DOCSLIB.ORG

Download Print Version (PDF)

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text

Load more

Operación JAQUE The Ultimate Deception by Charles H. Briscoe and Daniel J. Kulich VERITAS | 10 Note | Pseudonyms used in the Colombian government-sanctioned official history by Juan Carlos Torres, Operación JAQUE: La Verdadera Historia (Bogotá, CO: Editorial Planeta Colombiana, 2008) will be duplicated while true names in that account will remain. (meaning ‘check’ as applied in the This article, based extensively on COLAR participant JAQUE game of chess) was a highly compart- interviews, will demonstrate that Operación JAQUE was mented, unilateral Colombian military (COLMIL) a unilateral COLMIL operation, separate from the Joint deception operation that successfully recovered fifteen Chiefs of Staff-authorization to U.S. Southern Command VIP hostages from Las Fuerzas Revolucionarios de Colombia (SOUTHCOM) to conduct combined operations with (FARC) on 2 July 2008 without a shot fired or anyone Colombia [Operation WILLING SPIRIT (OWS)]. The injured. The Colombian Army (COLAR) intelligence- deception within the ‘grand deception’—JAQUE― orchestrated ‘sting’ was made possible by a highly effective was 97 percent COLMIL; 3 percent U.S. technical ‘grand deception’ operation. ‘Unwitting’ Colombian ‘platform’ intelligence. Embedded ‘unwitting’ USSOF and American special operations forces (COLSOF/ with ‘unwitting’ COLSOF reconnaissance, sensitive site USSOF) were operationally deployed to conduct exploitation and PSYOP teams who were to search for the combined reconnaissance, sensitive site exploitation, and FARC VIP hostage holders in the ‘restricted’ area, was part psychological operations (PSYOP) in a ‘restricted’ region. of GEN Montoya’s ‘grand deception.’ JAQUE was not They diverted FARC attention from the area arranged for part of OWS; its success nullified the reason for OWS.5 The the ‘sting.’1 three Americans, Ingrid Betancourt Pulecio, and eleven This “deception within the ‘grand deception’” operation other Colombians were recovered by the Colombian succeeded because all aspects of Operación JAQUE were military. “Remember, we knew that Ingrid Betancourt exclusively controlled and personally directed by General and the Americans would be the last hostages released by (GEN) Mario Montoya Uribe, the COLAR Commander.2 the FARC. The French president had failed to negotiate her This was not atypical behavior. Colombian generals release earlier. They were too valuable as peace negotiation like to direct operations from the forward command pawns,” said GEN Montoya.6 Now, from whence did this posts of subordinates.3 unorthodox, nontraditional deception operation originate, GEN Montoya was counting on the professionalism of and why did this concept get ‘traction’ with senior COLAR the COLAR generals. He wanted them to unknowingly intelligence officers and GEN Montoya? (‘unwittingly’) establish conditions to make the hostage The stroke of genius did not originate in the upper recovery possible. Their unwavering loyalty would make echelons of the COLAR, but came from below―the non- his ‘grand deception’ credible to FARC leadership. These commissioned officers (NCOs) of an Army EW/SIGINT ‘unsung heroes’ continued Operación ELIPSE after U.S. company―in early December 2007. The commander Special Operations Command, South (SOCSOUTH) listened intently to a very bright young crypto analyst had taken its task force home. However, ELIPSE would sergeant. “We have the capacity to dupe the FARC into be confined to a specific ‘restricted’ area. This enabled collecting the VIP hostages to attend an international COLAR signal intelligence (SIGINT)/electronic warfare propaganda video with their new commander, Alfonso (EW) units to convince the two FARC commanders to move their VIP hostages some 20-25 miles to the southeast where they would be helicoptered to meet the new FARC leader, Guillermo Leόn Sáenz Vargas, alias Alfonso Cano, to participate in a major propaganda video.4 GEN Mario Montoya Uribe, Commander of the Colombian Army (COLAR), 2006-2008, SOCSOUTH SSI and was the ‘Grandmaster’ behind SOCSOUTH Crest with Flag of the FARC (Las Fuerzas Revolucionarias de Colombia). Operación JAQUE. logo “Guardianes del Sur.’ 11 | VOL 14 NO 3 Yapuri River where the three Americans were spotted bathing Proof-of-Life photos of the SOUTHCOM Reconnaissance Systems during Operaciόn ELIPSE. (SRS) contractors taken by Colombian journalist Jorgé Enrique Botero in July 2003: (left to right) Keith D. Stansell; Marc D. Gonsalves; and Thomas R. Howes. Cano. The Venezuelans convinced them to release some hostages for humanitarian reasons earlier. Instead of just reacting to FARC-directed hostage moves, let’s take control of their communications and order them to relocate them where they could be rescued. You know that the only consistently reliable intelligence on the FARC is coming from us.”7 The COLAR crypto analysts had successfully penetrated FARC communications several months earlier and were systematically breaking their codes. Constant monitoring yielded tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). The FARC changed codes for communications security, but the crypto analysts ‘cracked’ them in days. The SIGINT company commander formed a working group of his most experienced NCOs, which he chaired. Their work was very ‘close hold.’ They ‘war gamed’ Senator Ingrid Betancourt Pulecio, a presidential candidate, methods for testing their theory and determined was taken hostage while campaigning in FARC-landia on innocuous messages, if answered, would lend ‘proof’ to 23 February 2002. the viability of the concept.8 Four events reinforced their confidence. During Operación AURORA (2005-2006), the FARC 33rd Front commander had been convinced to entrust his codes to a confidant (a COLAR Human Intelligence [HUMINT] deep cover operative) long enough to be photocopied. This SIGINT ‘coup’ confirmed that theFARC could be deceived.9 In April 2007, National Police officer Jhon F. Pinchao had escaped from a FARC prison camp on the Apaporis River. He reported that Ingrid Betancourt, the three Americans, and other VIP hostages were controlled by the FARC 1st Front, Eastern Bloc, led by Gerardo Aguilar Ramírez aka César.10 A combined inter-agency sensitive site exploitation team went to the vacated site, conducted forensics to confirm that the VIP hostages had been there, and corroborated the information provided by Pinchao. Previous supposition that the 63rd Front (Amazonas) had the VIP hostages was Colombian National Police Subintendente Jhon F. Pinchao. On the spurious.11 The COLAR SIGINT working group refocused right is Pinchao after 9 years of FARC captivity. VERITAS | 12 Key Figures as the ‘Decepciόn’ Played Out Command Personnel Álvaro Uribe Colombian Minister GEN Freddy GEN Mario Montoya BG Ricardo BG Charles T. Vélez, President of Defense, Juan Padilla de Léon, Uribe, Commander Díaz Torres, Cleveland, Special of Colombia. Manuel Santos Commander, of the Colombian Colombian Army Operations Calderón. Colombian Armed Army (COLAR), (COLAR) G-2. Command, South Forces (2006-2008). 2006-2008, was (SOCSOUTH) the ‘Grandmaster’ Commander. behind Operación JAQUE. FARC Personnel Interaction/Communication Lines in Operación JAQUE President Uribe President Bush COLOMBIAN PRESIDENT U.S. PRESIDENT León Sáenz Vargas, Victor Julio Suárez alias Alfonso Cano Rojas, alias Jorge Minister Santos was named as Briceño Suárez aka MINISTER OF DEFENSE Commander of Mono Jojoy, the the FARC on FARC Eastern Bloc GEN Padilla Plan B: QRF / PSYOP 26 March 2008. commander. COLMIL COMMANDER COLSOF / USSOF BG Diaz / COL Olano* GEN Montoya 2 / TECH. INTEL DIRECTOR COLAR COMMANDER Originated Concept Recruited Leader SIGINT COMPANY COL Navas* Mi-17 Helicopter x 2 COMMANDER HUMINT DIRECTOR MAJ Russi* COLAR AVIATION RECOVERY TEAM Secretaries LEADER FAKE FARC RTOs Recruited Team Separated until Op Execution RECOVERY TEAM Gerardo Aguilar Ramírez aka César, FAKE HUMANITATION NGO FARC 1st Front commander, controlled the HOSTAGE GROUP VIP hostages. “César” FARC, 1ST FRONT COMMANDER Jammed & Impersonated FARC Radio Operators “Mono Jojoy” FARC, EASTERN BLOC COMMANDER 13 | VOL 14 NO 3 Caribbean Sea Golfo de Venezuela Lago de Maracaibo Rio Magdalena Panama Golfo De Panama Venezuela Rio Apure Rio Arauca Rio Orinoco Rio Atrato Rio Cauca Rio Magdalena Rio Meta Pacic COLOMBIA Route of the Ocean SOUTH AMERICA Rio Meta Bogota Tolemaida RESCUE ELIPSE Tolemaida Map depictingRio Orinoco the route Rio Cauca of the rescue Mi-17. At Tolemaida the rescue team boarded the Mi-17 San José del Guaviare, QRF for the flight to Puerto Rio Guaviare SOUTH Rico airfield. When the AMERICA Rio Guainia order to execute was Tolemaida Rio Cesiquiare Tomachipan received, the Mi-17 flew ELIPSE to Tomachipan to recover the hostages. The dotted Operación line denotes the areas Dos Rios ELIPSE where the deception plan 1 2 Rio Vaupes was executed. Area 1 was the long-range diversion; Rio Uaupes area 2 was the close-in Brazildeception. Rio Negro Peru on the FARC 1st Front and the Eastern Bloc Riodirected Caqueta by west to discourage the FARC with the VIP hostages from Rio Putumayo EcuadorVictor Julio Suárez Rojas, alias Jorge Briceño Suárez, aka moving in that direction. Nine combined recce teams Mono Jojoy.12 Then, a second American proof-of-life video, employed ground sensors and were either observing or released in November 2007, was followed by a COLAR blocking access to Yari in the north.Rio JapuraAs more elements SIGINT-interceptRio Napo of a message from César (1st FARC Front) were inserted to form a cordon around the suspected to Mono Jojoy (Eastern
Recommended publications
  • Marisol Cano Busquets

    Marisol Cano Busquets

    Violencia contra los periodistas Configuración del fenómeno, metodologías y mecanismos de intervención de organizaciones internacionales de defensa de la libertad de expresión Marisol Cano Busquets TESIS DOCTORAL UPF / 2016 DIRECTORA DE LA TESIS Dra. Núria Almiron Roig DEPARTAMENTO DE COMUNICACIÓN A Juan Pablo Ferro Casas, con quien estamos cosidos a una misma estrella. A Alfonso Cano Isaza y María Antonieta Busquets Nel-lo, un árbol bien plantado y suelto frente al cielo. Agradecimientos A la doctora Núria Almiron, directora de esta tesis doctoral, por su acom- pañamiento con el consejo apropiado en el momento justo, la orientación oportuna y la claridad para despejar los caminos y encontrar los enfoques y las perspectivas. Además, por su manera de ver la vida, su acogida sin- cera y afectuosa y su apoyo en los momentos difíciles. A Carlos Eduardo Cortés, amigo entrañable y compañero de aventuras intelectuales en el campo de la comunicación desde nuestros primeros años en las aulas universitarias. Sus aportes en la lectura de borradores y en la interlocución inteligente sobre mis propuestas de enfoque para este trabajo siempre contribuyeron a darle consistencia. A Camilo Tamayo, interlocutor valioso, por la riqueza de los diálogos que sostuvimos, ya que fueron pautas para dar solidez al diseño y la estrategia de análisis de la información. A Frank La Rue, exrelator de libertad de expresión de Naciones Unidas, y a Catalina Botero, exrelatora de libertad de expresión de la Organización de Estados Americanos, por las largas y fructíferas conversaciones que tuvimos sobre la situación de los periodistas en el mundo. A los integrantes de las organizaciones de libertad de expresión estudia- das en este trabajo, por haber aceptado compartir conmigo su experien- cia y sus conocimientos en las entrevistas realizadas.
  • The Farc-Ep and Revolutionary Social Change

    The Farc-Ep and Revolutionary Social Change

    Emancipatory Politics: A Critique Open Anthropology Cooperative Press, 2015 edited by Stephan Feuchtwang and Alpa Shah ISBN-13:978-1518885501 / ISBN-10:1518885500 Part 2 Armed movements in Latin America and the Philippines Chapter 4 The FARC-EP and Consequential Marxism in Colombia James J. Brittain Abstract The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (FARC-EP) has maintained its base among small-holders including coca farmers and expanded its struggle through a local interpretation of Marxism and Leninism. This chapter reviews current accounts of its history and contemporary presence. The author then provides his own analysis of their strategy, namely that they have successfully pursued a gradual expansion of a separate power base and economy from that of the state and its capitalist economy, a situation that Lenin described as ‘dual power’, or, as Gramsci elaborated, a challenge to the hegemony of the ruling bloc. His visits and interviews and two recent documentary films in the FARC-EP areas show that the economy under FARC leadership, while taxing and controlling the processing and selling of coca, is still one of private small-holders. Many farmers grow coca as their main crop but all to some extent diversify into subsistence crops. This is a successful preparation for eventual state power of a completely different kind under which the economy will be socialised. For a half century the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas-Ejército del Pueblo, FARC-EP) have played a key role in organising, sustaining, and leading revolutionary activity within the Latin American country of Colombia.
  • Ending Colombia's FARC Conflict: Dealing the Right Card

    Ending Colombia's FARC Conflict: Dealing the Right Card

    ENDING COLOMBIA’S FARC CONFLICT: DEALING THE RIGHT CARD Latin America Report N°30 – 26 March 2009 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY............................................................................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. FARC STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES................................................................... 2 A. ADAPTIVE CAPACITY ...................................................................................................................4 B. AN ORGANISATION UNDER STRESS ..............................................................................................5 1. Strategy and tactics ......................................................................................................................5 2. Combatant strength and firepower...............................................................................................7 3. Politics, recruitment, indoctrination.............................................................................................8 4. Withdrawal and survival ..............................................................................................................9 5. Urban warfare ............................................................................................................................11 6. War economy .............................................................................................................................12
  • Break the Spell Or More of the Same?

    Break the Spell Or More of the Same?

    Break the spell or more of the same? 1 Colombian Platform for Human Rights, Democracy and Development Secretaría Técnica Corporación Cactus Correo electrónico: [email protected] Carrera 25 Nº 51-37, oficina 301 Tels.: (571) 345 83 40 - (571) 345 83 29 Comité Editorial: Corporación Cactus, Colectivo de Abogados José Alvear Restrepo (Cajar), Instituto Latinoamericano de Servicios Legales Alternativos (ILSA) Edición: Carlos Enrique Angarita Foto carátula: Jesús Abad Colorado Fernanda Pineda Palencia Caricaturas: Vladdo: Cortesía Revista Semana – Publicaciones Semana S.A. Antonio Caballero: Revista Semana – Publicaciones Semana S.A. Chócolo: Cortesía del autor Preparación editorial: Marta Rojas Traducción: Luke Holland Diseño: Paola Escobar Versión impresa en español: Ediciones Antropos Bogotá, Colombia, Noviembre de 2009 Los artículos que aparecen en este libro son responsabilidad de sus autores. Se permite la reproducción parcial o total de esta obra, en cualquier formato, mecánico o digital, siempre y cuando no se modifique su contenido, se res- pete su autoría y se mantenga esta nota. 2 Break the spell or more of the same? 3 ho IND 6 Presentation PART 4: COMMODIFICATION OF THE TERRITORY PART 1: CONTEXT 126 Rural and food issues under the Uribe government Juan Carlos Morales González 11 The Democratic Security Policy in its regional context: old affinities with the North, new contradictions with the Southr 139 The human right to water, environmental crisis Consuelo Ahumada and social mobilisation INDEX Rafael Colmenares Faccini 19 The bankers get rich while misery spreads Jorge Iván González 149 Commodifying public goods: deepening exclusion and poverty An analysis of waste management policy 24 In time of crisis, the bank doesn’t serve during the Álvaro Uribe government Juan Diego Restrepo E.
  • Ending Colombia's FARC Conflict

    Ending Colombia's FARC Conflict

    ENDING COLOMBIA’S FARC CONFLICT: DEALING THE RIGHT CARD Latin America Report N°30 – 26 March 2009 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY............................................................................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. FARC STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES................................................................... 2 A. ADAPTIVE CAPACITY ...................................................................................................................4 B. AN ORGANISATION UNDER STRESS ..............................................................................................5 1. Strategy and tactics ......................................................................................................................5 2. Combatant strength and firepower...............................................................................................7 3. Politics, recruitment, indoctrination.............................................................................................8 4. Withdrawal and survival ..............................................................................................................9 5. Urban warfare ............................................................................................................................11 6. War economy .............................................................................................................................12
  • The Hope for Peace in Colombia Pedro Valenzuela

    The Hope for Peace in Colombia Pedro Valenzuela

    armed conflict and peace processes 47 II. Out of the darkness? The hope for peace in Colombia pedro valenzuela On 24 November 2016, after more than five decades of armed conflict, several failed peace processes and four years of negotiations, the Colombian Gov- ernment and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia–People’s Army (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo, FARC– EP) signed the Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace (the Accord).1 The Accord ended a conflict that has cost the lives of around 220 000 people, led to the disappearance of 60 000 more, forcibly recruited 6000 minors and left 27 000 victims of kidnapping as well as more than 6 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees.2 This section discusses the circumstances that made the Accord possible, the development of the process and the challenges that lie ahead. Factors leading to negotiations The origins of FARC can be traced to the peasant self-defence units created by the Communist Party during the inter-party conflicts of the 1940s and 1950s, known to Colombians simply as ‘The Violence’. After its formal cre- ation in 1966 and throughout the 1970s, when the armed conflict was fairly marginal, FARC was closely allied with the Communist Party of Colombia. In the 1980s, however, it distanced itself from the Communist Party and promoted clandestine political structures, while attempting to expand into every province of the country, gain power at the local level, bring the war closer to the
  • Talking About Peace

    Talking About Peace

    Talking about Peace The Role of Language in the Resolution of the Conflict in Colombia Maja Lie Opdahl Master Thesis Department of Political Science UNIVERSITY OF OSLO Spring 2018 Word count: 55.040 II "Discourses are the product of power by which hegemonic interpretations are seemingly naturalized and internalized, but also resisted and contested, within the social realm" (Dunn and Neumann, 2016, p.13). III ã Opdahl 2018 Talking about Peace: The Role of Language in the Resolution of the Conflict in Colombia Maja Lie Opdahl http://www.duo.uio.no Print: Grafisk Senter IV V Abstract How was it possible that Colombian politicians found a solution to the conflict in 2016, but which nevertheless was rejected by the people? In this thesis, I analyse the process which ended in a historical peace agreement between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – The People’s Army (FARC-EP) in 2016. The ambition is to understand how the national government has moved discursively from fighting a war on ‘terrorism’ to promoting a political solution to an ‘internal armed conflict’. Theoretically, the thesis draws on poststructuralist discourse analysis to uncover how different constructions of identity (Self/Other) has translated into different national frameworks for peace. The basic premise is that actors interpret the world through language, and that language simultaneously creates, transforms and reproduces versions of the world. Discourses can be seen as structures of meaning that inform how we understand materiality and in simple terms, allow us to make sense of the world. In the extension, discourses produce a bandwidth of possible action and thought that we deem natural or unnatural, legitimate or illegitimate upon the confrontation of a problem.
  • “YOU'll LEARN NOT to CRY” Child Combatants in Colombia

    “YOU'll LEARN NOT to CRY” Child Combatants in Colombia

    “YOU’LL LEARN NOT TO CRY” Child Combatants in Colombia HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH New York • Washington • London • Brussels Copyright © September 2003 by Human Rights Watch All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America ISBN 1564322882 Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 2003109212 Addresses for Human Rights Watch 350 Fifth Avenue, 34th Floor, New York, NY 10118-3299 Tel: (212) 290-4700, Fax: (212) 736-1300, E-mail: [email protected] 1630 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 500, Washington, DC 20009 Tel: (202) 612-4321, Fax: (202) 612-4333, E-mail: [email protected] 33 Islington High Street, N1 9LH London, UK Tel: (171) 713-1995, Fax: (171) 713-1800, E-mail: [email protected] 15 Rue Van Campenhout, 1000 Brussels, Belgium Tel: (2) 732-2009, Fax: (2) 732-0471, E-mail:[email protected] Web Site Address: http://www.hrw.org Listserv address: To subscribe to the list, send an e-mail message to [email protected] with “subscribe hrw-news” in the body of the message (leave the subject line blank). Human Rights Watch is dedicated to protecting the human rights of people around the world. We stand with victims and activists to prevent discrimination, to uphold political freedom, to protect people from inhumane conduct in wartime, and to bring offenders to justice. We investigate and expose human rights violations and hold abusers accountable. We challenge governments and those who hold power to end abusive practices and respect international human rights law. We enlist the public and the international community to support the cause of human rights for all.
  • Why Rebels Stop Fighting Why Rebels Stop Enzo Nussio and Fighting Juan E

    Why Rebels Stop Fighting Why Rebels Stop Enzo Nussio and Fighting Juan E

    Why Rebels Stop Fighting Why Rebels Stop Enzo Nussio and Fighting Juan E. Ugarriza Organizational Decline and Desertion in Colombia’s Insurgency The unauthorized exit from an armed organization, what we call “desertion,”1 is a highly con- sequential act. If caught, deserters may face drastic punishment, including exe- cution. Why, then, do some members of armed groups nevertheless decide to Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/45/4/167/1911587/isec_a_00406.pdf by guest on 25 September 2021 stop ªghting? This question has relevance because, among other things, desertion also can have severe consequences for military organizations. During the invasion of Afghanistan, for example, the Soviet Union’s allied Afghan regime forces and Soviet troops recruited from Central Asia suffered massive rates of desertion. Deserters were replaced with soldiers ill-equipped to ªght the mujahideen in mountainous areas, contributing to the Soviet Union’s defeat.2 In Vietnam, the largest wave of U.S. military desertions, from 1969 to 1971, led to the “collapse of the armed forces.”3 Additionally, desertion can destabilize the military bal- ance in times of conºict, as the prolonged civil war in Syria demonstrates. Un- like the Syrian armed forces, which found suitable replacements for troops Enzo Nussio is Senior Researcher in the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zürich. Juan E. Ugarriza is Professor in the Faculty of Jurisprudence at the Universidad del Rosario, Bogotá. The authors thank the Colombian Ministry of Defense for granting access to data on desertion. They also thank the National Center for Historical Memory, the Universidad de los Andes, Pascual Restrepo, and the Fundación Ideas para la Paz for access to additional data.
  • Download Download

    Download Download

    CHAPTER 9 Colombia LEARNING OBJECTIVES • Identify how the three economic development in levels of analysis interact Colombia in Colombia • Explain how and why political • Use theoretical propositions and economic development to understand political and in Colombia differs from other Latin American countries TIMELINE 1819 Independence declared 1899–1902 War of the Thousand Days 1948 Jorge Eliécer Gaitán assassinated; La Violencia begins 1957 Sitges Agreement ends La Violencia 1964 Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) is formed 19 74 Official power-sharing agreement ended 1991 New constitution ratified 1998 FARC given demilitarized zone 2000 Plan Colombia goes into effect 2002 Alvaro Uribe elected 2003 Paramilitary demobilization began 2006 Alvaro Uribe reelected 2010 Juan Manuel Santos elected 197 M09_WEEK8252_01_SE_C09.indd 197 5/12/14 4:05 PM 198 PART III ▸ Andean Region As Defense Minister in 2008, Juan Manuel Santos organized the bombing of Colombian guerrilla camps in neighboring Ecuador, which killed a key rebel leader and yielded laptops with intelligence but also froze relations with the Ecuadorian government. The same year, he also worked on Operation Jaque, which freed fifteen prisoners inside Colombia held by guerrillas, including the former presidential candidate and longtime hostage Ingrid Betancourt. Later as president he vowed to work at the local level to restore land that had been taken violently from peasants or abandoned as the war against guerrillas and drug traffickers raged in the country. For years, the local population was ter- rorized. In recent decades, political violence has been a constant challenge in Colombia, and Santos’ own responses show how international, national, and local factors must all be viewed to understand Colombian politics.
  • La Segunda Marquetalia: Disidentes, Rearmados Y Un Futuro Incierto

    La Segunda Marquetalia: Disidentes, Rearmados Y Un Futuro Incierto

    La Segunda Marquetalia: Disidentes, rearmados y un futuro incierto Informes 34 La Segunda Marquetalia: Disidentes, rearmados y un futuro incierto Informe 34 Bogotá, Julio 2021 Directora Ejecutiva de la FIP La Segunda María Victoria Llorente Marquetalia: Disidentes, rearmados y Director Área de Dinámicas del Conflicto un futuro incierto Juan Carlos Garzón Autores Juan Carlos Garzón Andrés Cajiao Paula Andrea Tobo Juan David Corredor García Edición y corrección de estilo Martín Franco Vélez Fotografías Tomadas del video de creación de la Segunda Marquetalia, publicado en agosto de 2019 Diseño y diagramación Ladoamable ltda www.ladoamable.com ISBN 978-958-5517-74-5 Fundación Ideas para la Paz (FIP) Calle 100 No. 8A - 37 Torre A. Of. 701. Bogotá Tel. (57-1) 218 3449 www.ideaspaz.org / e-mail: [email protected] Serie Informes No. 34 / Julio 2021 Contenido 4 INTRODUCCIÓN DISIDENCIAS, REARMADOS Y LOS PROCESOS DE 9 FRAGMENTACIÓN E INTEGRACIÓN 14 EL ADN DE LA “SEGUNDA MARQUETALIA” 23 ÓRGANOS DE DIRECCIÓN: RESUCITANDO A LAS FARC DE ARRIBA HACIA ABAJO 28 LA TRAYECTORIA: DEL VIDEO Y EL DISCURSO A UN PROCESO DE EXPANSIÓN LENTO Y CON DIFICULTADES LA RESPUESTA DEL GOBIERNO COLOMBIANO 36 A LA “SEGUNDA MARQUETALIA” 40 EL ESCENARIO FUTURO 45 BIBLIOGRAFÍA INTRODUCCIÓN La Segunda Marquetalia: Disidentes, rearmados y un futuro incierto / Julio 2021 5 Introducción El 29 de agosto de 2019, mediante un video to- lan que las disidencias tienen distintas motivaciones mado en algún punto de la frontera entre Colombia y y que no se restringen a los incentivos económicos, Venezuela, rodeado de un grupo de excomandantes sino que incluyen variables políticas, organizaciona- de la guerrilla de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucio- les y territoriales.
  • In Spite of a Concerted Effort by the Colombian Government, with Close

    In Spite of a Concerted Effort by the Colombian Government, with Close

    FARC - InSight Crime | Organized Crime in the Americas Page 1 of 7 As the biggest irregular army in Colombia, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia - FARC) operates in various regions of the country in search of resources to fund their 50-year-old war against the government. The FARC is the oldest and most important guerrilla group in the Western Hemisphere. It has long financed its political and military battle against the Colombian government by kidnapping, extortion and participating in the drug trade on various levels. In spite of a concerted effort by the Colombian government, with close to $8 billion in US assistance, the rebel group still operates in 25 of Colombia's 32 provinces and is estimated to have approximately 8,000 guerrillas in its ranks. Over the decades, the FARC has frequently adapted its tactics in order to survive, from its 1982 decision to begin taxing coca growers and cocaine laboratories, to its failed attempt at establishing a political party, the Patriotic Union (Union Patriotica - UP), in 1984. Following the military defeats suffered during Alvaro Uribe’s presidency (2002-2010), and the 2008 death of its longtime spiritual and military commander, Pedro Antonio Marin, alias "Manuel Marulanda," the rebel group has focused less on controlling territory and more on guerrilla warfare tactics combined with building up its urban networks and increasing its political outreach. In 2012, the group began peace talks with the government of Juan Manuel Santos. • Origins • Modus Operandi • Resources http://www.insightcrime.org/groups-colombia/farc-ep?print=1&tmpl=component 9/19/2014 FARC - InSight Crime | Organized Crime in the Americas Page 2 of 7 Origins The FARC’s roots can be traced back to the outbreaks of violence that afflicted rural Colombia following the assassination of the populist leader of the Liberal Party, Jorge Eliecer Gaitan, in Bogota on April 9, 1948.