DOCSLIB.ORG

Read the Full PDF

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Read the Full PDF Job Name:2176826 Date:15-03-04 PDF Page:2176826pbc.p1.pdf Color: Cyan Magenta Yellow Black TheSoviei IDterveDtioa iD AfghanistaD Alfred L.lIonks American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research Washington and London Distributed to the Trade by National Book Network, 15200 NBN Way, Blue Ridge Summit, PA 17214. To order call toll free 1-800-462-6420 or 1-717-794-3800. For all other inquiries please contact the AEI Press, 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 or call 1-800-862-5801. Alfred L. Monks is associate professor of political science at the University of Wyoming. ISBN 0-8447-3431-4 Library of Congress Catalog Card No. 81-65770 AEI Studies 314 © 1981 by the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C., and London. All rights reserved. No part of this publi­ cation may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without per­ mission in writing from the American Enterprise Institute except in the case of brief quotations embodied in news articles, critical articles, or reviews. The views expressed in the publications of the American Enterprise Institute are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the staff, advisory panels, officers, or trustees of AEI. "American Enterprise Institute" and @) are registered service marks of the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. Printed in the United States of America Contents 1 INTRODUCTION 1 2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 2 SOVIET MOTIVES FOR THE INTERVENTION IN 3 AFGHANISTAN 18 Soviet Security 20 Hard-line Elements in the Ascendancy within Soviet Decision-Making Circles 22 Hafizullah Amin and the Political Situation in Afghanistan 26 The Soviets and the Regional Balance in Southwest Asia 28 CONSEQUENCES OF THE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN 4 AFGHANISTAN 31 5 SOVIET OPTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN 35 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MILITARY DOCTRINE AND 6 THE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN 40 7 POLICY OPTIONS FOR THE WEST 49 8 POLICY SUGGESTIONS FOR THE WEST 52 9 CONCLUSION 58 AFGHANISTAN AND NEIGHBORING REGIONS SOURCE: Adapted from "Russian Advances in Central Asia," Louis Dupree, Afghanistan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), p. 324, and "Afghanistan," Ludwig Adamec, Afghanistan's Foreign Relations to the Mid-Twentieth Century (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1974), p. x. 1 Introduction A complete analysis of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in late 1979 must wait until enough time passes for that event to be eval­ uated in terms of long-range Soviet military and political objectives. Meanwhile, we may trace the history of Russian/Soviet-Afghan re­ lations, we may consider why the U.S.S.R. acted as it did, and we may discuss the intervention as it relates to wider considerations of global policies and of Soviet military doctrine. The following ques­ tions will be examined in this study: (1) Do Russian and Soviet history offer evidence to support the notion that tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union intended to employ Afghanistan as an instrument to further Russian/Soviet goals? (2) Why did the Soviet Union invade another country at a time so politically and diplomatically unpropi­ tious? (3) What are the consequences-both international and do­ mestic-of the Soviet move into Afghanistan? (4) Did Soviet military doctrine have any influence on the Soviet intervention in Afghani­ stan? (5) What are the political options for the West in the wake of the Soviet action, and what policy suggestions can be offered? 1 2 Historical Background The history of Russian/Soviet-Afghan relations reveals a pattern of persistent Russian expansionism in Central Asia, and a concomitant fear from the nineteenth century onward, shared by both Britain and Afghanistan, that Russia might expand into neighboring Afghanistan. The British fear was shaped by an apprehension that Russia, having occupied several important areas in Central Asia, would turn south to Afghanistan, thus threatening British interests in that area. Afghan fears were motivated by the strong desires of Afghan rulers to build a neutral, independent, and economically viable state. This aim, intensified by the xenophobic tendencies of several of Afghanistan's early rulers, made Afghan apprehensions of an increasingly powerful Russia on their northern border understandable. Beginning in the nineteenth century, Afghanistan became the object of British-Russian imperial rivalries. 1 British apprehensions of Russia's long-range political and economic gains in Central Asia matched Russian fears of an extension of British influence from Af­ ghanistan into Central Asia, where Russia had important commercial interests. 2 Russia was also apprehensive that a revitalized Sunni 1 British-Russian rivalries began to center on Afghanistan as early as 1839, when the British, alarmed by Russia's support of Persian claims on Herat, invaded Afghanistan from India. British fears centered on an apprehension that Russia might be tempted to invade India through Afghanistan. Russia was primarily interested in Bukhara in Central Asia. Vartian Gregorian, The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan (Stanford: Stan­ ford University Press, 1969), p. 108. Another specialist states that British-Russian influence in Afghanistan began as early as 1828 after Persia had become a virtual Russian sphere of influence. See Ronald R. Rader, "The Russian Military and Af­ ghanistan: An Historical Perspective," Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual, David R. Jones, ed., vol. 4 (Gulf Breeze, Fla.: Academic International Press, 1980), p. 308. 2 Between 1758 and 1853 the- amount of Russia's exports to Central Asia increased twelve and one-half times, while the value of imports increased sixteen times. Between 1840 and 1860, the value of Russian trade with Central Asia doubled. Gregorian, Emergence of Modern Afghanistan, p. 102. 2 Muslim power in the recently conquered Central Asian khanates might form centers of potential Pan-Islamic uprisings, undermining Russia's recently acquired economic gains. The British-Russian trea­ ties of 1855 and 1857 strengthened the British position in Afghanistan and reduced possible Russian encroachments against Afghanistan. Despite these successes, there were deep divisions within British foreign policy circles regarding the proper policy to be pursued vis­ a-vis Afghanistan. These were sharpened as Russia made further advances in Central Asia, including political and economic gains in Khiva and Kokand in 1864, the capture of Tashkent in 1865, the annexation of Samarkand in 1869,3 and political and economic gains in Bukhara beginning in 1868. A temporary cessation of British-Rus­ sian rivalry in Afghanistan and Central Asia occurred in 1873, when the two powers concluded an agreement by which Russia recognized the northern and northwestern frontiers of Afghanistan and agreed to consider that country outside the Russian sphere of influence. In the same year, however, Russia occupied Khiva, and in 1875 occu­ pied Kokand. These events killed the British and Russian plan for a buffer zone between the British and Russian spheres of influence. According to the plan, Britain would have guaranteed the inde­ pendence of Kalat, Afghanistan, and Yarkand, and Russia would have guaranteed autonomy for Khiva, Kokand, and Bukhara. In 1874-1880, militant groups in both Russia and Britain came to power, and British-Russian rivalry in Central Asia and Afghanistan intensified. 4 British aims were to prevent further Russian advances in those areas, to protect India's border, and to bring Afghanistan under stricter British supervision and control. Russian aims were not so clear, since various groups advanced different positions. Some proposed that in the event of a British-Russian war in Europe, Russia should conclude an alliance with the Afghan amir (ruler) and then advance to India. Others proposed a policy of simultaneous support for rival claimants to the Afghan throne to foment internal unrest. An even more militant group proposed that the Transcaspian railroad be extended to the Afghan village of Herat in the northwest and to Kandahar in the south. They argued that this threat to India could paralyze British anti-Russian policies in Europe and might encourage Great Britain to conclude a mutually advantageous agreement with Russia over their conflicting European interests. The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, which resulted in sizable Russian gains, height- 3 This put Russian power at the Amu Oarya on the outer perimeter of a weak Af­ ghanistan state that by 1862 had been united tenuously under Oost Mohammed. Rader, "The Russian Military and Afghanistan," p. 309. 4 Gregorian, Emergence of Modern Afghanistan, pp. 108-110. 3 ened British fears of Russian long-range objectives and strengthened the position of those in England who favored a forward policy in Afghanistan. 5 On the other hand, the Second Anglo-Afghan War of 1879, which was the result of the British failure to obtain a diplomatic settlement with the Afghan amir assuring British influence in Af­ ghanistan and securing the Indian frontier, resulted in substantial benefits for the British in Afghanistan: the ouster of the anti-British ruler, Sher Ali, the acquisition of the strategic Afghan districts of Kurram Pass, Pishin, and Sibi, a permanent British representation in Afghanistan, supervision by the British of Afghan foreign affairs, and the transformation of Baluchistan into a British protectorate. The above developments led to a reexamination of British policy in Afghanistan. All proposals advanced in London to partition Af­ ghanistan into various principalities and to make Persia, rather than Afghanistan, the principal bulwark in the defense of India, were shelved, however, when the new Liberal government came to power. The new British policy toward Afghanistan was simple: to maintain a well-defined Indian frontier and to keep Afghanistan under British political control. The British accepted Abdur Rahman Khan as the new ruler of Afghanistan. While Rahman had full sovereignty over the internal affairs of his country, Britain retained full control over Afghanistan's foreign affairs, which it jealously guarded against in­ fluence from other powers, especially Russia.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Cuban Missile Crisis JCC: USSR
    asdf PMUNC 2015 Cuban Missile Crisis JCC: USSR Chair: Jacob Sackett-Sanders JCC PMUNC 2015 Contents Chair Letter…………………………………………………………………...3 Introduction……………….………………………………………………….4 Topics of Concern………………………...………………….………………6 The Space Race…...……………………………....………………….....6 The Third World...…………………………………………......………7 The Eastern Bloc………………………………………………………9 The Chinese Communists…………………………………………….10 De-Stalinization and Domestic Reform………………………………11 Committee Members….……………………………………………………..13 2 JCC PMUNC 2015 Chair’s Letter Dear Delegates, It is my great pleasure to give you an early welcome to PMUNC 2015. My name is Jacob, and I’ll be your chair, helping to guide you as you take on the role of the Soviet political elites circa 1961. Originally from Wilmington, Delaware, at Princeton I study Slavic Languages and Literature. The Eastern Bloc, as well as Yugoslavia, have long been interests of mine. Our history classes and national consciousness often paints them as communist enemies, but in their own ways, they too helped to shape the modern world that we know today. While ultimately failed states, they had successes throughout their history, contributing their own shares to world science and culture, and that’s something I’ve always tried to appreciate. Things are rarely as black and white as the paper and ink of our textbooks. During the conference, you will take on the role of members of the fictional Soviet Advisory Committee on Centralization and Global Communism, a new semi-secret body intended to advise the Politburo and other major state organs. You will be given unmatched power but also faced with a variety of unique challenges, such as unrest in the satellite states, an economy over-reliant on heavy industry, and a geopolitical sphere of influence being challenged by both the USA and an emerging Communist China.
    [Show full text]
  • Joint Crisis Committee
    Joint Crisis Committee Berkeley Model United Nations Introductory Letter: Hello, delegates! My name is Megan Gramling and I will be your head chair for BMUN LXIX Joint Cabinet Crisis. I am currently a second year at Berkeley, hoping to major in Business or Political Science. I have always had a growing interest in international politics and relations, which was what originally sparked my interest to join MUN. This will be my second year in BMUN and my sixth year in MUN altogether. Outside of BMUN, I hold a position in my sorority, Delta Gamma, and mentor students at a local elementary school through the Sage Mentorship Program. Some of my favorite things to do are travel, go to the beach, and binge watch Criminal Minds. I can’t wait to meet you all in committee! Jin Wei is a junior at UC Berkeley, studying Computer Science and Economics. This is his third year in BMUN and fourth year in MUN. His past chairing experiences include vice-charing UNIDO (66) and head chairing UNEP (67). His hobbies include binging Youtube and cooking new recipes he’s seen from Youtube. Vishnu is a junior at UC Berkeley studying Economics and Business Administration. This is his 3rd year in BMUN and 7th year doing Model UN. Last year he was the head chair for JCC, and previously was a vice chair for JCC. In his free time, Vishnu enjoys playing video games like Super Smash Bros. and Pokemon. Eric is a sophomore studying Computer Science. This is his 5th year of MUN, and he’s incredibly excited to dissect the intricacies of the Cold War Era and potentially blow some things up.
    [Show full text]
  • THE COLD WAR's LONGEST COVER-UP: HOW and WHY the USSR INSTIGATED the 1967 WAR by Isabella Ginor*
    THE COLD WAR'S LONGEST COVER-UP: HOW AND WHY THE USSR INSTIGATED THE 1967 WAR By Isabella Ginor* The Soviet warning to Egypt about supposed Israeli troop concentrations on the Syrian border in May 1967 has long been considered a blunder that precipitated a war which the USSR neither desired nor expected. New evidence from Soviet and other Warsaw Pact documents, as well as memoirs of contemporary actors, contradicts this accepted theory. The author demonstrates that this warning was deliberate disinformation, part of a plan approved at the highest level of Soviet leadership to elicit Egyptian action that would provoke an Israeli strike. Soviet military intervention against the "aggressor" was intended to follow and was prepared well in advance. "The truth of anything at all supposed Israeli reinforcements after doesn't lie in someone's account inspecting the Syrian front.(3) of it. It lies in all the small facts of In order to reconcile this Soviet the time." provocation with the accepted view that --Josephine Tey, The Daughter of Moscow had no intention to precipitate a Time(1) war, various theories have been proposed.(4) An especially noteworthy It is well-accepted in Middle Eastern version was offered recently by Karen historiography that the 1967 war's Brutents, a former CPSU Central immediate trigger was disinformation fed Committee counsellor,(5) who claimed by the Soviet Union to Egypt in May that Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir 1967 about massive reinforcements Israel Semyonov "couldn't control himself" and was supposedly concentrating on its prematurely revealed yet-unconfirmed border with Syria.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 H-Diplo Roundtable Review Craig Daigle. the Limits of Détente: The
    H-Diplo Roundtable Review Craig Daigle. The Limits of Détente: the United States, the Soviet Union and the Arab- Israeli Conflict, 1969-73. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012. Reviewed by Nigel Ashton, London School of Economics and Political Science The outbreak of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War has long been seen as the prime example of a local conflict which threatened the broader framework of superpower détente in the early 1970s. In The Limits of Détente, Craig Daigle seeks to turn this thesis on its head. His central argument is that the October 1973 war was in fact a consequence of détente: that the mitigation of U.S.-Soviet tensions paradoxically emboldened Egyptian President Anwar Sadat to launch the war and drag the reluctant superpowers into seeking a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict in order to salvage their new relationship. This thesis is persuasive to a large extent. President Sadat’s motives in launching the war have typically been framed within the context of his frustration at the deadlock in the regional peace process and the unwillingness of the Nixon Administration to press Israel to make concessions. Framed in this way, Sadat's resort to war, which took many, but not all, informed observers at the time by surprise, was a gamble worth taking. Daigle’s distinctive contribution to this narrative lies in underlining the paradox that the improvement in superpower relations in the years leading up to the 1973 war, in fact made the outbreak of hostilities more likely. The apparent unwillingness of the Moscow and Washington to rupture their relations over Middle East strategy closed off the one remaining diplomatic option open to Sadat.
    [Show full text]
  • Univmsity of Illinois
    UNIVMSITY OF ILLINOIS 1 May 84 IIHHIHMCI 19. THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER MY SUPERVISION BY 0av1d Flnnlgan A Study of Civil-Military Relations ENTITLED 1n the Soviet Union IS APPROVED BY ME AS FULFILLING THIS PART OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE Bachelor of Arts In Liberal Arts and Sciences DEGREE OF.------------------------------------------------------- A STUDY OF CIVIL-MILITARY RtLATIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION BY Dave Finnigan THB8XS for tha DEGREE OF BACHELOR OF ARTS IN LIBERAL ARTS AND SCIENCES College of Liberal Arts and Sciences University of Illinois Urbana, Illinois 1984 ACKH0W&BDQ8MEHT8 in tii* proo*a* of researching the thesis X have incurred many obligations and have received much help. X would like to thank Prof, Roger E. Kanet for his advice in writing the thesis and his time spent in reading the many drafts of it. My deepest appreciation also goes out to the staff of the Slavic and East-Buropean Library for their invaluable help in translating Soviet documents. X would also like to thank Harriett* Scott who had the unenviable job of typing the TABLE OF CONTENTS i m Chapter it Introduction and Three Models ••••••» 1 Chapter 2t Economic Issues .......... .............. 10 Chapter 3i Foreign Policy Questions in Soviet Civil-Military Relations............ .. • Chapter 4t Summary and Conclusion..................... 31 and Thyfy jgftyt The question of elvii-military relations is the soviet Union is a difficult ona. First, thsro is tho issue of de­ fining the terms "military” and "civilian" in the Soviet Union. Some have felt it more appropriate to refer to relatione be­ tween the Communist Party and the military.
    [Show full text]
  • Soviet-American Relations and the Yom Kippur War
    University of Montana ScholarWorks at University of Montana Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers Graduate School 2004 Test of detente: Soviet-American relations and the Yom Kippur War David Zierler The University of Montana Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd Let us know how access to this document benefits ou.y Recommended Citation Zierler, David, "Test of detente: Soviet-American relations and the Yom Kippur War" (2004). Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers. 5190. https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/5190 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact [email protected]. MANSFIELD LIBRARY The University of Permission is granted by the author to reproduce this material in its entirety, provided that this material is used for scholarly purposes and is properly cited in published works and reports. * *Please check "Yes" or "No" and provide signature** Any copying for commercial purposes or financial gain may be undertaken only with the author's explicit consent. 8/98 THE TEST OF DETENTE: SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND THE YOM KIPPUR WAR by David Zierler B.S. New York University, 2000 presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts The University of Montana 2004 Approved by: Chairman Dean, Graduate School 5"- iV o 4 Date UMI Number: EP40654 Alt rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
    [Show full text]
  • Glimpses Inside the Kremlin During the Cuban Missile Crisis Introduction by Timothy Naftali1
    SECTION 3: Soviet Union The Malin Notes: Glimpses Inside the Kremlin during the Cuban Missile Crisis Introduction by Timothy Naftali1 he John F. Kennedy Presidential Library’s October did the bulk of the updating, also contributed translations for 1996 release of the White House recordings made by two notes not currently on the Miller Center’s website. President Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis Trevolutionized our understanding of how the American side What do the Notes Tell Us? handled the most dangerous nuclear crisis of the Cold War.2 Some months earlier, the late Aleksandr Fursenko, a member In 1969 former British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan of the Russian Academy of Sciences, had learned about a col- in his introduction to Robert F. Kennedy’s Thirteen Days lection of official notes from the meetings of the Presidium— laid out a basic research agenda for students of the Kremlin the top decision-making body of the Soviet communist party side of the Cuban missile crisis: “why did the Russians risk and therefore of the USSR—during the missile crisis. These so much? What was their ultimate purpose? Why did they notes, which were written out in longhand by Vladimir withdraw? Why did they not retaliate at other, but equally Malin, the chief of the General Department of the Central sensitive, points?”5 Committee, formally recorded the Presidium’s decisions and, On the eve of the fiftieth anniversary of the Cuban occasionally, the discussion and justification behind the deci- Missile Crisis, how well do the Malin notes help us answer sions. Fursenko was able to get access to a few, but by no Macmillan’s questions? And do they suggest any others? means all, of the notes relevant to the Cuban missile crisis 3 for our 1997 book, “One Hell of a Gamble.” In 2003, the Why did the Soviets risk so much? What was their ultimate Russian State Archive of Contemporary History (RGANI), purpose? published a more complete collection of the Cuban Missile Crisis notes in Volume 1 of Archivii Kremlya, an edition over- Let’s take these questions together.
    [Show full text]
  • The Cuban Missile Crisis Russia
    EthicalMUN II The Cold War and the Cuban Missile Crisis Russia Chairs: Olivia Pollack and Owen Park Crisis Director: Josh Sacca and Jackson Davis EthicalMUN II Hello Delegates, We are delighted to welcome you to Ethical MUN II and we are looking forward to two full and exciting days of debate. The topic for this committee is the Cuban Missile Crisis and we are really looking forward to seeing your unique solutions. We hope that this topic will Theo Dassin stimulate your creativity and make for an amazing weekend. We have seven experienced Co-Secretary General chairs and crisis directors who are eagerly anticipating the conference. Please take time to thoroughly read the background guide and conduct research of you own so that you can have the best position papers possible. Iva Knezevic Co-Secretary General This background guide is simply a starting point for your research, and much more research is necessary to prepare for this committee. For those of you who are new to Model UN, this Alex Keswani committee is a crisis committee which means that there will constantly be new problems Chief of Staff (provided by our lovely crisis directors Jackson Davis, Josh Sacca, and Nick Shiland) that you must solve. In addition, this is a JCC which stands for joint crisis committee, in one Ryan Kelly room there will be delegates associated with the USSR and Cuba, and in the other will be delegates representing the American EXCOMM committee. The two groups will be in Vice-Secretary of constant communication throughout the conference. We want both groups to fully represent Committees their positions while working together to come up with a solution for this Crisis.
    [Show full text]
  • General Assembly Turns Down
    University of Nebraska at Omaha DigitalCommons@UNO Kabul Times Digitized Newspaper Archives 12-14-1968 Kabul Times (December 14, 1968, vol. 7, no. 220) Bakhtar News Agency Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/kabultimes Part of the International and Area Studies Commons Recommended Citation Bakhtar News Agency, "Kabul Times (December 14, 1968, vol. 7, no. 220)" (1968). Kabul Times. 1940. https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/kabultimes/1940 This Newspaper is brought to you for free and open access by the Digitized Newspaper Archives at DigitalCommons@UNO. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kabul Times by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UNO. For more information, please contact [email protected]. \ . .) .,'. ,.... • 'I' ,I '\ '. ,'. .' I , ,'~ '. , ' , . , . \', .. ,', J' , ' PAqE4 • '\ " . '~ :~':, ',,:":~"' ,~ THE KABUL TIMES .......:').. , .. , .. / .. ' .. , '. ',. 'DECEMBER 12, 1968 ,', (, I ~ _,'• ,.-: .i: ,. '.;.' I ...·, . -', . ." {]("\~~~-' :~''':'T"''''' ..'''!'t.''r ...:,.'"" ,; . ". i" . ~ 7 ,,'Ili, .,' ... '1'' World News In·Brief .. ~ {·.!I'.,~ ._-' 'I ''''1 :'. 1.\ " .. M~AMI, Dec. 12! '(Reuterl,.-A ·HONG :KdNG, ' ·De~•. 12,· (AFP)." ~ ~ ~ ~GHAN . 'I. ' ,). " :/ :" .' I '• .' -·'···E·'. ..···s··,,·· AJI.IANA AIR­ ,!,rans. World Airhnes paS!'enl.lel' -:rhe lfong Kong alithoritles J~~ bo~rd .. _ ',." . '. WIth 39. pe.ollle on was Wednesday' releaslld· Jmother five' .. " - \ , ' LINES: hllack~d In fhght yesterday 'and leftist political detainee' includ-" it., - •. .. pII~t t~ ' .. , ... the forced fly towards ing the popular lefi.wlng tilm . .' FRIDAY Cuba WIth a g·on hIS back, a cn- star Fu Chi '!. - mpany spo~esman said her~., In less than ten days the Bri- ~oell:g he~dlDg r~l~ase~; , .".. :-:. • • .AiiiyaJ The 727 was tish authorities have 12 , . for MIamI from St. LoUIS. It leftists from the Victoria' delen­ K.""ibar 0lI55 was n~w expecleq to reach J1a- tion centre.
    [Show full text]
  • This Manuscn'pt Has Been Reproduced from the Microfilm Master. UMI Films the Text Directly Hmthe Original Or Copy Submiiced
    This manuscn'pt has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly hmthe original or copy submiICed. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while othen may be hmany type of cornputer printer. The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignrnent can adversely affect reproduction. In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Ovenize materials (e-g., rnaps. drawings. charts) are repmduced by secüoning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and cantinuing frorn left to n'ght in equal sections with small overlaps. Photographs induded in the original manuscn'pt have bëen reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher qualÏty 6" x 9' black and white photographie prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in mis copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI diredy to order. Bell & Howell Information and Leaming 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346 USA MARSHAL N.V. OGARKOV AND THE TRANSFORMATION IN SOVIET MILITARY AFFAIRS BY TIMOTHY S. WADDELL A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of MASTER OF ARTS Department of Political Studies University of Manitoba Winnipeg, Manitoba O January, 1999 National Library Bibliothèque nationale 1*1 of Canada du Canada Acquisitions and Acquisitions et Bibliographie Services services bibliographiques 395 Wellington Street 395.
    [Show full text]
  • Kosygin Praises Services of Marshal Malinovsky
    University of Nebraska at Omaha DigitalCommons@UNO Kabul Times Digitized Newspaper Archives 5-4-1967 Kabul Times (May 4, 1967, vol. 6, no. 35) Bakhtar News Agency Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/kabultimes Part of the International and Area Studies Commons Recommended Citation Bakhtar News Agency, "Kabul Times (May 4, 1967, vol. 6, no. 35)" (1967). Kabul Times. 1486. https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/kabultimes/1486 This Newspaper is brought to you for free and open access by the Digitized Newspaper Archives at DigitalCommons@UNO. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kabul Times by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UNO. For more information, please contact [email protected]. , \,l.- • -, I ,. - r ..- .... r ,, \ \ '. , • t .. ) ,. I for preciS&:~.I~ul.tlons PAGE 4 THE KABUL TIMEs APRIL 3. 1967' , j" I _• _ , , W·~· IfleC;S8!:. "I U Nyun ECAFE JUixon-Smith Exiles: I· 1i9ME~N~~S;I\~ ~~IIEF Wolesi Ji,gah , FOR SHEER Describes As t' " '. , ~~ BOOT, April 3. (Bakhtar) -De- KABUL, April 3, (Bakhtar)- (Contd from pagel) Profit ..; DELIGHT Asia"-s' Economic Parliament Governor-General pu~ ~~iIptlO!l1N.nJs~..,Jff.l.,Mob,!Ull-,_,Dr,.~lllli,Kaml@r. a doctor working Deputy J ama GuI, Pakthla Prestig~. ~""-', ma~fAlttam ' TOKYO. April 3. (Reuter),­ FIU:ETOWN, April 3, (R~uter) arrlYed,he.,.i{l',e8terdf'¥ • for _the ':Public Health Ministry re­ centre, to '\Ilslt s"hool~ TOdRY ci"~iY'~~"~- . ~il'rJl~a from Tokyil yesterday where Deputy Mohammad Osman. " Portability ECAFE Executive Secretary U Nyun was optimistic Saturday -SIerra LeolJe's new military pect,ed to /l0 to GaramMrjitO Inspect _ lie went sIX months ago for training ~ rulers have deCIded to send Gov­ Tolak, Ghar, about progress both on the Asian llighway and on the Cambodian th'*''!/lI'!roJture ..\1oor _~llti!.
    [Show full text]
  • THE SOVIET UNION 1967–1969 Part 1: Political, Governmental, and National Defense Affairs
    A Guide to the Microfilm Edition of Confidential U.S. State Department Central Files THE SOVIET UNION 1967–1969 Part 1: Political, Governmental, and National Defense Affairs A UPA Collection from Confidential U.S. State Department Central Files THE SOVIET UNION 1967–1969 PART 1: POLITICAL, GOVERNMENTAL, AND NATIONAL DEFENSE AFFAIRS Subject-Numeric Categories: AID, CSM, DEF, and POL Project Coordinator Robert E. Lester Guide compiled by Joanna Claire Dubus A UPA Collection from 4520 East-West Highway • Bethesda, MD 20814-3389 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Confidential U.S. State Department central files. The Soviet Union, 1967–1969 [microform] / project coordinator, Robert E. Lester. microfilm reels ; 35 mm. Summary: Reproduces documents from Record Group 59, Records of the State Department, Subject-numeric files, 1967–1969, in the custody of the National Archives, College Park, MD. Accompanied by a printed guide compiled by Joanna Claire Dubus. ISBN 1-55655-978-X 1. United States—Foreign relations—Soviet Union—Sources. 2. Soviet Union—Foreign relations—United States—Sources. 3. Soviet Union—Politics and government—1953–1985— Sources. 4. United States—Foreign relations—1963–1969—Sources. I. Title: Confidential U.S. State Department central files. II. Title: Soviet Union, 1967–1969. III. Lester, Robert. IV. Dubus, Joanna Claire, 1981– V. United States. Dept. of State. VI. University Publications of America (Firm) E183.8.S65 327.73047'09'046—dc22 2004048545 CIP The documents reproduced in this publication are among the records of the U.S. Department of State in the custody of the National Archives of the United States. No copyright is claimed in these official records.
    [Show full text]