French soldiers with French Foreign Legion’s 6th Light Armored Brigade assault objective during bilateral seize-and-capture training exercise with U.S. Marines on Quartier Colonel de Chabrieres, France, May 29, 2015 (U.S. Marine Corps/Christopher Mendoza)
What It Means to Be Expeditionary A Look at the French Army in Africa
By Michael Shurkin
ormer U.S. Army Chief of Staff well as more scalable, tailorable, and also evoked the imperative of having an General Raymond Odierno regionally aligned. General Odierno’s “expeditionary Army.”2 What, however, F elaborated a vision for the Ser- successor and the current Army Chief do these terms mean? What would it vice’s future that left many questions of Staff, General Mark Milley, similarly take for the Army to realize the gener- unanswered. Specifically, he called for has spoken of the need for the Army als’ vision, and what, if any, are the the Army to be more expeditionary as to be “agile,” “adaptive,” and “expedi- associated risks? tionary,” and to have an “expeditionary A recently published RAND study mindset.”1 Lieutenant General Gustave of French army operations in Mali in Michael Shurkin is a Senior Political Scientist at Perna, writing in the March–April 2013 noted that in many ways, France’s the RAND Corporation. 2016 issue of Army Sustainment, has army epitomizes the characteristics
76 Features / A Look at the French Army in Africa JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 General Odierno and General Milley have Among other capabilities, Odierno rapidly shape conditions in the operational highlighted. It is a living example of a called on the Army to be the following: area, and operate immediately on arrival technologically sophisticated force that exploiting success and consolidating tacti- capable of task organizing at increas- checks all of the generals’ boxes; it does •• cal and operational gains. Expeditionary ingly lower levels to execute “small well precisely the things the generals call capabilities are more than physical at- footprint” operations on the U.S. Army to do. Studying how tributes; they begin with a mindset that capable of rapidly deploying scal- the French army has organized itself and •• pervades the force.7 able force packages, with the smaller operates provides insight into what their packages capable of rapidly reas- ideals might mean in concrete terms for The U.S. Army Training and sembling into larger formations as the U.S. Army and the associated ben- Doctrine Command’s 2015 pamphlet required efits—but also the implied compromises The U.S. Army Operating Concept: oriented to stress small-unit leader- and risks U.S. planners need to consider. •• Win in a Complex World, which bears ship that thrives in an environ- When comparing the strengths of the Odierno’s signature and reflects the ment of dispersed, decentralized French and U.S. armies, it must be ac- Future Force 2025 project, builds on the operations knowledged that there is little the French above by adding scalability, tailorability, aligned regionally so that operating can do that the ever-adaptable U.S. Army •• and the ability to manage in austere envi- units are familiar with local cultures, cannot. However, the Army’s general- ronments. It defines expeditionary as “the personalities, and conditions. purpose forces arguably are not designed ability to deploy task-organized forces on and organized to deploy and fight on a Odierno’s priorities later found ex- short notice to austere locations, capable small scale (at the brigade level or below), pression in the “Army 2025” concept. of conducting operations immediately and the Army normally does not create According to a white paper published in upon arrival.”8 The pamphlet also adds company- and battalion-size units from January 2014, the Army has to “operate a new term, expeditionary maneuver, multiple parent organizations, something differently.” It has to operate “decentral- defined as “the rapid deployment of task the French do routinely. There is usu- ized, distributed, and integrated.” It also organized combined arms forces able to ally a cost incurred when organizations must be “mission tailored,” with units transition quickly and conduct operations do things they are not designed to do.3 organized with the “capabilities needed of sufficient scale and ample duration American planners, moreover, appear for a specific mission and environment.” to achieve strategic objectives, aims to to have different understandings of Units also must be “engaged regionally.” turn the enemy out of prepared posi- what constitutes “enough” in terms of At the top of the agenda, however, is a tions or envelop forces from unexpected force protection, vehicle protection, revised force design featuring “optimized directions.”9 capabilities, and so forth.4 The French, combat units (BCT [Brigade Combat Turning now to the French army, we in contrast, operate on a small scale by Team] 2025)” intended to meet several find that it embodies many of the desired design and doctrine and appear to have objectives, among them being “more attributes mentioned above. Of particular an altogether different understanding of effectively mission tailored” and “region- interest, however, is not the degree to sufficiency. ally aligned.” The Army should have which the French army is expeditionary, “increased expeditionary capability” and but rather what the French example im- Envisioning Expeditionary be a “more expeditionary force” that plies for U.S. Army assumptions, as well In February 2013, General Odierno nonetheless “has retained capability.”6 as the risks involved if it were to become presented his vision of the future in an What the text does not provide is more like the French. article in Foreign Affairs, along with insight into how the force must change to issuing the more official 2013 Army be “more” of in so many ways. The most Operation Serval Strategic Planning Guidance.5 The prominent question, however, remains The French Operation Serval began on Army, he noted, changed as a result of the meaning of the word expeditionary. January 11, 2013, the day after Islamist a decade of operations in Afghanistan The fullest definition dating to just prior militants who had already seized control and Iraq. It needed, in effect, to be to the Future Force 2025 project can over northern Mali began an offensive recentered. The top priority was restor- be found in the 2012 Army Doctrine that threatened the nation’s capital, ing the Army’s conventional capabilities Reference Publication 3-0, Unified Land Bamako. France first responded by and retaining its value as a deterrent Operations: committing to the fight special forces associated with its ability to deploy and (SF) assets that were already in the sustain indefinitely large formations Expeditionary capability is the ability region. While the SF focused on stop- capable of defeating any adversary. to promptly deploy combined arms forces ping the offensive and rallying Malian However, for a variety of reasons, the worldwide into any area of operations army defenders, France rushed general- force could not simply revert to what it and conduct operations upon arrival. purpose troops into theater. The first to had been in the 1990s. On the contrary, Expeditionary operations require the arrive—also on January 11—were units it had to be something altogether new. ability to deploy quickly with little notice, flown in from Chad, where they had
JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Shurkin 77 been engaged in a long-running opera- proportionately larger support element. ments, and they have no strategic lift tion. Other units drove in from Côte What the French do—and what they of their own. However, the French— d’Ivoire, while still more units began have designed their army to do—is perhaps in light of their weak logistical arriving from France. measure out their forces in small incre- capabilities—arguably have made a By January 15, the French had ments and aim for “just enough.” That virtue of necessity by designing their stopped the militants’ offensive and involves, among other things, the ability forces to deploy and operate on a small begun advancing north to seize control to disaggregate and re-aggregate forma- scale and tailor their forces to meet spe- over the broad strip of land on either side tions on the fly as well as the will to cific needs. of the Niger River, commonly referred to accept a good deal of risk. The French pushed modularity to as the Niger Bend because of the river’s well below the brigade level. They did curving path. The Bend includes north- The Numbers this in the 1990s as part of a number of ern Mali’s most populous towns, Gao Setting aside the unknown number sweeping reforms intended to transform and Timbuktu. The French employed of SF troops who were present in the army from a large conscription-based fast-moving armored columns combined Mali before Serval began, the French continental force designed to fight the with airborne and air-land operations, contingent in Mali—whose north- Soviet Union into a smaller, more expedi- coordinated with SF and with air support ern half alone is roughly the size of tionary force. (By law, the French military from the French air force. The French France—started at zero. Moreover, could not deploy conscripts overseas, took Gao on January 25 and Timbuktu rather than first gathering strength and thereby forcing the army to rely on an 4 days later. They kept moving quickly, then committing to the field à la Opera- “army within the army” consisting of fully securing distant Kidal—the epicenter of tion Desert Shield, the French fielded volunteer formations that historically had Tuareg militancy—by January 31, and their units as they arrived in theater, a colonial vocation. Chief among them Tessalit on February 8. The campaign often company by company, platoon by are the Foreign Legion and the “Troupes climaxed in February and March as platoon. For example, the first non-SF de Marine,” or Marines, who in the 19th French and Chadian forces converged on group to arrive in Mali was a 200-man century were part of the French Navy.) the Adrar des Ifoghas mountains, where sous-groupement tactique interarmes The French understood that in order to remaining militants made a last stand. (SGTIA), a company-scale combined pack as much capability as possible into a By late spring, the “major combat op- arms task force that was detached from smaller force, that force would have to be erations” phase of Serval was complete. a battalion-size groupement tactique modular and flexible.11 The army dissolved Serval continued on a smaller scale until interarmes (GTIA), or combined arms its divisions in favor of brigades, which it officially came to an end on July 15, task force, operating in Chad. Two days became force providers, and placed regi- 2014, when it was subsumed into a new later, another SGTIA arrived from Côte ments at the center of gravity. The French regional counterterrorism operation, d’Ivoire by road. The largest single for- in 2015 revived its divisions, but opera- Barkhane. Nine French soldiers lost their mation to arrive in Mali as a group was tionally speaking, there is little change, lives fighting in Mali between January 11, a full GTIA of mechanized infantry that and what really matters now as in 2013 2013, and July 15, 2014. reached Dakar, Senegal, by ship, and are the French army’s task-organized and The French in Mali demonstrated then drove the rest of the way. scalable battalion- and company-level task a number of features of interest to this The total force reached roughly 3,400 forces, GTIAs and SGTIAs. article. These include the French army’s by the end of January and 5,300 by the Published French army doctrine approach to task organization, which is end of February. Of those, according to defines GTIAs and SGTIAs as task-or- related to how the French organize their the French military, 1,500 were support ganized combined arms forces designed force; France’s prioritization of mobil- personnel, or 28 percent of the overall to operate autonomously and indepen- ity over protection; the army’s regional force.10 Several experts on U.S. Army op- dently according to their commanders’ alignment; and finally its expeditionary erations consulted for this study indicated intent; the objective is decentralized culture, which relates to all of the above. that a comparable American force (that and distributed operations in keeping is, with comparable capabilities) would with maneuverist doctrine and mission Task Organizing have required a larger logistical tail of ap- command.12 The French in Mali demonstrated an proximately 40 percent, suggesting that SGTIAs and GTIAs have the same ability to tailor their forces, deploying the United States would have had to field structure but are different in terms of relatively small task-oriented forma- a larger force overall. scale. SGTIAs are composed of a core of tions. Although it is difficult to compare four platoons—three infantry and one the French and American armies, in GTIAs and SGTIAs armored, or vice versa—together with our assessment of the French forces The French deploy in small numbers a command element and those support deployed to Mali compared to U.S. in part because they would struggle to elements deemed necessary, often includ- norms, we believe that the Americans do otherwise. Their forces are few and ing some indirect fire capability as well as would have sent a larger force with a are overcommitted to overseas deploy- joint fires coordinators of various possible
78 Features / A Look at the French Army in Africa JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 French soldier sits aboard U.S. Air Force C-17 Globemaster III en route to Mali, where French forces were fighting extremists who took control of much of north of country, January 20, 2013 (U.S. Air Force/Nathanael Callon) types. A captain commands the force. there, which included everything from different formations with different com- GTIAs are larger, composed of four com- indirect fire to human terrain teams. The mand structures on the fly, as the mission panies—three infantry and one armored, GTIAs and SGTIAs in Mali were smaller evolved.13 or vice versa—with a command element and in fact did not comply with the doc- In the case of planned deploy- and those support elements deemed nec- trinally mandated 3/1 structure, reflecting ments, such as those that were slated for essary. A colonel commands. Additional some combination of commanders’ esti- Afghanistan, GTIAs and SGTIAs are platoons or companies can be tacked on mation of the force size required and unit more homogenous with respect to home as needed up until the task force reaches availability. For example, GTIA 3, which regiments and brigades. They also train a limit of eight. In Mali, several GTIAs participated in the Adrar des Ifoghas and deploy together as SGTIAs, cycling operated simultaneously, each with dis- offensive in northern Mali in February through France’s national training centers tinct areas of operation or missions and 2013, consisted of three companies (one as such. In addition, French officers are all under the command of a brigade-level mechanized infantry, one armor, and trained to function in and command headquarters established in theater, led by one engineering). It also had an artillery GTIAs and SGTIAs. Commanding a brigade commander. Thus, the French component consisting of two Caesar SGTIAs, for example, is part of the for- created a provisional Serval brigade. Only self-propelled howitzers and four 120mm mal training for French army captains, some of the forces participating in the op- mortars, communications and electronic which includes working with officers erations, it should be noted, are from the warfare elements, and tactical drones. of other branches to ensure that they brigade commander’s home brigade. The GTIAs and SGTIAs in Mali know enough about how the others do The exact composition of GTIAs often have drawn from a diverse array of their jobs to understand how to work and SGTIAs varies according to mission regiments. They routinely bring soldiers effectively with them. Presumably, col- requirements and the resources at hand. from regular line regiments together with lective and individual training of this sort SGTIAs in Afghanistan reportedly were marines and legionnaires, infantrymen reduces the turbulence that might be as- large and diverse owing to the numerous with cavalry troops, sappers, artiller- sociated with cobbling units together on requirements associated with operating ists, and so forth, structuring them into the fly in response to emergencies.
JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Shurkin 79 blindé multi-rôles, or VBMR) and the EBRC, which are due to enter service by 2020, are heavier than the vehicles they are intended to replace and offer greater protection, including add-on armor kits. However, they remain roughly in the Stryker weight class (the VBCI weighs in at 25.6 tons, and the VBMR and EBRC are expected to be lighter or roughly the same). French develop- ers have focused on maintaining their predecessors’ mobility while enhancing their capabilities, primarily by means of technology-enabling networked warfare. The VBCI, VBMR, and EBRC ostensibly will exercise high degrees of situational awareness and fight in close coordination with networked dismounted infantry, other vehicles, artillery, and air support.15 Interestingly, there appears to be a current within the French army that favors lower technology vehicles such as the venerable VAB, AMX-10RC, and ERC-90. For example, Colonel Michel Goya, a leading French military analyst, has argued in the past that perhaps cheaper, simpler weapons would be preferable because their lower cost would Mobility vs. Protection been tested with a 120mm gun, accord- enable the army to invest more in quan- The French army operates a vehicle fleet ing to one report.14 tity and training.16 With regard to Mali, that is well suited for precisely the kinds The French assess that mobility is the French claim to have found that the of operations it conducted in Mali. To more important than protection, and they low-tech nature of the vehicles used there be more specific, France has mechanized gamble that being able to move quickly was a virtue. Most of the French vehicles nearly all of its units, using relatively provides more protection than heavier in Mali—with the notable exception of light, wheeled armored vehicles that can armor. French doctrine emphasizes rapid the VBCI and arguably the Caesar and be transported in C-130s and C-160s as coordinated movements calculated to VBL—are old and slated for replacement well as driven long distances over poor maintain the operational initiative—pre- or at least modernization. The French quality roads and cross country. While cisely the kind of campaign the French now state that their outdated equipment lacking the level of protection of main conducted in Mali. This approach worked proved less delicate and easier to fix in the battle tanks and heavy infantry fighting there, although it is not clear how well field than newer equipment.17 vehicles such as the American Bradley, French armored units would hold up But not everyone was pleased by the the wheeled armor units of the French against a more sophisticated enemy performance of the aging vehicles. The army provide considerable firepower equipped with antitank guided missiles GTIA 3 commander, for example, com- for their weight class, especially when (ATGMs) or other standoff precision mented that the roughly 30-year old VABs compared with the U.S. Stryker. French weapons. We also must wonder if the and AMX-10RCs were “breathing their light tanks, armored personnel carriers, French would make the same tradeoff if last” and that their “performance reached and infantry fighting vehicles (véhi- they had more robust logistical capabili- a level that was at times preoccupying and cule blindé de combat d’infanterie, or ties, including a fleet of C-17s. makes their replacement indispensable VBCI) are equipped with 105mm guns The French nonetheless have doubled for continuing to conduct engagements (AMX-10RC), 90mm guns (ERC 90), down on their commitment to light at this level of difficulty.”18 The problem, and 25mm automatic cannons. The armor as they modernize. The VBCI, however, appears to have been the ve- armored reconnaissance and combat which entered service recently and hicles’ age, not their level of sophistication, vehicle (engin blindé de reconnaissance et has been deployed to Afghanistan, the as has been confirmed by recent reports.19 de combat, or EBRC), slated to replace Central African Republic, and Mali, and Particularly important to the the AMX-10RC within the decade, has the multirole armored vehicle (véhicle French are the relatively light logistical
80 Features / A Look at the French Army in Africa JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 U.S. Airmen and French soldiers load equipment inside U.S. Air Force C-17 Globemaster III in Istres, France, January 21, 2013 (U.S. Air Force/Nathanael Callon) requirements associated with light fighting in the Adrar des Ifoghas moun- that the French had little in the way of wheeled armor. Indeed, given the gener- tains described the operations in terms excess sustainment capacity. Any savings ally poor infrastructure in countries such of “roughing it.” It commented that the such as that which might have come from as Mali and France’s weak logistical capa- army had been in the field for a month using wheeled versus tracked vehicles bilities, anything that reduces the logistics and noted that the logistical support probably helped a great deal. burden is an advantage. was providing water, food, and fuel, but France’s choice of vehicles also gives French logistical capabilities, it otherwise the troops were left to get by its army a degree of flexibility regarding should be made clear, were stretched to as best they could. It was “the price to how it gets its units to the theater of their extreme limits in Serval, even with pay for taking so many people so far in so operations and moves them around once airlift borrowed from allies. The troops little time.”22 Colonel Bertrand Darras, there. Most vehicles arrived in theater that France rushed to Mali initially had who at the time was with the French by air, but a significant portion drove with them only the essentials (in many Ground Forces Command, commented to Mali from points elsewhere in West cases, 3 days’ worth of food and 9 liters that the troops in Mali after a few weeks Africa. As mentioned, some reached Mali of water), and the subsequent focus of in the field resembled “Napoleon’s army by driving from Senegal or Côte d’Ivoire. logistical efforts remained on providing before the Italian campaign” more than Once in theater, the French units the bare essentials (food, water, fuel) as they did a fully equipped modern force had to cover a lot of ground. For ex- troops raced north and east.20 France also because of the condition of their equip- ample, the commander of GTIA 3 in assumed responsibility for sustaining the ment, uniforms, boots, and so on. They Mali boasted that his battalion, during Chadian force; it may well have done the had no air conditioning, showers, or 6 weeks of operations, remained almost same for some of the other African con- toilets, Darras stated, and had trouble entirely “in the zone of operations, near tingents in theater. sleeping because of the heat: “We dis- or in contact with the enemy, without In late March 2013, a leading defense regarded all standards to keep the high returning to base, without technical blogger reported, based on his contacts momentum required to destroy as much pauses, and without conducting repairs.” in the French army, that ground troops of the enemy as we could.”23 He continued, “Each vehicle traveled were just barely keeping their vehicles The statements about Serval contain a 2,500 to 5,000 km” off-road and on dif- in working order.21 A news report of the great deal of bravado, but they make clear ficult terrain.24
JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Shurkin 81 French soldier discusses objectives with U.S. Soldier during field training exercise in Arta, Djibouti, March 16, 2016 (U.S. Air Force/Kate Thornton)
Regional Expertise loyal to General Haji ag Gamou, whose locally, should be sourced locally. In the The French army is, for all intents and men provided the French with invaluable case of water and fuel, the French literally purposes, a regionally aligned force. help, primarily by scouting and translat- knew whom to call and had pre-existing Setting aside their long colonial experi- ing. Working with ag Gamou’s men did contracts with regional suppliers.25 ence on the continent, the French know not come without risk, however, given Africa well. All French army units rotate that he represents a particular faction Expeditionary Culture through Africa on 4-month “short- within Tuareg society and has a long A less tangible yet significant factor duration missions.” France’s explicitly history of conflict with other Tuareg in French operations in Mali is the expeditionary brigades—that is, the his- notables, particularly ones hailing from expeditionary culture that serves the torically “colonial” units that conduct Kidal and the elite clans of the restive French army well when operating at a the lion’s share of the country’s overseas Kel Adagh confederation. What must small scale with limited resources. This operations—also conduct 2- or 3-year be stressed, though, is that the French might be particularly true of France’s “long-term missions” in Africa. almost certainly knew what they were specifically expeditionary units, most The payoff was evident in Mali, where doing and understood all the pertinent if not all of which historically have the French were able to make up for their ramifications and risks. The French, had an explicitly colonial vocation, own small numbers in part by calling in other words, arrived in Mali already most obviously the marines and the upon regional and local allies, with whom knowing the human terrain and did not Foreign Legion. These, it should be they know how to work effectively. The have to race to get up to speed. stressed, are not SF (although there most obvious example was the 2,250- Another way in which regional exper- are French marine SF regiments as well man Chadian contingent, which played tise paid off was France’s ability to rely on as commando-qualified legionnaires) an important role in some of the most regional bottled-water suppliers (pre-cer- but rather general-purpose forces with intense fighting in the campaign. Also of tified by the French health service) and a long-standing expeditionary mission note is the French army’s work with the fuel providers. The French operate with and outlook. Since the reforms of the Tuareg contingent in the Malian army the rule that whatever can be sourced 1990s, however, this expeditionary
82 Features / A Look at the French Army in Africa JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 culture is also apparently true of the his- have become familiar in Afghanistan. ties a luxury. Thus, it operated in Mali torically continentally focused regiments According to a French marine who had at or beyond the limits of its sustain- that now share responsibility for over- been involved in Serval, for example, ment capabilities with a force structure, seas deployments and rotate through the U.S. Army can fight “properly” in vehicles, and other elements carefully Africa alongside the former colonials the sense that it can think in terms of and optimistically calculated to be and distinguished themselves in Opera- going about an operation the best way. little more than sufficient: just enough tion Serval. In contrast, he stated, the French army troops, just enough force protection, Among the aspects of colonial opera- sees itself as having to make the best of just enough helicopters, just enough tions that arguably have some relevance whatever resources may be available. vehicles with just enough capabilities, for today is the small size of French Thus, he explained, planning for Serval and so forth. deployments, the degree of autonomy was an exercise in thinking through what According to the French senate, for that unit commanders exercised, the high was and was not available and coming to example, the VABs and VBCIs used degree of risk they accepted, and their terms with the associated risk. in Mali were not equipped to counter interest in leveraging local knowledge. Goya carried the argument further improvised explosive devices (IEDs) for French colonial forces were invariably and defined the American approach to the simple reason that those that were small and relatively ill resourced, reflect- warfare in terms of detecting the enemy, so equipped were all in Afghanistan.29 ing France’s priorities (protecting the locating it, and then using firepower to Moreover, although VBCIs offer better homeland) and its determination to destroy it—“fire maneuver,” he termed protection and other capabilities than any colonize cheaply or not at all. Badly it. This compares with destroying the of the other vehicles used in Mali, only outnumbered and for the most part enemy through combat, or “combat 36 VBCIs were used there, compared operating autonomously and without the maneuver,” which is riskier. The French with 177 venerable VABs. There were so possibility of timely reinforcements or see fire maneuver as a luxury, something many VABs and other out-of-date light- relief, colonial commanders—often just one can do when one has the means. armor vehicles in Mali partly because the captains and below—learned to leverage According to Goya, France’s Ground French had been gambling that they were local knowledge. Indeed, France owes its Forces Command has gone so far as to good enough. If they thought otherwise, success in northern Mali during the co- express the desire that the French army they presumably would make replacing lonial period in part to the commanders’ post-Afghanistan “de-Americanizes” so them a higher priority.30 As it happened, practice of attending to local politics and as not to retain the “bad habits” picked the enemy did not make effective use of the human terrain so as to better deploy up fighting alongside the U.S. military. its antitank weapons or IEDs and did not divide-and-conquer tactics, forge military “We learned a lot of methods from the possess ATGMs. But the French could alliances, and so on. Commanders knew Americans,” he stated. Another officer, not have been certain that would be the whom to trust, whom to promote, and a legionnaire who had participated in case. whom to push aside. multiple African and Afghan deploy- Similarly, the airborne operation in The French analyst Goya, a former ments, similarly expressed concern that Timbuktu featured a night-time combat marine, argues that much of the outlook the French army had learned some bad drop of 250 lightly armed legionnaires, and practices of France’s colonial units lessons in Afghanistan with regard to a risky enterprise in the best of circum- have survived and serve them well today. fighting “American-style warfare,” in stances. The French seem not to have had He describes today’s marine regiments’ the sense that infantrymen worked in good intelligence regarding the threat approach explicitly as “colonial” and close conjunction with drones, satellites, on the ground, for they conducted the defines it in terms of a “global approach” and aircraft providing close air support. drop to block retreating fighters but en- that involves not just tactics, but also France cannot afford to fight like that, he countered none. The French could just as mixing in with the population and un- stated, and besides, it was contrary to the easily have underestimated the threat as derstanding the entire context in which experience of most French officers most they overestimated it.31 one is operating.26 When asked about of the time, who have to operate in the Finally, the French cut things close institutional continuity from the colonial field with few resources.28 with respect to three key requirements: era, another marsouin (the French equiv- fuel, water, and medical support. French alent of leatherneck) questions cultural Accepting Risk doctrine regarding fuel is that one should continuity yet notes that French marine Waging war on the cheap necessarily never go below a 10-day reserve. Ten regiments today operate in the same con- translates into risk, especially if one days is the French army’s red line. In ditions as in the past, suggesting that, in favors close combat, as the French the first month of Serval, however, the effect, they operate in the same way.27 officers above claim. In contrast to the French, who often raced well ahead of French officers interviewed by the U.S. Army, which can be described as a their logistical elements, operated with author also draw a distinction between “belt and suspenders” institution, which 24 hours of reserve. Any “rupture,” how they are taught to operate and often uses backup or redundant systems, moreover, would have taken 12 hours to the “American way,” with which they the French army considers such ameni- address.32 The French also struggled to
JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Shurkin 83 U.S. Airman communicates with French air force pilots during tactical exercise in Djibouti, February 24, 2016 (U.S. Air Force/Kate Thornton) keep the most forward-deployed troops the same time when in fact they could •• sub-brigade modularity in northern Mali supplied with water only support 2.35 French officers also •• relatively light armored vehicles that and at times fell below the required 10 disclosed that they were not capable of emphasize mobility over firepower liters per man, per day. The extreme heat providing the “golden hour” standard of •• an institutional and command reduced significantly the lift of aircraft, medical support called for by French doc- culture accustomed and suited to obliging the French to rely on convoys of trine for all of the operations going on at austerity trucks.33 There, the problem was that the the same time. In at least one instance, •• greater acceptance of risk. bottled water reached Gao in containers, they had to choose not to provide golden If we break apart the first point, mod- but the trucks that took the water north hour coverage to one operation to pro- ularity, we find important differences with of Gao could not handle containers, and vide it to another.36 respect to training and the authorities and there was a limit to how many crates of The French army is a living example responsibilities bestowed upon company bottled water could be loaded on their of precisely the kind of force General commanders, which facilitate the kind beds before they fell off while driving Odierno and General Milley have envi- of decentralized and distributed opera- over the rough terrain (there are no sioned for the future of the U.S. Army. tions associated with mission command. paved roads north of Gao). The French The French force has demonstrated that Indeed, French officers interviewed for a would not have managed had they not it is adept at deploying small, scalable, separate study on interoperability claim jury-rigged walls for the truck beds using task-organized forces that can disag- to be on the extreme end of the mission wooden pallets.34 gregate and re-aggregate on the fly; command scale relative to their North Similarly, the French have a rule re- it has a force structure well suited for Atlantic Treaty Organization Allies with garding the amount of medical support expeditionary operations; and it leverages respect to the degree of autonomy and that must be on hand for a given number deep regional expertise. It also has an responsibility they invest in lower ech- of soldiers. In Mali at a certain point, expeditionary culture. Associated with elons and their commanders. according to the French G-4, doctrine these characteristics are elements that Whereas the French appear confi- dictated that they needed to have the distinguish the French army from the dent that their success on the battlefield ability to perform 12 major surgeries at American:
84 Features / A Look at the French Army in Africa JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 and low casualty rates demonstrate the Apache unit without the full panoply of support çois Cornut-Gentille,” Assemblée Nationale, elements and a large contingent intended to July 8, 2014. proficiency of their military, we are re- provide force protection. See Bruce Nardulli et 20 Céline Brunetaud, “La chaîne soutien en minded of Napoleon’s alleged remark al., Disjointed War: Military Operations in Koso- opérations: À coups d’expédition,” Terre Info that the quality he looked for the most vo, 1999 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002). Magazine, May 2013, 10. in his generals was that they be lucky. 5 Raymond T. Odierno, “The Force of 21 Philippe Chapleau, “Rusticité et ingéni- Moreover, Serval does not shed light on Tomorrow,” Foreign Policy, February 4, 2013, osité: Malgré tout, les véhicules tirent la langue available at
JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Shurkin 85