelho from the Madras Institute of Development Studies also declared that

“the culture of Tamil Nadu bureaucracy does not adopt other agendas easily,” and that “if the top cares, the rest will care.”156 Mr. Phanindra Reddy, the former Principal Secretary of MAWS, was the lone dissenting voice. He argued that the state will always find a way to implement national programs.157

I asked my interviewees if a sanitation policy like SBM could be developed at the state level by the Tamil Nadu government and how it would be different in its implementation. They overwhelmingly agreed that it was possible but an official at the

Coimbatore Corporation was unsure if the political support for sanitation could exist at the state level, like it does at the national level for SBM.158 Mr. Kowshik Ganesh from

Athena Infonomics, a global development consultant firm in Chennai, eloquently summarized how an effective sanitation campaign would be different if it were implemented by the Tamil Nadu government, instead of the central government. He argued that people in the state are proud of their Tamil heritage, and that behavioral change campaigns should leverage this to improve awareness and habits. He described how these campaigns should highlight the richness of Tamil culture and the contributions of ancient Tamil kingdoms to the development of water and sanitation infrastructure in the region. He also declared that famous Kollywood159 stars, like Vijay Sethupathi, should

156 Interview with Dr. Karen Coelho. Chennai, Jul 6, 2019. 157 Interview with Mr. Phanindra Reddy. Chennai, Mar 28, 2019. 158 Phone interview with Coimbatore Corporation officials. Chennai, Jul 3, 2019; Interview with Dr. Srinivasan. Chennai, Mar 26, 2019; Interview with Trichy Corporation officials. Trichy, May 29, 2019; Interview with Mr. Kowshik Ganesh. Chennai, Mar 25, 2019. 159 Kollywood is the Bollywood of Tamil Nadu.

142 be featured in the advertising campaigns to better resonate with people in Tamil Nadu.160

Given the state’s preference for regional political parties that highlight Dravidian and

Tamil culture and values in contrast to national Indian parties, Mr. Ganesh’s remarks emphasize the need for context specificity in “software” strategies.

While the Tamil Nadu government has not created any special inter-agency coordination mechanisms to implement SBM, it does not mean that it does not have the ability to do so. The Chennai River Restoration Trust I mentioned in Chapter 3 is widely acknowledged as one of the more effective inter-agency coordination channels to bring together representatives from different agencies to clean up the city’s rivers. Further, the single-use plastic ban implementation that went into effect in January 2019 was a result of extensive state-wide coordination between different local agencies and the Tamil Nadu

Pollution Control Board.161 The best example of inter-agency coordination as a response to a reputational threat are the monsoon preparedness meetings that bring together representatives from different agencies at the state and local levels after the 2015 floods devastated parts of Chennai. Since then, the state has been hit by two cyclones - Vardah and Gaja- and floods have ravaged the Nilgiris and Cuddalore (Ravishankar 2019). Local agencies were blamed for the loss of life and property by the public, especially during the

2015 Chennai floods when relief and rescue operations were slow-moving and piecemeal

(NDMA; Ravishankar 2019). In response, the state government took the initiative to hold coordination meetings ahead of monsoon seasons to ensure that agencies are aware of their responsibilities and know how to work together in emergencies (NDMA; “Govt takes

160 Interview with Mr. Kowshik Ganesh. Chennai, Mar 25, 2019. 161 Greater Chennai Corporation. Plastic ban public meeting. Dec 19, 2018.

143 stock” 2019). This top-down push for coordination emphasizes that the Tamil Nadu government is capable of mandating coordination, especially after a reputational loss.

However, SBM’s reputational devices do not seem to have provided enough incentives or disincentives for the state to encourage inter-agency coordination.

The push for coordination in response to the 2015 floods invites the question: What kind of a reputational effect are agencies sensitive to in Tamil Nadu, and why has SBM not been able to create the same conditions to motivate coordination from the state government? SBM provides both negative and positive reputational incentives; its public communication devices allow agencies to showcase their commitment to sanitation and its rankings encourage agencies to perform better if they slip in the rankings, like at the

Trichy Corporation. Further, the Joint Secretary for SBM from the Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs pointed out that while some cities like Trichy and Vellore are performing well in the rankings, the state as a whole needs to improve (Madhavan 2019).

This type of comment, combined with Chennai’s poor past performance in Swachh

Suevekshan, could have spurred the state government to improve sanitation by mandating coordination. It did not. This suggests that the Tamil Nadu government and agencies might be more sensitive to criticism from audiences within the state than beyond the state.

Agency-NGO Coordination

In Chennai, Coimbatore, and Trichy, coordination depends on historical context, bureaucratic autonomy, and the relevance of NGOs’ expertise to the priorities of the municipal corporations. SBM’s reputational devices have empowered the ongoing work of embedded NGOs in Coimbatore, but have not had an impact in the other two cities. In

Chennai, which currently has no major NGOs as service providers in sanitation, the turn

144 toward private-public partnerships in the 2000s ended coordination between NGOs like

Exnora in solid waste management and Sulabh for toilet construction. In Trichy, agency-

NGO coordination happened in toilet construction in the 2000s with NGOs like

Gramalaya and Scope working with the municipal corporation to build community and public toilets. However, currently, the Trichy Corporation is focusing on solid waste interventions under SBM, which is not included in the expertise of Gramalaya and Scope, which focus on water and sanitation.

In Coimbatore, political interference in the municipal corporation and a rich history of environmental activism have created embedded NGOs in sanitation. NGO leaders in the city and officials at the Coimbatore Corporation reported that State Minister for Municipal Administration Mr. S.P. Velumani wields an enormous amount of influence in the agency, constraining its autonomy.162 Coincidentally, Mr. Velumani is currently under investigation by the Madras High Court for using his position to award infrastructure contracts in Tamil Nadu cities to his family and friends (Imranullah 2019;

Sureshkumar 2019). Officials at the Coimbatore Corporation noted that failure to abide by Mr. Velumani’s wishes would result in the transferring of senior bureaucrats to less prestigious positions.163 The case of Coimbatore reinforces Iyer and Mani’s (2007; 2012) insight on the power politicians wield over bureaucracies.

In response to political meddling in the agency, senior bureaucrats, including the former Commissioner Dr. Vijayakarthikeyan, have become strong supporters of NGOs in sanitation. Environmental NGOs in Coimbatore have been active in the city, especially since the acute drought the region faced in 2003. The These NGOs are led by prominent

162 Interview with NGO Leader A. Coimbatore, Aug 21, 2018; Interview with NGO Leader B. Coimbatore, Aug 22, 2018. Interview with Coimbatore Corporation officials. Coimbatore, Dec 11, 2018. 163 Interview with Coimbatore Corporation officials. Coimbatore, Dec 11, 2018.

145 business and industry leaders, reflecting the city’s identity as a business, entrepreneurship, and industrial hub. As a result, sanitation NGOs in the city have close ties to the Coimbatore Corporation, and are able to leverage corporate social responsibility (CSR) funds within their business networks for their efforts. They are also well connected to community groups and the press, and draw a wide variety of volunteers from businesses and universities in the area. I thus refer to them as embedded NGOs, recalling Evans’s (1995) work on embedded autonomy in developmental states. Unlike in

Trichy and Coimbatore, NGOs in Coimbatore focus more on solid waste management than on toilet construction, which dovetails with the agency’s priorities for SBM.

SBM’s reputational devices to promote the importance of sanitation, like the media and social media campaigns and the Swachh Survekshan rankings, have empowered the ongoing efforts of NGOs in Coimbatore. For instance, the leaders of No Dumping attributed the success of their organization to the introduction of SBM, which helped raise awareness in households about the importance of waste segregation.164 The performative dimensions of SBM’s public communication efforts catalyzed existing solid waste interventions in Coimbatore, particularly in the waste entrepreneurship sector, by expanding demand for their services in response to the policy’s behavioral change campaigns.

5.5 Study Limitations

I focused my study on municipal corporations in Chennai, Coimbatore, and Trichy, and major NGOs that are service providers in the three cities. The insights on inter-agency

164 Interview with Mr. Prashanth. Coimbatore, Aug 20, 2018; Interview with Ms. Roopa Prasanth. Coimbatore, Aug 21, 2018.

146 coordination are thus limited to the perspectives of these three agencies, verified with policy documents from MAWS and media reports. Access to other agencies like Metro

Water, Tamil Nadu Slum Clearance Board, and Commissionerate of Municipal

Administration was difficult, and even when I did talk to bureaucrats from these agencies, they preferred to remain off the record because of the sensitive nature of their jobs. For a more comprehensive look at the type and quality of inter-agency relationships in sanitation in Tamil Nadu, it would have been useful to conduct interviews or surveys with all the major agencies in the state and in the three cities to explore if and how the introduction of SBM changed coordination patterns.

Further, I relied on data from interviews, media reports, and policy documents to conduct this study. An investigation of relationships between organizations would also have benefited from social network analysis, mapping out the different types of relationships between agencies across national, state, and local levels, NGOs, private sector participants, and community groups, like residential welfare associations. This method of analysis could provide insights on the diverse landscape of actors in urban sanitation in the state, and could help municipal corporations and the state government figure out how to engage with stakeholders to better distribute the work of sanitation provision.

5.6 What Lessons Can SBM in Tamil Nadu Offer for Urban Sanitation Implementation?

SBM has no formal mechanisms for policy evaluation, and this study is one of the first to investigate its impact on the ground. The case of SBM in Tamil Nadu highlights three lessons for urban sanitation implementation. First, institutional reform is needed

147 at the state and local levels. As my study illustrates, SBM’s reputational devices have exacerbated weak bureaucratic capacity or have had minimal impact on incentivizing coordination between agencies and between agencies and NGOs in Tamil Nadu. This underscores the importance of evaluating the existing institutional environment in cities to improve sanitation provision, and then addressing its challenges. In Tamil Nadu, for instance, this could take the form of an inter-agency task force in cities that acts as a nodal agency between the municipal corporations, the Slum Clearance Board, the Water and

Drainage Board, and Metro Water in Chennai to articulate the different responsibilities of each agency in contributing to improved sanitation. As Chibber (2002) highlights in his discussion of the failed Planning Commission, this nodal agency first needs to be endowed with the authority to discipline agencies for noncompliance. This can only occur if the state government identifies institutional reform as a major hurdle in sanitation provision, and provides the inter-agency taskforce with the requisite status. In addition to addressing relationships between agencies, this task force can emphasize partnerships with NGOs, community groups, and the private sector to remove some of the pressure from overburdened agencies. While institutional reform lacks the Bollywood quality of

SBM, it is imperative for the effective roll-out of sanitation policies.

Second, policies and laws dedicated to “higher hanging fruit,” like addressing the needs and rights of sanitation workers and manual scavengers, need to be enforced. While

SBM has outlined a suite of interventions from slum beautification projects to proper waste disposal, cities have privileged some over others. In the Tamil Nadu case, the three cities were focusing their efforts on solid waste management during the study period.

Little attention was paid to the plight of sanitation workers, and the manual scavenging community continues to be neglected. Some of the indicators in the Swachh Survekshan

148 rankings look for evidence of improved working conditions for sanitation workers and manual scavengers in cities but their needs are not foregrounded in the policy or in the implementation priorities in the three cities. As Ms. Roopa Prasanth, a behavioral change expert for No Dumping in Coimbatore, pointed out, the effectiveness of any sanitation policy rests on sanitation workers who are at the frontline of implementation.165 Media reports indicate that manual scavenging under SBM has not been addressed (The Wire

2019; Karthikeyan 2018). The Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment recently admitted that while manual scavenging is technically illegal, no state has reported convictions for the hiring of manual scavengers (The Wire 2019). Further, the conversation around sanitation workers is often only focused on the manual scavenging community, while ignoring other types of sanitation workers who come from different classes and castes. Subsequent urban sanitation interventions, either at the national, state, or city level, need to directly address improving the working conditions of sanitation workers. This does not initially require new policies to be developed but it does necessitate a political commitment to enforcing existing policies and laws that seek to protect these communities that are integral to sanitation but invisible.

Third, data on urban sanitation needs to be collected and evaluated in a systematic and honest manner. While conducting the study, I struggled to find high-quality data on urban sanitation at the city and state levels. In contrast, I found more granular data on rural sanitation. While SBM has taken the first step in marketing sanitation reforms to

Indian cities, more attention needs to be paid to the state of urban sanitation in India. If there is only a piecemeal understanding of what the sanitation challenges are in cities, it

165 Interview with Ms. Roopa Prasanth. Coimbatore, Aug 21, 2018.

149 is not possible to develop targeted interventions to address these problems. Further, the national and local governments need to stop hiding behind data in touting sanitation successes, particularly with data that is so easy to disprove like ODF declarations. In SBM

Rural, the Research Institute for Compassionate Economics and the Accountability

Initiative at the Center for Policy Research found that while open defecation rates have declined during SBM as a response to frenzied toilet construction, villages are not ODF as the government reported (Vyas 2019; RICE 2019). The report also details the use of threats and coercion in implementing SBM Rural (Vyas 2019; Rice 2019). While not much policy evaluation has happened to date in SBM Urban, the Center for Science and

Environment recently reported that third party verifications for Swachh Survekshan 2019 were rushed through in less than a month and that many cities were not visited by these teams (CSE 2019). Further, the report highlights the over exaggeration of source segregation and waste processing data announced by the Ministry of Housing and Urban

Affairs (CSE 2019). These troubling reports call into question the validity of the data collected by SBM and its commitment to sanitation. Is SBM about sanitation or about political theater?

Eradicating open defecation and creating bin-free cities in a country of over one billion people in five years is a pipe dream. Even the so-called first world has instances of open defecation and littering. SBM has indeed created a sanitation revolution in India, and there are some wins at the end of the policy’s implementation period but not the wins the ruling party wants. For instance, Dandabathula et al. (2019) find that acute diarrheal disease has decreased in rural India under SBM. The Research Institute for

Compassionate Economics has found that open defecation has decreased as well in rural areas (Vyas 2019; RICE 2019). However, these pragmatic wins are not celebrated by the

150 national government because they do not fit into the bizarre goal of India being ODF by

Gandhi’s 150th birthday. As a result of this political posturing, SBM is at risk of dimming the revolution it has started. If India is now ODF according to the “data” and the central government, then why should state and local governments prioritize sanitation post-

SBM?

5.4 Can SBM be Replicated in Other Contexts?

Combining the Familiar and the Exciting in Policy Implementation

In the world of sanitation, SBM is an unprecedented policy that has moved a country to thinking and dreaming about sanitation, with the support of politicians from the highest echelons of government and celebrities from the highest ranks of Bollywood.

SBM has elevated the importance of sanitation because of how rooted in Indian culture its programming has been. The use of Gandhi’s writing, his glasses as the logo, and his statue given out as prizes for cities who perform well in Swachh Survekshan have unified a country that is deeply fractured on political, religious, class, and ethnolinguistic lines in its quest to improve sanitation. Dr. Srinivasan, who heads the Information, Education, and Communication activities for SBM at the Chennai Corporation, mentioned that he gets a “Father of the Nation feeling” whenever he sees SBM campaigns with references to

Gandhi.166 Besides invoking Gandhi, the elements of competition, rankings, and rewards featured in SBM are embedded in everyday Indian life, particularly in the education system and in the Indian Administrative Service (IAS). Dr. Srinivasan, along with other interviewees from municipal corporations and NGOs, argued that without a system of

166 Interview with Dr. Srinivasan. Chennai, Nov 23, 2018.

151 evaluation and competition like Swachh Survekshan, there would be no incentive to motivate action around sanitation.167 To reinforce their points, these interviewees used the analogy of the Indian education system and questioned if students would study if there were no exams, grades, or rankings.

Here, David Stark’s (2011; 2017) insights on the value of rankings shed light on how the performance of praising and prizing can confer value, especially to non-market goods like the toilet or the trash can. For example, in SBM, latrines and open defecation rates derive value from being part of the city rankings. Stark (2011) also illustrates how the performance of prizing and praising of a good can add “symbolic properties [even to] the most profane of items” (p. 16). He points to how the marketing of a can of paint in a

Home Depot commercial turns paint into a symbol of marital bliss when a couple beams contentedly together in their freshly painted house (Stark 2011). Sanitation challenges in different cities are inextricably tied to contextual factors, more so than in other sectors, because of their cultural, religious, and political dimensions. Thus, its interventions should reflect that context sensitivity, as SBM has attempted to do. Mr. Kowshik Ganesh’s comments on how SBM would look very different if designed by the Tamil Nadu government reinforce how important and localized context is, especially for behavioral change campaigns. While the policy as a whole cannot be mechanically replicated in China or Kenya, it emphasizes the value of employing prominent cultural symbols and policy elements familiar to the society at large, and communicating them in a manner that is exciting but not outlandish. As Michael Hutter asserted in Stark (2011), “familiar

167 Interview with Mr. Prashanth. Coimbatore, Aug 20, 2018; Interview with Ms. Roopa Prasanth. Coimbatore, Aug 21, 2018; Mr. Sai Damodaran. Trichy, Sep 4, 2018; Interview with Dr. Srinivasan. Chennai, Nov 23, 2018; Sulabh International Officials. Chennai, Dec 4, 2018; Trichy Corporation Officials. Trichy, May 29, 2019.

152 surprises combining thrill with comfort are the most frequent and successful commercial variety.”

While SBM demonstrates its context awareness in its use of reputational tools to overhaul the image of sanitation and everything and everyone associated with it, it has not fully leveraged this to trigger institutional reform. The policy employs a “rising tide lifts all boats” attitude to sanitation, assuming that in its enthusiastic marketing of the policy itself and its various levers like the app, social media, and rankings, the excitement generated would be enough to create behavioral change in people and agencies. However, as my study shows, agencies are limited by their existing institutional characteristics in bureaucratic coordination. Instead of assuming that agencies would be moved to coordinate to augment their reputation and participate in the revolution, SBM could use existing bureaucratic culture to its advantage. For instance, to complement the “tick- box”168 culture in agencies, Swachh Survekshan could add indicators under the capacity building category specifically on coordinating with other agencies and with NGOs in improving sanitation outcomes. Further, SBM could conflate future iterations of Swachh

Survekshan with existing rankings and reward mechanisms, like the Nagar Ratna (Best

City) awards, to more holistically evaluate the ability of urban bureaucracies to fulfill their mandates.

Visibility in Sanitation in the Age of Social Media

SBM responded to Rose George’s (2008) lament of the invisibility of sanitation by launching extensive media and social media campaigns, and encouraging agencies and citizen groups to use SBM’s online platforms. The Deputy Commissioner of Health at the

168 Phone interview with Mr. Somnath Sen. Chennai, Dec 14, 2018.

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Chennai Corporation critiqued this social media culture of privileging visibility over impact at the Roadmap to Zero Waste Conference in Chennai.169 He described how after

SBM was introduced, community groups in the city have started to approach the

Corporation to offer their help with beach clean-up efforts. However, all of these groups want to clean up the same beach - the Besant Nagar beach - because it is pleasant and convenient to access, and thus, eminently Instagrammable (Figure 13). When the

Corporation pointed out that this beach was already fairly clean and that they had a list of other beaches that could be cleaned, the groups lost interest because those places are difficult to get to and are in need of actual work. The Deputy Commissioner argued that these groups want visibility without the effort, which is exacerbated by the use of social media. This serves as a cautionary tale to other cities or countries thinking about using social media as a platform to communicate behavioral interventions in different sectors.

As Mr. Phanindra Reddy, Dr. Srinivasan, and the Deputy Commissioner of Health in

Chennai have highlighted, the use of online interventions does not appear to trigger offline change.

169 Madras Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Roadmap to Zero Waste in Chennai. Chennai, Nov 9 and 10, 2018.

154

Figure 13: Besant Nagar beach (Photo by author)

The desire for visibility without the effort can also be used to describe some aspects of SBM that privilege publicity over sanitation reform. Mr. Somnath Sen, a policy consultant with the TNUSSP, eviscerated the many pictures of Prime Minister Modi holding up a broom to demonstrate his commitment to cleanliness. Mr. Sen pointed out that the Prime Minister and other senior bureaucrats “carefully picked up the broom, and not the shit.”170 He was referring more generally to the performance of improving sanitation that SBM prioritizes instead of the work that is needed to be done to make India open-defecation- and bin- free: behavioral change, institutional reform, and improving sanitation infrastructure and access. Mr. Rajesh Subburaj, also from TNUSSP, emphasized that in SBM’s quest to elevate sanitation’s visibility, the needs of the perennially invisible communities in sanitation have not been adequately addressed.171

He explained how floating populations, manual scavengers, and sanitation workers, who

170 Phone interview with Mr. Somnath Sen. Chennai, Dec 14, 2018. 171 Interview with Mr. Rajesh Subburaj. Coimbatore, Dec 10, 2018.

155 are at the frontline of any sanitation revolution, are largely ignored by this policy. Thus, efforts at raising awareness of a particular policy issue need to be accompanied by questions of who wants visibility, for whom, and who is left out of this conversation.

5.5 Beyond SBM: Coordination and Urban Sanitation

While documenting the physical environments of the three municipal corporations in my field notes, I noticed that the spatial characteristics of the three municipal corporations somewhat reflected their internal cohesion. Offices at the Trichy

Corporation, for instance, are located mostly in one three-story building, corresponding to the centralized nature of its management (Figures 14 and 15). The Coimbatore

Corporation’s offices are spread out over a few short buildings (Figures 16 and 17). The

Chennai Corporation is split between one sprawling old building from the early 20th century and a six-story, glass-forward building, constructed in 2015 (Figures 18 and 19).

The layers of the Chennai Corporation’s labyrinthine bureaucracy are mirrored in its spatial form. Investigating the architecture of coordination to explore links between the physical spaces occupied by agencies and their activities could add to the study of agency behavior.

156

Figure 14: Trichy Corporation (Photo by author)

Figure 15. Courtyard of the Trichy Corporation (Photo by author)

157

Figure 16. Coimbatore Corporation (Photo by author)

Figure 17. Part of the Coimbatore Corporation campus (Photo by author)

158

Figure 18. Ripon Building, Chennai Corporation (Photo by author)

Figure 19. Amma Maligai, Chennai Corporation (Photo by author)

Finally, the Chennai Corporation is thinking about submitting a proposal to the state government to merge with Metro Water, as part of its desire to bring all civic services within the same agency to improve coordination and implementation (Gautham 2019).

159

So far, I have only found one Times of India article on it and my interviewees in Chennai said they were not familiar with the operationalization of this intention. However, the article raises an interesting debate between inter-agency coordination and agency mergers. On one hand, an engineer at the Corporation emphasized that if the two agencies merged, Metro Water and the Chennai Corporation could work together more efficiently to expand formal coverage of water and sewer lines (Gautham 2019). However, a former

IAS officer pointed out that coordination is not the main problem with the two agencies, but Byzantine governance systems (Gautham 2019). A Metro Water engineer agreed saying that mergers are not the answer since every agency experiences coordination challenges in the city (Gautham 2019). These differing views on how to address coordination in the water and sanitation sector present an interesting question for future research on the potential efficacy of creating one agency to oversee municipal administration. Is a super-bureaucracy the answer to coordination challenges? My study suggests otherwise. While merging with Metro Water can superficially bring together water and sanitation implementation within the same agency, it is not a guarantee for improved coordination or a replacement for weak bureaucratic capacity or administrative incoherence already present within bureaucracies. If such a move were to occur, the state government and senior bureaucrats at both agencies need to ensure that clear relationships between departments need to be articulated before the merger, and that capacity issues are adequately addressed to improve service provision on the ground.

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Epilogue on Positionality

As a dark-skinned woman of South Indian descent, who is fluent in Tamil (but distinctly not of the Chennai kind) and vaguely foreign, I was a source of confusion and amusement in Tamil Nadu. During fieldwork, I was often mistaken for an IAS officer, someone who wanted to be an IAS officer, a World Bank consultant, and a college student.

While my affiliation with MIT and Resilient Chennai expanded my access to decision- makers in the environmental sanitation sector in Chennai, I realized it was my heritage and ability to speak Tamil that smoothed my way in Coimbatore and Trichy. Even before starting the PhD, I was interested in why and how researchers choose where to work, and how these choices converge in the over- and under-representation of certain cities and regions. In India, there is so much scholarship in urban development featuring Mumbai,

Kolkata, New Delhi, and increasingly, Bangalore, with much less attention given to other cities in southern or northeastern India. While studying these areas home to research

“bubbles”172 can be helpful given the amount of information already available and an existing research infrastructure, it may also simplify and distort views on a particular issue if these cities are presented as being representative of a region or country. For instance, before I started fieldwork in 2017, newspaper articles on SBM in India were framing the policy as a massive push to end open defecation and increase toilet production. What I found in Tamil Nadu was different. The three cities were channeling their efforts in solid waste management instead, leveraging SBM’s visibility efforts to address a problem they had spent years working on.

172 Randy Schekman, an American cell biologist who won the Nobel prize in 2013, described these research “bubbles” as a result of academic pressure to publish on fashionable topics and methods, while ignoring other lines of inquiry (Schekman 2013).

161

The people I met in Coimbatore and Trichy were surprised that I had visited them all the way from Boston, Massachusetts, to ask them about their perspectives on SBM and bureaucratic coordination. Some of them said that they did not think researchers were interested in their cities. My interviews and conversations with them often lasted for several hours, while they patiently answered my questions and generously shared their expertise with me. These usually ended with a cup of coffee or tea and snacks, when they asked about my grandparents and their connections to Tamil Nadu. They often felt protective of me when I was in Coimbatore or Trichy. They made sure that I had safe and comfortable transportation and accommodation, and invited me over for meals with their families so that I would not feel lonely. I was surprised by these overwhelmingly kind and hospitable gestures, having never spent much time in Tamil Nadu before. My friend in

India referred to this as the “nalla Thamizh ponnu” (good Tamil girl) effect, noting that they probably felt a sense of kinship with me over our shared heritage and language, without questioning my right to do research in the region. This was an issue that occasionally comes up for me when I meet Indian scholars from outside Tamil Nadu, mainly from North India, who become defensive and territorial when they learn that I am writing my dissertation on India but I am not from there. My fieldwork experience in

Tamil Nadu and the reactions from scholars from other parts of India led me to reflect on who has the right to research a particular place and if and how that right is tied to the researcher’s ethnicity, national origin, and language abilities.

Another unexpected element during my fieldwork was how comfortable the men I spoke to were in discussing different aspects of sanitation with me. Around 60 to 70 percent of my interviews were with men, and I had mentally steeled myself beforehand about expecting potential awkwardness in talking about issues like toilet habits,

162 defecation, and urination. I was surprised by how open and knowledgeable the men I spoke to were about describing the various problems in sanitation experienced by both men and women. I often found myself in situations when men or groups of men were earnestly telling me about the importance of including menstrual hygiene management in sanitation policies, and their anger and frustration at how the women in their lives are made to feel ashamed about menstruating or when purchasing sanitary products. On one hand, this nuanced and mature perspective on highlighting cultural taboos in menstruation in India and how they disproportionately affect women came from men in the environmental sanitation sector who have studied and worked extensively on this challenge. On the other hand, the lack of embarrassment they felt in discussing those deeply private issues with me was refreshing and not what I am accustomed to, even in the United States.

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Appendix A: Partial List of Interviews

1. Ms. Vijayalakshmi Murali, environmental leader. Coimbatore, Jul 16, 2018.

2. Mr. Selvaraj, environmentalist, Kowsika Nathi. Phone interview. Chennai, Aug 16, 2018.

3. Mr. Prashanth, social entrepreneur in waste, No Dumping, ASLRM, Swachh Bharat ambassador. Coimbatore, Aug 20, 2018.

4. Mr. R. Raveendran, RAAC. Coimbatore, Aug 21, 2018.

5. NGO Leader A. Coimbatore, Aug 21, 2018.

6. Ms. Roopa Prasanth, environmentalist. Coimbatore, Aug 21, 2018.

7. Ms. Timple Luloo, SBM Ambassador. Coimbatore, Aug 22, 2018.

8. NGO Leader B. Coimbatore, Aug 22, 2018.

9. NGO Leaders C and D. Coimbatore, Aug 23, 2018.

10. Sanitation Consultant A. Coimbatore, Aug 23, 2018.

11. Zonal sanitary officer. Coimbatore, Aug 24, 2018.

12. Mr. Roosevelt, Project Coordinator, Shunya Project and ICLEI. Coimbatore, Aug 24, 2018.

13. Sanitation Consultant B. Coimbatore, Aug 24, 2018.

14. Sanitary supervisor. Coimbatore, Aug 24, 2018.

15. Trichy City Corporation officials. Trichy, Sep 4, 2018.

16. Mr. Sai Damodaran, CEO of Gramalaya. Trichy, Sep 5, 2018.

17. Gramalaya team. Trichy, Sep 5 and Sep 6, 2018.

18. Ms. D. Vijula, SBM nodal officer and executive engineer, Greater Chennai Corporation. Chennai, Nov 23, 2018.

19. SBM team, Greater Chennai Corporation. Chennai, Nov 23, 2018.

20. Dr. Srinivasan, Head of IEC for SBM, Greater Chennai Corporation. Chennai, Nov 23, 2018.

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21. Senior Bureaucrat A. Chennai, Nov 23, 2018.

22. Ms. Kavita Wankhade, Team Leader, Tamil Nadu Urban Sanitation Support Program. Chennai, Nov 28, 2018.

23. Mr. Siddharth Hande, Founder/CEO of Kabbadiwala Connect. Phone interview. Chennai, Nov 28, 2018.

24. Sulabh International officials. Chennai, Dec 4, 2018.

25. Mr. Phanindra Reddy, Principal Secretary/Commissioner at Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Department. Chennai, Dec 6, 2018.

26. Senior Bureaucrat B. Chennai, Dec 6, 2018.

27. Mr. Rajesh Subburaj, Senior Community Sanitation Coordinator, Tamil Nadu Urban Sanitation Support Program and Keystone Foundation. Coimbatore, Dec 10, 2018.

28. Coimbatore City Municipal Corporation officials. Coimbatore, Dec 11, 2018.

29. Ms. Anusha Ananthakrishnan, Outreach Coordinator, Siruthuli. Coimbatore, Dec 12, 2018.

30. Mr. Krishnamohan Ramachandran, Chief Resilience Officer, Resilient Chennai. Chennai, Dec 14, 2018.

31. Mr. Arjun Bhargava, Resilience Manager, Resilient Chennai. Chennai, Dec 14, 2018.

32. Mr. Somnath Sen, Advisor, Institutional Development and Strategy, Tamil Nadu Urban Sanitation Support Program. Phone interview. Chennai, Dec 14, 2018.

33. Assistant Executive Engineer, Greater Chennai Corporation. Chennai, Dec 21, 2018.

34. Mr. Kowshik Ganesh, Senior Lead, Athena Infonomics. Chennai, Mar 25, 2019.

35. Sanitation Consultant C. Chennai, Mar 25, 2019.

36. Dr. Srinivasan, Head of IEC for SBM, Greater Chennai Corporation. Chennai, Mar 26, 2019.

37. Mr. Phanindra Reddy, Principal Secretary/Commissioner at Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Department. Chennai, Mar 28, 2019.

38. Trichy City Corporation officials. Trichy, May 29, 2019.

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39. Mr. M. Subburaman, CEO of Scope. Trichy, May 29, 2019.

40. Mr. N. Ravichandran, Commissioner of Trichy City Corporation. Trichy, May 29, 2019.

41. Mr. Sai Damodaran, CEO of Gramalaya. Phone interview. Trichy, May 30, 2019.

42. Mr. Roosevelt, Project Coordinator, Shunya Project and ICLEI. Phone interview. Chennai, Jul 2, 2019.

43. Ms. Kavita Wankhade, Team Leader, Tamil Nadu Urban Sanitation Support Program. Chennai, Jul 3, 2019.

44. Ms. Reeba Devaraj, Senior Specialist, Tamil Nadu Urban Sanitation Support Program. Chennai, Jul 3, 2019.

45. Dr. Suneethi Sundar, Specialist, Tamil Nadu Urban Sanitation Support Program. Chennai, Jul 3, 2019.

46. Coimbatore City Municipal Corporation officials. Phone interview. Chennai, Jul 3, 2019.

47. Ms. Vanessa Peter, Policy Researcher at Information and Resource Center for Deprived Urban Communities. Phone interview, Chennai, Jul 4, 2019.

48. Dr. Karen Coelho, Assistant Professor at Madras Institute of Development Studies. Chennai, Jul 6, 2019.

49. Mr. Rajesh Subburaj, Senior Community Sanitation Coordinator, Tamil Nadu Urban Sanitation Support Program and Keystone Foundation. Email interview. Singapore, Aug 20, 2019.

Event List

1. U.S. Consulate General in Chennai, Paperman Foundation of India, and the Madras Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Tamil Nadu Plastic Ban: A Solutions Mapping Meeting. Chennai, Sep 11, 2018.

2. Citizen Consumer and Civic Action Group (CAG) Workshop. Rethinking Urbanization and Right to the City. Chennai, Oct 2, 2018.

3. Madras Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Roadmap to Zero Waste in Chennai. Chennai, Nov 9 and 10, 2018.

4. Greater Chennai Corporation. Plastic ban public meeting. Dec 19, 2018.

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5. Resilient Chennai Strategy Launch. Chennai, Jun 27, 2019.

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Appendix B: Interview Protocol

A. Verbal Consent Script

Before the interview Thank you for taking the time to meet with me. Poor sanitation is a common problem in India, and the Swachh Bharat (Clean India) Mission hopes to improve the situation. In my dissertation for my PhD at MIT, I am interested in understanding the role of bureaucracies in implementing Swachh Bharat in cities.

This interview is voluntary – you can stop the interview at any time or ask me to move onto the next question if you don’t want to answer it. In my dissertation, I will list all of my interviewees by name or general title (e.g. Policy Analysis, Organization XYZ, City Name). If you prefer to remain anonymous, please let me know now or after the interview. Unless you give me permission to use your name, title, and/or quote you in any publications that may result from this research, the information you tell me will be confidential. All notes and interview recordings are coded with initials and dates to maintain anonymity.

I am planning to finish data collection by June 2019.

Do you have any questions before we begin? Do you mind if I take notes? You can tell me at any point during the interview if you wish to say something off the record.

After the interview Can I use your name in my interview? How do you wish to be described in my dissertation in terms of name and designation? Can I directly quote you or should I paraphrase? If I have follow-up questions, may I contact you? Please let me know if you have any questions or concerns - you have my contact information.

B. Interview Themes for Bureaucracies

1. Information on interviewee’s role and department responsibilities 2. What are the city’s main sanitation challenges? 3. What activities has the agency undertaken for SBM? How is this similar or different to before SBM? What motivated any changes? a. Use of social media and Swachhata app b. What types of behavioral change campaigns do they undertake? What communities do they focus on and why? 4. Opinion on SBM’s success in Tamil Nadu and their city a. Effectiveness of rankings and certifications in motivating action b. How do they define success? Sanitation? c. City characteristics (identity, culture, civic participation, politics - national, state, local) d. What advice would they give other cities who want to be successful at SBM?

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e. Can Tamil Nadu implement an SBM-like sanitation policy? How would it be different? 5. Challenges faced in implementing SBM a. What areas of the city have been hard to implement SBM in? Why? What areas have been easier? Why?

C. Interview Themes for NGOs 1. Information on organization’s mandate and past work 2. What are the city’s main sanitation challenges? 3. What is the NGO’s connection to SBM? 4. What types of communities do they work with? What kind of work do they do? 5. Relationships with different agencies, particularly the Corporation a. Has there been a change in relationship with the Corporation after SBM was introduced? 6. What other stakeholders do they work with? 7. Opinion on SBM’s success in Tamil Nadu and their city a. Effectiveness of rankings and certifications in motivating action b. Use of social media and the app c. City characteristics (identity, culture, civic participation, politics - national, state, local) d. How do they define success? Sanitation? e. Can Tamil Nadu implement an SBM-like sanitation policy? How would it be different? 8. Challenges in implementing SBM in their city a. What are they, and how can they be addressed? b. Who should address them? c. Who is left out in SBM?

D. Interview Themes for Consultants, Academics, Activists, and Journalists 1. Information on organization’s work and interviewee’s responsibilities 2. What are the city’s main sanitation challenges? 3. Who are the main stakeholders in sanitation provision in their city? a. Do they work together? Why or why not? 4. Opinion on SBM’s success in Tamil Nadu and their city a. Effectiveness of rankings and certifications in motivating action b. Use of social media and the app c. City characteristics (identity, culture, civic participation, politics - national, state, local) d. What changed, if anything, after SBM was introduced? Why? e. How do they define success? Sanitation? f. Can Tamil Nadu implement an SBM-like sanitation policy? How would it be different? 5. Challenges in implementing SBM in their city. a. What are they, and how can they be addressed? b. Who should address them? c. Who is left out in SBM?

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E. Interview Questions on Coordination for Bureaucracies 1. Inter-agency coordination a. Has the state mandated any CRRT-type mechanism to improve inter- agency coordination for SBM? b. Do you collaborate with other agencies to implement SBM? If so, which ones (e.g. CMA, Metro Water, Slum Clearance Board, CMDA etc.)? How long have you been working with them on sanitation? c. What are the challenges of coordinating with other agencies? 2. Intra-agency coordination a. What departments are involved in implementing SBM? b. How often do the departments meet? Has there been a change in frequency after SBM? 3. Agency-NGO coordination a. Do you work with any NGOs in the city to implement SBM? If so, which ones? How long have you been working with them? b. What types of work do the NGOs do? What kind of information do they have that is useful for your job? c. What kinds of activities do you undertake with them for SBM? d. Do you conduct behavioral change campaigns together or do NGOs conduct them? Why? e. Do you work with any other organizations besides NGOs to implement SBM? 4. SBM’s reputational devices a. What types of certifications are you working toward? (e.g. ODF, Star Garbage Rating) b. Does the agency use social media to publicize SBM? If so, what types do you use? How useful do you find social media in communicating with the public? c. What is your opinion about the usefulness about the Swachhata app for your job? d. Besides these efforts, what offline efforts have you undertaken for SBM? (e.g. improving “hardware,” in person behavioral change campaigns) 5. Bureaucratic capacity and administrative coherence a. Have there been any seconded positions to implement SBM? b. What types of work do SBM teams do, in addition to implementing SBM? 6. Relationships with politicians - local, state, national a. Have local politicians been helpful in raising awareness about Swachh Survekshan? b. Are there politicians who have been policy champions for sanitation before SBM? c. How would you describe relationships between politicians and the Corporation? Has SBM had an impact on these relationships? 7. Civic participation a. How do you think the lack of local elections affects SBM implementation, if it does? b. Before 2016, how did you find the experience of working with ward councilors for sanitation projects?

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F. Interview Questions on Coordination for NGOs 1. Agency-NGO coordination a. Do you work with the Corporation to implement SBM? Why or why not? If you do, who is your primary contact? b. Have you previously coordinated with the Corporation for sanitation projects? If so, what types of activities did you undertake together? How would you describe the experience of working with the Corporation? c. What organizations, besides the Corporation, do you work with? 2. SBM’s reputational devices a. What is your opinion on SBM’s emphasis on online platforms, like social media and the Swachhata app? In your opinion, how useful are online efforts in creating behavioral change? b. What is your opinion on the effectiveness of Swachh Survekshan rankings? 3. Relationships with politicians - local, state, national a. How do you navigate relationships with local politicians in your work? b. Are there politicians who have been policy champions for sanitation before SBM? c. How would you describe relationships between politicians and the Corporation? Has SBM had an impact on these relationships? 4. Civic participation a. How do you think the lack of local elections affects SBM implementation, if it does? b. Before 2016, how did you find the experience of working with ward councilors and the mayor for sanitation projects?

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Appendix C: List of Swachh Survekshan 2019 Indicators173

A. Breakdown of Marks

Component Percent of Total Marks (%) Number of Marks Certifications 25 (20 for Star Rating; 5 for 1250 ODF Rating) Direct Observation 25 1250 Service Level Progress 25 1250 Citizen Feedback 25 1250 Total 100% 5000 Marks

B. List of Service Level Progress Indicators in Solid Waste Management

No. Type Indicator Examples of Documentation Marks 1 Collection & % of wards covered with door-to- Number and capacity of vehicles deployed; 45 Transportation door waste collection ward-level staff deployment plan 2 Collection & % of wards practicing source Total number of dry/wet waste generated; 65 Transportation segregation log books of transfer stations 3 Collection & ICT-based monitoring mechanism Screenshot of app(s); copy of GPS/RFID log 50 Transportation 4 Collection & % of informal waste pickers Copy of recent survey report/study of 40 Transportation formally integrated into sustainable identification of informal waste pickers; livelihoods copy of contract with private sector and community groups that have enrolled informal waste pickers 5 Collection & Benefits extended to sanitary Pictorial documentation of usage of 55 Transportation workers personal protective equipment; evidence of health benefits 6 Collection & 100% of wards are clean in ULB Evidence of sweeping twice a day; evidence 65 Transportation of beautification and clean-up of vulnerable areas 7 Collection & Is the city bin-free? Mechanism of waste management, post- 18 Transportation bins; evidence of ICT monitoring systems 8 Processing and % of total wet waste collected that is No. of decentralized waste processing units 60 Disposal treated in the city; evidence of home-based waste processing 9 Processing and % of dry waste collected that is Mechanism in place for domestic hazardous 60 Disposal treated waste; evidence of waste processing facilities 10 Processing and Mechanism to manage construction Public notification for waste services; 50 Disposal and demolition waste evidence of functional waste helpline 11 Processing and Remediation of existing dumpsites Pictures of remediated dumpsites; waste 40 Disposal undertaken management model 12 Processing and Sanitary landfill/zero landfill city? Photo of landfill; log books of amount of 50 Disposal waste dumped in landfill 13 Processing and % of operational cost of Evidence of property taxes with sub- 50 Disposal environmental sanitation covered heading for sanitation charges; total by different sources of funding like revenue from sale of compost taxes and ads 14 Processing and % of bulk waste generators with on- List of bulk waste generators; visual 50 Disposal site processing evidence of on-site processing 15 Processing and % of households processing their Ward-level evidence of processing; quantity 15 Disposal wet waste at home of wet waste processed Total Marks 713

173 Information in this Appendix is taken from the Swachh Survekshan Toolkit 2019. Please refer to this document for more details.

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C. List of Service Level Progress Indicators for Toilets

No. Type Indicator Examples of Documentation Marks 1 Sustainable % of toilets connected to a closed Log book details on desludging vehicles; 70 Sanitation system ward-level details on septic tanks 2 Sustainable % of fecal sludge treated at Details of operational treatment plants; 48 Sanitation treatment plant treatment capacity 3 Sustainable % of completed individual List of SBM toilets constructed; list of 45 Sanitation household latrines with water households with functional water connection in latrines 4 Sustainable Are all public toilets uploaded as Toilet data should be uploaded on MoHUA 60 Sanitation SBM toilet in Google maps? dashboard 5 Sustainable % of CT/PTs open between 4am Toilet data should be uploaded on MoHUA 30 Sanitation and 10pm dashboard 6 Sustainable Toilet facilities in construction List of toilets with pictures; copy of 30 Sanitation sites? permission issued for construction 7 Sustainable % of operation and maintenance Copy of user fee collected; total costs of 30 Sanitation costs of CT/PTs recovered through operation and maintenance; details of revenue streams desludging operators Total Marks 313

D. List of Service Level Progress Indicators for IEC & Behavior Change

No. Type Indicator Examples of Documentation Marks 1 IEC & Behavioral Was Swachh Survekshan Details of ULB and citizen campaigns 23 Change promoted in the city? uploaded on Swachh Manch; evidence of dissemination through social media; list of organizations engaged 2 IEC & Behavioral Short movie/audio jingle created List of content created; evidence of 20 Change by ULB/citizens for circulation dissemination through Swachh Manch through social media? and social media and coverage 3 IEC & Behavioral Citizen-led campaigns? Visual evidence; evidence of 20 Change dissemination through social media Total Marks 63

E. List of Service Level Progress Indicators for Capacity Building

No. Type Indicator Examples of Documentation Marks 1 Capacity Building % of staff who have completed List of SBM-related staff; list of staff who 19 certifications on e-learning have completed courses courses in SBM portal 2 Capacity Building % of staff from Sanitation and Copy of workshop agenda; visual evidence 18 Engineering departments who or newspaper coverage; copy of attendance have attended at least 3 SBM record; contact details of staff workshops Total Marks 37

F. List of Service Level Progress Indicators for By-Laws and Regulations

No. Type Indicator Examples of Documentation Marks 1 By-Laws and Has the ULB notified and enforced Copy of notification; copy of fine receipts 17 Regulations Plastic Waste Management Rules issued; evidence of mechanism for 2016? checking of plastic usage 2 By-Laws and Are measures in place for user fee Copy of notifications; copy of receipt books 15 Regulations and penalties for open defecation, for fines; list of vulnerable spots public urination, and littering? 3 By-Laws and Has the ULB notified and enforced Copy of notification; copy of fine receipts 15 Regulations the Solid Waste Management Rules 2016? 4 By-Laws and Has the ULB notified and enforced Copy of notification; copy of receipt books 15 Regulations user charges from waste generators? Total Marks 62

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G. List of Service Level Progress Indicators for Innovation and Best Practices

No. Type Indicator Examples of Documentation Marks 1 Innovation and Quality of project submitted by Documentation and photos of project 40 Best Practices ULB 2 Innovation and Quality of citizen-led project Documentation and photos of project 22 Best Practices submitted by ULB Total Marks 62

H. List of Indicators for Certifications

No. Type Indicator Examples of Documentation Marks 1 Star Garbage Is the city certified under the Star Information on SBM portal/assessment 1,000 Rating Rating Protocol? report of third-party agency 2 ODF Status Which ODF status does the city Recommendations of third-party agency 250 have? Total Marks 1,250

I. List of Indicators for Direct Observation

No. Indicators Marks 1 Are residential and commercial areas clean? 200 2 Are CT/PTs clean and user-friendly? 250 3 Are CT/PTs prominently displaying SBM messages with Swachh Survekshan logo? 80 4 Are CT/PTs connected to safe onsite disposal system? 80 5 Are all markets clean? 170 6 Are transportation hubs clean? 170 7 Are billboards and posters visible in public areas? 100 8 Visible beautification undertaken of slums, old areas, flyover, and public spaces? 200 Total Marks 1,250

J. List of Indicators for Citizen Feedback

No. Indicators Marks 1 Are you aware that your city is participating in Swachh Survekshan 2019? 125 2 Are you satisfied with the cleanliness level in your city? 125 3 Are you able to easily spot litter bins in commercial and public areas? 125 4 Are you asked to segregate wet and dry waste by your waste collector? 125 5 Do you know where you waste goes after collection? 100 6 Do you find toilets accessible and clean now? 125 7 Do you know the ODF status of your city? 125 8 Number of active users on Swachhata app/Swachh Manch? 100 9 % of complaints on app resolved within Service Level Agreement time frame 100 10 % of population that has downloaded Swachhata app and/or joined Swachh Manch 100 11 User feedback on resolved complaints 100 Total Marks 1,250

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