TITLE : THE AMBIGUITY of NATIVE (RODNOI) LANGUAGE and th e DEGREE of RUSSIFICATION in TATARSTA N AUTHOR: JERRY F. HOUGH . Duke University THE NATIONAL COUNCI L FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEA N RESEARC H TITLE VIII PROGRA M 1755 Massachusetts Avenue, N .W . Washington, D .C . 20036 PROJECT INFORMATION : 1 CONTRACTOR : Duke University PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR : Jerry F. Houg h COUNCIL CONTRACT NUMBER : 806-24 DATE : May 21 , 199 6 COPYRIGHT INFORMATIO N Individual researchers retain the copyright on work products derived from research funded b y Council Contract . The Council and the U.S. Government have the right to duplicate written reports and other materials submitted under Council Contract and to distribute such copies within th e Council and U.S. Government for their own use, and to draw upon such reports and materials for their own studies; but the Council and U.S. Government do not have the right to distribute, o r make such reports and materials available, outside the Council or U.S. Government without th e written consent of the authors, except as may be required under the provisions of the Freedom o f Information Act 5 U.S.C. 552, or other applicable law . The work leading to this report was. supported in part by contract funds provided by the Nationa l Council for Soviet and East European Research, made available by the U . S. Department of State under Title VIII (the Soviet-Eastern European Research and Training Act of 1983, as amended) . The analysis an d interpretations contained in the report are those of the author(s) . THE AMBIGUITY OF NATIVE (RODNOI) LANGUAGE AN D THE DEGREE OF RUSSIFICATION IN TATARSTA N Jerry F. Hough Summary In the past the West had only census data to assess degrees of Russification among non - Russian nationalities . Scholars noted that the Moslem and Buddhist peoples of Russia wer e resisting assimilation very strongly, if we judge by the percentage - retaining the titular language as their rodnoi (native) language . Now, however, we can ask these questions in public opinio n polls . and a study conduced by the author and David Laitin explored language use in grea t detail in Bashkortostan, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Tatarstan, and Ukraine . In addition. four language questions were included on a 1993 election study in which 1000 respondents wer e interviewed in each of the 16 former autonomous republics . The results are striking . The category of rodnoi language turns out to have a very uneve n relationship to Russification . Large numbers of people who claim the titular language as their rodnoi turn out to have been raised in homes in which Russian was the first language, and the y now speak Russian with their mother and father . Chechenia and Tuva--and, basically Dagesta n and Kabarda--have been very slow to Russify, but this is not true of other groups . includin g Tatars and Bashkirs . 3 .3 percent of Tatars claim Russian as rodnoi language in the census . Among those Tatars in Tatarstan who claim Tatar as their rodnoi language in our survey, 15 percent spea k Russian with their parents, 31 percent with their spouse, and 34 percent with their oldest child . 4 .6 percent of Bashkirs claim Russian as rodnoi language in the census . Among those Bashkirs in Bashkortostan who claim Bashkir as their rodnoi language, 13 percent spea k Russian with their parents, 24 percent with their spouse . and 36 percent with their oldest child . The paper focuses on Tatarstan where 42 language questions were asked a sample o f nearly 1500 urban Tatars . half of them under 25 in age . The paper shows that assimilation i s strongly correlated with age, and that of Tatars 18-25 who list Tatar as their rodnoi language , 27 percent speak Tatar better than Russian . 24 percent speak them equally, and 49 spea k Russian better. 27 percent of young urban Tatars who claim Tatar as rodnoi language say they speak it with difficulty, 7 percent with great difficulty, and 2 percent not at all . Language use ranges greatly, with high percentages speaking Tatar with grandparents . and a minority to best friend . The paper first demonstrates that language use must be understood in very sophisticate d terms . Second, it suggests, as does Susan Goodrich Lehmann's work on religion using th e same data set, that we must be very, very careful in assuming that the attitudes of Moslems o f the local nationality in Chechenia are similar to those in Bashkortostan and Tatarstan . for language use, like religion, correlates with nationalism . The Ambiguity of Natiye (Rodnoi) Language an d the Degree of Russification in Tatarsta n The war in Chechenia is very small and remote and, as such, does not raise that much o f a threat to Russia, whatever the outcome . The real question about Chechenia is whether th e revolt within it will remain isolated . Several decades ago John Armstrong and his student . Brian Silver, emphasized that the Moslem peoples in the Soviet Union seemed to behav e differently . Silver looked at census data to show that Moslems were not assimilating to th e Russian language nearly as rapidly as non-Russians who had converted to the Orthodo x religion . From this perspective, the situation in the large Moslem republics on the Volga , Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, look particularly dangerous . As Table 1 indicates, they have 7 . 5 million people together . Like Estonia and Latvia, they have enough Russians to worry abou t being swamped, but, unlike Estonia and Latvia, they are located in the center of Russia . and Russians would think very differently about losing them than about the Baltic states o r Chechenia . Furthermore, Table 1, drawn from the 1989 census . shows the same relationshi p between language assimilation and religion that Silver discussed in the past . Table 1--The Ethnic Composition of the Populatio n in the Autonomous Republics of the RSFSR, 1989 , By Religion of the Titular Population (In percentages ) Auton Total Percent Percent Percent Republic Population Russian Titular Titula r Populat Populat Popula t with Rus s Nat Lang . 1) Titular Nationalities Who Traditionally Accepted Russia n Orthodox y Chuvashia 1,338,000 26 .7% 67 .8% 15 .O % Karelia 790,000 73 .6% 10 .0% 48 .3 % Komi 1,251,000 57 .7% 23 .3% 25 .6 % Mari 749,000 47 .5% 43 .3% 11 .6 % Mordovia 964,000 60 .8% 32 .5% 11 .5 % N Osetia 632,000 29 .9% 53 .O% 1 .8 % Udmurtia 1,606,000 58 .9% 30 .9% 24 .3 % Yakutia 1,094,000 50 .4% 33 .4% 4 .9 % 2) Titular Nationalities Who Traditionally Accepted Isla m Bashkiria 3,943,000 39 .3% 21 .9% 4 .6 % Ch-Ing 1,270,000 23 .1% 70 .7% 0 .2 % Dagestan 1,802,000 9 .2% 80 .2% 0 .8 % Kab-Balk 754,000 31 .9% 57 .6% 1 .1 % Tataria 3,642,000 43 .3% 48 .5% 3 .3% 1 3) Titular Nationalities Who Traditionally Accepted Buddhis m Buriatia 1,038,000 69 .9% 24 .0% 10 .6 % Kalmykia 323,000 37 .7% 45 .4% 3 .9 % Tuva 309,000 32 .0% 64 .3% O .9% ---------------------------------------------------------------- - Source : Natsional'nyi sostav naseleniia SSSR : Po dannykh vsevoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1989 g . (Moscow : Finansy i statistika, 1991), pp . 34-41 . ----------------------------------------------------------------- A huge survey conducted at the time of the 1993 election study included not only a 4000 - respondent national sample, but 1000-respondent surveys in each of 51 oblasts and forme r autonomous republics .' One was done in each of 16 former autonomous republics of Russia . When Susan Goodrich Lehmann looked at the questions on religion in this survey, she found a pronounced difference in religious belief and practice in Chechenia (and Dagestan) compare d with the other Moslem republics . The people in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan were much mor e secularized, particularly younger people in the cities . yazykThe same survey included a number of questions on language use--not only rodno i (the key question on the census), but also the language spoken with father, mother, spouse, an d first child. When this data is analyzed . it shows that the census category "rodnoi yazyk" i s extremely unreliable and clearly is used in different ways in different republics . Table 2 would, in fact, have predicted that the Chechens were the most dangerous of th e non-Russian peoples in Russia, but in a number of other cases--including Bashkortostan an d Tatarstan--the official native language (rodnoi yazyk) figures could suggest a far greate r resistance to Russification than is actually occurring . Lehmann's work on secularization amon g the Bashkirs and Tatars point in the same direction as the language data . 1The survey was funded by the MacArthur Foundation, the Carnegie Foundation . the Brookings Institution, and the National Science Foundation (SBR-94-02548 and SBR-94 - 12051) . 2 Table 2--Use of Russian by Titular Nationalit y Russian Republics, December 199 3 %Titular Popula t Percent Who Speak Russian wit h Republics whose rodno i language is Rus s Father Mother Spouse Oldest (1989 Census) Child Chechenia 0 .2% 1% 1% 2% 2 % Dagestan 0 .8% 6% - 7% 8% 12 % Tuva 0 .9% 3% 3% 5% 8 % Kabarda 1 .1% 6% 7% 11% 10 % North Osetia 1 .8% 14% 18% 23% 28 % Tatarstan 3 .3% 15% 15% 31% 34 % Kalmykia 3 .9% 49% 52% 58% 58 % Bashkortostan 4 .6% 14% 12% 24% 36 % Yakutia 4 .9% 9% 10% 11% 14 % Buriatia 10 .6% 22% 25% 32% 41% Mordovia 11 .5% 18% 20% 46% 54 % Mary 11 .6% 22% 22% 31% 47 % Chuvashia 15 .O% 15% 14% 22% 43 % Udmurtia 24 .3% 28% 28% 41% 66 % Komi 25 .6% 32% 29% 56% 65 % Karela 48 .3% 36% 33% 57% 63% As part of a study of language use in Bashkortostan, Estonia, Kazakhsta n, Latvia, Tatarstan .