German Philosophy 1760-1860: the Legacy of Idealism
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This page intentionally left blank GERMAN PHILOSOPHY -- The Legacy of Idealism In the second half of the eighteenth century, German philosophy came for a while to dominate European philosophy. It changed the way in which not only Europeans, but people all over the world, conceived of themselves and thought about nature, religion, human history, politics, and the structure of the human mind. In this rich and wide-ranging book, Terry Pinkard interweaves the story of “Germany” – changing during this period from a loose collection of principalities to a newly emerged nation with a distinctive culture – with an examination of the currents and complexities of its devel- oping philosophical thought. He examines the dominant influence of Kant, with his revolutionary emphasis on “self-determination,” and traces this influence through the development of Romanticism and idealismto the critiques of post-Kantian thinkers such as Schopenhauer and Kierkegaard. His book will interest a range of readers in the history of philosophy, cultural history, and the history of ideas. is Professor of Philosophy and German at Northwestern University. His publications include Hegel’s Dialectic: The Explanation of Possibility (), Hegel’s Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason (), and Hegel (), as well as many journal articles. GERMAN PHILOSOPHY -- The Legacy of Idealism TERRY PINKARD Northwestern University Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo Cambridge University Press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge , United Kingdom Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521663267 © Terry Pinkard 2002 This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provision of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published in print format 2002 - ---- eBook (NetLibrary) - --- eBook (NetLibrary) - ---- hardback - --- hardback - ---- paperback - --- paperback Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of s for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this book, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate. To Susan Contents Acknowledgements page ix List of abbreviations x Introduction: “Germany” and German philosophy The revolution in philosophy (I): human spontaneity and the natural order The revolution in philosophy (II): autonomy and the moral order The revolution in philosophy (III): aesthetic taste, teleology, and the world order :- Introduction: idealismand the reality of the French Revolution The s: the immediate post-Kantian reaction: Jacobi and Reinhold The s: Fichte The s after Fichte: the Romantic appropriation of Kant (I): H¨olderlin, Novalis, Schleiermacher, Schlegel –: the Romantic appropriation of Kant (II): Schelling vii viii Contents –: the other post-Kantian: Jacob Friedrich Fries and non-Romantic sentimentalism Introduction: post-revolutionary Germany Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit: post-Kantianism in a new vein Hegel’s analysis of mind and world: the Science of Logic Nature and spirit: Hegel’s system Introduction: exhaustion and resignation, – Schelling’s attempt at restoration: idealism under review Kantian paradoxes and modern despair: Schopenhauer and Kierkegaard Conclusion: the legacy of idealism Bibliography Index Acknowledgements Hilary Gaskin of Cambridge University Press first gave me the idea for this book. Without her encouragement both at first and all along the way, the book would never have been written. That she also contributed many helpful suggestions on rewriting the manuscript as it was under way all the more puts me in her debt. I have cited several of Robert Pippin’s pieces in the manuscript, but his influence runs far deeper than any of the footnotes could indicate. In all of the conversations we have had about these topics over the years and in the class we taught together, I have learned much from his sug- gestions, his arguments, and his ideas for how this line of thought might be improved. I have incorporated many more of the ideas taken from mutual conversations and a class taught together than could possibly be indicated by even an infinite set of footnotes to his published work. Fred Rush also read the manuscript; his comments were invaluable. Susan Pinkard offered not only support but the help of a historian’s gaze when I was trying to figure out how to make my way along this path. Without her, this book would not have been written. ix Abbreviations Briefe G. W. F. Hegel, Briefe von und an Hegel, ed. Johannes Hoffmeister, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, , vols. –. HeW G. W. F. Hegel, Werke in zwanzig B¨anden, eds. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel, Frankfurt amMain: Suhrkamp, . KW Immanuel Kant, Werke, ed. WilhelmWeischedel, Frankfurt amMain: SuhrkampVerlag, , vol. Schellings Werke F. W. J. Schelling, Schellings Werke, ed. Manfred Schr¨oter, Munich: C. H. Beck und Oldenburg, . SW J. G. Fichte, S¨amtliche Werke, ed. Immanuel Hermann Fichte, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, . WTB Friedrich von Hardenberg, Werke, Tageb¨ucher und Briefe, eds. Hans-JoachimM¨ahl and Richard Samuel, Munich: Carl Hanser, . x Introduction: “Germany” and German philosophy In , one of the many contenders for the title “the first world war” – in this case, the “Seven Years War” – was concluded. Its worldwide effects were obvious – France, besides being saddled with enormous financial losses as a result of the war, was in effect driven out of North America and India by Britain, never to recover its territories there – but, curiously, the war had started and mostly been fought on “German” soil, and one of its major results was to transform (or perhaps just to confirm) the German Land of Prussia into a major European power. It is hard to say, though, what it meant for “Germany,”since, at that point, “Germany,”as so many historians have pointed out, did not exist except as a kind of shorthand for the German-speaking parts of the gradually expiring “Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation.” Once a center of commerce and trade in the Middle Ages and Renaissance, “Germany,” in that shorthand sense, had by the eighteenth century become only a bit player on the European scene, long since having lost much of its economic vitality as trade shifted to the North Atlantic following the voyages of discovery and the intensive colonization efforts in what Europeans described as the “New World.” After suffering huge population losses in the Thirty Years War (–), “Germany” found itself divided by the terms of the Treaty of Westphalia in into a series of principalities – some relatively large, some as small as a village – that were held together only by the more-or-less fiction of belonging to and being protected by the laws and powers of the Holy Roman Empire (which as the old joke had it was neither holy, nor Roman, nor an Empire, and which was for that matter neither a state, a confederation, or a treaty organization but a wholly sui generis political entity difficult to describe in any political terms familiar to us now). For a good bit of its early modern history,“Germany” did not even denote a cultural entity; if anything, its major feature was its intense religious division into Protestant and Catholic areas, with all the wars and rivalries that followed fromthat division. Neither Protestant German philosophy – nor Catholic “Germany” thought of themselves as sharing any kind of joint culture; at most they shared a language (of sorts) and a certain accidental geographical proximity. “Germany” during that period must thus be put into quotation marks, since for all practical purposes there simply was no such thing as “Germany” at the time. “Germany” became Germany only in hindsight. Yet, starting in , “German” philosophy came for a while to dom- inate European philosophy and to change the shape of how not only Europeans but practically the whole world conceived of itself, of nature, of religion, of human history, of the nature of knowledge, of politics, and of the structure of the human mind in general. From its inception, it was controversial, always hard to understand, and almost always described as German – one thinks of WilliamHazlitt’s opening line in his re- view of a book by Friedrich Schlegel: “The book is German” – and it is clear that the word, “German,” sometimes was used to connote depth, sometimes to connote simply obscurity, and sometimes to accuse the au- thor of attempting speciously to give “depth” to his works by burying it in obscurantist language. Yet the fact that there was no “Germany” at the time indicates how little can be explained by appealing to its being “German,” as if being “German” might independently explain the de- velopment of “German” philosophy during this period. If nothing else, what counted as “German” was itself up for grabs and was being devel- oped and argued about by writers, politicians, publicists, and, of course, philosophers, during this period. Nonetheless, the questions those “German” philosophers asked them- selves during this period remain our own questions. We have in the in- terim become perhaps a bit more sophisticated as to how we pose them, and we have in the interimlearned a good bit about what kinds of it- erations or what kinds of answers to their problems carry what types of extra problems with them. Their questions, though, remain our ques- tions, and thus “German” philosophy remains an essential part of modern philosophy. What, then, was the relation of “German” philosophy to “Germany”? It is tempting to think of “Germany” becoming Germany because of the explosion in philosophical, literary, and scientific work that occurred at the end of the eighteenth century in that part of the world, such that “Germany” became a culturally unified Germany (or came to The line fromHazlitt is cited in Peter Gay, The Naked Heart (New York: W.W.Norton, ), p.