Job Name:2176826 Date:15-03-04 PDF Page:2176826pbc.p1.pdf Color: Cyan Magenta Yellow Black TheSoviei IDterveDtioa iD AfghanistaD

Alfred L.lIonks

American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research Washington and London Distributed to the Trade by National Book Network, 15200 NBN Way, Blue Ridge Summit, PA 17214. To order call toll free 1-800-462-6420 or 1-717-794-3800. For all other inquiries please contact the AEI Press, 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 or call 1-800-862-5801.

Alfred L. Monks is associate professor of political science at the University of Wyoming.

ISBN 0-8447-3431-4

Library of Congress Catalog Card No. 81-65770

AEI Studies 314

© 1981 by the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C., and London. All rights reserved. No part of this publi­ cation may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without per­ mission in writing from the American Enterprise Institute except in the case of brief quotations embodied in news articles, critical articles, or reviews. The views expressed in the publications of the American Enterprise Institute are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the staff, advisory panels, officers, or trustees of AEI.

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Printed in the United States of America Contents

1 INTRODUCTION 1

2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 2 SOVIET MOTIVES FOR THE INTERVENTION IN 3 AFGHANISTAN 18 Soviet Security 20 Hard-line Elements in the Ascendancy within Soviet Decision-Making Circles 22 Hafizullah Amin and the Political Situation in Afghanistan 26 The Soviets and the Regional Balance in Southwest Asia 28

CONSEQUENCES OF THE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN 4 AFGHANISTAN 31

5 SOVIET OPTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN 35 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MILITARY DOCTRINE AND 6 THE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN 40

7 POLICY OPTIONS FOR THE WEST 49

8 POLICY SUGGESTIONS FOR THE WEST 52

9 CONCLUSION 58 AFGHANISTAN AND NEIGHBORING REGIONS

SOURCE: Adapted from "Russian Advances in Central Asia," Louis Dupree, Afghanistan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), p. 324, and "Afghanistan," Ludwig Adamec, Afghanistan's Foreign Relations to the Mid-Twentieth Century (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1974), p. x. 1 Introduction

A complete analysis of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in late 1979 must wait until enough time passes for that event to be eval­ uated in terms of long-range Soviet military and political objectives. Meanwhile, we may trace the history of Russian/Soviet-Afghan re­ lations, we may consider why the U.S.S.R. acted as it did, and we may discuss the intervention as it relates to wider considerations of global policies and of Soviet military doctrine. The following ques­ tions will be examined in this study: (1) Do Russian and Soviet history offer evidence to support the notion that tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union intended to employ Afghanistan as an instrument to further Russian/Soviet goals? (2) Why did the Soviet Union invade another country at a time so politically and diplomatically unpropi­ tious? (3) What are the consequences-both international and do­ mestic-of the Soviet move into Afghanistan? (4) Did Soviet military doctrine have any influence on the Soviet intervention in Afghani­ stan? (5) What are the political options for the West in the wake of the Soviet action, and what policy suggestions can be offered?

1 2 Historical Background

The history of Russian/Soviet-Afghan relations reveals a pattern of persistent Russian expansionism in Central Asia, and a concomitant fear from the nineteenth century onward, shared by both Britain and Afghanistan, that Russia might expand into neighboring Afghanistan. The British fear was shaped by an apprehension that Russia, having occupied several important areas in Central Asia, would turn south to Afghanistan, thus threatening British interests in that area. Afghan fears were motivated by the strong desires of Afghan rulers to build a neutral, independent, and economically viable state. This aim, intensified by the xenophobic tendencies of several of Afghanistan's early rulers, made Afghan apprehensions of an increasingly powerful Russia on their northern border understandable. Beginning in the nineteenth century, Afghanistan became the object of British-Russian imperial rivalries. 1 British apprehensions of Russia's long-range political and economic gains in Central Asia matched Russian fears of an extension of British influence from Af­ ghanistan into Central Asia, where Russia had important commercial interests. 2 Russia was also apprehensive that a revitalized Sunni

1 British-Russian rivalries began to center on Afghanistan as early as 1839, when the British, alarmed by Russia's support of Persian claims on Herat, invaded Afghanistan from India. British fears centered on an apprehension that Russia might be tempted to invade India through Afghanistan. Russia was primarily interested in Bukhara in Central Asia. Vartian Gregorian, The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan (Stanford: Stan­ ford University Press, 1969), p. 108. Another specialist states that British-Russian influence in Afghanistan began as early as 1828 after Persia had become a virtual Russian sphere of influence. See Ronald R. Rader, "The Russian Military and Af­ ghanistan: An Historical Perspective," Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual, David R. Jones, ed., vol. 4 (Gulf Breeze, Fla.: Academic International Press, 1980), p. 308. 2 Between 1758 and 1853 the- amount of Russia's exports to Central Asia increased twelve and one-half times, while the value of imports increased sixteen times. Between 1840 and 1860, the value of Russian trade with Central Asia doubled. Gregorian, Emergence of Modern Afghanistan, p. 102.

2 Muslim power in the recently conquered Central Asian khanates might form centers of potential Pan-Islamic uprisings, undermining Russia's recently acquired economic gains. The British-Russian trea­ ties of 1855 and 1857 strengthened the British position in Afghanistan and reduced possible Russian encroachments against Afghanistan. Despite these successes, there were deep divisions within British foreign policy circles regarding the proper policy to be pursued vis­ a-vis Afghanistan. These were sharpened as Russia made further advances in Central Asia, including political and economic gains in Khiva and Kokand in 1864, the capture of Tashkent in 1865, the annexation of Samarkand in 1869,3 and political and economic gains in Bukhara beginning in 1868. A temporary cessation of British-Rus­ sian rivalry in Afghanistan and Central Asia occurred in 1873, when the two powers concluded an agreement by which Russia recognized the northern and northwestern frontiers of Afghanistan and agreed to consider that country outside the Russian sphere of influence. In the same year, however, Russia occupied Khiva, and in 1875 occu­ pied Kokand. These events killed the British and Russian plan for a buffer zone between the British and Russian spheres of influence. According to the plan, Britain would have guaranteed the inde­ pendence of Kalat, Afghanistan, and Yarkand, and Russia would have guaranteed autonomy for Khiva, Kokand, and Bukhara. In 1874-1880, militant groups in both Russia and Britain came to power, and British-Russian rivalry in Central Asia and Afghanistan intensified. 4 British aims were to prevent further Russian advances in those areas, to protect India's border, and to bring Afghanistan under stricter British supervision and control. Russian aims were not so clear, since various groups advanced different positions. Some proposed that in the event of a British-Russian war in Europe, Russia should conclude an alliance with the Afghan amir (ruler) and then advance to India. Others proposed a policy of simultaneous support for rival claimants to the Afghan throne to foment internal unrest. An even more militant group proposed that the Transcaspian railroad be extended to the Afghan village of Herat in the northwest and to Kandahar in the south. They argued that this threat to India could paralyze British anti-Russian policies in Europe and might encourage Great Britain to conclude a mutually advantageous agreement with Russia over their conflicting European interests. The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, which resulted in sizable Russian gains, height-

3 This put Russian power at the Amu Oarya on the outer perimeter of a weak Af­ ghanistan state that by 1862 had been united tenuously under Oost Mohammed. Rader, "The Russian Military and Afghanistan," p. 309. 4 Gregorian, Emergence of Modern Afghanistan, pp. 108-110.

3 ened British fears of Russian long-range objectives and strengthened the position of those in England who favored a forward policy in Afghanistan. 5 On the other hand, the Second Anglo-Afghan War of 1879, which was the result of the British failure to obtain a diplomatic settlement with the Afghan amir assuring British influence in Af­ ghanistan and securing the Indian frontier, resulted in substantial benefits for the British in Afghanistan: the ouster of the anti-British ruler, Sher Ali, the acquisition of the strategic Afghan districts of Kurram Pass, Pishin, and Sibi, a permanent British representation in Afghanistan, supervision by the British of Afghan foreign affairs, and the transformation of Baluchistan into a British protectorate. The above developments led to a reexamination of British policy in Afghanistan. All proposals advanced in London to partition Af­ ghanistan into various principalities and to make Persia, rather than Afghanistan, the principal bulwark in the defense of India, were shelved, however, when the new Liberal government came to power. The new British policy toward Afghanistan was simple: to maintain a well-defined Indian frontier and to keep Afghanistan under British political control. The British accepted Abdur Rahman Khan as the new ruler of Afghanistan. While Rahman had full sovereignty over the internal affairs of his country, Britain retained full control over Afghanistan's foreign affairs, which it jealously guarded against in­ fluence from other powers, especially Russia. During Rahman's reign, (1880-1901), Russian and British rivalry in Afghanistan and adjacent areas continued unabated, but the new Afghan ruler ac­ cepted British predominance. Rahman viewed Russia's aims toward his country with suspicion,6 but he was not totally comfortable about British objectives, either. In fact, Rahman was convinced that all his powerful neighbors were "hungry vultures, waiting for an oppor­ tunity to swallow their marked victim."7 Rahman astutely reasoned that his country's viability and independence depended on balancing Russian and British goals.

5 During the Russo-Turkish War, the Russians tried to exploit the Afghanistan situation in order to obtain British concessions concerning the Ottoman Empire. This involved the deployment of small Russian units along the Afghan border in the summer of 1878, and this heightened British fears of a Russian march to India through Afghan­ istan. The Treaty of Berlin (1878) ended the Russian mission's purposes, but British suspicions of Russia's aims in the area persisted. Rader, "The Russian Military and Afghanistan," pp. 309-310. 6 L. W. Adamec, Afghanistan: 1900-1923 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), p. 25. Rahman's negative perceptions of Russia were probably shaped by his thirteen­ year exile in Russian Central Asia. 7 Such a statement is not surprising, since Afghanistan has long battled an endless stream of invaders--Genghis Khan, the Persians, the Arabs, the Turks, the British, and finally the Russians.

4 Meanwhile, British distrust of Russian intentions in Central Asia and Afghanistan were intensified by two developments. The first involved the Russian capture of Merv in 1884, a region less than 200 miles from the Afghan village of Herat. The second was the Panjdeh crisis in 1885. While the first was perceived by the British as merely another example of Russian incursion into Central Asia, the second threatened to precipitate a major British-Russian military confron­ tation in Central Asia. In 1885, the Russians forcefully occupied the district of Panjdeh, an area south of Merv, but slightly north of what is now the Afghan border. Both the British and the Afghans were alarmed by the Russian presence in this area so close to the Afghan border. Although the Russians defeated the Afghans and asserted their demands to bring the Turkmen peoples under Russian control, they };leeded a British warning that a move on Herat would mean war with Britain, and they agreed to a demarcation of the north­ western Afghan boundary. The boundary treaty was drawn up in 1877. 8 Until his death in October 1901, Abdur Rahman strove to main­ tain a policy of independence and defensive isolationism, balancing power between Britain and Russia. This was no easy task, since both Russia and Britain viewed Afghanistan as a vital buffer between their two empires, and each was suspicious of the other's intentions. Though mistrustful of all foreigners, Rahman was more tolerant of British influence in his country than of Russian influence. Approving an agreement in which Britain recognized Afghan independence and pledged to defend Afghanistan from foreign aggression, Rahman also agreed to negotiate only with foreign powers through the British government in India, thus frustrating Russia's efforts to establish closer relations with his country. Moreover, in return for British guarantees of protection from rebellious non-Afghan border tribes in Northern Afghanistan and from foreign powers (primarily Russia), the British demanded and received the right to build military rail­ ways, telegraph lines, and fortifications and to station military ad­ visors inside Afghanistan. Upon Rahman's death, Russia sought to establish closer diplo­ matic and economic relations with his successor, Amir Habibullah

8 The boundary ran from Zulfikar, a village eight miles southwest of Panjdeh, north­ eastward to the village of Khwaja Salih on the Amu Darya river. In the 1890s, the Amu Darya was made the official northeastern boundary between the two countries. According to Soviet historians, the British defined the border in 1893; this brought a portion of Pustun and Baluchi tribes under British control. Colonel P. Tarutta, "The People of Afghanistan Build a New Life," Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, no. 8 (April 1979), p. 78.

5 (1901-1919).9 A series of border infringements by the Russians along the Afghan border only rekindled Afghan (and British) fears of Rus­ sian intervention in Afghan affairs. Britain reasserted its right to control Afghanistan's foreign affairs by offering to the new Afghan ruler suggestions that would continue to guarantee British influence in Afghanistan and to isolate Afghanistan from Russia. For instance, Russia wanted to establish direct commercial relations with Afghan­ istan. Britain, however, suspected ulterior motives and charged that Russia was violating its numerous past acknowledgments (made dur­ ing the period 1874-1888) that Afghanistan lay outside the Russian sphere of influence. After arduous negotiations, a new Anglo-Afghan treaty was signed on March 21, 1905. 10 The new treaty guaranteed British control over Afghanistan's foreign affairs, but it granted Brit­ ain no trade or railway concessions. It recognized limited Russian commerce with Afghanistan, with the stipulation that the amir first submit to Britain a proposal explaining how he would control and conduct such relations. Since Britain did not get all that it wanted, the treaty strengthened the position of the Afghan ruler, establishing him as a man capable of resisting British (and Russian) diplomatic and economic pressures. It also enhanced the position of the monarch and Habibullah's prestige in Afghanistan. It was not until the signing of the Anglo-Russian Convention of August 31, 1907, that Russian and British suspicions toward each other cooled somewhat. According to that agreement, Russia ob­ tained the same trading rights in Afghanistan as Britain and the right to deal directly with Afghanistan on nonpolitical matters, and control over the Amu Darya river. Britain declared that it had no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, and it would neither annex nor occupy any portion of Afghan territory. In addi­ tion, Britain agreed not to take military action in the area that might be perceived by Russia as a threat. In sum, the treaty represented a compromise for the two great powers: Russia declared that Af­ ghanistan lay outside its sphere of influence (except for commercial trade), and Britain stated that it had no intention of altering the political status quo in Afghanistan.II

9 In this endeavor, Russia was successful at least in trade relations. Trade with Russia accounted only for 29 percent of Afghanistan's foreign trade in the 1890s, and 34 percent in the period 1901-1905. Russia's imports from Afghanistan doubled between 1901 and 1905. Gregorian, Emergence of Modern Afghanistan, p. 196. From a military point of view, increased contacts with Afghanistan were important to Russia since Central Asian security required accurate information about that country. Rader, "The Russian Military and Afghanistan," p. 312. 10 Adamec, Afghanistan, pp. 61-64. 11 Another consequence of the treaty was that it spurred the growth of Afghan na­ tionalism. The nationalists argued that both the procedure and the substance of the

6 During World War I, Afghanistan declared its neutrality, despite German and Turkish attempts to draw it to their side and to use Afghanistan as an instrument to undermine British and Russian in­ fluence in the area. Afghanistan nonetheless signed a treaty of friend­ ship with Germany in January 1916. Although Afghanistan declared its neutrality during the war, the 1916 treaty marked the end of Afghanistan's policy of isolationism and the beginning of a perma­ nent presence of Germans in Afghanistan. Moreover, it fueled the fervor of Afghan nationalist-modernists who were more convinced than ever before that complete political independence from Britain was necessary before Afghanistan could begin its policy of modern­ ization. In addition, the position of the nationalist-modernists was strengthened by the presence of Germans in their country in the role of champions of Pan-Islamism. This was tangible evidence that it was possible to collaborate with a Western power and at the same time to obtain its aid in achieving its national goals. Afghan relations with Britain and Russia cooled at that time, because the treaty forced both Russia and Britain to station troops in reserve near the Afghan borders in case of an Afghan attack against them. Moreover, the treaty allowed foreigners (mostly Germans) hostile to both Russia and Britain into Afghanistan and contributed to the Afghan nation­ alist fervor. But the treaty, by not allowing Habibullah to vindicate his policy of neutrality and independence, eventually led to his as­ sassination on February 19, 1919. The new ruler of Afghanistan, Amir Amanullah (1919-1929), the third son of Habibullah, attempted to reduce British influence in his country, which critics of his father had termed excessive and ex­ ploitative. At the same time, he initiated relations with other powers, including the newly created Bolshevik regime in Russia. Afghanistan sought from the Soviet Union the establishment of diplomatic rela­ tions and an alliance in case of renewed conflict with Britain. Friction continued, however, between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, because the amir attempted to exploit Russian weakness during the Russian civil war. While the new Soviet government hoped to pre­ vent the growth of separatist Muslim states in Central Asia, Afghan and Turkish nationalists strove to create a Pan-Islamic state in Central Asia. Friction between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan reached a peak in the spring of 1920 after Afghan forces had moved into tne treaty threatened Afghan independence. They saw in the treaty the elimination of traditional Anglo-Russian rivalry in Afghanistan and suspected that the treaty por­ tended improved relations with both great powers at the expense of Afghanistan. Gregorian, Emergence of Modern Afghanistan, p. 211. The treaty was rescinded by the Russo-German Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (March 1918), which recognized the independ­ ence and territorial integrity of Persia and Afghanistan.

7 Merv-Kushk area and as the Soviets encouraged Jamshidi raids against Afghan settlements. Soviet military forces soon regained the initiative in the Russian civil war. By 1921, they had retaken lost territories in Central Asia, they had stopped Afghan penetration into the Panjdeh, and they had established the borders between their country and Afghanistan. Soviet-Afghan relations took a turn for the better in 1921. One reason for this improvement was the signing of the Russo-Afghan Treaty in February 1921,12 which included provisions for nonaggres­ sion, commerce, and technical assistance. In addition, the Soviet Union agreed to return to Afghanistan territory in the Panjdeh, to recognize Bukhara and Khiva as independent states, and to pay Afghanistan a yearly subsidy of 1 million gold or silver rubles. The treaty aroused the suspicions of Britain, which still considered Af­ ghanistan to lie within its sphere of political influence. Britain de­ clared that the amir's acceptance of the Russian treaty precluded the conclusion of an Anglo-Afghan treaty then under negotiation, but a new Anglo-Afghan treaty of friendship was finally signed on No­ vember 22, J921. The result was that Afghanistan remained de­ pendent on Britain for its commercial supplies and for its commu­ nications with the outside world. British-Russian rivalries in the area are evident in the conviction of Sir H. Dobbs, head of the British negotiation mission, that unless the amir's objectives, perceived by Dobbs to be expansionist, could be directed toward Central Asia, the amir would certainly direct them toward India. Dobbs even stated that the amir had hinted to him that if Soviet Bolshevik rule collapsed in Russia, he would with British assistance attempt to extend his hegemony over Soviet-controlled areas in Central Asia. 13 Relations between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan took a turn for the worse during the next few years. First, the Soviet Union did not alter its policy of assimilation toward Bukhara and Khiva enough to suit the Afghans, who renewed tneir agitation in the area. Dis­ turbed by this activity, the Soviets halted all deliveries of money and supplies to Afghanistan. In June 1922, they presented a list of de­ mands to the Afghan minister in Moscow. Their list included an end to Afghan raids in Turkestan. In December 1925, the Afghans accused the Soviets of invading their territory northeast of the Panjdeh district near the Amu Darya (Oxus) river. The origin of this dispute dates back to the 1890s, when the Russian-Afghan border was defined. By the first decade of the 1900s, the river had changed its course, moving

12 L. W. Adamec, Afghanistan's Foreign Affairs to the Mid-Twentieth Century (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1974), p. 61. 13 Adamec, Afghanistan, p. 166.

8 farther north. Afghan tribesmen gradually moved into the area as its course changed, and Afghanistan administered it, but Russia still claimed the territory south of the river, so there was general con­ fusion as to who actually owned the territory. The Afghans viewed the incident as proof of Soviet expansionist tendencies and rejected the Soviet claim. It is also possible that the Soviets wanted the amir to remove the Muslim Basmachi rebels from the area. 14 The new Soviet-Afghan Treaty of February 1921, and the Non-Aggression Treaty of 1926, did not stop Amir Amanullah from insisting on Af­ ghan sovereignty in the disputed area. He also averred that all for­ eigners in Afghanistan were employees of his government, subject to its regulations. The Soviets were no exception to this policy and thus were unable to reap any political benefits from their successes as technical advisors and advisors in other fields. In 1929, Amir Amanullah fell from power because of intensified rebel opposition to his domestic reforms. The Soviets blamed his fall on British intrigue, and the British, in turn, were afraid that the Soviet Union would exploit the newly created political vacuum in Afghanistan to their benefit. Both states withheld recognition and support of the new rebel regime headed by the Bacha-i-Saqqua Amir (Amir Habibullah). Soviet policy toward the new regime was am­ bivalent: on the one hand, the Soviets alleged that Bacha was a puppet of the British and should not be supported; on the other hand, after many years of diplomatic efforts to normalize relations with Afghanistan, the Soviet Union was not prepared to break with any Afghan ruler. Soviet policy, therefore, did not extend beyond verbal attack on the rebel leader. Persistent efforts by Habibullah (Bacha) did not stem mounting opposition to his rule, and on October 15, 1929, he was deposed and executed. Nadir Khan, who, with his followers, constituted the main op­ position to Amir Habibullah, became the new king of Afghanistan. Nadir Khan adopted a policy of reducing Soviet influence in his country, but nonetheless renegotiated Soviet-Afghan treaties15 and

14 The Basmachi movement was an anti-Soviet, religious-nationalist group that de­ manded the independence of Bukhara and Khiva. After the Soviet government was set up in Bukhara in September 1920, the Basmachi fled to northern Afghanistan from Soviet Central Asia and continued to raid Soviet territory. Members of the Basmachi movement have been carrying out raids in the northern provinces of Baghlan and Kunduz in Afghanistan in the current war. See Pravda, July 29, 1980, and August 12, 1980. 15 These included the 1926 neutrality treaty, renegotiated in June 1931, a postal accord (April 1932), and an agreement (September 1932) for the appointment of commissars to study frontier disputes. The new neutrality pact was designed to allay Soviet fears that Afghanistan had, in exchange for British assurances, entered into any secret anti­ Soviet obligations. Gregorian, Emergence of Modern Afghanistan, pp. 202-203.

9 signed a commercial treaty. Day-to-day communications between the two states continued, although the new Afghan ruler intended to curb what he perceived to be Soviet economic, if not political, pen­ etration of his country. Nadir Khan, however, beset by severe eco­ nomic problems and domestic strife, was assassinated on November 8, 1933. Nadir Khan never fully succeeded in eliminating either Soviet or British influence in his country, although he managed to adhere to a neutralist policy in some areas and to stay on friendly terms with both great powers. Soviet-Afghan relations were helped by Nadir's policy of nonintervention in Soviet Central Asia, by his re­ fusal to allow northern Afghanistan to be used as a possible spring­ board for anti-Soviet, Pan-Islamic, or Pan-Turkic activities, and by his signing of a nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union in 1931. Moreover, trade between the two states increased substantially be­ tween 1928 and 1933. 16 But Soviet contact with Afghanistan decreased as Nadir Khan moved to get Soviet technicians and engineers out of the country and to replace Soviet personnel in the Afghan air force with native Afghans. Nadir Khan was replaced in November 1933 by his eldest son, Muhammed Zahir Khan, then nineteen years old. The young ruler, who stayed in power until 1973, embarked on a program of economic modernization, which required the assistance of foreign powers. Zahir strove to establish correct relations with both the Soviet Union and Britain, to maintain close relations with Turkey, Iran, and other Muslim countries, and to promote extensive international contacts in general. While Zahir remained suspicious of the Soviet Union, in 1936 he renewed the Soviet-Afghan Mutual Assistance Pact, origi­ nally signed in 1931, he signed a new commercial agreement in May 1936 with the Soviet Union,17 and he signed an alliance with Iran, Iraq, and Turkey (the Saadabad Pact) in July 1937. Soviet reaction to this first regional agreement concluded by Afghanistan was generally favorable. 18 Finally, Afghanistan initiated the purchase of weapons from the Soviet Union in 1936. During the 1930s, Afghanistan became friendly with Germany, concluding several economic agreements with that country. In ad­ dition, in October 1936, the two nations signed the Afghan-German

16 Russian exports to Afghanistan in 1928--1933 more than doubled in volume. Ibid., p.318. 17 Afghanistan's cotton industry in the north needed machinery and tools for its growth. Soviet technology and expertise supplied this under terms of the agreement. 18 The Soviets regard the pact as an extension of the collective security system then being championed by Moscow. Ibid., p. 377. For a different interpretation of the Soviet reaction to the pact see Adamec, Afghanistan's Foreign Affairs, p. 234.

10 Protocol, whereby Germany agreed to deliver arms to Afghanistan, in addition to extending credit worth fifteen million marks. In 1937, Germany agreed to lend flying instructors to the Afghan air force and to sell planes for training purposes. While Afghanistan's agree­ ments with Germany were an obstacle to Soviet attempts to increase its own influence in Afghanistan, nonetheless, the Soviets and the Afghans concluded a commercial agreement in July 1940. In 1941, during World War II, both the British and the Russians insisted that Germans, Japanese, and Italians be interned and expelled from Af­ ghanistan. All the major powers in the war recognized the strategic im­ portance of Afghanistan and attempted to secure its friendship and collaboration. Despite the commercial accord between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, friction between the two states continued throughout the war, Afghanistan maintaining its friendship with Germany after the German attack on the Soviet Union in 1941. Even when it became obvious that Germany would lose the war, Afghan­ istan did not break off relations with the Third Reich. There was a great deal of sympathy for Nazi Germany in Afghanistan, which did not help either the British or Soviet cause there. One can distinguish three periods in Afghan foreign relations in the postwar period: (1) 1946--1953, which can be characterized as a period of traditional balancing of the influence of the great pow­ ers-at this time, the United States had replaced Great Britain as a counterbalance to the Soviet Union; (2) 1953-1963, which saw a shift in Afghan foreign relations, as a deterioration of Afghan-Pakistani relations made a rapprochement between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union imperative; (3) the period after 1963, which shows a trend toward normalization of relations with all of Afghanistan's neighbors, including Pakistan.19 During these three periods, the most important states to Afghan rulers were the United States, the Soviet Union, and the newly created state of Pakistan. During 1946--1953, the world divided into Communist and anti­ Communist blocs, led by the Soviet Union and the United States, respectively. Afghan rulers, continuing their long tradition of sus­ picion of their northern neighbor, perceived the Soviet Union to be a threat. They therefore adopted a policy of caution vis-a.-vis the Soviet Union, which was actually a policy of containing that country. A powerful state had to be found to help carry out this objective, and that state, which had also embarked on a policy of containing the Soviet Union, was the United States. To carry out its aims, the

19 Ibid., p. 262.

11 United States in the immediate postwar period concluded a number of mutual defense pacts with states bordering the Soviet Union and offered them material assistance to improve their economy and their armed forces. 2o The United States thus became the most important foreign state in postwar Afghanistan. The United States began ex­ tending technical and economic assistance to Afghanistan, but a military alliance between the two states was not possible for a number of reasons. 21 One reason was that the Soviet-Afghan Treaty of 1931, still in force, prohibited the two signatories from entering alliances with other states that might threaten either the Soviet or Afghan interests. During the period 1953--1963, a major shift in Afghanistan's for­ eign policy occurred, primarily as a result of Afghan relations with the newly created state of Pakistan. The key question between the two states concerned their border, which in some areas had never been clearly defined. While the complexities of this problem lie be­ yond the scope of this study, suffice it to say that Afghanistan once had included much of the area west of the Indus River. This territory, occupied by Afghans, had become the northwest frontier of Pakistan when the British granted independence to Pakistan in 1947. Af­ ghanistan and Pakistan thus found themselves increasingly at odds over the frontier question. Meanwhile, in pursuing its policy of containment of the Soviet Union, the United States signed pacts of mutual defense with both Turkey and Pakistan in April 1954, promising both states military aid. This strengthening of Pakistan was viewed in Afghanistan as a weakening of Afghanistan's power, which, in turn, reduced the possibility that Pakistan would come to terms with Afghanistan over the border question. Afghans in the disputed area (frontier Afghans, or Pathans) responded with disturbances, which, in turn, led to military action against them by Pakistan, the closing of the border, and the severing of Afghanistan's trade link with the Indian Ocean. Pakistan's actions meant that Afghanistan, in order to secure a lifeline for its trade, had to seek accommodation with a strong state

20 While the United States extended loans to Afghanistan in the early 1950s, the relatively small size of the loans, their high interest rates, and their short-term ma­ turities did little to further the American cause in Afghanistan. Richard S. Newell, The Politics of Afghanistan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), pp. 122-123. More­ over, while the United States supplied Pakistan with arms, beginning in 1954, it withheld them from Afghanistan. Rader, "The Russian Military and Afghanistan," p.317. 21 The other reasons included the unfeasibility of creating a network of anti-Soviet alliances because of the conflicting interests of Middle Eastern States and the desire of some not to become involved in big power disputes. Adamec, Afghanistan's Foreign Affairs, p. 263.

12 on one of its other borders. Despite Afghan apprehensions of inter­ vention from its northern neighbor and other local problems, the long history of trade with Russia/Soviet Union made it natural that Afghanistan should seek a rapprochement with that country. The new government of Prime Minister Muhammed Daud Khan therefore sought to improve relations with the Soviet Union. This policy re­ sulted in the conclusion of a boundary agreement in September 1948, in a four-year trade agreement between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union in 1950, in the extension of the Soviet-Afghan Treaty of 1931, and in a five-year transit agreement and a postal agreement in 1955. The Soviet Union also increased its material aid to Afghanistan and its support on several political issues. 22 Soviet Premier Nikita Khrush­ chev visited Kabul in December 1955 and subsequently extended a .credit of $100 million to Afghanistan for road construction, for de­ velopment of industrial and irrigation facilities, and for construction of a modern airport at Kabul. In addition, the Soviets extended a credit of $80 million to build a highway from the Soviet border through the city of Herat to the commercial city of Kandahar in the south. This project was financed by a long-term, low-interest loan repayable in exports of Afghan agricultural produce.23 The Soviets also extended financial and technical aid to explore for petroleum reserves near Sherghan in northwest Afghanistan, just south of the Soviet border. Finally, the Soviet government approved the first delivery of Soviet and East European arms to the Afghan govern­ ment. The Afghan willingness to accept large-scale Soviet aid caused concern in the United States, which led to a spate of articles asserting that Afghanistan had become one more Soviet satellite. But, the Afghan government continued to follow a neutralist policy. Prime Minister Daud expressed the Afghan outlook in the following words: "Our whole life, our whole existence, revolves around one single focal point-freedom. Should we ever get the feeling that our free­ dom is in the slightest danger, from whatever quarter, then we should prefer to live on dry bread, or even starve, sooner than accept help that would restrict our freedom."24 Yet, the American concern

22 One political issue in which the Soviets involved themselves was the Pushtuni~tan Question, the dispute over whether the Pathans (the Afghans living along the Afghan­ Pakistani border) should be allowed to establish their own independent state. The Soviet Union supported the Afghan government's position that the Pathans should be part of Afghanistan. 23 The main economic activity of Afghanistan is farming (grains, fruits, nuts, cotton) and herding. Afghanistan also has deposits of iron, copper, lead, and coal not yet fully exploited. 24 Gunther Nollau and Hans Jurgen Wiche, Russia's South Flank (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 136.

13 was justified, since Soviet military assistance to Afghanistan during that period was extensive; by 1973, it amounted to about $1.5 billion, far surpassing that from the United States or China. Muhammed Daud Khan was forced to resign as prime minister in May 1963, and a period of political instability in Afghanistan followed. 25 Numerous political organizations sprang up during this time-including the Marxist Democratic Party of the People (OPP). Under the leadership of Nur Muhammed Taraki, the OPP, along with other parties, called for the overthrow of the monarchy and the concentration of all internal power in the hands of the people. In July 1973, former Prime Minister Oaud deposed King Zahir Khan in a military coup and proclaimed himself president of the Republic of Afghanistan. Taraki's OPP supported Oaud, and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan was born. The Soviets imme­ diately recognized the new regime, and Oaud continued a neutralist policy with a strong pro-Soviet orientation. Yet, Oaud's attempts to improve relations with the then prowestern Iran and Pakistan prob­ ably displeased Moscow. The Soviets hoped to strengthen the bond between 'the two countries. To this end, they gave the Afghans $437 million in eco­ nomic credit during 1975. In 1976, the two nations signed a trade agreement calling for a 65 percent increase in commerce by 1980. By September of 1977, the Soviet presence in Afghanistan was greater than that of any other foreign power.26 Clashes between Muslim tribesmen and the Oaud regime were frequent, however, and in April 1978, Daud was assassinated, his government overthrown by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council led by Taraki and his Marx­ ist party. Taraki assumed the premiership in May, denying rumors that he represented a pro-Moscow government and promising to continue Afghanistan's traditionally neutralist policy. Both the atheistic ide­ ology and the arbitrary reform policy of the OPP, however, were anathema to most Afghans. As Taraki's government was forced by circumstances to rely on Soviet support, the number of Soviet ad­ visors and instructors quickly tripled, and more than twenty Soviet­ Afghan agreements were concluded in the first month after the COUp.27

25 Zahir Khan continued to rule until July 1973. Daud, appointed minister of defense in 1950, and prime minister and minister of the interior in 1953, was replaced by Muhammed Yusef as prime minister in 1963. From 1963 until 1973, when he replaced Zahir as president of the Republic of Afghanistan, Daud remained outside the gov­ ernment. 26 The Wall Street Journal, September 2, 1977. 27 Le Monde, May 16, 1978. Moreover, Soviet military advisors in Afghanistan greatly

14 Led by conservative tribalists who dislike any sort of meddling from Kabul, the rebellion against Taraki's government was fueled by the DDP's own totalitarian and ultra-left policies. In the name of modernization, nomads were settled on land that could not support agriculture; told to dig wells, they were provided with no tools. As part of the land reform program, individual villagers were given individual deeds to land that was formerly shared. Devout Muslims were made to attend classes in which their religion and tribal customs were insulted, and so on. Taraki's infantile Marxist government, much hated because of such practices, soon became a political em­ barrassment to the Soviets. By 1979, unrest among the Afghan masses had found its expres­ sion in widespread guerrilla warfare. Units of the Afghan army de­ serted to the rebels, while whole provinces freed themselves from central control. In the midst of this chaos, Taraki was assassinated in September 1979 by rival Marxists, led by Hafizullah Amin. 28 Hafizullah Amin became premier of Afghanistan. If anything, he was an even greater embarrassment to the Soviets than Taraki had been. Adopting harsh, repressive policies against both his po­ litical critics and his friends among the Muslim insurgents, Amin purged his own Marxist followers and indiscriminately jailed or killed rivals within the army and the government. Hated even more for his cruelty than Taraki had been for his arbitrary policies, Amin found himself confronted by a widespread revolt, which reached its peak when twenty-two out of twenty-seven Afghan provinces freed themselves from the Kabul government. How long his government would have lasted without outside intervention is uncertain. By early November 1979 contingency mil­ itary preparations for an Afghan operation were well under way.29 These measures included the gradual build-up of Soviet forces along the Afghan-Soviet border, the introduction of Soviet small-force units into Afghanistan itself, the preparation of facilities to receive addi­ tional forces, and direct pressure on Amin either to resign or to allow the Soviets to take over greater control of the anti-rebel campaign. As Soviet troop concentration along the border rose from three to five divisions, a special mission, headed by Soviet Lieutenant General V. Paputin of the Soviet Internal Security Forces, was sent to Af- increased in numbers in order to complete the "sovietization" of the Afghan army. Rader, "The Russian Military and Afghanistan," p. 320. 28 The first Soviet report of a change of government announced that 'Faraki had re­ quested removal from his party and government posts because of health reasons. Krasnaya Zvezda, September 16, 1979. 29 Rader, "The Russian Military and Afghanistan," p. 322.

15 ghanistan to attempt to obtain permission from Amin to build full military bases inside Afghanistan in return for 5,000 additional Soviet troops; the mission failed. On December 9, 1979, Soviet forces gathered along the Soviet side of the Afghan border. This development led to the full-scale invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet troops in late December. On De­ cember 27, 200 Soviet military transports landed in Kabul. 30 Five Soviet infantry divisions were sent north to positions along the Af­ ghan border, while other units were deployed by air to various provincial towns. Afghanistan was occupied in a matter of hours and days, Premier Amin was killed under questionable circumstan­ ces, and Babrak Karmal was set up in his place. 31 Moscow explained its actions by declaring that the legal gov­ ernment of Afghanistan had requested Soviet military assistance against counterrevolutionaries and foreign agents aided by China, Pakistan, and the United States. The twenty-year military, economic, and mutual security treaty with Afghanistan, signed on December 5, 1978, further legitimized the action in Soviet eyes, as did Article 51 of the UN Charter, which refers to the right of nations to individual and collective self-defense against external aggression. The Soviets described Hafizullah Amin as an "imperialist agent" repudiated by his own government when he tried to initiate a purge of the Afghan DPP, the intelligentsia, and the army.32 The Soviets also stated that their troops would leave Afghanistan as soon as all forms of "external aggression" against that country came to an end.33 The Soviet Union, however, compelled to increase its military com­ mitment from roughly 50,000 men to somewhere around 100,000

30 The Afghan minister of foreign affairs, M. Dost, claims that Soviet troops were invited into his country on December 28, 1979. 31 Karmal first came to prominence when he led a small group of leftist intellectuals who demonstrated against the Yusef government in October 1965. Karmal was a Marxist elected to the Wolesi Jirga (tribal council) from Kabul. He was part of the

"Kalkh,II or popUlar faction within the DPP, its Marxism more orthodox than that of the other faction, which was first led by Taraki, then by Amin. Karmal was given a diplomatic post by Taraki to get him out of the country; then he stayed in Eastern Europe when Amin took power. Karmal's current posts include general secretary of the central committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (Marxist), prime minister of the government, chairman of the revolutionary council, and commander of the army. 32 According to Soviet sources, Amin began to plot a government coup with the heads of the Islamic party of Afghanistan immediately after Taraki's murder. Krasnaya Zvezda, January 23, 1980, December 30, 1979; Pravda, January 5, 1980; Krasnaya Zvezda, January 23, 1980. 33 The most official Soviet statement on these conditions appeared in Brezhnev's press conference of January 12, 1980. Brezhnev stated that Soviet troops would be withdrawn

16 men, began fighting the same Muslim rebels who nearly brought down Amin's government.

from Afghanistan as soon as the reasons that caused the Afghan government to ask for Soviet intervention had disappeared. Pravda, January 13, 1980. The Kabul New Times was later quoted as saying that Soviet troops would be withdrawn from Af­ ghanistan as soon as "imperialist intervention" in the internal affairs of the country had ceased, that is, the preparation by American, British, Chinese, Pakistani, Israeli, and Egyptian instructors of "special mercenaries" to fight in Afghanistan. Krasnaya Zvezda, March 25, 1980.

17 3 Soviet Motives for the Intervention in Afghanistan

From an international perspective, the Soviet involvement in Af­ ghanistan is self-defeating. Consequences that must be perceived as disturbing to Moscow include a revitalization of NATO, an increased stimulus to U.S. military spending, and the virtual tabling of SALT II and detente by the West. Moreover, the United States and China have been brought closer together-a prospect dreaded by the Soviet Union. Anti-Soviet currents in the Islamic world have grown stronger; an international Islamic conference, held in January 1980, voted al­ most unanimously to cut off all economic aid to Afghanistan until Soviet troops were withdrawn. Common Market countries have agreed to limit farm exports to the Soviet Union. NATO states have agreed to allow 572 American medium-range ballistic and cruise missiles to be deployed on their soil. 1 Many countries responded favorably to the U.S. plan to boycott the Moscow summer Olympics. The Soviet action in Afghanistan did not get Jimmy Carter past the November elections, but it will provide his successor, Ronald Reagan, with fresh ammunition for his requests for greater expenditures for defense spending. Thus, the United States will now be more willing to play an active military role in defense of its perceived interests. Finally, a second UN General Assembly resolution, passed on No­ vember 21, 1980, demanded the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Afghanistan. One hundred eleven members favored the resolution, twenty-two opposed it, and twelve abstained from voting on it. 2 The

1 The decision was reached by NATO leaders at its sessions of December 12 and 13, 1979. 2 In the first UN resolution, the General Assembly condemned the Soviet invasion by a vote of 104 to 18 (with 30 abstentions or absences). This was the most serious diplomatic setback for the Soviet Union since the 1956 UN condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956.

18 Soviet Union rejected this resolution, as it did the assembly's first resolution in January 1980. Confronted by such negative consequences as the above, it is easy to conclude that the Kremlin was a victim of error, that Soviet leaders simply blundered into the invasion, or that expansionist de­ siderata compelled the intervention in Afghanistan. It seems likely, however, that other and more fundamental considerations made the Soviet Union act as it did and that the Soviets will keep their troops in Afghanistan regardless of the exorbitant political, military, and economic costs of doing so. It appears that the Soviet decision to intervene in Afghanistan was based on a combination of the follow­ ing factors: 1. The deep-seated concern Russian/Soviet leaders traditionally have had for secure borders-a preoccupation that is linked to the geography and to the history of Russia. This concern for security is linked to the need the Soviets feel to preserve Afghanistan as a Soviet protectorate. The loss of Afghanistan would mean that the Soviet Union would be encircled by hostile forces from Japan to Norway;3 2. The emergence of hard-line elements who may have achieved dominance within the highest decision-making bodies of the Soviet Union. Hard liners believe that the Soviet Union must draw a line beyond which it will not retreat. After the setbacks of recent years, and in view of the threat perceived from the growing NATO and Sino-Japanese-American forces, hard liners could not abandon Af­ ghanistan; thus, the Kremlin needed to prove its superpower status to the world-and perhaps to itself; 3. A fear that Hafizullah Amin would be overthrown and re­ placed by a conservative, Muslim, anti-Marxist regime only too anx­ ious to draw Soviet Muslims away from the Soviet Union. Moreover, to let Afghanistan fall to such forces might undermine the credibility of Soviet protection in the eyes of other socialist regimes, thus open­ ing up the possibility of falling socialist dominoes; 4. The need to maintain a credible presence in Southwest Asia. To let Afghanistan fall would weaken Soviet regional status and correspondingly result in a decline in Soviet influence in the Middle East and Southeast Asia.

3 Vladimir Petrov, "New Dimensions of Soviet Foreign Policy," Evolving Strategic Realities: Implications for u.s. Policymakers (Washington, D.C.: National Defense Uni­ versity Press, 1980), p. 33. U.S. Admiral A. Burke was quoted as stating that American missiles are positioned so that they surround the Soviet Union from virtually all sides. Krasnaya Zvezda, May 22, 1980.

19 Soviet Security

The first priority of the Soviet Union is security. The Soviet desire for security is so intense that it at times borders on paranoia.4 Russian history is replete with conflicts waged between the Russians and aggressive foreign powers, such as the Mongols, the Teutons, the Poles, the Turks, the Napoleonic French, and the Germans. The obsession with security generated by this history motivated Stalin to establish a buffer zone in Europe after World War II. It also motivated his successors to great efforts to guard against any weak­ ening of that buffer zone. A border controlled by the enemy is intolerable to the Soviets. In general, concern for security has been translated into a Soviet desire to make all the states with which the U.S.S.R. shares a border into neutral or friendly dependent states by any means necessary and possible at a given time. From Lenin's time, Soviet leaders have believed if any neighbor on their border is not neutral or friendly, the Soviet Union will be threatened by aggressive imperialist powers. The Soviets, therefore, have tradi­ tionally concentrated near their borders large troop formations with the capacity to move quickly. That Moscow viewed the unstable situation in Afghanistan as a threat requiring immediate resolution is understandable, consid­ ering the Soviet perception of the number of unfriendly powers facing it. With China seen as increasingly hostile, with the military build-up in Western Europe, and with resurgent Islamic movements gaining power in the Arab world, the Soviet-Afghan border has become all the more important to overall Soviet security interests. Further, the opening of the new Chinese Karakoram Highway with Pakistan may have caused the Soviets to fear they were being en­ circled and might be attacked by a bloc consisting of China, Pakistan, and the United States. 5 If Afghanistan were to join this bloc, this would have heightened Soviet fears. The Kremlin was also afraid of a possible Indian-Chinese rapprochement, and was doing all that it could to prevent its realization. 6 As Communist party Secretary Brezhnev said in a Pravda press conference on January 12, 1980, failure to move Soviet troops into

4 Craig Whitney, New York Times correspondent in Moscow, concurs with this asser­ tion. He argues that Soviet motives in Afghanistan are "more likely militant defen­ siveness caused by historic Russian fears of encirclement by hostile forces." "Soviet Obsession with Security," New York Times, February 1980. sT.V. Parasuran, "Is Detente Dead?" World Press Review, March 1980, p. 21. 6 For a Soviet attempt to use the opening of the Karakoram Highway with Pakistan to exploit Sino-Indian differences, see V. Shury'gin, Pravda, August 7, 1980.

20 Afghanistan would have "created a serious threat to Soviet security interests" on the Soviets' southern flank. 7 The border between Af­ ghanistan and the Soviet Union is seen by Moscow as a region the Soviets can and must control. Moscow faced a serious dilemma in Afghanistan, however. Tra­ ditionally, the Soviets sought to control their borders by neutralizing their neighbors or by turning them into client states of the Soviet Union. The Afghan peoples are fiercely independent and national­ istic;8 they are devoted to Islam and to their ancient tribal traditions, in which warrior values, such as bravery, chivalry, love of weapons, honor, revenge, tenacity, and survival, have long been honored qual­ ities. Moreover, Afghanistan is a tribal society in which traditions such as land held in common by the tribe or its subunits, the at­ tachment of the individual to the tribal community rather than to some central authority, and the supreme authority within a tribe of the tribal council are stressed. In seeking to bend these peoples to their will by pursuing a policy of centralism and collectivized land reform, the Soviets risked turning the Afghan peoples into their bitter and implacable enemies. Because of both the fighting will and the tenacity of the Afghans, as well as the rugged topography of the country, guerrilla warfare appeared likely to go on for a long time in Afghanistan. The military balance could easily shift, for instance, if the Soviet Union was unable to find enough allies within Afghanistan to maintain political stability and the facade of government,9 or if Muslims from other countries joined in the struggle against the occupying power,10 or if the Afghan rebels acquired enough modern weapons to deal effectively with Soviet helicopters and tanks. Whatever the ultimate outcome of the war, the U.S.S.R. seemed likely to be caught up in a protracted guerrilla conflict for many months or even years to come.

7 Pravda, January 13, 1980. Brezhnev's remarks suggest that he realized the probable negative international reaction to the Soviet intervention. An article that appeared in Pravda about one week before Soviet troops moved into Afghanistan suggests this, also. Pravda, December 20, 1979. 8 Richard S. Newell, The Politics of Afghanistan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), pp. 15-16. 9 According to Western reports, Karmal's regime has been seriously weakened by rival factions that are quarreling over such issues as law and order and the continued presence of Soviet troops in the country. The mid-July 1980 purge of government officials has undermined the Karmal government even more. UPI, The Denver Post, August 12, 1980. 10 The strongest leader to emerge so far is Syed Ahmed Gailani, the forty-five-year­ old leader of the National Liberation Front of the Islam revolution, which has its headquarters in Peshawar, Pakistan. Hasan Gailani, Syed Ahmed's nephew, com­ mands Muslim guerrillas in Paktia province, Afghanistan.

21 Hard-line Elements in the Ascendancy within Soviet Decision-Making Circles

Another possible factor that might have caused the Soviet interven­ tion in Afghanistan was the ascendancy of hard-line, anti-detente elements within the politburo and the central committee of the Com­ munist party of the Soviet Union. The moderate position has been seriously undermined by recent events on the international scene. Hard liners within the U.S.S.R. might cite the following as examples of the failure of moderate policies: • the decision of NATO states to increase their military spending substantially over the decade; • the willingness of the United States and its allies to consider economic and military aid to China; • the failure of Brezhnev's regime to respond more vigorously to China's invasion of Vietnam in 1979, thus encouraging further Chinese probes into Asia;11 • the reaction of the U.S. Congress to the Soviet combat brigade stationed in Cuba; • the West's firm rejection of Brezhnev's unilateral military reduc­ tions made in East Germany on October 6, 1979;12 • the establishment of an American Rapid Deployment Force, seen by the Soviets as an attempt to extend the U.S. military and political presence in the world;13 • NATO's decision to deploy American medium-range ballistic and cruise missiles in Europe despite Soviet efforts to kill this plan;14

11 The Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation obligates the Soviet Union to aid Vietnam in case of aggression against that state. Suslov stated in early 1979 that the U.S.S.R. would fulfill its treaty obligations with Vietnam. Pravda, March I, 1979. To make matters worse for Brezhnev, on April 3, 1979, China decided not to renew its Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union, concluded in 1950. 12 Brezhnev offered to withdraw 20,000 troops and 1,000 tanks from East Germany. The Soviets began to withdraw the Sixth Guards Tank Division (10,000 troops and more than 300 tanks) stationed near the West German border at Wittenburg on December 5, 1979. On April 7, 1980, an artillery unit was removed. In mid-May 1980, the Soviets declared that they intended to remove all troops and tanks involved in the proposal. Pravda, May 16, 1980. This is not to argue that the West had no valid reason for its rejection of the Soviet proposal, but only that Soviet hard liners have used this -act on the part of the West to substantiate their posture of toughness vis­ a-vis the West and their perceptions of U.S. imperialism. For a recent indication of how seriously Moscow perceives this rejection, see the communique of the Warsaw Pact meetings, Krasnaya Zvezda, May 18, 1980. 13 Krasnaya Zvezda, June 6, June 28, December 26, 1979. 14 Moscow apparently learned that these weapons might be deployed in Western Europe in early May 1979. Krasnaya Zvezda, May 6, 1979. The Soviets argue that while their medium-range missiles cannot hit American targets, U.S. rockets can hit the western regions of the U.S.S.R. They overlook the fact that in case of a nuclear

22 • the U.S. Senate's decision to table SALT II, a key component of Brezhnev's policy of detente. In politburo struggles between hawks and doves, Mikhail A. Suslov, chief party theoretician and longstanding politburo member, led the hard-line faction. 15 Selected by Stalin himself as agitprop leader in 1946,16 Suslov served at the top levels of party and state longer than any other Kremlin leader. In 1948, he played a key role in expelling Yugoslavia from the Cominform17 after Tito's demand for greater autonomy. In 1964, Suslov served as a sort of king maker during the transition surrounding the ouster of former premier Nikita S. Khrushchev. Although Suslov's role in the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia is still unclear, it is known that this traditional Sta­ linist favored a stronger military posture for the Soviet Union, in­ creased party control over the armed forces, and continued leader­ ship for the Russians in a state in which the Russians are becoming a minority. Circumstances sometimes compelled Suslov to pay lip service to Soviet efforts to normalize relations with the United States. At the same time, however, he charged that the military-industrial complex holds U.S. ruling circles in its grip18 and that American efforts seek to suppress national liberation struggles everywhere. With Soviet moderates discredited by events, Suslov would surely try to convince his politburo comrades of the orthodox Leninist view; that is, that imperialism has not changed and can best be dealt with from a position of strength. While other Soviet leaders have stressed the folly of trying to achieve military superiority over the United States, 19 Suslov declared that the Soviet Union must struggle always against the reactionary forces of imperialism-forces that include NATO and China20 as well as the United States. Finally, Suslov favored closer exchange with the United States they would probably hold Western Europe "hostage" to their strategic power. 15 Suslov has been described by a Western analyst as leader of the "overt Stalinist" faction of the Soviet party and government. D. Pospelovsky, "Factionalism and Soviet Leadership," Radio Liberty Research, CRD, 250/71, August 12, 1971, Munich, Germany. 16 The Agitation and Propaganda Section of the Party Central Committee. In 1947, Suslov became a member of the central committee. In 1949-1950, he served as editor in chief of Pravda. His chief posts at present include chairman of the foreign affairs committee of the supreme soviet, member of the central committee's politburo, and party secretary. 17The Organization of World Communist Parties, led by the Soviet Union, but dis­ banded in April 1956. 18 Suslov's statements on this theme are numerous. For examples, see Pravda, October 17, 1979; February 21, 1980. 19 See, for example, Krasnaya Zvezda, January IS, 1980. 20 Suslov has been especially hard on China. See Pravda, March I, 1979; December 31, 1979.

23 relations with Iran under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini. Sus­ lov warned his comrades that the United States was using the hostage situation as a pretext to undermine the Iranian government. The United States, he said, intended to use Iran as a base from which to attack the Soviet Union. Significantly, Suslov's position appeared to have grown more powerful after the summer of 1979. Not only did he hold the central position in photos of Soviet leaders21-a significant detail in a country where such items as protocol matter a great deal-but in the 1979 and 1980 celebrations of the October Revolution held in Moscow, it was Suslov who stood at Brezhnev's right hand. Suslov also sat next to Brezhnev in a meeting with French Communist party leaders in January 1980 and at the Warsaw Pact meetings held in early Decem­ ber 1980. As the official high priest of the ideological pyramid dominating all aspects of Soviet society and the chief theorist of Marxism­ Leninism, Mikhail Suslov could determine which government or party decisions are compatible with Marxism-Leninism and which are not.22 He could thus indirectly strongly influence policy making by using ideology as a weapon against political enemies. That Suslov and his fellow hard liners gained ground in Soviet policy making was suggested by events within the Soviet Union. For instance, until 1979, Brezhnev was typically lauded on the occasion of his birthday (December 19), while Josef Stalin received little notice on his birthday (December 21). But in 1979, the reverse was true: Brezhnev received relatively little public praise, and Stalin's anni­ versary was the object of an extensive article in Pravda. 23 This Pravda article was significant, not only because it was the most lengthy record of Stalin's career to appear in the Soviet press since 1952, but because policies denounced at the time of Khrushchev's revelations in the 1950s and ever since-such policies as forced industrialization and forced collectivization of agriculture-were called "necessary" during the difficult time when they occurred. The Stalinist purges, which wiped out much of the old Bolshevik leadership during the 1930s, were also called "necessary," though a "violation of Soviet justice and excessive."

21 For examples, see Izvestiya, June 16, August 31, October 9, 1979; Krasnaya Zvezda, May 11, 18, 28, 29, June 26, July 4, Decembe~ 6, 1980; and Pravda, May 14, June 27, September 1, October 9, November 11, 1980. 22 Suslov chaired the top-level ideological conference, held in Moscow in mid-October 1979. Pravda, October 17, 1979. 23 Pravda, December 21, 1979. It is not without interest that Josef Stalin was praised by Marshal K. Moskalenko in his Victory Day speech in 1980, but not in 1979. See Izvestiya, May 9, 1979; May 9, 1980.

24 In the same article, Brezhnev was quoted as condemning Stalin's cult of personality, but, in condemning Stalin for "voluntarism,"24 "subjectivism," and "idealism," he was also criticizing himself. For what is of highest importance, the article later stated, are the party, the Soviet government, the Soviet people-not the single leader and his voluntarist policies. It is an old habit of Soviet political journalism to criticize the present indirectly in terms of the past. Brezhnev's own politburo comrades probably believe him guilty of the same errors as those he criticized and were warning him not to build his own cult of personality. A meeting of the .central committee of the Soviet Communist party was held on December 16, 1979-only a few days before Soviet troops moved into Afghanistan.25 A decree issued by this meeting stressed agriculture, the cultural revolution, nationality problems, a strict Marxist-Leninist world outlook, proletarian internationalism, and "developing contradictions" in the capitalist world-all matters of particular interest to hard-line Stalinists. It is likely that Mikhail Suslov had a major role in writing the decree. And it is not implau­ sible that the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was engineered by Suslov and other Soviet hard liners. Undoubtedly some of the above is speculative and Kremlino­ logical in character. Since it is not the habit of the Soviet leadership to advertise internal struggles over policy and power, the outside analyst often is compelled to sift through such fine details to perceive what lies behind a barrier of secrecy. In conclusion, one may say that the policy of detente with the West has been abandoned by Soviet leaders. Leonid Brezhnev, who is far from being discredited by his own hawks, may himself, like Suslov, have become a hard liner. This is suggested by Brezhnev's latest public statements made to leaders from Ethiopia, Mozambique, and India. Despite Brezhnev's grandiloquent statements about peace­ ful coexistence, relations based on mutual respect and equality, and the need for "deepening detente," Brezhnev's virulent language used to characterize Western states has placed him in the hawkish cate­ gory.

24 In Marxist-Leninist terminology, "voluntarism" means the arbitrary and capricious rule by a single leader. 25 Pravda, December 16, 1979. Brezhnev stated in his January press conference that the central committee and the Soviet government made the decision to intervene in Afghanistan, which was not "easy." Pravda, January 13, 1980. Ronald Rader asserts that the Soviet decision to intervene in Afghanistan was made by the politburo on December 19, 1979. Rader, "The Russian Military and Afghanistan," p. 322. Georgi Arbatov implies that the Soviet decision was made in mid-December 1979. Georgi Arbatov, "A Soviet View of U.S. Policy," The Wall Street Journal, April 29, 1980.

25 Hafizullah Amin and the Political Situation in Afghanistan

Hafizullah Amin was premier of Afghanistan barely three months when Moscow found it necessary to replace him with a man of its own choosing. The reasons centered on Amin's inability to deal effectively with friends of the Marxist government, with the people of Afghanistan, or with outright foes. Ostensibly a Marxist himself, Amin was a ruthless, harsh individual with close ties to the Afghan officer corps,26 the members of which are mostly Pushtuns like him­ self. Originally he was allied with Nur Muhammad Taraki in the coup against Muhammad Oaud and part of his faction within the OPP. After he had Taraki murdered, Amin took the premiership himself-something that the Soviets, who had originally backed Tar­ aki, could not fail to resent. Assuming power in the fall of 1979, Amin immediately initiated a campaign against antigovernment ele­ ments, killing and imprisoning thousands without regard to whether they were real enemies, victims of circumstance, or simply critics. He also used the opportunity to stamp out personal rivals within the Afghan army and to persecute opponents within the Marxist party, which was divided into tribal as much as ideological factions. Such tactics only created more enemies for Amin and for this government. Meanwhile, the rebels fighting against this stillborn socialist state grew in strength. Muslim guerrillas, in virtual command of the coun­ tryside, initiated large-scale attacks against regions still held by the government, until they finally held twenty-two of the twenty-seven provinces. In retrospect, one can say that Amin's central problem was not to squelch critics or to entrench his position within the party and the state, but to suppress the rebels-especially in the eastern prov­ inces of Kunar and Paktia. Kunar province was a potential source of trouble because of the presence of an antigovernment radio station, Free Kunar, which daily beamed anti-Marxist propaganda to the Afghans. Paktia posed a formidable threat to Amin's government because of its strategic location on the Pakistani border: through Paktia runs the shortest route from Pakistan to Kabul, and rebels from Paktia often passed through the province on their way to attack government forces.

26 Amin was quoted as stating that the power of Afghanistan lay in its armed forces. Krasnaya Zvezda, August 8, 1979. Amin was a Pushtun in the Chilazi tribe, his political support consisting mainly of Pushtun army officers. The Pushtuns, who make up over one-half of the Afghan population, are the most numerous and politically dom­ inant group in the country. Newell, Politics of Afghanistan, p. 14.

26 Shortly before the Soviets decided to invade,27 a Soviet military delegation led by Deputy Defense Minister and Commander of Soviet Ground Forces General I.G. Pavlovskiy visited Afghanistan. This suggests that the Kremlin was not satisfied with Amin's efforts to deal with the rebels. Moreover, Amin was unable to stop the rising rate of desertions from the Afghan army, despite his own ties with the officer corps. Finally, Amin's ruthlessness only made the Afghan people hate his government all the more-a government already despised as atheistic and meddling by most Afghans. Amin could not dissociate himself from the ill-considered and heavy-handed re­ form efforts that occurred under the Taraki regime. 28 Despite re­ peated assertions that his government would respect political and religious freedoms, Amin could not even begin to negotiate with the rebels. Instead, as the Muslim rebellion increased in scope, his focus shifted from efforts to reconcile the people to a crude effort to hang on to power. The brutal methods he used in doing so only strength­ ened his enemies. Left to his own devices, Amin would soon have been over­ thrown. As his Marxist government deteriorated into chaos, the anti­ Soviet, anti-Marxist rebels would have been left as the strongest political force in the country. If an anti-Marxist Islamic regime held power in Afghanistan, the Soviet Union would be confronted on its southern border by three volatile Muslim nations, Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, with a combined population of about 130 million people. A successful anti­ communist revolt so nearby might stir up demands for autonomy among Muslims living in Soviet Central Asia-more than 30 million people in all, many of them with strong ethnic and cultural ties to the Afghans. Although nationalist drives in Soviet Central Asia are not so powerful as they are in other parts of the U.S.S.R.-the Ukraine, Georgia, and the Baltic states, for example-the potential

27 The period cited in the text is not certain because Western sources give conflicting dates of this mission. The New ,York Times Magazine states that Pavlovskiy visited Afghanistan shortly before Amin launched his attack on rebels operating in Paktia (October 1979). New York Times Magazine, January 13, 1980, p. 37. The Wall Street Journal reports that the Pavlovskiy mission occurred in the summer of 1979. Wall Street Journal, April 24, 1980. Jiri Valenta asserts that the visit occurred a few months before the invasion. Jiri Valenta, "The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: The Difficulty of Knowing Where to Stop," Orbis, vol. 24, no. 2 (Summer 1980), and Current News, Special Edition, October 1, 1980, N. 619, p. 4. 28 Taraki's land reforms, which began in the southern provinces of Afghanistan, also involved the establishment of state collective farms. Karmal's reforms, which also involve the creation of farm collectives, are being carried out much more cautiously. See Pravda, September 7, 1980.

27 for nationalist separatism is there. Both the Kremlim and the local communists in Soviet Central Asia know it. 29 Also, if Moscow had let the Marxist regime in Afghanistan fall, this would have undermined the credibility of Soviet protection in the eyes of other socialist regimes, opening up the possibility of falling socialist dominoes. There are already indications that socialist regimes in Eastern Europe, such as Poland, are becoming restive. Poland's labor problems pose only one problem for the Kremlin. 30 John Paul II's election as Pope seems to strengthen the already vi­ brant Catholic Church in Poland, a powerful counterweight to the Communist regime. Moreover, Rumania is not as deferential as it once was. It would be an exaggeration to say that all Eastern Eu­ ropean states except East Germany are attempting to sever their ties with Moscow. But it can be argued that Moscow had to demonstrate to the world in late 1979 that it could and would defend a socialist regime, regardless of how regressive and unpopular that regime was to the masses, and regardless of how much "overkill" the Kremlin displayed. To have acted otherwise might have further eroded the already strained cohesiveness of the socialist bloc, and correspond­ ingly, diminished Soviet influence, prestige, and credibility in the world. For these reasons, the Soviet Union might have felt it could not allow anticommunist rebels to seize power in Afghanistan. Amin had to be replaced by someone more predictable and more useful to Moscow. That man was Babrak Karma!.

The Soviets and the Regional Balance in Southwest Asia

A final factor believed to be behind the Soviet intervention in Af­ ghanistan was the need Moscow felt to maintain a credible presence in Southwest Asia and to undermine the West's influence there. To have let Afghanistan fall would have weakened the Soviet presence in Southwest Asia, and possibly in the world at large. To comprehend this point, one needs to grasp a basic principle of Soviet foreign policy: regional areas are important to Moscow since they represent key components of the global balance of forces ("correlation of forces")-a balance that is perceived by Moscow as a struggle be-

29 This is suggested in a Pravda article that appeared in March 1979 and was quoted in Newsweek, April 2, 1979, p. 45. The author, I. Aleksandrov (a pseudonym for a senior Soviet policy maker), declared that "Soviet public opinion opposes interference in the affairs in the Afganistan revolution [and] armed provocations and conspiracies carried from the territories of Pakistan, Iran and China." 30 For a perceptive analysis of Soviet problems in Poland, see Joseph C. Harsch, Christian Science Monitor, November 14, 1980.

28 tween capitalism (imperialism), led by the United States, and com­ munism, led by the Soviet Union.31 The main Soviet objective in this struggle is to bring about a shift in this balance favorable to the U.S.S.R. The Soviets clearly recognize that Southwest Asia is an area of increasing importance to the West, and thus of enhanced signif­ icance to them, since it has become an area of "antiimperialist, na­ tional-liberation struggles." This means that Soviet prestige and in­ fluence on a global scale can be promoted by making gains on a regional level-the outcome of a development on a regional level can either weaken or strengthen the global correlation of forces as per­ ceived by Moscow. Thus, Afghanistan, as part of Southwest Asia, is important in regional as well as global terms. Within the above context, Soviet leaders viewed Southwest Asia both as an important region in itself and as an important factor in the global balance. Thus, countries in that area are part of the anti­ imperialist struggle, the main purpose of which is to weaken the influence of the West and to strengthen that of the Soviet Union. Without doubt, Soviet leaders also realized that Southwest Asia, as a region of superpower confrontation, also influences developments in other areas, such as the Middle East and Southeast Asia, as well as the political and economic security of Western Europe. This way of thinking ("zero-sum game") reflects Moscow's conviction that any Soviet loss is a gain for the West, and any U.S. loss accrues to the Soviet Union, since it means a weakening of U.S. power and influ­ ence and an increase of Soviet power and influence. This mode of reasoning explains how Soviet leaders could claim that "imperialist agents" and not the Soviet Union initiated an "undeclared war" against Afghanistan, and that the Soviets were only "protecting" a beseiged country. The Soviet assertion that Afghan rebels, in at­ tempting to bring down the Marxist regime, were acting under the West's orders (the United States, China, and other major capitalist states) confirms this description of the Soviet mind-set: given the Soviet view that the world is a bipolar conflict between capitalism and socialism, and that regional struggles are parts of this global conflict, the enemy--any enemy-must be perceived as acting under the orders of its capitalist masters. Because the main Soviet objective in the regional/global struggle is to bring about a shift favorable to the Soviet Union, the enemy in Afghanistan must be defeated, since the outcome of the struggle will influence the outcome of the global balance of forces. The Soviet concept of the regional/global balance

31 The author is indebted for this material to Foy D. Kohler, Leon Goun\ and Mose L. Harvey, The Soviet Union and the October 1973 Middle East War: The Implications for Detente (Miami: Center for Advanced International Affairs, 1974), pp. 21-25.

29 also indicates that Moscow feels that it must increase its presence in Afghanistan (and in other countries in the area) in order to lessen the influence of the West in that area. A "nonaligned" Afghanistan (read: a Soviet protectorate) is a Soviet gain, and therefore a loss for the West. This is indicated by recent Soviet statements, which assert that a "nonaligned" Afghanistan will improve the international po­ litical climate, and that Afghanistan had pledged its support of Soviet foreign policy objectives, based on antiimperialist principles. 32 The Soviet view of the balance of forces is also evident in Brezh­ nev's sweeping peace proposal for the Persian Gulf, announced in early December 1980. 33 This plan, which would turn the area into a militarily neutral zone, may be seen as a move on Moscow's part to build sentiment for dismantling the U.S. military presence in the region. It is also an attempt to undermine the Carter Doctrine for U.S. defense of the oil-rich area. By reducing American military power in Southwest Asia, the Soviets would be increasing their own power (since any reduction of the West's power is perceived as an increase in the Soviet's). Brezhnev's plan was probably also moti­ vated by a desire to placate Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, who has been concerned with both the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan and the Soviet military build-up in the Indian Ocean.

32 For example, see Pravda, October 20, 1980. 33 Pravda, December 11, 1980.

30 4 Consequences of the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan

The first consequence of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was that the attitudes of suspicion and mistrust and the misperceptions that were characteristic of the cold war between the superpowers in the 1950s and 1960s resurfaced and hardened. As Michel Tatu has stated, "The unfortunate thing about Afghanistan is that it signals a return to a Cold War climate."l And with it there has emerged a recrudescence of the containment doctrine of the 1950s. Contain­ ment, based on the assumption that the Soviet Union is aggressive and expansionist, sought to restrain the U.S.S.R.'s forward thrusts by military force, backed up by economic and political manipulations. Translated into military terms, the new version of containment re­ quired a concentrated build-up of American and NATO military forces in the Far East and the construction of new naval facilities in Somalia, Oman, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Kenya. Correspond­ ingly, detente, which implies a relaxation of tensions between the two superpowers, became largely moribund. Some Western analysts believed there was no evidence of "inex­ orable Soviet geopolitical momentum."2 These studies, however, overlooked two basic facts of international politics. First, it is the perceived power of a state that is critical in determining the behavior of one state toward another. 3 Second, the Soviets adhere to a conflict doctrine of international politics. Concerning the first point, what

1 Michel Tatu, "Is Detente Dead?" World Press Review (March 1980), p. 21. 2 For example, see George F. Kennan, New York Times, February 1, 1980. "Soviet Political Momentum: Myth or Menace?" The Defense Monitor (Washington: Center for Defense Information), ISSN #0195-6450, January 1980. 3 Stanley Hoffman suggests that the objective criteria of power are becoming more difficult to translate into meaningful terms and says that international politics should be defined less as a struggle for power than as a contest for the shaping of perceptions. S. Hoffman, "Perceptions, Reality and the Franco-American Conflict," Images and Reality in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), pp. 58-59.

31 clearly emerged from a reading of official U.S. pronouncements was a perception firmly held by U.S. policy makers that the U.S.S.R. was engaged in a geopolitical offensive designed to extend its power and influence worldwide. In particular, the Carter administration saw the Soviet military build-up, combined with its expanded means of pro­ jecting power overseas, as a serious threat to vital American security interests around the world. This assumption lay at the root of the so-called Carter Doctrine, defined in President Carter's State of the Union Message in early 1980: "Any attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America. And such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."4 Implicit in the Carter Doctrine was the notion that the United States would erect a military shield around the Persian Gulf to safe­ guard oil supplies vital for the West. The United States sent aircraft carriers and other naval units to waters near the Persian Gulf and declared the region off-limits to the Soviet Union. The second mistake made by American doves is that they over­ looked the fact that the Soviets adhere to a conflict doctrine of in­ ternational politics and thus do not view reality in the same way as their Western counterparts. One of the basic principles of Soviet foreign policy -is the notion of a continuous struggle between the forces of capitalism and socialism, the character of the struggle being determined by the "correlation of forces" existing at a particular time. Further, the Soviets intend to promote the alteration of this "cor­ relation" in their favor by making moves that undermine the power­ both regional and global-of their adversary. 5 The Soviet concept of the "correlation of forces" embraces all phenomena-political, social, economic, and military. It is the central Soviet concept regarding political phenomena, and it acts as a guide to Soviet foreign policy. The scientific calculation of this "correlation" is said to determine the "correct line" of Soviet foreign policy; deviations from it are not permissible. Deviations include an underestimation as well as an overestimation of the enemy.6 The forces that constitute the "cor­ relation of forces" are any moves that appear to promote the freedom of action of the Soviet Union and to thwart that of its adversaries. Struggle and conflict are thus inherent features of Soviet foreign policy. Further, the Soviets believe that a favorable imbalance (pereves

4 The Carter Doctrine was unveiled on January 21, 1980, in a televised address to the joint houses of Congress. For a Soviet reaction to tnis speech, see Pravda, January 26, 1980. 5 Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet Military Policy (London: Faber & Faber, 1966), p. 84. 6 Ibid., p. 82.

32 sil) can confer important advantages to the state that possesses it. Conversely, an unfavorable imbalance can restrict advance. If the Soviets feel that they possess a favorable imbalance of power-and they have asserted this since 1947-they will make moves to exploit it. If they believe that the enemy holds the advantage, they must retreat. Since Soviet leaders continue to view international politics in Marxist-Leninist terms, a comprehension of this crucial Soviet concept is essential for anyone wishing to understand Soviet foreign policy. Regarding Afghanistan, it can be argued that since the Soviets believe that the "correlation of forces" favors them, there is a po­ tentiality for advance. But as they advance, they expect that they will encounter resistance from the "hostile" capitalist West. As Gar­ thoff has stated, "The actual appearance of counter-Soviet measures is seen as the anticipated anti-Soviet actions, seeming to confirm the policy of utilizing all potentialities for advance."7 A second result of the Soviet move into Afghanistan relates to the character of international politics. With a new cold war in the offing, the struggle between the U.S.S.R. and the United States has again become the dominant fact of international politics. Other strug­ gles in the world are defined either in terms of the Soviet-American relationship or as secondary in nature. Thus, the leaders of both superpowers direct their attention to what impact a policy will have on the other superpower to the near exclusion of other factors. Yet, it can be argued the above change in the nature of inter­ national politics can have a positive significance for the West. As stated, the Soviets have always viewed the global struggle between capitalism and socialism as a dynamic process and the main "con­ tradiction" of our time and believed that they must promote a pos­ itive shift in this balance in their favor; regional balances are seen as vital parts of this overall global conflict. It can be argued that as the cold war regains its dominating place in international politics, Western leaders can redirect their attention to the Soviet concept of the regional/global struggle and at the same time broaden their own conception of security. The present strategic stabilization may be a tenuous basis for international security, given the Soviet concept of international politics as an arena of an ongoing struggle between social systems in which regional balances playa crucial role. Thus, leaders in the West may come to realize that management of Third World conflicts as well as the West's role in such areas are highly significant to Western security interests; if this occurs, the West may be emboldened to challenge the Soviets ill such contested areas.

7 Ibid., p. 94.

33 A third consequence of the Soviet move is that the U.S.S.R. itself may be transformed. It is logical to assume that the Soviet leadership will place greater emphasis on those aspects of the Soviet economy that are necessary to support an ever more powerful mil­ itary organization. 8 Responding to this imperative, the party's control over all sectors of Soviet society will be intensified, and efforts to indoctrinate the masses with Marxist-Leninist ideology will increase. 9 Popular support of party policies will be mobilized through the ma­ nipulation of external tensions, while the idea of the aggressive na­ ture of imperialism will be used as a kind of bogyman to make Ivan behave. Furthermore, the gap between the symbolic language of Marxism-Leninism and political practice, which widened with detente, will again narrow. It is thus possible that Soviet leaders will decide that certain aspects of their ideology, such as capitalist encirclement and the aggressive nature of world imperialism, are validated by recent developments in the capitalist world. This realization may cause them to revert to the military advocacy of revolution and to the wider use of armed force as an instrument of foreign policy.lO

8 This contention is supported by Petrov, "New Dimensions of Soviet Foreign Policy," p.37. 9 General A.A. Epishev, head of the Main Political Administration within the Soviet armed forces, stated in early June 1980 that the number of hours devoted to Marxist­ Leninist indoctrination for Soviet soldiers and all citizens would increase substantially in the near future. Pravda, June 5, 1980. Epishev was apparently not satisfied with the work in this area since the May 1979 central committee decree on ideology. For this decree, see Izvestiya, May 6, 1979. 10 As Petrov says, Moscow has at least partially abandoned its low profile and has placed greater reliance on its military power. Petrov, "New Dimensions of Soviet Foreign Policy," p. 37.

34 5 Soviet Options in Afghanistan

There are no easy solutions for Moscow in Afghanistan. But it ap­ pears that the Kremlin has four choices for action: (1) unconditional withdrawal; (2) conditional withdrawal, under conditions acceptable to itself; (3) a prolonged limited war; or (4) an all-out offensive de­ signed to break the back of the Afghan resistance once and for all. An all-out offensive would be very costly to the Soviet Union militarily and politically, as would a long, drawn-out conflict. Un­ conditional withdrawal would leave Afghanistan open to what Soviet leaders describe as "foreign agents" supported by the United States, China, and its allies. It is likely that as the struggle drags on, the Soviet leadership will come to see conditional withdrawal as the least intolerable choice. Although a withdrawal would be undesirable from the point of view of Soviet honor, it would be acceptable as long as forces hostile to the U.S.S.R. were removed from Afghanistan. But a caveat must be inserted here: the Soviets will withdraw their forces only if the viability of the Marxist regime in Afganistan is fully assured. It is, therefore, not surprising that the Karmal regime and the Soviet government have advanced a political solution to this crisis. The government of Afghanistan offered a peace proposal on May 14, 1980-a proposal that reflects Moscow's priorities. 1 This plan includes the normalization of relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, amnesty to all Afghans living in Pakistan, negotiations with Iran and Pakistan of all outstanding disputes between these countries and Afghanistan, the taking of steps by all parties to the negotiations to terminate any form of intervention in the affairs of Afghanistan. In addition, the proposal declared that the United States and the Soviet Union would have to guarantee a political settlement by lend-

1 Pravda, May 15, 1980.

35 ing their credibility to the Afghan-Iranian and Afghan-Pakistani ac­ cords. The American guarantee would also have to include a com­ mitment not to continue "subversive activity" inside Afghanistan, or that carried out from third countries. The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan would be conducted within the context of the political settlement, while the concrete forms of this withdrawal would "depend on solving the question of effective bilateral guar­ antees between Afghanistan-Iran and Afghanistan-Pakistan." The Karmal government, which would have to be present at all negoti­ ations, also proposed that the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf be transformed into a "zone of peace" and that all military bases in those areas be dismantled. Since mid-May 1980, Soviet views on the Afghan peace proposal have gradually changed. At the June 24 party plenum the "complete cessation of aggression against Afghanistan and reliable guarantees against subversion from abroad" were given as the prime precon­ ditions for a political settlement.2 At the same time, Afghanistan was described for the first time as a "nonaligned" state. In an Izvestiya editorial that appeared three days later, the same conditions and description of Afghanistan as a "nonaligned" state were repeated.3 On July 1,1980, the following were cited as preconditions for a po­ litical settlement of the Afghan question: (1) complete cessation of all forms of "world aggression" against that country; (2) reliable guarantees to terminate all forms of subversion against Afghanistan; (3) the normalization of relations with Pakistan and Iran; and (4) a guarantee from the United States that it would desist from further subversive activity in Afghanistan including that carried out from other states.4 These steps were said to create prerequisites for solving the question of further steps in the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. A central committee statement issued in late August 1980 simply declared that a political solution to the Afghan question would improve "the political climate in the area" and that the United States and China were responsible for failing to realize it. 5 On Oc­ tober 16, 1980, during Afghan party chief Babrak Karmal's visit to Moscow, Brezhnev stated that the most vital aspect of the May 14 peace proposal was an accord between Afghanistan and Pakistan

2 Pravda, June 24, 1980. 3Izvestiya (editorial) June 27, 1980. 4 Pravda, July 2, 1980. 5 The Soviets view the Sino-American alliance, now called a "partnership," as a fait accompli. See party secretary K.V. Rusakov's statements in Pravda, May 22, 1980. Soviet leaders also assert that China has become the "sixteenth member of NATO." For an example, see Colonel V. Bokarev, "The Armed Forces of the U.S.S.R. in the Post­ War Period," Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, no. 12 Oune 1979), p. 78.

36 and that the Soviet Union respected the foreign policy of Afghanistan and its status as a "nonaligned" country. 6 The Soviet-Afghan dec­ laration of October 19, issued prior to Karmal's departure from the Soviet Union, stated that the achievement of a political solution to the Afghan conflict would improve the "international political cli­ mate." Preconditions for a political solution were the termination of external intervention against Afghanistan, an agreement between Afghanistan and its neighbors, especially Pakistan, guarantees of the nonresumption of subversive acts against the country and its Marxist government, and the continued existence of the Marxist government of the country. 7 In turn, Afghanistan pledged its policy of "non­ alignment" based on antiimperialist precepts, as well as its complete 'agreement with Soviet foreign policy goals. Several conclusions emerge from the evolution of Soviet thinking on a political settlement in Afghanistan. First, the improvement of Afghan-Pakistani relations is of primary concern to Soviet leaders. This is understandable, since the reduction and elimination of rebel intervention in the country-rebels based largely in Pakistan-would make it easier for Karmal's Marxist regime to gain legitimacy and viability. Second, Soviet leaders no longer consider essential the American guarantee of an Afghan-Iranian and Afghan-Pakistani ac- . cord. Third, the Soviets now consider Afghanistan to be "nonaligned"-thus, a vital component in the Soviet's anti-Western political/economic/military struggle. A "nonaligned" Afghanistan means to Soviet leaders a state that will support its foreign and domestic policies. In return for such support, the regime of Babrak Karmal will continue to receive Soviet military, economic, and po­ litical aid. This means that the "independence" of Afghanistan now is about as meaningful as that of Mongolia. Fourth, the Soviets seem eager to build a bloc of anti-Western states in Southwest Asia with Afghanistan as one of the components. The achievement of a political settlement of the Afghan problem acceptable to Moscow rests squarely on improving relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. How can this be accomplished with pro-Western General Mo­ hammed Zia ul Haq in power in Pakistan? Thus, Soviet aims toward Pakistan are crucial in understanding Soviet policies in Afghanistan. The Soviets would not object to promoting the ouster of Pakistani strongman Zia, since he has long been firmly opposed to any settle­ ment with the Marxist regime in Afghanistan, and since the Soviets would like to have India as an immediate neighbor. There are three ways that the Soviets could do this. They could fan the secessionist

6 Pravda, October 17, 1980. 7 Pravda, October 20, 1980.

37 strivings among Pakistan's Pathan and Baluchi tribes within the prov­ ince of Baluchistan, which straddles Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Or the Russians could try to overthrow the regime of General Zia, whose domestic and foreign policies have tended to isolate him from Western sympathy. As a last alternative, Soviet troops could march into Pakistan and take the country by force. The first option appears to be the most promising for the Soviets, since the costs would be much lower for them. While many Baluchi elders abhor the Marxist regime of Afghanistan because of its atheism, they seem to be equally opposed to American military aid to Pakistan, which they believe could be used by the central government against them. Thus, while the Russians are perceived as evil by the Baluchis (since they are supporting an unpopular regime in Afghanistan), the Americans are viewed in practically the same light, since they are supporting an equally unpopular regime in Pakistan. Baluchi resentments toward the Zia regime run deep. The Bal­ uchis feel that they have never received a fair deal from the central government. Baluchis make up about one-half of the province's 2.5 million people, yet Punjabis control about 90 percent of the Pakistan bureaucracy and hold all key government posts in the province. Moreover, the Baluchis feel that they do not get a fair return on their economic resource, natural gas, which is piped to Pakistan's major cities. Baluchistan receives about $25 million annually in revenues from the sale of this commodity but then must repurchase its own natural gas from neighboring Karachi. Further, General Zia's exe­ cution of his predecessor, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, in 1979 and his holding of Bhutto's widow and daughter in detention do not add to Zia's popUlarity in Baluchistan. In addition, the recent arrest of leaders of the two opposition parties in Baluchistan is not perceived in Balu­ chistan as a positive move. Moreover, young Baluchi tribesmen re­ portedly openly support the Soviet presence in Afghanistan and could be used by Moscow as a kind of fifth column inside Baluchi­ stan. If the Soviets are successful in fanning popular discontent among the Baluchis toward the central government, they could bring' it down or at least undermine it. This, in turn, could promote the unification of the 1.2 million Baluchis living in Pakistan with the 300,000 living in Afghanistan and the 1 million in Iran. Recent Soviet support of the second largest opposition party in Pakistan in its efforts to form an anti-Zia united front may be an indication that the Soviets perceive that the option presented here is not unrealistic. Pakistan is crucial to Soviet plans for a settlement in Afghanistan. Undermining the Zia regime by fomenting separatist rebellions may be perceived by Soviet leaders as one way of bolstering Soviet re-

38 gional status in Southwest Asia. For the Soviets, conditional with­ drawal from Afghanistan presupposes the viability of the Marxist regime there; this in turn presupposes improved relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

39 6 The Relationship between Military Doctrine and the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan

In the period since Marshal Andrei Grechko was replaced as defense minister (1976--1981), certain tenets of Soviet military doctrine show continuity, while others reflect change. 1 Doctrinal changes include: (1) an enhanced role for the Communist party in formulating military doctrine and in directing other aspects of Soviet military affairs; (2) an alteration in the types of war postulated: a greater stress on and sophistication in treating civil wars, an expansion of national liber­ ation struggles, an upgrading in importance of civil wars and national liberation struggles as "just" conflicts (in comparison with wars in defense of socialism) and a redefinition of defensive socialist wars and of "unjust" wars to include imperialist efforts to restore capi­ talism in newly established socialist states; (3) a recognition of the possibility of a local war initiated by the Soviet Union (as well as by an enemy nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological attack) and acknowl­ edgement that a war can remain local in scope even if waged by rival military alliances; (4) an escalation doctrine directed to a great extent toward discouraging a Western drive for military superiority; (5) an increased emphasis on the Warsaw Pact armies in military defense planning; (6) a renewed emphasis that the Soviet Armed Forces must rally all "antiimperialist" forces in the world in the struggle against the West; (7) a deemphasis on a war-waging capability; and (8) a preemption strategy directed toward a possible attack from the East (ChinalJapan) and toward preventing the West from gaining military superiority over the Soviet Union and its allies. Can the above doctrinal changes be associated with the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan? The increased role of the Communist

1 For an in-depth exposition of these doctrinal changes, see the author's forthcoming book on Soviet military doctrine, chapter 4. For a recent example of how the, Soviets perceive their military doctrine and the military doctrine of the West, see Krasnaya Zvezda, January 15, 1980.

40 party over military affairs in the Soviet Union indicates not only that the decision to intervene in Afghanistan was a political one, but that some military leaders may have opposed such a move. It appears that top Soviet military leaders, such as Marshals N.V. Ogarkovand V.G. Kulikov, General I.G. Pavlovskiy, and other members of the Soviet high command supported the move, but lower-ranking offi­ cers and soldiers may have opposed the intervention. Although the evidence for this assertion is not abundant, we do know that at a military conference of the Soviet high command, held in Moscow on June 3, 1980, the issue of raising the educational role of the armed forces was the main theme. Ogarkov made a presentation, "In the Interests of Increasing Combat Readiness," which discussed the problem of raising the morale-political and ideological level of the troops.2 Little was said, however, about the military aspects of Soviet training. Moreover, certain units of a military command (not cited) were severely criticized for their low military discipline. Political officers of the military districts located closest to Afghanistan made statements emphasizing the strengthening of the morale-political firmness of the troops. Captain V.V. Caplan, a political officer of the Far Eastern Military District, stressed the importance of waging an uncompromising struggle with "bourgeois and Maoist ideology and morale," and inculcating within Soviet troops "true political views on events occurring within the country and abroad and maintaining class hatred toward the enemies of our Fatherland...."3 General A.A. Epishev, head of the Main Political Administration, the party's arm within the armed forces, announced that more hours per week will be spent in the future on the education of Soviet troops, that is, the study of Marxist-Leninist ideology, including the antiimpe­ rialist theme.4 This emphasis may reflect an apprehension among top Soviet leaders that Soviet troops may not fully understand all the circumstances surrounding the Soviet intervention in Afghani­ stan and their continued presence there. There is evidence that more Soviet theorists posit a war as a viable tool of state policy than before 1976. Statements made by Colonel V. Vorobiev in early 1979 may be relevant to Afghanistan.

2 See N. Ogarkov, "In the Interests of Increasing Combat Readiness/' Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, no. 14 (July 1980), pp. 24-31. The morale-political preparation of Soviet troops includes the promotion of an acceptance of the policies of the Soviet government and party, of an understanding of the essence, character, and goals of a future war, the development of a Marxist-Leninist world view, the development of a Communist code of behavior, strict discipline, and a hatred' of the enemy. 3 Colonel V.V. Caplan, "The Komsomol Member, An Ideological Warrior," Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, no. 14 (July 1980), p. 63. 4 Epishev, Pravda, June 5, 1980.

41 Force can be employed because it is derived from the ruling class, and based on the higher principles of Socialism, on order and organization. Such a force can be justified only if it overcomes the resistance of reactionary forces and promotes the progressive development of society. And while it may suffer defeat, it will ultimately be victorious. [Emphasis added.]5 In another statement Colonel K. Vorobiev stated: Experience shows that only by using armed force can one defend the revolutionary conquests from the attacks of impe­ rialist interventionists, suppress the attacks of the enemies of social progress, and assure the development of acountry proceeding along a socialist path. [Emphasis added.]6 Since, according to the Soviet perception, the above course of events was occurring in Afghanistan, they had a doctrinal justification for intervening in that country: Force was justified because it was em­ ployed to protect a socialist country threatened from external and from internal enemies. The increased emphasis on war as a political instrument may therefore be associated with what the Soviets per­ ceived they might have to do-intervene in a local situation on their border. The current Soviet concept of civil wars stresses not only conflicts between the bourgeois and the proletarian classes, the traditional Marxist concept, but between the reactionary forces, aided by the Western powers and the progressive forces within a state. This con­ cept may have been postulated with newly developed socialist states, including Afghanistan, in mind. It is broader in scope than the or­ thodox Marxist-Leninist interpretation of civil wars, and it certainly fits the Soviet interpretation of events that have occurred in Af­ ghanistan. It takes account of possible conflicts in all states oriented toward socialism, and it may be an indication on the doctrinal level that Soviet leaders expect the West to attempt to undermine such new (and unstable) regimes. This conjecture is supported by the expansion of the Soviet concept of national liberation struggles to include Soviet efforts to

5 Colonel V. Vorobiev, Krasnaya Zvezda, September 6, 1979. 6 Colonel K. Vorobiev, "The Incarnation of Leninist Ideas on the Armed Defense of Socialism," Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, no. 1 (January 1980), p. 22. See also Major General L. Korzun, "The Military Organization of the Soviet State," Kommunist Vooru­ zhennykh Sil, no. 7 (April 1979), p. 9. This has been stated even more forcefully by other Soviet military writers: in mid-1979, Major General L. Korzun asserted that "only by force ... can the great historical problems be solved, ..." "The Military Organization of the Soviet State," Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, no. 7 (April 1979), p.9.

42 strengthen local armies against possible Western incursions. It is also supported by the broadening of the concept of wars in defense of socialism to include the defense of not only established socialist states, such as the Soviet Union, but also those states that are build­ ing socialism, and thus defending themselves against counter rev­ olutionary attacks, such as Afghanistan. Such conflicts are considered just by Soviet military theorists and may be fought by the Soviet Union. The multinational character of wars in defense of socialism­ a new feature of such conflicts-may be related to a Soviet appre­ hension of a growing lack of unity among the nations constituting the Soviet Union. Thus, a war fought to prevent a nation or ethnic group from seceding from the Soviet Union would be just. In sum, this expansion of the definition of just wars in defense of socialism may reflect a growing uneasiness within Soviet political and military circles that they may be called upon to prevent certain national groups, such as the Muslims in Central Asia, from breaking away from the Soviet Union. But a caveat is in order: It is impossible to ascertain whether this doctrinal alteration was the result of a Soviet perception of potential national disunity, and thus a convenient ra­ tionalization for coping with the problem, or whether doctrine shaped the perception. It is difficult to interpret the shift discernible in Soviet operational art-the stress on concealed mobilization and the delivery of surprise strikes, and the postulate that war may be initiated by enemy chem­ ical and bacteriological, as well as by nuclear or conventional attack. Pertinent statements on Soviet operational art appeared well before the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. 7 The inclusion of chemical and bacteriological warfare in Soviet doctrine in 1980 (although im­ puted to the West) may indeed reflect the Soviet employment, or potential employment, of bacteriological weapons in Afghanistan. 8 Imputation of a particular tactic or of a weapons system to the West is often Soviet camouflage to shroud its own adoption of that tactic or system.

7 For example, see Colonel General F. Gaivoronskiy, "The Development of Soviet Operational Art," Voyenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal, no. 2 (February 1978), pp. 19-26. 8 According to Western intelligence, each Soviet division is equipped with a full com­ plement of chemical-biological-radiological warfare decontamination units. Time, Jan­ uary 28, 1980. The Soviets have denied that they are employing chemical weapons in Afghanistan. Krasnaya Zvezda, March 7, 1980. If they are using such agents in Afghanistan, their assertions that U.S. officials plan to increase spending on the development of such substances may be an attempt to deflect international (and domestic) attention from Soviet use of such weapons in Afghanistan. For Soviet accusations that the United States is employing such weapons see Krasnaya Zvezda, July 19, 1980; Pravda, April 10, June 2, August 21, 1980.

43 Alteration in the Soviet concept of a local war to include wars fought by coalitions of states, such as the Warsaw Pact and NATO, clearly suggests that Moscow believes that a war can remain local in scope regardless of the number of participants. It is tempting to speculate that this doctrinal alteration was made so that, if the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, a Western response in Europe, involving NATO and the Warsaw Pact forces, could remain restricted. This is closely related to the changes that have occurred in the Soviet concept of escalation-it is now the scope of the conflict, the nature of weap­ ons used, and the state of the arms race that are considered the most vital factors of escalation. If the war remains restricted in geography and in weapons utilized (as in Afghanistan), it will not escalate into an all-out, nuclear, superpower war. But if the arms race continues, the Soviets will threaten escalation of the war in Afghanistan into a strategic nuclear war. That they have so far not done so (a form of blackmail) suggests that the Soviets feel that they can match the West's military technological achievements. Thus, Soviet leaders still assess the risks of escalation to be quite high, especially in situations that might bring the Soviet armed forces into direct conflict with those of the United States. The duration of war thesis, which began to be debated around 1978 (the year when the Marxist regime was installed in Afghanistan), may be related to events in Afghanistan. Although it is customary for Western strategists to interpret this issue in terms of a global, superpower war, or as a war in Europe, Soviet theorists may have had states oriented toward socialism in mind during the debates. In such states, for the most part located in less developed areas of the world, conflicts might become protracted, especially if indigenous guerrillas (in Marxist language, counterrevolutionaries) were trained by outside forces to overthrow a weak socialist regime. It is thus possible that debate over this issue has reflected uncertainty among Soviet military/political leaders over the likelihood of such conflicts and the extent of Soviet participation in them. It may also reflect the Soviet's uncertainty about their probable success in quelling an up­ rising in a country like Afghanistan. Some Soviet military thinkers may have argued that the intervention could be conducted quickly and with relatively little bloodshed, as it was in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Others, acutely aware of the Afghan's fierce independence and resilience, and the lack of a mass base for the Marxist regime there, may have had serious doubts about such an outcome. Soviet reluctance to claim victory in war, discernible beginning around 1977, is probably related to Moscow's awareness of the West's perceptions of the growing Soviet military threat, as well as to grow-

44 ing Western military strength. Since the U.S.S.R. does not want to appear superconfident of victory in war (since this would cause the West to increase its military spending), this alteration in doctrine has probably been shaped by a Soviet desire to encourage the West to cut back its spending for strategic and tactical weapons. It may, however, also be linked to Afghanistan. While Afghanistan cannot compare to the advanced Western states in military technology, weaponry, and manpower, the Soviets have had no experience since World War II in fighting in such rugged terrain as that in Afghani­ stan. 9 They closely studied the American experience in Vietnam and concluded that a preponderance in weapons and manpower, while important, is not sufficient to defeat a resilient people (such as the Afghans). The reluctance to claim victory in a future war, evident in Soviet doctrinal statements since 1977, suggests that the Soviets intervened in Afghanistan at a time when they felt compelled to do so for reasons cited earlier. The Soviets have been known since Lenin's time for their penchant for caution. They will not attempt military action unless they are reasonably certain of victory. Soviet reluctance to claim victory in war reflects this caution. The shift in the Soviet doctrine on the character and functions of the Soviet armed forces-it is multinational, and must protect the Soviet homeland and socialist conquests in the world-reflects changes in Soviet defense priorities. Virtually all national liberation struggles have already been waged, and new states established. The newly created socialist regimes must be maintained, protected, and solidified. Furthermore, the Soviet Union sees itself surrounded by a belt of increasingly numerous and powerful states. The U.S.S.R. and the new socialist regimes (socialist conquests) must be defended. In practical terms, this means that the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet armed forces, and the armies of the newly created socialist states must be strengthened. The shift in doctrine on this point may, in addition, reflect a growing Soviet apprehension that all nations of the Soviet Union must be protected against possible fissiparous tendencies. 10

9 Half desert, half mountains, Afghanistan covers a high, landlocked patch of Central Asia almost the size of Texas. 10 A significant shift in Soviet views on the organizational structure of the Soviet armed forces has recently occurred: The territorial-militia form of organization, long eschewed by Soviet military planners and theorists, is apparently being reconsidered as an organizational option, along with the present form of cadre (regular army). This could mean that Soviet leaders believe that quickly mobilized local military units may have to be organized to put down disturbances in Soviet border areas or in local wars. After moving into Afghanistan, the Soviets strengthened some of their low-readiness' units along the border with Iran to cut mobilization time. This would also reduce warning time for the United States in the future. For the doctrinal shift, see Major General L. Korzun, "The Military Organization of the Soviet State," Kommunist Vooru­ zhennykh Sil, no. 7 (April 1979), p. 12.

45 This is one reason why events in Afghanistan were perceived as so important to Soviet leaders. One of the functions of the Soviet armed forces is to prevent any Soviet republic, or ethnic group, from seced­ ing from the U.S.S.R. The Muslim populations in Central Asia seem to be most vulnerable. It is extremely difficult to say if the alterations observed in the Soviet principles of military building since 1976 can be related to events in Afghanistan. For one thing, these changes have been slight. The concept of the harmonious development of all branches of the armed forces, for example, has not been repeated in subsequent formulations since 1978. Socialist and proletarian internationalism have been merged into one principle, replacing proletarian interna­ tionalism (1977) and socialist internationalism (1978), which were separate elements in earlier presentations. Socialist internationalism was introduced as a principle in early 1978. It may reflect Soviet efforts to protect not only Eastern bloc states (proletarian interna­ tionalism), but also those states oriented toward socialism (including Afghanistan). Hence, the stress on socialist internationalism may reflect a Soviet perception of the importance and vulnerability of newly created socialist regimes. The new principle of friendship of nations, now merged with both socialist and proletarian internation­ alism, may indicate that the diverse nations of the Soviet Union must be protected by both the Warsaw Pact armies and the Soviet armed forces. The following statement, made by Colonel G. Gusev in mid­ 1980, may shed some light on the new Soviet emphasis on the multinational nature of the Soviet armed forces with implications for Afghanistan:

V.1. Lenin considered that one of the characteristics of our army is that it is an army of proletarian internation~lism, an army of the friendship and brotherliness of the natzons of the U.S.S.R. About forty non-Russian nations were deprived by tsarism of the right to serve in the army.. Wit~ the vic!ory of the October revolution, they for the fIrst tIme receIved weapons, the actual right to protect the Fatherland and their freedom. [Emphasis added.pl

The article, written by Captain First Class N. Shumikhin in early October 1980, may also have implications for Afghanistan, as well as for national groups in the U.S.S.R.:

11 Colonel G. Gusev, /lV.I. Lenin-The Creator of the Soviet Armed Forces," Kommunist Voorzhennykh Sil, no. 14 (July 1980), p. 87.

46 The Armed Forces of the U.S.S.R. were and are a great school of internationalism-a school for the education of feelings of brotherhood, solidarity, and mutual respect of all nations and national groupings. "Our Armed Forces,­ stated comrade L.I. Brezhnev-are a united friendly family, a living manifestation of socialist internationalism."12 Most of the troops that took part in the Soviet invasion of Afghan­ istan-at least during the initial phases-were from non-Russian na­ tions (Uzbeks, Tadzhiks, Kazakhs, and Turkmen). The Soviets are particularly concerned about convincing these troops that their first allegiance is to the U.S.S.R., rather than to Afghan Uzbeks and Muslims. It appears that one of the reasons for the recent emphasis on the multinational character of tIle armed forces in Soviet military doctrine, closely linked with the educational role of the armed forces, is not only to build a more cohesive armed forces, but to ensure that the young soldier will, during his term of service, faithfully serve his homeland-the U.S.S.R.-and continue to support it after his discharge. The deemphasis in Soviet doctrinal statements on a war-waging capability mayor may not be related to events occurring in Afghan­ istan. It is arguable that such a deemphasis was intended to lull the West-on both the political and the military levels-into a false sense of security. It may have been a screen to shroud the Soviet intention to intervene in Afghanistan. It is also possible that Soviet muting of its war-waging capability was intended to be communicated to the West, but that it had nothing to do with Afghanistan. It can be argued that this shift was designed to undermine the West's per­ ception of the growing Soviet military threat in order to reach an accommodation with the United States and Western Europe over arms reductions. But the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, by pro­ viding a potential precedent for using Soviet troops outside of its East European empire, has compelled the West to view the Soviet Union as troublesome and threatening, not only to the United States, but to the rest of the world. If this analysis is correct, it implies that the doctrinal change had little to do with events in Afghanistan but was designed to foster a Western perception of the Soviet Union as a state striving for peace. Soviet leaders must by now realize their miscalculation. It is difficult to associate the changes in the Soviet doctrine on preemption, observed since 1976, with the Soviet invasion of Af­ ghanistan. The functions of this doctrine, which is supposed to frus-

12 Captain First Class N. Shumikhin, Krasnaya Zvezda, October 9, 1980.

47 trate the aggressive plans of imperialism, include: (1) decelerating the arms race; (2) preventing the formation of Western military blocks; (3) reducing the establishment of American military bases around the world; (4) reducing the influence of military-industrial complexes in Western states; (5) discouraging the use of Western armies for expansionist and interventionist purposes; and (6) "play­ ing the Chinese card." All of these have probably backfired on the Soviets. In other words, each of the above plans, seen as threatening to the Soviet Union because they represent a Western attempt to achieve military superiority vis-a-vis the Soviet Union (change the "correlation of forces" in favor of capitalism), has been pursued, and it can be expected that they will be pursued with greater intensity in the future. Yet, the aspect of Soviet preemptive strategy that has focused on China/}apan13 may have implications for Afghanistan. For if the Soviets believe, however falsely, that China intends to launch an attack against the Soviet Union, it might be felt in Moscow that it was feasible and necessary to secure Russia's southern border with Afghanistan before launching a preemptive attack against China. This would provide the Soviets with some security along their Afghan border in case of war with China.

13 The Sino-American rapprochement---called "partnership" in current Soviet par­ lance-is described as an extremely dangerous development for all the peoples of the world. Pravda, June 24, 1980. The Soviets are also becoming increasingly apprehensive of a growing U.S.-Japanese alliance directed at them. Krasnaya Zvezda, July 31, 1980.

48 7 Policy Options for the West

There are several options open to the West regarding the Soviet presence in Afghanistan as well as in adjacent areas. Some of these options overlap and, thus, should not be considered mutually ex­ clusive. These include: (1) continued build-up of American/Western military forces in Southwest Asia and elsewhere, as well as the continued supply of Western allies (ChinalJapan/Pakistan/South Ko­ rea/and NATO states) with military and economic technologies; (2) continued imposition of economic and other sanctions against the Soviet Union; (3) search for a political solution in Afghanistan aimed at the creation of an independent state under international super­ vision; (4) agreement to certain concessions to the U.S.S.R. such as the acceptance of Afghanistan, like Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, and other states in Eastern Europe, as part of the Soviet sphere of influence, or the granting to the Soviet Union of the same economic, political, and diplomatic benefits that have been extended to the People's Republic of China, and (5) slowing down of the American military build-up and a reduction of arms in general. Option three may not be feasible because there is ample evidence that Soviet leaders will not accept an independent Afghanistan operating under international supervision. Clearly, the Soviets want to establish and are establishing a Soviet protectorate in Afghanistan and would not accept any other solution that might jeopardize this status. To Mos­ cow, Afghanistan has become "nonaligned," which means that So­ viet leaders already consider it part of their sphere of influence and not part of the West's. Recognition by the West of Afghanistan as part. of the Soviet sphere of influence, therefore, may be considered totally unrealistic. Moreover, such a recognition could prove highly costly in political terms-both domestic and international-for the Reagan administration. Such a move by the West-tantamount to acquiescence to a Soviet policy move-could embolden Soviet deci-

49 sion makers to pursue even more aggressive policy moves in the future. Thus, this option lacks substance and could backfire on the West. The granting to the Soviet Union of concessions in the hope that detente will be promoted is admirable but does not seem particularly feasible as an option for the West at this time. This is so since there are still deep divisions between the superpowers on a broad range of issues. Further, the Soviet Union has not surrendered its ideo­ logical ambitions, nor its conflict mind-set. Thus, the Soviet concept of detente is not identical with Western bourgeois-liberal ideas on the subject. According to the Soviets, detente does not preclude but presupposes nonpeaceful as well as peaceful forms of struggle, and that even during detente, certain types of struggle-national liber­ ation struggles and civil wars-should be supported by the Soviet Union. Detente with the Soviet Union would not prevent Afghani­ stan and the rest of Southwestern Asia from becoming an interface in the global struggle between the two superpowers. While Marxist-Leninist prescriptions are extremely flexible, M. Suslov and other hawks in the Soviet Union playa large role in the interpretation of this body of thought. This, by itself, should dictate caution for the West and reduce exaggerated hopes of an early return to detente. In addition, the Peking-Washington relationship is a fait accompli, and the venom of Soviet-Chinese and Soviet-American re­ lations has not cooled. There are arguments that can be raised against the granting to the Soviet Union of the same economic, political, and diplomatic benefits that have been extended to the People's Republic of China. For example, a more modernized Soviet Union could be­ come an even more assertive state that might act in ways that do not always parallel American interests. Also, such concessions could undermine United States-China relations, a relationship that has evolved from that of a potential adversary to one of a diplomatic colleague and economic partner. A policy of attempting to be even­ handed toward both Peking and Moscow could diminish the increas­ ing convergence in Chinese and American national interests. We do not consider option number five (a slowing down of the American military build-up) feasible either, since it might encourage Soviet decision makers to undertake a more adventurous policy course. By reducing American military might, the risks of militancy in Soviet foreign policy would decline, and the main argument of Soviet moderates against their hard-line colleagues-detente is pref­ erable to a more aggressive foreign policy-would be undermined. 1

1 Morton Schwartz, Soviet Perceptions of the United States (Berkeley: University of Cali­ fornia Press, 1978), p. 167.

50 In other words, Soviet leaders must be convinced that aggression and a more adventurous foreign policy does not pay. In addition, a reduction of American military power at this time might lead to a loss of American credibility with its allies around the world, es­ pecially its NATO allies, who have been told that they must increase their own defense spending because of the increased Soviet military threat. Option five would undermine the confidence of U.S. allies in President Reagan, who has stated that he will not reduce American military spending. In addition, such a reduction in U.S. power could contribute to a further lessened confidence in Western power on the part of Third World nations. The American withdrawal from Vietnam and the Guam doctrine, as well as the decline in Western military capabilities-not only American, but British and other Western mil­ itary capabilities as well-vis-a-vis the Soviet military power has already led to a reduced confidence in American military power in Third World states. Further, while an abatement of the arms race is desirable, there is little chance that the Soviets, given their paranoia, their need for security, and their large military forces, coupled with their conflict model of international politics, will agree to a reduction in arms. The momentum of the Soviet arms build-up, resulting in ever-improving Soviet military capabilities, is a clear indication of this. Other options we have not mentioned, such as the unleashing of American military forces against the Soviet Union, against the Warsaw Pact forces, or in areas adjacent to Afghanistan, are too unrealistic to be considered.

51 8 Policy Suggestions for the West

Great caution needs to be exercised in offering policy suggestions for Western decision makers, not only because of the volatility of South­ west Asia-an area in the world that probably presents greater chal­ lenges to peace than any other-but because all too little is known about what goes on in the minds of Soviet decision makers. Indeed, much of the conduct of foreign affairs in both Washington and Mos­ cow remains hidden behind the barriers of secrecy. Before turning to some policy suggestions, let us examine some of the more salient principles guiding Soviet foreign policy. Soviet foreign policy makers are basically insecure and also sensitive about being treated as an inferior power, Russian and Soviet history and Marxist-Leninist ideology having reinforced these feelings. 1 The dis­ cord that has erupted between China and the Soviet Union over strategy, tactics, ideology, and common borders has become perhaps the most significant political feature of the second half of this century. The key factor in determining global events is the "correlation of forces" between the two opposing blocs. The Soviet Union has tra­ ditionally been reluctant to allow any vacuum filled with a socialist state to change back to a more democratic or capitalist form of gov­ ernment. Soviet leaders tend to view the world in bipolar terms, that is, imperialism led by the United States, and communism led by the Soviet Union. Given their conflict mind-set, which stresses conflict in international relations, Soviet leaders view the United States and the non-Communist West in general as aggressive and opposed to all Soviet policy moves that are described as peaceful. The Soviets believe that the "correlation of forces" has shifted to favor the so­ cialist bloc since World War II. The Soviet Union excludes what it calls "support for struggles of national liberation" from its profession

1 See Jerry F. Hough, "The Soviet Succession," Washington Post, April 17, 1977.

52 of support for "peaceful coexistence." In other words, the Soviet Union reserves for itself the right to interfere in the internal affairs of nonaligned countries. Last, Kremlin leaders perceive regional areas to be important factors in determining the global balance of forces. 2 Thus, an area such as Southwest Asia is seen as a reflection in a regional context of the global conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. While some in the West may quarrel with the assumptions underlying these principles, they constitute the Soviet's Weltanschauung (world view) and guide Soviet foreign policy. What are the implications for the West, and the United States in particular, of the above features of Soviet foreign policy, and what policy suggestions can one legitimately draw from them? One policy proposal for the West would be that the United States present a strong image to the Soviet Union (and to the rest of the world). Specifically, this would mean keeping military force levels at current or higher strength in Southwest Asia, deploying new weapons sys­ tems in Western Europe as planned, maintaining U.S. bases around the world, and continuing rapprochement with China. Actions speak more clearly than words and are far more convincing. Thus, increases in defense budgets, modernization of military forces in various West­ ern states, increased availability of trained manpower are all mes­ sages the Kremlin can understand and cannot fail to take seriously, and speak louder than a cacophony of political statements-which the Kremlin would probably distort for propaganda purposes. Whether or not the messages to the Soviet Union are convincing depends on the Kremlin's perception of the political will and military capability of the non-Communist world, and especially its strongest states, to resist further Soviet policy initiatives. Thus, an image of a powerful United States must be projected. It is essential that Moscow leaders perceive a determined U.S. national will, one that possesses credi­ bility abroad and domestic backing in the United States. This should influence the Kremlin's assessments of the risks and opportunities associated with policy options open to them. Such steps could make clear to the Soviets-and to Cuba and to East Germany-the costs of gross international misconduct and the limits of tolerance on the part of Western states. This firm approach is all the more crucial, since recent Soviet statements have portrayed the United States as a country seriously lacking in credibility-hence the vigorous Soviet campaign to pres­ sure America's West European allies to "reconsider" their decision to allow the deployment of U.S.-made medium-range missiles on

2 Kohler, Goure, Harvey, The Soviet Union and the October 1973 Middle East War, pp. 22-23.

53 their soil. U.S. policy makers have been perceived in Moscow as affected by a post-Vietnam, isolationist-militaristic syndrome, which makes them either lacking in will or prone to overreacting to situa­ tions. Further, given the Soviets' belief that the "correlation of forces" favors them, with its implications for potentialities for advance, they may be tempted to increase their influence in Southwest Asia and in other areas. Also, the Soviets, no longer inhibited by networks of economic and political-diplomatic interests, fashioned during the years of detente, may be tempted to "push" around the world, especially in Southern Africa, and possibly in Southwest Asia. It can be argued that President Carter's doctrine, advanced in early 1980, as well as the economic sanctions imposed against the U.S.S.R., were steps in the direction of promoting this approach. This doctrine, forceful and tough, left no doubt in Moscow's mind that Southwest Asia is an area the United States considers of major economic and strategic importance. The build-up of American forces in that area represents a sustained policy for keeping the area stable and prosperous. In sum, the United States must project an image sufficiently strong to contain Soviet policy moves and to convince Soviet leaders that the United States means business. At the same time, Soviet moderates must be convinced that the United States would welcome a return to detente-as long as the security of the United States is not undermined. It would be claiming far too much, however, to say that the above proposal would be well received in Moscow. So why is it being suggested? First, the policy proposed should strengthen u.S. leadership at home and abroad-a leadership that has foundered badly in its own domestic disunity and in the disunity among its allies. From the Soviet side, it is possible to envisage developments in which the Soviet leadership may be convinced that the United States means what it says and that it (the Soviet government) should think twice before attempting another Afghanistan gambit. Also, a strong, resolute America should dissuade Moscow hard liners from undertaking a more adventurous policy course. In contrast, a weak­ ening of the U.S. military position would tend to undermine the political position of Soviet moderates. By reducing U.S. military power, the risks of militancy on the part of the Soviet Union would decline, and the main argument of Soviet moderates-detente is preferable to a more aggressive foreign policy-would be weakened. 3 Finally, a militarily strong United States need not necessarily per­ suade Moscow that the United States and its allies intend to attack

3 Schwartz, Soviet Perceptions of the United States. p. 167.

54 the Soviet Union or to engage in other actions perceived as threat­ ening by Moscow. If Moscow leaders believe that the "correlation of forces" favors them, they should expect countermeasures; in this case, a Western response to the Soviet move in Afghanistan. The above proposal, of course, contains a fundamental and se­ rious potential danger: It might confirm the Soviet image of the United States, held by many in Moscow, as aggressive and imperi­ alistic, and this conviction might compel the Soviet Union to increase its own military power even more. This argument lacks substance for the following reasons. The Soviet Union has been steadily in­ creasing its own military power over the past decade or so, with little apparent concern for the security interests of the West. Further, given the image, held by Moscow, of an inherently aggressive, ex­ pansionist West, which seeks to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union, coupled with the Marxist-Leninist conflict model of international politics, there is little doubt that the Soviets will con­ tinue to increase their military capabilities, regardless of what the West does. Under such circumstances, the West has little to lose­ and much to gain-by increasing its defense spending. What is needed is a resurgence of commitment, proven by action, on the part of the West, to guarantee the security of nations against further Soviet foreign policy initiatives. In the final analysis, this approach assumes that a militarily strong America is the best guarantee of peace. The actual capability of U.S. military forces, as well as the credibility of the determination on the part of the United States to use those forces must be refurbished. The second proposal pertains to Third World nations. 4 The United States should embark upon a more dynamic policy toward Third World countries, one credible to leaders in such areas, as well as to leaders in the Soviet Union, China, and other Communist states. The Soviet presence in Afghanistan, and its subsequent trans­ formation into a Soviet protectorate, constitutes a threat to the in­ dependence and security of other nations in Southwest Asia. The establishment of a "nonaligned" Afghanistan, with the possibility of the extension of Soviet influence in such states as Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan, means the heightened possibility of regional unrest. Each regional area should be evaluated with three broad considerations in mind: the dynamics of political and economic change in the area; the diminution of Western influence; and the high probability of probes by the Soviet Union to increase its influence there. American

4 The author is indebted for these ideas to Harlan Cleveland and Andrew J. Good­ paster, After Afghanistan-The Long Haul (Washington: The Atlantic Council of the United States, 1980), especially pp. 11-15, 34-41.

55 policy makers should ascertain the degree to which each of the above factors is present in an area and indicate which measures would be the most useful. While the likelihood of a Soviet-American confron­ tation over such matters as oil supplies and trade routes is certainly potentially serious, the possibility of such a confrontation is reduced as long as the global/regional balance of power is maintained. On the other hand, possible Soviet domination of Third World countries may be a greater threat to the West. Three steps could be taken by the United States to foster closer ties between the United States and Third World countries. (1) Peaceful ties must be estab­ lished between the West and such countries by economic and political means-increased trade, investment, and aid, as well as the recog­ nition of the independen.ce of each country and its right to determine its own political system and domestic/foreign policies. (2) Support of domestic change, even if this means supporting an opposition faction to the ruling regime and relinquishing ties with an oppressive regime. For too long, the United States has been identified with feudalism and counterrevolution in the minds of many, thus con­ firming Marxist-Leninist ideological prescriptions. (3) Western sup­ port must be extended to Third World nations to countervail exter­ nally .supported military pressures. The lesson of Afghanistan should not be forgotten. Failure of the West to extend aid to that country was a major factor in its turning to the Soviet Union for help. Hence, inactivity can be a dangerous policy. We must keep in mind that the Soviets, with their conflict model of international politics, and their doctrine that they must support national liberation struggles against "imperialist oppression," will not remain inactive. Can we afford to allow the status of a particular country, as well as that of a regional balance, to be determined by default? In other words, no matter what the motive for the recent Soviet intervention in Afghanistan-whether it was one step in a grand design of global expansionism, or whether it was a local response to problems on Soviet borders-the Soviet Union must be viewed as troublesome and threatening to Western interests. This is all the more true, given the growing dimensions of Soviet military power in the strategic area, in European conventional and nuclear forces, and in the ability to project its power more effectively. What is disturbing is the distinct possibility that the Soviet Union, with its larger naval force and the capability to move its troops rapidly through airlift, may be now more willing to intervene directly in lands more distant from its borders. A final proposal per~ains to the long-term relationship that the United States seeks to create witl1 the Soviet Union in the 1980s.

56 Because of differences in social systems, ideologies, national inter­ ests, and the growing dimensions of Soviet military capabilities over a broad spectrum, the Soviet Union must be viewed in the West as a potential adversary. This assumes that the West in general, and the United States in particular, avoid any aid to Soviet economic development, let alone military cooperation. This writer is not per­ suaded that a return to detente is a promising proposal, unless Western policy makers are willing to accept the Soviet interpretation of this concept-which is highly unlikely. Perhaps the best approach for the Reagan administration is to adopt a tough, consistent, but flexible pattern of behavior. This would combine a continuous mil­ itary build-up on the part of the United States with dialogue on minor areas where very limited agreements with the Soviet Union could be consummated. But such agreements should not be linked with other more troublesome issue areas. The United States must generate the will and intention to maintain and strengthen its military forces commensurate with its superpower status. This is all the more important since the Soviets, by their move into Afghanistan, have demonstrated that they place greater reliance on their military power. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan may be a precedent for future Soviet action,. and the West should be alert to forestalling such moves.

57 9 Conclusion

The purpose of this study was to examine the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979-1980 and to answer some questions about that intervention. Does the history of Russia/the Soviet Union support the notion that tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union intended to em­ ploy Afghanistan as a step in the expansion of Russian/Soviet power? The history of Russia suggests a pattern of Russian expansion into Central Asia. British and Afghan leaders feared that Russia might expand into Afghanistan. Russian leaders were afraid that Britain would encroach upon Russian commercial interests in Central Asia. After World War II, both the United States and the Soviet Union attempted to extend their influence in Afghanistan; the U.S.S.R. was the more successful. Beginning in April 1978, Soviet influence and the Soviet presence in Afghanistan increased greatly as a result of a coup that brought Taraki's Marxist party to power. Under the subsequent regimes of Amin and Karmal, Soviet influence grew even greater. Why did the Soviet Union intervene in Afghanistan at a time when the probable costs of such a move were so high? While Soviet motives are difficult to assess because of the secrecy surrounding Soviet decision making, four factors were crucial in the Soviet de­ cision to intervene in Afghanistan: (1) a need to secure the Soviet southern border, especially because of the unstable political situation in Iran and the growing Sino-Western rapprochement; (2) the pos­ sible ascendancy of hard-line elements within Soviet decision-making -circles in the wake of the numerous political/diplomatic setbacks suffered by the Soviet Union; (3) a Soviet belief that Hafizullah Amin, leader of the Afghan Communist party and government from Sep­ tember 1979 to December 1979, would either be overthrown by anti­ Soviet forces in Afghanistan or would remain in power but pursue policies incompatible with Soviet interests in Afghanistan and South-

58 west Asia in general; and (4) the need to maintain a credible presence in Southwest Asia, which would promote Soviet influence in that and other areas of the world, and at the same time reduce American influence. What are the consequences of the Soviet action, in terms of international politics, Soviet-American relations, the nature of the international system, and of internal Soviet politics? One conse­ quence of the Soviet action is clear: It has led to a recrudescence of the cold war, prevalent in the 1950s and the 1960s. Now, however, the danger of escalation into war has risen sharply, to a great extent as a result of the growing military power of the Soviet Union. Pros­ pects for a resumption of an improved atmosphere between the two superpowers are not bright. Another consequence of the Soviet ac­ tion is that it appears to have moved the struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union back to the forefront of international relations, a place it occupied during the earlier cold war. Further, in the wake of the Soviet military action in Afghanistan, Soviet leaders may now place more emphasis on the militant aspects of their pol­ icies, both domestic and international, than was prevalent during the late 1960s and in the 1970s. What influence, if any, did Soviet military doctrine have on the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan? It was found that certain aspects of Soviet military doctrine may have been influential in prompting the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, while others were either of marginal or no significance. The role of the Communist party over the Soviet armed forces has been increasing steadily for some time, so that may be considered a contributing factor in the Soviet inter­ vention-firm party control may have convinced some military lead­ ers that the Soviet intervention was necessary. In addition, the doc­ trinal tenets concerning war as an instrument of policy, civil wars, local wars, national liberation struggles, defensive socialist conflicts, and the character and functions of the Soviet armed forces seem to be most relevant to Afghanistan. These provided a doctrinal justi­ fication for the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, a commitment to support the Marxist regime there, a belief that military action against Afghanistan would not result in escalation to a higher level of con­ flict, and a belief that the Soviet armed forces must protect all nations of the U.S.S.R. against the possibility of some ethnic groups, or whole republics, breaking away from the Soviet Union. It is difficult to ascertain whether the other doctrinal changes since 1976 had an influence on the Soviet decision to intervene. Policy suggestions have been offered for the West. Despite the hardening of Soviet-American relations, the West must project an

59 image of strength and resolve. This is based on the assumption that a strong United States military is the best guarantee for preventing war. Another proposal is that the United States pursue a more dy­ namic policy in Third World countries in order to prevent them from falling into the Soviet orbit-a development that could embolden Moscow to embark upon even more adventurous foreign policy moves. The Reagan administration should adopt a firm, consistent, and flexible approach toward the Soviet Union. Underlying all these proposals is the assumption that the United States must demonstrate the credibility of its determination to maintain a strong military and to use military force if necessary.

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