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INCHING AWAY FROM ARMAGEDDON: DESTROYING THE U.S. CHEMICAL WEAPONS STOCKPILE April 2004 By Claudine McCarthy and Julie Fischer, Ph.D. With the assistance of Yun Jung Choi, Alexis Pierce and Gina Ganey The Henry L. Stimson Center Introduction i Copyright © 2004 The Henry L. Stimson Center All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior permission in writing from The Henry L. Stimson Center. Cover design by Design Army. The Henry L. Stimson Center 11 Dupont Circle, NW 9th Floor Washington, DC 20036 phone 202.223.5956 fax 202.238.9604 www.stimson.org ii The Henry L. Stimson Center Introduction INTRODUCTION On 3 September 2003, the Department of Defense issued a press release noting that the United States (US) would be unable to meet the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) deadline for the destruction of 45 percent of its chemical weapons stockpile by 27 April 2004.1 This announcement also indirectly confirmed that the United States will be unable to meet the CWC’s deadline for destroying its entire stockpile by 27 April 2007. The treaty allows for a five-year extension of this final deadline, which the United States will likely need to request as that date draws closer. Chemical weapons destruction is the exception to the old adage that it is easier to destroy than to create. While some of the toxic agents are stored in bulk containers that must be emptied, their contents neutralized, and the contaminated containers destroyed, more remain in weaponized form (inside rockets, bombs, landmines, and other armaments) in storage igloos at six sites in the US. Maintaining safety, therefore, must be the priority for the destruction process. Assuring citizens of the communities near to the facilities that every effort is being made to minimize risks to their safety and working with these communities to develop sound emergency response plans are connected but separate tasks. Indeed, many citizens, alarmed by the possible damage an accidental release during destruction could cause to their communities, have mounted extensive efforts to address their concerns. Lawsuits over safety measures delayed the operational testing of the Anniston, Alabama facility, while investigation of an accidental leak that exposed a worker to an agent at Tooele, Utah caused its facility to cease operation for several months. Regulatory changes, contractor problems, security concerns, and addressing the deteriorating condition of some parts of the stockpile are other reasons that have been cited for the ongoing delays and increased costs that have plagued US chemical destruction efforts. The purpose of this guide is to serve as a basic reference to the US chemical demilitarization program. The guide does not seek to pass judgment on the program, nor on those who oppose the program’s decisions. 1 The United States requested, and received in October 2003, a three-year extension of this intermediate deadline via mechanisms provided within the CWC. The Henry L. Stimson Center Introduction iii All of the information contained within this document was gathered from open sources and collated in this volume with tabbed divisions for easy access to the topic areas. The data was current as of April 2004. Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Project research assistants Katherine Powers and Yun Jung Choi and interns Alexis Pierce and Gina Ganey pulled together the data found herein, an often confusing and difficult task. In the long term, ridding the United States of this deadly arsenal will improve the security of all Americans. Understanding the complexity of the task and continuing to develop and support policies that move this process forward safely in the short term is of the utmost importance in reaching that goal. Claudine McCarthy Editor April 30, 2004 iv The Henry L. Stimson Center Introduction INCHING AWAY FROM ARMAGEDDON: DESTROYING THE U.S. CHEMICAL WEAPONS STOCKPILE April 2004 Acronyms Destruction Sites Chemical Agents Munitions and Storage Destruction Techniques Program Time and Cost Overruns Key Organizations/Agencies Timeline of Legislation and Oversight Timeline of Chemical Leaks at Destruction Sites Glossary Links Sources The Henry L. Stimson Center Acronyms v vi The Henry L. Stimson Center ACRONYMS ABCDF Aberdeen Chemical Agent Disposal Facility ACADF Anniston Chemical Agent Disposal Facility ACWA Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives ACWAP Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment Program APG Aberdeen Proving Ground ATAP Alternative Technologies and Approaches Project CAC Citizens Advisory Commission CBDCOM Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention CMA Chemical Materials Agency CSDP Chemical Stockpile Disposal Project CSEPP Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program CWC Chemical Weapons Convention DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency EPA Environmental Protection Agency FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency GB sarin H, HD, HT sulfur mustard JACADS Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System NaOH sodium hydroxide NECDF Newport Chemical Agent Disposal Facility NSCMP Non-Stockpile Chemical Material Project PBCSF Pine Bluff Chemical Storage Facility PMECW Program Manager for Elimination of Chemical Weapons PUCD Pueblo Chemical Depot SCWO super critical water oxidation TOCDF Tooele Chemical Agent Disposal Facility UMCDF Umatilla Chemical Agent Disposal Facility The Henry L. Stimson Center Acronyms vii viii The Henry L. Stimson Center Figure: US Chemical Weapons Storage/Destruction Sites The Henry L. Stimson Center Destruction Sites 1 ABERDEEN CHEMICAL AGENT DISPOSAL FACILITY (ABCDF) Aberdeen/Edgewood, Maryland When the US chemical demilitarization effort began, Aberdeen housed 5 percent of the nation’s original stockpile – 1,625 tons of chemical agent. As of April 2004, 7% of the agent stockpile and 7% of the munitions stockpile at the Aberdeen facility had been neutralized. Agent Blister agent sulfur mustard stored in ton containers Site Location and Specifics • Southeast of Edgewood, MD; near the City of Aberdeen (pop. 13,000) • In Harford County (pop. 227,713) • 2,700 families live on-site Employment Statistics • Aberdeen Proving Ground employs 6,699 civilians and 4,785 military personnel∗ • Subcontractor Battelle Memorial Institute employs 210 local civilians Agent Destruction Accelerated Neutralization Contractors/Subcontractors • A $306 million contract was awarded to Bechtel National, Inc. in 1998 • Subcontractors include: Battelle Memorial Institute Innovative Emergency Management Earth Tech Horne Engineering EA Engineering Upper Chesapeake Medical Services General Physics Corporation UXB Waste Management ∗ Numbers are not available for demilitarization facilities alone. The Henry L. Stimson Center Destruction Sites 3 Groups/Organizations Involved with Site Local APG Superful Citizens’ Coalition Aberdeen, Abingdon, Baltimore, Earleville, Elkton, and North East Counties State Harford County Harford County Division of Environmental Affairs Harford County Health Department Bureau of Environmental Health Maryland Citizens’ Advisory Commissions Milestones/Important Developments • April 2003: Destruction began almost two years ahead of original schedule • January 2004: Over 78 tons of agent has been destroyed Projected Schedule • Spring 2004: Complete agent neutralization, 18 months ahead of original schedule • Winter 2004: Finish cleaning containers • Summer 2005: Close site, one to two years ahead of original schedule Political Representatives • US Representative C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger III (D - 2nd District) • US Senators Barbara Mikulski (D) and Paul Sarbanes (D) • Maryland Governor Robert L. Ehrlich • Maryland State Senator Nancy Jacobs (34th District) • Maryland State House Delegates Charles Boutin (34th District) and Mary-Dulany James th (34 District) Contact Information Edgewood Chemical Stockpile Outreach Office tel. 410-676-6800 fax. 410-676-2483 Aberdeen Chemical Agent Disposal Facility tel. 410-436-5253 fax. 410-436-9646 4 The Henry L. Stimson Center Destruction Sites ANNISTON CHEMICAL AGENT DISPOSAL FACILITY (ACADF) Anniston, Alabama When the US chemical demilitarization effort began, Anniston housed 7 percent of the nation’s original stockpile – 2,254 tons of chemical agent. As of April 2004, 5% of the agent stockpile and 3% of the munitions stockpile at the Anniston facility had been destroyed. Agent • Nerve agents sarin and VX stored in cartridges, projectiles, rockets and mines • Blister agent sulfur mustard stored in cartridges, projectiles and ton containers Site Location and Specifics • 8 miles west of Anniston (pop. 23, 332) • In Calhoun County (pop. 112,171) Employment Statistics • Anniston Army Depot as a whole employs 3,804 people∗ • Affiliated groups o Westinghouse Electric Corporation employs 503 people o Werner Co. (aluminum extrusions) employs 650 people o General Dynamics employs 223 people Agent Destruction Technique Incineration Contractors/Subcontractors • $213.8 million contract awarded to Westinghouse Electric Corporation in 1996, now part of the Washington Demilitarization Company • Current contract value is approximately $1.3 billion • Subcontractors include: Battelle Memorial Institute Morrison Knudsen General Physics Corporation Bechtel National, Inc., Innovative Emergency Management Becon Construction Company ∗ Numbers not available for demilitarization facility. The Henry L. Stimson Center Destruction Sites 5 Groups/Organizations Involved with the Site Local Coosa River
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