Reforming the Afghan National Police A joint report of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (London) and the Foreign Policy Research Institute (Philadelphia) REFORMING THE ANP About RUSI The Royal United Services Institute is an independent think tank engaged in cutting edge defense and security research. A unique institution, founded in 1831 by the Duke of Wellington, RUSI embodies nearly two centuries of forward thinking, free discussion and careful reflection on defense and security matters. www.rusi.org About FPRI Founded in 1955, the Foreign Policy Research Institute is a 501(c)(3) non-profit organization based in Philadelphia, devoted to advanced research and public education on international affairs. It aims to bring the insights of scholarship to bear on the development of policies that advance US national interests. www.fpri.org For information, contact: Alan Luxenberg, [email protected] or 215-732-3774, ext. 105 Executive Summary Afghanistan represents one of the largest attempts Kosovo provide a number of important lessons by the international community at state-building which need to be digested for ANP transformation. since the end of the Cold War. Nobody doubts Yet each mission remains sui generis. Afghanistan’s the good intentions of the Afghan authorities or social, cultural, security and political idiosyncrasies the international community in aiming to ensure belie any hope that measures can be blindly the stability and long-term sustainability of transplanted from one context to the next – not Afghanistan. Large resources have been devoted least the context of acute conflict which imposes a to the rehabilitation of the country and progress number of specific dynamics determining the shape has undoubtedly been achieved. Afghanistan is of effective reform policies and programs. Based on unrecognisable from the Taliban-run state at the these lessons, RUSI and FPRI strongly recommend beginning of this decade. Nevertheless, even by the the following: Afghan government’s own admission, much work remains to be done. Reform the international effort, not just the police: This monograph explores one aspect of the massive reconstruction effort; reform of the Commit to long-term ANP transformation Afghan National Police (ANP). Much progress has International actors should enter into a ten-to- been accomplished, from infrastructure built to fifteen year police-focused memorandum of the numbers of officers trained. But even by the understanding with the Government of Afghanistan. Afghan government’s own admission, problems Over-optimistic programme timetables must be remain. Institutional and individual competence to re-configured, set instead by the Afghan clock – tackle crime remains low, while corruption, police and measured against benchmarks of qualitative criminality and abuses of power are pervasive. outcomes, as opposed to donor metrics of Failing to provide sufficient civil security, the police quantitative outputs. are unable to fulfil their potential role as a key appendage to the reconstruction effort. Moreover, Expand financial, human and logistical resources the acute security and justice deficit confronting Donors must dedicate increased funds for reform, Afghan communities presents an existential threat particularly allocated through the Law and Order to the current post-Taliban system. Lawlessness Trust Fund Afghanistan. Addressing personnel is frequently cited as a primary reason for citizen shortages of 1,500 trainers is key, either through disillusionment with the central government and diverting military personnel or on the open market. growing sympathy for insurgent forces. The EU Police Mission in Afghanistan in particular should renew efforts to secure additional funds Nothing in this report is meant to diminish the and personnel, exerting pressure on allies such as well-intentioned efforts of actors currently working France and Portugal and increasing its salaries as hard to ensure Afghanistan’s stability and progress. an incentive. Rather, the sole purpose is to take stock of the current situation, identify areas of police reform Utilise the right institutional and individual actors where further progress is required, and suggest The domination of reform by the Combined recommendations which can further speed the Security Transition Command – Afghanistan, reform effort. There exists a wealth of experience while not ideal, must be accepted as a necessity. gleaned from over thirty years of police reform Mitigating the negative impact requires clearer and development which has not been sufficiently divisions of labour between strategic and policy acknowledged in Afghanistan. Reform missions direction and implementation. Responsibility in El Salvador, Iraq, Timor-Leste, Sierra Leone and for Ministry of the Interior reform should fall to RefoRming the AnP the EU. Increased co-ordination of the chaotic populated by under-represented ethnicities could reform effort requires donor commitment to the therefore help. Vetting procedures, which are rarely International Police Monitoring Board which must followed, must be radically overhauled. Careful then clarify chains of command, reduce areas of evaluation of officers must take place at a number overlap and duplication starting with the merger of of levels throughout the recruitment and training EU Police Mission and the EC Rule of Law mission. process. Private contractors, such as Dyncorp, should be Training must be revised to improve efficacy carefully assessed and if necessary removed. and respect for human rights. Course length for satanman (non-commissioned officers) and Also needed is recruitment of personnel with wider skills satunkai (patrolmen) must be increased. Training sets (for example, institution building and change must go ‘back to basics’, while specialised courses management), experience of conflict reform, and on prevalent crimes – for example, domestic higher ranks. Cultural, linguistic and area expertise troubles and land disputes – would improve service is imperative. delivery. Establishment of a nationwide literacy campaign would address pervasive ANP illiteracy. Afghan ownership, where possible, must be Also recommended is expansion of Focused broadened – from reform design to implementation. District Development, and greater concentration Most important is the development of a on targeting particularly vulnerable districts. comprehensive Afghan, rather than US or German, vision of reform. Avoid short term force generation Actors must avoid repeating the mistakes of hastily Relay the foundations of policing: technical assembled security forces such as the National capacity building Auxiliary Police. Inimical to qualitative reform, recent decisions to sponsor expedited training Abandon the obsession with ANP numbers and recruitment programs – for example, ‘pyramid Security is not the product of a neat mathematical schemes’ to train 35,000 for the election – should equation. Tashkeel (the Police Organisational be abandoned. Staffing Plan) increases, both unsustainable and ineffective, should be rejected. Reform should Reforming the institutional architecture concentrate on tackling police attrition and ‘ghost policemen’ via biometric technology, regular Extensive reform of the Ministry of Interior is required payment of salaries and better management. A Better capacity and skills of the ministry at both functional and geographical reorganisation of an individual and institutional level are needed. the police coupled with expanded ANP presence Officials need improved mentoring, while extensive in urban centres and on highways and borders is internal reorganisation to enhance transparency, highly recommended. clarify branch responsibilities, and reduce duplication of effort, is needed. This will count for Focus on ANP quality little if ministry control over itself and the police is Low recruitment standards should be not strengthened. Reorganisation to ensure clear increased. Merit-based recruitment, to increase lines of authority and internal purges aimed at professionalism, requires strict enforcement of reducing factionalism and mitigating bureaucratic objective criteria. Political, tribal and ethnic bias resistance are required. Political will must be strong, must be challenged by donors and the drafting of necessitating donor conditioning of assistance on recruitment officials from different geographical comprehensive ministerial reform. locales. Ethnic imbalances in the police promote a culture of impunity and illegitimacy among the population. Recruitment drives in regions ii executive SummARy Improve accountability and oversight Comprehensive reform Internal institutional safeguards, such as the Ministry of the Interior’s internal affairs Reform the criminal justice sector department, must be expanded to tackle endemic Effective policing requires an effective criminal corruption and abuses of power. Removing the justice sector. It is essential to launch a criminal need for presidential decrees to fire officers would justice ‘surge’, reversing years of poor funding begin strengthening unit capabilities. and personnel, to ensure adequate capacity and improved efficiency in the provision of justice. Meanwhile, the government should make an example Infrastructure and personnel capacity-building, of corrupt middle and upper management, signalling from new courthouses to new judges, must be the end of police impunity, and improving managerial complemented by the sector’s decentralisation. oversight and