DOCSLIB.ORG

CHEMICAL WEAPONS Stockpile Destruction Delayed at the Amy’S Prototype Disposal - Facility

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
CHEMICAL WEAPONS Stockpile Destruction Delayed at the Amy’S Prototype Disposal - Facility July 1990 CHEMICAL WEAPONS Stockpile Destruction Delayed at the Amy’s Prototype Disposal - Facility RE!3TRICIZD-- Not to be released outside the General Accounting Office unless specifically approved by the OfTice of Congressional Relations. GAO/NSIAD-90-222 National Security and International Affairs Division B-239332 July 30, 1990 The Honorable John Glenn Chairman, Committee on Governmental Affairs United States Senate The Honorable John Conyers, Jr. Chairman, Legislation and National Security Subcommittee Committee on Government Operations House of Representatives The Honorable Earl Hutto Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives This report responds to your requests that we review the Department of Defense’s Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program. We discussed the Department’s overall efforts to dispose of chemical weapons in our earlier report entitled Chemical Weapons: Obstacles to the Army’s Plan to Destroy Obsolete U.S. Stockpile (GAO/NSIm90-155, May 24, 1990). This report discusses the operational delays at the Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System-the Defense Department’s prototype disposal plant. Unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report for 30 days. At that time, we will send copies to the Chairmen of the House and Senate Committees on Armed Services and on Appropriations, the Secretaries of Defense and the Army, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and other interested parties. This report was prepared under the direction of Richard Davis, Army Issues, who may be reached on (202) 275-4141 if you or your staff have any questions. Other major contributors are listed in appendix II. Frank C. Conahan Assistant Comptroller General Executive Summary In November 1985, the Congress enacted Public Law 99-145, requiring Purpose the Department of Defense to destroy the U.S. stockpile of chemical weapons by September 30, 1994. In September 1988, the Congress extended the completion date for chemical weapons disposal to April 30, 1997. The Army has concluded that high-temperature incineration is the preferred disposal method. In 1988, the Army completed construction of its prototype plant-the Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System. However, this plant needs additional testing and verification before it becomes a fully operational chemical weapons disposal plant. The Chairmen of the Subcommittee on Readiness, House Committee on Armed Services; the Legislation and National Security Subcommittee, House Committee on Government Operations; and the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs asked GAO to determine the status of the Johnston Island disposal program. Our objectives were to identify and assess (1) the program’s current schedule and cost estimates, (2) the causes of schedule slippage, (3) the impact of this slippage on the Army’s overall chemical disposal program, and (4) the Army’s con- tractor oversight activities. In fiscal year 1981, the Army planned to build a disposal facility on Background Johnston Island to destroy M55 chemical rockets. The Congress, in 1985, directed the Defense Department to destroy the entire U.S. chemical weapons stockpile, not just M55s. In that same year, the Army began to construct a disposal plant on Johnston Island. In 1986, the Army’s Western Command, headquartered in Hawaii, awarded an 8-year opera- tions and maintenance contract on a cost-plus-award-fee basis for the Johnston disposal plant. 32 months after the original February 1989 full-scale start-up date. The original full-scale start-up date was delayed about 22.5 months by the Army’s efforts to comply with the statutory requirements to ( 1) destroy all types of munitions, not just the M55 rockets, and (2) conduct opcra- tional verification tests. The start-up date slipped another 9.5 months because of technical and contractor staffing problems. Further delays are likely if problems continue at the facility. ‘As of this date, the Army had not begun these tests. The Army estimates that operar IOK>LS /iI tu*ym in the summer of 1990. Page 2 GAO/NSLAIMO-222 Army’s Chemical Weapons I)i.spcwd Plant Executive Summary Moreover, as of March 1990, the Army estimated that the total *Johnston disposal program will cost about $561 million to complete operations through 1994-an increase of $190 million over the Army’s 1985 esti- mate. Most of the increased estimated cost can be attributed to the two statutory requirements and the technical and contractor problems. If problems continue and the operations and maintenance contract is extended beyond July 1994, the estimated cost will continue to grow. Because of delays in operational testing at Johnston Island, the Army also delayed the construction of three follow-on facilities--at Anniston, Alabama; Pine Bluff, Arkansas; and Umatilla, Oregon. GAO estimated that the additional time required to store the munitions at Johnston Island and the three follow-on sites will cost the Army more than $33 million. To improve the contractor’s performance on the operations and mainte- nance contract, the Army withheld all or significant portions of the con- tractor’s award fee for several evaluation periods. Further, the Army attempted to strengthen its own oversight of the operations and mainte- nance contract, including controls over contractor overtime costs. How- ever, the Army’s oversight of contractor overtime needs to be further improved. Principal Findings Several Problems Caused The Johnston disposal program has expanded significantly since 1985. Until November 1985, when the Congress required the Defense Johnston Schedule Department to destroy the entire chemical stockpile, the Johnston Slippage and Estimated facility was intended to destroy only M55 rockets, beginning full-scale Cost Increases operations on February 1, 1989. In December 1987, the Congress passed Public Law 100-180, which required the Army to conduct full-scale ver- ification tests with lethal agents to demonstrate that the disposal tcch- nology could safely and efficiently destroy chemical weapons. These two statutory changes caused the Army’s original full-scale operations start date to slip 22.5 months-from February 1, 1989, to December 1.5, 1990. The Army moved the full-scale operational date back another I)..’ months-from December 15, 1990, to September 27, 1991-due to equipment, computer, and plant corrosion problems and the contrac.tor’s inability to fill some technical and management positions. Further Page 3 GAO/NSLAIMO-222 Army’s Chemical Weapons Dibpwal Plant Executive Summary delays are possible if, as in the past, the Army experiences major slip- page in any of the 279 operational testing start-up activities. For example, as of January 1990,42 of the 279 start-up activities had slipped an average of 22 days; some activities had slipped almost 2 months. In October 1985, the Army’s life-cycle cost estimate for the Johnston disposal program was $371 million. As of March 1990, the total esti- mated cost to complete operations through 1994 was about $561 million. The March 1990 estimate includes about $421 million for construction, equipment installation, and the operations and maintenance contract and about $140 million for base and logistical support and other costs. Schedule Slippage Delayed The schedule slippage in the Johnston program has resulted in construc- Follow-on Facilities’ tion delays at three stateside facilities-at Anniston, Pine Bluff. and Umatilla. Chemical weapons will have to be stored an additional Construction and 9.5 months on Johnston Island, 19 months at each of the Pine Bluff and Increased Munition Umatilla sites, and 10 months at Anniston. GAO estimated that the addi- Storage Costs tional time required to store, guard, inspect, and maintain the munitions at Johnston Island and the three follow-on sites will cost more than $33 million. Army Has Withheld Most In 1988 and 1989, the Army took action to correct contractor perform- ance on the operations and maintenance contract. In response to staffing of Contractor’s Award Fee and other problems, the Army gave the contractor successively lower Due to Unsatisfactory performance ratings from May 1988 through April 1989. For all ev.alua- Performance tion periods, beginning in August 1986 and ending in August 1989. the Army awarded 47 percent of the total available award fees. The &-my withheld the contractor’s entire award fee for one period covering January through April 1989. Improved Controls Needed According to the contracting officer’s representative, contract for Overtime Costs employees regularly worked 60 to 80 hours per week. GAO'S anal> SIS showed that in July 1989, 19 employees worked at least one 9c1-h I!II week. Army officials told GAO that the operations and maintcnan~ t’ (‘on- tract did not include provisions for the Army to ensure that t ht. 4I III tractor’s overtime was necessary or that charges were legitimatcn ‘l’ht Army tried to persuade the contractor to strengthen its review\ ;mct reporting procedures for overtime. In January 1990, according t I ) ! rmy officials, the contractor verbally agreed to have its department t 11’.1(is Page 4 GAO/NSIADQO-222 Army’s Chemical Weapon- lhnprrl Plant Executive Summary approve employee overtime in advance and to report to the Army on overtime usage. However, as of March 1990, the contractor had not fully complied with the terms of the verbal agreement. - GAO recommends that the Secretary of the Army direct the Army’s Recommendations Western Command to negotiate a formal agreement with the operations and maintenance contractor regarding the approval and the use of over- time and incorporate it into the existing contract. Such an agreement could help the Army in its oversight responsibility of the contractor’s use of overtime. Included in chapter 3 of this report are other recommendations to the Secretary of the Army, which are designed to improve the Army’s over- sight of contractor operations at the Johnston plant and at the follow-on disposal plants.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The History of the Chemical Weapons Movement
    Chemical Weapons Movement History Compilation William R. Brankowitz 27 April 1987 . Office of the Program Manager for Chemical Munitions (Demilitarization and Binary) (Provisional) Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland 21010-5401 I Chemical Weapons Movement History CcX@latiOn Table of Contents Page Executive Surnnaq 1 How To Use The Cmpilation 2 Introduction 6 Location Key 15 Incident Summarization Sheets 18 Compilation of Moves Pages w Year 1946 11 pages 1947 1 page 1948 2 pages 1949 4 pages 1950 3 pages 1951 2 pages 1952 2 pages 1953 3 pages 1954 3 pages 1955 1 w-e 1956 2 pages 1957 2 pages 1958 3 pages 1959 1 page 1960 1 Page 1961 1 page 1962 2 pages 1963 3 pages 1964 4 pages . 1965 5 pages 1966 4 pages 1967 6 pages 1968 a pages 1969 1 Page 1970-77 2 pages SE'EONI 3 pages SmON II 2 pages 1981-86 3 pages Reccrmendations and Conclusioris 25 f-4 i 4' References Executive Summary The production of a compilation of movement operations provides a base of data which can be used or interpreted in many ways. Some are favorable to the Army, and some are not. However, the Army wishes to show that (1) it has moved large quantities of chemical weapons over many years with relatively few problems and that (2) the Army has learned lessons from the problems which is has encountered. The Army also shows in this study that although there have been some problems associated with the movement of chemical weapons, there has never been a chemical agent fatality associated with such a move.
    [Show full text]
  • Chemical Munitions Igloos for the Container Storage of Wastes Generated from the Maintenance of the Chemical Munitions Stockpile Attachment D.2
    Tooele Army Depot - South Hazardous Wae Storage Permit Permit Attachment 12 - Container Management Modification Date: March 3. 1994 Chemical Munitions Igloos for the Container Storage of Wastes Generated from the Maintenance of the Chemical Munitions Stockpile Attachment D.2. Containers with Free Liquids The stockpile of chemical munitions stored at TEAD(S) (which included the M-55 rockets before they were declarbed obsolete, and became a hazardous waste) requires continual maintenance. These maintenance activities generate wastes, examples of which are: The valves and plugs used on ton containers used to store bulk chemical agent are changed out on a periodic basis, the valves and plugs that are removed are decontaminated, containerized, and managed as a hazardous waste. Wastes of this type would typically carry waste numbers F999 and/or P999, in addition to other waste numbers where applicable. Discarded protective clothing (including suites, boots, gloves, canister to personnel breathing apparatus, etc.) is containerized and managed as a hazardous waste. Certain types of impregnated carbon have been found to contain chromium and silver in leachable quantities exceeding the TCLP criteria for hazardous waste. In such cases, EPA Waste Numbers D007 and DOll would be assigned to these wastes in addition to any other applicable hazardous waste numbers. Any indoor area where chemical agents, or agent filled munitions are stored has the potential to be ventilated. The air removed from the area passes through a bed of activated carbon before being released to the atmosphere. When the activated charcoal is changed out, the spent' carbon is containerized, and managed as a hazardous waste.
    [Show full text]
  • Desind Finding
    NATIONAL AIR AND SPACE ARCHIVES Herbert Stephen Desind Collection Accession No. 1997-0014 NASM 9A00657 National Air and Space Museum Smithsonian Institution Washington, DC Brian D. Nicklas © Smithsonian Institution, 2003 NASM Archives Desind Collection 1997-0014 Herbert Stephen Desind Collection 109 Cubic Feet, 305 Boxes Biographical Note Herbert Stephen Desind was a Washington, DC area native born on January 15, 1945, raised in Silver Spring, Maryland and educated at the University of Maryland. He obtained his BA degree in Communications at Maryland in 1967, and began working in the local public schools as a science teacher. At the time of his death, in October 1992, he was a high school teacher and a freelance writer/lecturer on spaceflight. Desind also was an avid model rocketeer, specializing in using the Estes Cineroc, a model rocket with an 8mm movie camera mounted in the nose. To many members of the National Association of Rocketry (NAR), he was known as “Mr. Cineroc.” His extensive requests worldwide for information and photographs of rocketry programs even led to a visit from FBI agents who asked him about the nature of his activities. Mr. Desind used the collection to support his writings in NAR publications, and his building scale model rockets for NAR competitions. Desind also used the material in the classroom, and in promoting model rocket clubs to foster an interest in spaceflight among his students. Desind entered the NASA Teacher in Space program in 1985, but it is not clear how far along his submission rose in the selection process. He was not a semi-finalist, although he had a strong application.
    [Show full text]
  • U.S. Disposal of Chemical Weapons in the Ocean: Background and Issues for Congress
    Order Code RL33432 U.S. Disposal of Chemical Weapons in the Ocean: Background and Issues for Congress Updated January 3, 2007 David M. Bearden Analyst in Environmental Policy Resources, Science, and Industry Division U.S. Disposal of Chemical Weapons in the Ocean: Background and Issues for Congress Summary The U.S. Armed Forces disposed of chemical weapons in the ocean from World War I through 1970. At that time, it was thought that the vastness of ocean waters would absorb chemical agents that may leak from these weapons. However, public concerns about human health and environmental risks, and the economic effects of potential damage to marine resources, led to a statutory prohibition on the disposal of chemical weapons in the ocean in 1972. For many years, there was little attention to weapons that had been dumped offshore prior to this prohibition. However, the U.S. Army completed a report in 2001 indicating that the past disposal of chemical weapons in the ocean had been more common and widespread geographically than previously acknowledged. The Army cataloged 74 instances of disposal through 1970, including 32 instances off U.S. shores and 42 instances off foreign shores. The disclosure of these records has renewed public concern about lingering risks from chemical weapons still in the ocean today. The risk of exposure to chemical weapons dumped in the ocean depends on many factors, such as the extent to which chemical agents may have leaked into seawater and been diluted or degraded over time. Public health advocates have questioned whether contaminated seawater may contribute to certain symptoms among coastal populations, and environmental advocates have questioned whether leaked chemical agents may have affected fish stocks and other marine life.
    [Show full text]
  • Chemical Weapons Technology Section 4—Chemical Weapons Technology
    SECTION IV CHEMICAL WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY SECTION 4—CHEMICAL WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY Scope Highlights 4.1 Chemical Material Production ........................................................II-4-8 4.2 Dissemination, Dispersion, and Weapons Testing ..........................II-4-22 • Chemical weapons (CW) are relatively inexpensive to produce. 4.3 Detection, Warning, and Identification...........................................II-4-27 • CW can affect opposing forces without damaging infrastructure. 4.4 Chemical Defense Systems ............................................................II-4-34 • CW can be psychologically devastating. • Blister agents create casualties requiring attention and inhibiting BACKGROUND force efficiency. • Defensive measures can be taken to negate the effect of CW. Chemical weapons are defined as weapons using the toxic properties of chemi- • Donning of protective gear reduces combat efficiency of troops. cal substances rather than their explosive properties to produce physical or physiologi- • Key to employment is dissemination and dispersion of agents. cal effects on an enemy. Although instances of what might be styled as chemical weapons date to antiquity, much of the lore of chemical weapons as viewed today has • CW are highly susceptible to environmental effects (temperature, its origins in World War I. During that conflict “gas” (actually an aerosol or vapor) winds). was used effectively on numerous occasions by both sides to alter the outcome of • Offensive use of CW complicates command and control and battles. A significant number of battlefield casualties were sustained. The Geneva logistics problems. Protocol, prohibiting use of chemical weapons in warfare, was signed in 1925. Sev- eral nations, the United States included, signed with a reservation forswearing only the first use of the weapons and reserved the right to retaliate in kind if chemical weapons were used against them.
    [Show full text]
  • NSIAD-95-67 Chemical Weapons: Stability of the U.S. Stockpile
    United States General Accounting Office Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee GAO on Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources, Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives December 1994 CHEMICAL WEAPONS Stability of the U.S. Stockpile GAO/NSIAD-95-67 United States General Accounting Office GAO Washington, D.C. 20548 National Security and International Affairs Division B-259506 December 22, 1994 The Honorable Mike Synar Chairman, Subcommittee on Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources Committee on Government Operations House of Representatives Dear Mr. Chairman: Since 1985, the U.S. Army has been working to implement congressional direction to dispose of the U.S. stockpile of unitary1 chemical weapons and agents—a process the Army currently estimates will cost $8.5 billion. Because the Army continues to experience delays in implementing its disposal program and may have to store the stockpile longer than planned, you asked us to review the Army’s (1) prediction of how long chemical weapons can be stored safely and (2) contingency plans for disposing of chemical weapons that become dangerous. Background In November 1985, Congress passed Public Law 99-145 directing the Department of Defense (DOD) to destroy its stockpile of unitary chemical agents and weapons by September 30, 1994. The weapons are stored at eight sites in the continental United States and on Johnston Atoll in the Pacific Ocean. (See app. I for the stockpile munitions and storage locations.) To comply with the congressional direction, the Army, DOD’s lead service in chemical matters, developed a plan to burn the stockpile on-site in specially designed high-temperature incinerators.
    [Show full text]
  • Restoration | Appendix S: Sea Disposal of Military Munitions Agent Weight (NCAW) of CWM According to the CA and Disposal Location
    disposed of in U.S. coastal waters. It also identifies sites where conventional military munitions were disposed of in these waters. DoD’s research into sea disposal of CWM has identified approximately 30,000 tons of disposed CA at 21 sites in U.S. coastal waters. The term CA, as used in this appendix, is limited to those substances on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) schedule of chemicals. Figure S-1 provides a summary of the net chemical Restoration | Appendix S: Sea Disposal of Military Munitions agent weight (NCAW) of CWM according to the CA and disposal location. NCAW totals were determined using assumptions regarding the container sizes and densities Under Section 314 of the Fiscal Year (FY) 2007 In the interim, DoD will report, annually, any new of the disposed materials. National Defense Authorization Act, the Department information identified during the review. of Defense (DoD) is required to conduct a historical Figure S-2 displays the locations of each disposal This interim report identifies the Department’s review of available records to determine the number, site in U.S. coastal waters. progress on the historical review since FY2006. size, and probable locations of sites where the Specifically, this report updates the general Figures S-3 through S-32 provide information on each military disposed of military munitions in U.S. locations, types, and quantities of chemical disposal site. For CWM disposal sites, these figures coastal waters. The Department will include the munitions or chemical agents (CA), collectively include CA type, the type of munition or container, the final Section 314 report in the FY2009 Defense referred to as chemical warfare material (CWM), quantity that was sea disposed, and the NCAW.
    [Show full text]
  • Disposal of Chemical Weapons: Alternative Technologies (Part 4 of 8)
    Chapter 2 The Army’s Chemical Weapons Disposal Program Percentage THE U.S. ARMY’S CHEMICAL Site Iocation of total WEAPONS STOCKPILE Tooele Army Depot, UT,. 42.3 Pine Bluff Arsenal, AR. 12.0 Umatilla Depot, OR... 11.6 Geography and Distribution Pueblo Depot, CO. 9.9 Anniston Army Depot, AL.. 7.1 The chemical weapons (CW) stockpile is located Johnston Island, South Pacific . 6.6 on Army bases at eight continental U.S. sites (see Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD. 5.0 Newport Army Ammunition Plant, IN...... 3.9 figure 2-1) and at Johnston Island in the Pacific Lexington-Blue Grass Army Depot, KY. 1.6 Ocean (717 nautical miles southwest of Hawaii). It is distributed as follows (by percentage of chemical The stockpile includes chemical agents stored in agent): bulk containers without explosives and propellants, as well as rockets, land mines, mortars, cartridges, Figure 2-1—U.S. Chemical Weapons Stockpile Distribution I Newport Army I Ammunition Plant I VX - TC / (3.9%) Umatilla Depot HD - TC GB -P, R, B VX - P, R, M, ST (1 1.6%) Tooele Army Depot Lexington- H-P Blue Grass Army HD -C, P, TC HT -C, P GB -C, P, R, B, TC GB - P, R, TC (42.3%) VX -P, R (1 .6%) Pueblo Depot HD -C, P Anniston Army HT - C Depot (9.9%) Pine Bluff HD -C, P, TC Arsenal HT - C HD -C, TC GB -C, P, R GB, VX, H, HD, HT = Chemical agents. HT - TC VX -P, R, M GB - R (7.1%) TC = Ton container VX - R, M R = Rockets (12.0%) M = Mines ST= Spray tanks B = Bombs C = Cartridges P = Projectiles SOURCE: U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Milestones in U.S. Chemical Weapons Storage and Destruction with More Than 2,600 Dedicated Employees Plus Contractor Support Staff, the U.S
    Milestones in U.S. Chemical Weapons Storage and Destruction With more than 2,600 dedicated employees plus contractor support staff, the U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency (CMA) leads the world in chemical weapons destruction with a demonstrated history of safely storing, recovering, assessing and disposing of U.S. chemical weapons and related materials. CMA manages all U.S. chemical materiel except for the disposal of two weapons stockpiles that fall under the Department of Defense’s U.S. Army Element Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives pilot neutralization program. Through its Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program, CMA works with local emergency preparedness and response agencies at weapons stockpile locations. 1960-1982 1960s and before 1971 1979 The United States begins stockpiling and The United States finishes transferring The Army constructs and begins using chemical weapons against Germany chemical munitions from Okinawa, Japan, operating the Chemical Agent in World War I, which lasts from 1914 to to Johnston Island, located about 800 Munitions Disposal System (CAMDS), 1918. The weapons are securely stored miles from Hawaii, in September of 1971. a pilot incineration facility located at U.S. military installations at home at what is now the Deseret Chemical and abroad. 1972 Depot (DCD), Utah. The Army tests disposal equipment and processes The Edgewood Arsenal, Md., produces The Army forms the U.S. Army Materiel at the plant. More than 91 tons of mustard and phosgene but the Arsenal Command’s Program Manager for chemical agent are safely destroyed. is not large enough to store the agent Demilitarization of Chemical Materiel, and new installations are constructed in headquartered at Picatinny Arsenal, Huntsville, Ala., Denver, Colo., Pine Bluff, near Dover, NJ.
    [Show full text]
  • Umatilla Chemical Agent Disposal Facility
    INCHING AWAY FROM ARMAGEDDON: DESTROYING THE U.S. CHEMICAL WEAPONS STOCKPILE April 2004 By Claudine McCarthy and Julie Fischer, Ph.D. With the assistance of Yun Jung Choi, Alexis Pierce and Gina Ganey The Henry L. Stimson Center Introduction i Copyright © 2004 The Henry L. Stimson Center All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior permission in writing from The Henry L. Stimson Center. Cover design by Design Army. The Henry L. Stimson Center 11 Dupont Circle, NW 9th Floor Washington, DC 20036 phone 202.223.5956 fax 202.238.9604 www.stimson.org ii The Henry L. Stimson Center Introduction INTRODUCTION On 3 September 2003, the Department of Defense issued a press release noting that the United States (US) would be unable to meet the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) deadline for the destruction of 45 percent of its chemical weapons stockpile by 27 April 2004.1 This announcement also indirectly confirmed that the United States will be unable to meet the CWC’s deadline for destroying its entire stockpile by 27 April 2007. The treaty allows for a five-year extension of this final deadline, which the United States will likely need to request as that date draws closer. Chemical weapons destruction is the exception to the old adage that it is easier to destroy than to create. While some of the toxic agents are stored in bulk containers that must be emptied, their contents neutralized, and the contaminated containers destroyed, more remain in weaponized form (inside rockets, bombs, landmines, and other armaments) in storage igloos at six sites in the US.
    [Show full text]
  • Chemical Weapons
    From the Toxipedia website in original form. Last updated by Toxipedia in 2014. Dr. Steve Gilbert, author. Chemical Weapons Overview The modern era of chemical weaponry began in the First World War and advances in synthetic chemistry led to the development of increasingly potent compounds such as Nerve Agents and VX. Chemical weaponry stockpiling was an integral part of the arms race throughout the Cold War and they were used during that time by Egypt, Iraq, and Iran. The Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993 outlaws the production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons for all signatories (all but 8 nations have signed). History Chemical Weaponry in Ancient, Medieval, and Pre-World War I The use of chemical compounds (as well as biological materials) dates back to biblical times. Greek historian Thucydides recorded use of Arsenic smoke by the Spartans against the Athenian city of Delium during the Peloponnesian War in 425 A.D. (#Tucker, 2006). Similar smoke was used during the Sung Dynasty by the Imperial forces in China. The Germans burned a mixture of bones coated in resin to produce a foul stench that would keep invaders at bay (#Hutchinson, 2003). The use of poisons fell out of favor in the 18th and 19th century. The British in the Crimean War rejected use of cacodyl Cyanide shells, dismissing them "as bad a mode of warfare as poisoning the wells of the enemy" (#Scott, 1997). In 1862 New York schoolteacher John W. Doughty wrote to the US Secretary of War suggesting methods of poison gas. This was dismissed and subsequently followed by a War Department General Order signed by President Abraham Lincoln stating that the use of poison should be "wholly excluded from modern warfare" (#Hutchinson, 2003).
    [Show full text]
  • U 14 Clfi SS I F I ED
    -. - RCCl.950405.005 u 14 CLFi SS I F I ED U. S. ARFly CHLWCAL CORPS FIELD REQU-S AGWGY Fort McCleUan, Alaboma CHMCN, CORPS QUARTERLY HISTORICAL REPORT (RCS CMLC-7) (U) 1 October - 31 December 1961 COPY.. "....." I....... ~... OE "COPIES Office of the Command Historian, CBDCOM Edgewood Arsenal, MD Classified Records Room U. S. ARMY CHEMICAL COWS FIELD REQUIRENEW'S AGENCY Fort McCleUan, Alabama CWCAL CORPS QUARTERLY HISTORICllL REPORT (RCS CMLC-7) Second !&axtier, FY 1962 (1 October - 31 December 1961) SECTION I - INTROIXJCTION I. (U) The U. 3. Arqy Chemical Corps Field Requirements Agency during the period reported on (second quarter, Fiscal Year 1962) operat- ed under prov5sions of Chemical brps Regulation Nr 10-18, S. Chemical Corps Field Requirements Agency," dated 28 February 1961. The Agency (hereinaf'ter referred to as CCFBA) waa stationed at Fort McClellan, Alabama; assigned as a Class II activity under the jurisdiction of the Chief Chemical Officer, with staff supervision and operational contml by the Director for Military Operations; and attached for administrative and logistical support to the U. S. hrmy Chemical Corps Training Cammand. The Commanding Officer of CCFRA wm Colonel Jack E. Babcock, 02u3, Chdcal Corps. The Historian was Douglas E. Wilson (crS-12), Program Coordinating Qfficer and Documentation Officer. Where no entry or en incqlete entrJr is made in the sections that follow, it is to be understood that no change has ocowled since the end of the last reporting period. SECTION I1 - POLICY 2. (U) Mission and Responsibilities. No change. 3. (U) Programs and Trojects. The work of CGFR.4 in carrying out its missions md resuonsibilities has continued as described in arevious reports, with no &&e in the system of numbering projects outhed in the report for 1 January - 31 March 1961.
    [Show full text]