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Electoral Security Framework Technical Guidance Handbook for Democracy and Governance Officers

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Electoral Security Framework Technical Guidance Handbook for Democracy and Governance Officers ELECTORAL SECURITY FRAMEWORK TECHNICAL GUIDANCE HANDBOOK FOR DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE OFFICERS JULY 2010 This report was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by Creative Associates International, Inc.The author’s views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) or the United States Government. TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ......................................................................................................................................................1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................................................................2 Electoral Security Assessment ...............................................................................................................................................................................................3 Electoral Security Planning ......................................................................................................................................................................................................3 Electoral Security Programming ...........................................................................................................................................................................................3 Monitoring and Evaluation ......................................................................................................................................................................................................4 INTRODUCTORY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS .................................................................................................................5 Electoral Security and Targets ................................................................................................................................................................................................5 Electoral Conflict and Violence .............................................................................................................................................................................................6 Electoral Justice ..............................................................................................................................................................................................................................6 Other Terms and Definitions .................................................................................................................................................................................................7 ELECTORAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT .............................................................................................................................8 Contextual Analysis .....................................................................................................................................................................................................................8 Historical Conflict Factors .................................................................................................................................................................................................... 13 Stakeholder Analysis................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 14 ELECTORAL SECURITY SYSTEM PROGRAM PLANNING ..........................................................................................18 Introduction to Planning........................................................................................................................................................................................................ 18 The International Community ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 19 Local Change Agents ............................................................................................................................................................................................................... 19 Coordination................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 22 USAID Interests and Constraints ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 23 ELECTORAL SECURITY SYSTEM PROGRAMMING ......................................................................................................24 State Electoral Security Stakeholders ............................................................................................................................................................................ 24 Non-state Electoral Security Stakeholders ................................................................................................................................................................. 28 MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E) ......................................................................................................................32 Introduction to Monitoring and Evaluation ................................................................................................................................................................ 32 Building a Performance Monitoring Plan (PMP) ...................................................................................................................................................... 32 Challenges of M&E in Insecure Environments .......................................................................................................................................................... 34 Good Practices for conducting M&E in Insecure Environments .................................................................................................................... 35 ELECTORAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT TOOLKIT .........................................................................................................36 Purpose ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 36 Electoral Security Framework Toolkit ............................................................................................................................................................................ 37 FOOTER TEXT ELECTORAL SECURITY FRAMEWORK i TABLES AND FIGURES TABLE 1 – ELECTORAL SECURITY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS ..................................................................................7 TABLE 2 – ELECTORAL INCIDENT CODING .................................................................................................................14 TABLE 3 – ELECTORAL THREATS AND TACTICS BY PHASE .....................................................................................15 TABLE 4 – STATE STAKEHOLDERS ..................................................................................................................................16 TABLE 5 –NON-STATE STAKEHOLDERS ........................................................................................................................17 TABLE 6 –ELECTORAL INTERVENTION MODELS FOR ELECTION SECURITY PLANNING ..............................20 TABLE 7 –ELECTORAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISMS ...............................................................................27 TABLE 8– MONITORING AND EVALUATION TERMINOLOGY ..................................................................................33 TABLE 9– STATE ELECTORAL SECURITY MATRIX ......................................................................................................39 TABLE 10– ELECTORAL SECURITY PROGRAM MATRIXES ........................................................................................48 FIGURE 1 – ELECTORAL SECURITY FRAMEWORK SNAPSHOT ...............................................................................10 FIGURE 2 – ELECTORAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION COORDINATION ............................................................25 ANNEXES ANNEX I –TOOLKIT WORKSHEETS ................................................................................................................................51 ANNEX II – ACRONYMS .....................................................................................................................................................55 ANNEX III – SOURCES........................................................................................................................................................57 ANNEX IV - END NOTES ....................................................................................................................................................59 ii UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The Electoral Security Framework was written by Creative Associates International, Inc. (Creative) under funding from the United States Agency for
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