Democratic Security Policy in Colombia: Approaches to an Enemy-Centric Counterinsurgency Model
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Democratic Security Policy in Colombia: Approaches to an enemy-centric counterinsurgency model Jerónimo Ríos Sierra Universidad Complutense de Madrid (España) Jaime Zapata García Universidad de Bogotá Jorge Tadeo Lozano (Colombia) Revista de Humanidades, 36 (2019). p. 129-154. ISSN 1130-5029 Democratic Security Policy in Colombia: Approaches to an enemy-centric counterinsurgency model1 Política de Seguridad Democrática en Colombia: aproximaciones a un modelo de contrainsurgencia centrado en el enemigo Jerónimo Ríos Sierra Universidad Complutense de Madrid (España) [email protected] Jaime Zapata García Universidad de Bogotá Jorge Tadeo Lozano (Colombia) [email protected] Fecha de recepción: 3 de octubre de 2017 Fecha de aceptación: 28 de enero de 2019 Abstract The purpose of this document is to reflect upon the Democratic Security Policy (PSD by its abbreviation in Spanish) that took place in Colombia under the presidency of Álvaro Uribe Vélez, between 2002 and 2010. To this end, in the fight against the guerrillas of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC by its abbreviation in Spanish) and the National Liberation Army (ELN by its abbreviation in Spanish), the PSD is understood, in these terms, not so much as a population-centric counterinsurgency strategy, but on the contrary, as a predominantly enemy-centric model. It is also theoretically presented as a hybrid model between the scheme of compulsion and accommodation proposed by Hazelton (2011, 2013, 2017), and the authoritarian model that Zukhov (2012), or Byman (2016) approach, among others. In this regard, the work draws on data from the database on the internal armed conflict expressly facilitated by the Vice- Presidency of the Republic, and by a set of in-depth interviews with the main actors involved in the conflict during the time of the study, from the Government, as well as from the Military Forces, the guerrillas and the paramilitaries. Keywords: Counterinsurgency; Democratic Security Policy (PSD by its abbreviation in Spanish); Armed Conflict; Colombia; Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC by its abbreviation in Spanish); National Liberation Army (ELN by its abbreviation in Spanish) 1 This work was supported by the Observatory for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law - Vice-Presidency of the Republic of Colombia. 131 Democratic Security Policy in Colombia – J. Ríos Sierra y J. Zapata García Resumen El siguiente trabajo tiene como propósito reflexionar sobre la Política de Seguridad Democrática (PSD) acontecida en Colombia bajo la presidencia de Álvaro Uribe Vélez entre 2002 y 2010. A tal efecto, en la lucha contra las guerrillas de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) y el Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), la PSD se entiende, a tenor de estas líneas, no tanto como una estrategia contrainsurgente basada en la población sino, todo lo contrario, como un modelo mayoritariamente centrado en el enemigo. Asimismo, teóricamente se presenta como un modelo híbrido entre el esquema de compulsión y acomodación que plantea Hazelton y el modelo autoritario que abordan Zukhov o Baldy, entre otros. Al respecto, el trabajo se nutre de cifras provenientes de la base de datos sobre el conflicto armado interno expresamente facilitadas por la Vicepresidencia de la República, y por un conjunto de entrevistas en profundidad con actores protagonistas del conflicto durante el tiempo objeto de estudio, tanto del Gobierno, como de las Fuerzas Militares, las guerrillas y los paramilitares. Palabras clave: Contrainsurgencia; Política de Seguridad Democrática; Conflicto Armado Colombia; FARC; ELN Para citar este artículo: Ríos Sierra, J. y Zapata García, J. (2019). Democratic Security Policy in Colombia: Approaches to an enemy-centric counterinsurgency model. Revista de humanidades, n. 36, pp. 129-154 ISBN 1130-5029 (ISSN-e 2340-8995). Sumario: 1. Introduction. 2. Theoretical framework: notions, scope and meaning of the counterinsurgency action. 3. Methodological aspects. 4. The Colombian counterinsurgency in the 21st century: demystifying the population-based COIN paradigm. 5. Conclusions. 6. References. 1.INTRODUCTION The main objective of the following work is to analyze the dimension of the Democratic Security Policy (PSD by its abbreviation in Spanish), which took place in Colombia under the presidency of Álvaro Uribe Vélez in his two periods of government (2002-2006 and 2006-2010), emerging from its strong counterinsurgency tendency and despite the fact that, during these years, the official governmental position was always that the FARC and ELN were not guerrillas but terrorist groups. Apart from this consideration, the fact is that most of the academic literature on this subject has always maintained the conception of understanding guerrillas as insurgent actors (Daly, 2012; Gruber & Pospisil, 2015; Marks, 2017) within a scenario of internal armed conflict. However, the PSD integrates in itself a series of changes in the form not only of recognizing but also of fighting the insurgent enemy, which justifies its nourished interest as object of study. And the point is that, a good part of the specialized works with greater academic relevance emphasize that the counterinsurgency strategy (COIN) experienced in Colombia under the PSD, by its characteristics, responds mainly to the population-centric COIN paradigm 132 Revista de Humanidades, 36 (2019). p. 129-154. ISSN 1130-5029 (DeShazo, McLean, & Mendelson, 2009a Berrios, 2017; Ospina, 2017). However, and unlike these, the following work vies for vindicating a dimension of the PSD where instead, it would be possible to find more reactive, even more authoritarian elements, typical of the COIN schemes that are focused on the enemy. This is how this work is organized into four clearly differentiated parts. Initially, a theoretical approach to the concept of COIN, to its main elements and, above all, to the two models that are predominant in the specialized literature: the focus on the enemy, and the focus on the population (Jardine & Palamar, 2013; Paul, Clarke, Grill, & Dunigan, 2016). Subsequently, we present the methodological aspects that characterize this work, proposing not only the starting point of why to conceive the PSD within the models of COIN focused on the enemy, but also identifying some of the variables, sources of information, and research techniques used to this end. In the third part, the Colombian case is carefully studied from two very specific theoretical references that converge in the construction of the COIN model focused on the enemy. On the one hand, the model of compulsion and accommodation suggested by Hazelton (2011, 2013, 2017), and on the other, the authoritarian model proposed by Menjívar and Rodríguez (2005), Zukhov (2012), or Byman (2016). Finally, we present the conclusions that, as a corollary, seek to identify both future lines of research and other debates that are still unresolved after this work. 2.THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: NOTIONS, SCOPE AND MEAN- ING OF THE COUNTERINSURGENCY ACTION The concept of counterinsurgency can not be simplistically reduced to strictly tactical or strategic terms, but, on the contrary, it must be understood as a concept that is in constant redefinition by the state policy-makers in order to satisfy the traditional Weberian idea that substantives the State in strict terms of legitimate and exclusive monopoly of violence over a given territory (Weber, 2005). However, the complexity of the notion of COIN goes through its own academic identification. That is, should COIN be understood as a discipline or sub-discipline of strategic studies, or better as a practice, or even as a tool from the state? Initially, and transcending from a debate that does not involve this work, it can be pointed out that COIN, in any case, is conceived from its beginnings in the sixties, as a kind of programmatic doctrine at the dawn of the influence of the RAND Corporation and whose objective is to respond “to the problems of Cold War low-intensity conflict, under conditions of nuclear superpower confrontation, against agrarian communist insurgencies in the former territories of European empires in Asia and Africa” (Killcullen, 2012, p. 131). Thus, COIN responds in particular to a logic of conflicts that have changed due to the geopolitical order of Post-Cold War (Taylor & Flint, 2002), but which continue to be influenced by the concurrence of national liberation guerrillas acting against a colonizer or post-colonizer agent (i.e. Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria). At the same time, the 133 Democratic Security Policy in Colombia – J. Ríos Sierra y J. Zapata García State (i.e. Peru, Colombia), sensu contrario, seeks to reinforce its legitimacy and, by extension, to defeat the insurgent threat that is taking place in its sovereign territory. That is to say, based on the above it can be pointed out that an irremediable confrontation between the insurgent, who initiates the action, and the State, who responds in COIN mode is being fed. A COIN that counts with issues against it, to say, the development of an armed confrontation generally in peripheral contexts (Saleyhan, 2007; Tollefsen & Buhaug, 2015), inaccessibility where in a conjunctural manner juxtapose unresolved agrarian struggles, national demands, or colonial disputes and that, as McAlister (1967), Taylor (1997) or Dixon (2009), point out, use preexisting networks - being families, tribes, or political parties - for the sake of a popular malaise that feeds the social foundations of popular