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“With A Little Help From Our Friends:”1 The Development of Combat Intelligence in the American Expeditionary Forces, 1917-1918 DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By James L. Doty III, M.A. Graduate Program in History The Ohio State University 2010 Dissertation Committee: Dr. John F. Guilmartin, Advisor Dr. Nathan Rosenstein Dr. Stephanie J. Smith 1 The title is inspired by the Beatles song, “With a Little Help From My Friends,” Sgt. Pepper’s Lonely Hearts Club Band, 1967. Copyright by James L. Doty III 2010 Disclaimer The views expressed in this work are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. Abstract The United States Army, like its counterparts in Europe, especially the United Kingdom, struggled to achieve recognition as a profession during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The Army developed educational institutions, improved standards of conduct, and further developed specialized knowledge in areas such as intelligence. US army officers and military officials sponsored these changes knowing and sometimes adapting from similar developments in other armies. When the First World War started in 1914, the American army was close to par with the British army in its development of intelligence as a specialized field and body of military knowledge. By 1917, Britain and the other belligerents had tremendously advanced their intelligence practices as part of the broader development of warfighting techniques through three years of warfare. Britain’s army had expanded twenty-fold, new capabilities such as aerial photography and signal interception had developed and matured, and classic techniques for intelligence collection, such as prisoner interrogations, had been further refined and systemized. US army officers observed some of these developments but lacked resources or support to incorporate them into American practice. By the time the United States entered the war in April 1917, the army had fallen far behind the forces of the other belligerents in its strength, organization, and doctrine. ii The American army needed assistance to be successful in battle: it had to grow in size just as the British army had done while at the same time modernizing its practices. Some historians have criticized this American effort. Among those receiving blame for American shortcomings is General John J. Pershing, the commander of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF). According to these historians, Pershing’s rejection of allied trench warfare methods and espousal of his own “open warfare” methods, which were neither clearly defined nor adequately trained, degraded the combat ability of the AEF. While this explanation for the AEF’s shortcomings has merit, the AEF actually drew greatly upon allied experiences in a variety of areas, including artillery, aviation, tanks, and intelligence. American officers adopted allied intelligence organization, methods, and training into the AEF. Allied officers in the British and French missions who traveled to the United States in April and May 1917 provided many details of their organization and methods. Major Dennis E. Nolan, who became the head of AEF intelligence in France, drew upon the information provided in these missions, information collected by military attaches, and information he gained from personal observation of the British and French armies in the field to draw up the first American intelligence regulations. These regulations were in many cases word for word the same as the British Second Army intelligence instructions given to him while at the British front. From battalion level to the AEF General Headquarters (GHQ), Nolan largely adopted British intelligence organization for the AEF. Any differences in doctrine and organization from the British model reflected a choice to employ French methods or preexisting American methods. iii Allied officers trained Americans in intelligence methods even after Pershing began Americanizing the trainers. Finally, the American instructors at the Army Intelligence School (AIS) drew upon the British Intelligence School at Harrow-on-the-Hill, England, when they organized the school, developed curriculum, and later added more course content. One British and two French officers served as faculty at the school as well. The actions of Nolan and other American officers demonstrate that members of the AEF were receptive to adopting a variety of allied methods into American practice. The difference between Pershing’s rejection of allied “trench warfare” methods and the AEF’s acceptance of allied, especially British, intelligence primarily appears to have been based on the lack of a comparable American intelligence system at the outbreak of war. Similar adoption of allied methods in aviation, armor, and artillery suggest that too much focus has been placed on Pershing’s opposition to allied trench warfare doctrine in terms of infantry tactics and not enough on the incorporation of allied methods into almost every other functional area of the AEF. iv Acknowledgments I wish to thank my advisor, John F. Guilmartin, for helping me see this project to completion. I am also grateful to Nathan Rosenstein and Stephanie Smith for their helpful suggestions and encouragement. I have appreciated the efforts made on my behalf by the personnel of the U.S. Army Military History Institute (USAMHI) at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, Maryland, and the Australian War Memorial (AWM), Canberra, Australia. Dr. Sommers and Mitch Yockelson provided especially valuable assistance during my research. A number of staff at the AWM helped me obtain documents from 10,000 miles away. I also appreciate the support provided to me by the Office of the Dean, United States Military Academy (USMA), for facilitating my travel to conduct additional research for this project. I am blessed to have had the opportunity to work with the best teaching faculty in the world, my peers, mentors, and friends who have served in the Department of History at USMA. Each conversation on the hallway, office, or discussion panel helped me grow as a professional. I also thank Major (Ret.) Jim Beach, MBE, now at Salford University, for providing advice from a different national perspective. His enthusiasm for the subject v and emailed encouragement made the task more enjoyable. He graciously read the entire manuscript. I must thank Major Stoney Trent for getting his PhD first; his example helped keep my nose to the grindstone. He has also acting as my intellectual sparring partner for nearly twenty years. If I had a good idea, chances are he provided the first critique. Finally, many thanks to Jen and the boys, who missed me while I typed. vi Vita 1991................................................................Yukon High School 1995................................................................B.S. History, United States Military Academy (USMA) 2005................................................................M.A. History, The Ohio State University 2005 – 2008....................................................Instructor and Assistant Professor, Department of History, USMA Publications Trent, Stoney A. and James L. Doty III. “Marketing: An Overlooked Aspect of Information Operations.” Military Review (July-August 2005), 70-74. Fields of Study Major Field: History Area of Emphasis: Military History Minor Field: Ancient History Minor Field: Latin American History vii Table of Contents Abstract............................................................................................................................... ii Acknowledgments............................................................................................................... v Vita.................................................................................................................................... vii Table of Contents............................................................................................................. viii List of Tables ...................................................................................................................... x List of Abbreviations ......................................................................................................... xi Introduction......................................................................................................................... 1 Chapter 1: Development and Formalization of Military Intelligence, 1854-1917 .......... 20 Regulations and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) ..................................... 23 Strategic Organization................................................................................................... 33 Combat Intelligence Organizations............................................................................... 41 Intelligence Schools and Training................................................................................. 53 Chapter 2: Creating AEF Intelligence............................................................................... 60 Allied Missions ............................................................................................................. 60 Dennis E. Nolan ...........................................................................................................