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The Assassination of Fakhrizadeh—A Major Iranian Counterintelligence Failure?

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The Assassination of Fakhrizadeh—A Major Iranian Counterintelligence Failure? Global Security and Intelligence Studies • Volume 6, Number 1 • Spring / Summer 2021 The Assassination of Fakhrizadeh—A Major Iranian Counterintelligence Failure? Ardavan Khoshnood Summary: The assassination of Iranian top nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh is one of numerous assassinations in Iran conducted by foreign powers ever since 2007. In the past six months, assas- sins have in addition to Fakhrizadeh also been able to kill Al-Qaida’s no. 2 on Iranian soil. The three most important organizations in the Iranian intelligence community are the Ministry of Intelligence, as well as the Intelligence Organization and Intelligence Protection Organization of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. There is no doubt that the assassination of Fakhrizadeh is a counterintelligence failure; however, there are indications that the Iranian intelligence community have been compromised. The assassins of Fakhrizadeh had accurate information about Fakhrizadeh and his security details. Because of this breach, Iran will conduct serious reforms in its intel- ligence community and may also eliminate individuals it suspects work on behalf of foreign powers and may have leaked information. he recent assassination of Iranian the Tehran province. Have the Iranian nuclear scientist and high-pro- intelligence community been compro- filed member of the Islamic Rev- mised? Tolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Brig- adier General Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, A Review of Targeted Attacks is yet a sign of the Islamic republic of Iran’s poor counterintelligence. Since Ardeshir Hosseinpour the beginning of 2007, Iran has wit- (January 15, 2007) nessed seven targeted killings and one Born in 1962, Hosseinpour was a nu- attempted assassination in the country. clear physicist. He was found dead on Seven of these attacks have targeted Ira- January 15, 2007, in his house. Author- nian nuclear scientists, while one was ities stated that his death was because directed against a leader of Al-Qaida. of “gassing” as a result of a “defect in Only in the past six months, one Al-Qa- the heating system” of his residence ida leader and one high-profiled nucle- (Kayhan 2007). On November 30, ar scientist have been assassinated in 2020, Mostafa Moein, former Minister 199 doi: 10.18278/gsis.6.1.9 Global Security and Intelligence Studies of Science, revealed on his Instagram Energy Organization of Iran. He is cur- page that Hosseinpour was assassinat- rently a member of the Iranian parlia- ed by Mossad using radioactive gas ment. On the morning of November (Haghighatnejad 2020). 29, 2010, Abbasi was driving his car with his spouse in the passenger seat, Masoud Alimohammadi when a motorcyclist planted a bomb (January 12, 2010) on the door (Asr-e Iran 2011a). Abba- Born in 1959, Alimohammadi was a si stopped the car, and both he and his physics professor. In the early morning wife fled the car as the bomb detonated, of January 12, 2010, as he was leaving only injuring the couple. Iran blamed his residence, a motorcycle equipped Mossad (Sanger & Broad 2011). with a remote-controlled bomb ex- ploded and fatally injured him (Java- Dariush Rezaeinejad nan Online 2010). In December 2010, (July 23, 2011) the Ministry of Intelligence announced Born in 1977, Rezaeinejad was an elec- that it had arrested the perpetrator, one trical engineer who cooperated with Majid Jamali Fashi, 24-years old. He the Ministry of Defense (BBC 2011). “confessed” on television working for Rezaeinejad was assassinated on the Mossad, and was hanged for the crime, evening of July 23, 2011. He was sitting in May 2012. in his car, outside of his house, together with his wife and their daughter, when Majid Shahriari two motorcyclists started shooting (November 29, 2010) (Asr-e Iran 2011b). Five bullets were Born in 1966, Shahriari was a nuclear fired, of which one fatally injured him. scientist and employee of the Atomic His wife was injured, but survived. Ira- Energy Organization of Iran. On the nian officials blamed Israeli Mossad for morning of November 29, 2010, he and the assassination (Putz 2011). his wife were picked up by their driv- er. A motorcyclist drove close to the Mostafa Ahmadi Roshan car and planted a bomb which detonat- (January 11, 2012) ed, killing Shahriari (Mashregh News Born in 1979, Ahmadi Roshan was a 2020a). The Ministry of Intelligence nuclear scientist and worked as “com- arrested Maziar Ebrahimi, who, under merce deputy of the Natanz nuclear heavy torture, “confessed” on television power plant” (Tabnak 2018). On the to the assassination (Gol 2019). He was morning of January 11, 2012, he was later proved innocent and freed (Tab- picked up by his driver, and while driv- nak 2019). ing on the streets of Tehran, a motor- cyclist planted a bomb on Ahmadi Ro- Fereydoon Abbasi shan’s car door, which detonated and (November 29, 2010) killed him. Iran, via its Supreme Leader, Born in 1958, Abbasi is a nuclear phys- Ali Khamenei, blamed both the CIA icist who previously headed the Atomic and the Mossad (The Times 2012). 200 The Assassination of Fakhrizadeh—A Major Iranian Counterintelligence Failure? Abu Muhammad Al-Masri intelligence protection, it is believed (August 7, 2020) that it has also intelligence protection Born in 1963, Abdullah Ahmad Abdul- units inside its different departments lah, better known as Abu Muhammad as well. The IRGC has—parallel to the Al-Masri, was Al-Qaida’s number 2. IO-IRGC—the Intelligence Protection He lived in a prosperous area of Tehran Organization of the Islamic Revolu- with his family. On the August 7, 2020, tionary Guard Corps (IPO-IRGC). The Al-Masri and his daughter Maryam IPO-IRGC became independent from were gunned down by two men on the IO-IRGC in the mid-1980s as Iran a motorcycle (Goldman et al. 2020). understood the importance of counter- Al-Masri and Maryam were sitting in intelligence and started to invest in that a car outside of their residence. Iran discipline. Since then, the two organi- claimed that the killed man was a Leba- zations work closely together but fully nese history professor (Mashregh News independently from each other. 2020b). The incumbent head of the MOI Mohsen Fakhrizadeh is the clergyman Mahmoud Alavi. The (November 27, 2020) IO-IRGC is since more than a decade, also headed by a clergyman, Hossein Born in 1958, Fakhrizadeh, a nuclear Taeb. The IPO-IRGC is currently head- scientist, and a high-ranking member ed by Brigadier General Mohammad of the IRGC, was considered to be the Kazemi. The Minister of Intelligence architecture of the Islamic regime’s nu- is selected by the president but must clear program. At the time of his assas- be approved by the Supreme Leader of sination, he headed the Organization the Islamic Republic, Ali Khamenei. of Defensive Innovation and Research. The heads of the IO-IRGC and IPO- The details of his assassination are still IRGC, however, are directly appointed unknown, but he was gunned down on by Khamenei himself. While the IO- November 27, 2020, as he drove—well IRGC gathers both domestic and for- guarded—in the city of Absard. Iran in- eign intelligence, the IPO-IRGC is fore- stantly blamed Israel (Zarif 2020). most responsible for counterespionage, counterterrorism, and safeguarding the Iranian Counterintelligence IRGC from penetration (Khoshnood 2020a, 7). ounterintelligence in Iran, for unknown reasons, is called In- In an attempt to coordinate the telligence Protection. The two Iranian intelligence and security appa- Cmain intelligence and security organi- ratus, the Islamic regime created the zations in Iran, are the Ministry of Intel- “Council for Intelligence Coordination” ligence (MOI) as well as the Intelligence on 29 October 2013 (Mousavi 2018). Organization of the Islamic Revolution- The council is headed by the Minister ary Guard Corps (IO-IRGC). While of Intelligence and engulfs nine in- the MOI has a central department of telligence and security organizations, 201 Global Security and Intelligence Studies among them the MOI, the IO-IRGC, including those provided to the PR- and the IPO-IRGC. The fact that the IRGC. IPO-IRGC is presented as an indepen- With so many assassinations and dent organization parallel to MOI and assassination attempts in Iran since IO-IRGC, illuminates its important role 2007 against high-profile individuals of in the Iranian intelligence community. the regime, there is no doubt that Iran The current Chief Justice of has suffered numerous counterintelli- Iran, Ebrahim Rayisi, recently visited gence failures (Khoshnood 2020b). In the headquarter of the IPO-IRGC and assassinating the aforementioned indi- stated that even though the IRGC as a viduals, several clandestine teams have whole have been of utmost importance over a period of time been able to freely for the strength of the Islamic Republic follow, map, and organize their attacks in Iran, the role of the IPO-IRGC has without the regime’s intelligence orga- been far more important and sensitive nizations being able to reveal the plans (Mashregh News 2020c). or even stop them. Not even when the assassinations started and the regime’s Interestingly, neither the MOI, intelligence community became aware nor the IO-IRGC or the IPO-IRGC, are of the threats could they take the nec- responsible for the executive protection essary measures to protect their assets. of high-ranking officials of the Islamic Thirteen years after the first assassina- regime. It is instead a third organiza- tion, when Ardeshir Hosseinpour was tion inside the IRGC, the Protection killed, opponents of the Islamic regime Organization (PR-IRGC), which is re- were able to not only assassinate Al-Qa- sponsible for this task. The PR-IRGC ida’s number 2 in Iran, but also Iran’s has a three-folded responsibility: (1) most important and valued nuclear sci- protection of the country’s airports entist (Khoshnood 2020c).
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