DOCSLIB.ORG

Textual Notes and Abbreviations Textual Notes and Abbreviations

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Textual Notes and Abbreviations Textual Notes and Abbreviations Textual Notes and Abbreviations Textual Notes and Abbreviations Textual Notes and Abbreviations I have attempted to keep as close to the original transcription as is compat- ible with reasonably idiomatic English. This has most often meant some modifying of sentence structures, and on other occasions altering as well the structures of paragraphs: in several instances, I rearranged paragraph order and their punctuation. My aim throughout has been to serve the in- terests of the reader, who cannot benefit from inflections of speech as did the original auditors. To elucidate satisfactorily the range and subtlety of Henrich’s argument, I have provided a good deal more in the way of scholarly aid than many English readers are accustomed to find. The footnotes throughout the vol- ume were not originally included in the lectures; I have consulted with Henrich throughout their preparation, but the final responsibility for them rests solely with me. Despite my best efforts, and all of those who have helped me, mistakes doubtless have remained undetected. Although I take solace in the counsel from no less a forger of the contemporary standards of historical scholar- ship than Spinoza—“nullus liber unquam sine mendis repertus est”—I shall nonetheless be grateful to those who, upon discovering errors, will report them to me. Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814) ANPW An Attempt at a New Presentation of the Wissenschaftslehre. In Introduc- tions to the Wissenschaftslehre and Other Writings. Edited and translated Dan- iel Breazeale. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1994, pp. 1–118. AR “Review of Aenesidemus.” Translated Daniel Breazeale. In EPW, pp. 59–77. xlv xlvi Textual Notes and Abbreviations DW Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre. Aus dem Jahren 1801–1802. In FW, vol. II (1845). All citations are given in accordance with the text of the GA, vol. II,6, ed. Reinhard Lauth and Hans Gliwitzky (1983), pp. 105–324. EM “Eigne Meditationen über ElementarPhilosophie” (1793–1794). In NS (1971), pp. 19–266. EPW Fichte: Early Philosophical Writings. Translated and edited Daniel Breazeale. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988. FTP Foundations of Transcendental Philosophy (Wissenschaftslehre) nova methodo (1796–1799). Translated and edited Daniel Breazeale. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992. FW Fichtes Werke. Edited Immanuel Hermann Fichte. 11 volumes. Berlin: Wal- ter de Gruyter, 1971 [I–VIII are a reprint of Johann Gottlieb Fichtes sämtliche Werke (Berlin: Veit & Comp., 1845–1846); IX–XI are a reprint of Johann Gottlieb Fichtes nachgelassene Werke (Berlin: Veit & Comp., 1834–1835)]. GA Gesamtausgabe der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Edited Reinhard Lauth, Hans Jacob, and Hans Gliwitzky. 34 volumes. Stuttgart–Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1964–. GEW Grundriss des Eigenthümlichen der Wissenschaftslehre in Rüksicht auf das theoretische Vermögen als Handschrift für seine Zuhörer. Jena and Leipzig: Christian Ernst Gabler, 1795. All citations are given in accordance with the text of the GA, vol. I,3, ed. Reinhard Lauth and Hans Jacob (1966), pp. 137–208. GgW Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre. Leipzig: Christian Ernst Gabler, 1794–1795. All citations are given in accordance with the text of the GA, vol. I,2, ed. Reinhard Lauth and Hans Jacob (1965), pp. 173–451. NS Nachgelassene Schriften. 1793–1795. First published as Johann Gottlieb Fichtes nachgelassene Werke. Edited Immanuel Hermann Fichte. Berlin: Veit & Comp., 1834–1835. All citations are given in accordance with the text of the GA, vol. II,3, ed. Reinhard Lauth and Hans Jacob (1971). ODCW Outline of the Distinctive Character of the Wissenschaftslehre with Respect to the Theoretical Faculty. In EPW, pp. 243–306. RA “[Rezension:] Ohne Druckort. Aenesidemus, oder über die Fundamente der von dem Hrn. Prof. Reinhold in Jena gelieferten Elementar-Philosophie. Nebst einer Vertheidigung des Skepticismus gegen die Anmassungen der Vernunftkritik” (1792). In Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung, 47, 48, 49 (11–12 Feb- ruary, 1794). All citations are given in accordance with the text of the GA, vol. I,2, ed. Reinhard Lauth and Hans Jacob (1965), pp. 31–67. SE The Science of Ethics as Based on the Science of Knowledge. Translated A. E. Kroeger, edited W. T. Harris. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner and Co., 1897. SK Science of Knowledge: With the First and Second Introductions [1970]. Trans- lated and edited Peter Heath and John Lachs. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer- sity Press, 1982. Textual Notes and Abbreviations xlvii SSPW Das System der Sittenlehre nach den Principien der Wissenschaftslehre. Jena and Leipzig: Christian Ernst Gabler, 1798. All citations are given in accordance with the text of the GA, vol. I,5, ed. Reinhard Lauth and Hans Gliwitzky (1977), pp. 19–317. Wnm “Wissenschaftslehre nach den Vorlesungen von Herr Professor Fichte” (ca. 1796–1799). In Nachgelassene Schriften, vol. II. Edited Hans Jacob. Berlin: Junker and Dünnhaupt, 1937, pp. 341–612. All citations are given in accor- dance with the text of the “Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo,” ed. Hans Gliwitzky, in GA, vol. IV,2 (1978), pp. 17–266. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) ÄS “Das älteste Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus” (1796–1797). Edited Franz Rosenzweig. Heidelberg: Winter, 1917. All citations are given in accordance with the text of the Werke: Auf der Grundlage der Werke von 1832– 1848. Neu edierte Ausgabe, vol. I, ed. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Michel Markus (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1971, repr. 1986), pp. 235–237. B Briefe von und an Hegel. Band I. Edited Johannes Hoffmeister. Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1961. ESGI “The ‘Earliest System-Programme of German Idealism’ (Bern, 1796).” Translated H. S. Harris. In Hegel’s Development: Toward the Sunlight (1770– 1801). By H. S. Harris. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972, pp. 510–512. ETW Early Theological Writings. Translated T. M. Knox. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948. FK Faith and Knowledge. Translated Walter Cerf and H. S. Harris. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977. GlW Glauben und Wissen oder die Reflexionsphilosophie der Subjectivität, in der Vollständigkeit ihrer Formen, als Kantische, Jacobische, und Fichtesche Philosophie. In Kritisches Journal der Philosophie, 2,1. Tübingen: Cotta’sche Buchhandlung, 1802. All citations are given in accordance with the text of the GW, vol. IV, ed. Hartmut Buchner and Otto Pöggeler (1968), pp. 313–414. GPR Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts. Berlin: Nicolaische Buchhandlung, 1821. All citations are given in accordance with the Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts. Mit Hegels eigenhändigen Randbemerkungen in seinem Handexemplar der Rechtsphilosophie, in Sämtliche Werke. Neue kritische Ausgabe, vol. XII, ed. Johannes Hoffmeister (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1955). GW Gesammelte Werke. Edited Rheinisch-Westfälische Akademie der Wissenschaften. 22 volumes. Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1968–. PhG System der Wissenschaft. Erster Theil. Die Phänomenologie des Geistes. Bamberg and Würzberg: Joseph Anton Goebhardt, 1807. All citations are given in accordance with the text of the GW, vol. IX, ed. Wolfgang Bonsiepen and Reinhard Heede (1980). xlviii Textual Notes and Abbreviations PR Philosophy of Right. Translated T. M. Knox. London: Oxford University Press, 1971. PS Phenomenology of Spirit. Translated A. V. Miller. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977. SL Hegel’s Science of Logic. Translated A. V. Miller. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1969. SsP Das System der speculativen Philosophie. Fragmente aus Vorlesungsmanuskripten zur Philosophie der Natur und des Geistes (1803– 1804). In GW, vol. VI, ed. Klaus Düsing and Heinz Kimmerle (1975). TJ Hegels theologische Jugendschriften (1793–1800). Edited Herman Nohl. Tübingen: Mohr, 1907. Reprint, Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1966. WL1 Wissenschaft der Logik. Erster Band. Die objective Logik. Nürnberg: Johann Leonhard Schrag, 1812. All citations are given in accordance with the text of the GW, vol. XI, ed. Friedrich Hogemann and Walter Jaeschke (1978). WL2 Wissenschaft der Logik. Zweiter Band. Die subjective Logik oder Lehre vom Begriff. Nürnberg: Johann Leonhard Schrag, 1816. All citations are given in accordance with the text of the GW, vol. XII, ed. Friedrich Hogemann and Walter Jaeschke (1981). Dieter Henrich (1927–) ATS “Die Anfänge der Theorie des Subjekts (1789).” In Zwischenbetrachtungen. Im Prozess der Aufklärung. Edited Axel Honneth, et al. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1989, pp. 106–170. BL Bewusstes Leben. Untersuchungen zum Verhältnis von Subjektivität und Metaphysik. Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, 1999. BSMP “The Basic Structure of Modern Philosophy.” In Cultural Hermeneutics, 22 (1974): 1–18. CoR The Course of Remembrance and Other Essays on Hölderlin. Edited Eckart Förster, translated Abraham Anderson. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997. FOI “Fichte’s Original Insight.” Translated David Lachterman. In Contemporary German Philosophy, vol. I. University Park, Penn.: Pennsylvania State Univer- sity Press, 1982. FuE “Fichtes ursprüngliche Einsicht.” In Subjektivität und Metaphysik. Festschrift für Wolfgang Cramer. Edited Dieter Henrich and Hans Wagner. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1966, pp. 188–232. All citations are given in ac- cordance with the text of Fichtes ursprüngliche Einsicht (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1967). GdA Der Gang des Andenkens. Beobachtungen und Gedanken zu Hölderlins Gedicht. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1986. Textual Notes and Abbreviations xlix GmP “Die Grundstruktur der modernen Philosophie. Mit einer Nachschrift:
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Kant, Lonergan, and Fichte on the Critique of Immediacy and the Epistemology of Constraint in Human Knowing
    Fordham University Kant, Lonergan, and Fichte on the Critique of Immediacy and the Epistemology of Constraint in Human Knowing Michael Baur ABSTRACT: One of the defining characteristics of Kant’s “critical philosophy” is what has been called the “critique of immediacy” or the rejection of the “myth of the given.” According to the Kantian position, no object can count as an object for a human knower apart from the knower’s own activity or spontaneity. That is, no object can count as an object for a human knower on the basis of the object’s givenness alone. But this gives rise to a problem: how is it possible to accept the Kantian critique of immediacy while also giving an epistemologically adequate account of the constrained or finite character of human knowing (i.e., an account that does not rely on some appeal to what is simply “given”)? This paper examines how this crucial question is addressed (with more or less success) in the “critical philosophies” of Kant, Lonergan, and Fichte. INTRODUCTION CCORDING TO KANT’S “critique of immediacy,” an object cannot count as Aan object for a human knower, apart from the knower’s own spontaneous, intelligent activity in questioning, understanding, interpreting, and judging. In the wake of Kant’s critique, many philosophers have sought to address epistemologi- cal issues in terms of the “constraint” that must be understood as rendering such activity limited and finite.1 A crucial question thus becomes: how is it possible to accept the Kantian critique of immediacy and its corresponding emphasis on activ- ity, while also giving an adequate account of the constrained or finite character of human knowing? 1Thus Johann Gottlieb Fichte held that one of the primary tasks of philosophy was to give an account of the feeling of constraint or necessity that accompanies some of our representations, but not others.
    [Show full text]
  • Qualitative Freedom
    Claus Dierksmeier Qualitative Freedom - Autonomy in Cosmopolitan Responsibility Translated by Richard Fincham Qualitative Freedom - Autonomy in Cosmopolitan Responsibility Claus Dierksmeier Qualitative Freedom - Autonomy in Cosmopolitan Responsibility Claus Dierksmeier Institute of Political Science University of Tübingen Tübingen, Baden-Württemberg, Germany Translated by Richard Fincham American University in Cairo New Cairo, Egypt Published in German by Published by Transcript Qualitative Freiheit – Selbstbestimmung in weltbürgerlicher Verantwortung, 2016. ISBN 978-3-030-04722-1 ISBN 978-3-030-04723-8 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04723-8 Library of Congress Control Number: 2018964905 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2019. This book is an open access publication. Open Access This book is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this book are included in the book’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the book’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
    [Show full text]
  • Kant's Critique of Judgment and the Scientific Investigation of Matter
    Kant’s Critique of Judgment and the Scientific Investigation of Matter Daniel Rothbart, Irmgard Scherer Abstract: Kant’s theory of judgment establishes the conceptual framework for understanding the subtle relationships between the experimental scientist, the modern instrument, and nature’s atomic particles. The principle of purposive- ness which governs judgment has also a role in implicitly guiding modern experimental science. In Part 1 we explore Kant’s philosophy of science as he shows how knowledge of material nature and unobservable entities is possible. In Part 2 we examine the way in which Kant’s treatment of judgment, with its operating principle of purposiveness, enters into his critical project and under- lies the possibility of rational science. In Part 3 we show that the centrality given to judgment in Kant’s conception of science provides philosophical in- sight into the investigation of atomic substances in modern chemistry. Keywords : Kant , judgment , purposiveness , experimentation , investigation of matter . Introduction Kant’s philosophy of science centers on the problem of how it is possible to acquire genuine knowledge of unobservable entities, such as atoms and molecules. “What and how much can the understanding and reason know apart from all experience?” ( CPuR , Axvii). This raises the question of the role of experiments in the knowability ( Erkennbarkeit ) and the experientiality (Erfahrbarkeit ) of nature. Kant’s insights into the character of scientific experimentation are not given the hearing they deserve. We argue that Kant’s theory of judgment establishes the conceptual framework for understanding the subtle inter- actions between the experimental chemist, the modern chemical instrument, and molecular substance.
    [Show full text]
  • Interpreting Kant's Theory of Divine Commands Patrick Kain Purdue
    Interpreting Kant’s Theory of Divine Commands Patrick Kain Purdue University / Philipps-Universität Marburg [to appear in Kantian Review] Kant rejected “theological morality”, insisting that no one, including God, can be the “author” of the moral law because the moral law is a categorically necessary, non-positive law.1 Kant was also no religious enthusiast2 and clearly intended to rule out certain kinds of dependence of ethics on theology. Such considerations make it tempting to suggest that Kant was fully committed to what has been called the “autonomy of ethics” from theology.3 Yet an observant reader of Kant’s corpus is constantly confronted with passages in which Kant discusses philosophical theology, connections between moral philosophy and theology, and even argues that we should “recognize all our duties as divine commands.”[KpV 5:129] Some have responded to these passages by suggesting that Kant’s conception of practical faith “is a boil, a tumor, a cancer within the critical philosophy, which is necessary to remove surgically,” in order to save what is valuable in Kant.4 Yet, Allen Wood and John Hare have each recently argued that such attempts to “secularize” Kant not only obscure our understanding of the history of philosophy, but may also blind us to ideas that are among Kant’s most important contributions to contemporary philosophical reflection.5 Wood emphasizes (against critics’ claims of individualism) both Kant’s deeply social conception of organized religion as model for genuine ethical community and its connection to the salutary social ideals of the Enlightenment; Hare emphasizes Kant’s avoidance of a false dichotomy (allegedly grounded in “the descriptive fallacy”) between substantive moral realism and creative anti-realism and a second false dichotomy (grounded in the presumed inadequacy of traditional theism) between a morality completely dependent upon God’s will and one completely independent of it.6 To some extent, one’s judgment of Kant’s greatest Divine Commands, p.
    [Show full text]
  • Ether in Kant and A¯Ka¯S´A in Pras´ Astapa¯ Da Philosophy
    16_FernandoTOLA.qxd:Maqueta.qxd 5/3/10 11:59 Página 1013 ETHER IN KANT AND A¯KA¯S´A IN PRAS´ASTAPA¯ DA PHILOSOPHY IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE FERNANDO TOLA CARMEN DRAGONETTI Fundación Instituto de Estudios Budistas, FIEB/CONICET (Buenos Aires) ABSTRACT: The study of Indian and Western systems of Philosophy reveals many points of thematic and methodological coincidences between them. We have collected a good number of these coincidences in our recent books, where we have included many philosophical texts in Sanskrit and in European languages which contain the expression of astonishing similar ideas and theses. In the present article we add a new instance of coincidence between Indian and - - Western thought in relation to akas´a in India (limited to the Indian philosophical system Vais´es. ika) and ether (Aether or Äther in German) in the Opus postumum of Kant. The inexistence of both - a-ka-s´a and ether has been established by Modern Science. Aka-s´a and ether in India and the West, respectively, constitute a notorious example of a-s´ raya-siddha, the well-known logical defect considered by Indian Logic. - - - KEY WORDS: ether, Kant, akas´ a, Pras´ astapada, Opus Postumum, Vais´ es.ika, Philosophy. Ether en Kant y ākāśa en Praśastapāda Filosofía desde una perspectiva comparativista RESUMEN: El estudio de los sistemas de Filosofía indios y occidentales revela muchos puntos de coincidencias temáticas y metodológicas entre ambos. Hemos reunido un buen número de estas coincidencias en nuestras publicaciones recientes, donde hemos incluido muchos textos filosó- ficos en sánscrito y en lenguas europeas que contienen la expresión de ideas y tesis asombrosa- mente similares.
    [Show full text]
  • J. G. Fichte-Gesamtausgabe III,6
    J. G. FICHTE-GESAMTAUSGABE 111,6 J. G. FICHTE-GESAMTAUSGABE DER BAYERISCHEN AKADEMIE DER WISSENSCHAFTEN Herausgegeben von Reinhard Lauth und Hans Gliwitzky BRIEFE BAND 6 JOHANN GOTTLIEB FICHTE BRIEFWECHSEL 1806-1810 Herausgegeben von Reinhard Lauth, Hans Gliwitzky, Peter K. Schneider und Erich Fuchs unter Mitwirkung von Ives Radrizzani, Erich Ruff und Manfred Zahn Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1997 Friedrich Frommann Verlag (Günther Holzboog) Herausgegeben mit Unterstützung der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft und des Bundesministeriums für Forschung und Technologie CIP-Kurztitelaufnahme der Deutschen Bibliothek Fichte, Johann Gottlieb: Gesamtausgabe der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften I J. G. Fichte. Hrsg. von Reinhard Lauth u. Hans Gliwitzky.­ Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: frommann-holzboog ISBN 3-7728-0138-2 NE: Fichte, Johann Gottlieb: [Sammlung]; Lauth, Reinhard [Hrsg.] 3. Briefe Bd. 6. Briefwechsel1806-1810 I hrsg. von Reinhard Lauth ... unter Mitw. von Ives Radrizzani ... - 1997. ISBN 3-7728-1681-9 Einbandgestaltung und Typographie Alfred Lutz Schwäbisch Gmünd Satz und Druck Laupp & Göbel Nehren bei Tübingen © Friedrich Frommann Verlag (Günther Holzboog) Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1997 Einleitung Über vier fahre, erfüllt von einschneidenden Ereignissen, umfaßt dieser vorletzte Band der Briefereihe unserer Ausgabe. Die politisch-militärischen Ereignisse des Jah­ res 1806 sind von eminenter Bedeutung sowohl für Deutschland und Europa, als auch andererseits für das Individuum]. G. Fichte, den Familienvater, den Gelehrten und Lehrer der Philosophie. Europa erhält eine neue Ordnung, auf der Landkarte wie in den Köpfen und Herzen seiner Bewohner. Auch Fichte muß sich neu orientieren: Die Tätigkeit als Professor der Philosophie in Erlangen war nach einem arbeits- aber äußerlich wenig erfolgreichen Semester schnell wieder zu Ende gegangen. Mit der vor der siegreichen französischen Armee flüchtenden preußischen Staatsspitze reist der Philosoph im Oktober 1806 nach Königsberg, nachdem er sich vorher vergeblich dem preußischen König als ,Feldpredi­ ger' angeboten hatte.
    [Show full text]
  • Erman Kaplama 1 Introduction to Cosmological Aesthetics: The
    Erman Kaplama Introduction to Cosmological Aesthetics: The Kantian Sublime and Nietzschean Dionysian I. Introduction This paper is founded on a close reading of Kant’s Opus Postumum in order both to explore the essential motivation which drove Kant to write a last comprehensive magnum opus (after having completed his critical philosophy) and, by doing so, to show the essential link between his aesthetics and the idea of Übergang (transition from the metaphysical principles to physics) which was chosen by him to be the title of this last work. For this work contains not only his dynamical theory of matter defining motion within the natures of space and time, and the advanced version of his philosophy of natural science, but also his arguments for the phenomenal validity of the metaphysical foundations (or the essential unity of the theoretical and practical reason), his teachings on the aesthetic human faculties of judgment and Anschauung (sense-intuition), and the discernment of the transcendental philosophy from Platonic idealism carrying it to a rather cosmological level, i.e. Kant’s insertion of the concept of cosmotheoros. That is why it would not be inappropriate to characterize the incomplete (but rich and innovative) Opus Postumum, as the continuation of both his theory of the sublime and reflective judgment from the third Critique, and his underlying motivation to integrate his physics, aesthetics, ethics and metaphysics into a single philosophical viewpoint like in the philosophical – cosmological systems of Pre-Socratics. For only in Opus Postumum, Kant began questioning the validity of the dichotomies between object and subject, matter and form, phenomenon and noumenon, phusis and ethos, nature and reason, world and God.
    [Show full text]
  • Hegel's Concept of Desire
    Hegel’s Concept of Desire SCOTT JENKINS there is a longstanding tendency in philosophy, and in some pre-theoretical contexts, to regard persons as essentially disembodied points of view on the world. In the thought of figures as diverse as Plato, Descartes, and Thomas Nagel, this tendency results in the division of a person, with features of our conscious lives such as bodily awareness, the feeling of desire, or the relation to other persons relegated to inessential status. In what follows I propose one way of understanding some early developments in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit that involves attributing to Hegel a concern with denying that these aspects of human experience may be sorted in this manner. My exposition of Hegel’s position focuses on his concept of desire, which figures most prominently in his assertion at the beginning of the fourth chapter that “self-consciousness is desire in general” (¶167).1 There are almost as many understandings of this assertion as there are interpretations of the Phenomenology, but I believe the reading I offer to be novel. I propose that we understand Hegel’s identification of self-consciousness and desire as the claim that desiring plays an important role in an apperceptive subject’s relation to itself. In arguing for this reading, I demonstrate that there exist deep affinities between Hegel’s remarks on self-consciousness and desire in the Phenomenology and Fichte’s treatment of these topics in his applied philosophy during the Jena period, in particular in his System of Ethics.2 Understood in this way, Hegel’s concept of desire figures in an ambitious attempt to establish relations of interdependence between subjective capacities regarded as essential to consciousness and those often relegated to inessential status.
    [Show full text]
  • Section 2. Kant's Opus Postumum Rejection of the Highest Good
    Kant’s post-1800 disavowal of the highest good argument for the existence of God I have two main goals in this paper. The first is to argue that Kant gave up on his highest good argument for the existence of God around 1800. The second is to revive a dialogue about this thesis that died out in the 1960s: I believe that this dialogue, which seems to have concluded with the naysayers in ascendence, ended prematurely. The paper is divided into three sections. In the first, I reconstruct Kant’s highest good argument in order to introduce the first piece of evidence in favor of my thesis: Kant’s deep-seated ambivalence about the various premises in this argument. In the second, I turn to Kant’s Opus postumum in order to canvass the second piece of evidence in favor of my thesis: Kant’s many claims to the effect that there is only one way to argue for the existence of God, a way which resembles the highest good argument only in taking the moral law as its starting point. In the third, I examine the counterarguments to my thesis as they were introduced in the 1960s, and I explain why I do not find them persuasive: although they undercut some of the evidence mustered by Adickes (the original proponent of my thesis), they leave the evidence on which I build my argument unimpugned. In so doing, I introduce the third and final piece of evidence in favor of my thesis: the continuity between Kant’s Opus postumum argument and a line of thought from his earlier work.
    [Show full text]
  • The Philqsophy of Nature of Kant, Schelling and Hegel
    Citation: Dieter Wandschneider (2010) The Philosophy of Nature of Kant, Schelling and Hegel, in: Moyar, Dean (ed. 2010) The Routledge Companion to Nineteenth Century Phi-iosophy. London, New York: Routledge 2010, 64—‘l03 3 THE PHILQSOPHY OF NATURE OF KANT, SCHELLING AND HEGEL UFE‘' (“Fm -z =sSb:3Sl.C/J Q;r-Q3SE.SD...cs -a Translated by Patrick Leland Introduction Man, though himself a child of nature, is — in Herder’s words — a freed man of nature. Through reason he is able to disentangle himself from natural compulsions and adapt nature to his needs. Admittedly, that also means his relation to nature is not thoroughly determined by nature but rather is precariously open. Reason is thus continuously required to clarify and justify anew man’s relation to nature. In other words, it is constitutive of man that he has a concept of nature and hence also a fundamental need for a philosophy of nature. It is no accident that in the Ionian world the philosophy of nature was “the form in which philosophy as such was born” (Wahsner ZOOZ: 9). In this respect, it is surprising that the present age, which more than any previous era is determined by the results and applications of scientific research, has not developed a thoroughgoing philosophy of nature. Instead, it is the philosophy of science, or philo- sophical reflection on the foundations of natural science, which — prepared already in the second half of the nineteenth century — has attained a truly epochal status during the twentieth century and continues to dominate contemporary philosophy. As the latter has allowed the philosophy ofscience to supersede the philosophy ofnature, it has neglected to develop a concept of nature adequate for our time.
    [Show full text]
  • This Is a Postprint Draft! Please Do Not Cite
    This is a Postprint Draft! Please do not Cite. WHEN CITING ALWAYS REFER TO THE FINAL VERSION PUBLISHED IN EUROPEAN JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION, VOL. 10, NO. 4, 83–116. WITHDOI: 10.24204/EJPR.V11I1.2725 THE DIVINE SELF-MEDIATION IN THE UNIVERSE: EUTELEOLOGY MEETS GERMAN IDEALISM Thomas Schärtl University of Regensburg Abstract: The paper compares the non-standard theistic notion of God as presented by John Bishop and Ken Perszyk in their so-called “euteleological” concept of God with idealistic, especially Hegelian and post-Hegelian, concepts of the divine. Both frameworks not only share striking similarities, based on their guiding intuitions, but also have remarkably parallel problems that have already been discussed in 19th-century speculative German theology in the aftermath of German Idealism. The article offers some DOI: 10.24204/EJPR.V11I1.2725 proposals to strengthen the euteleological concept of God metaphysically — based on some insights coming from post-Hegelian discussions. I. INTRODUCTION . Citable Version has Version . Citable That the concept of a personal God should be placed under scrutiny is not just a recent idea or develop- ment, but, rather a basic tenet found for example in Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s highly disputed remarks on the notion of a divine governance of the world, in which he proposes that a personal concept of God nearly always falls prey to superstition and eventually becomes religiously inadequate. In the past two decades, a slightly different set of motives has fostered a comparable tendency to move beyond the notion of a personal God.1 We can distinguish between motives stemming from: (1) Please do not Cite do not Please DRAFT perceived inconsistencies among divine attributes (for instance, divine goodness, divine omnipotence, or divine omniscience); (2) metaphysical demands of naturalism and contemporary views on the origin of the universe or the evolution of life; and (3) evidential problems that any kind of supernaturalism, which seems to be a necessary ingredient of personal theism, must face.
    [Show full text]
  • In the Beginning Was the Act a Historical And
    Faculteit Letteren & Wijsbegeerte Liesbet De Kock In the Beginning was the Act A Historical and Systematic Analysis of Hermann von Helmholtz's Psychology of the Object Proefschrift voorgelegd tot het behalen van de graad van Doctor in de wijsbegeerte 2014 Der Denker stellt sich in den grossen Zusammenhang der Philosophie- und Wissenschaftsgeschichte: den dem “Philosophieren auf eigene Faust”, bei dem jedes Individuum nur in einem persönlichen zufälligen Reflex die Antwort auf die Rätsel des Seins zu finden sucht, soll ein Ende gemacht werden. […] Jeder Gedanke, jedes echte Grundmotiv des Philosophierens steht mit der Gesamtheit der übrigen in einer ideellen Gemeinschaft: und diese Gemeinschaft der Ideen ist es, die auch der geschichtlichen Betrachtung erst Sinn und Leben verleiht - Ernst Cassirer (1912), p. 252. Promotor Prof. Dr. Gertrudis Van de Vijver Copromotor Prof. Dr. Steffen Ducheyne iii Table of Contents TABLE OF CONTENTS V PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 1 CHAPTER 1 4 INTRODUCTION: THE POETRY OF PERCEPTION 4 1.1 Hermann von Helmholtz: General Introduction 4 1.1.1 Selective Biography 4 1.1.2 Helmholtz and the Problem of the Object 7 1.2 The Poetry of Perception: Helmholtz’s Faust 11 1.2.1 The Realm of the Mothers: Faust in the Dark Gallery 14 1.2.2 The Symbolic Relation to the World: Chorus Mysticus 20 1.2.3 What was There in the Beginning? The First Study Room Scene 24 1.3 General Aim and Strategy 28 1.3.1 Main Research Question 28 1.3.2 The Problem of the Object: Interpretive Framework 29 1.3.2.1 Helmholtz and Empiricism: The Problem of Psychological Construction 30 1.3.2.2 Helmholtz and Kant: The A priori Structure of Understanding 32 1.3.2.3 Helmholtz and Fichte: The Problem of Differentiation 35 CHAPTER 2 39 HELMHOLTZ’S PHYSIOLOGICAL EPISTEMOLOGY AND THE GENESIS OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEM OF THE OBJECT 39 2.1 Introduction 39 2.2 Hermann von Helmholtz and Johannes Peter Müller 40 v 2.3 Helmholtz’s Physiological Reductionism: Anti-Vitalism 42 2.4 Goethe, Purkinje, Müller and the Primacy of Subjective Perception.
    [Show full text]