ThirdWorld Quarterly, Vol 16, No 2, 1995 Churchesand politics in Latin America:Catholicism at the crossroads JEANDAUDELIN& WEHEWITT

Sincethe European discovery of the New World in 1492, Latin America has emergedas apredominantlyRoman Catholic region. Indeed, both the discovery itselfand the subsequent exploration and development of the region were undertakenas ajointeffort of churchand state. At face value,the aims ofthese partieswere starkly different. For the state, the goal was territorialand material acquisition.For the Church, Latin America represented virgin territory for the conquestof souls.Yet, from the early days of Spanishand Portuguese conquest throughthe early to mid-19thcentury (when many countries of theregion gained theirindependence) to well into the 1900s, both parties worked hand in gloveto ensurethat their respective objectives could be met. For their part, the colonial andlater national governments counted on the moral support of the Church to maintaina statusquo favouring the political and economic elite. The Church freelyoffered this support in return for state assistance inmaintaining Catholic religioushegemony. As efficientas itwas, this mutually beneficial arrangement began to change, however,by 1950 when, in many countries, clerics, religious and laypersons beganto question the Church’ s politicalrole as thedefender of privilege.Some evenbecame active in support of change-orientated social movements and programmesdesigned to improve the lot of the poor, whose welfare had not largelyimproved in the post-World War II period,despite record rates of economicgrowth in the region. Duringthe 1960s, these forms ofChurch-based activism took on a particular urgency,as awaveof military-backed bureaucratic± authoritarian governments assumed powerin country after country. Most of these regimes claimed to be actingon behalf of the rational interest, as partof an effort to develop a more stablepolitical system andensure future economic progress. These objectives weresought, however, with little regard for the economic well-being of the poorestsectors ofsociety,and in anatmosphere of severe repression.Those who opposedgovernment policiesÐ including many within the ChurchÐ were jailed, deportedor killed. Suchpractices strained the relationship between the institutional Church and thestate to the breaking point in many countries. Indeed, sanctioned by the increasinglyprogressive stance of theregion’ s bishopsÐas shownin documents releasedin the wake of their1968 meeting in Medellõ ÂnÐsome nationalchurches wentso far as tocommit themselves institutionally to an oppositional role in favourof those most disadvantaged by military rule.

0143-6597/95/020221-16 Ó ThirdWorld Quarterly JEAN DAUDELIN &WEHEWITT

Aspartof this new stance, known officially as the`preferential option for the poor’, members ofthehierarchy in a numberof countriescriticised government socialand economic policy. Church bodies produced research revealingthe errors andharm caused by government action (and/ orinaction), while Church- sponsoredmass movements,such as thebase Christiancommunities or CEBs (comunidadeseclesiales/ eclesiaisde base )gavestrong voice to those excluded fromthe new restricted political arena. Whereit occurred,such activity endured for well over a decadein theregion. Bythe early 1980s, however, with the gradual return to civilian rule in most countries,the Church’ s activiststance began to fade. Where it still exists, the politicalrhetoric of the Church is generallyless stridentthan in the past, and manyChurch-based movementsÐ especially the CEBsÐseem tobe either disap- pearingor pursuing a moremoderate political path. In place of a moreradical politicalagenda, moreover, has appeareda newemphasis on thedevotional side ofCatholicism. Thisshift back to the political status quo within the Latin American Church appearsto havecaught many observers unaware, and has todatebeen the subject ofscant inquiry. In response, this paper represents a preliminaryattempt to remedythis de® ciency, by offering a generalanalysis of thescope and causes of recentChurch change in the region. Ourbasic argument is thatrecent Church actions represent a strategic orientationalshift conditioned by a newset ofrealities both within the insti- tution,and within the wider religio-political realm. This thesis is exploredwith referenceto theregion as awhole, 1 withparticular emphasis, however, on those venueswhere key directing elements within the institutional Church moved furthestto the left, and are nowin the process ofmoving backÐ Brazil, Chile andCentral America (especially Nicaragua). We begin the analysis with an overviewof the rise andfall of the progressive Church in the region, as ithas beeninterpreted within the existing literature. This is followedby a discussion ofthose speci® c factorswhich we believe have ® guredmost prominently in conditioningthis turn of events.

Contextand interpretations ofthe rise andfall ofthe activist Church Inthe dozen or so years following1960, military leaders assumed controlof nationalgovernments in alargenumber of LatinAmerican countries. 2 In and of itself,this was notsuch a noveldevelopment. Historically, the militaries of the regionhave seen themselvesas thefrontline defenders of constitutionalism,and havefrom time to time,in one place or another, intervened to restore social and politicalorder. In the past, however, such interventions were relatively short- lived.What makes thepost 1960 wave of military takeovers unique is thatthe regimeswhich emerged became well entrenchedÐ many, in fact, endured for wellover 20 years. Thefactors precipitating the latest wave of militaryinterventions were many. Basically,however, they may be tracedto growingmilitary unease with attempts bycivilian governments in the 1950s to move away from capitalist economic modelsand planning, and towards innovations associated with Soviet-style 222 CHURCHES AND POLITICS INLATIN AMERICA communismÐeg the creation of state industries, social welfare schemes or programmesdesigned to redistributeincome. Military leaders were also preoccu- piedby the more liberal political agenda of the civilian governments of thetime, inparticular their tendency to allowÐ even encourageÐ popular organisation and dissent.To military leaders in many countries these types of experiments constituteda clearand present threat to the security of the nation. Oneby one, military establishments moved to remove this threatÐ Brazil in 1964;Argentina in 1966 (and then again in 1976); Peru in 1968; Ecuador in 1972;Chile in 1973; and Uruguay in 1973. With the exception of Peru and Ecuador(where the military took a morepopulist line), most of the regimes installedwere decidedly right-wing in orientation. In the literature, they have beendescribed more precisely as `bureaucratic±authoritarian’ , as theirprimary goalwas tocombat the forces threateningnational security by a) restoring integrityto the political process (principallyby purging `communists’ from the politicalarena); andb) encouragingrapid economic development through careful stateplanning and enhanced integration within the world market (through increasedtrade). Such measures wereundertaken, it should be emphasised, at considerablecost to the general population. Political parties were either shut downor subjected to severe limitations,and dissident elements and organisa- tions,such as labourunions and other advocacy groups, were banned or severely restricted.Those actively opposing military rule were dealt with harshly. Many voluntarilywent in to exile, while those who stayed behind to ® ghtrisked imprisonment,torture, or even death. Risingeconomic fortunes in thelate 1960s and early 1970s in Latin America helpedto legitimise the military and its bureaucratic± authoritarian agenda in mostcountries. Indeed throughout this period, the region as awholeposted economicgrowth rates far abovethe developing world average, fuelled primarily bytheexpansion of domestic industry. Consequently, military regimes were able topress onwith their conservative economic programmes, cultivating outside ®nancingof mega-projects, developing stronger international trade linkages and buildingup the national infrastructure. All these measures paidoff handsomely, butmanaged to bene® t thefew at the expense of themass inthe region. In sum, themilitary’ s planscalled for a `fatteningup’ of the region’ s economicpie, beforeany signi® cant redistribution of thespoils of advancedindustrialism could beconsidered. This entailed considerable hardship for lower-class workers who continuedto earn meagre wages, while their bosses earnedsome ofthe highest salaries inthe world. Withthe advent of worldwide recession and the oil crisis ofthe early to mid-1970s,the economic boom began to fade, however. Markets for Latin Americanexports began to shrink, while rising fuel costs cutdeeply into pro® ts, workers’wages, and ultimately, government revenues. Many national govern- mentsfound themselves unable to coverdebt repayments from earlier borrowing oninternationalmarkets; mostcontinued to borrow to helpcover their increasing shortfallin revenues. Before long, most countries of the region had built up a massive debtload, while at the same timepossessing few resources tohelpthem repayanxious creditors. Theinability of manya militarygovernment to respond to this crisis, coupled 223 JEAN DAUDELIN &WEHEWITT withthe growing misery of the poorest segments of the population, eventually servedto delegitimisetheir regimes. After the mid-1970s, military leaders slowly dismantledthe authoritarian structures they had mounted and handed power back tocivilians. Indeed, by 1985, democratic elections had been held in virtually all theformer dictatorships of the region. Today, almost all the countries of Latin Americapossess democraticconstitutions, although in practice, political elites havecontinued to rely on authoritarian measures toensure social control. Thepolitical developments since the early 1960s form the backdrop for Churchchange in recent years. As mentionedearlier, the Roman Catholic Churchin Latin America had for much of its long history sought to defend its institutionalinterests and integrity through collaboration with economic and state elites.Only after 1950 did social activism emerge as asigni®cant force, when elementswithin the Church began to encourage the larger institution to adopt the concernsof thesocially disadvantaged and abandon its historic ties to elites.This tendencyintensi® ed following the wave of military dictatorships which shook theregion after 1960. In response to the repression orchestrated by the new regimes,a numberof national churches moved towards direct advocacy of the lower-classcause as standardoperational policy. In direct confrontation with boththe military and other elites, these churches embarked upon a systematic campaignto encourage change in the political, economic and social status quo, utilisingboth the rhetoric of widely distributed statements and position papers, andconcrete action strategies and programmes designed to promote and protect theinterests of the poor. In Brazil, for example, the Church supported various nationaland regional agencies and `commissions’ designed to supportthe rights ofspeci® c interestgroups in societyÐ including peasants (the Pastoral Land Commission),and native peoples (Indigenous Missionary Council)Ð as wellas humanrights generally (Peace andJustice Commission). Throughoutthe region, the base Christiancommunities or CEBs became a particularlyimportant force for institutional activism. Some accounts suggest thatin the heyday of the phenomenon (during the late 1970s and early 1980s), theremay have been as manyas 3to4 millionpeople active in many tens of thousandsof these groups located in rural areas oron the outskirts of the region’s largerurban centres. 3 Whilesome weredirected towards more devo- tionalends (prayer, baptism, etc), many were reported to have been involved in explicitlypolitical activities such as petitioningcampaigns to improve the local qualityof life, workers’ strikes, and organising mass rallies. Anumberof explanations have emerged to account for the origins and eventualscope of the Church-based activism which emerged in the postwar period.Based upona con¯ict-orientated understanding of society (and as often as notreferring explicitly to the work of Marx and/ orGramsci) liberation theologiansÐamong them Gutie Ârrez,Betto and Leonardo Boff 4Ðhavetended to see Churchinnovations in the political sphere as promptedby base level activismrooted in popular dissatisfaction with the politico-socioeconom icstatus quo.From within the social scienti® c realm,other researchers haveadopted a differenttack, drawing upon a Weberianconception of organisational structure, powerand interest, and focusing more upon the Church as `institution’. Accord- ingto thisview, the political activism of theChurch has followeda dynamicand 224 CHURCHES AND POLITICS INLATIN AMERICA agendaset byinstitutional leaders, partially in response to socioeconomic or politicalcircumstances, but in the end designed to enhance institutional power. 5 Alimitednumber of `synthetic’ approaches, ® nally,have also appeared. These attemptto improveupon the base leveland institutional perspectives by pointing toa moredynamicÐ even dialecticalÐ relationship between grassroots demands andinstitutional interests in the emergence of progressive Church politics. 6 Despitetheir many differences, the adherents of these various positions do agreeon one thing; they have largely accepted the intensity and the scope of Churchactivity during the 1970s and early 1980s as a`given’, withsome maintainingan unabashedly optimistic tone regarding the Church’ s potentialin thisregard. 7 Yetit isincreasinglydawning on manyspecialists that the previous assessments ofthe effective mobilisation capacity and the in¯ uence of the popularChurch are problematic,and that a fundamentalreorientation in political directionis nowtaking place within the Church generally. 8 Thisturnaround is mostevident in those countries where the institutional Churchhad been most active in the cause ofsocialjustice. In the case ofChile, forexample, Stewart Gambino has notedthe growing rift in politicalorientation betweenbishops, and between bishops and the clergy, resulting in amoveaway frominvolvement in morecontroversial matters. 9 Klaibernotes a similarprocess occurringin Peru. 10 While,under the left-leaning military regime (1968± 1980), theinstitutional Church rather comfortably pursued the social justice cause, moderatesand conservatives have since assumed prominence,forcing the left wingof the Church into retreat. Commenting on Brazil, Drogus also points to anewconservatism within the institutional Church, 11 onewhich may in theend alienatethose activists remaining among the clergy, laity and religious adherents. Progressivismis similarlyin perilin thechurches of CentralAmerica. Crahan’ s religioussurvey of theregion points to splitsbetween progressives and others in theChurch in most countries. 12 Evenin Nicaragua, claims Williams, 13 the in¯uence of progressiveswithin the national Church has declinedsigni® cantly in recentyears. All the while, in manyareas, therehas beena turntowards greater promotionof devotionalpractices and groupsÐ such as CharismaticRenewal or Opus Dei.14 Thoseresearchers whohave to date considered the origins of these develop- mentshave tended to focus on Vatican policy as theprincipal causal variable. 15 Thereis certainlymuch to commend this interpretation. While resistance to a progressiveorientation in Church organisation and sociopolitical involvement was presenteven during Vatican II, theelection of John Paul II andhis choice ofArchbishopRatzinger to head the Secretariat for the Doctrine of theFaith has certainlyinaugurated a newera atthe centre of the Catholic Church. Many authorshave seen JohnPaul II’ s papacyleading the Church back to an anti-modernattitude, profoundly alien even to the Enlightenment. 16 Practicalindications to thiseffect are numerous:the Vatican’ s discussionsand progressiverapprochement with fundamentalist Msgr Lefebvre,the harsh sanc- tionsimposed on liberal European theologians and the refusal to consider any democratisationof the Church’ s structureor even to discuss theordination of women.Most important, however, from the Latin American standpoint, have been1) theVatican’ s strongcriticism of liberationtheology which, among other 225 JEAN DAUDELIN &WEHEWITT things,has longadvocated that the Church adopt a moreopen governance structure,and take a moreaggressive stance against social injustice; 2) the disciplinarymeasures ithas takenagainst liberation theologians themselves, in partbecause of their open ¯ irtationwith secular Marxism; and3) theVatican’ s unequivocalcondemnation of attempts by progressives to set upa justice-orien- tated`parallel’ Church structure in Nicaragua and other countries. In other words,the nice words about the poor and loud calls for social justice which the Popeuttered in his many trips to the region appear to have been increasingly divorcedfrom a Vaticanpolicy which, for all practical purposes, has been directedat weakening the very sectors ofthe Church which could have given thesewords a substance. Thenomination of bishops, a Papalprerogative, has providedthe most effectivetool for the implementation of the new conservative agenda. With Catholicdioceses still organised in amostcentralised and, in effect,authoritarian fashion,a changeof bishopcan, and has provedto have a tremendouseffect on theorientation of pastoral work. One of the best known examples is the Archdioceseof Recife (Brazil). Here, in one of the poorest ecclesiastical territoriesin the region, the progressive bishop Helder Ca Ãmara was replaced uponretirement by a conservative,who quickly dismantled the social action infrastructurepainstakingly built up by his predecessor. 17 Conservativeswere alsonominated as bishopsor auxiliarybishops in Santiago,Lima, Managua and Salvador(Brazil), while `moderate’ clerics were chosen for various new dioceses createdin 1989 in theSa ÄoPauloarea. 18 Indeed,over the 15 years ofhispapacy, JohnPaul II has putnew menÐ for the most part moderates and conservativesÐ atthe head of close to 50% of Latin America’ s dioceses. Atthe same time,many factors suggest that a `Vaticanconspiracy’ expla- nationfor declining Church activism in Latin America is inadequate.To begin with,it ignores the Church’ s speci®c institutionalgoals and objectives, as well as theresources atits disposal to implement them. Moreover, it leaves aside carefulconsideration of the recentÐ and dramaticÐ modi® cations in both the religiousand sociopolitical milieu in Latin America. Thislatter set ofenvironmentalfactors has beenexamined in recent studies of thesubject, 19 leadingto a reconsiderationof the mainstream views of the progressiveexperiment. We feel, however, that the ® rst set offactors, relating tothe fundamental strategies of the Church has notbeen given enough weight inthese analyses. Inresponse, we argue here that 1) recent Church change must be considered as astrategicundertaking, one in keeping with previous goals and objectives of theChurch in Latin America; and 2) thisstrategic undertaking has resultedfrom boththe chronic inability of theprogressives to redirect the institutional agenda withinthose national churches where they were most active and the need on the partof institutionalleaders to respondto threats to continued religious hegemony posedby the growing Protestant movement as wellas theneed to avoid in¯uence-threatening controversy in anincreasinglypluralistic political environ- ment.The component elements of this thesis are developedin turn in the sectionswhich follow. 226 CHURCHES AND POLITICS INLATIN AMERICA

Strategiccontinuity and the quest forin¯ uence Sincethe 1960s, much discussion has takenplace within the Catholic Church worldwideregarding its fundamental purpose in society. Within the Latin Americanregion, this discussion has resulted,to some extent,in diversepractice atthe national and local (diocesan) level. Nevertheless, institutional behaviour has remainedremarkably consistent, and a fundamentalcontinuity in the basic objectivesof the regional Church may be discerned. As Bruneaupoints out, 20 theCatholic Church’ s basicorientation in Latin Americahas beenand continues to be the maintenance of societal in¯ uence. Suchin¯ uence, claims Bruneau, is essentialif the Church is tocarry out its primarythis-world mission of `salvation’ . Whilesuch objectives are nowhere statedexplicitly, they are neverthelessimplicit in thehuge scope of thequestions andproblems that Latin American Churches consider in theirmeetings and seek toact upon. This quest for societal relevance still appears to give its coherence tothe institution’ s attitudesand practice, as wellas tothe thrust of thebishops’ interventions. TheChurch’ s goalof in¯ uence, furthermore, has traditionallybeen pursued usinga mass appealstrategy. To the Church, Latin America has `always’been thereligion of the vast majority of theregion’ s people,and it has doneall in its powerto ensure that this remains the case. Thiscan be seen clearlyin its sacramentalpolicy, which continues to be pursued with particular zeal. For example,since the 1970s the number of baptisms per priest has consistently variedfrom 150 to 200 each year. The annual total of baptisms over the same periodhas risenfrom 7.2 to 8.5 million. Such numbers suggest that a mass appealapproach to religion is stilladhered to. Recentlyadopted proselytising methods also attest to thecontinued use ofthe mass appealstrategy, with growing interest throughout the region in the use of `televisionmarketing’ . InBrazil, by far thelargest country of the region, the Churchis proceedingrapidly with a planfor a networkof Catholic stations to deliverthe Church’ s message toall parts of the country. Themass appealstrategy, it must be added, has sinceits inception been directedby a relativelysmall institutional elite. Indeed, there has beenlittle attemptto `democratise’ the institution, despite the mandate of Vatican II to openthe Church’ s doorsto the full participation of its members. Certainly, progressivepolicies calling for greater lay participation in Church governance wereimplemented in a numberof dioceses, and in some, advisory assemblies wereconvened. The extent to which this change has meantan effective democratisation,however, is indoubt. Nowhere have such assemblies been givenany real power. We have yet to hear about a diocesanpolicy with which thebishop, however progressive, disagrees; norhas anybishop been overruled byanassembly. At bestthen, the workings of theseprogressive dioceses ® tJose Comblin’s descriptionof theprogressive priests’ relationship to their¯ ock:from theauthoritarianism of fear tothe authoritarianism of love. 21 Wherethe priest’ s powerwas formerlyrooted in his presumed connection to God, in other words, ithas founda newbasis inpaternalistic concern. Whatthis basic continuity of objectives and means suggestsis thatthe recent 227 JEAN DAUDELIN &WEHEWITT shiftsin theChurch’ s politicalorientation are less re¯ective of broadly-based and deepseated ideological commitments, and more likely to represent institutionally guidedoperational strategies designed to achieve the Church’ s primaryobjective of in¯uence. Just as inthe 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s, the base Christiancommuni- tiesand other progressive movements were encouraged as a`mass appeal’tool to achievein¯ uence, today much of® cial interest has arisenin pursuing a more traditionalcourse to in¯ uence by emphasisingmore traditional forms ofreligious involvementamong the laity. The question which remains to beansweredis why thisshift in operational strategy has occurredat this particular time.

Intra-institutional struggles Oneset offactorsdriving the retreat to the devotional sphere stems frominside theinstitution. Simply stated, the Church’ s conservativeturn to some degree maybe interpreted as theresult of a long-terminability on the part of the region’s progressivewing ® rmlyto set theagenda within their national churches. Thefact is thatthe changes that took place in manychurches in the1960s and 1970swere not the result of a radicalisationof thewhole Catholic hierarchy and clergy.The `Church of thePoor’ or the`Progressive’ or `PopularChurch’ never meantthe whole Catholic Church. In fact, even in the most `progressive’ nationalchurches of the region (Brazil, Nicaragua, Chile), only a minorityof bishopsand priests would have de® ned themselves in this way, and only a fractionof theCatholic ¯ ockidenti® ed with them. It isconsequentlyas a social movement activewithin the bounds of the Church that the progressive push shouldbe understood. Therelative prominence of the progressive Church under the military regimes, theCELAM ConferenciaGeneral del Episcopado Latinamericano documents fromMeadellõ ÂnandPuebla, the many instances of Catholic bishops and priests takingpublic stands against human rights abuses andin favourof socialjustice, as wellas thefact that most studies of the Church focused on its progressive sector,produced the impression of a hegemonyof the progressives over Latin AmericanCatholicism as awhole.The quality, timeliness and sheer size ofthe intellectualproduction of theliberation theologians also played an important role inconveying this impression. In fact, however, the political hegemony of the progressiveswas oftenwrongly inferred from their remarkable dominance of the theologicaldiscourse in the region. Theinability of the progressives to carve out a signi®cant space withintheir churchesis, however, painfully evident. Even the CEBsÐthe most important innovationassociated with the progressives and the fundamental element of its socialbaseÐ never achieved an importance commensurate with the progressives’ ownclaims. Many factors were at play here, the most important being their small number,22 limitedpoliticisation 23 andcontinued dependence on the hierarchy, 24 as wellas thelimited scope of effective empowerment they made possible for theirmembers. 25 Norwere the `mainstream’ moderates and conservatives who were frequently themajority within the Church particularly impressed with the progressives’ effectivenessin securingthe Church’ s positionin society.When all was saidand 228 CHURCHES AND POLITICS INLATIN AMERICA done,the progressives delivered no morefaithful, no moreseminarians, no more prieststhan their more traditionalist counterparts. 26 Infact, they did not even deliverthe `natural communities’ of thepoor, constituencies to which they were supposedlybest adapted. In a recentinterview, the well-known progressive archbishopof Sa ÄoPaulo,Cardinal Paulo Arns, admits that the progressives’ rhetoricturned people away. 27 Inthe end, it is fairto say thatto some degreethe progressives’ apparent hegemonyin Latin American Churches lasted only as longas theconservatives andthe moderates permitted. In Nicaragua, as earlyas 1980,progressives were alreadybecoming marginalised within the hierarchy. 28 InBrazil, Ralph Della Cavasimilarly noted serious signs of weakness in the progressive camp by the mid 1980s.29 InEl Salvador, the progressives and their base communitieshave alwaysbeen barely tolerated by thehierarchy and were never a forcewith which thelatter had to reckon. 30 Whenpressure was exertedby the Vatican and when themoderates in the hierarchy showed a willingnessto reconsider political involvement,the progressives were simply unable to muster enough leverage to resist thechange.

Threats fromwithin the religious arena Alongsidethese internal factors, the Church’ s returnto the devotional has been stronglyconditioned by the changing religious arena in Latin America. Increas- ingly,Catholicism is beingconfronted by an aggressively proselytist religious enterprisein theform of evangelicalProtestantismÐ especially Pentecostalism, a particularlyexpressive brand of thefaith which emphasises activecelebration of theHoly Spirit through song, prayer, and sometimes faith healing and speaking in tongues. Whatimmediately strikes the eye when examining this new religious force is thelarge and growing army of cadres itpossesses. Ina typicalLatin American parish,where there is atmost one priest, several Protestant pastors are active. Accordingto O’ Shaughnessy,there are nowat least 54 000Protestant mission- aries workingin Latin America from North America alone. 31 Onthe Catholic side, the opposite trend is occurring;the number of priestsin relationto the population has fallensteadily between 1973 and 1990, from 1.6 to1.2 per 10 000inhabitants. It is truethat the number of vocations (priests in training)has beengrowing since 1973, from 0.27 per 10 000inhabitants to 0.54 inSouth America and from 0.52 to 0.67 per 10 000in CentralAmerica. But even ifall these students were to become and stay priests, which is doubtful,they wouldstill replace only one half of the currentÐ and fast agingÐstaff. The numberof men and women adherents has alsonot kept up with population growth.In fact, the only positive statistic is theincrease in `catechists’ (accord- ing to the StatisticalYearbook ofthe Church, a non-ordainedand at least part-timeChurch worker), especially in Central America and Mexico. Many workin the parish as layauxiliaries to the local priest, are ofteninvolved in stimulatingand directing base Christiancommunities. Their numbers, however, are stilllow, reaching barely 10 000for Mexico and Central America and 14 000 forthe whole of South America. 229 JEAN DAUDELIN &WEHEWITT

Forthe Protestants, steady growth in missionary strength in the region has paidoff handsomely. In Central America, estimates of Protestant strength vary fromcountry to country. Crahan estimates that Honduras is nowroughly 8% Protestant,with Guatemala at 25%± 35%. 33 Daudelinclaims that the ® gurefor Nicaraguais about20%, 34 whileStein states thatEl Salvador is now15%± 20% Protestant. 35 InSouth America, there are alsoa numberof major venues for Protestantgrowth, according to observers. Stoll relates that Protestants account forabout 20% of the overall population in Chile. 36 The® gureoffered for Peru is 5%,37 andfor Brazil, around 17%± 20%. 38 Accountingfor the bulk of the ®gures,all observers agree, are thevarious Pentecostal groups operating from networksof chapels distributed throughout Latin America. Analystspoint as wellto the large growth rates withinthese groups. O’Shaughnessystates, that during the last half of last decade, the number of LatinAmerican adherents to Protestantism grew from 25 to 50 million. 39 Stoll claimsthat, in most countries, the Protestant movement has grownexponentially, withProtestants set toclaim the majority of thepopulation by the year 2000 in anumberof areas, includingBrazil, Puerto Rico, and Guatemala. 40 Itmust be pointed out, however, that such numerical claims are tenuous.To beginwith, they are typicallybased on Protestant Church estimates, which may beexaggerated. As Stollhimself suggests, `¼ itbears repeatingthat church growthestimates have to beapproachedwith great caution’ . 41 Indeed,in the case ofBrazil for example, there is aconsiderablegap between Protestant Church estimatesof Protestant strength and those related by that country’ s world-re- spectedstatistical agency, the Instituto Brasileiro de Geogra® a eEstatõÂstica (IBGE).WhileChurch ® gurescount up to20%of thepopulation as Protestant,the IBGE has consistentlycounted under 10%Ð and a largeproportion of these are members ofBrazil’ s longestablished mainline Lutheran church. In addition, predictionsabout growth rates tendto be statistically exaggerated thanks to ignorance,error, or both. Typically, these predictions are basedon percentage increases derivedfrom rather low starting numbers. For example, while it may besaid that a churchwhich has seen itsmembership increase from 50 000to 100000 has grown100%, after eight years thesame increaseof 50 000added tothe new base of500 000 reveals a muchlower growth rate of 10%. In other words,constant growth will ultimately yield a smallerand smaller actual growth rate.One cannot, then, make predictions about growth based simply on previous percentageincreasesÐ as manyauthors appear to have done. Thus, as Cleary suggests,42 itmaybe somewhatwrongheaded to talk about a Protestantexplosion inLatin America. Rather, what we are seeingis amovementthat has grown steadilyover the course of the century. Asecondobservation which must be made is that,contrary to conventional wisdom,the Protestant movement is notmonolithic in religious terms. For example,while Pentecostalists are certainlythe fastest growingsegment, and are quicklymaking up a largeproportion of the collectivity, a largenumber of diversegroups are alsorepresented, from Baptists to Mormons to Methodiststo Jehovah’s Witnesses.Even Pentacostalism, Cleary suggests, 43 is nota unitary phenomenon,with various strains espousing a varietyof religious viewpoints. Politicallyas well,there are importantdifferentiations. Much evi- 230 CHURCHES AND POLITICS INLATIN AMERICA dencedoes of course suggest that evangelical Protestantism is alliedwith conservativeinterests. In Central America, Stein’ s research has pointedto a generaltendency towards the right wing among Protestant adherents in most countries,44 whileStoll suggests a similarpattern exists for Latin America as a whole.45 Interestingly,however, most observers also point to the existence of fundamentalpolitical splits within the movement. In Central America, within bothProtestant and Catholic religious realms, Crahan states `therole of churches andchurch people ¼ todayis highlycomplex, and does not lend itself to easy categorization’. 46 InGuatemala, for example, Protestant political involvement has notalways been welcomed with open arms bythe right, while some Pentecostalchurches have moved to concern themselves more with socioeco- nomicissues. Daudelinalso points out political divisions within Protestant groupsin Nicaragua, 47 as doesKlaiber in thecase ofPeru, 48 whereat least some groupshave moved towards social action. For the region as awhole,such splits haveresulted in the formation of two distinct church conferences, one for those moresocially involved churches ( CLAIÐtheLatin American Council of Churches),and one for the more conservative churches ( CONELAÐ the Latin AmericanConfraternity). 49 Butwhatever the empirical or ideological dimensions of the threat, the Protestantadvance appears to have had a chillingeffect on the institutional Church.As sociologistW IThomashas said: `If mende® ne situations as real, theyare realin their consequences’ . Forthe Catholic Church, the consequence has beenalarm about the threat to continued in¯ uence that the presumed Protestantinvasion represents. Thispreoccupation appears to have gripped both moderates/ conservativesand progressives,albeit for different reasons. On theone hand, traditionalists see the Protestantadvance as threateningbecause of its assault on cultureÐ Catholic culture.On theother hand, progressives see Protestantsmore as apoliticalthreat tothe Church’ s socialagenda, because of their presumed support for the political right.50 Accordingto D’ Antonio, 51 some progressiveshave openly decried Protestantismas aright-wingforce linked to USimperialismthrough the Central IntelligenceAgency. Some, moreover, are usingthe fear ofbeingrelegated to a secondaryposition in the Latin American religious arena to their advantage, as amechanismto resist theconservative policies of the Vatican. For example, liberationtheologians Jose ÂComblin 52 andEnrique Dussell 53 havestated that conservativeChurch policies will push the poor into the arms ofthe Pentecostal- ists,and have thus attempted to convince the larger institution to change its course. Inthe rush to respond to the Protestant threat, however, the moderates and conservativesappear to have prevailed, resulting in a gradualmove away from left-wingmass appealstrategies of thepast (such as the CEBs), andmore towards strategiesemphasising the devotionalÐ in effect mimicking Protestant tactics. Somewithin the hierarchy have been content to concentrate their efforts on thisfront on political and economic elites. The penetration of new groups such as OpusDei is seen bythese sectors as anef® cientway to regain in¯ uence. Yetthis is aminorityposition which has notbeen endorsed by the majority 231 JEAN DAUDELIN &WEHEWITT ofbishops. While they too invest heavily in a pastoralof the elites and of the middleclass, conservativeslike Euge ÃnioSales (archbishopof Rio de Janeiro) feelthat an effort also has tobe made to resist theprogression of the Pentecostalistsin thepoorest segments of society.Hence their encouragement of CharismaticRenewal, with its emphasis on spiritualvalues, open celebration and directcommunion with God. Throughoutthe region, this would appear in fact to be the strategy of choice. WhileMartin has ¯atlystated that Catholic Charismatic groups are onlya tiny minorityin LatinAmerica, 54 theevidence suggests otherwise. Cleary asserts that `Catholicpentecostalism spread in Latin America like ® reina dry® eld’, 55 with estimatesof practitioners ranging into the millions. Indeed, Cleary notes, Catholicpentecostal groups exist in many countries as aformof base Christian community.In Brazil, reports from as earlyas 1983indicate that the movement is growingextremely quickly, especially among the lower-middle class, while Hewitt’s research inSa ÄoPaulosuggests that many of the formerly politically progressive CEBsare increasinglyturning to the Charismatic fold. 56

Political pluralism as amine® eld Thecurrently liberalised political milieu of Latin America has alsoconditioned thecourse of manya nationalchurch in recent years, and will likely continue to doso. Within the political mine® eld which pluralism represents, the Catholic ChurchÐifit is tohaveany chance of attainingits overarching goal of renewed in¯uenceÐ has tofollow a carefullycharted course. Controversy and divisive questionsmust be avoided;cohesion and clear direction maintained at all costs. Duringthe previous authoritarian era, the situation was muchclearer. At the same time,for those more activist churches, it was aperiodof arti® cial visibility.Military dictatorships in countries such as Chileand Brazil offered nationalchurches such prominence by barringmostÐ if notallÐ other organisa- tionsfrom taking public stands. Thus, in many places, the Church effectively emergedas the`voice of the voiceless’ . Thisis notto deny that tremendous courage had to be shown in these circumstancesby those most actively involved in oppositional movements. As mentionedpreviously, in most countries, the progressives made up onlya small minorityof clerics, religious men and women, and lay people, and were more oftenthan not barely tolerated by institutional leaders. The determination and courageshown by activist bishops, clerics and lay Catholics, however, does not diminishthe arti® ciality of the situation created for the Church by the partial closingof the social and political ® eld.Such arti® ciality was amplyrevealed when,as politicalliberalisation ® nallyoccurred in the 1980s, the Church’ s more activistvoice was suddenlydrowned by formerly `voiceless’ people organised intoa myriadof politicalparties and social movements. From this point on, the moreactivist Churches became merely one political voice among many. Tothisexpanded competition was soonadded the increased complexity of the issues involved.Most of the questions to which a simple,yes orno, moral answercould be givensuddenly disappeared. Gone were the stances whichcould commandthe immediate agreement of themajority of the people. Gone as well 232 CHURCHES AND POLITICS INLATIN AMERICA was thetime when a moderateopposition was theonly possible stand to take towardsthe government. In these complex times and circumstances, a clear identi®cation of the Church with a givenparty, with a givencause, could be extremelycostly in terms ofpopular appeal. TheChurch appears to havequickly learned the lessons ofthisnew reality. In thelast Brazilian election, while some localpriests and activist laypersons becameinvolved with left-wing parties, the highest and most respected authori- tiesof the Church decided to keep their choice unknown, while encouraging everyoneto use theirright to vote. In addition, the leadership of the National Conferenceof Brazilian Bishops ( CNBB)has increasinglytaken a vaguestance on socialissues. 57 Thestatement regarding the propriety of agrarian reform or the informationdescribing the political systelms alternativesfor the 1993 refer- endumin Brazil on constitutional reform clearly show that the Church here is tryingto stay far above`petty’ political debates. Theseattempts at `playing a role’in thecrucial political and social debates of thetime by putting the discussion on a higherlevel, 58 suggestthat the Church, whilestill groping for in¯ uence, fears arealtest of its capacity to in¯ uence the publicdebate. As itattempts to move through the political mine® eld created by pluralism,it will probably remain on a `safe’ neutralcourse.

Conclusion TheCatholic Church in Latin America has alwaysbeen involved in regional politics.From the middle of thiscentury, however, an important qualitative shift occurredin the type of involvement favoured. During the 1960s and 1970s especially,the traditionally conservative Catholic Church became involved in an effortto effect widespread social and political transformations in many coun- tries.At a timewhen the vast majority of regimes were conservative and in manycases repressivemilitary governments, the Church increasingly sided with thesecular left on manysocial issues. Bythe 1980s, though, those more activist nationalchurches began to slip back to a moreconservative position on social change. Thepolitical involvement of the Church throughout its long history in Latin Americahas beendirected primarily at maintaining in¯ uence in society. This imperative,we wouldargue, led both to the activist turn of the1960s and 1970s, andto the more recent political turnaround in the 1980s and 1990s. The timing ofthis move was conditionedby forces atwork both inside and outside the institution.Certainly, an increasingly conservative Vatican played some rolein theprocess, but this is onlypart of the story. The political retreat may be seen as primarilyattributable to acombinationof factors,including the general failure ofthe Catholic left ® rmlyto set thesocial agenda of the larger institution, the needto respondto theProtestant invasion currently underway in theregion, and adesireto set amoreneutral political course and thereby avoid controversy, dissentand defection in an increasingly open political milieu. Wherewill the Churches of Latin America move from this point? Certainly, theregional institution will not disappear from the political ® eldaltogether. Whatappears to be developing looks somewhat like a throwbackto more 233 JEAN DAUDELIN &WEHEWITT traditionalchurch± state relations, in which social issues certainlyhave a place, butwhere institutional preoccupations are prominent.Furthermore, the typical attitudetowards social issues is changingfrom an in-depth involvement towards anoverarching intervention that stays abovedebates about speci® cs. Forits part, the`preferential option for the poor’ as anorientation increasingly appears secondaryto the Church’ s needto maintain in¯ uence, and it may well lose what littlemeaning it has, if it is feltto threaten this. Overall,events on this front bear continued watchingÐ especially since few scholarsappear to have acknowledged the current trend in the ® rst place. Certainly,further explanation is requiredof some ofthe forces wehave identi®ed here: theinertia of theinstitution and its blind pursuit of in¯uence; the intractableposition of the hierarchy on internal `democratic’ reform; and, perhapsmost importantly, the failure of the progressives to carve out a space withinthe larger Church. With the political shift of the Church to the right, anotherchapter in the history of theregional Church has beenopened, providing opportunitiesfor continued study and research onthe relationship between religionand politics.

Notes 1 As muchas thisis possible.In most respects, theLatin American regionis extremely diverse,and this is noless truein terms ofreligious or speci® callyCatholic temperament. The`shift to the left’ citedabove occurredto a far greater extentin some countriesthan in others. By the same token,some Churchesare movingback to the right and centre at aslower pace, whileoneÐ that of MexicoÐappears at themoment tobe ¯irtingwith a more `progressive’stance. Nonetheless,we believea regionaltrend may beidenti®ed, andit is tothis phenomenon that we turnour attention. For an in-depth examination of individualcases, the reader is directedto the appropriate literature onthe particular country in question. 2 Thefollowing discussion is basedon ananalysis developed by Pollock.See DPollock,`Debt, development anddemocracy: recent trendsin Latin America’ ,inP Blanchard& PLandstreet(eds), HumanRights in LatinAmerica andthe Caribbean ,Toronto:Canadian Scholars’ Press, 1989. 3 See ECleary, Crisis andChange: The Church in Latin America Today ,Maryknoll,NY: Orbis,1985, p 104. Evenwith 3 to4 millionmembers, onlya tinyfraction of the Latin American populationwould be involved in the CEBsÐperhaps somewhere between 1%and 2%. 4 See, forexample FBetto, CEBs: Rumoa NovaSociedade ,SaÄoPaulo:Paulinas, 1983; L Boff,`Theological characteristics ofa grassrootsChurch’ , inS Torres& JEagleson(eds), TheChallenge of Basic Christian Communities ,Maryknoll,NY: Orbis,1981; and G GutieÂrrez, `Theirruption of the poor in Latin America andthe Christian communities of the common people’ , inibid. Leonardo Boff resigned from the priesthood in1992, in part because ofVatican criticism ofhis putatively `Marxian’ brand of liberation theology. He neverthelessremains animportant ® gurein liberationist literature. 5 See especially TCBruneau, ThePolitical Transformation of the Brazilian Catholic Church , London: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1974;and TheChurch in Brazil ,Austin,TX: University of Texas Press, 1982. 6 L G S Lima, EvolucËaÄoPolõÂticados Cato Âlicose daIgreja no Brasil ,PetroÂpolis,RJ: Vozes, 1979;S Mainwaring, TheCatholic Church and Politics in Brazil, 1916± 1985 ,Stanford,CT: StanfordUniversity Press, 1986. 7 MAdriance,`Agents of change: the roles of priests, sisters, andlay workers in the grassroots Catholic Churchin Brazil’ , Journalfor the Scienti® c Studyof Religion ,30(3), 1991, pp 292± 305; M Dodson& L O’Shaughnessy, Nicaragua’sOther Revolution:Religious Faith and Political Struggle ,ChapelHill, NC: Universityof North Carolina Press, 1990;D Lehman, Democracy andDevelopment in Latin America , Philadelphia,PA: Temple UniversityPress, 1989;P Lernoux, Peopleof God: The Struggle for World Catholicism ,New York:Viking, 1989; P Sigmund, LiberationTheology at the Crossroads. Democracy or Revolution,New York:Oxford University Press, 1990. 8 RDella Cava,`A derrotada Igreja Progressista’, Jornaldo Brasil (Riode Janeiro), Caderno B, 14July 1985;`The ª People’s Churchº, theVatican, andAbertura’ , inA Stepan(ed), DemocratizingBrazil. Problemsof Transition and Consolidation ,New York:Oxford University Press, 1989;Mainwaring, The 234 CHURCHES AND POLITICS INLATIN AMERICA

CatholicChurch and Politics ,®nalchapter; V Paiva,`A Igreja modernano Brasil’ ,inPaiva (ed), Igreja e QuestaÄoAgraÂria,Sa ÄoPaulo:Loyola, 1985, pp. 52± 67. C Perani,`A Igreja no Nordeste. Breves notas histoÂrico-crõÂticas’,Cadernosdo CEAS (Salvador),94, 1984, pp. 25± 45. 9 HStewart-Gambino,`Rede® ningthe changes and politics in Chile’ , inE Cleary &HStewart-Gambino (eds), Con¯ict andCompetition: The Latin American Church in a ChangingEnvironment ,Boulder,CO: LynneRienner, 1992, pp 20, 40± 41. 10 JKlaiber,`The Church in Peru: between terrorism andconservative restraint’ ,inCleary &Stewart- Gambino, Con¯ict andCompetition , pp 88±90. 11 CDrogus,`Popular movements and the limits of political mobilization at thegrassroots in Brazil’ ,inCleary &Stewart-Gambino, Con¯ict andCompetition , pp 64, 82. 12 MCrahan,`Religion, revolution, and counterrevolution: the role of thereligious right in Central America’ , paperpresented at theAnnual Meeting of theAssociation for the Sociology of Religion, Washington, DC, 9±11 August 1990. 13 PWilliams,`The limits of religious in¯ uence: the progressive Church in Nicaragua’ ,inCleary & Stewart-Gambino, Con¯ict andCompetition , p 129. 14 Sometimes knownas CatholicPentecostals, Charismatics meet insmall groupsfor song, prayer and to give personaltestimony of their faith. Some claim theability to heal, and speaking in tongues is common. Members ofOpus Dei alsotend to emphasise thedevotional, primarily by advocating the need to apply Christianprinciples to all aspects ofone’ s day-to-daylife andwork. Members ofthe institution, including laypersons,priests, and seminarians are especially active as teachers inuniversities and training institutions. 15 H Cox, TheSilencing of Leonardo Boff. The Vatican and the Future of World Christianity ,Oak Park,Il: MeyerStone, 1988; Della Cava,`The People’ s Church’; PLernoux, Peopleof God: The Struggle for World Catholicism ,New York:Viking, 1990; I Lesbaupin,`O Vaticanoe aIgreja noBrasil’ , ComunicacËoÄes do ISER,9(39),1990, pp 17± 33. 16 MCleÂvenot, L’Eqlisea perdula raison ,Paris:Descle Âe. 1990;J BLibaÃnio, Avoltaa Ágrandedisciplina , SaÄ o Paulo:Loyola, 1988. 17 Rvander Ploeg, `Um olharsobre a igrejado Regional Nordeste II’ , RevistaEclesia ÂsticaBrasileira , 48 (189),1988, pp 163± 178; `A Igreja dospobres no Nordeste’ , Cadernosdo CEAS ,132,1991, pp 61± 71. 18 Fornumerous other examples, see thecase studiesin Cleary &Stewart-Gambino, Con¯ict andCompetition . 19 Ibid. 20 Bruneau, ThePolitical Transformation . 21 JComblin,`Algumas Questo Äes aÁpartirda Pratica das ComunidadesEclesiais deBase noNordeste’, Revista EclesiaÂsticaBrasileira ,50(198), 1990, pp. 435± 450. 22 Thenumber of base Christiancommunities, purportedly the active cells ofa renewed Church,appears to havebeen greatly exaggerated. There are noreliable censuses ofthe communities anywhere. An extrapola- tionbased on the CEBsofthe Archdiocese ofSaÄoPaulo,where theyhave been actively promoted by Catholic authorities,suggests, however, that a realistic numberfor Brazil wouldbe around10 000. See JDaudelin, `Brazil’ sprogressiveChurch in crisis: institutionalweakness andpolitical vulnerability’ , unpublished manuscript,1992. Even if CEB advocates’numbers are used(ie 80000± 100 000 for Brazil), their membershipwould still represent only3% to4% of thepopulation of the country (estimated in1991at 150 million).Brazil beingthe only large countryof LatinAmerica where thephenomenon has anyimportance, onemust conclude that from a social±scienti® c standpoint,the revolution the communities were supposed torepresent forthe Latin American Churchnever happened. Even from the bishops’ standpoint, for whom theywere nota revolutionaryinstrument but, more modestly,a means ofregaining `natural communities’ (see ConfereÃncia Nacionaldos Bispos do Brasil, Planode Pastoral de Conjunto 1966± 197 ,Riode Janeiro: LivrariaDom Bosco,1967; `Documento da CNBB sobreas ComunidadesEclesiais deBase’ , ServicË o de DocumentacËaÄo, 15(160), 1982, pp 988± 1002), they were notparticularly useful. 23 W E Hewitt, BaseChristian Communities and Social Change in Brazil ,Lincoln,NE: Universityof Nebraska Press, 1991;Perani, `A Igreja noNordeste’ . 24 PAROliveira,`Mapeamento pastoral da Diocese deCrateus’ ,Riode Janeiro: ISER,Programade Assessoria, 1990. 25 Drogus,`Popular movements and the limits of political mobilization’ ; Comblin,`Algumas Questo Äes’ ;D Levine, PopularVoices inLatin American Catholicism ,Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1992. 26 Thisapplies even to thecase ofprogressive bastions like the theological institute in Recife andthe seminary ofJoa ÄoPessoa inNortheast Brazil. See CSartori,interview with Jean Daudelin,23 August 1991, Bayeu, Paraiba,Brazil. 27 PEArns,excerpts froman interview with Isto EÂ.RevistaEclesia ÂsticaBrasileira ,52(206), 1992, pp 452±454. 28 P Williams, TheCatholic Church and Politics in Nicaragua and Costa Rica ,London:Macmillan, 1989; `Thelimits of religious in¯ uence’ . 29 Della Cava,`A derrotada Igreja Progressista’. 30 JSobrino,interview with Jean Daudelin,7 August1991, San Salvador, El Salvador. 235 JEAN DAUDELIN &WEHEWITT

31 LNO’Shaughnessy,`Onward Christian soldiers: the case ofProtestantism in Central America’ ,inE Sahliyeh(ed), ReligiousResurgence andPolitics in the Contemporary World ,Albany,NY: SUNY Press, 1990,p 104.To some observers,this represents arecent NorthAmerican invasionof sorts,perhaps designed toensure US hegemonyin the region. The fact is,however, that many variants of ProtestantismÐ especially PentecostalismÐhave roots in LatinAmerica datingback decades. Alarge numberof Protestantmissionar- ies, consequently,are indigenousto the countries in which they operate. 32 Data onChurchpersonnel in this section are derivedfrom the Vatican’ s StatisticalYearbook of the Church forthe years 1973to 1990. The last available issue was publishedin 1992. 33 MCrahan,`Religion, revolution, and counterrevolution’ . 34 JDaudelin,`Corporatist intermediation in the religious ® eld:Protestants and the state inrevolutionary Nicaragua’ ,paperpresented at theAnnual Meeting of the Canadian Association of Latin American and CaribbeanStudies, Ottawa, 22±25 October 1992. 35 AStein,`Religion and mass politicsin Central America’ ,paperpresented at theMeeting of the New EnglandCouncil of Latin American Studies,Boston, MA, 24 October 1992. 36 D Stoll, Is LatinAmerica TurningProtestant? The Politics of EvangelicalGrowth ,Berkeley,CA: University ofCalifornia Press, 1990,p 333. 37 JKlaiber,`The Church in Peru’ . p94. 38 Stoll, Is LatinAmerica TurningProtestant? , p 333. 39 O’Shaughnessy,`Onward Christian soldiers’ , p104. 40 Stoll, Is LatinAmerica TurningProtestant? , p 9. 41 Ibid. 42 Cleary,`Evangelicals and competition in Guatemala’ ,p179. 43 ECleary,`Conclusion: politics and religionÐ crisis, constraints,and restructuring’ , inCleary &Stewart- Gambino, Con¯ict andCompetition , p 215. 44 Stein,`Religion and mass politicsin Central America’ . 45 Stoll, Is LatinAmerica TurningProtestant? , p 19. 46 MCrahan,`Religion, revolution, and counterrevolution’ , p2. 47 JDaudelin,`Corporatist intermediation in the religious ® eld’. 48 Klaiber,`The Church in Peru’ , p94. 49 O’Shaughnessy,`Onward Christian soldiers’ , p99. 50 HStewart-Gambino,`Introduction: new game, new rules’, inCleary &Stewart-Gambino, Con¯ ict and Competition , p 14. 51 MD’Antonio, Fallfrom Grace. TheFailed Crusade of the Christian Right ,London:Deutsch, 1990, p 168. 52 As quotedin G MacEoin,`In joust for Latin America, Rome seeks optionfor rich’ , NationalCatholic Reporter,8November1991, p 18. 53 EDussell,interview, NationalCatholic Reporter ,23October 1993, p 13. 54 D Martin, Tonguesof Fire. The Explosion of Protestantism in Latin America ,London:Basil Blackwell, 1990, p 130. 55 Cleary, Crisis andChange ,pp110± 111. 56 See `FeÂCarismaÂtica’ , Veja,1June1983, p 70;W EHewitt, ` CEBsandthe Progressive Church in Brazil: whatcomes next?’, paperpresented at theXVIII InternationalCongress of the Latin American Studies Association,Atlanta, GA, 10±12 March 1994. 57 TCBruneau& WEHewitt, `Catholicismand political action in Brazil: limitationsand prospects’ , inCleary &Stewart-Gambino, Con¯ict andCompetition . 58 Stewart-Gambino,`Introduction: new game, new rules’.

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