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Chemical Accident Or Incident Response and Assistance (CAIRA) Operations

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Chemical Accident Or Incident Response and Assistance (CAIRA) Operations Department of the Army Pamphlet 50–6 Nuclear and Chemical Weapons and Materiel Chemical Accident or Incident Response and Assistance (CAIRA) Operations Headquarters Department of the Army Washington, DC 26 March 2003 UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY of CHANGE DA PAM 50–6 Chemical Accident or Incident Response and Assistance (CAIRA) Operations This revision-- o Clarifies procedures that may be adapted to situations involving terrorist use of chemical agent in the public domain (para 1-1). o Clarifies Army responsibilities under Executive Order 12856, Federal Compliance with Right-to-Know Laws and Pollution Prevention Requirements (para 2-2b). o Clarifies that for the purpose of enhancing management or meeting personal command style, the commander may modify the Initial Response Force (IRF) and Service Response Force (SRF) organizations (para 2-7c(5)). o Contains new procedures for a split-based concept of operations for the SRF (para 2-9e). o Eliminates granting the IRF/SRF special authority to waive Army regulatory requirements under certain circumstances. o Installations now must coordinate CAIRA Plans with the Regional Response Teams (para 2-13b(1)). o Incorporates provisions for an Army-appointed Remedial Project Manager to oversee long-term chemical accident/incident (CAI) recovery operations (para 3-6b(1)). o Requires attachment of a copy of the Hazard Assessment to CAIRA Plans (para 3- 4c(3)). o Adds munitions render safe and disposal procedures (para 7-3). o Revises guidelines for tort damage claims associated with a CAI (para 10-1). o Revises procedures for environmental monitoring to include lessons learned from CSEPP exercises and updated regulatory guidance (chap 11). o Modifies procedures for remedial operations to reflect the latest regulatory guidance and field practices (chap 14). o Deletes most of the guidance on IRF and SRF exercises (para 17-4). o Updates the points of contact for CAIRA operations and lists Internet addresses for select Government agencies (appendix C). o Deletes the appendix on the U.S. Army Combat Pictorial Detachment. o Deletes the appendix on personnel protective clothing and equipment. o Deletes the appendix on CAIRA personnel decontamination station. o Deletes the appendix on chemical agent behavior in the atmosphere. o Deletes the appendix on overpack containers. o Deletes the appendix on decontaminants. o Deletes the appendix on decontamination of specific items. o Adds a new appendix that provides general information on CAI at formerly used defense sites and nonstockpile emergencies (app I). o Eliminates most of the detailed guidance on preparation of CAIRA plans (app J). Headquarters *Department of the Army Department of the Army Pamphlet 50–6 Washington, DC 26 March 2003 Nuclear and Chemical Weapons and Materiel Chemical Accident or Incident Response and Assistance (CAIRA) Operations and assistance operations in Army Regu- agency who holds the grade of colonel or lation 50–6. the civilian equivalent. Applicability. This pamphlet applies to Suggested improvements. Users are t h e A c t i v e A r m y , t h e A r m y N a t i o n a l invited to send comments and suggested Guard of the United States, and the U.S. improvements on DA Form 2028 (Recom- Army Reserve. Specifically, this pamphlet m e n d e d C h a n g e s t o P u b l i c a t i o n s a n d a p p l i e s t o p e r s o n n e l , o r g a n i z a t i o n s , a n d contractors that have or will have the po- Blank Forms) directly to the Deputy Chief tential to respond to accidents or incidents of Staff, G–3, ATTN: DAMO–SSD, 400 involving chemical agent material (includ- A r m y P e n t a g o n , W a s h i n g t o n , D C ing research, development, test, and eval- 20310–0400. uation of dilute solutions) or nonsurety Distribution. This publication is availa- material (nonstockpile chemical weapons munitions/materiel). ble in electronic media only and is in- tended for command levels C, D, and E Proponent and exception authority. for Active Army, Army National Guard of History. This publication is a revision. The proponent for this pamphlet is the t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , a n d U . S . A r m y Deputy Chief of Staff, G–3. The Deputy Reserve. S u m m a r y . T h i s p a m p h l e t e x p l a i n s t h e Chief of Staff, G–3 has the authority to p o l i c i e s a n d p r o c e d u r e s p r e s c r i b e d f o r approve exceptions to this pamphlet that c h e m i c a l a c c i d e n t o r i n c i d e n t r e s p o n s e a r e c o n s i s t e n t w i t h c o n t r o l l i n g l a w a n d r e g u l a t i o n . T h e D e p u t y C h i e f o f S t a f f , G–3 may delegate this authority in writing to a division chief within the proponent Contents (Listed by paragraph and page number) Chapter 1 Introduction, page 1 Purpose • 1–1, page 1 References • 1–2, page 1 Explanation of abbreviations and terms • 1–3, page 1 Organization • 1–4, page 1 Chapter 2 Emergency Response System, page 1 Section I Introduction, page 1 Overview • 2–1, page 1 Principal regulatory documents • 2–2, page 1 Section II Army Emergency Response System, page 2 Organizational concept • 2–3, page 2 Headquarters, Department of the Army • 2–4, page 2 Major Army commands • 2–5, page 3 *This pamphlet supersedes DA Pamphlet 50–6, dated 17 May 1991. DA PAM 50–6 • 26 March 2003 i UNCLASSIFIED Contents—Continued Army Technical Escort Unit • 2–6, page 3 Emergency response forces • 2–7, page 3 Initial Response Force • 2–8, page 6 Service Response Force • 2–9, page 7 Roles and duties of IRF and SRF commanders • 2–10, page 7 Section III National Response System, page 9 National Contingency Plan • 2–11, page 9 Federal • 2–12, page 10 Regional • 2–13, page 13 State • 2–14, page 14 Local • 2–15, page 14 Chapter 3 Management, page 15 Section I Introduction, page 15 Overview • 3–1, page 15 Management fundamentals • 3–2, page 15 Section II Concept of Operations, page 15 Concept • 3–3, page 15 Readiness phase • 3–4, page 17 Response phase • 3–5, page 23 Recovery phase • 3–6, page 27 Recordkeeping • 3–7, page 29 Chapter 4 Information Systems Support, page 30 Overview • 4–1, page 30 Functions • 4–2, page 30 CAIRA operations • 4–3, page 30 Information systems capability planning • 4–4, page 30 Concept of operations • 4–5, page 31 Additional resources • 4–6, page 31 Guidelines • 4–7, page 32 Information systems annex • 4–8, page 34 Chapter 5 Security, page 34 Security program • 5–1, page 34 Specific requirements • 5–2, page 34 Resources • 5–3, page 34 Concept of operations • 5–4, page 35 Operations security • 5–5, page 36 Security annex • 5–6, page 36 Chapter 6 Medical Support, page 36 Overview • 6–1, page 36 Specific requirements • 6–2, page 37 Concept of operations • 6–3, page 38 Service Response Force medical support • 6–4, page 41 ii DA PAM 50–6 • 26 March 2003 Contents—Continued Medical treatment of chemical agent casualties • 6–5, page 41 Chapter 7 Agent and Munitions Operations, page 43 Overview • 7–1, page 43 Concept of operations • 7–2, page 43 Munitions render safe and disposal • 7–3, page 44 Agent and munitions annex • 7–4, page 46 Chapter 8 Public Affairs, page 46 Overview • 8–1, page 46 Planning • 8–2, page 46 Preparation • 8–3, page 46 Execution • 8–4, page 48 Recovery • 8–5, page 50 Chapter 9 Logistics Support, page 51 Overview • 9–1, page 51 Concept of operations • 9–2, page 51 Logistics activities • 9–3, page 51 Resources • 9–4, page 52 Specific priorities • 9–5, page 53 Chapter 10 Legal, page 53 Overview • 10–1, page 53 Specific requirements • 10–2, page 54 Resources • 10–3, page 54 Concept of operations • 10–4, page 55 Legal annex • 10–5, page 55 Chapter 11 Environmental Monitoring, page 56 Overview • 11–1, page 56 Procedures • 11–2, page 56 Stationary sources • 11–3, page 58 Transportation emergencies • 11–4, page 59 Technology • 11–5, page 61 Passive biomonitoring • 11–6, page 61 Chapter 12 Meteorology, page 61 Overview • 12–1, page 61 Factors affecting CAIRA operations • 12–2, page 62 Operations at a CAI site • 12–3, page 63 Chapter 13 Contamination Control, page 63 Overview • 13–1, page 63 Hazard determination • 13–2, page 63 Reduction of contamination • 13–3, page 65 Identification of chemical agents • 13–4, page 65 Decontamination • 13–5, page 68 DA PAM 50–6 • 26 March 2003 iii Contents—Continued Sampling and analyses • 13–6, page 69 Chapter 14 Restoration Operations, page 70 Overview • 14–1, page 70 Installation remedial operations • 14–2, page 70 Special considerations • 14–3, page 71 Chapter 15 Contractor Operations, page 73 Overview • 15–1, page 73 Concept of operations • 15–2, page 73 Chapter 16 OCONUS Operations, page 74 Overview • 16–1, page 74 OCONUS unique factors • 16–2, page 74 Specific requirements • 16–3, page 75 Chapter 17 Training, page 76 Overview • 17–1, page 76 Army training • 17–2, page 76 Other governmental agency training • 17–3, page 79 Exercises • 17–4, page 80 Appendixes A.
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