State Responses to Nuclear Proliferation

The Differential Effects of Threat Perception

Brian K. Chappell State Responses to Nuclear Proliferation Brian K. Chappell

State Responses to Nuclear Proliferation The Differential Effects of Threat Perception Brian K. Chappell Washington, DC, USA

ISBN 978-3-030-59800-6 ISBN 978-3-030-59801-3 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59801-3

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This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy and position of the Department of Defense, its Components, or the U.S. government. The public release clearance of this publication by the Department of Defense does not imply Department of Defense endorsement or factual accuracy of the material. For the ancestors who endured and sacrificed everything to survive. Your dreams live.

For Amir Pasha To my mother Jan and Grandmother Olivia Acknowledgments

This book has been a goal since I was a student at the University of Michigan, and a work in progress since I began my doctoral work at Catholic University. After years of contemplation and revision, I now share it with you. To my inspiration, Amir Chappell, who consistently asks, “Daddy, why do you have so many books?” You will soon discover a world many can only imagine. I hope our trips to the bookstore and nightly readings planted a seed in you. I look forward to your growth and our lifelong discussions as you begin your journey. Behold, the only thing greater than yourself. To my mother, Jan Chappell, whose love was the spark that lit the fire. She skillfully guided me into a world that had only existed in our dreams. Her vision lit the path that became my reality. I can only hope that I have made her proud. I am immensely grateful to the Chappell family for their unconditional love and unwavering support. Thank you: Beverly Chappell, Gwen Chappell, Debra Chappell McIntosh, Camille Chappell Johnson, Kathy Chappell, Veronica Chappelle McCullough, Annette Chappell, Robert Reed, Rodney Reed, Brandon Chappell, Darren Chappell, Christian Chappell, Cedric Boswell, Rashid Johnson, Amirah Johnson, Larry Breland, Harold Tillman, Trevor Ruffin, Dayan Ruffin, Korey and Kristen McCullough, and Aisha Ruffin Atkins. Kim James Haygood and Tonya James, your humor and encouragement made this process a bit less stressful. I am thankful for both of you. Rosalind Boswell, thank you for always believing in me. You are the light that has shined brightly since my childhood. I owe immense gratitude and loving admiration to my grandmother Olivia Chappell, who truly understood the value and power of education because a segregated public school system limited her educational opportunities. Her century of wisdom is my guide. One professor played a critical role in my academic career and in the evolution of this book. Dr. Phil Henderson was my graduate school mentor, and I owe him tremendous gratitude for the years of friendship and guidance he provided. Phil never missed an opportunity to remind me that I needed to write this book. Most graciously, he was there every step of the way: graduate school lectures, honor society initiation, promotion ceremony, colloquium, comprehensive exams,

ix x Acknowledgments dissertation proposal, dissertation committee, dissertation defense, graduations, and manuscript development. His generosity and dedication made all the difference. Every student should be so fortunate. Dr. Andrew Yeo served on my dissertation committee where his edits and reccomendations had a surgeon’s precision. I am grateful for the critical thought and academic rigor he added to my dissertation. Dr. Yeo’s knowledge and inputs made this a much better book. Dr. Willard Hardman, the “Vilnius Schoolmaster,” was crucial in advancing my line of critical thought. I credit him for guiding me to probe beyond politics and towards culture and political psychology because, as he famously stated, “There is never, ever, a single cause for war.” In memory of Dr. Wallace Thies, a true scholar and national security expert who chaired my dissertation committee. Wally was tough and often tested my knowledge and grasp of the literature, but he made me a better scholar and for that, I am thankful. He was a major influence in shaping my academic thought, and I am forever grateful for his brilliance and dedication to his profession. Wally helped make my vision a reality. Sadly, Professor Thies passed away while I was editing this book. This book involved the input and influence of many people to whom I am enormously grateful. Natasha, I am immensely thankful for your Iranian cultural expertise, Farsi translations, religious insight, and support. Your inputs and knowledge were invaluable to my research and the finished project. Thank you for answering all my random questions and helping me better understand the literature, history, and the culture. Yeki bood, yeki nabood. To the original Ph.D., Dr. Lucy Belle Lang-Chappell, thank you for blazing the path for me to follow. You will always be my favorite person in charge. Dr. Kahlil Johnson, thank you for the psychiatric and psychological perspectives, and for being a calming voice during the storm. Your wise counsel and reassurances played a pivotal role during the writing of my manuscript. Our conversations were a welcomed break from the madness. Stephan Pietszak, from day one we dreamt and encouraged one another to succeed. Despite the challenges and words of those who doubted us, we kept our heads when others lost theirs. Thank you, Brother. I owe a special thank you to Mohammed and Bonnie for their kindness and hospitality. They graciously shared their knowledge, and I am thankful for our Iranian history, political, and cultural discussions over chai, sharbat, and baghali polo. Tianna Johnson, thank you so much for the positive energy and reassuring encouragement. Alex Obaitan and Desiree Woodard, your support and encouragement were much-needed and wel- comed voices. I extend a special thank you to Karyn Temple for the intellectual discussions, encouragement, and legal perspectives. I am indebted to Dr. Nesha Z. Haniff, who is one of my former professors at the University of Michigan. Dr. Haniff was the first person I met who had written a book. I thank her for inspiring me to learn about the African Diaspora and encouraging me to write a book of my own. I owe a special debt of gratitude to the early mentors who helped point me in Acknowledgments xi the right direction: David Costa, Tony Grant, Phil Maddox, and William “Big Bill” Page. There are so many special people who encouraged me along the way, these are but a few: Keith Borden, Clifford Boswell, Richard Bramlett, Erica Chappell, Lamont Coleman, Erika Crawford, Ronnie Doaks, Helen Dye, Willie Hall, Ty Haygood, Bev Heck, Mary and Michael Henderson, Elliott Hogans, Jan Jett, Katie Johnson, Valerie Kiley, Pat Lavender, Dawn Lowe, Mike “Brother Black” Madison, Carl McIntosh, Nancy Monday, Tytonia Moore, Ken Moss, Susan Motley, Melvin Pree, Steve Rose, Dharamraj Singh, Mildred and Fred Stringer, Staci Stringer, Anna Trotter, Sara Underwood, Bobby Vinson, Scott Whalen, Francheska Wilson, and Esther Wise. I owe special recognition to my colleagues from the nuclear enterprise: Roosevelt “Ted” Mercer, Anthony Goins, Todd Kaegi, Andrew Kovich, James Bailey, and Billy Wade. I would be remiss if I did not recognize my Brothers from Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity, Incorporated: Michael Tillman, Reginald Hampton, John Beardsley, Kameron McCullough, Larry Breland II, Freddie Knight, Jeff Williams, Darryl Mitchell, and Darryl Marshall. To my favorite teacher, Otto Zillgitt, who inspired me during my early years, when I needed it most. Otto was the teacher who made a difference. I am eternally grateful for our friendship and for his continued mentoring. I also owe special recognition to “Big Brian” Johnson for his unrelenting question, “Man, when are you going to finish that damn book?” I am grateful to the colleagues who contributed their time and expertise to help improve the quality of this book. Our conversations helped shape many of the insights contained in these pages. Dr. Seyyid Mohiaddin Mesbahi, your mentoring and insight on Iran and Islam were immensely helpful to my research and provided me a greater understanding of the region and its complexities. I am forever grateful for both your wisdom and your willingness to share your thoughts. Ilan Goldenberg, I am extremely appreciative of your knowledge and perspectives on Israel and the Holocaust. Thank you for helping me add depth and context to the discussion. Dr. Tiana Jackson, thank you for being the sounding board for an assortment of thoughts and for helping me to organize my ideas to make this a better book than it otherwise would be. Dr. Keita Franklin, thank you for the scholarly feedback and positive peer pressure. Dr. Andrew Radin, I am thankful for our discussions on Israel and for your publishing advice. Dr. Hasan Javadi, I enjoyed our talks and your lectures on Middle Eastern politics and Iranian history. I am also grateful to the intrepid Phil Caruso who gratiously gave of his time to add subject matter expertise and vision to the manuscript by proofing my chapters and adding critical thought to the national security discussion. Phil made astute observations about both structure and chapter content. Dean Fischer, I thank you for your insight and for our discussions on Israel and the Holocaust. Dr. Hassan Abbas, I am grateful for you sharing your Pakistan expertise and intricate knowledge of the region. Maaza Mengiste, your literary journey is an inspiration. You inspired me to put my thoughts on paper and to paint my words with colors. Thank you for setting xii Acknowledgments the bar so incredibly high. For anyone I may have missed, please forgive my oversight. In honor of Billy and Roy Chappell, and Fred James Sr., the architects who built the foundation. and In memoriam Morgan Chappell, Stephen Cruise, Eliza Jefferson Thomas, Austin Chappell, Susie Cruise, Emma Foster, Edith Mills Walker, Noah Fairley, Clementine Breland, Linold Chappell, Flora Evans Chappell, William “Billy” Chappell, Fred James, Sr., Winnie R. James, Roy M. Chappell, Emma Matthews, Clarence Matthews, Annabelle Whaley, William Gregory Chappell, Todd O. Chappell, Edward Darin Chappell, Jamesenna Tillman, Chauncey O. Reed, Flossie Chappelle, and Jason James. They have never left me, even though they are gone.

Washington, D.C. Brian K. Chappell, Ph.D. December 2020 About This Book

Contemporary fears of rogue state nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism pose unique challenges for the global community. North Korea continues to defy international norms over its nuclear testing and ballistic missile launches, the India– Pakistan rivalry stokes concerns that their continued hostilities could spiral out of control and lead to a nuclear exchange, and Iran continues to challenge the pro- visions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty by enriching uranium beyond levels required for civilian use, hinting at a military component of its nuclear activities. Furthering these concerns are worries that a terrorist organization could acquire an inadequately secured nuclear device and detonate it in a populated area. Adding to this conundrum is the continued fear of the illicit trafficking in nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technology, and the sharing of this technical expertise with nations of concern. Highlighting the importance of these issues, President Barack Obama stated, “For the first time, preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism are now at the top of America’s nuclear agenda.” Within this anarchic international system of potential shifts in the distribution of power, the United States has consistently stated its opposition to the further spread of nuclear weapons. Yet, while having the global-reaching military power to attack and disrupt the nuclear programs of all states of concern in their nascent stages, with the exception of Iraq in 2003, the United States bypassed military strikes and selected coercive diplomacy and economic sanctions as the mechanisms to address each state’s nuclear program. These non-kinetic actions ultimately failed to disrupt the targeted programs, and North Korea, India, and Pakistan crossed the nuclear threshold and became nuclear powers. In the contemporary case of Iran, the United States has used a combination of diplomacy, sanctions, suspected cyberattacks, and a nuclear agreement to impede Tehran’s nuclear program. Despite warnings from the United States and Israel, Iran continues to enrich uranium, which it states is for peaceful civilian-use purposes, and thus permitted by Article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

xiii xiv About This Book

These contemporary cases illustrate the challenges additional proliferation poses to powerful states that wish to preserve the current power structure and prevent the rise of adversarial states whose behavior and policies already stress regional sta- bility and challenge the existing power status quo. Saira Khan argues the rela- tionship between these regional challenging states and the powerful state is highly politicized and deeply adversarial because a regional state that is supposed to bandwagon with the global power is, instead, challenging and competing against it. Thus, the global power singles out these rising states as the most salient threat and identifies them as rogue states or states of concern, and consequently develops security policies to address them as threats. These states are not threats in the traditional sense that they are able to militarily defeat or conquer the global power. They are perceived as threats because the global power deems they can disrupt regional and global stability. In these scenarios, the global power tends to mis- calculate the intent and capability of the weaker state.1 Even though halting the further spread of nuclear weapons is at the forefront of American foreign policy, surprisingly, very little scholarship is devoted to examining why a powerful state, such as the United States, will use force against one state, but pursue diplomacy with another state to impede the progress of their nuclear programs. Understanding the causal mechanisms for these variations in state responses to nuclear prolifera- tion is critical to determining the influences that contribute to a state’s threat per- ceptions and its proliferation response. Perhaps no other region is a better testbed for this examination than the Middle East, due to its history of conflict, nuclear proliferation, and preventive strikes. The United States and Israel are the two most vocal opponents of further nuclear pro- liferation in the Middle East. Even so, historically, they have responded differently to the same proliferation cases. In the past forty years, there were four cases where three Middle East states were suspected of reaching significant milestones toward acquiring a nuclear weapon. In three of the four cases, either the United States or Israel used military force against the country suspected of proliferation—Iraq in 1981, Iraq in 2003, and Syria in 2007—while the other state either took no action or used coercive diplomacy as a proliferation response. In the fourth case of Iran in 2015, the United States brokered an internationally negotiated nuclear settlement— the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—while Israel criticized the deal and threatened to take unilateral military action to halt Tehran’s continued uranium enrichment. The existing literature does not provide a rigorous examination of these incon- sistencies nor does it thoroughly discuss the motivations and psychological influ- ences that shape a state’s threat perceptions and proliferation responses. The literature also fails to suggest a point at which a powerful state transitions from diplomacy to the use of force to address an opposing state’s nuclear ambitions. This is of particular importance as it pertains to rogue states because conventional wisdom argues that once a state acquires a nuclear weapon, it has a deterrent

1Saira Khan, Iran and Nuclear Weapons: Protracted Conflict and Proliferation (New York: Routledge, 2011), 33. About This Book xv capability and is able to establish redlines designed to prevent the overthrow of its current government and the destruction of the state. This book offers a unique approach to understanding the dilemma of why powerful states respond differently to similar cases of nuclear proliferation by examining the United States and Israel’s responses to the four most advanced cases of proliferation by Middle East states to determine whether and how their differing situations influenced their threat perceptions and responses to proliferation. The author argues cognitive psychological influences, including the trauma derived from national tragedies like the September 11th attacks and the Holocaust, and a history of armed conflict increases the threat perceptions of a powerful state’s foreign policydecision-makers when confronting a state seeking to challenge an existing power structure by acquiring a nuclear weapon. The study suggests these variations are caused by the state decision-makers’ differing perceptions of the threat posed by proliferation. The intensity of these threat perceptions is influenced by cognitive phenomena that ultimately shape the state’s foreign policydeci- sion-making process. The research suggests variations in the intensity of a per- ceived threat will strongly influence the powerful state’s proliferation response. Lower perceptions of a threat will lead to either no action or the use of coercive diplomacy, while higher threat perceptions will lead to the use of military force. The study offers insight into improving approaches to contemporary nuclear prolifera- tion by providing a more robust understanding of how threat perceptions influence a powerful state’s proliferation response. Determining why two powerful states with similarly aligned proliferation policies perceive and respond differently to the same proliferation case is essential to forecasting future responses to horizontal proliferation. The research examines the extent to which U.S. support of Iraq during the Iran– Iraq War may have lessened the United States’ perception of the threat posed by Iraqi proliferation in 1981. Concurrently, it examines the proposition that Israel’s sensitivity to a prospective nuclear-armed Iraq intensified its sense of urgency, resulting in the use of military force to halt Iraqi proliferation. The study attempts to answer the question of why there were two markedly different responses to Iraqi proliferation by two close allies. Relatedly, this study provides a better explanation for the United States’ preventive war with Iraq in 2003 by illustrating how sub- jective threat perceptions, political motivations, and misleading intelligence led to an exaggerated threat and, ultimately, a severely flawed rationale for war, which continues to influence the credibility and scope of U.S. proliferation responses. This study also examines why Israel deferred to the United States in dealing with Iraq in 2003. Specifically, the book explores the impact of how U.S. security guarantees and the perception that Iraq no longer posed a threat after the 1991 Iraq War helped shape Israeli deference to U.S. policy. The study also examines Israel’s 2007 strike against Syria’s al-Kibar nuclear reactor and assesses the Bush administration’s consultation with the Israelis before the attack. Lastly, the research seeks to explain why the United States pursued coercive diplomacy with Iran, which culminated in the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also called the Iran Nuclear Deal, by demonstrating the Obamaadministration’s preference for xvi About This Book diplomacy and its opposition to the Bush administration’s use of force in Iraq influenced its proliferation policies with Iran. Finally, the study assesses the argument that Israel pursued a hard-line approach with Iran because it perceived a nuclear-armed Iran would challenge Israel’s regional dominance, disrupt regional stability, and provide a nuclear umbrella for Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards-Quds Force and Iran-affiliated proxies throughout the region, as well as the potential that a nuclear Iran would spark a regional nuclear arms race. By providing a better understanding of how threat perceptions influence state policy responses, the book offers insight for improving approaches to contemporary nuclear state proliferation. Contents

1 Introduction ...... 1 Statement of the Problem ...... 6 Purpose of the Book ...... 8 The Use of Case Studies ...... 9 Conceptual Underpinnings for the Study ...... 9 Research Questions ...... 16 Research Hypotheses ...... 16 Scope of the Study ...... 16 Limitations and Assumptions ...... 16 Power Projection Disparities ...... 17 Interdependence ...... 19 Data Analysis ...... 19 The Differential Effects of Threat Perception ...... 22 Summary ...... 24 2 Literature Review ...... 27 Background ...... 28 Deterrence Theory ...... 30 The Spread of Nuclear Weapons ...... 33 Nuclear Motivations ...... 38 Proliferation Optimism and Proliferation Pessimism ...... 47 The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation ...... 51 Political Psychology ...... 53 Summary ...... 64 3 Cognitive Psychological Influences ...... 67 Cognitive Psychological Influences ...... 68 Historical Tragedy and Perceptions of Threat ...... 70 Israel—Historical Tragedy and Perceptions of Threat ...... 72 Historical Analogies ...... 75

xvii xviii Contents

Adversarial Rhetoric ...... 77 Fixed Analogy ...... 79 The United States—Historical Tragedy and Perceptions of Threat ..... 81 Historical Analogies ...... 82 Adversarial Rhetoric ...... 85 Fixed Analogy ...... 87 History of Conflict ...... 88 Israel—History of Conflict ...... 91 Israel and Iraq ...... 91 Israel and Hezbollah and Hamas ...... 92 Israel and Syria ...... 94 Israel and Iran ...... 95 The Regional Hegemon ...... 101 The United States—History of Conflict ...... 103 The United States and Iraq ...... 103 The United States and Syria ...... 108 The United States and Iran ...... 110 Summary ...... 115 4 National Security Policy and Nuclear Policy ...... 117 Israel—National Security Policy ...... 117 Foreign Policy Decisions...... 121 The United States—National Security Policy ...... 122 The Truman and Eisenhower Administrations...... 127 The Kennedy and Nixon Administrations ...... 128 The Carter Administration ...... 129 The Reagan Administration ...... 129 The George H.W. Bush Administration ...... 131 The Clinton Administration ...... 132 The George W. Bush Administration ...... 133 The Obama Administration ...... 135 Nuclear Policy ...... 139 The United States—Nuclear Policy ...... 140 Summary ...... 144 5 Military Doctrine and Power Projection ...... 145 Israel—Military Doctrine ...... 146 The United States—Military Doctrine ...... 148 The Reagan Administration ...... 149 The Powell Doctrine ...... 151 The Bush Administration ...... 152 The Obama Administration ...... 153 Power Projection Capability—Airpower ...... 154 Contents xix

Israel—Power Projection Capability—Airpower ...... 157 The United States—Power Projection Capability—Airpower ...... 159 Summary ...... 166 6 The Middle East States and Threat Perceptions ...... 167 The United States and Israel—National Security Relationship ...... 171 The Israel Lobby ...... 176 Evangelical Christian Support for Israel ...... 181 Iraq—National Security and Threat Perceptions ...... 184 Syria—National Security and Threat Perceptions ...... 192 Iran—National Security and Threat Perceptions ...... 199 Summary ...... 215 7 Analysis of Data ...... 217 Heuristic for Threat Assessment Privileging Identity ...... 219 Heuristic for the Proliferation Response ...... 220 Iraq Case Study—1981 ...... 221 Israel and the Raid on Osirak ...... 232 Iraq Case Study—2003 ...... 234 The United States and the Iraq War ...... 250 Syria Case Study—2007 ...... 251 Israel and the Raid on Al-Kibar ...... 260 Iran Case Study—2015 ...... 262 The United States and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) ...... 278 8 Conclusion ...... 289 Implications ...... 295 Recommendations for Further Study ...... 297

Appendices ...... 299 Glossary ...... 329 Bibliography ...... 353 Index ...... 391 About the Author

Brian K. Chappell, Ph.D. served twenty-eight years in the United States Air Force and is a veteran of the Afghanistan War (Operation Enduring Freedom). He is a career Nuclear and Missile Operations Officer with over twenty years of inter- national engagement and national security policy experience. Brian has served as a Middle East Policy Senior Advisor to the Under Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs, a South Asia Policy Senior Advisor to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and as a Senior Advisor for Defense Governance to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Dr. Chappell holds a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, a Master of Science in Administration from Central Michigan University, a Master of Arts in International Affairs from Catholic University, a Master of Science in Strategic Intelligence from the National Intelligence University, and a Doctor of Philosophy in World Politics from Catholic University. He has traveled extensively throughout Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, and has conducted cultural research in Afghanistan, Botswana, Ethiopia, and Iraq. Dr. Brian K. Chappell is a member of Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity and lives in the Washington D.C. metro area.

xxi Abbreviations and Acronyms

A2/AD Anti-Access/Area Denial ALCM Air Launched Cruise Missile APNSA Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs CIA Central Intelligence Agency CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff DIA Defense Intelligence Agency DOD Department of Defense EMP Electromagnetic Pulse EPW Earth Penetrating Weapon FARP Forward Arming and Refueling Point FPDM Foreign Policy Decision-Making FTO Foreign Terrorist Organization GBSD Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent GWOT Global War on Terrorism HEU High Enriched Uranium HGV Hypersonic Glide Vehicle HVPW High Velocity Penetrating Weapon IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency IAF Israeli Air Force ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (3100+ mile range) IDF Israel Defense Force IRBM Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (1860–3100 mile range) IRGC Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps IRGC-QF Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force ISIS Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (Daesh) JCPOA Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (The Iran Nuclear Deal) KT Kiloton (Nuclear Yield Measurement) LEU Low Enriched Uranium LOC Line of Control LYNW Low Yield Nuclear Weapons

xxiii xxiv Abbreviations and Acronyms

MAD Mutually Assured Destruction MIRV Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle MRBM Medium Range Ballistic Missile (620–1860 mile range) MT Megaton (Nuclear Yield Measurement) NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NC2 Nuclear Command and Control NDS National Defense Strategy NIE National Intelligence Estimate NMS National Military Strategy NPR Nuclear Posture Review NPT Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty NSC National Security Council NSG Nuclear Suppliers Group NSS National Security Strategy NUDET Nuclear Detonation NWFZ Nuclear Weapons Free Zone NWS Nuclear Weapons State OCA Offensive Counter Air PU Plutonium QME Qualitative Military Edge SAM Surface to Air Missile SIGINT Signals Intelligence SLBM Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile SLV Space Launch Vehicle SRBM Short Range Ballistic Missile (40–620 mile range) SSBN Subsurface Ballistic Nuclear (Submarine/Boomer) START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty U Uranium UN United Nations UNSC United Nations Security Council USAF United States Air Force USN United States Navy WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction List of Figures

Fig. 6.1 U.S. military aid to Israel over decades (Sharp, “U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel,” 7) (Source CRS Graphics) ...... 173 Fig. 7.1 Heuristic for Threat Assessment Privileging Identity (Rousseau and Garcia-Retamero, “Identity, Power and Threat Perception,” 760) ...... 218 Fig. 7.2 Heuristic for the Proliferation Response ...... 218

xxv List of Tables

Table 2.1 Nuclear weapons states, 1945–2019 ...... 34 Table 2.2 Defining Tenets of Neorealism and Foreign Policy Decision-Making ...... 58 Table 4.1 Total U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East, 1950–1970 (loans and grants; current year $ in millions)..... 127 Table 4.2 Total U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East, 1971–2001 (loans and grants; current year $ in millions)..... 130 Table 4.3 U.S. strategic nuclear forces under new START ...... 143 Table 5.1 Air Combat Capability ...... 161 Table 5.2 Fighter Generations ...... 163 Table 7.1 Heuristic Question Categories ...... 218 Table 7.2 The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation Theory vs The Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory—Threat Assessment Forecasts ...... 219 Table 7.3 The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation Theory—Threat Assessment Forecast—Iraq 1981 ...... 223 Table 7.4 The Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory—Threat Assessment Forecast—Israel and Iraq 1981 ...... 226 Table 7.5 The Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory— Proliferation Response Forecast—Israel and Iraq 1981...... 227 Table 7.6 The Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory—Threat Assessment Forecast—The United States and Iraq 1981 ..... 230 Table 7.7 The Differential Effect of Threat Perception Theory—Proliferation Response Forecast—The United States and Iraq 1981...... 232 Table 7.8 The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation Theory—Threat Assessment Forecast—Iraq 2003 ...... 236 Table 7.9 The Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory—Threat Assessment Forecast—Israel and Iraq 2003 ...... 239 Table 7.10 The Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory—Proliferation Response—Israel and Iraq 2003 ...... 240

xxvii xxviii List of Tables

Table 7.11 The Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory—Threat Assessment Forecast—The United States and Iraq 2003 ..... 247 Table 7.12 The Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory—Proliferation Response—The United States and Iraq 2003...... 249 Table 7.13 The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation Theory—Threat Assessment Forecast—Syria 2007 ...... 252 Table 7.14 The Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory—Threat Assessment Forecast—Israel and Syria 2007 ...... 256 Table 7.15 The Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory—Proliferation Response—Israel and Syria 2007 ..... 256 Table 7.16 The Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory—Threat Assessment Forecast—The United States and Syria 2007 .... 258 Table 7.17 The Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory—Proliferation Response—The United States and Syria 2007...... 260 Table 7.18 The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation Theory—Threat Assessment Forecast—Iran 2015 ...... 269 Table 7.19 The Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory—Threat Assessment Forecast—Iran 2015 ...... 272 Table 7.20 The Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory— Proliferation Response—The United States and Iran 2015 .... 274 Table 7.21 The Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory—Threat Assessment Forecast—The United States and Iran 2015 ..... 276 Table 7.22 The Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory— Proliferation Response—The United States and Iran 2015 .... 277 Table 7.23 Israel—Threat Perceptions of Nuclear Proliferation ...... 283 Table 7.24 The United States—Threat Perceptions of Nuclear Proliferation ...... 283 Table 7.25 The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation Theory (Kroenig)—Threat Assessment and Proliferation Response ... 284 Table 7.26 The Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory (Chappell)—Threat Assessment and Proliferation Response ...... 284 Table 7.27 The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation Theory vs The Differential Effects of Threat Perception – Actual Outcome Accuracy ...... 285 List of Maps

Map 1 The Middle East Map 2 The Islamic Republic of Iran Map 3 The Republic of Iraq Map 4 The State of Israel Map 5 The Syrian Arab Republic Map 6 The Golan Heights Map 7 Israeli Raid on Iraq’s Osirak Nuclear Reactor Map 8 Nuclear Facility Strikes Attributed to Israel Map 9 Previous Israeli Strikes and Iranian Nuclear Facilities Map 10 Iranian Ballistic Missile Ranges Map 11 Iran’s Major Nuclear Facilities Map 12 Selected Iranian Ballistic Missiles Map 13 Selected Iranian Partners, Proxies, and Affiliates

xxix Central Personalities

Egypt

Hassan al-Banna Founder of Muslim Brotherhood (Assassinated in 1949) Gamal Abdel Nasser President of Egypt, 1956–1970 Sayyid Qutb Islamic fundamentalist scholar (Executed in 1966) Anwar Sadat President of Egypt, 1970–1981 (Assassinated in 1981)

India

Homi J. Bhabha Father of India’s nuclear program

Iran

Fereydoon Abbasi Iranian nuclear scientist who survived an assassination Mojtaba Ahmadi IRGC cyberwarfare official (Assassinated in 2013) Mahmoud Ahmadinejad President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 2005–2013 Brig Gen Ali Reza Asgari IRGC general who allegedly defected to the West in 2006 Masoud Alimohammadi Iranian nuclear scientist (Assassinated in 2010) Shahram Amiri Nuclear scientist: defected/returned (Hanged in 2016) Akbar Etemad Father of Iran’s Nuclear Program

xxxi xxxii Central Personalities

Mohsen Fakhrizadeh Leader of Iran’s nuclear program (Assassinated in 2020) Brig Gen Esmail Ghaani Commander, IRGC-Quds Force, 2020-Present Ardeshir Hosseinpour Iranian nuclear scientist died of asphyxia (Died in 2007) Maj Gen Mohammed Ali Jafari Commander, IRGC (Retired in 2019) Mehdi Karroubi Reformist Presidential Candidate (House arrest in 2011) Ayatollah Ali Khamenei Supreme Leader of Iran, 1989-Present Mohammed Khatami President of Islamic Republic of Iran, 1997– 2005 Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini Supreme Leader of Iran, 1979–1989 Massoud Ali Mohammadi Iranian nuclear scientist (Assassinated in 2010) Brig Gen Hassan T. Moghaddam Head of Iran’s missile program (Assassinated in 2011) Hossein Ali Montazeri Grand Ayatollah; former designated successor to Khomeini Mohammed Mossadegh Prime Minister of Iran, 1951–1953 (Overthrown in 1953) Seyyed Mir Hossein Mousavi Prime Minister of Iran, 1981–1989 (House arrest in 2011) Masud Naraghi Nuclear scientist who defected to the United States Mohammed Reza Pahlavi Shah of Iran, 1941–1979 (Died in 1980) Reza Shah Pahlavi Shah of Iran, 1925–1941 (Died in 1944) Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1989–1997 Darioush Rezaeinejad Iranian nuclear physicist (Assassinated in 2011) Mostafa Ahmadi Roshan Iranian nuclear scientist (Assassinated in 2012) Hassan Rouhani President, Islamic Republic of Iran, 2013-Present Major General Hossein Salami Commander, IRGC, 2019-Present Ahmad Shah Final Ruler of the Qajar Dynasty, 1909–1925 Majid Shahriari Iranian nuclear scientist (Assassinated in 2010) Major General Qassem Soleimani Commander, IRGC-Quds Force (Killed in 2020) Central Personalities xxxiii

Iraq

Faisal I King of Iraq, 1921–1933 Faisal II King of Iraq, 1939–1958 (Executed in 1958) Ghazi I King of Iraq, 1933–1939 (Killed in 1939) Saddam Hussein President of Iraq, 1979–2003 (Executed in 2006) Jafar Dhia Jafar Father of Iraq’s nuclear program; Nuclear physicist Yahya al-Meshad Iraqi nuclear scientist (Assassinated in 1980)

Israel

Ehud Barak Prime Minister of Israel, 1999–2001 Menachem Begin Prime Minister of Israel, 1977–1983 David Ben-Gurion Prime Minister of Israel, 1948–1954 Ernst David Bergmann Father of Israel’s nuclear program Meir Dagan Director of Mossad, 2002–2010 Golda Meir Prime Minister of Israel, 1969–1974 Benjamin Netanyahu Prime Minister of Israel, 1996–1999, 2009-Present Ehud Olmert Prime Minister of Israel, 2006–2009 Shimon Peres Prime Minister of Israel, 1995–1996 Tamir Pardo Director of Mossad, 2011–2016 Yitzhak Rabin Prime Minister of Israel, 1992–1995 (Assassinated in 1995) Ariel Sharon Prime Minister of Israel, 2001–2006

Lebanon

Bashir Gemayel President-elect of Lebanon (Assassinated in 1982) Imad Mughniyeh Hezbollah senior commander (Assassinated in 2008) Hassan Nasrallah Secretary General of Hezbollah, 1992-Present

Libya

Moammar Qaddafi Leader of Libya, 1969–2011 (Executed in 2011) xxxiv Central Personalities

Non-state Actors

Al Qaeda Global terrorist network that conducted the September 11th attacks Hezbollah Iran-supported armed militia based in Lebanon Mujahedeen-e Khalq (MEK) Anti-Iran group; the United States designated it a terror group until 2012 Osama bin Laden Leader of Al-Qaeda, 1988–2011 (Killed in 2011) Ayman al-Zawahiri Leader of Al-Qaeda, 2011-Present

North Korea

Kim ll-sung Supreme Leader of North Korea, 1948–1994 Kim Jong-il Supreme Leader of North Korea, 1994–2011 Kim Jong-un Supreme Leader of North Korea, 2011-Present Do Sang-rok Father of North Korea’s Nuclear Bomb

Pakistan

Qamar Javed Bajwa Chief of Army Staff (COAS), 2016-Present Benazir Bhutto Prime Minister of Pakistan (Assassinated in 2007) Zulfikar Ali Bhutto Prime Minister of Pakistan (Hanged in 1979) Abdul Qadeer (A.Q.) Khan Head of a nuclear technology black market ring

Palestine

Mahmoud Abbas President of Palestinian National Authority, 2005-Present Yasser Arafat President of Palestinian National Authority, 1994–2004

Saudi Arabia

Salman bin Abdul Aziz King of Saudi Arabia, 2015-Present Mohammed bin Nayef Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, 2015–2017 Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, 2017-Present Central Personalities xxxv

Syria

Bashar al-Assad President of Syria, 2000-Present Hafez al-Assad President of Syria, 1971–2000

The United States

Joe Biden Vice President of the United States, 2008–2016 George H.W. Bush President of the United States, 1988–1992 George W. Bush President of the United States, 2000–2008 Richard “Dick” Cheney Vice President of the United States, 2000–2008 Hillary Rodham Clinton Secretary of State, 2009–2013 William Jefferson Clinton President of the United States, 1992–2000 Robert Gates Secretary of Defense, 2006–2011 General Curtis LeMay Commander, Strategic Air Command, 1948–1957 Barack Hussein Obama President of the United States, 2008–2016 J. Robert Oppenheimer Father of the Atomic Bomb, Director of the Manhattan Project Colin L. Powell Chairman, JCS, 1989–1993; Secretary of State, 2000– 2004 Ronald Reagan President of the United States, 1980–1988 Condoleeza “Condi” Rice APNSA, 2001–2005; Secretary of State, 2005–2008 Susan E. Rice US Ambassador to the UN, 2009–2013; APNSA 2013–2017 Donald Rumsfeld Secretary of Defense, 1975–1977, 2000–2006 Caspar “Cap” Weinberger Secretary of Defense, 1981–1987 Paul Wolfowitz Deputy Secretary of Defense, 2001–2005 Map 1 The Middle East (Source: Central Intelligence Agency2)

2https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/attachments/docs/original/ middle_east_phy.pdf?1555349777.