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Crisiswatch, Nr. 58 1 June 2008, No58 Board of Trustees CrisisWatch: Co-Chairs summarises briefly developments during the previous month in some 70 situations of current or potential Christopher Patten conflict, listed alphabetically by region, providing references and links to more detailed information sources Thomas Pickering (all references mentioned are hyperlinked in the electronic version of this bulletin); assesses whether the overall situation in each case has, during the previous month, significantly deteriorated, President and CEO significantly improved, or on balance remained more or less unchanged; Gareth Evans alerts readers to situations where, in the coming month, there is a particular risk of new or significantly escalated conflict, or a particular conflict resolution opportunity (noting that in some instances there may in fact be both); Executive Committee and Morton Abramowitz summarises Crisis Group’s reports and briefing papers that have been published in the last month. Cheryl Carolus Maria Livanos Cattaui* CrisisWatch is compiled by Crisis Group’s Brussels Research Unit, drawing on multiple sources including the Yoichi Funabashi resources of our some 135 staff members across five continents, who already report on some 60 of the situations Frank Giustra listed here. Comments and suggestions can be sent to [email protected]. Stephen Solarz George Soros To search past issues of CrisisWatch visit our databases and resources page at www.crisisgroup.org. Pär Stenbäck *Vice-Chair May 2008 Trends Adnan Abu-Odeh Deteriorated Situations Improved Situations Kenneth Adelman Ersin Arioglu Guinea (p.4) Myanmar/Burma (p.7) Lebanon (p.11) Shlomo Ben-Ami India (non- South Africa (p.4) Nepal (p.6) Lakhdar Brahimi Kashmir) (p.6) Sudan (p.3) Syria (p.11) Zbigniew Brzezinski Macedonia (p.8) Zimbabwe (p.4) Taiwan Strait (p.6) Kim Campbell Mali (p.5) Naresh Chandra Joaquim Alberto Chissano Unchanged Situations Victor Chu Wesley Clark Afghanistan (p.6), Albania (p.8), Algeria (p.12), Armenia (p.8), Azerbaijan (p.8), Bangladesh (p.6), Pat Cox Basque Country (Spain) (p.9), Belarus (p.9), Bolivia (p.10), Bosnia & Herzegovina (p.8), Burundi Uffe Ellemann-Jensen (p.2), Central African Republic (p.2), Chad (p.2), Chechnya (Russia) (p.8), China (internal) (p.6), Mark Eyskens Colombia (p.10), Comoros Islands (p.4), Côte d’Ivoire (p.4), Cyprus (p.9), Democratic Republic Joschka Fischer of Congo (p.2), Ecuador (p.10), Egypt (p.12), Ethiopia/Eritrea (p.3), Ethiopia (p.(internal) (p.3), Leslie H. Gelb Georgia (p.9), Guinea-Bissau (p.4), Haiti (p.10), Indonesia (p.7), Iran (p.11), Iraq (p.11), Israel/ Carla Hills OccupiedTerritories (p.10), Kashmir (p.6), Kazakhstan (p.5), Kenya (p.3), Kosovo (p.8), Kyrgyzstan Lena Hjelm-Wallén (p.5), Liberia (p.4), Mauritania (p.12), Moldova (p.9), Morocco (p.12), Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan) Swanee Hunt (p.9), Niger (p.4), Nigeria (p.5), North Caucasus (non-Chechnya) (p.9), North Korea (p.6), Pakistan (p.6), Philippines (p.7), Rwanda (p.2), Saudi Arabia (p.11), Senegal (p.5), Serbia (p.8), Sierra Leone Anwar Ibrahim (p.5), Somalia (p.3), Somaliland (p.(Somalia) (p.3), Sri Lanka (p.7), Tajikistan (p.5), Thailand (p.7), Asma Jahangir Timor-Leste (p.7), Turkey (p.9), Turkmenistan (p.5), Uganda (p.2), Ukraine (p.9), Uzbekistan (p.5), Nancy Kassebaum Baker Venezuela (p.10), Western Sahara (p.12), Yemen (p.11) James V. Kimsey Wim Kok Ricardo Lagos Joanne Leedom-Ackerman June 2008 Watchlist Ayo Obe Christine Ockrent Conflict Risk Alerts Conflict Resolution Samantha Power Zimbabwe Opportunities Victor Pinchuk Fidel V. Ramos Ghassan Salamé Douglas Schoen Thorvald Stoltenberg Ernesto Zedillo Crisis Group Crisis Group is an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation, with 135 staff members on five continents, working Chairmen Emeritus through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict. Crisis Group’s approach is grounded in field research. Teams of political analysts are located within or close by countries at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of Martti Ahtisaari violent conflict. Based on information and assessments from the field, Crisis Group produces regular analytical reports containing George J. Mitchell practical recommendations targeted at key international decision-takers, and backed up with high-level advocacy. Crisis Group is co-chaired by former European Commissioner for External Relations Lord Patten of Barnes and former U.S. Ambassador and Boeing Vice President, International Relations, Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering, and its President and Chief Executive is former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans. Crisis Group Africa Report N°140, Congo: Four Priorities for Sustainable Peace in Ituri, 13 May 2008. Congo’s reconstruction hinges on the Ituri district, where a new integrated peacebuilding strategy is required, involving national and provincial institutions, actively supported by the UN Mission in Congo and donors. Land-related tensions CENTRAL AFRICA that helped spark the conflict have not been eased and constantly threaten to lead to new inter-ethnic confrontations. The peace Burundi PALIPEHUTU-FNL leaders returned from Tanzania process also critically requires a framework for transparent 16 May, leader Rwasa 30 May, following regional and UN treatment of Ituri’s resources. Absent an integrated approach, pressure. Talks on implementing 2006 peace agreement the return of chaos is likely. resumed 17 May. Ceasefire declaration signed 26 May, but 2 rebels killed 28 May. Army-FNL clashes 5-9 May killed 50 rebels following ambush near capital, displaced some 20,000. Rwanda ICTR started ex-minister Callixte Kalimanzira’s Fighting continued despite talks, mid-May UN Peacebuilding trial 5 May, first new trial since June 2007. Former Muganza Commission visit. Major army offensive 22 May; rebels accused commune officials began defence 20 May. ICTR refused of 22-24 May grenade attacks in Bujumbura, surrounding area: to transfer ex-interhamwe leader Munyakazi to Rwandan 7 killed, some 20 wounded – FNL denied. courts as part of process to speed trials, questioning courts’ “Burundi govt and rebels sign ceasefire deal”, AFP, 26 May partiality; witness protection under scrutiny after 6 May witness 2008. disappearance from Arusha safehouse. Kenyan govt 6 May “Burundi risks new war as peace talks falter”, AFP, 20 May froze assets of fugitive Felicien Kabuga, accused of funding 2008. Hutu militias during genocide. Col Faustin Sebuhura – wanted For background, see Crisis Group Africa Report N°131, by ICTR, hiding with FDLR in eastern DRC – returned 21 May Burundi: Finalising Peace with the FNL, 28 Aug. 2007. to Rwanda due to illness. ”Kenya freezes assets of Rwanda genocide suspect”, Reuters, Central African Republic Govt peace deal with APRD, last 6 May 2008. rebel group to join peace process, signed Libreville 9 May ahead of 8 June all-inclusive talks: secured ceasefire, APRD amnesty, Uganda No progress on LRA peace deal. Leader Joseph prisoner release but excluded key provisions on demobilisation. Kony no-show at 10 May meeting on Congo-Sudan border with DRC opposition leader Bemba arrested in Belgium on ICC northern Ugandan elders, chief mediator Riek Machar; new warrant 24 May for 2002-3 atrocities during military support LRA negotiator James Obita had suggested Kony might sign for then president Patassé. UN 23 May reported upsurge in peace deal after Apr refusal. Impatience grew: Govt of Southern banditry adding to devastating humanitarian situation. Sudan President Salva Kiir stated 22 May LRA must sign or “CAR citizens seek aid against mass kidnappings”, Mail & will be forced to leave Sudan; ICC called for suspension of aid Guardian, 26 May 2008. to LRA. Ugandan judiciary 23 May announced creation of new “Cautious welcome for rebel ceasefire”, IRIN, 14 May 2008. war crimes division of High Court. Rights group estimates at For background, see Crisis Group Africa Report N°136, least 100 children abducted by LRA since Feb. DRC, Ugandan Central African Republic: Anatomy of a Phantom State, 13 presidents agreed 11 May new border demarcation over oil- Dec. 2007. rich Lake Albert. Constitutional Court late month annulled law requiring police to approve public meetings, protests. Democratic Republic of Congo President Kabila rival ”Peace deal dissolves”, IWPR, 19 May 2008. and ex-VP Bemba arrested in Belgium 24 May on ICC warrant ”Fresh questions as Kony remains elusive”, IRIN, 15 May 2008. for war crimes in CAR 2002-3; opposition MLC alleged govt For background, see Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°46, plot, while thousands protested in party stronghold Mbandaka. Northern Uganda Peace Process: The Need to Maintain DRC-Uganda tensions eased as leaders meeting Dar-es- Momentum, 14 Sept. 2007. Salaam 10-11 May agreed to re-mark border to resolve oil reserve dispute; but Kampala 19 May confirmed arrest of HORN OF AFRICA 14 DRC soldiers for illegally crossing. 3 sentenced to death in trial of 22 BDK sect members accused of separatist plots.. Chad Rebel leader Koulamallah 13 May called on France Aid groups 8 May said 40,000 displaced in North Kivu clashes to lead mediation with govt amid continued insecurity in recent weeks, late month reported steep rise in spontaneous east. New PM Abbas earlier retracted Apr offer to negotiate IDP camps; mass graves uncovered in province 26 May dating after rebels rebuffed. Tensions with Sudan mounted over to 1990s. Infrastructure Minister Pierre Lumbi 9 May announced N’djamena’s alleged backing of 10-11 May Darfur rebel attack $9b Chinese loan, infrastructure investment package agreed on Khartoum: Chad denied, shut border after Sudan cut ties, in exchange for mining rights; opposition condemned. UNSC 1 issued provocative 14 May call on UNAMID to secure Darfur. June began 9-day Africa trip to promote peace in 5 key conflict New AU Chief Jean Ping “confident” tensions would ease after zones, including east DRC. separate talks in capitals mid-month, despite reported Chadian “Bemba arrest removes rival to Congo president”, Reuters, troop build-up along border.
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