British Journal for the History of

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Reply to Dews, and a Plea for Schell ing

Journal: British Journal for the History of Philosophy

Manuscript ID BJHP-2015-0299.R2

Manuscript Type: Original Article

Keywords: freedom, , Jacobi, Kant, Schelling

URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/bjhp Page 1 of 14 British Journal for the History of Philosophy

1 1 2 3 Reply to Dews, and a Plea for Schelling 4 5 6 Sebastian Gardner 7 8 9 10 1. Peter Dews examines two contrasting interpretations of the Freiheitsschrift – Markus 11 Gabriel's, which takes ontology as the work's main concern, and my own, which reads 12 13 Schelling as employing a practical strategy – and argues that each reveals serious 14 For Peer Review Only 1 15 limitations, recognition of which leads to a more comprehensive view of the work. 16 Dews goes on to conclude that, contra what Gabriel and I (each on different grounds) 17 18 imply, the Freiheitsschrift does not succeed in its aim but rather falls between two 19 20 stools, Schelling's deficiencies in 1809 pointing towards the great innovations of his late 21 philosophy. 22 23 The common criticism that Dews makes of Gabriel and myself is that we neglect 24 25 the vital methodological condition that Schelling lays down at the outset of the 26 Freiheitsschrift , that a theory of freedom must both accord with the first-person 27 28 perspective from within which we enjoy a feeling of freedom, and embed freedom in an 29 30 objective system of concepts; one-sidedly, Gabriel takes the second route and I take the 31 former. Dews's specific criticism of my interpretation is that it attributes to Schelling an 32 33 argument inconsistent with the view of morality articulated in the Freiheitsschrift . The 34 35 potential for dissonance to which Dews rightly draws attention is something I had 36 overlooked and neglect of the relevant issues constitutes a weakness in my presentation, 37 38 though I am not convinced that the implications for the interpretation itself are as 39 40 serious as Dews suggests, for reasons that I will try to explain. Because the general 41 issues surrounding Schelling's philosophical methodology and ethical theory deserve 42 43 clarification on their own account, what follows may hold independent interest. 44 45 One potential source of resistance to the attribution to Schelling of a Kantian- 46 Fichtean style argument from first-person normative consciousness – not identified by 47 48 Dews in so many words but perhaps in the vicinity of his concerns – derives from 49 50 uncertainty that Schelling, in 1809 if not before, allows transcendental proof to be self- 51 supporting. The dual system approach which Schelling had adopted in 1800 allowed 52 53 transcendental philosophy to proceed under its own steam, methodologically 54 55 independent from Naturphilosophie , but by the time of the Freiheitsschrift , when both 56 the dual system model and the Identity Philosophy's unification of the two systems have 57 58 been left in abeyance, the picture has become unclear. In addition and more particularly, 59 60 URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/bjhp British Journal for the History of Philosophy Page 2 of 14

2 1 2 3 whatever Schelling may think of transcendental method in 1809, longer-term 4 5 uncertainty surrounds his view of the probative value of practical self-consciousness. 6 This goes right back to his 'Fichtean' texts of 1794–98, which give different indications 7 8 concerning what is proven by the transcendental philosopher's discovery of an act of 9 10 freedom at the core of self-consciousness. To be sure, the vacillations or at any rate 11 variations in the weight Schelling puts on practical self-consciousness reflect the 12 13 difficulties he encounters in completing his project of unifying Freedom and Nature, 14 For Peer Review Only 15 and to that extent I agree with Dews that the Freiheitsschrift lies under the shadow of a 16 high-level lack of integration in Schelling's thought. The moral I would draw from this, 17 18 however, is that, precisely because in 1809 Schelling still has no fixed and final account 19 20 of a single philosophical method which would synthesize its Freedom- and Nature- 21 related, and its a priori and a posteriori aspects, Schelling does not preclude, rather he 22 23 leaves scope for, a metaphysical derivation from practical self-consciousness, even if 24 25 the results thereof stand in need of revalidation from a standpoint which is theoretical 26 rather than practical and which does not confine itself to the transcendental method.2 In 27 28 short, Schelling's requirement that freedom be located in a system of concepts does not 29 30 preclude an argument that extrapolates from moral consciousness, even if 31 he cannot allow it to be the whole story. 32 33 Dews's objection, however, is more finely focussed. It is that Schelling in 1809 34 35 'no longer thinks that there is any such thing as the normativity of pure practical reason' 36 and rejects the associated conception of 'the moral person as divided between 37 38 transcendental freedom and the pull of empirical incentives', 3 and therefore cannot 39 40 intend to argue in the way I propose. Let me now expand on what I said in my paper, 41 briefly and obscurely, concerning Schelling's transformation of Kant's Fact of Reason, 42 43 in a way that aims to take account of and accommodate the important points that Dews 44 45 presses against my interpretation. 46 Indisputably Schelling in the Freiheitsschrift sets himself against Kant's thesis of 47 48 the efficacy of pure practical reason and his identification of the moral law with the 49 50 principle of autonomy, from which it follows that Schelling cannot be endorsing the 51 Fact of Reason as it stands in the second Critique – since that argument is designed 52 53 precisely to establish cognition of the intelligible ground of transcendental freedom 54 55 presupposed by the moral law conceived as the principle of autonomy. It is also beyond 56 doubt, and stands in close connection with the preceding, that Schelling's account of 57 58 moral goodness is not Kant's: the moral goodness of an agent, on Schelling's 59 60 URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/bjhp Page 3 of 14 British Journal for the History of Philosophy

3 1 2 3 conception, is owed not to the motivational sufficiency of the agent's pure practical 4 5 reason but to the agent's total, nature-inclusive being. 6 Putting these two points together, it may well seem that Schelling not only 7 8 rejects the conclusion of Kant's Fact of Reason deduction but has also destroyed the 9 10 basis for any argument of its kind: if the agent qua natural being is factored into 11 normative consciousness, then this can no longer be regarded as pure in the way 12 13 required for Schelling to be interpreted in the way I suggested. More broadly, it may 14 For Peer Review Only 15 seem that a transcendental construal of the Freiheitsschrift , as well as putting all the 16 emphasis on the first-person point of view, confines itself to the Freedom side of Kant's 17 18 great dualism and, aside from adding a new focus on evil, understands this in terms no 19 20 different from Kant, or Fichte – as if Schelling's anti-Fichtean metaphysics of Nature 21 made no difference to how he conceives rational self-consciousness. 22 23 While Dews is right to insist on the two fundamental points cited above as 24 25 marking Schelling's distance from Kant, it does not follow, I think, that Schelling 26 cannot employ the same distinctive form of argument from normative consciousness to 27 28 ratio essendi . What allows him to do so, in short, is that the ultimate grounds of moral 29 30 cognition and volition remain for him, as for Kant, exclusively a priori : for Schelling 31 too moral consciousness is pure , even though it does not consist in consciousness of 32 33 pure practical reason. It is so because the motivational value of empirical particularity – 34 35 the normative weight that I attach to whatever motives arise from my natural being – is 36 not the immediate effect of my existence as a particular in nature, but derives from the 37 38 pre-empirical choice that I make at the non-temporal moment of my creation: the pure 39 40 choice that I make before entering the temporal stream of Nature is what determines the 41 motivational significance and moral valency that nature within me has, once I have 42 43 entered into it. So although for Schelling the moral agent does indeed exhibit (as Dews 44 45 emphasizes) a fusion of practical reason with natural-empirical particularity – what the 46 Schellingian agent judges it to be right to do, and wills to do, is an expression of, and is 47 48 necessitated by, her total nature as a particularized natural being – the very unity of this 49 50 whole, by virtue of which the agent is not (as per Kant) a mere Freedom-Nature 51 compound but rather some sort of identity of the two, has a non-empirical ground. 52 53 Schelling's transformation of Kant's moral psychology has something important 54 55 in common, structurally, with Schiller's earlier grappling with Kant's Freedom/Nature 56 dichotomy. Central to the Letters on Aesthetic Education is the claim that self- 57 58 determination is inadequately conceived (or worse) so long as it excludes Nature, 59 60 URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/bjhp British Journal for the History of Philosophy Page 4 of 14

4 1 2 3 empirical particularity, and confines itself merely to agreement with universal Reason. 4 5 Schiller presents himself accordingly as attempting to save Kantian self-determination 6 from Kant's own narrow rationalistic miscontrual of it. Schelling, by contrast, rejects the 7 8 concept. Yet they concur in thinking that, in order to have reality, freedom and moral 9 10 goodness must be properties of the person as a whole, meaning that what Kant treats as 11 external to normative consciousness – the Neigungen that, according to Kant, must first 12 13 be taken up into maxims in order to yield reasons for action – must be relocated within 14 For Peer Review Only 15 it. And the parallel extends to the means which they employ to achieve this result: just 16 as Schelling's unification of Freedom and Nature turns on a pre-empirical act of choice 17 18 (the point made above), so too does Schiller's solution, in the argumentative heart of the 19 20 Letters , turn on the postulation of a pre-empirical state of 'unlimited determinability' in 21 the formation of our mental powers. 4 They agree, therefore, that the two dimensions of 22 23 human personality that Kant painstakingly separates cannot, as they stand, be merely 24 25 glued together or co-mingled, and that the unity of free moral agency must have its 26 source (which Schelling locates in a choice coincident with the subject's creation and 27 28 Schiller in a retreat to pre-natal indetermination facilitated by aesthetic experience) 29 5 30 independently of and prior to the agent's empirical existence as a particular in nature. In 31 that sense, both uphold Kant's conception of a pure a priori foundation for normativity 32 33 in general. And it is the manifestation of this pre-empirical ground in moral awareness 34 35 that, in Schelling, gives normative consciousness its authority as a datum for 36 metaphysical extrapolation. 37 38 The full importance of Nature for Schelling's argument, on my construal, 39 40 emerges when we directly compare his theory of evil with Kant's. A fundamental point 41 in Kant's argument is that we must avoid attributing to human beings an a priori interest 42 43 in evil for its own sake : to attribute such a will to man is to make him either (i) a 44 45 'diabolical being', which his capacity for the good will precludes, or (ii) 'morally good 46 and evil at the same time', which is contradictory.6 An evil will must therefore not be 47 48 understand as directed at its object qua evil . Hence Kant's claim that the opposition of 49 50 good and evil can be represented only as a matter of the prioritization of one of two 51 principles, the moral law and the principle of self-love, over the other. 7 Though the 52 53 principles must stand on the same level, in so far as an intelligible choice is made 54 55 between them, they are unequal in a key respect: the moral law expresses the ground of 56 its own necessity (pure reason), whereas the agent's prioritization of the principle of 57 58 self-love is groundless or rather whatever ground it may have is 'inscrutable'. The 59 60 URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/bjhp Page 5 of 14 British Journal for the History of Philosophy

5 1 2 3 structure Kant describes thus combines symmetry (the principles are equally both 4 5 practical alternatives) with asymmetry (regarding their rational modality), and it is 6 designed to provide for the reality of evil without imputing a diabolical will. What it 7 8 fails to supply, in Schelling's terms, rendering Kant's solution 'merely formal', is a 9 10 ground of the possibility of a real opposition of good and evil: without some insight into 11 what is at stake for the agent in their choice of either good or evil, it is impossible to 12 13 understand how they can actually conflict , how the subordination of the one principle to 14 For Peer Review Only 15 the other can be an issue for the will of an agent, rather than merely subsisting as logical 16 alternatives. Kant is of course fully aware that moral conflict cannot be understood as a 17 18 confrontation of normative consciousness with what lies outside it, but nor has he, 19 20 Schelling claims, shown how it can be understood as a diremption within it. The 21 Kantian counter-claim is that any attempt to supply the allegedly missing insight – any 22 23 greater degree of 'realism' about evil – will run foul of the absurdity of attributing a 24 25 diabolical will; Kant's thesis of noumenal ignorance is consequently indispensable for 26 the imputability of evil actions, just as his thesis of the transcendental ideality of 27 28 empirical reality is indispensable for the attribution of freedom. 29 30 Schelling meets the challenge by employing Kant's own structure, but 31 transposing it into an ontological key. Following Kant, Schelling plots the relation of 32 33 good and evil along two dimensions: on the one (ontological groundedness) they are 34 35 symmetrical, and on the other (rational warrant) they are not. This combination of 36 symmetry and asymmetry is not left hanging, as in Kant, but provides the epistemic 37 38 basis for, and is taken to derive metaphysically from, a corresponding combination in 39 40 their ontological grounds. Each is aligned with a different relation of Grund and 41 Existenz : in the case of the good, Existenz has precedence over Grund , in that of evil, 42 43 Grund has precedence over Existenz . These structures derive in turn from the inherent 44 45 differences of Grund and Existenz , and the symmetry-and-asymmetry of their relation: 46 each grounds the other, according to Schelling's theory of and Nature, but in 47 48 inverse senses. The Grund -Existenz configuration, being metaphysically ultimate, closes 49 50 all possibility of further explanation. It has thus been explained how it is possible for 51 evil to figure positively in normative consciousness without imputing a diabolical will. 52 53 One crucial condition for Schelling to do all this is his rejection of a basic 54 55 assumption that Kant makes concerning the form that normative consciousness 56 necessarily takes. Kant assumes that normativity can take only one form, namely that of 57 58 a principle of practical reasoning ;8 his justification being of course that anything else 59 60 URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/bjhp British Journal for the History of Philosophy Page 6 of 14

6 1 2 3 would of necessity amount to a mere empirical cause. If Kant's assumption of the 4 5 mutual exclusivity of Freedom and Nature stands, then Schelling's claim to have 6 improved on Kant's theory is defeated: since, on that assumption, whatever ontological 7 8 grounds Schelling may posit will only figure for the agent, and be capable of bearing on 9 10 her will, once (and in so far as) they have been represented as, translated into, principles 11 of reasoning. This would take us all the way back to Kant's theory of evil, and leave us 12 13 facing once again the unanswerable question concerning the (principled?) basis on 14 For Peer Review Only 9 15 which the evil agent prioritizes the principle of self-love above the moral law. But 16 Schelling of course rejects Kant's Freedom/Nature dualism, and this allows normativity 17 18 to reside in Nature. What exactly normativity-in-nature amounts to for Schelling is a 19 20 topic of its own, but for present purposes all it means is that the principle of evil active 21 in man need not be identified with a principle of reasoning, without thereupon being 22 23 reduced to a non-normative Kantian empirical cause. This allows the pull of evil to be 24 25 genuinely normative, without its grip being identified with the endorsement of a 26 principle's rational validity. Schelling's assumption of the presence of Nature within 27 28 normative consciousness – or at the very least, his rejection of Kant's exclusion of it – is 29 30 therefore crucial for his construction of a theory of evil which supplies what Kant lacks. 31 To return to the earlier issue of Schelling's methodology, the derivation of metaphysics 32 33 from normative consciousness that he on my reading proposes might be described, not 34 35 exactly as naturphilosophisch transcendentalism (since no specific doctrines of Nature 36 drive Schelling's argument), but simply as a transcendental argument liberated from 37 38 Kant's restrictive assumption of the mutual exclusivity of Freedom and Nature. 39 40 One final remark. There is an important respect in which Schelling, for all of his 41 disparagement of Kantian-Fichtean , remains Kantian, indeed formalist, in his 42 43 thinking about morality. Kant's expositions of his moral theory begin with an analytic, 44 45 which is all-determining for the resulting metaphysics of morals: it is because the 46 ordinary concept of a good will leads to the concept of a principle that motivates by 47 48 virtue of its formal property of universality, that the moral law ultimately comes to be 49 50 identified with autonomy. Schelling does not provide an analytic, but he leaves us in no 51 doubt concerning the correct analysis of the concept of the Good: transposing Kant's 52 53 identification of morality with universal law, the Freiheitsschrift aligns goodness and 54 55 love with universality, and evil with particularity. Universality takes a different shape in 56 Schelling – for whom it is, as said above, not first and foremost a property of a 57 58 principle , but rather a matter of the form of an agent's selfhood – but he sustains the 59 60 URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/bjhp Page 7 of 14 British Journal for the History of Philosophy

7 1 2 3 formalistic alignment of moral distinctions with metaphysical categories, and this is 4 5 crucial for his inference from normative consciousness to its ratio essendi . 6 If what I have said is right, then, although claims for the practical-Kantian 7 8 interpretation of the Freiheitsschrift must be qualified and clarified in the ways Dews 9 10 shows to be necessary – and, as Dews also indicates, the work must also be reevaluated 11 in light of Schelling's later development – it does not follow that the interpretation itself 12 13 is awry. 14 For Peer Review Only 15 16 2. The difference of Dews's and my respective appraisals of the Freiheitsschrift should 17 be seen against the background of our fundamental agreement concerning the interest 18 19 which the work holds not simply as a moment in Schelling's development but as an 20 21 account of human freedom. Since this is hardly a mainstream view, it is worthwhile to 22 say something about its basis, as I understand it. What follows is intended to 23 24 complement and supplement the argument that Dews gives in Part III of his paper 25 26 concerning the need for a speculative theory of freedom. 27 The Freiheitsschrift is, all too obviously, not a resource drawn on when 28 29 contemporary philosophers (in the analytic tradition, at any rate) reflect on the problem 30 31 of free will. Its present-day readers are those whose historical interest in classical 32 extends beyond the obvious landmarks of Kant and Hegel, and 33 34 those, such as Žižek, who are constructing general philosophical positions of their own 35 36 in dialogue with classical German thought. In this respect it is not on its own, however. 37 Contemporary discussion of freedom in the analytic anglophone sphere is almost 38 39 completely dissociated from the classical German legacy. 10 As Dews indicates, the one 40 41 element that has survived, due largely to P. F. Strawson, is the notion of the 'practical 42 point of view', which Kant is widely supposed to have shown to be in some important 43 44 way self-validating. Kant's intelligible causality has no place and is mentioned only, like 45 46 Schopenhauer's variant of the theory, as an absurdity to be avoided. Fichte's and Hegel's 47 accounts of freedom, if they surface at all, do so in the context of rights and political 48 49 theory. That more than half a century of intensive philosophical activity dedicated to 50 51 establishing the possibility and actuality of human freedom should be taken to boil 52 down to one fragmentary footnote in which Kant reports a provisional step in an 53 54 argument not yet completed – this surely demands explanation: How has it come about 55 56 that one of the great developments in modern philosophy, which unified itself around 57 the concept of freedom and devoted page after page to expositing the meaning and 58 59 60 URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/bjhp British Journal for the History of Philosophy Page 8 of 14

8 1 2 3 implications of a concept which has lost none of its importance and with which no later 4 5 philosophical development can plausibly claim to have made substantial progress, has 6 absolutely no significance whatsoever for contemporary thought about the topic? 7 8 One point should be made immediately, in order to rule out what might seem the 9 10 obvious answer: it cannot be the 'metaphysicality' as such of classical German theories 11 of freedom that explains their contemporary irrelevance, since metaphysical 12 13 commitments abound in the theories of historical authors who do hold a place in 14 For Peer Review Only 15 contemporary discussion, and many contemporary theorists of free will who are 16 indifferent to historical writings invest heavily in general metaphysics. (Nor can it be 17 18 attributed to the nominally 'idealistic' character of classical German metaphysics, given 19 20 their huge diversity on every dimension.) Some other explanation is required, and it is 21 reasonable to suppose that it has to do with the way in which the problem of freedom is 22 23 conceived in classical German philosophy. My suggestion is that it results from what 24 25 may be called the all or nothing character of freedom and of the task that it sets, in the 26 post-Kantian conception. 11 By this is meant that (1) freedom and value in general are 27 28 regarded as essentially interconnected, such that (a) freedom is necessary and sufficient 29 30 for the possibility of value, and (b) no methodological mistake is involved in attempting 31 to elucidate or vindicate freedom through axiological reflection; (2) freedom, though 32 33 necessarily expressed empirically, is independent from and immunized against 34 35 empirical contingency – in the jargon, it belongs to the unconditioned; (3) freedom must 36 pertain to the whole of human personality or to its deepest root, such that (a) the 37 38 distinction between subjecthood and freedom is a conceptual and not a real distinction, 39 40 and (b) if the attribute of freedom comes late in the metaphysical explication of what 41 constitutes a human being, then its reality will to all effect have been denied rather than 42 43 provided for. 44 45 Up to a point the conception is recognizably Kantian: transcendental freedom as 46 Kant conceives it certainly satisfies (1) and (2). What is not so clear is that Kant's theory 47 48 of freedom succeeds in satisfying (3), even though it is hard to see on what grounds 49 50 Kant could reject it. If we now turn to Jacobi, we find a forceful statement of the all-or- 51 nothing conception which helps to explain the uneasiness concerning Kant's account 52 53 which motivates the German Idealists' theories of freedom. In the first edition of his 54 55 Spinoza Letters , Jacobi protests against determinism on the following grounds: 56 57 58 59 60 URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/bjhp Page 9 of 14 British Journal for the History of Philosophy

9 1 2 3 The whole thing comes down to this: from fatalism I immediately conclude 4 against fatalism and everything connected with it. — If there are only efficient, 5 but no final, causes, then the only function that the faculty of thought has in the 6 7 whole of nature is that of observer; its proper business is to accompany the 8 mechanism of the efficient causes. The conversation that we are now having 9 together is only an affair of our bodies; and the whole content of the 10 11 conversation, analysed into its elements, is extension, movement, degree of 12 velocity, together with their concepts, and the concepts of these concepts. The 13 inventor of the clock did not ultimately invent it; he only witnessed its coming to 14 beFor out of blindly Peer self-developing Review forces. So too Raphael, Only when he sketched the 15 16 School of Athens, and Lessing, when he composed his Nathan . The same goes 17 for all philosophizing, arts, forms of governance, sea and land wars – in brief, 18 for everything possible. For affects and passions would have no effect either, so 19 20 far as they are sensations and thoughts; or more precisely, so far as they carry 21 sensations and thoughts with them. We only believe that we have acted out of 22 anger, love, magnanimity, or out of rational decision. Mere illusion! What 23 fundamentally moves us in all these cases is something that knows nothing of all 24 25 that , and which is to this extent absolutely devoid of sensations and thoughts. 26 These, the sensations and thoughts, are however only concepts of extension, 27 movement, degrees of velocity, etc. – Now, if someone can accept this, then I 28 cannot refute his opinion. But if one cannot, then one must be at the antipodes 29 12 30 from Spinoza. 31 32 33 The particular interest of this passage, stripped of extraneous features, is Jacobi's notion 34 of freedom as diffused throughout human personality, co-extensive with and 35 36 constitutive of the total range of internal subject-constituting phenomena, such that 37 38 denial of freedom would entail our elimination, or at any rate would leave us hollowed 39 out, spiritless. Whether Kant need strictly disagree with anything Jacobi says here is 40 41 uncertain, but in any case we do not find in Kant any similarly forthright affirmation of 42 43 the foundational status and comprehensive reach of freedom. 44 The analysis I gave of the all-or-nothing conception of human freedom is only 45 46 an approximation, 13 and a lengthy treatment would be required to substantiate the claim 47 14 48 that it is original to and distinctive of classical German philosophy. That said, it 49 provides two things which are needed: a direct explanation for the non-relevance of 50 51 classical German theories to contemporary discussion, and a basis on which we can 52 53 identify what is specific to the way Schelling conceives freedom in the Freiheitsschrift . 54 To take the first of these: Although the all-or-nothing conception does not entail a 55 56 commitment to indeterminism, it does rule out ab initio all forms of empirical 57 58 compatibilism – the very type of position most widely believed to offer the best 59 60 URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/bjhp British Journal for the History of Philosophy Page 10 of 14

10 1 2 15 3 prospects for the defence of human freedom. In addition, it means that a constructive 4 5 speculative method of some sort, yielding metaphysical claims of a very general and 6 most likely revisionary nature, is required if human freedom is to be grasped 7 8 adequately. From such a perspective, contemporary discussion of human freedom, in 9 10 which arguments characteristically turn on assertions and denials of conceptual 11 connections between concepts extant in the manifest and/or scientific images, and which 12 13 pursues metaphysical possibilities conservatively, within the constraints of one or other 14 For Peer Review Only 15 of those images, appear to be engaged in a circumscribed task located at a point 16 relatively far downstream, and cannot be expected to do more than map assumptions 17 18 which would avoid precluding the possibility of human freedom. That empirical 19 20 compatibilism consistently proves the most stable (that is to say, the least awkward) 21 position in contemporary debate comes as no surprise. 16 22 23 The specificity of the Freiheitsschrift – the contrast that it forms with other post- 24 25 Kantian speculative theories of freedom – lies in Schelling's holding fast to a 26 fundamental insight of Kant's and Jacobi's, namely that there is at the level of natural 27 28 consciousness an opacity in freedom which is indicative of its metaphysical depth . This 29 30 opacity is a corollary of the all-or-nothingness of freedom: it becomes explicit for us 31 (per Jacobi) when our reflection seeks to grasp the ground of the phenomena that we 32 33 take to manifest our freedom, or (per Kant) when we ask what makes it possible for us 34 35 to act under the Idea of freedom (in other words: what grounds our inalienable 36 commitment to a capacity for rational determination of action). It is also connected 37 38 closely with freedom's axiological dimension, in two ways: if the fact of freedom did 39 40 not present itself as of a different order from other facts, then it could not matter 41 primitively in the way that it does; and if freedom did not have a subterranean depth, 42 43 then its unity could not survive the bifurcation into negative and positive conceptions 44 17 45 which markedly characterizes theories of freedom. 46 The task which classical German philosophy sets itself is to show that this 47 48 appearance of depth is not deceptive, not an optical effect of our ignorance of concealed 49 50 causes. One form that the project takes is the attempt of Fichte (and Hegel) to transform 51 the opacity of freedom into transparency – to illuminate it all the way down. 52 53 Accordingly the Wissenschaftslehre seeks to show that the depth of the fact of freedom 54 55 consists in its being a 'fact' of an extraordinary kind, without parallel, one which makes 56 self and world possible; but which can nonetheless be illuminated fully, because the fact 57 58 is immanent in self-consciousness. 18 59 60 URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/bjhp Page 11 of 14 British Journal for the History of Philosophy

11 1 2 3 Whether or not he ever shared the objective of fully illuminating freedom, up 4 5 until 1804 Schelling did not set himself in opposition to it. By 1809, however, Schelling 6 had identified evil as the crucial obstacle to any such approach, and this gave him 7 8 reason for reverting to the other strategy of classical German philosophy, explored 9 10 earlier in the day by Kant and Jacobi, which aims to upholds the reality of freedom 11 precisely by allowing it to remain in some respect cognitively unassimilated – whence 12 13 Kant's thesis of the incomprehensibility of freedom, and Jacobi's theory of immediate 14 For Peer Review Only 15 affective-intuitive Glaube /Vernunft which no wissenschaftlich reflection can recuperate. 16 The Freiheitsschrift does not straightforwardly follow their pattern, however: Schelling 17 18 instead offers a synthesis of strategies, a combination of Kantian ignorance with 19 20 Fichtean illumination. The true opacity in freedom, the real source of its resistance to 21 rational insight, Schelling claims, is our capacity for evil, but from this datum – and by 22 23 turning our attention away from self-consciousness and towards God sive Nature – we 24 25 can extrapolate a metaphysics that affords the same level of insight into our existence as 26 free beings as the Wissenschaftslehre claims to do. Thus it may be said indifferently 27 28 either that the Freiheitsschrift raises the Kantian 'comprehended incomprehensibility' of 29 30 freedom to a higher power, or that it provides an illumination of freedom as total as the 31 phenomenon allows. 32 33 Schelling's approach to freedom is differentiated on the one side, therefore, from 34 35 the Fichtean-Hegelian claim that speculative reflection can render freedom fully 36 transparent to philosophical reflection, and on the other from the contemporary 37 38 assumption that freedom, in order to have reality, must yield to analysis in terms of 39 40 other and plainer concepts already in circulation. But his disagreement with our 41 contemporaries is much greater than with his own. From Schelling's standpoint, the 42 43 tendency of contemporary defences of freedom, reflecting the anti-speculative 44 45 philosophical outlook which conditions them, is to superficialize freedom: lacking all 46 conviction in the possibility of metaphysical depth, we find it necessary to suppose that 47 48 freedom, in order to exist, must be located right at the surface. Accordingly we seek to 49 50 align it as closely as possible with some antecedently recognized, uncontested and 51 relatively unproblematic feature of our rational lives, on which we take ourselves to 52 53 already have a firm criteriological grip – responsiveness to reasons, capacity for self- 54 55 control, governance by second-order volitions, and suchlike. What is puzzling about this 56 endeavour, from the classical German perspective, is the expectation that a concept 57 58 which carries such an extraordinary weight will allow itself to be identified with a 59 60 URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/bjhp British Journal for the History of Philosophy Page 12 of 14

12 1 2 3 specific architecture of propositional attitudes or other psychological configuration. The 4 5 correlative objection is that, in order to recognize facts about mental life as bearing the 6 specific significance of manifesting freedom, we must already be in possession of a 7 8 concept which is not the concept of a mere psychological condition – freedom must 9 10 already be available as an 'Idea', or something of a similar non-empirical order, in order 11 for us to interpret and experience some particular type of psychological life as that of a 12 13 being equipped with freedom. Whatever the shortfallings of classical German 14 For Peer Review Only 15 philosophy, there is reason to regard its claim that human freedom cannot be a fact like 16 any other as a lesson that needs to be relearnt. 17 18 19 20 References 21 22 23 Dews, Peter, 'Theory Construction and Existential Description in Schelling's Treatise on 24 25 Freedom ' [PUBLICATION DETAILS OF ISSUE OF THE BJHP IN WHICH 26 PRESENT ARTICLE ALSO APPEARS TO BE SUPPLIED]. 27 28 Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, Johann Gottlieb Fichtes sämmtliche Werke , Vol. 11, ed. 29 30 Immanuel Hermann Fichte (Berlin: Veit & Comp., 1845–46). 31 Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, 's Leben und literarischer Briefwechsel. 32 33 Die erläuternden Aktenstücke zur Biographie und den litterarischen Briefwechsel 34 35 enthaltend , Vol. 2, ed. Immanuel Hermann Fichte (Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1862). 36 Heidegger, Martin, The Essence of Human Freedom: An Introduction to Philosophy 37 38 (1930), trans. Ted Sandler (London: Continuum, 2002). 39 40 Jacobi, Johann Friedrich, Concerning the Doctrine of Spinoza in Letters to Herr Moses 41 Mendelssohn (1785), in The Main Philosophical Writings and the Novel 'Allwill' , trans. 42 43 and ed. George di Giovanni (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 44 45 1994). 46 Kane, Robert (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 47 48 2002). 49 50 Kant, Immanuel, Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1793), in Kant, 51 Religion and Rational Theology , trans. and ed. Allen W. Wood and George di Giovanni 52 53 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 54 55 Kant, Immanuel, Practical Philosophy , trans. and ed. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: 56 Cambridge University Press, 1996). 57 58 59 60 URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/bjhp Page 13 of 14 British Journal for the History of Philosophy

13 1 2 3 Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von, Philosophical Inquiries into the Nature of 4 5 Human Freedom (1809), trans. James Guttman (LaSalle: Open Court, 1936); also as 6 Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom and Matters 7 8 Connected Therewith , trans. Jeff Love and Johannes Schmidt (Albany, NY: State 9 10 University of New York Press, 2006). 11 Schiller, Friedrich, On the Aesthetic Education of Man: In a Series of Letters (1793–95), 12 13 trans. Elizabeth M. Wilkinson and L. A. Willoughby (Oxford: Clarendon, 1982). 14 For Peer Review Only 15 16 17 1 Peter Dews, 'Theory Construction and Existential Description in Schelling's Treatise on 18 Freedom ' [PUBLICATION DETAILS OF ISSUE OF THE BJHP IN WHICH PRESENT 19 ARTICLE ALSO APPEARS TO BE SUPPLIED]. 20 2 Thus Schelling introduces the Grund /Existenz distinction as having already been established 21 by Naturphilosophie (Freiheitsschrift , 357), and in the Weltalter it is introduced via reflection 22 on the nature of God. 23 3 Dews, 'Theory Construction and Existential Description in Schelling's Treatise on Freedom ', 24 pp. 000 and 000. 25 4 Letters 19–21, in On the Aesthetic Education of Man: In a Series of Letters (1793–95), trans. 26 Elizabeth M. Wilkinson and L. A. Willoughby (Oxford: Clarendon, 1982), pp. 128–149. 27 5 The further difference in their respective strategies, reflecting their different estimates of how 28 much is needed to fix the problem bequeathed by Kant, concerns of course the concept of 29 Nature, which Schiller leaves untouched, and which Schelling wholly transforms. If Schelling 30 were to make a criticism of Schiller, it would surely be that his expectation of being able to 31 overcome the Freedom/Nature division within the subject without rethinking the metaphysics of 32 Nature is naive. 33 6 Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1793), 6:35 and 6:36, in Kant , Religion and 34 Rational Theology , trans. and ed. Allen W. Wood and George di Giovanni (Cambridge: 35 36 Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 82 and 83. See also 6:22–25, pp. 71–73. 7 Ibid, 6:36, p. 83. 37 8 38 Kant says explicitly that the propensity to evil must consist in (bestehen muß) unlawful 39 maxims (ibid, 6:32, p. 80), and that 'the ground of evil' can lie 'only in a rule' (6:21, p. 70). 9 Ibid, 6:21, p. 71: 'One cannot, however, go on asking [...]'. 40 10 41 I take the Oxford Handbook of Free Will , edited by Robert Kane (Oxford: Oxford University 42 Press, 2002), as representative. Kane explains in his Introduction (p. 37n2) that coverage of the 43 history of free will debates would require a separate volume, and the contributions to the 44 Handbook bear out his view that discussion can proceed with only incidental reference to 45 historical sources. The only contributor who discusses Kant at any length is Galen Strawson, in 46 a chapter included under 'Non-Standard Views'. Apart from P. F. Strawson, neo-Kantian writers 47 such as Christine Korsgaard have no presence. 11 48 Here again I am borrowing from Paul Franks. 12 49 Johann Friedrich Jacobi, Concerning the Doctrine of Spinoza in Letters to Herr Moses 50 Mendelssohn (1785), in The Main Philosophical Writings and the Novel 'Allwill' , trans. and ed. 51 George di Giovanni (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1994), p. 189. 13 52 In particular, a case can be made that autonomy should be added as a fourth component. 53 14 And to explore its later development in Kierkegaard, Bergson, Sartre, Heidegger, Merleau- 54 Ponty, Adorno and others who take their bearings from the classical German conception. 55 Heidegger's The Essence of Human Freedom: An Introduction to Philosophy (1930), trans. Ted 56 Sandler (London: Continuum, 2002), provides an especially clear and explicit restatement of the 57 view that human freedom cannot be regarded as merely one 'particular' philosophical problem 58 among others. 59 60 URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/bjhp British Journal for the History of Philosophy Page 14 of 14

14 1 2 3 4 15 Differently put, it entails that there is truth in indeterminism at the empirical level, whether or 5 not indetermination per se belongs to the essence of freedom. One interesting implication of the 6 all-or-nothing conception is that (some of) the terms employed by natural consciousness to 7 articulate freedom – in particular and most obviously, the 'could have done otherwise' clause 8 and the modal openness of the future – may be legitimate expressions of consciousness of 9 freedom, without being strict conditions of its reality: if freedom is not transparent to natural 10 consciousness, then the conceptual means that we ordinarily employ to signal its reality – 11 though these must be validated in at least an oblique sense – may lack strict truth, and yet not be 12 false or empty. From this it follows, contra the methodology of contemporary discussion, that 13 the issue of the nature and reality of freedom cannot be decided simply by conceptual analysis 14 of the termsFor in which wePeer ordinarily articulate Review our conviction of our Only freedom. 15 16 While it cannot by any means be said that naturalism is a shared premise of contemporary 16 freedom theorists, it is at least true that, by dint of what it implicitly refuses to countenance as 17 worthy of consideration, the debate is to all effect conducted under pressure from naturalism. 18 Here it needs to be pointed out that, as regards taking seriously the metaphysical implications of 19 natural science, the situation is no different from the 1780s, as the passage from Jacobi shows; 20 what has changed is the perception of philosophical possibilities available for the defence of 21 human freedom – as these have narrowed, so the concept of freedom has been contracted. 22 17 This feature of the concept's behaviour, the fact that we instinctively grasp freedom on the 23 one hand as an unconditional end, hence as something fully positive, and at the same time 24 represent it in terms of negation, absence of constraint and so forth, without having any clear 25 idea how the two dimensions are connected – a duality that the history of political thought 26 displays on a large scale – is distinctive and ought to be found more puzzling than it is. 27 18 For a succinct statement of Fichte's commitment to transparency, see 'Zu ''Jacobi an Fichte''' 28 (1805/06), Sämmtliche Werke , ed. Immanuel Hermann Fichte (Berlin: Veit & Comp., 1845–46), 29 Bd. 11, p. 390. Also relevant is Fichte's letter to Jacobi, 3 May 1810, in Johann Gottlieb Fichte's 30 Leben und literarischer Briefwechsel. Die erläuternden Aktenstücke zur Biographie und den 31 litterarischen Briefwechsel enthaltend , Bd. 2, ed. Immanuel Hermann Fichte (Leipzig: 32 Brockhaus, 1862), pp. 179–184, which opens with what appears to be an attack on the 33 Freiheitsschrift . 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/bjhp