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Universidad Del Azuay Faculty Of UNIVERSIDAD DEL AZUAY FACULTY OF LAW SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES COVE “Final Peace Agreement in Colombia: New migration scenarios in Ecuador ” Graduation work prior to obtaining a Bachelor's Degree in International Studies with a bilingual mention in Foreign Trade Authors: González Merchán Doménica Paoletich Guerrero María Natalia Director: Mgtr. Ana María Bustos Cordero Cuenca - Ecuador 2018 TABLE OF CONTENTS COVER ......................................................................................................................... 1 ILUSTRATIONS INDEX ................................................................................................ 5 TABLES INDEX ............................................................................................................ 5 SUMMARY ................................................................................................................... 5 CHAPTER I................................................................................................................... 8 THE ARMED CONFLICT .............................................................................................. 8 1.1. The Conflict ....................................................................................................... 8 1.2. Background of the conflict ................................................................................ 10 1.2.1. Political scope ............................................................................................ 10 1.2.2. Economic scope......................................................................................... 14 1.2.3. Social scope .............................................................................................. 16 1.2.4. Military scope ............................................................................................. 19 1.2.5. International scope ..................................................................................... 20 1.3.4. Beginning of paramilitarism ........................................................................ 26 1.3.5. The 1980s and 1990s ................................................................................ 27 1.3.6. The Colombia Plan .................................................................................... 29 1.3.7. Uribe’s Government ................................................................................... 31 1.4. Consequences of the conflict for Colombia ....................................................... 32 1.4.2. Moral consequences ..................................................................................... 33 1.4.3. Political consequences .................................................................................. 33 1.4.4. Sociocultural consequences .......................................................................... 34 1.4.5. Economic consequences ............................................................................... 34 1.5. Conclusions to the first chapter......................................................................... 35 CHAPTER II................................................................................................................ 36 The Construction of the Peace Agreement in Colombia .............................................. 36 2 2.1. Peace processes in internal conflicts ............................................................... 36 2.2. Peace processes in Colombia .......................................................................... 39 2.4 Description of the Agreement ............................................................................ 60 2.5 Reactions of the different actors of the conflict .................................................. 64 2.6 Conclusions to the second chapter. ................................................................... 65 CHAPTER III............................................................................................................... 67 3.1. The legislation on refugees ............................................................................... 67 3.2. The status of refugee in Ecuador ...................................................................... 69 3.3. Colombian migratory waves ............................................................................. 71 3.4 Migrant impact in Ecuador ................................................................................. 75 3.5 Conclusions to the third chapter ........................................................................ 82 CONCLUSIONS ......................................................................................................... 84 RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................................... 86 BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................... 87 LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1. Geography of the armed conflict ........................................................................ 10 Figure 2. Causes of the internal war in Colombia ............................................................... 11 Figure 3. Homicide rate .................................................................................................. 17 Figure 4. Kidnapping rate ............................................................................................... 17 Figure 5. Magnitude of the refugees ............................................................................ 19 Figure 6. Fenix operation ................................................................................................ 21 Figure 7. Peace process dispositives ................................................................................ 38 Figure 8. Municipalities that make up the Caguán Clearance Zone ................................... 48 Figure 9. Meeting between Santos and Timochenko .......................................................... 56 Figure 10. Colombian refugees per year in Ecuador ........................................................... 73 3 Figure 11. Confirmed dissidences of the FARC by region of influence and attributed actions………………………………………………………………………………………….62 Figure 12. Location of Colombian refugees in Ecuador…………………………………..73 Figure 13. Immigrants by country………………………………………………………….76 LIST OF TABLES Table 1. Political alternation of the Popular Front ……..…………………..……………..24 Table 2. Chronology of the peace process………………….…………………..….….…..51 Table 3. Comparative chronological and flow of refugees…………………………....… 75 Table 4. Percentage of Colombian refugees by province..……………………………...79 4 SUMMARY This research aims to identify the new migration scenarios in Ecuador because of the implementation of the Final peace agreement. As a result of the internal conflict in Colombia, a large part of the population was forced to move to other nearby countries as in the case of Ecuador. This migration has caused changes in the social relations of the populations that have hosted them. It is important, then, to know the data and the consequences of the massive emigration of Colombians in our country. In order to determine the migratory consequences that exist in Ecuador with the implementation of the Final peace agreement in Colombia, was carried out a bibliographic exploration on the conflict, along with some interviews with activists and representatives the UN, which facilitated the understanding of the problem. The new migration scenarios as a result of the Final peace agreement were identified, with a contingent of more than a hundred thousand Colombian refugees, with a higher proportion of women, and a significant growth of migration which coincides with the Presidency of Uribe and a downhill of it with the start of talks in 2012 and finally, with the 2016 peace agreement. KEYWORDS: Internal armed conflict of Colombia, guerrilla, Final Peace Agreement, refugees, immigration in Ecuador 5 INTRODUCTION The Colombian internal conflict, because of its duration for more than sixty years, has produced serious consequences for the population, and has provoked numerous border problems with neighboring countries, including Ecuador. Not only it has caused deaths among the belligerents but it has caused victims among the civilian population and has produced damage to properties and infrastructure of the country. From the Decade of the fifties to the present day, Colombians have been harmed by the consequences of the armed conflict, and have had to move in order to escape from the serious consequences of the war such as the constant violations of human rights. The guerrilla conflict started approximately in 1964 between the Colombian Government and the peasant guerrillas, the revolutionary armed forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN). The conflict is historically based in the conflict known as "The violence", which was triggered by the assassination of the political leader Jorge Eliécer Gaitán and the interference of the United States. This exerted a strong repression against communism in areas rural Colombia in the 1960's, which led to several militant Liberals and Communists to reorganize FARC. The conflict has gone through several phases with more or less intensity and has seen how involved groups used various tactics of confrontation throughout history. The reasons for fighting vary from one group to another. Various movements such as FARC guerrillas claim to be fighting for the rights of the poor in Colombia to protect them from
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