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247 © the Author(S) 2019 F. Rezaei, Iran's Foreign Policy After The INDEX1 NUMBERS AND SYMBOLS al-Zaafran, 67 20-Year Perspective Document, 54 Ali e Ahmad, Jalal, 13 AML, see Anti-Money Laundering Ansar-e-Hezbollah, 43 A Anti-Access/Anti-Denial (A2/AD), 36 A2/AD, see Anti-Access/Anti-Denial Anti-Money Laundering (AML), 100 Abadgaran, 9, 32 Arabian Peninsula, 15, 179 Abdullah Azzam Brigades, 181 Arab Spring, 35, 62, 63, 144, Aerospace Force, 30–32, 54, 130 166–168, 196, 197, 245 Aerospace Industries Organization Araghi, Abdullah, 43 (AIO), 97 Arak heavy water research Afghanistan, 15, 33, 52, 122, reactor, 28, 33 124, 234 Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, 117, 130 Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud, 4, 14, 40, Assad regime, 64, 67, 68, 71, 54, 62, 63, 87, 121n21, 122, 157, 208 218, 218n9, 218n10, 243 Astana, 69, 71, 155, 156n39, 204, AIO, see Aerospace Industries 205, 235, 245 Organization Aydon, 67 al-Amiri, Hadi, 125 Azarakhsh, 57 Al-Latamneh, 67 Azim Gostaresh Hormoz Shipbuilding al-Rastan, 67 Industry, 90 1 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes. © The Author(s) 2019 247 F. Rezaei, Iran’s Foreign Policy After the Nuclear Agreement, Middle East Today, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-76789-5 248 INDEX B CISADA, see Comprehensive Iran Baath Battalions, The, 147 Sanctions, Accountability, and Bab al-Mandeb, 35, 39, 169, 171, 177 Divestment Act al-Baghdadi, Abu Omar, 126, 127 Citibank, 23 Bahai, 42 Coalition of Islamic Societies, 7 Bahrain, 166, 167, 169, 175, Command and Control, Battle 176, 182 Management, Communications Bandar bin Sultan, Prince, 181 (C2BMC), 178 Bank Melli Iran (BMI), 17, 100 Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Bank Refah, 24 Accountability, and Divestment Bank Saderat, 22 Act (CISADA), 23 Bank Tejarat, 24 Council of Ministers, 1 Baquba, 155 Countering Iran’s Destabilizing BARJAM, see Barname Jame Eghdam Activities Act of 2017 Moshtara (CIDAA-­2017), 96, 97 Barname Jame Eghdam Moshtarak (BARJAM), 25 Basij, 3, 5–10, 42, 43, 102, 103, 145, D 147, 167, 173, 216n2, 217 Damascus, 64, 71, 132, 132n49, Battalions of Hezbollah, 117 141–148, 155, 198, 202, 205, Bonyad Mostazafan, 4 227, 230 Bonyad Shahid va Omur-e Janbazan, 4 Davutoglu, Ahmet, 198–200 Bush, George W., 85, 114, 120, 144 Dehnavi, Hassan Zareh, 42 Bushehr reactor, 51 Dehqhan, Hossein, 60 Deir al-Zour, 155 Deir Fol, 67 C Dialogue among Civilizations, 8 C2BMC, see Command and Control, Dunford, Joseph, 72, 156 Battle Management, Communications Cavasoglu, Mevlut, 204 E CENTCOM, see Central Command ECHR, see European Convention on Center for Borderless Security Human Rights Analysis, 14 ElBaradei, Mohammed, 87 Central Command (CENTCOM), 26, EU, see European Union 39, 121, 176, 179 Europäisch-Iranische Handelsbank, 24 China, 29, 53, 54, 58, 69, 71, European Convention on Human 87, 98 Rights (ECHR), 102 Chizari, 145, 147 European Union (EU), 24, 28–30, CIDAA-2017, see Countering 85–89, 95–98, 101–106, 170, Iran’s Destabilizing Activities 196n18, 244 Act of 2017 Executive Order (EO), 24, 25 INDEX 249 F Hezbollah, 9, 10, 15, 43, 65, 73, 141, Fatemiyoun Brigade, 147, 150 144, 146, 147, 149–151, 155, FDI, see Foreign Direct Investment 219–221, 219n12, 219n13, Firuzabadi, Hassan, 104 225–236, 225n30, 225n31, Flynn, Michael T., 31 226n33, 226n34, 227n35, Fordow, 27–29 227n36, 228n39, 228n40, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), 17 231n45, 232n48, 234n52, Foreign terrorist organization 235n55, 244 (FTO), 15 Holocaust, 87, 221–223 Foundation of Martyrs and Veterans Homs, 71, 149, 151, 155, 198 Affairs, 4 Houthis, 15, 165, 168–170, 179, France, 29, 69, 84, 87, 89, 92, 181, 201, 230 94, 98, 102 HSBC, 23 Free Syrian Army (FSA), 67, 145–146, Human Rights Reform, 43n53 149, 198, 198n24, 199, 201 HWPP, see Heavy Water Power Plant FSA, see Free Syrian Army FTO, see Foreign terrorist organization Future Bank, 24 I IAEA, see International Atomic Energy Agency G IDF, 219, 220, 227, 227n35, 229, Gasht-e Ershad, 42 231–233, 233n51, 235, 245 Gazprom, 57 Idlib, 70, 71, 154, 155, 204–207, General Intelligence Directorate 205n45 (GID), 147, 179 IDRO Group, 4 Germany, 2, 29, 69, 84, 87–89, 94, ILSA, see Iran-Libya Sanctions Act 98, 99, 195 Imam Hossein Brigade, 150 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 52 Imam Hossein University, 14, 150, Great Britain, 29, 84, 85, 87 151, 227 Great Satan, 21, 26n11 IMF, see International Monetary Fund Green Movement, 10, 16, 145 Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), 117 Improvised Rocket-Assisted Mortars H (IRAMs), 117 al-Hakaymah, Mohammad Khalil, 124 India, 15, 25, 53, 57, 58, 69n45 al-Hakim, Abdul Aziz, 118, 120, Industrial Development and 120n18, 121 Renovation Organization of Iran Hama, 67, 146, 198n23 (IDRO), 4, 61 Haqqani, 8, 15, 22, 43, 101, 148, International Atomic Energy Agency 173, 218, 219, 244 (IAEA), 16, 27–30, 33, Heavy Water Power Plant (HWPP), 28 85–87, 195 Hezb-e Kaargozaaraan-e Saazandegi, 35 International Monetary Fund Hezb Etedal va Tose, 16 (IMF), 95 250 INDEX Investment Co-operation 130n40, 131n42, 131n45, Commission, 94 131n46, 132n47, 132n48, IR-1, 27 133n51, 133n52, 141–144, 146, Iran, 1–3, 5–7, 9, 10, 12, 14–17, 148–150, 155, 164, 165, 168, 21–45, 52–74, 52n2, 54n8, 176, 192–193, 199–200, 54n9, 54n10, 55–56n12, 56n13, 203–208, 216, 234, 244–245 58n18, 59n20, 59n21, 60n22, IRGC, see Islamic Revolutionary 60n23, 60n26, 61n27, 71n50, Guards Corps 71n51, 83–106, 113–125, IRGC Aerospace Force (IRGCAF), 30 114n4, 116n8, 116n9, 117n10, IRGCAF, see IRGC Aerospace Force 118n12, 118n14, 119n15, IRGC-QF, see Islamic Revolutionary 119n16, 121n21, 122n22, Guards Corps and Quds Force 123n25, 129–136, 129n38, ISIS, see Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 130n40, 131n42, 131n44, Islamic Republic, 1, 2, 15, 15n20, 21, 131n45, 131n46, 132n47, 26, 33n30, 36, 40–42, 51, 55, 132n48, 132n49, 133n51, 83, 89n15, 95, 105n61, 113, 134n53, 141, 163–167, 114, 119n16, 143, 145, 198, 169–172, 175–177, 179–183, 207, 216n5, 218n9, 221, 222 189–208, 215–218, 216n5, Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps 218n9, 219n13, 221–223, (IRGC), 2–5, 7, 10–12, 14, 15, 221n17, 222n19, 223n22, 23, 30, 32, 34, 35, 36n36, 39, 223n23, 223n24, 224n26, 225, 43, 63–65, 72, 73, 101, 102, 225n30, 226, 226n32, 229–231, 114–124, 126, 128, 129, 229n42, 229n43, 231n45, 131–136, 141–143, 145, 148, 234–236, 243–246 150–155, 157, 165, 167–170, Iranian-European Economic 175–177, 180, 181, 193, 199, Cooperation Center (IEECC), 94 204, 217, 218n8, 219, 220, Iranian Rail Industries Development 222, 224, 226–230, 234, Co. (IRICO), 93 235, 245, 246 Iran-Khodro, 92 Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), 85 (IRGC) and Quds Force (QF), Iran Sanctions Act (ISA), 95, 96n34 14, 15, 34, 64, 65, 105, Iran’s Central Bank, 17 114–116, 118, 119, 121, 123, Iran’s foreign policy, 18, 27, 52 128, 131, 133, 134, 144–146, Iraq, 3, 5, 6, 14, 27, 35, 51, 52, 55, 148–150, 153, 154, 156, 165, 65, 69n45, 83, 85, 113–116, 166, 171, 173, 181, 200, 202, 116n9, 117n10, 117n11, 205, 207, 219, 220, 227–230, 118–136, 118n12, 118n14, 234, 235, 244–246 120n17, 120n18, 120n19, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), 121n20, 121n21, 122n22, 32, 35, 67–69, 72, 72n53, 122n23, 122n24, 123n25, 125n27, 126n30, 127n32, 123n26, 125n28, 126n31, 127n33, 128–131, 128n37, 127n35, 129n38, 130n39, 130n41, 133, 134, 136, 148, INDEX 251 149, 154, 155, 157, 176, 177, Khomeini (Ayatollah), 3, 5, 6, 13, 14, 180, 201–204, 201n35, 208, 245 21, 52, 53, 164, 166, 180, Israel, 15, 16, 27, 28, 31, 32, 62, 73, 244–246 87, 96, 129, 143, 144, 149, 150, Khomenist movement, 2 153, 165, 180, 181, 190–193, Khorramshahr, 30, 31, 93, 131 191n5, 207, 215–226, 216n2, Kobani, 155, 202 217n7, 218n8, 218n9, 220n16, Kremlin, 43, 65 223n25, 224n26, 224n27, Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), 201 228–232, 228n39, 231n46, Kurdish problem, 194 232n48, 232n49, 233n50, Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), 234–236, 234n52, 234n53, 191–193, 196, 200, 206, 207 235n55, 235n56, 244, 245 Kurdistan Free Life Party, 193 J L Jafari, Mohammad Ali, 43, 142, Larijani, Ali, 10, 56, 99 167, 217 Latika, 155 Jahad-e Khodkefayee, 53 Lebanon, 15, 27, 35, 64, 69n45, 116, Jahangiri, Eshaq, 16 117, 122, 129, 141, 142, 144, Jannati, Ahmad (Ayatollah), 8, 21 155, 171, 219, 219n14, 220n16, Jazayeri, Massoud, 63 221n17, 226, 228, 228n39, 229, JCPOA, see Joint Comprehensive Plan 232–235, 232n50, 234n52, 245 of Action Liwa Zulfiqar Brigade, 147, 150 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), 12, 16, 17, 26–30, 33–35, 42, 85, 88, 89, 95, M 97–99, 103, 106, 129, 168, 179, Mahdi Army, 117, 118, 130, 134 224, 244, 246 Majlis, 2, 8, 16, 32, 99, 153, 166, Jordan, 15, 69n45, 100, 124, 133, 199, 222 169, 178, 181, 205, 236 MAPNA, 90, 122 Massive Ordnance Air Blast (MOAB), 32 K Mattis, James, 26, 133 Karbaschi, Gholam Hossein, 35 Mawlana Jalaleddin al-Rumi, 190 Kataib Hezbollah, 117, 130, 132, McMaster, R. H., 26 147, 150 Mehr News Agency (MNA), 122n24, KDP, see Kurdish Democratic Party 123n26, 199, 199n28, 201n35, Khamenei, Ali (Ayatollah), 3, 54, 84, 207n51, 222n20, 222n21 86, 115, 116, 116n7, 164, MEK, see Mujahedin-e Khalq 202, 215 Organization Khatami, Mohammad, 6–12, 15, 53, Mersad, 32 84, 86, 116, 143, 164, 165, 190, Mesbah Yazdi, Mohammed Taqi 192, 246 (Ayatollah), 8, 9, 148, 173 252 INDEX Middle East, 14, 27, 54, 56, 57, Nasrallah, Hassan, 220, 221, 227, 62–65, 84, 93, 96, 97, 99, 115, 234, 234n53 119, 143, 146, 149, 163n1, Nateq Nuri, Ali Akbar, 6 164n2, 165n4, 166n7, 169n13, NEDSA, 36, 38, 39, 151 171, 177n31, 189n1, 190n3, Negotiated political order, 1–19 192n7, 194n13, 197, 198n25, Neisari, Afarin, 42 199n29, 200, 200n32, 204, Neo-protectorate, 154 204n42, 222n19, 230n44, New Syrian Force (NSF), 147 234n52, 235 Nimr, Sheikh, 167, 168n10, 173, Ministry of Information, 173n22 and
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