Non-Signatories
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NON-SIGNATORIES AFGHANISTAN Key developments since May 2001: Afghanistan has experienced dramatic political, military, and humanitarian changes. The cabinet approved Afghanistan’s accession to the Mine Ban Treaty on 29 July 2002 and the following day the Minister of Foreign Affairs signed the instrument of accession on behalf of the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan. Mine action operations were virtually brought to a halt following 11 September 2001. The mine action infrastructure suffered greatly during the subsequent military conflict, as some warring factions looted offices, seized vehicles and equipment, and assaulted local staff. Four deminers and two mine detection dogs were killed in errant U.S. air strikes. Military operations created additional threats to the population, especially unexploded U.S. cluster bomblets and ammunition scattered from storage depots hit by air strikes, as well as newly laid mines and booby-traps by Northern Alliance, Taliban, and Al-Qaeda fighters. A funding shortfall for the mine action program in Afghanistan prior to 11 September 2001 had threatened to again curtail mine action operations. But since October 2001, about $64 million has been pledged to mine action in Afghanistan. By March 2002, mine clearance, mine survey, and mine risk education operations had returned to earlier levels, and have since expanded beyond 2001 levels. In 2001, mine action NGOs surveyed approximately 14.7 million square meters of mined areas and 80.8 million square meters of former battlefield area, and cleared nearly 15.6 million square meters of mined area and 81.2 million square meters of former battlefields. Nearly 730,000 civilians received mine risk education. A total of 16,147 antipersonnel mines, 1,154 antivehicle mines, and 328,398 UXO were destroyed. In all of these activities, 95 to 99 percent of the actions were completed prior to 11 September 2001. The ICRC recorded 1,368 new landmine and UXO casualties in Afghanistan in 2001, but that number is not comprehensive. Background Mine action activity in Afghanistan was suspended after it became clear that a military response in Afghanistan would follow the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States. International and local NGO staff was evacuated, although some local staff voluntarily remained behind to handle emergencies. The training of deminers was suspended, due to fears that their training camps would be mistaken as terrorist camps.1 The cessation of mine action came as many civilians fled cities for rural areas, crossing mined areas in the process, due to the threat and the eventual reality air strikes. Both the Program Manager of the UN Mine Action Program for Afghanistan (MAPA) and the head of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) mine risk education unit considered population movements as increasing the risk of casualties from mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO).2 As international and local staff departed, the Taliban and other warring factions raided a number of UN and mine action NGO offices. They seized buildings, vehicles, and equipment, and assaulted local staff. The Kandahar offices of MAPA and several other local mine action organizations were repeatedly attacked and occupied by Taliban forces between the end of September and the middle of October.3 Mine action NGOs were also assaulted in Kabul and 1 Matthew Fisher, “War Stymies Mine Work,” Ottawa Sun, 11 October 2001. 2 “Afghanistan: Concern About Growing Mine Threat,” ICRC Press Release, Geneva, 4 October 2001; Paul Watson, “A Hidden Enemy Lies in Wait on Afghan Soil,” Los Angeles Times, 27 September 2001. 3 Statements by Stephanie Bunker, spokesperson for the UN Humanitarian Coordinator in Afghanistan, during a press briefing by the UN Offices for Pakistan and Afghanistan, Islamabad, 25 September 2001 and 3 October 2001. 588 Non-Signatories 589 Jalalabad during the same period.4 The HALO Trust (HALO) office in Puli-Khumri in Baglan province was occupied by elements of the Taliban on 28 September 2001.5 By 20 October 2001, MAPA estimated it had lost 80 vehicles to the Taliban, as well as millions of dollars in equipment.6 Beginning on 7 October 2001, mine action personnel and facilities were also affected by coalition air strikes. On 9 October 2001, bombs struck the Afghan Technical Consultants (ATC) office in Kabul. Four local staff members were killed and four more injured. The building was destroyed, along with two vehicles and two electrical generators.7 On 25 October 2001, a bomb hit the mine detection dog training center near Kabul. Two dogs were killed, two vehicles destroyed, and a number of buildings damaged.8 The Demining Agency for Afghanistan (DAFA) headquarters site was also hit by air strikes, destroying many of their vehicles, mechanical equipment, and other stores. Weapons used in the air strikes but not previously encountered in Afghanistan posed new dangers, both to civilians and mine action personnel. One particularly deadly unexploded munition was the BLU-97 bomblet, which was dispensed from the U.S. CBU-87 and CBU-103 cluster bombs. Afghan deminers had no operational experience or training in clearing these devices.9 Furthermore, MAPA reported an increased UXO threat due to bombing of ammunition storage locations, which spread UXO over a large radius sometimes reaching five kilometers.10 On 24 October 2001, MAPA asked the United States to provide information on locations of munitions deployed and at the end of October moved 4,000 deminers out of the country for training on cluster bomb disposal.11 Key training staff also visited the Kosovo Mine Action Coordination Center to gather lessons learned and to develop and appropriate training plan. On 3 November 2001, MAPA announced plans to hold training sessions in Quetta, Pakistan in mid-November for 1,000 staff and mine clearance trainers, and 3,000 staff in Peshawar, Pakistan.12 On 28 November 2001, the U.S. State Department announced it would spend an additional $7 million to help demine Afghanistan, including funds to train Afghan deminers how to clear cluster bombs.13 According to the Program Manager of the UN Mine Action Center for Afghanistan (MACA), the U.S. was cooperative in providing information about coalition cluster bomb strikes, providing map coordinates of cluster bomb strikes to the UN, the Danish Demining Group (DDG), and HALO.14 Specialists from MACA were also deployed on 7 December 2001 in Herat to help train local mine action staff to deal with the new ordnance dropped by coalition strikes.15 In co-ordination with the MAPA, DDG established new drills, techniques, and procedures to enable the teams to deal with the unknown ordnance in Afghanistan. At the beginning of December 2001 a joint Afghan 4 Statement by Stephanie Bunker, UN Spokesperson, Islamabad, 11 October 2001. 5 Statement by Stephanie Bunker, UN Spokesperson, Islamabad, 3 October 2001. 6 Statement by Stephanie Bunker, UN Spokesperson, Islamabad, 25 September 2001; Statement by Antonio Donini, Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator for Afghanistan, during a press briefing by the UN Offices for Pakistan and Afghanistan, Islamabad, 20 October 2001. 7 Statement by Stephanie Bunker, UN Spokesperson, Islamabad, 9 October 2001. 8 Statement by Stephanie Bunker, UN Spokesperson, Islamabad, 27 October 2001. 9 Statement by Dan Kelly, Program Manager, UN Mine Action Center for Afghanistan, during a press briefing by the UN Offices for Pakistan and Afghanistan, Islamabad, 24 October 2001. 10 Statement by Dan Kelly, Program Manager of UNMACA for Afghanistan, Islamabad, 3 November 2001; Philip Patterson, “Presentation by the MAPA,” to the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Awareness and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 30 January 2002. 11 Stephen Farrell, “Cluster Bombs are New Danger to Mine Clearers,” London Times, 26 October 2001. 12 Statement by Dan Kelly, Program Manager, UNMACA, Islamabad, 3 November 2001. 13 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Office of Humanitarian Demining Programs, “The U.S. Humanitarian Demining Program in Afghanistan,” 1 December 2001. 14 Statement by Dan Kelly, Program Manager, UNMACA, Islamabad, 9 November 2001; HALO press release, “Humanitarian Mine Clearance Resumes in Afghanistan,” 19 November 2001; Danish Demining Group (DDG) email to Landmine Monitor (NPA), 29 July 2002. 15 Statement by Antonio Donini, Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator for Afghanistan, Islamabad, 7 December 2001. 590 Landmine Monitor Report 2002 Technical Consultants (ATC) and DDG course about new munitions used by the coalition forces was conducted for field staff.16 Three days after the Taliban left Kabul, HALO had survey teams on the ground conducting an urgent assessment of the mine and UXO threat along former Northern Alliance/ Taliban fronts. HALO began survey work in the north a week later.17 At the end of November 2001, some mine clearance teams resumed work. MAPA activated mine clearance and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams in Kabul. HALO resumed work around Bagram, clearing mines and UXO in preparation for area residents to return home to the Shomali plain area.18 DDG EOD teams were on call for emergency clearance from 20 November 2001. DDG teams assisted in a number of EOD tasks in and around Kabul, clearing unexploded Coalition ordnance at Wazir Akber Khan and Maidan Shahr main road.19 Additional clearance teams began to clear 500-2,000 pound unexploded aircraft bombs in and around Kabul, including three at the airport.20 DDG resumed operations around Kabul and was given