Transformative Conflict Resolution in an Unstable Neighbourhood: ’s Conflict Resolution Efforts in the

Talha KÖSE* Abstract Introduction

Turkey had pursued a foreign policy in the In the ruling Justice and Development Middle East that focused on transformative conflict resolution until the beginning of the Party’s (JDP) tenure (2002-present), “Arab Spring”. This transformative conflict Turkish foreign policy decision makers resolution approach had aimed at bringing have forged a new vision and a new holistic and systemic change to the entire region. Turkish foreign policy had aimed at foreign policy identity for Turkey in the transforming the conflict-producing structures, Middle East. Their grand vision is one tried to engage positively with the actors and of becoming a “centre country”, and elites and attempted to change the security- dominated agenda into a multi-dimensional Turkey’s new role is that of an “order- agenda. Despite the dominant discourse of the instituting country”. In order to actualise transformative conflict resolution, in practice this role, Turkey has changed its foreign- the most effective conflict resolution methods and tools that Turkey utilised during this policy discourse and mobilised practical period fell under the management approaches. foreign-policy tools and instruments that Turkey’s normative concerns and priorities had previously been partially neglected. did not overlap with the priorities of other influential actors in the region. Furthermore Turkey has acted like a regional peace- the gap between transformative discourse and broker, and it has been actively involved management practice has widened since Turkey as a third party in many conflicts in the became involved more directly with ongoing crises in the region. region. It has also tried to de-securitise its foreign policy agenda by improving Key Words cultural and economic integration with its neighbouring countries, and it has Conflict Resolution, Conflictpaid special attention to structural peace- Transformation, Turkish foreign policy, building efforts. Middle East conflicts. Turkey’s third-party efforts in the * Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, İstanbul neighbouring region have been inspired Şehir University. by a holistic notion of regional order

171 PERCEPTIONS, Winter 2013, Volume XVIII, Number 4, pp. 171-194. Talha Köse

in which Turkey plays a central role.1 sided against the regimes that tried The Turkish approach to settlement to maintain the authoritarian status mediation, conciliation and negotiation quo. Although Turkey’s success in the has tried to challenge the pre-existing Middle East diplomacy was due to political and socio-economic status quo in this new paradigm, transformative CR the Middle East. These efforts have aimed approaches have faced certain limitations to transform the political, economic and in the aftermath of the “Arab Spring,3 cultural structures and relations, which and Turkish foreign policy has gradually still have residues of the Cold War, and incorporated coercive foreign policy the authoritarian political regimes in tools. Contextually, the centrifugal the region. Turkish efforts at regional tendencies were accelerated after the stabilisation and conflict resolution civil war in Syria and Turkey is now (CR)2 can be defined as “transformative” trapped on one side of this polarisation. because they have aimed to gradually Turkey’s transformative potential has change conflict-producing structures, been constrained due to this contextual issues, relations and communication uncertainty. In this new milieu Turkey norms in a systematic way rather than has taken a side role rather than playing solely focusing on trying to address the role of third party. This study immediate problems. On the other hand, examines Turkey’s conflict resolution Turkey has been trying to institutionalise efforts towards Middle East until the an order based on good neighbourly Arab Spring. relations and increased trade and cultural exchange at the grassroots level. Transformative Conflict The Turkish approach to Resolution in the Middle settlement mediation, East conciliation and negotiation has tried to challenge the pre- In the academic literature, “conflict existing political and socio- management”, “conflict prevention”, economic status quo in the “conflict resolution”, “conflict transformation” (CT) and “conflict Middle East. reduction” are often used interchangeably. There are conceptual differences between Those policies were pursued these terms, and those differences have systematically until the civil wars in practical implications. CT refers to “the Libya and Syria, where Turkey clearly longer term structural, relational and

172 Transformative Conflict Resolution in an Unstable Neighbourhood cultural changes that are brought by Once the conflict among the parties is conflict resolution”.4 Proponents of CT5 managed, new relationship forms can often exaggerate the differences between emerge. CM often does not aim to bring CR and CT in favour of the second systemic and sustainable changes to the term. However, as Mitchell emphasises, conflict-producing environments. the concept of “transformation” emerged because of the misuse or corruption of the original term “resolution”.6 Since Turkish foreign-policy decision CR is widely used to define the field makers strategically pursue in general and is the most well-known transformative CR, which has term, this concept is preferred in this a more ambitious agenda of study. Turkish conflict-resolution efforts change than do the settlement, fit better with the “transformative management and resolution approach” rather than the “resolution” approaches. or “management” approaches, since the former aims to bring a systemic CR tries to “address underlying causes change in the region. Rather than CT, of conflict by finding common interests “transformative CR” is preferred as the and overarching goals”9 and it involves term that best denotes Turkey’s CR attitudinal and structural changes to efforts within the designated era. address the root causes of conflicts. Conflict management (CM) is the Ramsbotham et al. consider CT, in constructive handling of difference and contrast, as the deepest level of change divergence, and it focuses on practical and the extension of conflict resolution and achievable ways to bring opposing to a broader level.10 CT emphasises parties together into a cooperative addressing the structural roots of process. CM does not struggle to address conflict by changing existing patterns the underlying sources of conflict in of behaviour and creating a culture a holistic way or to change the status of nonviolence. While the peaceful quo in a systemic way.7 It is based on settlement and termination of conflicts the assumption that conflicts are rarely are emphasised in CR, CT problematises completely resolved or eliminated, violence rather than conflict. A deeper but that they can be managed by level of change to transform conflict- negotiation, mediation, conciliation producing emotions and culture is and arbitration, and sometimes through emphasised in CT.11 CR promotes the deeper institutional reform of the termination of conflict by addressing security sector and good governance.8 the conflict’s root sources. CT also aims

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to incorporate processes to address the became visible starting in the second term residues of conflict, including trauma, of the JDP administration.17 The Middle fears, hurts and hatreds.12 East and North Africa (MENA) and the are the main areas where this According to John Paul Lederach, new policy has been actualised. Turkey one of the leading theorists in this area, has played active third-party roles in CT respects and includes cultural and the Iranian nuclear crisis, between Syria human resources within a particular and Israel, between Syria and Iraq, and setting rather than imposing an outsider between the fighting factions and groups answer.13 CT accentuates empowering in Palestine, Iraq and Lebanon. Turkey disenfranchised parties and allowing has actively used conflict-resolution emotional and cultural expressions as and conflict-management instruments important elements of transformative to implement its role as an “order- practice.14 CR, in contrast, focuses on the instituting actor”. Turkish NGOs and termination of the underlying sources civilian actors have become important of conflict and addressing the needs, stakeholders in this transformation. interests and value-oriented concerns These official diplomatic efforts are only a of the actors involved. CT stresses limited aspect of a comprehensive policy changes at the personal, structural and of conflict transformation. Interventions relational levels15 Turkish foreign-policy at the grassroots levels and unofficial decision makers strategically pursue levels have been crucial elements of transformative CR, which has a more successful transformation.18 ambitious agenda of change than do the settlement, management and resolution The role of an “order-instituting actor” approaches. is a complicated and multifaceted one, one that encapsulates leadership roles From Discourse to Practice: in the fields of regional politics, culture, economics, structural peace building Transformative Conflict and security. This role has necessitated Resolution in Turkish a substantial transformation in Turkey’s Foreign Policy foreign policy vision and practice as well. New foreign-policy instruments in A new role and foreign policy addition to the methods of traditional identity diplomacy, balance of powers and coercive diplomacy are crucial in order Turkey’s foreign-policy vision in the to maintain a transformative foreign region as an “order-instituting actor”16 policy.

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Turkish foreign policy still tries to Tackling the structural challenges build the institutional infrastructure and capacity to implement these instruments Turkish decision makers’ interpretation on a regular basis, yet Turkey has recently of the problems and conflict-producing emphasised them as priority agenda structures and processes in the MENA items in its foreign policy. For example, region is a holistic one. Local or state- the protection of human rights, support level conflicts and problems are often for peace, security, democratisation, considered part of a malfunctioning development, humanitarian assistance in system. Structural intervention complex emergencies and development, techniques are related to these diagnoses. as well as an emphasis on intercultural At the regional level one of the most dialogue, are highlighted as Turkey’s significant regional challenge is the vision for its UN Security Council persistent polarisation and fragmentation candidacy for 2015-2016.19 This vision due to ideological, religious, ethnic or also marks the changes in Turkey’s sectarian differences and the artificial foreign-policy approach. political territories that do not reflect Peacemakers’ transformation practices the cultural, demographic and economic fall into four analytical categories: actor integrity of the region. According to transformation, issue transformation, the mentor of this new foreign policy, rule/norm transformation and structural Minister of Foreign Affairs Davutoğlu, a 20 transformation. Turkish conflict just, peaceful and sustainable order in the resolution efforts tried to incorporate region can only be reached in a holistic all these pillars. At the practical level way and with the genuine involvement Turkish conflict resolution efforts can of all local actors. be categorised under four transformative agendas: “tackling the structural Davutoğlu argues that borders and challenges at both regional and global political divisions in the region are levels”; “forging a multi-dimensional issue artificial and lead to conflict, and claims agenda”; “crisis free communication and that those borders can only be managed institutionalised cooperation efforts”; in a holistic way with the consent of and “efforts to invent new rules and grassroots-level local actors.21 Political norms of constructive communication”. divisions in the region were shaped Many policy practices fall under these according to the interests of colonial four main strategies; however, it is powers during the colonial era and the difficult to evaluate the dispersal and security concerns of rival ideological overall effectiveness of these practices. blocs during the Cold War:

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The incompatibility between the have emerged as one of the pillars of physical geography and the political geography that was shaped by the Turkey’s foreign-policy agenda. Issues post-colonial state structures is one such as foreign-development aid;23 of the most significant contradictions peace support missions in Lebanon, in Middle East geopolitics. This incompatibility is at the same time one Afghanistan, Somalia and Kosovo; and the most fundamental reasons for intra- energy/pipeline diplomacy have become 22 region crises. priority areas for Turkey. In the process, Ideological rivalries and enduring Turkey has attempted to shift from a violent conflicts in the region have military-based foreign policy approach created political and, more importantly, to one that is proactive, multi-directional invisible psychological barriers between and has multiple tracks.24 the peoples of the region, and those barriers have been institutionalised by Turkey would also be one of the authoritarian regimes and elites that primary beneficiaries of regional are alienated from their own people. peace and integration therefore Transforming the conflict-producing Turkey’s efforts also aim to serve political and economic structures its own political and economic and improving human potential and interests as well. resilience is the main objective of efforts of structural transformation. Turkey’s Turkey redefined its criteria for official and unofficial contributions contributions to peacekeeping and peace- to regional conflict resolution and support missions on 15 March 2005. development efforts are consistent with According to this document, Turkey this viewpoint. Turkey would also be one required a UN Security Council decision of the primary beneficiaries of regional on the legitimacy of such operations; peace and integration therefore Turkey’s Turkey’s priority areas are designated as efforts also aim to serve its own political the Balkans, Central Asia and the Middle and economic interests as well. East; and the international organisations Turkey’s holistic interpretation of that should collaborate in these areas regional and global problems has are NATO, the EU, the UN and the resonated both at the policy level and OSCE.25 In addition to these criteria at the rhetorical level. Making official and priorities, Turkey also included a contributions to regional peace-building cost-benefit analysis and a clear mandate efforts and encouraging Turkish NGOs as part of the general principles for to become more involved in those efforts contributing to the peacekeeping and

176 Transformative Conflict Resolution in an Unstable Neighbourhood peace-support operations. Turkish Turkey’s development aid. Although President Abdullah Gül also chaired issues related to “hard security” are still the UN Security Council summit on Turkey’s strategic priorities, military “Peacekeeping- Peace Building”. Broader security is no longer Turkey’s top collaboration with regional organisations concern in its regional foreign-policy and increasing civilian capacity have practice. Turkey has started to perceive security and foreign policy in a regional been emphasised by Turkey’s decision and multidimensional way and has makers.26 incorporated economic stability, cultural Security is reinterpreted in a more cooperation, and identity issues, as well comprehensive way, and holistic human as human needs, into its foreign-policy security has become a focal point in agenda.

Figure 1: Turkey’s foreign official development aid (in million US $)

1270

967

780 714

339,15

2004 2006 2008 2010 2011

Source: Data compiled by the author from Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry, Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA), at http://www.tika.gov.tr/en/ [last visited 12 November 2013].

Turkey’s official development and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey agency, the Turkish Development and (TOBB) have been investing in the field Cooperation Agency (TIKA),27 and of structural intervention and peace NGOs such as the Union of Chambers building.28 With its official and non-

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governmental investments, Turkey is the value orientations of the Turkish becoming one of the emerging donors people. Economic inequality and in development and peace building.29 structural problems in underdeveloped Turkey has taken over the Secretariat countries, problems of the UN Security of the UN’s Least Developed Countries Council, cultural discrimination and (LDC) office and held the UN’s Fourth Islamophobia, unilateral military LDC Summit in Istanbul.30 Turkey’s intervention in international conflicts involvement in the LDC secretariat and the disproportionate use of force represents a commitment to the problems have been the main themes of Turkey’s of LDC countries for at least the next public criticisms and moral appeals. decade. Turkey has also undertaken Turkey’s criticism of the US occupation important responsibilities to rebuild of Iraq,31 its clear condemnation of Israel Somalia, which has been suffering from for operations in Lebanon and Gaza,32 hunger and a humanitarian crisis because its efforts to resolve the Iranian nuclear of ongoing political instabilities. problem through diplomatic channels, and its critical attitude towards the Istanbul and Ankara are delegation of Anders Fogh Rasmussen as becoming locations where NATO secretary-general because of his various official and unofficial passive attitude during the cartoon crisis 33 actors from the region can come that insulted Islamic values in Denmark have been perceived negatively in together and express themselves the West. However, Turkey has also to a broader audience. received significant public support in In addition to its constructive role and the MENA region for its stance on these 34 active third-party approach in regional issues. Through these criticisms and affairs at the rhetorical level Turkish interventions, Turkey has also wanted leaders have voiced systemic criticism to demonstrate that its foreign policy is of the malfunctioning institutions independent and principled, one that and processes at the global level where allows it to condemn its allies when there those structures are seen as obstacles are controversies over values. to regional peace and stability. These Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s systemic criticisms resonate with reprimand of Israeli President Shimon Turkish leaders’ ambitions to become Peres at the World Economic Forum a more significant global actor. Turkey meetings and his call to Egypt’s Hosni has used international forums to Mubarak to step down were memorable. criticise policy practices that contradict These same discourses and criticisms

178 Transformative Conflict Resolution in an Unstable Neighbourhood generated scepticism both in Western come together and express themselves to public opinion and domestically. Those a broader audience. Turkey has tried to criticisms and condemnations were prioritise economic and cultural issues considered by the critics of JDP’s foreign and to transform the security-dominated policy in debates about the “axis shift or agenda in the region. change of direction in Turkish foreign Enabling contact and engagement policy”35 and the “Middle Easternisation between peoples and cultures through of Turkish foreign policy”.36 Generating trade, visa-free tourism, cultural controlled tensions and using these exchanges and popular culture such tensions to express commitments as soap operas, movies, music and TV and moral positions is a widely used shows is another pillar of Turkey’s foreign instrument of Turkish foreign policy. policy in the region. Those engagements However, Turkey’s material contributions and civilian interactions have changed to structural peace building efforts had people’s attitudes and perceptions much more concrete impacts. towards each other in positive ways39 and helped dissolve psychological and Forging a multi-dimensional cultural barriers between peoples in the agenda region. Trade and travel in the region have increased drastically in the last In its foreign policy, Turkey has several years40 and many people have gradually evolved from a passive and benefitted from these interactions. As 37 security-oriented actor into an actor demonstrated in Figure 2 Turkey’s overall that can undertake a proactive role trade volume with Middle Eastern in regional peace and stability. Non- countries and neighbours has increased governmental organisations (NGOs) dramatically. Nowadays, there is a wide have started to play a more active role base that supports further cultural and 38 in Turkey’s multi-track diplomacy. economic integration and engagement. Without any doubt, this has become The Turkish government has encouraged possible because of Turkey’s political and supported Turkish companies’ stability and economic growth, as well attempts to invest in the region and to as its efforts to rediscover its cultural, create job opportunities for people in the historical and geographical depth. region. By creating a mutual dependency, Istanbul and Ankara are becoming Turkish policy makers have also aimed to locations where various official and increase Turkey’s political and economic unofficial actors from the region can leverage in the region.

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Figure 2: Turkey’s foreign trade volume with MENA countries (in billion US $)

400 20% 16% 17% 300 6% 15% 13% 11% 12% 200 10% 100 5%

0 0% 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2011

Turkey’s trade volume with the Middle East and North Africa

Turkey’s total foreign trade volume

Ratio of Middle East and North Africa in Turkey’s total foreign trade volume (%)

Source: Data compiled by the author from Turkish Statistical Institute, at http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/Start. do;jsessionid=ydj0TfFLhGpvPZc9t3s3W02hW540h5TNmLyTfJHpyM49BVrZvSp2!-138871134 [last visited 12 November 2013].

Non-state actors such as NGOs, that benefit from trade and other business organisations and charitable interactions with Turkey have advocated organisations have started to play for an improvement of relations between a more active and effective role in northern Iraq and Turkey. Regional 41 42 making foreign policy. As trade, interdependency based on cultural tourism, education, culture and non- and economic exchange has helped to governmental activities have come reduce the potential for conflict and to prominence, the actors carrying focused relations on mutual gains rather out these activities have strengthened than strategic competition. Because of their position in the making of foreign policy. These elements have eventually the contextual transformations in the become major components in Turkey’s aftermath of the “Arab Spring”, especially soft power.43 Turkish manufactured because of increasing tensions in Syria, goods and cultural products have Iraq and Lebanon, security-oriented created some sympathy towards Turkey issues have started to dominate Turkey’s in northern Iraq. Furthermore, actors policies in the region as well.

180 Transformative Conflict Resolution in an Unstable Neighbourhood

Figure 3: Travel records of citizens of Middle East and North Africa countries (based on individuals)

Arab countries in total North Africa total

1893170

1168094

411530 219637 244173 135296 194546 38070

1991 2002 2008 2010

Source: Data compiled by the author from Republic of Turkey Ministry of Culture and Tourism, at http:// www.kultur.gov.tr/?_dil=2 [last visited 16 November 2013]. Crisis-free communication with challenges in performing third-party existing actors tasks in the region. First, because of its Ottoman imperial legacy, Turkey used At the relational level Turkish policy to have a quite a bleak public image in makers have tried to deepen their the region. Second, the security-oriented communication and cooperation with agenda of the Cold War era disconnected regional actors, including non-state the peoples of the region from each other. actors, in a crisis-free environment. One of the important pillars of Turkey’s However, while engaging and activism in the region has been the task empowering non-state actors and of building trust and transforming its extending some compensation in order public image at both the elite and popular to integrate them into political processes levels. Turkey’s main goals have been to has become one of the pillars of Turkish de-securitise regional policy, invest in foreign policy, this has led to scepticism soft power44 and increase the region’s about Turkey’s regional intentions. cultural and economic integration45 and Turkey faces certain limitations and become an influential regional actor as

181 Talha Köse

an active peace broker. All these tasks are sustained dialogue and structural peace interrelated in its holistic foreign-policy building are becoming essential pillars enterprise. of contemporary Turkish foreign policy. Overall, Turkey’s third-party approach One of the important pillars of and conflict-resolution initiatives in the Turkey’s activism in the region region constitute a coherent style. has been the task of building Turkey has shifted its diplomatic trust and transforming its practice from a crisis- or conflict- public image at both the elite oriented policy to a communication- and popular levels. and conciliation-oriented one. The notion of rhythmic diplomacy aims At the official level, Turkey has to ensure Turkey’s active participation established certain cooperation and and intervention in regional and global conflict-resolution mechanisms.forums as a responsible member of Platforms such as the Stability the international community. Turkey and Cooperation Platform and the has tried to keep regular contacts with Alliance of Civilisations project, international actors and to pursue together with the establishment of high- dynamic peacetime diplomacy. The level strategic councils with Russian policy of promoting maximum regional Federation, Greece, Iraq and Syria, cooperation and collaborative decision- show an attempt to institutionalise making even before the emergence of communication, cooperation and crises or problems has been pursued both conflict-management efforts. Turkey at official and unofficial levels. Turkey’s also took over the secretariat of the UN’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet LDC office and conducted the LDC’s Davutoğlu has described this strategy fourth summit. Together with Finland, as “rhythmic diplomacy”. The aim of Turkey launched the “Mediation for Turkey’s “rhythmic diplomacy” has been Peace” initiative in September 2010. On to move Turkey’s diplomatic relations 22 June 2010, the UN General Assembly with its counterparts from negative peace adopted a resolution on mediation to positive peace where there is common by consensus, which was initiated understanding, trust, and collaborative by Turkey. The economy, cultural decision making. exchange, public diplomacy, crisis- management instruments, confidence- Turkey’s strategy has aimed to generate building measures, mechanisms of a consensus based on a mutual agreement

182 Transformative Conflict Resolution in an Unstable Neighbourhood on positive future relations and has has also taken a more active role in the continued through different paths such international organisations of which it is as joint actions in international forums a member. The Alliance of Civilisations and organisations, free-trade agreements (AoC), Turkey’s joint initiative with (FTAs), high-level cooperation councils, Spain, is an important initiative for high-level strategic dialogues and high- macro-level CR46 that tries to address level strategic cooperation councils. the problems of cultural and religious Turkey has developed political- intolerance and misunderstanding. consultation mechanisms with Egypt, Turkish diplomats and politicians have Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Tunisia, tried to use these international forums to Morocco, Libya, Oman, Qatar and shape public opinion and express their Bahrain. It has also become part of vision to a broader audience. Overall, the the Turkish Arab Cooperation Forum objective of Turkey’s rhythmic diplomacy and initiated the High-Level Strategic is to set a sustainable agenda to deepen its Dialogue with the Gulf Cooperation relations in order to reach positive peace Council. It also signed FTAs with Egypt and maximum cooperation with the (2005), Syria (2007), Jordan (2009) countries and international organisations and Morocco (2006). In its bilateral around Turkey. relations, Turkey formed high-level strategic cooperation councils with Iraq (2008), Syria (2009) and Lebanon The notion of rhythmic (2010). Through these mechanisms, diplomacy aims to ensure Turkey has tried to deepen its relations Turkey’s active participation with MENA countries. and intervention in regional and global forums as a responsible Turkey has also undertaken leadership member of the international roles and initiatives within international community. organisations. In addition to its non- permanent membership in the UN Security Council (2009-2010), it is also Another important policy to transform a member of the Organisation of the the actors has been to engage with Islamic Conference (OIC), the G-20 the non-state actors and to a certain and the Conference on Interaction and extend the actors that are considered as Confidence-Building Measures in Asia “spoilers”. The Turkish government has (CICA), for which it is currently serving tried to empower marginalised actors, a term as president. Furthermore, Turkey some of which are considered spoilers,

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and rather than isolating and containing motivates some of those groups to not them, Turkey has tried to integrate them participate in a system of democratic into the political processes. “Spoilers” government. Within such a context, are defined as actors that are actively armed militias and illegal organisations engaged in violent actions aimed at turn into political actors. Turkey has undermining a peace process.47 There are tried to maintain its contact with many groups, some of which have wide political representatives of non-state constituent bases and social legitimacy, in actors, some of which are considered the Middle East that are not in favour of spoilers, including Hamas, Hezbollah peace or a negotiation processes. Ethnic, and Iraqi Sunni resistance groups. The sectarian, religious, tribal and political main objective of this policy has been divides in the Middle East do not allow to keep communication channels open for the formation of monolithic political with all the central stakeholders in multi- entities that ensure fair representation ethnic countries such as Iraq, Palestine, of all groups. Davutoğlu has argued Afghanistan and Lebanon.48 that it is not possible to achieve holistic Turkish decision makers have taken and sustainable peace and order in the the electoral success of organisations region without negotiating with all the such as Hamas and Hezbollah as signs important political actors. Anchoring of their social and political legitimacy those actors to political processes is in their communities. Furthermore, it considered to be a better option to has been considered a better strategy to contain the spread of violence. Turkish recognise those groups as political actors leaders have tried to develop relations in order to curtail their tendency to with those leaders who have legitimacy resort to violence. This strategy indicates in their ethnic, religious and sectarian a clear change in the guiding principles communities. of Turkey’s foreign policy, because in the past Turkey often refrained from publicly Hamas and Hezbollah as signs and officially engaging with non-state of their social and political actors. Turkey has even advocated on legitimacy in their communities. behalf of some of these groups and tried to empower them as political actors, thus gaining leverage with them. Turkey’s Prevailing regimes in the region acceptance of Hamas and its efforts to have failed to represent the political keep communication channels open aspirations of all these groups, which with political factions in Iraq, Palestine,

184 Transformative Conflict Resolution in an Unstable Neighbourhood

Lebanon and Syria have been criticised improve its bilateral relations and deepen by Turkey’s Western allies and neighbours relations with its neighbouring regions like Iran and Syria.49 The Turkish have been the key policies in its third- government has tried to empower and party activism. For several years Turkey legitimise those groups to a certain had tried to develop positive relations extent by providing them a forum to with Bashar al Assad of Syria in order to express their views. Overall, Turkey has transform Syria into a more constructive acquired some leverage on these spoilers player in the region. Together with groups, but it is not clear whether this Brazil, Turkey also tried to find non- leverage can be used effectively during coercive methods resolve the Iranian periods of crisis. nuclear issue. Turkish leaders have tried to intervene quickly in situations of Inventing new rules and norms political tension to prevent the further of constructive communication escalation or spread of the conflicts, and to bring all the parties to the table or at and cooperation least keep them as potential negotiating partners. Those efforts have often Building trust and developing not received publicity because of the relationships based on constructive undisclosed nature of the engagements. communication norms has been one of the characteristics of Turkey’s regional policies. An important aspect of Turkey’s Other regional actors have foreign policy as a holistic enterprise was occasionally interpreted Turkey’s to transform communication norms not interventions as pro-Sunni, yet only with its neighbours but also among Turkey has often defended a its neighbours. As a communication and post-sectarian position as part third-party intervention method Turkish of its vision of regional order. leaders have tried to resort to local idioms and cultural codes. Turkey has put special emphasis Turkey has used communications- on mediation efforts in international oriented third-party approaches such conflicts, and, together with Finland, as mediation, facilitation, good offices, it launched the “Mediation for Peace” crisis management, shuttle diplomacy initiative in September 2010 at the UN. and informal consultations in its recent This initiative aimed to highlight the foreign-policy practice. Turkey’s efforts to importance of preventive diplomacy

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and mediation in the resolution of of opinion with regard to the future of international conflicts and called for relations with Iran, but the provisions the allocation of more resources for of the deal may prove useful for future mediation and other preventive efforts agreements. Turkey has made successful not only by the UN but also by regional attempts to engage Sunni groups- which organisations. Turkey organised a summit support resistance ones- more actively titled “Peacekeeping- Peacebuilding” in the future of a united Iraq.52 Turkey on 23 September 2010 with the has also played a mediator role between participation of President Abdullah Gül. Hamas and the PLO in Palestine. Turkey’s resolution, which was adopted by consensus by the UN General Foreign-policy makers have Assembly on 22 June 2010, is the only tried to reduce the security resolution about mediation that has been adopted by the UN. concerns of its neighbours, thus opening a space for better- Turkey has gained access to almost all quality engagement. ethnic, sectarian, and religious groups in the region as a consequence of this activism. Turkish officials have also got in Turkey’s interventions as a third party touch with most of the influential political are not simply communication and leaders throughout the region. Especially facilitation strategies, nor can they be in Lebanon, Iraq and Palestine, Turkish explained solely as a pragmatic attempt efforts have tried to bridge sectarian and by Turkey to safeguard its own security. factional divisions. Other regional actors Turkey has a specific notion of inter- have occasionally interpreted Turkey’s communal peace and regional order, interventions as pro-Sunni, yet Turkey and a holistic vision of security that is has often defended a post-sectarian inspired by a pax Ottomana. There are position as part of its vision of regional no explicit references to the Ottoman order. Ankara has also acted as a mediator legacy or a pax Ottomana in Davutoğlu’s between Israel and Syria while making discourse as a mediator, but his practice efforts to reach a consensus between Iraq is inspired by Turkey’s historical legacy and Syria.50 Together with Brazil, Turkey in the region. Davutoğlu believes that, has conducted active diplomacy to because of its historical experience in resolve the Iranian nuclear crisis through ruling the region for centuries, Turkey diplomatic channels.51 The nuclear has many advantages that can allow it swap deal failed due to the differences to communicate and cooperate with

186 Transformative Conflict Resolution in an Unstable Neighbourhood all parties, understand their concerns concerns of its neighbours, thus opening and interests succinctly and discuss all a space for better-quality engagement. issues sincerely. The distinctive features This “zero problems with neighbours” of Turkish mediation in recent years policy had enabled a constructive are the strong historical references to transformation of Turkey’s relations with and inspirations from a pax Ottomana. its neighbours until the deterioration As opinion surveys53 also show, Turkey’s of its relations with Syria. The main efforts in conflict resolution and active logic behind this policy is to change the third-party initiatives have been received prevailing notion of “we are surrounded positively in the region. by enemies” within Turkish society with The principle or vision of “zero problems a notion of “all our neighbours are our with neighbours” is the most well-known potential friends”, and cooperation is a and most frequently mentioned objective better way to deal with problems rather of Turkey’s new foreign-policy vision. than competition or confrontation. The “zero problems with neighbours” discourse should also be considered a natural consequence of the notion of a The mismatch between the pax Ottomana or from Turkey’s efforts discourse and the actual policy to reconnect positively with the people performance can be explained in its neighbourhood. Indeed, Turkish with the limitations of the foreign policy is identified with the transformative CR approach, slogan of “zero problems”, which is Turkey’s constraints and wide quite an inaccurate reading of Turkish scale contextual transformation foreign-policy practices during the last in the region. several years. This vision has tried to de-securitise Turkey’s relations with its neighbours, thus opening a space for more Nowadays, the vision of “zero problems constructive engagements in the cultural with neighbours” is subject to heavy and economic fields. Turkey has also criticism because Turkey is experiencing tried to build trust with its neighbours tensions with political elites in Syria and by indicating a clear commitment to Iraq and tense relations with Israel. The peace and friendly relations rather than vision of “zero problems with neighbours” competition for power and influence has never been the fundamental pillar in the region. Turkish foreign-policy of Turkey’s overall objective of being makers have tried to reduce the security an “order-building actor”. The “zero

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problems with neighbours” vision is a The mismatch between the discourse discursive intervention that has aimed and the actual policy performance can to reframe the often passively interpreted be explained with the limitations of the motto of Turkish foreign policy, “Peace transformative CR approach, Turkey’s at Home, Peace in the World”. constraints and wide scale contextual transformation in the region. What Went Wrong? The As Ryan mentions the transformative Limits of Transformative CR agenda necessitates a normative in the Middle East consensus, a normative judgment about what is wrong about the situation and Turkish foreign-policy decision what needs to be changed.55 Turkey’s makers have systematically tried to normative judgments about the region promote the holistic notion of peace based on the notion of a pax Ottomana and order through transformative CR. and its diagnosis of the sources of the These policies are compatible with problems in the region is not shared Turkey’s interests and priorities in the with the other important regional fields of regional security and economic players such as Iran and Saudi Arabia, integration. The most visible aspect of nor with other global actors such as Turkey’s proactive diplomacy has been the US, Russia and China. On the other official third-party efforts implemented hand those policies were not purely by bureaucratic and political elites. normative oriented policies: they also This proactive foreign policy can be aimed to promote Turkey’s regional considered a paradigm shift in Turkish interests and ambitions. Turkey’s efforts foreign policy.54 However, this paradigm to overcome political, economic and shift could not achieve its goals of social fragmentations in the region were transforming the conflicts in the region. perceived sceptically by other powers in The political instability in Syria has the region in the aftermath of contextual demonstrated that, within the dynamic transformations. Furthermore, it is quite security environment of the MENA difficult to lead such a transformation region, the role of an “order-instituting without the use of coercive tools and country” and the tasks of transformative techniques where there are strong status CR necessitate both more effective quo forces. Turkey’s third-party roles coercive tools and better coordination have been constrained after its more with other regional and global actors. direct involvement in disputes with

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Israel and Syria and tensions with the Another significant limitation of these Maliki government in Iraq. policies is that transformative CR tries to avoid coercive foreign policy tools as Limitations inherent to Turkey’s much as possible. Turkey invests less in transformative conflict-resolution military security and has constrained practices can be summarised as the the arms race in the region. Some problem of acceptability and the analysts argue that this “soft foreign antagonistic attitudes of potential policy” has limited Turkey’s deterrence rivals in the region. Third parties can potential in the region, thus making it only function with the acceptance less secure in times of tension. Those and approval of the primary parties limitations constitute serious challenges involved in the conflicts in the region. to Turkey’s ability to execute policies Turkey’s foreign policy agenda is not based on transformative CR. Turkey has solely defined by normative concerns, abandoned the holistic collective security indeed holistic notion of collective and peace approach and returned to a security and economic benefits out of balance of powers approach, especially broader trade and human mobility have in Syria and Iraq. The uncertainty caused served Turkey’s interests more than its competitors in the region. Furthermore, by the Arab revolts and the political crisis Turkey’s engagement and contacts with in Syria have generated serious security Hamas, Hezbollah and Iraqi Sunni challenges for Turkey, which cannot be groups, its tensions with Israel due to addressed solely with the tools of CR. the Mavi Marmara and Davos crises, and its neutral position on the issue of The more limited and less the Iranian nuclear crisis have disturbed ambitious agendas of conflict 56 Turkey’s European allies and the USA. prevention and conflict Those actors wanted to see Turkey as a management were relatively loyal ally rather than a neutral or critical more successful in Turkey’s actor in the Middle East, and Turkey’s conflict resolution practice in policies in these areas created a trust the Middle East. vacuum for a while. Turkey’s strategic vision for the region and regional interests have contradicted with the Lastly, the tectonic change in the interests of other regional players, and MENA region due to the Arab revolts has thus Turkey has lost the status of trusted led to uncertainties. No single country and neutral third party. or group of countries was able to predict

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and shape the course of this structural coordination with international or transformation. Although Turkey has regional organisations and local network mobilised significant resources both at building. The more limited and less the civilian and official levels, Turkish ambitious agendas of conflict prevention efforts to transform the region and and conflict management were relatively institute order have been too ambitious more successful in Turkey’s conflict because of the tensions and violent resolution practice in the Middle East. It conflicts in the region are so widespread. seems that CM will continue to be more CT in Turkey’s neighbourhood can compatible with Turkey’s foreign policy only be achieved with the participation objectives in the post-“Arab Spring” of more stakeholders and with better context.

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Endnotes

1 Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Türkiye Merkez Ülke Olmalı”, Radikal, 26 February 2004. Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu has challenged the frequently used bridge metaphor that locates Turkey between the East and West, Europe and Asia. Davutoğlu instead emphasises the metaphor of a “centre country”, which signifies an important change in Turkey’s new foreign policy. See, Lerna K. Yanık, “The Metamorphosis of Metaphors of Vision: ‘Bridging’ Turkey’s Location, Role and Identity after the End of the Cold War”, Geopolitics, Vol. 14, No. 3 (2009), pp. 531-549. 2 Several terms are used to define the “field”, including “conflict resolution” (CR) “conflict transformation”, “conflict management” and “peace studies”. In this study, I prefer to use CR, which is the earliest and most widely accepted term to define the discipline. In this study, I further distinguish between “CR” and “conflict resolution” in order to avoid confusion. The former is used to denote the discipline, while the latter is used to denote the practice. 3 In the popular and academic literatures, the term “Arab Spring” is frequently used to denote the series of political transformations in the Middle East and North Africa, which started with the popular revolts in Tunisia in December 2010. I have adopted this term because it is the one most commonly used to define the ongoing political transformation in the MENA region. 4 Johannes Botes, “Structural Transformation”, in Daniel Druckman, Larissa Fast and Sandra I. Cheldelin (eds.), Conflict: From Analysis to Intervention, London, Continuum, 2003, pp. 269-290. 5 Adam Curle, Making Peace, London, Tavistock Publications, 1971; Johann Galtung, “Conflict Resolution as Conflict Transformation: The First Law of Thermodynamics Revisited”, in Kumar Rupensinghe (ed.), Conflict Transformation, New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1995, pp. 51-64; Johann Galtung, Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization, London, Sage Publications, 1996; John Paul Lederach, Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation Across Cultures, Syracuse, NY, Syracuse University Press, 1995; John Paul Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies, Washington DC, USIP, 1997; Raimo Väyrynen, “To Settle or to Transform? Perspectives on the Resolution of National and International Conflict”, in Raimo Väyrynen (ed.), New Directions in Conflict Theory, Thousand Oaks, CA, Sage Publications, 1991, pp. 1-25 ; Kumar Rupesinghe, Conflict Transformation, London, Macmillan, 1995. 6 Christopher Mitchell, “Beyond Resolution: What Does Conflict Transformation Actually Transform”, Peace and Conflict Studies, Vol. 9, No. 1 (2002), pp. 1-23. 7 David Bloomfield and Ben Reilly, “The Changing Nature of Conflict and Conflict Management”, in Peter Harris and Ben Reilly (eds.), Democracy and Deep-Rooted Conflict: Options for Negotiators, Stockholm, International IDEA, 1998, pp. 7-28. 8 Dan Snodderly, Peace Terms: Glossary of Terms for Conflict Management and Peacebuilding, Washington DC, USIP, 2011, p. 15. 9 Ibid. 10 Oliver Ramsbotham, TomWoodhouse and Hugh Miall, Contemporary Conflict Resolution, 3rd edition, Cambridge, Polity, 2011, p. 9.

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11 Lederach, Building Peace; Johannes Botes, “Conflict Transformation: A Debate Over Semantics or a Crucial Shift in the Theory and Practice of Peace and Conflict Studies?”, International Journal of Peace Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2 (2003), pp. 1-28. 12 Mitchell, “Beyond Resolution”, pp. 16. 13 Lederach, Preparing for Peace; Lederach, Building Peace. 14 Robert A. Baruch Bush, “Efficiency and Protection, or Empowerment and Recognition: The Mediator’s Role and Ethical Standards in Mediation”, Florida Law Review, Vol. 41 (1989), pp. 253-289; Robert A. Baruch Bush and Joseph Folger, The Promise of Mediation, revised edition, San Francisco, Jossey-Bass, 2005. 15 Väyrynen, “To Settle or to Transform?”, p. 163. 16 “Davutoğlu: ‘Türkiye Düzen Kurucu Bir Ülke’”, Hürriyet, 23 June 2009. 17 In its second term (2007-2011), the JDP administration consolidated its power in the domestic context vis-à-vis the military and the bureaucratic establishment, and, more importantly, Turkey’s security concerns with regard to the future of Iraq have been kept to a minimum. 18 Rupesinghe, Conflict Transformation; Lederach, Building Peace. 19 Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Birleşmiş Milletler Teşkilatı Ve Türkiye”, at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/birlesmis-milletler-teskilati-ve-turkiye.tr.mfa [last visited 7 April 2013]. 20 Väyrynen, “To Settle or to Transform?”, pp. 1-25. 21 Ahmet Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye’nin Uluslararası Konumu, İstanbul, Küre Yayınları, 2001. 22 Ibid., p. 140. 23 Hakan Fidan and Rahman Nurdun, “Turkey’s Role in the Global Development Assistance Community: The Case of TIKA (Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency)”, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, Vol. 10, No. 1 (2008), pp. 93-111. 24 Fuat E. Keyman, Turkish Foreign Policy in the Era of Global Turmoil, Policy Report No. 39, Ankara, SETA Foundation, 2009. 25 Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Policy of Zero Problems with Our Neighbors”, at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/policy-of-zero-problems-with-our-neighbors.en.mfa [last visited 17 August 2013]. 26 Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, “President Gül Underlines the Need for a More Active Security Council”, at http://www.tccb.gov.tr/news/397/77359/gul-underlines-the-need-for- a-more-active-security-council.html [last visited 6 June 2013]. 27 Fidan and Nurdun, “Turkey’s Role in the Global Development Assistance Community”, pp. 93-111. 28 Meliha Benli-Altunışık and Esra Çuhadar, “Turkey’s Search for a Third Party Role in Arab- Israeli Conflicts: A Neutral Facilitator or a Principal Power Mediator?”, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 15, No. 3 (2010), pp. 371-392; Talha Köse, “Türk Dış Politikasının Ortadoğu’daki Yeni Kimliği ve Çatışma Çözümlerini Keşfi”, in Burhanettin Duran, Kemal İnat and Mesut Özcan, Türk Dış Politikası Yıllığı 2010, Ankara, SETA Yayınları, 2011, pp. 621-661.

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29 Fidan and Nurdun, “Turkey’s Role in the Global Development Assistance Community”. 30 “Turkey to Host UN Summit on Least Developed Countries”, Ahram Online, 12 April 2011, at http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/2/9/9887/World/International/Turkey-to- host-UN-summit-on-least-developed-countr.aspx [last visited 1 July 2012]. 31 According to Öniş and Yılmaz, the period between 1 March 2003 and 5 November 2007 marked the lowest period in Turkish-American relations since the 1975-1978 embargo. See, Ziya Öniş and Şuhnaz Yılmaz, “Between Europeanization and Euroasianism: Foreign Policy Activism in Turkey During the AKP Era”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 10, No. 1 (2009), pp. 7-24. 32 “Davutoğlu: Gazze Saldırısı, Türkiye İsrail İlişkilerinde Dönüm Noktası Oldu”, Zaman, 1 December 2010. 33 “Turkish PM Opposed to Rasmussen’s NATO Bid”, FRANCE 24, 3 April 2009. 34 “2010 Arab Public Opinion Poll: Obama’s Popularity Decreases while Erdogan’s Popularity Increases”, zimbio.com, 10 August 2011. 35 Philip Gordon and Ömer Taşpınar, “Turkey on the Brink”, Washington Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 3 (2006), pp. 57-70; James Kitfield, “Who Lost Turkey? Did Our NATO Ally Shift Its Allegiances After Deadly Attacks On Its Gaza Aid Shi, Or Has This Been Building Up”, at http://www.nationaljournal.com/njonline/ns_20100621_3616.php [last visited 7 July 2013]. 36 Tarık Oğuzlu, “Middle Easternization of Turkey’s Foreign Policy: Does Turkey Dissociate from the West?”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 9, No. 1 (2008), pp. 3-20. 37 During the Turgut Özal presidency in the early 1990s, as well as during period when İsmail Cem was Foreign Minister (1997-2002), Turkey attempted to abandon its passive and security-oriented foreign-policy paradigm, but these attempts proved unsustainable due to its economic and political instabilities. See, Meliha Benli-Altunışık, “Worldviews and Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East”, New Perspectives on Turkey, Vol. 40 (Spring 2009), pp. 179-185. 38 Kerem Öktem, “Projecting Power: Non-Conventional Policy Actors in Turkey’s International Relations”, in Kerem Öktem, Ayşe Kadıoğlu and Mehmet Karlı (eds.), Another Empire? A Decade of Turkey’s Foreign Policy Under the Justice and Development Party, İstanbul, İstanbul Bilgi University Press, 2012, pp. 77-108. 39 Mensur Akgün and Sabiha Senyücel-Gündoğar, Ortadoğu’da Türkiye Algısı 2011, Istanbul, TESEV, 2012. 40 Mehmet Babacan, Whither Axis Shift: A Perspective from Turkey’s Foreign Trade, SETA Policy Report No. 4, Ankara, SETA, 2010; Kemal Kirişci and Neslihan Kaptanoğlu, “The Politics of Trade and Turkish Foreign Policy”, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 47, No. 5 (September 2011), pp. 705-724. 41 Ahmet Sözen, “A Paradigm Shift in Turkish Foreign Policy: Transition and Challenges”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 11, No. 1 (March 2010), pp. 103-123. 42 Kemal Kirişci, “The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading State”, New Perspectives on Turkey, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Spring 2009), pp. 29-57.

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43 Basheer M. Nafi, “The Arabs and Modern Turkey: A Century of Changing Perceptions”, Insight Turkey, Vol. 11, No. 1 (2009), pp. 63-82; Tarık Oğuzlu, “Soft Power in Turkish Foreign Policy”, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 61, No. 1 (March 2007), pp. 81-97. 44 Meliha Benli-Altunışık, “The Possibilities and Limits of Turkey’s Soft Power in the Middle East”, Insight Turkey, Vol. 10, No. 2 (2008), pp. 41-54; Oğuzlu, “Middle Easternization of Turkey’s Foreign Policy”. 45 Öktem, “Projecting Power”, Sadık Ünay, “Economic Diplomacy for Competitiveness: Globalization and Turkey’s New Foreign Policy”, Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 15, No. 3-4 (Autumn-Winter 2010), pp. 21-47. 46 Talha Köse, “The Alliance of Civilizations: Possibilities of Conflict Resolution at the Civilizational Level”, Insight Turkey, Vol. 11, No. 3 (2009), pp. 77-94; Ali Balcı and Nebi Miş, “Turkey’s Role in the Alliance of Civilizations: A New Perspective in Turkish Foreign Policy?”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 9, No. 3 (September 2008), pp. 387-406. 47 Karin Aggestam, “Internal and External Dynamics of Spoiling: A Negotiation Approach”, in Edward Newman and Oliver Richmond (eds.), Challenges to Peacebuilding: Managing Spoilers During Conflict Resolution, Tokyo, New York, United Nations University Press, 2006, pp. 23- 39. 48 Gürkan Zengin, Hoca: Türk Dış Politikası’nda Davutoğlu Etkisi, İstanbul, İnkilap Kitabevi, 2011, pp. 265-271. 49 Soner Çağaptay, “Is Turkey Leaving the West?”, Foreign Affairs, 26 October 2009. 50 Burak Ege Bekdil and Ümit Enginsoy, “Turkey To Have Triple Role in Libya Mission”, Defense News, 2011; “Irak İle Suriye’ye ‘Barışın’ Baskısı”, Radikal, 18 August 2009. 51 Ivan Watson and Mitra Mobasherat, “Turkey: Iran Nuclear Swap Offer Shows ‘Vision’”, at http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/europe/05/18/iran.nuclear/ [last visited 22 August 2013]. 52 Zengin, Hoca, pp. 265-271. 53 Akgün and Senyücel-Gündoğar, Ortadoğu’da Türkiye Algısı 2011. 54 Sözen, “A Paradigm Shift in Turkish Foreign Policy”. 55 Stephen Ryan, “Conflict Transformation: Reasons to be Modest”, in Dennis Sandole, Sean Byrne, Ingrid Sandole-Staroste and Jessica Senehi (eds.), Handbook of Conflict Analysis and Resolution, New York, Routledge, 2008, p. 305. 56 Çağaptay, “Is Turkey Leaving the West?”.

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